8 Editorial by Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Texts by Amrita De Sophie Gueudet Frank Jacob Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori - Edizioni Museo Pasqualino
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GLOBAL HUMANITIES
8
Year 6, Vol. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939
Editors Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane
Identity and Nationhood
Editorial by Texts by
Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Amrita De
Sophie Gueudet
Frank Jacob
Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori
edizioni
Museo
Pasqualino
edizioni
Museo
Pasqualino
direttore Rosario Perricone
GLOBAL HUMANITIES
8
Biannual Journal
ISSN 2199-3939
Editors
Frank Jacob
Nord Universitet, Norway
Francesco Mangiapane
University of Palermo, Italy
Scientific Board
Jessica Achberger Dario Mangano
University of Lusaka, Zambia University of Palermo, Italy
Giuditta Bassano Gianfranco Marrone
IULM University, Milano, Italy University of Palermo, Italy
Saheed Aderinto Tiziana Migliore
Western Carolina University, USA University of Urbino, Italy
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr. Sabine Müller
Angelo State University, USA Marburg University, Germany
Stephan Köhn Rosario Perricone
Cologne University, Germany University of Palermo, ItalyGLOBAL HUMANITIES
8
Year 6, Vol. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939
Editors Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane
Identity and Nationhood
Editorial by Texts by
Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Amrita De
Sophie Gueudet
Frank Jacob
Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori
edizioni
Museo
Pasqualino© 2021 Associazione per la conservazione delle tradizioni popolari
Museo internazionale delle marionette Antonio Pasqualino
Piazza Antonio Pasqualino, 5 – 90133 Palermo PA, Italy
www.edizionimuseopasqualino.it – info@edizionimuseopasqualino.it
Regione siciliana
Assessorato dei beni culturali
e dell’identità siciliana
Dipartimento dei beni culturali
e dell’identità siciliana
ISBN 979-12-80664-01-3
DOI https://doi.org/10.53123/GH_8
Design and Typesetting
Francesco Mangiapane
Printing House
Fotograph S.r.l., Palermo, Italy
Cover
© Khashayar Kouchpeydeh, Mankind will never stop having wars with itself unless none is left but
one, @ Unsplash
The articles in this volume were peer reviewed.
The publisher is available for any claimants who could not be contacted.
This volume is covered by copyright and no part of it can be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
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The paper used for printing is made with a fibrous mixture made of 100% recycled fibers and is guaranteed by
Blauer Engel certification. Its fibers are bleached with Chlorine Free processes. It is therefore 100% ecological.Table of Contents Editorial����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7 Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane Gallipoli. The Rise of Mustafa Kemal, and the Martial Creation of the Turkish Nation�9 Frank Jacob Violence in Republika Srpska’s National Narrative�������������������������������������������������������25 Sophie Gueudet Israel’s Failure to Produce a National War Memorial Site. Fragmented National Memory in an Inclusive Semiotic Sphere ��������������������������������41 Udi Lebel and Zeev Drori Masculinities in Digital India. Trolls and Mediated Affect������������������������������������������ 61 Amrita De Contributors���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������77
Editorial
Frank Jacob and Francesco Mangiapane
T
he nation state refer to this idea to legitimize their own
is back, or, existence. Considering that the history
more accurate- of nationalism is not over and will not be
ly, it was never over in the near future, the articles in this
gone. It is strik- volume will hopefully help to further the
ing that the end ways nationalism impacts our daily lives
of the Cold War and also stimulate new research on rel-
did not lead to the world flourishing while evant aspects related to the formation of
liberalist ideas, which Francis Fukuyama nation states and their creation of nation-
had so prominently declared victorious at al narratives to remember in the future.
last, determined politics around the globe.
The end of the “Soviet Empire” led to new Bodø, Norway and Palermo, Italy
nationalist struggles that seem to have de- June 2021
termined the first two decades of the 21st
century. With challenging and challenged
ideas for national independence in all parts
of the world, nationalism is again having a
strong impact on political decisions and
is stimulating the rise of nationalist pop-
ulism and right-wing parties alike.
Nevertheless, every nation state is
based on the idea of a nation that is, as
Ernest Renan formulated it, created by a
shared past and the consensus of the pres-
ent. It is the root of each nation state, but
it can also divide the latter and force them
into secession. Therefore, the nation and
its formulation are important topics to
study from different angles and within
different academic disciplines. The rise of
nationalism is without any doubt a glob-
al phenomenon, and the present issue of
Global Humanities therefore takes a clos-
er look at the formation of nationhood
and the symbols and figures involved and
offers a broader view on the history and
actuality of the nation and the states that
GLOBAL HUMANITIES
HTTPS://DOI.ORG/10.53123/GH_8_1 YEAR 6, VOL. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 7https://doi.org/10.53123/GH_8_2
Gallipoli
The Rise of Mustafa Kemal, and the Martial
Creation of the Turkish Nation
Frank Jacob
Nord Universitet, Norway
frank.jacob@nord.no
Abstract. The Gallipoli Campaign was often considered a sideshow of the Great War, but
it played an important role in creating the myth of Mustafa Kemal, who should become the
leader of Turkish nationalism after the First World War ended. The Turkish nation was cre-
ated by war and Kemal, later Atatürk (Father of the Turks) was the decisive figure within the
process. His fame might have originated by defending the Ottoman Empire against foreign
invasion, but his political power was based on the victories during the war of independence.
The present article traces the rise of Mustafa Kemal, the genesis of Turkish nationalism in
the first third of the 20th century and the role the Gallipoli campaign played for it.
Keywords: Gallipoli, Mustafa Kemal, Turkish nationalism, First World War.
Although the main focus of research events related to the Gallipoli campaign
related to the centennial of the First World (Macleod 2015) has played an important
War is still directed on the campaigns in role in Britain, as well as in Australia,
Europe, in particular the Western Front, where discussions about the reasons for
“the Gallipoli operations are the most fa- its failure and the ANZAC (Australian
mous and well-remembered today” (Ul- and New Zealand Army Corps) myth, re-
richsen 2014: 75).1 The memory of the spectively, were at the center of commem-
1 For extensive discussions of the campaign, see Haythornthwaite (1991), Carlyon (2003), Hart (2014), Erickson
(2015a, 2015b), Liddle (2015), Moorehead (2015 [1958]) and Jacob (2020a).
Photo © Australian War memorial P01141.001. The Commander Mustafa Kemal
Bey (Ataturk) (Fourth From Left) With Officers And Staff Of The Anafarta GLOBAL HUMANITIES
Group, Of Which He Was Given Command 1915-08, Gallipoli, Suvla Bay Area. YEAR 6, VOL. 8, 2021 – ISSN 2199–3939 9orative events (Hopkins-Weise 2007; Pri- leadership had originally intended to
or 2015). However, the victory at Gallipoli save the empire from partition and co-
was as important for the Turkish memory lonial rule, but the war would trigger its
as the defeat and shared suffering were further decline and fall (Aksakal 2008:
for the Australian identity (Jacob 2019). 2). The Young Turks and their attempts
Ulrichsen emphasizes the role Gallipo- to reform the empire had already stim-
li-related memories have played for the ulated a Turkish nationalism before the
Australian and Turkish nations since First World War (Feroz 1969; Findley
the end of the First World War, as this 2010: 201-205), but the Balkan Wars had
military campaign “has come to symbol- weakened the empire, and their defeat in
ise the rise of a national consciousness 1918 initially limited the chances for the
in both countries, and the memory and Turkish national struggle, although the
bravery of those who took part contin- nation would be forged in wars continu-
ue to reverberate a century on” (2014: ing until 1922 (Findley 2010: 219-226).
75). However, Gallipoli as a symbol lost The rise of the Turkish nation from the
its power with the end of the Ottoman ashes, to use a metaphorical expression,
Empire. Although the Ottoman victory was related to another rise, namely that
at the Dardanelles established the myth of Mustafa Kemal, a military officer who
of Mustafa Kemal, the later Atatürk, who would begin to determine and decide the
led the troops of the Ottoman Empire future of an independent Turkey in the
into the attack against foreign invaders, aftermath of the First World War. His
the post-war political leader of independ- success was based on the victory at Gal-
ent Turkey would reshape the semiotics lipoli as well, because Kemal, who would
related to his own role during the First become known as Atatürk, “Father of
World War and the following war of in- the Turks,” was not only remembered
dependence. Instead of referring to his as the defender of the Turkish nation in
early military success as an awakening the post-war period, but also as someone
point of Turkish nationalism, he would who in 1915 had already defeated the im-
change the semiotics to focus stronger on perialist attempt of the Entente to con-
his own role as the leading man of a new quer the soil that would later belong to
era. The following article will address the Turkish nation. Kemal’s rise to power
how Atatürk reshaped Ottoman nation- was consequently related to his military
alism into Turkish nationalism, by shift- successes that laid the foundation for his
ing the focus from Gallipoli towards the political reshaping of Turkey from 1922.
more important legacy of the war of inde- The present article therefore intends
pendence and his own role during these to follow the history of the building of the
years. The article will also show how this Turkish nation state, to emphasize how
Atatürkian shift is currently contested by the role of Atatürk was reshaped and re-
Neo-Ottomanism and a return to pre-Re- defined. The commemoration of Kemal’s
publican narratives and semiotics. military victories at Gallipoli and be-
After the Battle for the Gallipoli Pen- tween 1918 and 1922, when he defended
insula, Kemal himself had become a the new nation against foreign invaders
symbol of the resistance of the Ottoman stimulated an anti-imperialist national-
Empire against Western invasion, some- ism, which was quite common in coloni-
thing the Ottoman military leadership al and semi-colonial regions of the world
had intended by its participation in the in the interwar period.2 However, Kemal
First World War on the side of Germa- went further than just building an inde-
ny. With their decision to join the war on pendent nation, he inscribed himself as
the German side in 1914, the Ottoman a semiotic figure within the national nar-
2 For example, for a discussion of Chinese nationalism in relation to the First World War and Japanese imperial-
ism, see Jacob (2020b).
10Frank Jacob Gallipoli
rative. To achieve this, Kemal would not of modern Turkey, the national assem-
only use a nationalist language, which, bly chose to award him with the name
according to Umiker-Sebeok (1977: 122) “Atatürk” and would thereby forever in-
is not the only way to establish a semiotic scribe his history into that of the Turkish
system, but used his own image to em- nation (Zürcher 2012: 130). This rise to
phasize his role for all Turkish people to power was made possible by Kemal’s mil-
be seen. Kemalism became part of a se- itary successes, and until the end of the
miotic system in Turkey in which he pro- First World War, his career was a pure-
vided what Umberto Eco referred to as a ly military one. While Kemal had been
form communicative process: “When the trained according to Western standards
destination [of a communicative process] during his time at military schools and
is a human being … we are … witnessing the academy for future members of the
a process of signification—provided that general staff in Constantinople (today’s
the signal is not merely a stimulus but Istanbul), he shared the idea of Turkish
arouses an iinterpretive response in the independence early on and therefore
addressee. This process is made possi- joined the Young Turks in 1908 and par-
ble by the existence of a code. (Eco 1979: ticipated in their “revolution” during the
8) Remembering the birth of the Turk- same year (Hanioğlu 2001; Der Matos-
ish nation meant remembering Kemal, sian 2014; Lévy-Aksu & Georgeon 2017).
whose statue would be seen in all parts Sultan Abdülhamid II had intend-
of Turkey to define a new set of semiotics ed to modernize his empire by estab-
for the national narrative that went be- lishing institutions that would provide
yond language and image alone (Barthes Western-oriented education, but this
1977: 9), i.e. to provide a possibility for also stimulated “the emergence of an en-
the popular understanding of what the lightened intelligentsia within the ranks
Turkish nation was supposed to be based of the civil and military bureaucracy that
on: Kemal Atatürk. The new semiotic adopted the principles of the French
instrumentalization of his own past and Revolution” (Dincsahin 2015: 9). With
its broad visualization was consequently an enlightened military elite, the sultan
supposed to establish meaning (Genosko had also created his own enemies, who
2016: 1. Also see Kristeva 1971: 1) would demand political reforms to turn
the Ottoman Empire into a constitutional
1. Kemals’s Rise after Gallipoli monarchy to prevent its further decline.
Before further elaborating on Kemal’s This was also a secular movement, as the
nationalist interpretation of Ottoman Young Turks “despised Abdülhamid II’s
and Turkish history, a short description personal piety” and “blamed his attach-
of his career and achievements seems to ment to Islam for his autocratic conserv-
be in order here. Born in Thessaloniki in atism” (Reynolds 2011: 83), although they
1880/81 as Mustafa Kemal, he undertook shared the same enemy as the Muslim
a military career that would eventually forces of the empire, namely Western
also change the way people referred to imperialism. The Young Turks were con-
him. He achieved the rank of brigadier sequently not a homogenous movement
in the Ottoman Army by 1916, and he but divided into different factions, with
was thereafter referred to as Mustafa Ke- the Committee of Union and Progress
mal Pasha. After 1921, when his victory (CUP), the one Kemal had been a part of
against the Greek Army at the Sakarya as well, being one of the more progres-
River turned him into a national hero sive forces (Dincsahin 2015: 9).
and defender of Turkey, he was called The “revolution” of 1908 had shown
Gazi, which could be translated either that the diversity of the Young Turks
as “conquering hero” or “champion of movement would cause problems, espe-
Islam.” In 1934, once he had established cially since “non-Muslim communities
and secured the independent nation state sought opportunities to establish self-rule
11in their own nation-states rather than re- It was the victory at Gallipoli and Ke-
maining subjects of the Sultan” (ibid.). mal’s role in defending the landing zones
Kemal nevertheless continued his mili- against the Allied troops – he had taken
tary life for the next few years and in 1911 the initiative and attacked the latter ones
organized guerilla warfare against Italy without waiting for a German approv-
in Tripolitania before serving during the al – that proved that the Ottoman Army
Balkan Wars. He continued to be active was not inferior, as many war planners in
and influential in the CUP, although he London had anticipated. In addition, the
was not one of its political leaders. Dur- Ottoman military victory laid the ground
ing the July Crisis, Kemal, at that time a for Kemal’s reputation as a successful de-
lieutenant colonel, served as the Ottoman fender of national interests (McMeekin
military attaché in Sofia for the Balkan 2012: 38). When the “British withdrew
states, namely Bulgaria, Montenegro, their entire expeditionary force in January
and Serbia (Tetik 2007). While he was 1916, Gallipoli had become synonymous
negotiating with Bulgarian authorities to with Allied humiliation and Turkish tri-
join the war on the side of Germany and umph” (ibid.), and Kemal’s rise to power
the Ottoman Empire, Kemal realized that began, although the German commander
he would prefer an assignment of com- of the defending troops, Otto Liman von
bat duty instead, and in November 1914, Sanders, would later complain that the
when war had officially been declared, he Turkish officer’s role during the Gallipo-
li campaign had been overemphasized.3
approached Enver Pasha with the request
Regardless of such a critical view by a
to be transferred. His anti-German posi-
former German commanding officer af-
tion, as he had criticized the German mil-
ter the First World War, the Turkish na-
itary mission in the Ottoman Empire be-
tion-building process centered around
fore, as well as his activities with regard to
“two key victories: Gallipoli and the Turk-
the CUP prevented such an assignment
ish War of Independence of 1919-22,
at that time. However, in January 1915,
which culminated in the republic’s rec-
as the war had continued and demanded
ognition in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne”
capable officers, “Mustafa Kemal finally (Macleod 2015: 155). Both of them were
left Sofia to take command of an Otto- relevant for Mustafa Kemal, who, howev-
man division that as yet existed only on er, would due to political necessities rath-
paper” (Hanioğlu 2011: 73). In February er emphasize the latter, which made out of
1915, Kemal was in Thrace to recruit and the Ottoman defender of the Dardanelles
train his division, but a British attack, the hero and “father” of Turkish inde-
passing through the Dardanelles with a pence. The defeat in the Balkan Wars had
fleet, alarmed the military leadership and already made the Young Turks demand
commanded him to head for Gallipoli. “a new spirit and enthusiasm” (Beşikçi
Hanioğlu has emphasized how the war 2014: 555) for the army, and men like Ke-
created a window of opportunity for Ke- mal had tried to strengthen their political
mal, whose rise was now made possible, influence as well. However, the Ottoman
and although “[s]eated at an embassy Army was suffering from several prob-
desk scarcely one month before, he now lems, including insufficient logistics and
found himself in the midst of one of the diseases (Ozdemir 2008: 28-31, 48). All
greatest battles of modern times. At last in all, the Ottoman Army was neverthe-
he would have the chance to command less able to mobilize around 3,000,000
an offensive operation within the context men during the First World War (Turkish
of a defensive campaign and win thereby Military Archives, Ankara, BDH, Folder
a place in history” (ibid.: 74). 62/File 309A/Index 005, cited in Beşikçi
3 Liman von Sanders to Carl Mühlmann, Munich, January 30, 1927, German Federal Archives, Military Archives
(BArch MArch), RH61/1088.
12Frank Jacob Gallipoli
2014: 558), and the experience of the war riography inaugurated by the republican
was shared by many men who would lat- regime in the 1930s” tended to not over-
er support Kemal’s claim for independent emphasize the impact of Gallipoli as an
power under his leadership. important moment that triggered Turk-
Regardless of their large number, ish nationalism, but rather “present[ed]
Beşikçi described several problems the the emergence of Turkish nationalism as
Ottoman Army was weakened by: a process of ‘awakening,’ belated yet inev-
itable,” (Özkirimli 2011: 90), it was also
First of all, there was the problem of lack of inevitable that Kemal’s role as the central
standardization among regions regarding re-
figure remained an important aspect of
cruitment. […] Secondly, although at the be-
ginning a short war was generally expected, Turkish nationalism in the decades to
the Ottoman state began to have difficulty in come, because it would serve as the base
sustaining a large-scale and permanent mo- for an exclusively Anatolian-Turkish na-
bilization as the war continued. And, third- tionalism that needed to be separated
ly, resistance to conscription in the forms of
draft-evasion and desertion became a major
from its Ottoman past. When it emerged
problem especially in the second half of the from the War of Independence in 1922,
war. (2014: 558) as Ugur Ümit Üngör correctly highlight-
ed, “[m]entally, the young nation state
The victory at Gallipoli was conse- was still blank and needed a memory.
quently an outstanding experience, as The continuous process of defining and
it showed that the Ottoman Army was fine-tuning a national identity entailed a
capable of winning battles if led by com- parallel process for a national memory”
manders like Kemal, who consequently (2011: 218). It was Kemal who provided
became a kind of figurehead of Turkish an integrative nationalist figure, the “Fa-
nationalism during the First World War, ther of the Turks,” whose transition into
since other military leaders, like Ismail Atatürk reached back to the last rearing
Enver Pasha, had failed to secure victo- up of the Ottoman Empire when fighting
ries, e.g. in the Caucasus region. For the the Allied invasion forces at the Darda-
“foundation myth [of the Turkish nation], nelles and on the Gallipoli Peninsula, but
the War of Independence is by far the at the same time provided a new direc-
more important, but the memory of Gal- tion for the establishment of a semiotic
lipoli is nonetheless interesting and the system, in which this victory should play
link between the two is Mustafa Kemal” a rather marginalized role.
(Macleod 2015: 155). Kemal was therefore During the battles for independence,
the central figure, and and after playing a Kemal “galvanized the simple Turkish
role in the pivotal moments of Gallipoli soldier with a new courage. They were
and the War of Independence “he then ready to follow him to hell” (Armstrong
went on to lead the Turkish national 1972: 80). This would be part of the
movement which fought to overthrow foundational myth of modern Turkey, as
the stipulations of the Treaty of Sèvres, without Gallipoli there would have been
end the Ottoman sultanate, and estab- no opportunity for Kemal to rise. Regard-
lish sovereign, secular, and democratic less of this interrelation between the mil-
government in Turkey” (ibid.). For the itary officer and the establishment of the
establishment of the independent Turk- modern Turkish nation state, “the creator
ish nation, the defense of a multi-na- of modern Turkey, has been one of the
tional empire, however, seemed to have most controversial personalities of the
been rather unsuitable and Kemal would Muslim world in the twentieth century.
later rather rely on an Anatolian-based Some admire him while others despise
Turkish nationalism to forge the new se- him. In some quarters he is considered
miotic system that would center around a role model for Muslim leaders and in
his own person as the decisive national others, the enemy of Islam” (Sohail 2005:
leader. Therefore the “nationalist histo- 133). Kemal’s military success was initial-
13ly not rewarded when the sultan acknowl- ence. A tradition of nationalist defense
edged the achievements of the 27th and was eventually invented (Hobsbawm &
57th regiments and decorated soldiers Ranger 1983) to match the necessities of
and officers in April 1916. Nor was he Kemal’s later rule as Atatürk.
mentioned in official publications about In some ways, Kemal’s life story was
the successful Ottoman defense of the nevertheless very typical of a military of-
Dardanelles (Macleod 2015: 157), which ficer who was part of the Young Turks
also seems to highlight that the depiction movement (Zürcher 2012: 130), but his
of his decisive role was rather related to experience of the First World War in gen-
later post-war narratives, which in a way eral, and the Gallipoli campaign in par-
overemphasized it to fit the new semiotic ticular, as well as the War of Independ-
system of a Kemal that towered all Turk- ence, also provided him with a chance to
ish citizens like a national father figure. create an “imagined community” (An-
The sign of Gallipoli, as Peirce defined it, derson 1983) for all Turkish soldiers that
was consequently interpreted from a ret- naturally centered around Kemal, whose
rospective point of view (Peirce 1998, vol. experiences were shared by the soldiers,
2: 478) The government was interested in and whose national program would nat-
documenting an important victory, not a urally exploit references to this shared
single officer. One sent “writers and jour- past. Kemal could, with regard to the mil-
nalists Ağaoğlu Ahmed, Ali Canip, Celal itary, and especially the new elites related
Sahir, Enis Behiç, Hakkı Süha, Hamdul- to it, refer to a shared semiotic system
lah Suphi, Hıfzı Tevfik, Muhittin, Orhan based on the experiences of the battles
Seyfi, Selahattin, Mehmed Emin, Yusuf and wars that had led towards independ-
Razi, Ömer Seyfettin, İbrahim Alaeddin, ence. The Turkish nation could be built
and Müfit Ratip; the musician Ahmed due to the struggle against foreign occu-
pation, which is why, as Andrew Mango
Yekta; and the painters İbrahim Çallı and
outlined, “[t]he emergence of a fully in-
Nazmi Ziya” (ibid.: 158) to the battlefield
dependent, stable Turkish national state
in July 1915, just six months after the Al-
within the community of civilised na-
lied troops had been evacuated from the
tions was a fortunate, if unintended, con-
peninsula. It is therefore worth noting, as
sequence of the policies of the victors of
MacLeod emphasizes, that “Kemal’s role
the [First World] War” (2010: 3).
at Gallipoli became significantly more ac-
claimed after he attained power. Prior to 2. The War of Independence and
that, it was the humble soldier who was Turkish Nationalism
primarily celebrated for his heroism at After the armistice in 1918, the Otto-
Gallipoli” (2015: 155). This is important, man Empire was occupied by the Allied
as the victory at Gallipoli was later more powers, whose political representatives
heavily emphasized to construct a line had already discussed plans on how to
of Turkish nationalism that began with divide it among themselves. The fear that
a victory against invading foreign forces, caused the Ottoman leaders to join the
a victory that had been made possible by alliance with Germany in the first place
the man who would also unite Turkey would now, four years later, become a
during its fight for national sovereignty reality. In this situation, Kemal began to
between 1918 and 1922, and it was thus rise up as a prominent figure and even-
an essential element of the War of Inde- tually the leading man of the nationalist
pendence as well. Although Kemal was liberation movement (Kuva-i Milliye), as
mentioned as a hero in some Ottoman he “managed to pull together a coalition
reports about Gallipoli, his role would be of diverse constituencies, which, despite
more and more central in later narratives, profound differences of opinion and alle-
although the focus tremendously shifted giance, were unified in their opposition to
away from Gallipoli towards the battles the foreign takeover of Anatolia” (Kezer
related to the Turkish War of Independ- 2015: 4). Considering the new situation
14Frank Jacob Gallipoli
and the end of the Ottoman Empire, soon-to-be new capital, Ankara, and the
Kemal attempted to establish a modern government by the sultan Mehmet VI
nation state of Turkey, based on a more was declared illegitimate, while Kemal
homogenous Turkish nation—exclus- and his supporters claimed to represent
ing any minorities from power—instead the Turkish nation. Constantinople was
of returning to the status quo ante. As a therefore sacked again by British occu-
Young Turk, he had demanded reforms, pation forces, who would rule the city by
but now he would long for a clear discon- martial law (McMeekin 2012: 41). Due
tinuum, i.e. a new start (ibid.: 5). to these events, “outraged parliamen-
Although the state, due to the necessi- tary deputies fled to Ankara to convene
ties of military mobilization, had begun the Turkish Grand National Assembly
to centralize its power in the war years (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) on 23
(Besikçi 2012: 1), there had been side April 1920, promptly electing Kemal its
effects, namely “new alliances between president” (ibid.). The Grand National
the state and the Anatolian Muslim pop- Assembly acted as the new government
ulation” (ibid.: 2) as well as more state of Turkey so that, politically, the sepa-
control on the local level. The wartime ration from the Ottoman past had been
mobilization, as Besikçi emphasizes, completed, but the peace treaty of Sèvres
consequently “achieved certain objec- in May 1920 had severe territorial con-
tives and played a major role in reshap- sequences for the new nation, as Greece
ing Anatolia’s social infrastructure in the received almost all of Thrace and was au-
years immediately preceding the Turkish thorized to gain the Izmir region, to be
National Struggle of 1919-1922” (ibid.: confirmed by a subsequent plebiscite.
314). Kemal could consequently base his Eastern Turkey was supposed to be di-
efforts to secure a new and modern Turk- vided between Armenia and Kurdistan,
ish nation state on some aspects that had while Italy and France would receive oc-
already been developed during the war. cupational zones between Antalya and
He could also channel a strong sense of Afyon and in Cilicia, respectively (ibid.).
nationalism, which had been directed to- These terms would limit Turkey’s na-
ward minorities within Turkey, namely tional integrity and sovereignty for years,
the Armenian population, who would be- and the accord stimulated a nationalist
come the victims of genocide during the reaction as it was considered to be a dic-
war (Akçam 2013; Suny 2017; Morris & tatorial and anti-Turkish treaty, especially
Ze’evi 2019), but Kemal would now use since it favored former minorities. Mc-
and direct these nationalist sentiments Meekin’s evaluation of the treaty’s impact
against external enemies. highlights the nationalist responses that
In May 1919, Kemal was appointed played into Kemal’s hands: “Sèvres was
as the new inspector of the Ninth Army the best possible recruiting poster for
at Samsun, and he was supposed to help Kemal’s nationalist army, which, from
the British occupation forces to suppress its base in Ankara, began a multifront
banditry in the Black Sea region. Regard- war against now-independent Armenia
less of his appointment, Kemal began to in the Caucasus, the Greeks advancing
forge an alliance for national resistance inland from Izmir and Bursa, (in theory)
with other army officers, namely Kâzım the Italian and French troops to the south
Karabekir and Ali Fuat (Cebesoy). Be- and southeast, and even the British, re-
tween June and September, several meet- sponsible for defending the Straits and
ings and congresses in Amasya, Erzu- the capital” (2012: 41).
rum, and Sivas led to the formation of The war that would follow between
a Turkish nationalist principle and the 1918 and 1922 was one in which Turkey
alliance that was supposed to defend it had to fight alone against all, and the task
against the foreign invaders. A Nation- seemed doomed, considering that no
al Pact (Misak-ı Milli) was ratified in the support could be expected from any other
15power with an interest in the region, espe- lican government the international pres-
cially since Russia faced its own civil war tige and legitimacy” (ibid.: 43), but Kemal
in the aftermath of the Russian Revolu- had also laid the ground for his dominant
tion. Since Kemal and the Soviet Russian role within the new nation state in the
government were under pressure, they at years until his death. As its first presi-
least agreed on a pragmatic alliance, for- dent, he would turn his military success
mally established by the Treaty of Kars in into political power and influence, mak-
October 1921. Territorial claims were ex- ing him the main winner of the Turkish
changed and granted. Kemal could there- War of Independence (Zürcher 2012: 131).
by pacify his eastern front, and without He would use this power to strengthen
the threat of a two-front war, he could fo- his position even further when conflicts
cus on his main enemy, the Greek forces. with his former allies erupted once the
Initial Turkish successes were countered foreign enemies had been defeated. In
by a Greek offensive, leading to the deci- November 1924, Kazim Karabekir, Rauf
sive battle between the two armies at the Orbay, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, and Refet Bele,
Sakarya River, in which 90,000 Turks who had been important during the War
would make a stand against 100,000 of Independence as well, founded an op-
Greeks. What started as a possible battle position party in 1924, but Kemal used
of annihilation, as a Turkish defeat would emergency laws to counter the menace
have left the capital Ankara, around 50 to his uncontested position as the first
miles away, open to an attack by the en- man of the Turkish nation state. Until
emy, would, regardless of the Greeks’ su- 1926, “all of the former leaders of the in-
periority in firepower, become a victory dependence struggle had been purged in
that would even intensify the image of a spectacular political trial in which they
Kemal as a nationalist hero who not only were accused of involvement in a plot to
had defended the Ottoman Empire at assassinate the President” (ibid.: 132),
Gallipoli, but also the Turkish nation at and Kemal was free to continue his polit-
the Sakarya River: “The victory at Sakarya ical course as he alone saw fit.
heralded Turkey’s national revival.” (ibid.: Vogel referred to the following period
42). The British authorities were willing as one of Kemal’s “transformative lead-
to revise the Treaty of Sèvres in favor of ership” (2011: 513) as the latter began to
Turkey in March 1922, granting them the secularize and modernize Turkey in the
Aegean region, although Thrace was sup- years that followed the establishment
posed to remain Greek. Kemal realized of the new nation state (Hanioğlu 2011:
that the full extent of the Turkish nation 160-61). Kemal, as Vogel further high-
could not only be secured by peace and lights, “took an ancient empire that was
opted for, in a kind of Bismarckian sense, being dismembered, firmed up some of
“blood and iron” to solve the current is- the remaining borders, and built new in-
sues of the post-war order. In June 1922, stitutions to remake Turkey into a mod-
the attack on Greece began, and Izmir ern, Western-style and Western oriented
was finally taken back in September. The nation” (2011: 513). Hanioğlu in this re-
Turkish forces were eventually also suc- gard argues that Kemal’s “new ideology,
cessful in regaining eastern Thrace, and unsurprisingly, was a modified, scientif-
the British had to accept these realities, ically sanctioned version of Turkish na-
while David Lloyd George, the “master- tionalism” (2011: 161). Kemal intended,
mind of Sèvres,” resigned in October, as the new political leader of Turkey, to
“never to return to public office” (ibid.). replace the religious bonds of his citizens
The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 would with nationalist ones “through a radical
eventually secure the new Republic of reinterpretation of Islam from a Turk-
Turkey territorially, and not only had the ish nationalist perspective” (ibid.: 132).
nation thereby “won its independence He needed to give his people a new na-
under arms, which gave its new Repub- tional narrative, which also means a new
16Frank Jacob Gallipoli
semiotic system that would be centered senses: the number of roles in which Atatürk
around himself, and when he spoke for is depicted and the freedom of artistic expres-
sion. Only four different roles can be clearly
more than 36 hours during the six days identified (military hero, teacher, father and
of the first Republican People’s Party’s emblem of modernity), and the vast majority
congress in October 1927, he intended to of the paintings and statues, and even of the
create the narrative for Turkish national- poses taken up by actors in the Atatürk films,
ism and to further center the power with- go back to photographs that can be easily iden-
tified. There seems to be a strong reluctance
in the new nation state in his own hands. to allow for artistic licence when depicting the
In his lectures, he reinterpreted the previ- leader. (Ibid.: 136).
ous year and ensured that he alone would
be remembered as the savior of Turkey These different interpretations and
(ibid.), and this overemphasis also stim- images already show that it was hard to
ulated later reinterpretations and myths clearly identify Kemal/Atatürk, and the
about his role at Gallipoli (Macleod 2015: narrative seemed to offer a variety of ways
159). The history of Turkey as an inde- to attach him to one’s own wishes and ide-
pendent nation was consequently a se- as. Kemal seems to have supported this
mantic construction by Atatürk himself, “flexibility” of his own image, considering
whose words, ipse dixit, described what that his own reports about the Gallipoli
should later be understood as the history campaign were not published before the
of the Turkish War of Independence and early 1940s (Macleod 2015: 160). The
the genesis of the modern Turkish state. commemoration of the events of 1915/16
Stories about this campaign would now played a less important role in the nation-
be more like a vaticinium ex eventu, as alist agenda after 1922, but it was part of
Kemal’s eventual success stimulated the Kemal’s personal story and therefore of
overemphasis of his role in the military some interest, although the memory of the
campaign to defend the Dardanelles as First World War and the last years of the
well. Kemalism would consequently be- Ottoman Empire obviously did not arouse
come a “prime example of a personality too much attention in the early years of
cult manufactured by the state” (Zürcher the republic, and as Macleod emphasized,
2012: 132), creating a semi-religious per- when “it was remembered, it was increas-
son-bound nationalist narrative. ingly known for the role of Mustafa Kemal
That Kemal at the same time based as well as for the devotion of the country’s
his nationalist narrative on moderniza- ordinary soldiers” (2015: 161).
tion and secularization was also a neces- It is interesting to note here, too, that
sity in regards to his own self-representa- the legend of the Turkish president in re-
tion, as the beliefs related to Sunni Islam lation to his military service at Gallipoli
prohibited the glorification and depic- was later prominently supported, e.g.
tion of bodies, e.g. as statues. Although when Winston Churchill called Kemal a
it caused possible problems with such “man of destiny” (ibid.: 162). The cam-
religious traditions, statues of Kemal paign would especially be remembered
would be erected in many cities, especial- by British veterans and other visitors who
ly in central spaces. Kemalist nationalism would travel to Turkey for trips to the
was consequently in some regards even Gallipoli Peninsula, but there were also
anti-Islamic, as the messages represent- visitors from other countries who would,
ed by the personal cult of the military
during a cruise through the Mediterra-
hero and political leader of Turkey went
nean Sea, use the opportunity to visit the
against existent religious rules (ibid.: 132-
famous battlefields (ibid.: 165). Official
3). Later, Atatürk became a central ele-
commemorations had nevertheless come
ment of Turkish nationalism, as he
to a halt in the interwar years, as Kemal
has been depicted over and over again in a lim-
focused on the War of Independence as
ited number of well-defined roles. The reper- a source for and focus of the new nation-
toire of visualisation seems to be limited in two al narrative. It is therefore quite ironic
17that he expressed the following thoughts both on the textual and the visual level.
about national history in 1931: “[W]riting While sayings by him became winged ex-
history is just as important as making pressions and were often cited, his face
history: if the writers are not faithful to would be extremely prominent in the
the makers, then the immutable truth public sphere of Turkey where statues
will be altered in ways that can confound were errected in many cities and in cen-
mankind” (quoted in Kezer 2015: 1). Nev- tral places. The “Father of the Turks” was
ertheless, Kemal’s nationalist approach made omnipresent. You could see or read
was successful, and as Atatürk, the “Fa- Atatürk almost everywhere. More impor-
ther of the Turks,” he would remain an tantly, the “Kemalist elite that followed
essential part of the country’s national Ataturk envisaged a militantly secular,
identity for decades. ethnically homogeneous republic ready
to join the Western world. It banished
3. Atatürk’s Turkish Nationalism Islam from school curricula, glorified
and the Commemoration of Gal- Turkish history, and ‘purified’ the Turk-
lipoli ish language in order to foster national
Once in power, Atatürk “spent the lat-
pride and unity” (Çandar 2000: 89). The
ter part of his life secularizing and West-
course of secular Turkey would be con-
ernizing state and society” (Navaro-Yas-
tinued in the following decades (Macle-
hin 2002: 189) as it not only served the
od 2015: 60-62) until the 1980s, with
necessities to build up a strong and mod-
Atatürk remaining “still far and away the
ernized nation state but also to secure his
most central single symbolic focus of his
own image as some kind of enlightened
nation” (Weiker 1982: 1).
leader, or national educator. For these
Since the 1990s, Turkey has begun to
purposes, “he organized a major transfor-
remember Gallipoli more thoroughly, as
mation from a polity governed by Islamic
it helped to stimulate friendly internation-
law to one that strictly separated affairs of
religion and state” (ibid.) and, due to his al relations with the former Allied pow-
achievements, was well remembered for ers, probably Australia first and foremost.
the remaining decades of the 20th centu- The references to the campaign, however,
ry. With regard to “so many other charis- also changed in their wording, and na-
matic leaders in recent world history, … [it tionalist pride was no longer focused only
is] the very length of his symbolism, its all on Atatürk but also on the victory of a bat-
but unanimously positive nature, and its tle that had laid the foundations for his
near universality, both in his own coun- rise in later years (Macleod 2015: 175-187).
try and world wide” (Weiker 1982: 1), that The images of Atatürk at the same time
make Kemal Atatürk a powerful symbol were diversified once more and his prom-
of 20th century Turkish nationalism, al- inence increased even more (Özyürek
though his political agenda was quite an 2004: 374), leading to some kind of om-
internationalist one at the same time. nipresence of the national hero, who in a
The unity between the man and the way linked the history of the last roar of
nation was not only emblematized by the the Ottoman Empire with the nationalist
many statutes but also by his mausoleum rise of a new and strong Turkish nation
(the Anıtkabir), which “is more than just state. However, there was also a change
the final resting place of Atatürk’s body with regard to the role of Islam from the
but also a national stage set and a rep- 1990s, as “the state stresse[d] the public
resentation of the hopes and ideals of the role of Islam to ensure social harmony
Republic of Turkey” (Wilson 2009: 225). and to serve as an ultimate source of le-
With regard to the visualization of Turk- gitimization just as it did in Ottoman
ish nationalism and thereby a semiotic times” (Yavuz 2003: 79). This “neo-Otto-
systematization of his image, Atatürk man turn” (Aydıntaşbaş 2019) was even
became a central aspect of the existent strengthened after Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
sign system of the nationalist narrative, determined the political fate of Turkey,
18Frank Jacob Gallipoli
although Atatürk’s personality cult re- direction for a long period of time. For a
mained strong in the early 2000s (Ök- long time, his mausoleum would repre-
ten 2007; Özyürek 2006). Consequently, sent the idea of the Turkish nation like
Kemalism was one side of a dichotomic no other building or space in Turkey. “An
Turkish identity, and those who represent essential component of nationalist pro-
the secular part of it “suggest that Kemal- jects that seek to institute a new sense
ism is the Turkish equivalent of the en- of nationhood and define a new nation-
lightenment; a guiding philosophy which al subject is the construction of national
brought Turks out of their dark age and space” (Çinar 2005: 99), and so, along
onto the road to modernity” (Ciddi 2009). with the mausoleum, other Atatürk me-
The idea of a Western-oriented mod- morials also played an important role to
ernization has nevertheless been criti- create a sense of national belonging, a
cized as a form of intellectual concept sense of being part of the nation that had
that provided no clear definition for the been created by the “Father of the Turks”
Kemalist agenda and its predecessors, himself. Çinar highlighted in this regard
but was rather a tool to connect Turkey that “nationhood is not only about the
to a capitalist world system in which its collective imagination of a national com-
national position should be as strong as munity, but also about the imagination of
possible. Somay argues with regard to national space” (ibid.).
this problem that Atatürk was consequently an impor-
tant factor of the Turkish nation from
The hypothesis that “modernisation,” “West- 1922, one that was also considered an-
ernisation,” “Europeanisation” and “develop- ti-imperialist in any sense of the word. In
ment” (economic or otherwise) were all used his early military career, he had opposed
as euphemistic signifiers for the advancement
the German military mission, whose of-
of capitalism, also indicates that they have lit-
tle to do with their root concepts “modern,” ficers ran the Ottoman Army and were
“Western,” “European” and “developed.” Since very influential (Grüßhaber 2018: 26-
all these terms entered Oriental cultural struc- 102), and the Gallipoli-related operations
tures and intellectual life as external factors, were “a prime example of combined arms
conceptualised, defined and put into circula-
warfare. The battle proved an instructive
tion by either colonial or patronising Europe-
an powers, the Oriental cultures that are sup- experience for all combat parties involved.
posed to modernise, Westernise, Europeanise This was especially the case for the more
or “develop” had little say in what they were than 3000 German soldiers that saw ac-
supposed to mean. (2014: 9) tion during the campaign” (ibid.: 79)/
However, “members of the German mis-
Modernization meant different things sion not only advised the Ottomans but
for different people in different times, actually took over field commands dur-
but the diverse ideas were in a way united ing the First World War” (Zürcher 2012:
with regard to the idea of a strong Turkish 130), something Kemal had not only crit-
nation by the central authority of Kemal icized but maybe even considered when
after 1922. Nevertheless, the system was he turned out to be relatively reluctant
only held together by his commemora- to commemorate his own involvement
tion and dominance, as different people in this important Ottoman victory. As
continued to want different things when mentioned earlier, German officers, like
they talked about modernization. While Otto Liman von Sanders, still considered
“[e]verybody wanted some of them, but Gallipoli to be a German victory (Prigge
never all of them, and combinations and 1916), and reports about Kemal in Nazi
permutations (depending on the priori- Germany actually depicted a much more
ties) that emerged were almost as varied positive image of the strong Turkish lead-
as there were people” (ibid.), Kemal’s au- er. In the category “men of the month,”
thority provided the link for different in- the Zeitschrift für Politik (Journal for Pol-
terests and channeled them in the same itics) published a feature that compared
19Kemal’s role for Turkey with that of Hit- the military ranks, who were interested in
ler for Germany: “a new form [of myth] in which ‘Turkish’
soldiers replaced the more multinational
The “sick man” [Turkey] has become healthy Ottoman or Anatolian troops and Atatürk
today, healthier than ever and takes the posi- became the commander who led them to
tion in the political power play of Europe that
is his due to his geopolitical situation deter- victory. Gallipoli, unlike other campaigns,
mined by barren and harsh Anatolia, by a man became the first defence of the mother-
who equals—if not even surpasses—this land- land, although it carried no more signifi-
scape in harshness and spartan unpretentious- cance than that” (ibid.: 170). The Gallipo-
ness! (Heberlein 1937: 168)
li myth was consequently transformed
agaon, “Turkified,” so to speak, to match
Since Atatürk did not run a democratic the new national narrative, and the events
state after 1923 but rather an autocratic de- of the campaign were said to match the
mocracy in which an opposition was not overtowering image of Atatürk as the first
free to express criticism, the parallels made man of the new and strong nation of mod-
Hitler even feel some kind of admiration ern Turkey. The now “official” Gallipoli
for the Turkish statesman (Ihrig 2014: myth was fully developed in the 1960s,
109-110). “Atatürk and his New Turkey and only military historians would pro-
were understood [by National Socialists] vide different evaluations of something
not only as ‘one of us’ in the Third Reich, that had already been interpreted within
but also as forerunners of the new kind of the public space of national memory.
völkisch modernity” (ibid.: 148), and criti- In the early 1950s, a debate about the
cisms of an overemphasis of Kemal’s role insufficient commemoration of the events
at Gallipoli eventually disappeared. in 1915/16 also finally led to a broader rec-
The centennial would resemble the ognition of Gallipoli’s role, and demands
climax of interest in the campaign, as it for proper memorials to the fallen sol-
had been developed in Turkey over the diers were made. It would, however, not
years, yet it came at a time when Atatürk’s be until 21 August 1960 that the Darda-
legacy had been contested by a new form nelles Martyrs’ Memorial (Çanakkale Şe-
of Turkish nationalism (Uyar 2016: 165). hitler Abidesi) was finished and would
The history of the defense of the Gallipo- address from then on the “sacrifice, vic-
li Peninsula had eventually “earned its tory and national pride” (ibid.: 173) of the
prominent position in Turkish history Turkish nation under Kemal’s leadership
only after a lengthy and arduous journey, in relation to the last roar and victory of
having long remained solely of interest the Ottoman Empire. Further monu-
to Turkish military officers and a small ments would follow, and the area would
group of enthusiasts” (ibid.). For many eventually be turned into a national park,
years, there had only been local com- although the interest of the government
memorative events, and the attention the in Gallipoli decreased for a while.
battlefields received by Australian and
British tourists had not been matched by Conclusion
Turkish visitors. The Ottoman leadership The rise of Turkish nationalism since
around Enver Pasha had already tried to the 2000s, however, again revived the
use the victory of Gallipoli for political interest in Gallipoli, although it tends to
purposes, but after the War of Independ- reinterpret the semiotic system again. It
ence, Kemal would not pay too much at- is no longer Kemal, who is so important.
tention to this issue when “[t]he glory and The unity of the Turkish soldiers, resist-
sacrifices of the Gallipoli war dead and the ing foreign powers, seem to be more cen-
campaign’s veterans faded in the glow of tral now, especially since this narrative
the newly established Turkish Republic” also fits a government, whose represent-
(ibid.: 168). In later years, however, the atives rather want to see themselves re-
myth of Gallipoli was transformed, and viving Ottoman great power policy, than
sparked the new interest of people beyond to commemorate a secular Kemalism in
20Frank Jacob Gallipoli
Turky today. Gallipoli, as well as Kemal struggles at home, the future of Turkish
Atatürk, are consequently signs within nationalism and the role Atatürk will play
the system of Turkish nationalism that within it are currently being renegotiat-
are currently redefined again. What the ed. Time will eventually show which ele-
final outcome of this reprogramming of ments will be important for the reshaped
the semiotic system of the nation will nation of Turkey in the 21st century, but
look like in the end, is hard to be fore- it is not yet clear which role the rise and
told. However, these signs had been re- impact of Kemal as well as the commem-
defined before and they will play a role in oration of Gallipoli are going to play.
the future, although it is not exactly clear
how this role will look like. References
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some people have claimed and slandered, World War. New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2008.
but as the anniversary of the glorious re-
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