A tenuous trilateral? Russia-India-China relations in a changing world order 1/2019
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1/2019
A tenuous trilateral?
Russia-India-China relations
in a changing world order
—
Christopher Weidacher Hsiung
PUBLISHED BY THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS | UI.SE
Christopher Weidacher Hsiung Associate Fellow, UI PhD Candidate, Oslo University © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Language editing: Andrew Mash Cover photo: TT
Summary • Trilateral interactions between Russia, India and China can be traced back to the early years of the Cold War. It was not until after the end of the Cold War, however, that all three countries began to cooperate more closely together, driven by an ambition to create a multipolar world order. • Today, the three meet regularly within a triangular mechanism known as the RIC trilateral, with the aim of increasing cooperation in regional and global multilateral institutions, most notably among the BRICS and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The current geopolitical flux, linked to the unpredictable US foreign policy of US President Donald J. Trump, has further intensified cooperation. • Nonetheless, bilateral relations between the three states have developed unevenly. Closer China-Russia strategic cooperation is in stark contrast to the stagnation in the India-Russia relationship. India-China relations are perhaps the most problematic. New Delhi’s concern over China’s growing power and influence in Asia has led to enhanced strategic ties between India and the United States. Trilateral relations are gradually moving into a “2+1 constellation”, and China-Russia relations are stronger than anything India enjoys with either of the other two. • The challenge for India is to find its own position between a growing China-Russia “authoritarian entente” and US attempts to create a broad Indo-Pacific coalition to counter China’s growing power and influence. India will remain engaged with both China and Russia, not least economically with China, while at the same time developing political and security links with the USA. In the final analysis, India will keep all options open and try to extract the best possible outcome to further its prime strategic aims of modernising the economy and building up its national strength. • Russia, India and China constitute the three most important “non-Western” powers and their impact on regional and global affairs is significant. Policymakers in Europe should therefore pay close attention to developments among Russia, India and China, and especially regarding bilateral developments between them, as these will have consequences for Europe’s relations with all three states, separate but also collectively. © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 3
Geopolitical flux and Indian hedging create a unified force that can shape the
On the sidelines of the G20 meeting in making of a “multipolar order” that better
Buenos Aries in December 2018, the reflects their interests and positions.
President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, invited
India’s Prime Minster, Narendra Modi, and Interestingly, India also held a formal
the President of China, Xi Jinping, for a leaders’ summit with the USA and Japan,
formal sit-down meeting. The aim was to the first ever of its kind, at the same G20
share views on current regional and global meeting. Commenting on that meeting,
affairs, and to discuss the potential for Modi remarked, “Japan, America and India
wider cooperation. While encounters is JAI: In Hindi, ‘JAI’ means success”.3
between the three world leaders have Moreover, just a few months before, India
become a regular occurrence, for instance and the USA had held their much
through the BRICS mechanism, the meeting anticipated “2+2 meeting” between their
was significant since it was the first trilateral foreign and defence ministers, which
summit in more than 12 years. According to marked the highest ever level of
the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey institutionalised security engagement
Lavrov, it was decided that such summit between them. The two countries also
meetings would be regularised, indicating a signed the landmark Communications
new level of cooperation between Russia, Compatibility and Security Cooperation
India and China.1 Agreement (COMCASA), which allows for
sensitive communication and intelligence
The summit was grounded in growing sharing between the two militaries. This is
concern over the current geopolitical flux in just two recent examples of the moves
the world brought about by the made by India and the USA for closer
unpredictable and inconsistent foreign strategic cooperation, largely linked to
policy behaviour of US President Donald J. shared concerns over China’s growing
Trump.2 Particularly worrying at that power and influence in the Asia-Pacific
moment was Trump’s strong protectionist region. India’s growing ties with the USA
approach to international trade, which has therefore clearly cut through the apparent
led to an escalating trade war between closeness between Russia, India and China.
China and the USA that is also affecting
India and Russia. More generally, the These seemingly contradictory trends of
summit discussed a long-standing shared closer Russia-India-China relations, on the
aspiration of the three states to reform the one hand, and India’s warming relations
post-1945 international order, which is with the USA and other Asia-Pacific nations,
perceived as reflecting the interests of the on the other, therefore require closer
West, and especially the USA and Europe, scrutiny. The three Eurasian giants
over those in the “non-Western” world. By constitute the three most important “non-
teaming up, Russia, India and China hope to western” great powers. How they interact
1 2
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian TASS, “Putin suggests Chinese, Indian leaders
Federation, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s should hold regular meetings in RIC format”,
interview and answers to questions for the December 1, 2018,
programme “Moscow: Kremlin: Putin” on the http://tass.com/politics/1033762
3
sidelines of the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, NDTV India, “In First Japan-America-India Meet,
December 2, 2018, PM Modi Calls Partnership ‘JAI’”, December 1,
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/- 2018, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/342 modi-terms-japan-us-india-partnership-as-jai-
5025 says-it-means-success-1956147
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 4with each other and with the international instead became bilateral, most notably in
community at large has a significant effect the Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s, India’s
on regional and global affairs. What can we active efforts to promote a large role for
expect from Russia-India-China trilateral China in the Bandung conference in 1955 or
cooperation? Does India’s apparent hedging India’s support for the Soviet Union despite
behaviour cause problems for deepening its proclaimed neutrality. Crucially, even
ties between the three? To answer these these bilateral attempts eventually broke
questions, it is important to look at the down as the Cold War unfolded: first, with
historical development and dynamics of the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split at
trilateral relations: the main drivers and the end of the 1950s; and then following the
characteristics, commonalities and fault China-India border war in 1962. One major
lines; and, crucially, how bilateral relations consequence was that China established
among the three dyads are shaped and the ties with the USA in order to fend off the
role India plays for China and Russia. Finally, Soviet Union, marked by the famous visit of
the interaction between Russia, India and US President Richard Nixon to China in
China has interesting implications for 1972, while India and the Soviet Union
Europe too. increasingly identified a common purpose in
counterbalancing China. With this, the
Old and new triangles notion of any truly meaningful trilateral
In one sense, current Russia-India-China cooperation all but vanished.
cooperation has its origins in the Cold War
period, when balance of power and The idea of constructing trilateral
strategic considerations largely dictated cooperation was “revitalised” following the
developments. At that time, and especially end of the Cold War. Efforts to
throughout the 1950s, the three countries institutionalise such cooperation began to
were joined by their common interest in take form in the mid-1990s, largely due to
countering Western hegemony and Russian efforts. In 1998, the then Russian
influence, although their motivations Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov,
differed. For the Soviet Union, cooperation proposed during a trip to India that the
with China and India served Moscow’s three countries join together to establish a
purpose in its global competition with the strategic triangle in order to counter-
USA. For China, close alignment with the balance US hegemonic power and unilateral
Soviet Union was motivated by shared politics, not least in the military field. Russia
communist ideology and the promise of and China had already formed a strategic
economic and technical support to rebuild partnership in 1996, but Primakov believed
China, but also a desire to fend off the it important to include India, in part due to
threat from the USA, made acute by the India’s growing global importance but also
Korean War. India for its part aimed to because including India, as a democracy
remain neutral in the global geopolitical supportive of a rules-based liberal order,
competition between the USA and the would increase the international legitimacy
Soviet Union. New Delhi offered an of the endeavour.
alternative path to the Western and
Communist blocs, one which brought China and India, however, broadly rejected
together the newly established Asian and the idea of a formal cooperation
African post-colonial states. mechanism. First, they worried that such a
formation would send the wrong message
However, these common interests never led to other states in the region, notably the
to a formalised trilateral engagement but USA. Both strongly valued their economic
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 5and trade links with the West, so any outcomes. The trilateral format is far less
perception of balancing efforts would have institutionalised than the BRICS
to be kept to a minimum. Second, while mechanism, which has seen more robust
bilateral relations among the three development. Moreover, meetings have
countries had undoubtedly improved since been rescheduled more than once due to
the end of the Cold War, relations remained intra-triangular issues, mostly between
undeveloped and far from as strategic as China and India. In 2017, for instance, the
Russian rhetoric suggested. For instance, meeting was postponed from April to
China and India wrestled with several tricky December, probably due to China’s
bilateral issues, not least the border issue displeasure at a visit by the Dalai Lama to
which kept relations strained. Third, both Arunachal Pradesh, a region where China
China and India doubted Russia’s sincerity and India are embroiled in a territorial
and saw Primakov’s idea as driven more by dispute. The more than two-month long
Russia’s own geopolitical game against the border stand-off in 2017 between Chinese
West than efforts to construct cooperation and Indian troops in Bhutan’s Doklam
among them or to work for multipolarity region also badly affected relations.
and improved global governance.
That said, some steps have been made to
Despite the lukewarm response from China achieve more tangible cooperation. For
and India, the idea of more institutionalised instance, the three countries now cooperate
cooperation mechanisms lived on. The on disaster management and in a trilateral
three countries began holding informal business forum, and have established a
foreign ministers’ meetings in 2001, and in trilateral academic scholars’ dialogue which
2006 these became an annual formal forum, makes policy recommendations.4 More
the so called RIC Foreign Ministerial importantly, however, the three countries
Meetings. The states began to release joint have tried to step up efforts to improve
communiques, in which they offered their policy consultation and coordination. The
views on current affairs and proposals on fight against terrorism and other non-
how to expand trilateral cooperation. These traditional security challenges such as drugs
foreign ministers’ meetings have taken and organised crime often tops the list of
place regularly ever since and a 16th policy concerns. For instance, the 2017 joint
meeting took place in Wuzhen, China, in communique issued by the 15th Foreign
February 2019. Russia, India and China held Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi put strong
their first leaders’ meeting in St Petersburg emphasis on combating terrorism, by
in 2006. intensifying cooperation on measures to
combat terrorist propaganda, cutting off
The significance of the trilateral mechanism the sources of terrorist financing and
has been questioned. Critics often lament disrupting recruitment flows, among other
that meetings merely produce lofty things.5 The trilateral meetings now also
declarations that lead to few concrete hold regular working group consultations on
4
See e.g. the “Summary Report” of the 15th Federation, the Republic of India and the
Russia-India-China (RIC) Trilateral Academic People’s Republic of China”, December 11, 2017,
Conference, 24–25 January 2017, https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
https://www.icsin.org/uploads/2017/03/09/e30 documents.htm?dtl/29171/Joint+Communiqu+o
b99b7af0612ad71fac0be8bedc18c.pdf f+the+15th+Meeting+of+the+Foreign+Ministers+
5
Government of India, Ministry of External of+the+Russian+Federation+the+Republic+of+In
Affairs, “Joint Communiqué of the 15th Meeting dia+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China
of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 6Asia-Pacific affairs and organise meetings improving relations with the Association of
for young diplomats.6 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and other
East Asian states. Modi has also developed
More broadly, the global financial crisis in a policy orientation, “Neighbourhood First”,
2008 had an important impact on incentives which puts a premium on building close
for closer cooperation. The crisis showed, at relations with states in India’s immediate
least in the eyes of the non-Western world, vicinity in South Asia. In addition, it is clear
that the West was in relative decline. The that great power diplomacy has assumed an
US-led global liberal order was questioned important role in Modi’s activism, by
and new modes of global governance building closer strategic ties with the USA,
sought, providing a greater say for non- reinvigorating relations with Russia and
Western countries. Especially India and most importantly managing the
China as the most promising emerging increasingly complex relationship with
economic powers, naturally saw that the China.
time for greater cooperation had arrived. It
was no accident that the BRICS format was Engagement in multilateral forums
saw its first top leader summit in the Trilateral cooperation must be considered in
aftermath of the global financial crisis. a broader context and not confined to a
Moreover, since the beginning of the 21st strictly formalised “trio mechanism”. The
century, China and Russia have grown three states interact and cooperate in a
increasingly concerned about US policy, variety of regional and global multilateral
particularly as it pertains to them, and this institutions. The most important of these
has pushed the two states closer together. are arguably the BRICS format and the
India, while not the target of similar US Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),
pressure, nonetheless remains committed two clear illustrations of a common
to upholding its policy of strategic aspiration to create an alternative to
autonomy while also finding its own way to Western dominance of regional and global
great power status. Under Modi, who has institutions.
been India’s Prime Minister since 2014, the
country is now seeking a more active The BRICS grouping, which comprises
foreign policy role. The government talks Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa,
about India moving from being a mere was launched as a full-scale diplomatic
balancer to becoming a “leading power” in entity in 2009. It has since developed into
world affairs. This means that India now has one of the most important non-Western
an aspiration not just to be reactive or to international institutions. Cooperation is
respond to events, but to shape or even made more complicated by the different
drive them.7 The result has been energetic political, economic and cultural conditions
diplomatic engagement in the Asia region that exist in each of the countries. China, for
and beyond, perhaps most clearly through instance, is the world’s second largest
Modi’s “Act East Policy”, aimed at economy and most populous country while
6
Ivan Tselichtchev, “China and India to Iran and release of Dr C. Raja Mohan’s book ‘Modi’s
Korea: Why Russia is the Asian player to watch”, World-Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence’”,
South China Morning Post, September 22, 2018, July 18, 2015, https://mea.gov.in/Speeches-
https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/long- Statements.htm?dtl/25491/Remarks_by_Foreign
reads/article/2164723/china-and-india-iran-and- _Secretary_at_the_release_of_DrC_Raja_Mohan
korea-why-russia-asian-player-watch s_book_Modis_WorldExpanding_Indias_Sphere_
7
Government of India, Ministry of External of_InfuencequotJuly_17_2015
Affairs, “Remarks by Foreign Secretary at the
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 7South Africa ranks far behind. There are positions. For instance, before the BRICS
also very different policy preferences. summit in Qingdao in 2017, China and India
Russia views the BRICS as a geopolitical tool decided to pull back their troops from the
against the USA, while China and India see Doklam stand-off, probably in an attempt
economic cooperation as the prime motive. to avoid bringing tensions to the BRICS
Finally, while economic links are arguably summit. During the meeting, Xi and Modi
the strongest tie between the BRICS, met on the sidelines to hold bilateral talks
economic relations are far stronger to further defuse tensions and put bilateral
between BRICS and non-BRICS, mostly with relations back on track.8
Western states.
The other main body for cooperation is the
Nonetheless, the BRICS should not be SCO. Since India and Pakistan became full
dismissed too easily. Cooperation is more members in 2017, there has been potential
than just annual summitry. A growing for increased multilateral cooperation
number of intra-BRICS meetings and between Russia, India and China, especially
working group consultations are also taking on Eurasian affairs. The SCO can trace its
place. While concrete results from many of origins to the 1990s, when China and the
these meetings are yet to materialise, the newly established Central Asian states tried
mere fact that the BRICS countries are to settle their new borders, and Russia also
continuing to expand and deepen their participated in the border talks. The SCO
exchange at a minimum shows that was formally founded in 2001 and has since
member states wish to use the platform to developed into one of the most influential
achieve real objectives. The BRICS now run regional institutions in Central Asia. The
the New Development Bank (NDB) and the SCO aims to enhance political trust among
Contingency Reserve Arrangement, which its members and promote regional stability
funds various infrastructure and and peace, mostly through cooperation on
development projects. The NDB is arguably combating terrorism and extremism. This
the BRICS’ most concrete achievement yet, has resulted in growing security cooperation
although it has smaller stock capital than among the SCO states, most notably in
the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank regular joint military exercises referred to as
(AIIB) and far fewer members. SCO “peace missions”.
At the 2018 BRICS summit in Johannesburg, China has developed closer economic
South Africa, leaders vowed to continue cooperation with the Central Asian states
working for closer intra-BRICS cooperation and has become their biggest trading
while also standing up for multilateralism partner, which threatens to marginalise
and against protectionism, as a direct Russia’s traditional position in the region.
response to the trade and tariff policies of However, Russia retains a dominant military
US President Donald J. Trump. The BRICS position through the Collective Security
also expressed support for the Joint Treaty Organisation (CSTO), of which
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan are
Iran’s nuclear issues, effectively backing Iran members. India, which is also wary of
against the USA. Finally, and perhaps most China’s growing economic presence in
importantly, the BRICS format allows Eurasia, most notably through its Belt and
Russia, India and China to manage and Road Initiative (BRI), might look to Russia to
mitigate differences and even conflicting counter Chinese initiatives. Nonetheless,
8
BBC, “Xi and Modi mend ties after border https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-
standoff”, September 5, 2017, 41158603
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 8China and Russia have managed their countries greater weight in negotiations.
competing agendas in Central Asia over the Since the last voting share reform in 2016,
years. Talk of a clash of interests in the China is now the third biggest shareholder
region seems overblown and a Russian- after the USA and Japan, while India and
Indian coordination against China in the Russia are among the top ten. Following the
SCO appears unlikely. Trump administration’s imposition of taxes
and tariffs on steel and aluminium, mainly
The inclusion of India and Pakistan will targeting China but also affecting Russia
change the dynamics of the SCO, and and India, the three countries now also find
perhaps make it more difficult to manage, themselves on the same side on upholding
in particular on issues of regional security the openness and inclusiveness of the global
and terrorism where India and Pakistan trading system as embodied in the World
have strong disputes in the region. India’s Trade Organisation (WTO).
membership was long backed by Russia as a
counterweight to China’s growing power. Moreover, all three countries officially view
Pakistan’s membership was seen as a the UN as the core international body for
compromise with China, which has global governance and the key multilateral
supported Pakistan in its conflict with India. platform for guaranteeing international
Officially at least, China and Russia appear peace and security. They often make joint
optimistic that with India and Pakistan as calls for reform of the UN system, including
full members, the bilateral conflict between Security Council reform, and support India
the two can be mitigated. The terrorist playing a larger role.9 In reality, however,
attack in Indian Kashmir in February 2019 Russia and especially China are resistant of
might provide a test case. any Security Council reform that would
allow for an expanded Security Council
However, it is still too early to say how although Russia officially supports India.
Russian-India-Chinese cooperation will Finally, there might be potential to find
develop within the SCO. India is trying to common ground on the evolution of Asian
reap economic and political benefits from regional and multilateral initiatives
closer engagement with Central Asia, which underpinned by ambitions to construct
is still underdeveloped. At the same time, alternative governance structures to the
however, India is the only SCO country not current liberal world order. Notable
to have officially endorsed China’s BRI. examples are China’s BRI and the China-led
Beyond such cooperation in the BRICS and AIIB, Russia’s Eurasian Greater Partnership
the SCO, there is a wider web of global or stepped-up efforts by India to provide
institutions such as the G20, the UN and the regional leadership in South Asia. However,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), in which even if there is a common aspiration among
the three meet and interact, often brought the three for coordination and cooperation,
together by an ambition to reform these these projects are also manifestations of the
institutions. For instance, the three states three countries’ own efforts to gain
have worked in tandem, often through the influence in Eurasia and strategic
BRICS, to increase voting shares in the IMF competition among the three remains.
as their combined voice has given the Russia has increasingly come to accept
9
Government of India, Ministry of Foreign https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
Affairs, “Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting documents.htm?dtl/26628/Joint_Communiqu_o
of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian f_the_14th_Meeting_of_the_Foreign_Ministers_
Federation, the Republic of India and the of_the_Russian_Federation_the_Republic_of_In
People’s Republic of China”, April 18, 2016, dia_and_the_Peoples_Republic_of_China
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 9China’s leading role in Eurasia but is 2014, as Russia turned to China to ease
nonetheless still wary. India is more openly pressure from the West. Improved ties
concerned, as evidenced by its reluctance to between China and Russia are one of the
formally endorse China’s BRI. For instance, biggest foreign policy achievements of both
India, together with Russia and Iran have countries, not least given the historical
initiated a joint project, the so-called animosity, and the ideological competition
International North-South Transport and strategic mistrust that had long
Corridor (or INSTC), which aims to connect characterised bilateral relations. The Sino-
Russia and Northern Europe to India and Russian relationship is officially described as
Southeast Asia in what has been touted as a a “comprehensive strategic partnership of
response to China’s BRI (even though the coordination”. According to China’s
INSTC predates BRI). ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, it constitutes
the most comprehensive and far-reaching
Uneven bilateral relations among the of all of China’s more than 100 different
three: towards a 2+1 constellation? partnerships with various countries and
While trilateral cooperation has witnessed organisations.10 Bilateral trade in 2018
gradual expansion in recent years, bilateral exceeded USD 100 billion. China is Russia’s
relations among the three have become biggest trading partner and energy
increasingly uneven. This poses a serious cooperation is still developing. Construction
challenge to future developments. In of the “Power of Siberia” natural gas
essence, closer Sino-Russian cooperation pipeline, which began in 2014, at an
contrasts with India’s stagnating estimated cost of USD 400 billion, is set to
relationship with Russia. Importantly, India- become operational in 2019. Russia was
China relations have also witnessed growing China’s largest provider of crude oil for the
strategic competition. What had previously third year running in 2018. China and Russia
been a comparatively equal trilateral also cooperate in the Arctic on energy and
relationship has slowly developed into a shipping.11
situation in which China and Russia are
much closer than India is with either of the Significantly, China and Russia have
two, thereby rendering the trilateral stepped up regional and global security
mechanism more of a “2+1 constellation”. coordination, and bilateral military
This becomes more obvious when the three cooperation, including new advanced arms
separate bilateral relationships are deals and military joint exercises. The noted
examined. Russian military analyst, Vasily Kashin, has
claimed that the 2018 Vostok-18 drill, a
China-Russia: growing strategic closeness Russian military exercise in which China
The Sino-Russian relationship has gradually participated for the first time, is a sign that a
improved since the end of the Cold War but formal military alliance between China and
particularly following the crisis in Ukraine in Russia is more realistic today than ever.12
10 11
Li Hui, Keynote Speech at Russian International Christopher Weidacher Hsiung and Tom
Affairs Council (RIAC) Club Meeting, “Russia- Røseth, “The Arctic Dimension in Sino-Russian
China Relations in the Context of the Results of relations”, in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Bobo Lo
the 19th National Congress of the Communist (eds), Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st century
Party of China”, November 16, 2017, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019).
12
http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and- Vasiliy Kashin, “Vostok 2018: a new phase of
comments/analytics/new-era-of-china-s- cooperation”, Moscow Defense Brief, vol. 67, no.
development-and-prospects-for-china-russia- 5 (2018), http://www.mdb.cast.ru/mdb/5-
relations/ 2018/item4/article1/
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 10There are of course lingering problems in cent stake in the Russian Vankorneft oilfield
the Sino-Russian relationship, in particular by a consortium of state-owned Indian oil
China’s growing footprint in Central Asia companies in 2015. This is something that
which challenges Russia’s traditional Russia remains reluctant to allow China to
position in the region, but overall relations do, despite the more developed state of
exhibit remarkably positive development Sino-Russian energy links. Nonetheless, the
and progress. overall level of economic cooperation is
limited and bilateral trade modest, at less
India-Russia: stable but stagnating than USD 10 billion annually in recent years,
India-Russia relations are marked by a high despite repeated pledges on boosting
degree of political trust and enduring bilateral trade. The main challenge for the
stability. They were particularly strong in two states is to move beyond their heavy
the 1960s and 1970s. For much of the post- reliance on the military-technological
Cold War period, however, relations have domain as the basis for economic
stagnated, even though both sides cooperation.
recognise the need to revitalise and
broaden them.13 Bilateral cooperation is by Neither Moscow nor New Delhi view the
and large built on cooperation in the other side as top of their foreign policy
military-technological area, and to a certain priorities. While Russia’s “turn to the East”
extent in energy, including civilian nuclear has put a new premium on engagement
power. Space exploration is also an area of with Asia as a whole, China is the main focus
cooperation. of these attempts. This has also made India
increasingly wary of the Sino-Russian
India’s arms trade relationship with Russia relationship, especially as is assumes a
had long been better developed than the much stronger anti-Western stance. Given
China-Russia arms trade relationship. Russia that India is deeply concerned about China’s
has been India’s main supplier of arms and growing influence in South Asia, a China-
Russia provided India with more advanced dominated Asia with Russia as its main
weaponry than it provided China. This has supporter does not bode well for India’s own
changed in recent years, however, as strategic interests, or for the India-Russia
evidenced by the simultaneous export of relationship more generally. Moreover,
the S-400 missile defence system to China there are signs that Russia is also changing
and India. Russia-India defence its policy on Pakistan, for instance by
collaboration also contains a higher level of offering new weapon sales, through the first
sophistication in terms of joint design and Russia-Pakistan military exercise in 2016
production projects, such as plans to and its contacts with the Taliban in
develop a fifth generation of stealth Afghanistan. These overtures could present
fighters. India and Russia have also held new challenges for Russia’s relationship
annual joint military exercises, the so-called with India.
Indra drills, since 2003. In 2017, the two
sides held their first exercise involving all China-India: growing strategic rivalry
three military branches: air, land and sea. China-India relations are by far the most
In the area of energy cooperation, Russia complicated of the three bilateral
has allowed Indian investment in upstream relationships. On the one hand, bilateral
projects, such as the purchase of a 49.9 per relations have made some progress, as
13
A.V. Kortunov et al., 70th Anniversary of (Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council,
Russia-India Relations: New Horizons of 2017)
Privileged Partnership, Report no. 34/2017
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 11exemplified by growing bilateral trade, India’s concerns over China’s growing naval
which in 2017 hit a record high of close to presence in the Indian Ocean hamper steps
USD 85 billion. Chinese foreign direct towards deeper cooperation. India is also
investment in India, for instance, in start- deeply concerned about the trade
ups among other things, has grown rapidly imbalance: its trade deficit with China was
in recent years, albeit from a very low base. approximately USD 51 billion in 2017.
India is also a founding signatory to the AIIB Finally, China’s BRI also challenges India’s
and has emerged as the largest beneficial wider regional role in South Asia where
member. As of early 2018 it had received a China is investing in a number of ports in
quarter of the bank’s total loans.14 countries close to India, such as Gwadar in
Moreover, China and India have many Pakistan, Chittagong in Bangladesh,
similar concerns regarding global issues Kyaukpyu in Myanmar and the port of
such as trade and climate change. For Hambantotari in Sri Lanka. Of particular
instance, with regard to climate change, concern is China’s heavy support of the
China and India signed a Memorandum of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing which runs through Pakistan-controlled
Climate Change in 2009, which included occupied Kashmir, which is claimed by
setting up an intergovernmental working India.
group to exchange views and establish
official cooperation in this area. Both China Crucially, the many challenges in the Sino-
and India see the United Nations Indian relationship, which have only been
Framework Convention on Climate Change exacerbated by China’s rise and its growing
(UNFCCC) as the most appropriate foreign policy assertiveness, have led to a
framework for dealing with global climate visible willingness in New Delhi to
change.15 This means that China and India developing stronger security links with the
have increasingly coordinated their USA and US allies in the region, such as
positions in the UN in various ways, such as Japan and Australia. This in part can also be
through the G77/China group, the BASIC explained by more active US efforts to draw
group or the Like-Minded Developing India closer. For instance, the Trump
Countries (LMDC) informal grouping. The administration now uses the term Indo-
informal Wuhan summit in May 2018 Pacific instead of Asia-Pacific and has called
between Modi and Xi Jinping also seemed for a “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), a
to have done much to reset the tense broad vision that brings together like-
relations following the Doklam stand-off in minded democracies in the region to defend
2017. In fact, Modi and Xi Jinping met and uphold the international rules-based
bilaterally on four separate occasions in order, universal liberal norms and access to
2018, signalling how far the two powers maritime global commons. While it has not
prioritise stable relations. been stated officially, this is clearly a
response to what the USA sees as a China
Nonetheless, deep-rooted mistrust, a hard- that is hostile to US interests in the region.
to-resolve border conflict, China’s “all- Moreover, it is clear that the USA intends to
weather-relationship” with Pakistan and
14 15
Kiran Stacey and Simon Mundy in Mumbai, Government of India, Ministry of External
and Emily Feng, “India benefits from AIIB loans Affairs, “Joint Statement on Climate Change
despite China tensions”, Financial Times, March between India and China during Prime Minister’s
18, 2018, visit to China”, May, 15, 2015,
https://www.ft.com/content/da2258f6-2752- https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-
11e8-b27e-cc62a39d57a0 documents.htm?dtl/25238/
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 12make India a major partner in this broader Nonetheless, India is gradually
Asia policy. strengthening its ties with the USA, most
notably its security and defence links. This
As a further illustration, the USA, Japan and upward trend began with the landmark
Australia are trying to draw India into a 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement.
wider coalition to contain China through a Another important agreement is the
relaunch of the Quadrilateral Security Logistics Exchange Memorandum of
Dialogue, or Quad, which began on the Agreement (LEMOA) signed in 2016, which
side-lines of the ASEAN summit in 2017. facilitates port calls, joint military exercises,
The Quad is an effort to coordinate military training, disaster relief operations and
exchange, and share intelligence, training bilateral access to logistical facilities. As
and mutual understanding. The parties noted above, India and the USA also signed
involved – with India on the relative the COMCASA agreement at the 2+2
outskirts – already enjoy considerable meeting in 2018. Beyond this, the USA has
bilateral or trilateral cooperation. The USA, promoted arms sales to India, for instance,
India and Japan also hold a regular military by elevating India’s defence trade status to
exercise, the Malabar Exercise, and Strategic Trade Authorization-1 (STA-1).
Australia is seeking to participate. The Quad This in effect puts India on the same level as
was first proposed by the Prime Minister of NATO member states and gives India
Japan, Shinzo Abe, in 2007 but failed largely access to the most advanced and
due to the reluctance of Australia’s then sophisticated US arms. India also received a
Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, to formally sanctions waiver which spared it from
endorse the idea, which he feared would punitive action following its purchase of
alienate China and heighten tensions in the Russia’s S-400 missile defence system. No
region. such sanction waiver was granted to China,
for instance, when it purchased the exact
India is still reluctant to fully embrace any same weapon system, although the Indian
overly strong engagement with the USA procurement did strain US-Indian ties as
that could be interpreted in Beijing as US New Delhi resisted bowing to US demands.
containment efforts. For instance, at the The different US policy towards China
Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018, Modi clearly shows the nature of its security
refrained from criticising China’s foreign concerns, and the role that India is expected
policy and instead highlighted the to play.
importance of Sino-Indian trust and
cooperation. Modi also remarked that the India’s policy challenge and the future of
Indo-Pacific must be “free, open and trilateral relations
inclusive”.16 The addition of inclusive is While India remains wary of China’s rise,
clearly aimed at not antagonising Beijing Russia seems to have accepted that China is
and signalling a wariness of the more now the stronger power in its bilateral
“China-hostile” free and open Indo-Pacific relationship – but more importantly that
and Quad strategies. Moreover, India has Moscow has nothing, at least in the short
also rejected Australia’s bid to participate in term, to fear from China. Many of the
the Malabar Exercise. concerns that Russia had in relation to
China – such as Chinese immigration to the
Russian Far East, China’s growing military
16
Narendra Modi, “Prime Minister’s Keynote Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Ke
Address at Shangri La Dialogue”, June 1, 2018, ynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+0
https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches- 1+2018
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 13strength, China’s growing presence in about China’s rise, this does not
Central Asia or the unbalanced trade automatically translate into being a natural
structure akin to being just a raw material partner of the USA. The fact that India went
provider, where Russia only exports oil and ahead with the purchase of the S-400
natural gas to China – have been shown to system despite US threats of sanctions
be overblown or at least manageable. The demonstrates that India will not accept
result is that Russia is now more diktats from Washington. Furthermore,
comfortable accepting China’s power. while Beijing remains a prominent
Crucially, China and Russia see eye to eye challenger to India, the costs of taking too
on the role that the USA is playing in confrontational a stand are high. The
containing China’s global rise and the potential for growing trade relations is seen
resurgence of Russia as a great power. as promising and India does not want to risk
While India and Russia remain stable these. In fact, China is already India’s largest
partners, their views of and approaches to trading partner. The fact that India rejected
China differ, which also affects the future the participation of Australia in the Malabar
prospects for trilateral cooperation. Exercise shows that India is not prepared to
fully embrace the notion of the Quad at the
The underlying logic of the Russia-India- risk of antagonising China.
China trilateral cooperation is therefore
changing. When the trilateral mechanism Finally, India’s overarching policy goal is to
took shape at the end of the 1990s and was modernise and build its own national
developing in 2000s, the underlying logic strength. Despite the growing power of
was a relatively “equal” construct of India, there are a number of domestic
balancing acts, first and foremost against constraints that prevent a more activist
the USA, albeit mostly rhetorically, but also foreign policy, in particular one which
among the three powers themselves. India entails becoming entangled in great power
hoped that together with Russia it could politics. Despite the grandiose foreign
balance the growing power of China. Russia policy ambitions of Prime Minister Modi,
expressed similar hopes, as evidenced by its the reality is that India’s political system is
long support for India’s inclusion in the SCO burdened by corruption and inefficient
and for India’s full membership of the bureaucracy. In addition, India still struggles
Nuclear Suppliers Group. with regional and ethnic cleavages.
Environmental issues such as pollution and
The question for India is therefore where to water shortages are important long-term
situate itself in the new context. While it problems for any future Indian government.
seems probable that India will remain The Modi government, which often has
engaged with China and Russia on issues of lofty global ambitions for India, is keenly
common interest, India will at the same aware of all this.
time forge closer political and security links
with the USA. India will not tie itself too Relevance for Europe
closely to either party, however, but instead While Europe is mainly preoccupied with its
abide by its policy of strategic autonomy. immediate neighbourhood, relations
The USA is likely to push for closer strategic between Russia, India and China still have
ties, but India will carefully calculate the implications for European policymakers.
cost and benefits of this US outreach, not Most broadly, their cooperation on global
least with regard to how it might be governance affects Europe. In the realm of
perceived in Beijing and Moscow. international trade and economics,
Furthermore, while India has grievances interactions in “Western” institutions such
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 14as the WTO and the IMF and non-western and future trajectory of its bilateral
institutions such as BRICS could threaten relationship with China and Russia. Despite
Europe’s privileged position. While the more public animosity towards
comprehensive trilateral cooperation is yet Pakistan, India sees China as its most
to materialise, the potential for greater challenging long-term security threat.
cooperation remains and therefore requires India’s relationship with Russia, while robust
careful monitoring in Europe. India’s full and friendly, has stagnated. Russia’s
SCO membership provides an institutional growing ties with Pakistan are also of
platform for increased interaction among concern to India. As noted above, this has
the three powers. Cooperation on fighting meant that India is increasingly moving in
terrorism, potentially even more so within the direction of forging closer strategic ties
the framework of the SCO, has implications with the USA and several US allies in the
for Europe. The issue of stabilising Asia-Pacific. This is of concern to both China
Afghanistan is falling increasingly on and Russia.
regional powers, as NATO continues to
scale down its military engagement there. Europe should therefore recognise the
Arctic issues are also an area to follow. geopolitical change that is under way in
China and India now both have permanent Asia. The question arises whether Europe
observer status on the Arctic Council. They could or should assume a role there. Europe
are interested in Arctic natural resources and India do seem to have found new
and both are trying to develop cooperation common interests and concerns amid the
with Russia in this area. current geopolitical uncertainties. Europe-
Russia relations remain highly strained due
However, as highlighted above, trilateral to events in Crimea and Ukraine in 2014 and
relations have developed unevenly and the there is growing concern in Europe about
role and importance of India in particular is China’s global power, and Chinese
being tested. The trilateral relationship is investments in strategic sectors in
evolving into a 2+1 constellation, with particular. Europe seems to have taken a
stronger ties between China and Russia growing interest in supporting India’s
than India enjoys with either. It is important emergence as a great power, made easier
to understand the bilateral pairing of the under the umbrella of cooperation between
three powers. In particular, Europe should democracies. This could allow New Delhi
note the fact that Sino-Russian relations will more leverage vis-à-vis China and Russia,
continue to grow stronger, spurred on by something that could also benefit European
continuing tensions in US-Chinese and US- interests.
Russian relations. China and Russia will not
form a formal alliance, but the conditions In particular, China’s BRI seems to have
are developing for a much closer strategic brought the EU and India closer together.
alignment than Western observes tend to Modi’s trip to Europe in April 2018 saw new
assume. In Europe this means keeping a efforts to deepen the strategic partnership
close eye on developments in Sino-Russian formed in 2005. This had lost momentum
relations and a clear realisation that strong soon afterwards and been confined mostly
ties between Beijing and Moscow have to trade and cultural exchanges. Today,
become a permanent feature of global however, broader strategic and geopolitical
politics. worries are beginning to make an impact on
the relationship. The EU launched a new
India, on the other hand, is the weakest link India strategy document in 2018, which
in the relationship, mostly due to the nature
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 15identified India as an important partner.17 The EU has also launched its own strategy on connectivity between Europe and Asia, in response to China’s BRI. Reading this strategy document, it is clear that India and Europe share similar concerns.18 India is also the largest democracy in the world and shares similar values with Europe. Both seek to promote global agendas on democracy and human rights. That said, Europe should have a realistic view of its role in Asia, and of its security role in particular, which remains limited. India’s greater role in Asia and the world will ultimately depend on its strength at home, and how New Delhi chooses to interact with China, Russia and the USA. 17 18 European Commission, “Elements for an EU European Commission, “Connecting Europe strategy on India”, November 20, 2018, and Asia: Building blocks for an EU Strategy”, https://cdn5- September 19, 2018, eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/MJxu https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_co GXIelnF8rvfq4cRLxzC1mUacEWgvfout13dMi4o/ mmunication_-_connecting_europe_and_asia_- mtime:1542708985/sites/eeas/files/jc_elements _building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-09- _for_an_eu_strategy_on_india_- 19.pdf _final_adopted.pdf © 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 16
© 2019 The Swedish Institute of International Affairs 17
About UI Established in 1938, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) is an independent research institute on foreign affairs and international relations. Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs. All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field. Copyright of this publication is held by UI. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non- commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of UI. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Visiting Address: Drottning Kristinas väg 37, Stockholm Postal Address: Box 27 035, 102 51 Stockholm Phone: +46 8 511 768 00 www.ui.se info@ui.se Twitter: @UISweden @ResearchUI
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