2018 Journal - ALLIED RAPID - NATO
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ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
ALLIED RAPID
REACTION CORPS
Ready for Today - Evolving for Tomorrow
Journal
2018
Journal 2018
FOREWORD
ALLIED RAPID 2017 was a seminal year for HQ ARRC. We remained on
standby as the Land Component HQ for the NATO Response
REACTION CORPS Force and tested our ability to deploy at speed through a
successful test exercise to Bulgaria and Romania alongside
Ready for Today - Evolving for Tomorrow
the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land).
2017 also marked the first full year of our 4-year Recalibration
Plan, aimed at developing us into a modern, agile Corps
HQ capable of operating and winning in the Contemporary
Operating Environment. This, coupled with our burgeoning
Concept Development and Experimentation Plan, an
innovative Terrain Walk and our extensive Training Support
to other formations, have all served to identify myriad lessons
from which we, and others across NATO, can learn.
The articles contained in this Journal are necessarily wide-
ranging and reflect many of those lessons. They’ve been
written by men and women from across the 23 Participating
Nations who care and think deeply about their chosen
profession, and to whom I am extremely grateful.
Lt Gen Tim Radford CB DSO OBE
www.arrc.nato.int Commander, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
/Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
@HQARRC
HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
/HQARRC
Readers are reminded that the contents of this Journal are protected by copyright. While
they are free to use the ideas expressed in it, and may copy, distribute or publish the work or
part of it, in any form, printed, electronic or otherwise, for non-commercial purposes without
pao.mr@arrc.nato.int further permission from the author, any such use must clearly credit the author, recognise
their ownership of copyright, and clearly indicate the source. Readers are permitted to make
copies, electronically or printed, for personal, academic and classroom use. Any commercial
+44 (0)1452 718500 use must be negotiated directly with the author(s).
2 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
CONTENTS
Page Page
1. The Evolving Global Security Situation and its 14. Delivering Corps Deep Fires in a High Tempo
Impact on the European Theatre, NATO and Multinational Environment
HQ ARRC Lt Col Tim Iddon GBR-A 38
Maj Alex Michael GBR-A 4
15. Air C2 Challenges in Corps Warfighting
2. Multinationality: Harnessing its Strengths and Gp Capt Chris Mullen GBR-AF 42
Minimising its Weaknesses
16. Federated Mission Networking
Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro ITA-A 6
Lt Col Martin Bever GBR-A 44
3. Development of the NATO Response Force
17. Know your Audience: The value of analysing
Maj Alex Michael GBR-A 8
sentiment during NATO Operations
4. Near Real-World Planning – Turning Wales Lt Col Martin Browning GBR-A and
and Warsaw Summits into Reality Maj Chris Bell GBR-A 47
Col Richard Clements GBR-A 10
18. Inland Waterways – Expanding the Capacity
5. The Increasing Importance of a STRATCOM of Military Movement
Mindset Maj Phil Lawrence GBR-A 50
Wg Cdr Peter Clarke GBR-AF 12
19. The Utility of Risk Management to Underpin HQ
6. Gender Advising at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction ARRC’s Planning, Readiness and Operations
Corps – A Success Story? Lt Cdr Charlotte Yemm GBR-N 52
Capt Nina Schommers DEU-A 15
20. Maritime Security in the Baltics
7. Enabling Crisis Response: Lessons from Cdr John Payne GBR-N 54
NOBLE JUMP 17
Capt Mark Matthews GBR-A 18 21. Unlocking Non-Commissioned Officers’ Talent
in a Peacetime, Multinational Environment
8. Ex ARRCADE LIGHTNING 17 – A New Model SSgt Amy O’Hara GBR-A 56
for Professional Study?
Brig Paul Tennant GBR-A 20 22. Bias – How Can It Affect Intelligence Support
to Decision-Making?
9. Developing Leadership Through Adventure Maj Jim Buchan GBR-A 58
Training - Exercise SELVA BACKSTOP 2017
Maj Dave Latimer GBR-A 22 23. Risk to the Mission, Risk to the Force – Why
Does Countering Corruption Matter?
10. Operations Planning - Using the NATO Mr Peter Appleby GBR-C and
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive Col Alex van Nieuwburg NLD-A 60
(COPD) at the tactical level: A comparison
between the UK planning process and the COPD 24. Positioning Air Defence for Re-Introduction
Lt Col Ole Stephan DEU-A 24 of M-SHORAD
Maj Trey Guy USA-A 62
11. Survive to Command and Innovation
Lt Col Martin Bever GBR-A 30 25. Developing Capability for Deception Operations
LTC Rachelle Hathaway USA-A and
12. Lessons in Corps Warfighting from the SFC Laurens Maliepaard USA-A 64
Battle of the Bulge – Exercise ARRCADE
BUGLE 2 2017 26. The Lost Art of Battle Damage Assessment
Lt Col Scott Morrison CAN-A 33 WO1 Andrew Herrity GBR-A,
SSgt Marco Orru ITA-A, Sgt John Vivani GBR-A
13. Enabling the Commander’s Freedom and Bdr James Cheetham GBR-A 68
of Manoeuvre (or not!)
Lt Col Brian Tritten GBR-A,
Maj Daniel Lyons GBR-A and
Maj George McCrea GBR-A 36
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 3
ARRC JOURNAL
THE EVOLVING GLOBAL SECURITY
SITUATION AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, NATO
AND HQ ARRC
Maj Alex Michael (GBR-A)
We live in a security environment that contains a broad and evolving set of challenges.
The international order and norms are changing. Both known and emerging actors are
regularly adjusting their strategic aims and so unpredictability is flourishing once more.
As we approach the end of the second explosive demography with insufficient operations enabled her to promote a
decade of the 21st Century, the NATO economic growth, have created a series competitive advantage in the region.
Alliance faces both new and resurgent of challenges on Europe’s southern Thus the impression of perceived threat
threats to our security. Within an ‘arc borders. It is the second and third (West against East) ferments.
of instability’, to the east a single state order effects of this instability that can
actor is vying to strengthen its sphere of influence NATO and the EU the most. What is NATO doing to reduce
influence, while to the south the threat As an example, Daesh’s ideological the threat in the East?
is two-fold, security threats from radical expansion and its focus upon Western What has been done in answer to
Islam, and the economic threats and societies has caused an unprecedented Russia’s violence in Eastern Ukraine,
humanitarian challenges of migration. refugee movement into Europe which, its occupation of Crimea, her arming
in addition to the administrative burden, of the separatists and a general desire
To the East... Russia’s strategic
has masked the movement and intention to want her to move from confrontation
objectives appear to restore its
of past and potential terrorists. back to cooperation? NATO’s role is
international status and, against the
tide of NATO expansion, strengthen What is more, these two apparently one of deterrence, where the Allies
its influence in ‘near abroad’ states. In distinct challenges create complexities are leveraging all instruments of state
order to rebalance regional power and where they converge on Europe’s power. The military component has been
status, Russia’s hybrid tactics aim to borders. Although Russia shares a based predominantly on a relatively new,
cause regional instability and expose the number of objectives with the West in flexible, NRF model that holds responsive
capacity weaknesses of the European Syria and Iraq, it exploited an opportunity, and mobile forces at high readiness
Union (EU) and NATO. Looking for a manifested by a lack of coordinated in addition to a rotational forward
solution to this might be easier if our presence within some of the states
relationship with Russia was not so multi- bordering Russia. While this certainly
dimensional. A complex, contemporary, reassures the nations geographically
strategic environment, caused by themes close to Russia, it does not deny the
of common interest between the Alliance, effects ‘below the threshold of open
the EU and between individual countries aggression’ that promote the interests of
and Russia, demands a sophisticated Russia as a competing nation. But while
and pragmatic approach. This means sometimes aggressive competition can
that some problems might be better be easily mistaken for confrontation, a
managed together with Russia, and not better understanding of Russian aims is
in opposition. required to tailor our overt approach.
Russia’s military strength has been decisive
To the South... A potent mix of state
and efficient Western action to project
What more can be done to
and non-state actors, interwoven with
strength. Russia’s rapid decision making, reduce the threat in the East?
migration, organised crime, traditional Although there is recent evidence that
no viable political opposition to decisions
rivalries and the combination of an both sides can cooperate effectively,
and public willingness to accept military
4 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Russia has chosen a different path. But
why?
President Putin has chosen anti-Western
rhetoric and nationalist self-assertion
as the foundation for his regime and
he justifies Russia’s aggressive actions
on the basis of perceived Western
encirclement. This means that current
Russian sentiment will not change
quickly. But should we not be looking
to dispel his fears? While deterring,
competing and engaging do not exclude
each other, a flexible, adaptable political
approach and military posture is still
needed. Avoiding mis-calculation and
achieving conflict prevention, regardless
of the competition, remains crucial.
While politicians and diplomats engage
with Russia to understand the mutually
acceptable middle ground, they also
need to understand when deterrence
can antagonise. History has shown that
Russia will rise to the challenge, but we Russian cartoon highlighting Deterrence or Provocation
do not need to make it a challenge.
• Make time to train. The SACEUR- with each other and their processes;
endorsed LTRP dictates when certified an essential aspect of high readiness
Future
HRFs are at Readiness. For HQ deterrence forces.
A state will rarely need to fight if it deters ARRC it shows us when we are to
effectively enough. The military arm of With this in mind, between LTRP
be at Readiness either as a Joint HQ
NATO must improve its understanding of commitments, HQ ARRC has chosen to
(Strategic/ Operational level) or LCC
deterrence, and ability to deter – indeed focus training towards the role of a Corps
HQ (Operational). The issue is that
it should always look to, particularly while HQ; to allow time to specialise, and
there is no time set aside to specialise
the threat changes so regularly. How because it is arguably easier to scale
as a NATO Corps HQ (higher-tactical)
can the military arm of NATO improve? down the complexity of a certified Corps
and you cannot become a warfighting
HQ to that of a LCC HQ. In addition,
• Make training complex. Training must Corps HQ overnight. Ex ARRACE
it enables our UK and multi-national
be as complex as the most demanding FUSION 17 also demonstrated that it
Divisional training affiliations to nest
scenario. A truly responsive and takes time to excel at commanding at
into an operational Corps HQ; enjoying
effective multi-national military force the Corps level: it is the most challenging
support from an experienced rather than
can only be established through more, role that the ARRC undertakes.
adhoc HICON structure. More still, our
and better, training. Forces also • Specialise. A Corps HQ operates within potential adversary uses the Army and
can improve through specialisation the detail of the higher-tactical level Corps levels of command effectively –
- because they are able to train more thus more, not less, time is needed to we therefore need a capable counter
regularly for that discipline. maintain/ improve processes. Rotating to deter (and potentially defeat) at that
• Use the Corps HQ. For warfighting through different roles can contribute scale of command.
at scale (an essential skill for effective to the challenges a HQ staff will face
and potentially accelerate skill fade. To The challenge is finding the time and
deterrence), the Corps HQ role is
maintain and improve the ability of a resources to get this specialisation
missing in the NATO Long Term
HQ it stands to reason that they should right, while concurrently meeting LTRP
Rotation Plan (LTRP). This manifests
specialise on a particular discipline. We commitments. Although we remain
itself in capability gaps, and reduced
are beginning to see this emerge while ready if committed to the ‘fight tonight’,
understanding of the challenges of
MNC-NE now has a regional function - our current target is to be certified as a
warfighting at scale against a peer
this approach should be expanded. Corps Warfighting HQ within five years.
adversary in the complex environment
However, to be able to war fight at this
of the 21st Century. The Corps HQ also • Training with Corps troops. Corps
scale and complexity not only requires
provides the important gearing between troops are essential to enabling
a change of mind-set but also a radical
the Land Component Command (LCC) the success of the corps level of
adjustment to the structure and training
and Divisional levels of command and operation. Thus to train and fight as
of our NRF HQs. Acknowledging this,
can coordinate the activity of up to five a corps requires dedicated corps-
perhaps we should make the bold
divisions (a LCC HQ cannot because level capabilities (not double hatted
adjustments sooner rather than later?
it sits at the Operational level and as divisional capabilities) which are as
thus has a longer planning horizon) familiar with the HQ Staff as the staff are
and corps troops. It will also focus with them. The complexity of fighting ABOUT THE AUTHOR
on shaping the various levels of deep the corps battle (Deep, Close and Rear Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
battlespace to ensure success in the across all domains) and management in the G7 Branch at HQ Allied Rapid
Close battle. of the battle space requires familiarity Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
and cohesion that is difficult to achieve as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
rapidly unless formations are familiar JUMP.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 5
ARRC JOURNAL
MULTINATIONALITY –
HARNESSING ITS STRENGTHS
AND MINIMISING ITS FRICTIONS
Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro (ITA-A)
“Working in international organisations and living in foreign countries is not only an
adventure and experience for life, but it also generates issues. Some issues you can
prepare yourself for during the phase prior to posting, and others will come at a later date
and unexpectedly, but, that is why it is called an adventure.”
NATO is a multi-national organisation. airmen, they are sent as ambassadors for operability is much more than that; it starts
It gets its strength through being an their Nation and their Service. As military with people understanding each other.
alliance of 29 nations behind a common professionals they are often at the top of Within the NCS/NFS it is the people not
goal - Peace in Europe. However, their game, trained and educated to a equipment that are the critical capability.
that very strength can easily become high level, and destined for promotion. A ‘non-compatibility’ of understanding
weakness without careful management But the challenges they face once in post makes command and control harder and
and understanding and nowhere is this are numerous and, if not understood and can endanger our rate of success.
truer than within the military headquarters managed, potentially damaging.
In ancient history a story was written
of the NATO Command Structure (NCS)
Language about the Tower of Babel; the people who
and NATO Force Structure (NFS).
were building it were able to do so initially
The NCS and NFS bring together the The most obvious challenge is language. because they spoke the same language
best and brightest of NATO’s military Inter-operability is a phrase frequently but when language failed the task failed.
personnel. Selected by their nations for used in conjunction with multi-national This principle counts for international
their abilities as soldiers, sailors and operations, and usually refers to non- organisations as well. Without a
compatible equipment. But inter- common and clear understanding of our
doctrine, processes and tasks, a NATO
headquarters can easily become a box
of expensive but incompatible parts
rather than a finely-tuned engine.
While language is a beautiful thing
and our ability to integrate 29 nations
something to be proud of, how do we
minimise the friction of language? Here
are three thoughts:
• As nations, we must prepare our
people in a good and sufficient way
so they can maintain themselves.
Language classes before posting
help to overcome the most common
communication problems, but they do
not teach dialect or colloquialisms.
• As Headquarters, we must stick to one
operational language, write down most
Italian Army Major General Roberto D’Allesandro, deputy commander for the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, of our procedures and practices and
speaks with an ARRC British Army officer during Exercise ARRCADE Fusion 2015 stick to them.
6 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
• As individuals, we must understand can be more than one way to skin a unity of command, but we need to get
the difference between ‘hearing’ and cat’ if I am permitted to use an English as close as we can in building a real
‘understanding’. NATO Standard English colloquialism and, just sometimes, the professional multinational organisation
has its limitations and the speaker needs ‘other way of doing it’ might just have with shared responsibilities.
to ensure the listener has understood its merits. • Every nation sees different values
and not just heard. This brings a big in the NATO Alliance, and uses their
responsibility to native speakers. So What? membership in a different way. Some
As DCOM ARRC, I have had the nations invest a lot of money in their
privilege to observe both the strengths defence organisations to reach NATO
and weaknesses of a multi-national
headquarters from above and, now at
the end of my tour, I can look back at an
interesting and intense 3 year period. A “While language is a
period where I truly learned what can
be achieved when you not only harness
beautiful thing and our
the military experience and intellectual ability to integrate 29
power of multiple nations, but share
Spanish and British Army personnel conduct responsibilities as well and put it to work. nations something to
weapons familiarisation during Exercise Trident
Juncture 2016
The ARRC is rooted in its operational be proud of, how do we
high readiness role, but at the same time
Culture
it is at the forefront of experimentation
minimise the friction of
Another challenge is culture. Working
in an international organisation
and development activities. It invokes language?”
transformation and evolution - for
requires awareness, acceptance and Maj Gen D’Alessandro
example the new UK Doctrine on Corps
understanding of multiple cultures. Just
Operations; largely written by the ARRC’s
as misunderstood language can create
multinational, multicultural community
frictions, different cultures can and will
- and it works hard to be a career and
cause similar problems if not managed. standards, others invest less money.
life opportunity. But we need to be more
This is not only the ‘social’ cultural The same could be said about NATO
forward looking; thinking ourselves
difference experienced by ‘foreigners’ policies and doctrine. Some nations
deeper into the future and try to predict
when they choose to live abroad, but also have included NATO doctrine in their
what we need to be and planning how we
the different ‘professional’ cultures. At its national ones, others vice versa.
get there ahead of our adversaries, so
core, culture is a set of standards, values • Resurgent threats have different
for my closing points I offer the following
and beliefs which determines the way we responses from different nations. For
thoughts:
think, how we act and what we cherish. some it is ‘ah, back to the good old
It is impossible to instantly put aside days’, for others it is completely new and
our cultural norms when posted in an for others ‘we warned you’. However,
international organisation, because they the world has changed since the fall off
are the root of our identity. Where our the Berlin Wall in 1987. The ways we
posting is only temporary, and not for life, conducted major military operations in
it is even harder, because Internationals the past differs very much from how we
will go back home sooner or later. see it today. This difference demands
We must accept that, to succeed, an a change of mind set for all of us and
international organisation needs to be a a realisation that we cannot just reach
‘melting pot’ for cultures, give room for British, Croatian and Italian service personnel back to the things we have learned in
assigned to the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
those differences and work to ensure conduct operational wargaming during Exercise the past. We have to understand, we
we provide a ‘safe environment’ for ARRCADE Fusion 2017 have to learn and, most importantly, we
people to work in. We then will be able to have to adapt; and we must do so now
• The importance of NATO becomes if we are to be ‘Ready for tomorrow’.
generate cohesion and an atmosphere
ever more evident, and the ability of
that delivers success because of our I started by saying that the strength of
the Alliance to adapt is crucial for its
differences rather than despite them. NATO is in its diversity, unity and the
survival. The freedom to grow, shrink,
So, how can we harness the advantages focus and re-role as necessary are common goal. The potential damaging
and minimise the frictions of cultural becoming increasingly important factors internal dangers lay in that as well. We
differences? There is no one answer, but for success. Mass migration, natural need to guard against these internal
here are my suggestions: disasters caused by climate change, dangers. We have to be prepared as
geo-political issues and diminishing an alliance against external threats and
• As leaders we must understand all should continue to minimise the potential
natural resources cause tensions
those under our command and ensure for internal friction.
around the globe and NATO must have
we maximise their strengths and help
the means to respond to them all; and if
minimise their weaknesses. We must
necessary concurrently. ABOUT THE AUTHOR
create an atmosphere where cultural
differences are valued, recognised and • We need to remember that military Maj Gen Roberto D’Alessandro is the
harnessed (the good ones anyway). personnel serving in the NCS/NFS Deputy Commander at HQ Allied Rapid
have their own national chain of Reaction Corps.
• As individuals we must understand
command, Rules of Engagement and
that cultural differences and ways of
caveats. This has an effect on the
working are not inferior, that ‘there
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 7
ARRC JOURNAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO
RESPONSE FORCE (NRF)
Maj Alex Michael (GBR-A)
The NATO Response Force (NRF) provides the Alliance with the capability to conduct a
rapid demonstration of force and provide an ‘early entry’ military presence in response
to an emerging crisis. This article considers the work conducted by Headquarters Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), as the NRF Land Component Headquarters for 2017, to
further develop the NRF concept.
How did the NRF concept challenges faced by the Alliance. Under NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs1)
develop before 2017? changes introduced through the RAP, the in order to speed the Receipt, Staging,
Land portion of the NRF was enhanced Onward Movement (RSOM) of NRF
The NRF concept was launched in
to make it more responsive, more elements through the Joint Operational
November 2002, following the Prague
flexible and significantly larger and more Area (JoA). Note that MND-SE will
Summit. Subsequently, during a meeting
capable. Three echelons were formed at also be able to execute 2* command of
in June 2014, Allied Defence Ministers
graduated readiness; national and NATO Land forces up to
discussed the strategic implications of
Divisional scale (for Article 5 operations
Russia’s actions in and around Ukraine. • The Very High Readiness Joint Task
in the south-east).
The implications of a resurgent Russia, Force Land (VJTF(L)), a multi-national
coupled with a concern that the NRF was brigade-size force held at 5-7 days Refining the NRF(L)
already falling short of its mission, led notice to move, with Spearhead
Ministers to agree to develop a Readiness elements deployable within 48-72 As the first NRF Land Component
Action Plan (RAP) detailing how NATO hours; Command (LCC) HQ, NRDC-ESP
would respond to the challenges posed forged changes in the design, readiness
• An Initial Follow-on Forces Group and structure of the interim NRF(L)
by Russia. The RAP was to be ready for (IFFG), at 45 days notice to move;
approval at the September 2014 Wales model. With little conceptual guidance,
• A Follow-on Forces Group (FFG). NRDC-ESP contributed significantly to
Summit.
the current NRF Directive and helped
In addition, speed of deployment
The two mutually supporting pillars of the to ensure that the NRF reached full
would be increased by establishing the
RAP are the Assurance Measures and operational capability by the end of 2016.
necessary strategic lift mechanisms, a
the Adaptation Measures. Assurance Through staff visits and observations
Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG)
enacted through a continuous presence from training, HQ ARRC was able to
would be formed to provide theatre level
and activity in the eastern part of the benefit greatly from this work, confirming
logistic support, and advanced planning
Alliance, and adaptation carried out to improvements in the speed of
would enable accelerated decision-
address the current and evolving security deployment, the STRATCOM plan and in
making. A new and ambitious exercise
the management of this larger and more
programme was also designed with an
complex force. NRDC-ESP put the new
accompanying STRATCOM plan that
and improved NRF model on the road
would publicise the new capabilities
and handed the baton to HQ ARRC to
to friends (assurance) and potential
continue the evolution in 2017.
adversaries (deterrence) alike.
Noting the requirements laid down in
Finally, regional HQs such as Multi-
the new NRF Directive, the detailed
National Corps-North East (MNC-NE)
observations provided by NRDC-ESP,
based in Poland and Multi-National
and our own observations from our
Division-South East (MND-SE) based in
preparation year, HQ ARRC sought to use
Romania would take control of assigned
The Readiness Action Plan was agreed at the the planning and deployment periods of
Wales Summit
8 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS
READY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 and 22 as the means It became clear
to further develop the NRF concept. HQ that there were a
ARRC also supported the continuation number of risks to
training of JFC-NP during Ex TRIDENT the NRF which were
JOUST. From these we identified three neither captured
key areas of development: nor being managed.
To address this, HQ
• Deployment Under the control of
ARRC developed
JFC-NP3, the NOBLE JUMP 17 series
a risk register to
of exercises rehearsed, for the first
enable this HQ
time, the procedures and alerting
and others to
concept for all forces designated as
understand the
the NRF 17. Subsequently, using an
implications of risks
amended response plan to shape the
to the NRF and
deployment, Ex NOJP 2 enabled the
identify ways to
first deployment of elements of the The Spanish 7th Infantry Brigade handed over the VJTF(L) role
mitigate them.
VJTF(L) to the Alliance’s south-eastern
flank, supported by HQ MND-SE. This • 2* Level of Command • Coherent Narrative A coherent
was aided significantly by the early Coherent command and control is narrative that links all NATO exercise
deployment of the core-staff element essential and this year confirmed that a activity (and other national or bi-
from the JLSG (HQ ARRC). The Divisional level of command is needed lateral exercises) will help cohere
exercise validated the NATO Command for the NRF. The LCC HQ command our STRATCOM messaging. Crisis
Structure’s ability to rapidly deploy a and control of 29 (Land) divisional troop Response Planning periods (using the
ready and capable spearhead. It also force elements is unsustainable. In same ACO-directed exercise scenario)
provided a better understanding of the addition, a layer of complexity is added could also align across the other
amalgamated challenges created by when a LCC HQ attempts to coordinate Components, ensuring collaborative
multiple nations, deploying by multiple the battle rhythm between the campaign planning (up, down and sideways) to
means4, involving transit through planning of a JTF HQ and the execution maximise the value of training. Coherent
multiple countries. Once in the JoA, through tactical actions of the Land exercise, training and communication
HQ ARRC rehearsed the transfers of Component. As an Operational/higher- objectives could be issued to HRFs to
authority while MND-SE (supported by tactical HQ, the LCC must be able to ensure that they are linked through all
NFIU ROU and BGR and the Hellenic develop and refine plans up to 96 hours NRF exercise activity. The same link
Movement Control Centre) controlled in advance although its battle rhythm could flow to national exercise activity
the RSOM. The inward movement needs to also elongate to synchronise to achieve a fully holistic preparation.
of force elements over twelve days with the higher HQ. With an intermediate • Training Complexity and Realism
provided a suitably complex scenario 2* HQ, the complexity created between Further investment and development
for MND-SE and the NFIUs, allowing 3* and 1* HQs is mitigated. of the ISR , Influence and CMI
them to develop their understanding training environment is required. We
of their role throughout RSOM. It Recommendations should also ensure that we replicate
also confirmed the importance of Following our year as the NRF(L), HQ reality (Future Character of Conflict
understanding how the NRF uses Host ARRC has identified a number of key complexity) within the training construct
Nations and the associated liaison areas for further development to support and maximise opportunities for
requirements. The exercise enabled NRDC-ITA as they take on the mantle for experimentation activities. Wherever
the development of the relationships 2018: possible, NRF exercises should be led
and processes between the JLSG and • Larger Exercising Forces Not all
with an operational (J5/3) approach,
the regional HQs. It also enabled the VJTF(L) forces participated in Ex NOJP rather than a training (J7) approach.
LCC HQ to rehearse the deployment 2 and only small elements from the other They should also be Joint by nature,
of its Forward Coordination Element Components deployed. Although this owned by ACO and drive innovation at
and practice distributed command from year we increased the complexity for the every level of command.
its permanent HQ in Innsworth, UK. deployment phase, to further develop the
Operationally and conceptually the mechanics of a large scale deployment ABOUT THE AUTHOR
exercise projected active deterrence (and the message that it sends), future
and concept validation while building Maj Alex Michael is currently SO2 Policy
deployments could be larger in scale in the G7 branch at HQ Allied Rapid
the capacity of MND-SE and NFIU and include more elements from the
ROU and BGR. Reaction Corps. Previously he worked
Component Commands and Forward as the exercise planner for Ex NOBLE
• Risk Management There is value in Presence. Additionally, a table top JUMP.
identifying and managing risks to the exercise that included the whole NRF
NRF effectively so they can be reported would benefit future planning and
upon as part of routine procedure. help inform the process of adjusting
Their utility is also realised if captured the European theatre to enable rapid
in the operational planning process. deployment of the largest force.
1 New in-place force enablers.
2 Ex NOBLE JUMP 1 = AERTEX, Ex NOBLE JUMP 2 = ALERTEX followed by DEPLOYEX.
3 HQ ARRC G7 provided the Co-OPR for this exercise.
4 Eight countries by road, rail, air and sea.
5 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
6 The degree of complexity, however, needs to be coherent with the scope (level of ambition) of the exercise
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 9
ARRC JOURNAL
NEAR REAL-WORLD PLANNING –
TURNING WALES AND WARSAW
SUMMITS INTO REALITY
Col Richard Clements (GBR-A)
In early 2017, Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), whilst stood by
as the NATO Response Force (NRF) Land Component Command (LCC) Headquarters,
undertook a period of crisis response planning (CRP) in preparation for Exercise NOBLE
JUMP 2 (Ex NOJP2). Ex NOJP2 was a readiness and deployment exercise, in which
elements of HQ ARRC and the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (Land) (VJTF(L))1
brigade deployed to another NATO Alliance Country.
HQ ARRC’s planning was the first of its the complexities of rapid deployment Unit (NFIU) staff. NFIUs are relatively
kind by a High Readiness Force (Land) planning and the potential value of new NATO staff capabilities in HNs; not
Headquarters as it was based on a incremental deployments. only do they provide an immediate link
modified real world regional Graduated between NATO forces and HQs with HNs
Response Plan (GRP). This enabled HQ Value of Near-Real World forces and HQs, but they are critical in
ARRC to develop a LCC Operation Order Planning with Host Nation and early enablement of NATO forces.
(OPORD), replicating what would occur Key Staff
for real should that GRP be activated. The first significant lesson was the
Inconsistencies in GRPs
As such, it was the first time that a GRP value of using near-real world or real- Unsurprisingly, planning also identified
had been subject to notable scrutiny, world plans. This lesson had previously inconsistencies between and within
and the first time that it had been used been identified during 2015, when HQ the levels of GRPs, which can only be
to plan for real troops deploying to the ARRC planned and deployed to the found when testing the plans thoroughly
region; albeit in a planned exercise using Baltics. ARRC’s lessons from 2015 were through execution, albeit in a training
incorporated into the development of the context. GRPs are constructed with plans
GRP for that region. Whilst NATO policy at the strategic, operational and tactical
is not to exercise real world plans, a (component) levels. Whilst developed
small amount of revision of these plans - collaboratively, these plans are complex
to de-sensitise them and build in a near- and detailed and it is challenging to
real world scenario - enables significant achieve perfection. Consequently, some
training value to be gained. Members of the details contained in the plans were
of the planning staff at HQ ARRC were inconsistent between the different levels
able to develop a great understanding of plans, while others were inconsistent
Romanian troops assigned to NATO’s Multinational of the detail in the real-world GRP, within a plan. For example, some plans
Division Southeast conduct a live fire exercise in undertake detailed branch level analysis talked of ‘X’ days of supply (DOS), whilst
the Cincu Training Area in Romania during Exercise others articulated ‘Y’ DOS; indeed one
Noble Jump 2017 and understand the implications of
the geography, regional dynamics and plan talked of ‘X’ in the main body and ‘Y’
a scenario. This short article aims to Host Nations’ (HN) capabilities. This in the annexes. Whilst seemingly trivial,
highlight some of the lessons identified experience will be invaluable if the real- such detail becomes important in the
during CRP, in particular: the value of world GRP is to be activated at any stage timely execution of plans and can now
near-real world planning; the challenges whilst enhancing the value of ARRC’s be corrected.
faced when writing GRPs with sufficient readiness training and professional
detail to be executable rapidly, whilst development. Another lesson confirmed Command and control
also being sufficiently generic to cater was the immense value of HN liaison Command and control (C2) is a persistent
for numerous potential eventualities; officers and NATO Force Integration challenge in an Alliance context. C2
1 The VJTF(L) is a brigade sized force conceived at the Wales Summit in 2014 and now in its second year of combat effectiveness.
10 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPSREADY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
a realistic and credible strategy of
incremental deterrence, with increasingly
capable and sizeable forces being
deployed to ensure a balance is retained
between the provocation and deterrence
of a potential adversary. The concept of
incremental deterrence should be further
developed in the revision of GRPs for
the VJTF. It should be noted that force
elements deployed in such an incremental
approach must consist of balanced force
packages. For example, deployment of
combat forces with no logistics support
or firepower, is unsustainable and lacks
credibility. Tailoring of force packages
is required; for example some regions
require bespoke capabilities, such as
wet-gap crossing capabilities in areas
with wide rivers.
Conclusion
In sum, planning for Ex NOJP2 using
a near-real world GRP provided an
excellent opportunity for HQ ARRC to
rehearse and refresh skills in planning
for the execution of a real-world GRP.
Not only did the staff learn notable
lessons on the details in the plans,
Soldiers with the British Army’s 20th Armoured Infantry Brigade conduct a patrol in the Cincu Training Area in identifying inadvertent inconsistencies,
Romania during Exercise Noble Jump 2017 but they also gained a considerably
arrangements are already well defined this in a timely manner. As a result, greater understanding of a region and
in all GRPs, but what is often not well a combination of the NFIUs and a HN capabilities not previously studied.
defined in order to retain agility, is nominated tactical HQ will be required The detailed lessons identified can
which HQ is to undertake which role. to deliver RSOM. Ex NOJP2 employed now be fed back into the revision of the
For example, the plans do not stipulate HQ Multi-National Division (South-East) real-world GRPs to make them more
which HQ would act as the LCC HQ as (MND(SE)) as the tactical level RSOM
there are several different options above HQ and this HQ developed the tactical
that of HQ ARRC in 2017. This said, the level RSOM, ably supported in turn by
lengthy and complex discussions over HQ ARRC Enabling Command staff, who
exact C2 between force elements for Ex have supported Joint Force Command
NOJP2, further blurred and compounded (Naples’) JLSG in 2017. HQ MND(SE)
by national, real-world and exercise C2 managed numerous complexities
differences, highlighted how essential and multiple competing pressures of
early and detailed clarity of C2 is. different force contributing nations with
Execution of a GRP under time-pressure a deployment over 3 different countries.
does not afford NATO the opportunity to This complex RSOM planning must be
discuss and resolve these C2 challenges sufficiently pre-developed that rapid Soldiers with the Polish Army’s 10th Dragoons
in the face of a real opposition; which refinement can be conducted to ensure Battalion conduct a movement to contact drill in the
Cincu Training Area in Romania during Exercise
HQ is delivering what C2 must be more that RSOM structures and C2 are in Noble Jump 2017
clearly defined in the baseline GRP. place as lead elements of the VJTF(L)
deploy. Tactical RSOM planning is effective. Ex NOJP2 and the planning
Reception Staging and the most time and resource pressured using a near-real world GRP tangibly
Onwards Movement Planning requirement in an emerging deployment demonstrates that the concepts of the
and will represent one of the greatest Readiness Action Plan, GRPs and the
Another notable challenge is timely and
risks to delivery of timely notice to effect. VJTF as conceived at the Wales summit
effective tactical level Reception Staging
in 2014 and refined at Warsaw 2016, are
and Onwards Movement (RSOM)
planning. In all GRPs, the operational Incremental Deterrence and now being delivered as truly deployable
Balanced Force Packaging and credible capabilities.
commander directs a tactical HQ to
undertake the tactical level RSOM The utility of the VJTF(L) in early
planning and then command the tactical deterrence was reinforced by planning ABOUT THE AUTHOR
execution of RSOM in the land domain. for Ex NOJP2. Only part of the VJTF(L) Col Richard Clements is ACOS G5 Plans
Whilst NATO doctrine is that this tactical brigade deploy on Ex NOJP2 and the at HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.
RSOM should be commanded by the deployment is being ‘played’ on the
Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG), a exercise as an incremental deployment,
lack of standing JLSG at high readiness with further simulated follow-on forces
precludes the JLSG from delivering deploying. This design represents
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 11ARRC JOURNAL
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE
OF A STRATCOM MINDSET?
Wg Cdr Peter Clarke (GBR-AF)
StratCom is now an established military buzzword, one which many use but few
understand. To make matters worse, we are now expected to adopt a ‘StratCom mindset’;
difficult if you aren’t really sure what StratCom is in the first place. So, what is a StratCom
Mindset and why does it matter?
Military Committee Policy ‘StratCom is not a stand-alone function, policy, is to place responsibility with
The recently introduced NATO but it ensures the coherence and the Chief StratCom (in the case of HQ
Military Committee Policy on Strategic effectiveness of existing capabilities. ARRC, Ch JFIB) for understanding,
Communications (MC0628) goes some This model is most appropriate to the full coordinating and synchronising all
way to bringing clarity to the issue. As range of activities covering peacetime, activity (words and deeds) that may have
noted in COS SHAPE’s letter to NATO crisis and conflict in the modern security a strategic communications effect on our
Command Structure (NCS) & NATO environment’. audiences and stakeholders; and a focus
Force Structure (NFS) Commanders1, that should be maintained throughout
The cumulative effect of these two key
the Policy directs the introduction of a peace, crisis and conflict.
statements, reinforced throughout the
separate pillar, grouping together all
communications disciplines and reporting
directly to the Commander, in order to
oversee and integrate information effects
‘during peace, crisis and conflict’. In
doing so, the policy recognises that the
information environment is already a
contested space, in which our potential
adversaries are already manoeuvring.
The Policy also redefines StratCom for
the NATO Military structure as:
‘the integration of communication
capabilities and the information staff
function with other military activities,
in order to understand and shape the
Information Environment (IE), in support
of NATO aims and objectives.’
Not only does this definition now focus
StratCom specifically towards the
strategic (NATO Aims and Objectives),
but it places equal emphasis on both the
activity and the outcomes.
The policy also goes on to say that: The Operational Spectrum in the 21st Century
1 SH/SAG STC/AM17-318278 dated 17 Aug 17.
12 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPSREADY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
What It’s Not So Communications is an action, it objectives; not an activity. Objectives
Before we look at what it is, let’s consider requires only a sender. It is what you should wherever possible be
what StratCom is not. do. achievable, measurable, focused on
outcomes not outputs, and related to
• Not (just) Public Affairs. While Communication (noun): “The imparting
changing attitudes and/or behaviour.
Military Public Affairs (MPA) is often or exchanging of information” “The
the primary communications function successful conveying or sharing of ideas Audience Insight (The Who and
for delivering StratCom effects, it is and feelings”. The key element here is Why)
not StratCom. MPA conducts activity the receiver – Communication is an If we try to communicate with
to deliver the effects assigned to it, but effect, it is what is understood by the everyone, all the time, all at once, we
the identification, planning, sync, coord receiver, it is what you achieve. will fail. To achieve your objectives
and measurement of those effects is The final element in a basic will require an understanding of who
conducted by the StratCom function. understanding of communications theory your key audiences and stakeholders
are, and why. Identifying those who
can help or hinder your ability to
achieve your objective will enable
effective communications activity and
minimising wasted effort.
Strategy/Idea (The What and When)
Once we understand who can affect
our outcome and why, we need to
consider what effect we need to
have on them and why. The effect
could be one of change - attitudinal
or behaviour – or it could be one
of reinforcing existing beliefs and
behaviours.
Implementation (The How)
It will be rare that we will be able to
Strategic Communication is everyone’s business have the desired effects on all our
audiences from a single message
• Not (just) at Strategic level. Strategic is to appreciate that what you say is not delivered through a single channel.
impact can come from the most tactical always what is heard. To communicate This means that, to be effective, our
action. Commanders at all levels effectively we need to understand our messages should be tailored to our
should ensure they have an advisor audience, understand how they hear, audiences and as much thought given
whose role is to keep a weather eye how they make sense of the world. For to the channels (how we deliver the
on the strategic situation and intervene example, try telling an American that message) as the message itself.
should they believe a decision, however walking on the pavement is the safest
tactically sound, may have adverse place to be!
strategic impact.
• Not (just) someone else’s business.
StratCom is everyone’s business. Our
actions speak louder than our words,
and the best scripted statements and
media engagements will come to
naught if our actions contradict them.
So, now we know what it’s not, let’s
consider what it is.
Communications Theory for Reassurance of Home
Beginners and Host Nation
Audiences is vital to
To understand StratCom you have to success on operations
understand its nature, and the importance So, now we have an understanding of the Evaluation and Scoring (the How
of language. That involves at least a little ‘What’; we need to think about the ‘How’. Good)
knowledge of communications theory. For this, NATO has adopted the OASIS Measurement of Performance
Communicate (verb): “Share or model for communications planning: (MoP) is a straightforward exercise;
exchange information” “Succeed in Objectives (The Outcome) combining outputs and audience reach
conveying one’s ideas or in evoking to demonstrate message penetration.
understanding in others” In other words, Like all activities, if you don’t know
Unfortunately, Measurement of
to communicate requires a sender where you are going, you will
Effect (MoE) is much more difficult; a
and a receiver. probably end up somewhere else.
merging of art and science, of insight
Effective StratCom planning has to
and evaluation. This is an area into
Communications (noun): “Means start with an clearly defined endstate
which much time and effort is being
of sending or receiving information”. and supporting communications
devoted; but we’re not there yet.
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 13ARRC JOURNAL
Conclusion
A StratCom mindset has to:
Objectives • Start with a desired endstate not an
activity;
• Understand that communication is a
key objective to all activity, and that all
Audience Insight activity communicates;
Review and refresh • Be able to view our activities (both
the approach after words and deeds) through the
each phase of the audiences’ eyes, ears and brain.
campaign • Understand that sound tactical action
Strategy/Idea may have adverse strategic effects; we
may win the battle but lose the war!
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Wg Cdr Peter Clarke is currently Chief
Implementation PAO in the Joint Fires and Influence
Branch at HQ Allied Rapid Corps.
Feedback
to optimise
implementation
Scoring/Evaluation
So What? Strategy: While nationally, politicians
It is vital that all personnel in an have no concerns messaging their
organisation understandand are aligned populations to achieve a desired
to a StratCom mindset, thereby ensuring effect, the same is not true of external
that finite resources are focussed on organisations, however friendly. This
the desired end state and its supporting gives the NFS a key role in enabling,
objectives. If they do not, energy and coordinating and supporting bi-lateral
effort will be wasted on non-essential NATO/National communications to their
activities, and well-meaning tactical home audiences.
activity could undermine the strategic Implementation: To be effective, NATO
intent. But what does this mean for the communications need to be conducted
NATO Military structure? at all levels; making clear direction and
Objectives: NATO’s ‘raison d’etre’ is delegation essential. NATO StratCom
the deterrence of potential adversaries, Frameworks, correctly used, enable
and reassurance of alliance members NCS/NFS personnel to effectively direct
and their populations. Both of these are their organisations communications
communication effects – so NATO’s key outputs; and to understand when and
output is communications. Consequently. how to get direction if they are unsure. Deterrence of potential adversaries is a
fundamental role for NATO
Commanders at all levels need to ensure
that measurable effects for all activities
conducted by their organisation include
the delivery of one or both of these
effects; and communications form part of
all initial scoping and planning.
Audiences: NATO has 29 Allies,
numerous partners, and several
potential adversaries. Those audiences
span a huge range of cultural, linguistic
and ethnic diversity; each with a deeply
ingrained narrative. Understanding each,
communicating with each, and ensuring
that those communications are mutually
supporting and do not contradict each
other is a huge task that can only be
done if Alliance and National capabilities
are brigaded and aligned; a role ideal for
the NFS.
14 ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPSREADY FOR TODAY – EVOLVING FOR TOMORROW
GENDER ADVISING AT
HQ ALLIED RAPID REACTION
CORPS – A SUCCESS STORY?
Capt Nina Schommers (DEU-A)
Adopting a gender perspective means considering the socially constructed attributes
of men, women, boys and girls, thus taking the entire population into account, whilst
recognising their differences. The point to prove is that the implementation of gender
perspective into the planning and conduct of military operations will have a positive
effect on immediate, and more importantly long term, mission success.
officer. The focus of the GENAD,
however, is directed outward. He or she
observes the behaviour and the effects
of a military unit in its assigned area of
operations. GENADs focus on the civilian
population in theatre, not on equality and
equal rights within HQ ARRC or NATO
Forces.
“Women’s participation in global security
isn’t a favour to women. There can be
no lasting peace without equal inclusion
of both men and women.” (Secretary
General Stoltenberg, 2016).
It is a fact that wars have different effects
on men, women and children. All too
often, conflicts cause great harm to the
civilian population, especially to those
who are particularly vulnerable. Gender-
Diversity - Representatives from 11 NATO headquarters, 12 nations, soldiers and civilians came together to based crimes such as mass or gang
discuss the integration of the Gender Perspective within NATO
rapes, trafficking of women and girls,
For this purpose, the position of Gender of the GENAD at HQ ARRC is to raise slave trade, forced marriages and the
Advisor (GENAD) at HQ ARRC was awareness for gender-related issues. recruitment of child soldiers are often
introduced in 2014. During peacetime This includes clarifying the term and its used as warfare strategies. This is why
establishment, the GENAD position is a impact on the conduct of operations. they have to be assessed as part of
part-time job which becomes a full-time HQ ARRC follows the NATO guidelines the enemy situation, just like the type,
position in exercises and missions, as on the subject and has now firmly strength and behaviour of the enemy
staff numbers are increased. A GENAD established its position as both an forces.
is the point of contact for the commander advocate and a pioneer in the field of
NATO has officially applied the gender
when it comes to gender-specific issues gender at the highest tactical level.
perspective since 2009. The work is
during missions.
Why is the Integration of the based on NATO’s Bi-SC Directive 40-1
Viewing operations from a different angle (“Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender
Gender Perspective Important
turned out to be a real necessity for HQ Perspectives in the NATO Command
ARRC for the first time in 2015, when it
for HQ ARRC? Structure Including Measures for
assumed its role as a Joint Task Force. Often, the GENAD is associated or even Protection during Armed Conflict”). The
At the moment, the most important job confused with an equal opportunities directive determines that the gender
ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS 15ARRC JOURNAL
aspect has to be considered in the early in conflicts to a significantly lesser “female searchers”, as part of female
planning stages of operations. Thus, it extent than men – into the post-conflict engagement teams (FET) or mixed
is the duty of the HQ ARRC GENAD to peace and reconstruction process via engagement teams (MET). Through the
be involved in the working and planning networking and inclusion measures. The inclusion of women, all measures can
process from the beginning until the aim of integrating the gender aspect is to contribute to a better understanding of
end. He or she provides support through expand the military sphere of influence the operational environment and the
by gaining more information and a more protection of forces.
complete operational picture.
The Integration of the Gender
“Women’s Gender in NATO Missions Perspective at HQ ARRC
participation in global Abroad To guarantee that the gender perspective
Current operations such as KFOR in is taken into account across the
security isn’t a favour Kosovo and RSM in Afghanistan have whole HQ, all Branches have Gender
to women. There already seen the successful integration Focal Points (GFP). The GFPs act as
of GENADs. While these positions are multipliers and sensors for the GENAD.
can be no lasting manned by individual nations, they ensure In addition to completing an online-
that NATO as a whole has integrated based NATO training programme, they
peace without equal the gender aspect into deployments. are offered courses on the subject of
inclusion of both men Not every nation necessarily needs to “gender in operations” and learn what
provide such a position. For example to watch out for in their respective field.
and women.” during ARRC’s time as the NRF in 2017 They provide the GENAD with access
Spanish, British, Italian, Czech and other to their department and he or she can
Secretary General Stoltenberg, 2016 military units had to report to the HQ. All benefit from their expertise. Together
those countries have trained GENADs, they ensure that the military action taken
as do 21 out of the 29 NATO member by the HQ incorporates the gender
specialised expertise, similar to the states. Whether one of their GENADs perspective.
political advisor (POLAD) and cultural would actually be available in the event
advisor (CULAD). This can, for instance, In its role as a Corps HQ, ARRC is
of an operational deployment however,
take the form of contributions or annexes the highest tactical level of command.
could not be determined.
to Operation Orders. These can deal with Specific points of contact with the
everything from general gender aspects in The number of women in theatre – or population in theatre however are to be
operations, sex desegregated reporting, rather the fact that there are female found at lower levels of command. Ideally
sexual and gender based violence as soldiers available for NATO missions and in the future, the HQ should further
well as the code of conduct in the area of at all – is important for many different intensify cooperation on gender issues
operation. Another aspect of their job is to reasons. Depending on the mission with its subordinate units. The network of
integrate women – who often participate and the security situation, female GENADs and GFPs must reach all the
soldiers are needed and employed as way down to the lowest tactical level, in
A First - In May 2017 HQ ARRC hosted the 8th ACO Gender Conference. Mandated by SHAPE, this was the first time the conference was hosted by a Corps level HQ.
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