Media Landscapes and Disinformation in the V4 - Visegrad Insight
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2(11)|2017
ISSN 2084-8250 | GBP€4.99 | EURO€6.00 | PLN 16.00
The Buzz
Around
The Ballot
ISSN 2084-8250
11
Media Landscapes and Disinformation in the V4
9 772084 825077
7 December 2017
Warsaw
Conference organizers:
T H O U G H T P R O V O K I N G
Conference partners:
2 (11) | 2017
circulation: 6,000
frequency: twice a year
editor-in-chief
Wojciech Przybylski (Res Publica, PL)
twitter: @wprzybylski
director of operations
Magda Jakubowska (Res Publica, PL)
m.jakubowska@visegradinsight.eu
+ 48 694 40 19 80
editor
Galan Dall (Res Publica, USA)
editor@visegradinsight.eu
online content editor
Gabriela Rogowska (Res Publica, PL)
gabriela.rogowska@visegradinsight.eu
senior associate
Marcin Zaborowski (Res Publica, PL)
twitter: @MaZaborowski
associate
Anna Wójcik (Res Publica, PL)
twitter: @annawojcik
economy section editor
Martin Ehl (Hospodářské noviny, CZ)
twitter: @MartinCZV4EU
intelligent mind editors
Éva Karádi (HU)
Marta Šimečková (SK)
books editor
Julia Sherwood (SK)
contributing editors
Juraj Čorba (SK)
Katarína Kucbelová (SK)
Marek Sečkař (CZ)
Sophie Shevchuk (UA)
Máté Zombory (HU)
graphic design
Published by
Fundacja Res Publica im. H. Krzeczkowskiego
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Cover by Paweł Kuczyński
Visegrad Insight is an analysis and opinion journal led by accomplished editors from the Visegrad Group countries: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Its aim is to provide a platform for high profile debate on the perspectives and challenges for cooperation
of the Central European governments, business and communities. Published by Res Publica, Poland.
T h o u g h T p r o v o k i n g
2 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017
EDITORIAL
The buzz
around the ballot
Every period in history has its jokes including the Post-truth era. This one has been
PIOTR BEKAS
told following the occupation of Crimea: if it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck and
denies it’s a duck, it’s a Russian duck. In truth, our duck does not quack – it tweets!
The acronym of the Russian IRA stands today for a new kind of terrorist organisation
– the Internet Research Agency (AKA the troll factory) whose operations were recent-
ly revealed in relation to the electoral campaign in the USA.
What makes the Russian fake-news campaign so successful? It appears that the con-
temporary masters of lies the IRA are able to considerably influence the global demo-
cratic process. Is it due to their strength or more due to our weakness?
The latter explanation makes more sense. During the recent digital revolution – a
rapid process that had a vast impact on our societies, we let hostile scouts take over
part of our domestic electoral agenda.
This autumn, Twitter’s self-audit revealed that nearly half of the American population
has been exposed to this Russian campaign of hate and fake-news. The goal, apparent-
ly, was not only to have Donald Trump elected but to polarise the American society.
The IRA sponsored both radicalism of the right and of the left. But why was it possible
in the first place?
Two particular developments revived this mass scale disinformation. First – the 2008
WOJCIECH PRZYBYLSKI financial crisis that struck down traditional media all across the world, and second
Editor-in-chief
– the rapid growth of social media. Capitalism and the internet, neither one a Russian
invention, quickly became the new weapons of the information age.
THE SWIFT GROWTH OF SOCIAL Central Europe, in many ways, has become more exposed than the USA or other EU
MEDIA TOOK REVENUE FROM TRA- partners. The swift growth of social media took revenue from traditional media outlets
DITIONAL MEDIA OUTLETS AND EX- and exposed societies to pure political propaganda. Editorial oversight, often referred
POSED SOCIETIES TO PURE POLITICAL to as gatekeeping, no longer safeguards social media followers and friends from direct
PROPAGANDA exposure to divisive practices. As a reaction, Facebook introduced its own editorial
oversight that was revealed earlier this year, but it might not have been soon enough
for countries that had already been heavily exposed.
As we show, compared to Germany, in 2017 more people in the V4 (+10%) prefer and
have trust in so-called “alternative media” than in mainstream outlets. Trust in main-
stream media is further undermined by poor business models that are not catching
up with the quickly growing digital advertising market.
In the Post-truth era, the fourth estate of democracy, counting social media in, has
become a challenge to democracy. To build up democratic, resilience let’s start with
resilience of quality media.
3
CONTENTS
EUROPE
POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
6 urvey – The Impact of the Internet on
S
Media and Politics Szabolcs Töhötöm
Tóth, Karel Kovář, Zuzanna Ziomecka,
Tomáš Bella, Eric Maurice
10
House Undivided – How pro-Putin
ideologues have united both the
far-right and the far-left in their
unwavering support of the Kremlin’s
geopolitical agenda Péter Krekó,
interview with
Lóránt Győri
Robert Pszczel from
13 ire and Brimstone – Deception and
F the NATO HQ
Dread in Central Europe Galan Dall
Illustration: Paweł Kuczyński
From Tweets to Tanks – interview
16
16
with Robert Pszczel from the NATO
HQ
ECONOMY PAGE
SOCIAL MEDIA
Report: Media Consumption Trends –
18
in cooperation with weCAN network
20 The Vulnerable V4 Miriam Lexmann WHAT ARE MEDIA
MEDIA
CONSUMPTION
POPULISM & POWER TRENDS IN V4
24 T he Cassandra Curse Danuta
Dobrzyńska-Schmimer
26 T he Czech Elections and the Future
of Media Independence Václav Štĕtka
28 The New Enemy Zselyke Csaky
The Shadow over media Michał
30
18
Kobosko
34 J ournalism’s Growing Pains in
Visegrad Beata Balogová
PAGE
38 Making lemonade Zosia Wasik
40
The Pitfalls of Censoring Fake News
Barbora Bukovska in conversation
SECTION
with Aleksandra Eriksson
43 Imbalance and Glass Ceilings
Greta Gober
45
Gender Equality in CEE Media,
Helena Chmielewska-Szlajfer
SECURITY
CYBER
48
The State of Cyber Security in the V4
Botond Feledy
51
June 2017 Cyber Attack in Ukraine
Michael Chertoff, former Secretary
24
of Homeland Security
52
How vulnerable is the Polish Cyber
World to Attacks Tomasz Matuła
PAGE
4 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017
CONTENTS
INTERVIEW
The Hurdles Ahead
THE HURDLES
EU ON THE EDGE
55 T remors in Europe’s
The Report Card Foundation
for Central Europe
AHEAD FOR Roland Freudenstein
CENTRAL
EUROPE
V4 ABROAD
Iveta Radičová FUTURE OF EU
59 T he End of Convergence Cornelius
Ochmann, Wojciech Przybylski
60
The Different Faces of Visegrad
Kai-Olaf Lang
61 T he Hurdles Ahead for Central Europe
Iveta Radičová
64
Germany and Central Europe
Michal Kořan
68
The Euro, Always on the Central
European Edit Inotai
70 dditional Conditions
A
61
Zoltán Kovács, Secretary of State of
Hungary, on the adoption of the euro
in Hungary
PAGE 71 urozone membership – the Facts,
E
the Game, and the Debate – flash
report by Visegrad Insight
84
72 The Parisian Mirror Milan Nič
75 ho Will Be Served at the Table
W
and Who Will Be Served for Dinner,
PAGE Edit Zgut
The Small Steps of Europe Paweł
78
Kowal, former deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs
Rastislav Káčer 82
What German Elections mean for
Central Europe Marcin Zaborowski
INTELLIGENT MIND
SLOVAKIA
84 on’t Merchandise Doubt Rastislav
D
Káčer
BOOKS
89
FICTION WE LOVE
89 In Literature Julia Sherwood
90 Emöke Szabó Lovas
PAGE
92 Magdalena Mullek
93 Anna Zaranko
94 Michal Jareš
Julia Sherwood, Emöke Szabó Lovas,
Magdalena Mullek, Anna Zaranko, Michal Jareš
5
EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
We have asked five
internet savvy editors
about the buzz around
the ballot. What was
the impact of the internet
on media and politics
SURVEY in recent years?
6 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017
POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
SZABOLCS TÖHÖTÖM TÓTH
Editor-in-Chief of Magyar Nemzet (Hungarian nation), a Hungar-
ian daily founded by Sándor Pethő in 1938. He is also project
leader for the online development of the newspaper.
W
ith Donald Trump rising to power, the debate on To make things worse for those Hungarian news outlets
fake news has engulfed editorial pages, prompt- that still try to resist this surge, the government has become
ed hosts of news stories and provoked myriads one of the biggest advertisers in the media market. In fact,
of twitter posts all over Europe and in the United according to the CANnual Report 2017 (see pages 18–19 in
States. Less attention has been paid though to another dan- this issue), the Prime Minister’s Office was the second biggest
gerous phenomenon. One that I would call the “fake media”. advertiser in Hungary in 2016, following the German telecom-
In Hungary, the government has managed to create one munication giant Telekom.
so successfully that newspapers, television stations and online Of course, this advertisement money goes to friend-
news sites belonging to its propaganda machine now threaten ly media companies. To add more insult to injury, there is a
to suffocate the real thing: those who still try to maintain ed- widespread perception that private companies are under pres-
itorial independence and work with the traditional watchdog sure by the Hungarian government not to place ads in news
approach to those in power. outlets that are perceived as enemies by Fidesz, Hungary’s
In the last three or four years, through friendly business- ruling party.
men and thinly veiled direct funding, the Hungarian govern- This brutal interference has resulted in an extremely dis-
ment has channeled hundreds of billions of forints into buying torted media market, where independent players are bound
existing media companies and creating new ones. Now, it ef- to compete with a thinly-veiled state-run media conglomerate
fectively controls (through its cronies) one of the two over- that is awash with public and (scared) private money in an
the-air commercial television channels (Tv2), two national economic system that is more and more controlled and bullied
newspapers (Magyar Idők and Magyar Hírlap), a free daily by the state.
distributed on mass transit lines (Lokál), two national tabloid Meanwhile, market trends that have hit media compa-
daily newspapers (Ripost and Bors), the biggest Hungarian on- nies hard in other countries of Europe are of course present
line news site (Origo), a television news channel (Echo TV), a in Hungary as well. The decline of print ad revenue coupled
news radio channel (Karc FM), all of the regional daily news- with the growing amount of money that Google and Facebook
papers (!) and their associated online news sites, and an addi- is diverting from these companies are huge problems for
tional two, relatively new, online news sites (Pesti Srácok and Hungarian media companies.
888) – besides weekly newspapers and several smaller scale Thus, under these circumstances, the Hungarian govern-
news operations on the internet. ment does not have to curb press freedom to silence dissent:
While acquiring all these riches, in 2016 it managed to all it has to do is to create competitors to private companies
buy and shut down the leftist Népszabadság, one of Hungary’s that are already under siege by market forces, in order to cre-
flagship daily national newspapers. ate fake media that tries to behave like the real one. Except for
Of course, the government is also served by the whole its main goal is not to hold the government accountable, but to
public media, which has practically been enslaved and re- assist it, not to expose propaganda, but to spread it, and not to
duced to a propaganda machine on steroids, including the unveil the truth but to hide it in an artificially created noise.
state-run news agency, multiple television channels, radio
stations and an online news site. All financed with taxpayer
money, of course.
7
EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
ZUZANNA ZIOMECKA
Editor-in-Chief of NewsMavens.com. A media maker driven by
the conviction that diversity and inclusion are the best way for-
ward for our VUCA world. She uses media and journalism to cre-
ate leadership interventions into issues that she feels deeply
about. A woman, a mother, a European, a practitioner and pro-
moter of mindfulness, and a great admirer of pirates.
T
he internet has eliminated the barrier of entry into me-
dia. In these days of intense social media penetration,
everyone is a commentator and politicians no longer
need the media to get through to their constituencies. A
major challenge in this situation is that advertisers, the bread
and butter of the media business, also no longer need the me-
dia to reach audiences. This puts media in a position it has
never been in before – we now have to prove our utility to both
the public and the consumer goods industry.
KAREL KOVÁŘ A clear trend in this search for a new “reason to be” is the
One of the most popular Czech video bloggers who introduced emergence of fact checking as a media format. Instimojer, a
political themes to Czech video blogging cementing his status fact checking NGO in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an example
by being one of three to interview President Juncker. In 2016, of a stand-alone institution dedicated to checking claims and
he received the Blogger of the Year award. Forbes has identified promises made by local authorities. A story recently released
him as the 17th most influential Czech on social networks in on Instinomjer gives an inside look at how Bosnian politicians
2016 and listed him as one of the 30 most talented Czechs make use of loose regulations to put up their own online news
aged under 30. He was also listed as a New Europe 100 chal- sources that launch smear campaigns against political rivals.
lenger by Res Publica, Google, Financial Times and the Visegrad Another example is Gazeta Wyborcza’s SONAR – a big data
Fund in 2017. start-up also created to track local politicians.
I
t is brutal I would say. News especially. Basically, every-
body is dealing with something I call information mad-
ness nowadays. Sometimes it´s very hard to tell what´s
the truth and what´s just a fake story. People are mostly
confused not knowing what to trust anymore, which creates
instability and distrust. That is extremely convenient for big
powers (especially Russia), which want to see the EU divided
and unstable. There is enough evidence that Russia itself is
helping to create this kind of situation through hacking and
paid “news outlets” which have been successful in spreading
an epidemic of fake news stories. Feeling that the EU does not
care enough, Visegrad is moving closer to the so-called strong
leadership idea and basic values like free independent media
or parliamentary democracy are being threatened.
8 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
ERIC MAURICE
Editor-in-Chief of EUobserver. Before joining the Brussels-based
news website, he was editor-in-chief of Presseurop, a pan-Euro-
pean and multilingual media project. A graduate from the Par-
is-Sorbonne University in history of international relations and
the Paris École Supérieure de journalisme, he started his ca-
reer at the French weekly Courrier International, where he suc-
cessively was in charge of the French, US and Western Europe
desks.
I
t is not an original thing to say, but the internet has ac-
celerated the pace of news because everyone now – in-
cluding journalists – expect articles on any event to come
online very quickly, as if they were just an extension of
tweets and news alerts.
That tendency is intensified by the fact that the internet
has also extended the competition – traditional media, pure
players, news agencies (which traditionally were only provid-
TOMÁŠ BELLA ers for news organisations, not directly to the public) are at the
Co-founder and head of online at Dennik N, independent Slo- same level but with their own characteristics and pace.
vak daily newspaper. Daily “N” was founded in 2015 by former To follow that pace, you have to try to publish different
members of the editorial team of SME daily. Previously, he was kinds of news – breaking, factual or analytical. In these realms,
the editor-in-chief at Sme.sk and CEO at Piano, a company pro- the biggest publishers have an advantage.
ducing paid-content software for publishers. Nominated as a On EU politics, the impact – seen from a more cyni-
New Europe 100 challenger for introducing the ground-breaking cal perspective – is that the institutions, and mainly the EU
technology of a pay-wall for media content by Res Publica, Goog- Commission, use this environment to better control the
le, Financial Times and the Visegrad Fund. information.
They know that we journalists have to work quickly, and
T
often they give us documents at the last minute, just before a
he internet, especially in smaller countries, allows poli- commissioner comes to make an announcement. Then we have
ticians to cut out the (media) middle man, which can be only their point of view if we want to write our article quickly.
used for both good and evil. Some politicians enter into Politicians – and I include commissioners, MEPs, more
honest public discussions with their voters which allows than just EU national leaders – also communicate more
citizens to get direct answers from them and better informa- through social media by sharing articles and reports they
tion about their attitudes than through media (or billboards). like, or in which they are quoted, or even opinion pieces they
On the other hand, the internet made it very easy for wrote (and which are mainly written in order to be shared on
extremists to communicate directly with potential voters, social media).
something that used to be much harder through the filter of EU officials and politicians know that journalists in
traditional media. Brussels spend all their days on Twitter. So that’s how they
In the end, I believe the effect will be positive but, as share their speeches, react to events, deny news, try to spread
with any other new medium, people will need to go through their spin. From that point of view, Twitter has become a
years of slowly learning how to use the medium and how to quasi-official means of communication, much more than
recognize and avoid its potential traps. Facebook.
9EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
A House
Undivided
How pro-Putin ideologues have united
both the far-right and the far-left in their
unwavering support of the Kremlin’s
geopolitical agenda
Illustration: Paweł Kuczyński
PÉTER KREKÓ AND LÓRÁNT GYŐRI
A
little more than a year mostly older pensioners burnt out by the the works of the leading neo-Eurasian
ago, a limited circle of Trianon trauma and some youths sport- ideologist Alexander Dugin.
fans gathered in a small ing discreet Hitler-Jugend haircuts, all The sympathy of Ms. Őry to the
far-right bookstore lo- of them ready to hear the author, Daniel pro-Kremlin emigre circle of far-right ac-
cated underground of Friberg, speak about the immigrant situ- tivists residing in Budapest is not surpris-
one of the most prom- ation in Europe. ing. She is the Head of the Foreign Desk
inent plazas in Buda- A journalist, Mariann Őry was also at the right-wing Magyar Hírlap news-
pest to welcome the among the crowd and even introduced paper – owned by a pro-Fidesz oligarch
new book of the European “alt-right” (in Mr. Friberg as a regular economist in her – that openly promotes an anti-immigra-
fact: Nazis in suits) titled “The Real Right journal. The author is in fact an ex-Swed- tion, illiberal, misogynistic and homo-
Returns: A Handbook for the True Op- ish neo-Nazi turned CEO of the Arktos phobic agenda, resonating governmental
position”. The audience was composed of group, the main European publisher of messages.
10 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
Where this story gets interesting is portrays him (as well as Putin) as a Saint ANTI-FASCISTS IN ARMS IN V4
that Őry is in fact the daughter of Gyula George who fights against the dragon of COUNTRIES: HUNGARY, CZECHIA
Thürmer, the Chairman of the Hungarian Islamic terrorism. AND POLAND
Workers’ Party (HWP) – a successor of The second important point is that Of course, after four decades of state
the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party converging anti-establishment, anti-EU socialism, the post-communist block is
(MSZMP), the only political remnant and anti-NATO narratives on the radi- not the stronghold of the radical left any-
of hardcore, orthodox communism. cal left and radical right often manifest more. The general fate of Central-Eastern
She used to be on the political board themselves in cooperation. One such European far-left parties is that they fade
of the party, when her father turned it example involves the “nationalist radical away, unable to modernize themselves,
into a pro-Russian family-business after leftist portal” called Bal-rad. This web- losing their old voters while having diffi-
2010. She also enthusiastically reported page, pushing several pro-Russian arti- culties to attract the new urban, educat-
about her father’s press conferences on cles embedded in a bizarre combination ed electorate that the green parties reach
Syria, Crimea and other foreign policy of radical left-nationalist and anti-glo- out to. Instead, these parties keep living
issues – in all of these cases, presenting balist narratives was sponsored by Lukoil as communist spectres of the Soviet past.
standpoints totally compatible with the – despite their being an utterly marginal The only relevant political force in
Kremlin’s. Thürmer, for example, ap- site and, therefore, having zero PR value. the region is in Czechia. The Communist
peared bizarrely enthusiastic after the Then, not-so-surprisingly, it moved to a Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)
annexation of Crimea by Russia – Russian server in April 2017. received 15% of the vote in 2013, but has
“If Albanians have the right in Here, we can see again the manifes- declined to 8% by 2017. Over the years,
Kosovo for self-determination, Russians tation of a global phenomenon on a local they have been able to maintain a close
have the same right in Crimea. (…) We level: the ideological convergence of the relationship with the Russian Communist
should rather cherish that the borders fringes is at the same time spontaneous Party – after the Soviet Union fell apart –
of the second world war are not carved and facilitated. Russia, a natural ally of which is, these days, a pseudo-opposition
in stone. We should not feel sorrow over fringe movements in their fight against party with a strong nationalist and even
Trianon, (…) Europe would be much bet- the global establishment, is trying to nostalgically imperialist agenda.
ter off by re-drawing the map according make the most out of this anti-Western While having seen better days, the
to the will of the people.” coalition. leader of the Russian communist party,
Gyula Thürmer’s son, Gyula Máté Another important instance in- Zyuganov, received almost 30% of the
T. is also politically active: he used to be a volved the Hungarian communist par- vote in the presidential elections in 2000
candidate for the Hungarian Communist ty which cooperated with the now when Putin was first elected as president.
party, and he is right now also the column- dissolved neo-Nazi Hungarian National In the latest Duma elections, they were
ist of pro-governmental newspapers such Front (MNA). This party became no- still the strongest opposition party with
as Magyar Hírlap and Pesti Srácok that torious for its leader shooting down a more than 13% of the vote, and Russian
are also pushing an authoritarian, illiberal, policeman in late 2016. He also conduct- communists keep an important role in
xenophobic agenda and tons of fake news. ed “airsoft drills” with members of the keeping the old comrade networks alive.
Russian military service, the GRU (dis- However, the Russian communists
WHERE ALL RADICALS guised as Russian diplomats accredited are not the only force reaching out to the
CONVERGE in Hungary). Surprisingly enough, it ac- radical left in Europe. While the Kremlin-
Two important conclusions can be drawn knowledged the Workers’ party as a gen- driven disinformation campaigns are fre-
from this seemingly marginal and par- uine representation of the “Hungarians’ quently described as strongly ideological,
ticular case. First of all, an increasing real interest.” While the Hungarian com- in fact, they are totally opportunistic,
overlap between the narratives of the rad- munists are, originally, known for their aiming to reach different audiences via
ical left and the radical right, especially notorious and militant anti-fascism, various channels. In 2016, the Russian
when it comes to foreign policy issues in Thürmer’s party protested together in Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, for ex-
which Russia is involved. They usually social matters with the neo-Nazis, and ample, published an English article in
come to the same conclusion on different the MNA published ideological articles the Russian Global Affairs (the “Russian
logical routes; while the radical right, for promoting the “formation of a workers’ Foreign Affairs magazine”), which explic-
example, like to refer to Putin as the last state” on Hungarian communist websites. itly targets left-wing intellectuals and pol-
real Christian, conservative leader in Eu- After the annexation of Crimea, iticians in the West with quotations from
rope and celebrate his attempts to dom- both far-right and far-left “independent George Orwell, and statements to the ef-
inate this sphere of influence, the radical European observers” went to legitimize fect that Western European welfare states
left in Europe – from Syriza through to the illegal secession referendum, in March just copied the Soviet Union’s success.
the Czech Communists and Die Linke to 2014. Despite the fact that the Hungarian After the Maidan revolution, the
the Dutch Socialists and Podemos – re- Workers’ Party was unable or unwilling Kremlin launched the single biggest dis-
fer to the maintaining of peace, neutrality to send an envoy, the Communist Party information campaign in the last decade
and self-determination when justifying, of Greece (KKE), the German Die Linke, about a Western initiated “Fascist coup”
for example, the Crimean annexation. the Polish Democratic Left Alliance in Kiev. This message resonated well with
When talking about Syria, the radical and Mateusz Piskorski, the founder of both the fellow Ukrainian Communist
left tend to see Assad as an eternal com- the leftist-national Zmiana party, did parties, Russian compatriots evoking the
rade fighter against the imperialists; the so along with scores of far-right party “Great Patriotic War” fought by Stalin,
radical right, in a similarly positive light, representatives. and European left-wing parties and in-
11EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
tellectuals. Three years after the war ness” with CIS-EMO in the post-Soviet
against Ukraine unleashed by Russia, the space, aiming at legitimising Kremlin-
KSČM still warns of the “open Western backed regimes, breakaway regions and
aggression against Russia,” and the emer- referenda. In 2015, the politician found-
gence of “fascist, and Nazi forces”. KSČM ed Poland’s first and only openly and
organized the first “Current Fascism in blatantly pro-Russian leftist party called
Europe” workshop in 2014 on Russian Zmiana (Change). At the same time,
foreign policy in the Czech Parliament he was pushing the “Ukraine is fascist”
in cooperation with the Institute of narrative as a “geopolitical expert” on
Slavic Strategic Studies (ISSS) founded in Sputnik and Russia Today. Piskorski was
Prague in 2013. Again, we can obviously arrested by the Polish authorities in May
see the joint far-right far-left platform. 2016 allegedly on charges of espionage
The latest pro-Russian discussion titled for Russia and China. Shortly after, the
“Myths about Russia” was held by the “Laundromat scandal” proved that the
far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy European Centre of Geopolitical Analysis
party together with the ISSS in 2016 in (ECAG) led by Piskorski was – using
the Czech Parliament. money coming from Russia.
In Poland, obviously pro-Russian
voices are usually more silent and more TACTICALLY BLIND,
marginal. Still, beside the far-right, we can DEAF AND MUTE
find strong proponents of Russia on the While Zmiana is rather an extreme case,
left as well. A member of the post-Com- the Polish Democratic Left Alliance’s be-
munist Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), haviour sums up the far-left’s paradoxical
Adam Krzysztof Kępiński, for example, connection with Moscow. Leftist parties,
participated as an election observer at even in the centre, are usually much less
the 2014 “referendum” on the secession blatant about their support for the Krem-
of Crimea. Leszek Miller, the party’s for- lin as compared to their far-right coun-
mer chairman and former PM of Poland, terparts. Most European leftist parties
has frequently criticised politicians of rarely praise Putin or his regime openly.
being too harsh towards Russia and has They call for “neutrality”, “peace” and the
called for a friendlier relationship with “stopping of western aggression” instead.
their eastern neighbour. The majority of European far-left parties
In 2014, Miller called the Russian showcase a double-edged strategy of rhe-
aggression a “fratricidal war” in Eastern- torical self-containment and the denial
Ukraine, blaming the Right Sector for the of pro-Putinism with an almost uncon-
crisis without mentioning Russia’s role in ditional support of the Kremlin’s core
the war. In an interview given to Sputni, geopolitical goals. While the far-right
the former PM later criticised the Polish is rather vocal in its ideological pro-Pu-
authorities for not letting the pro-Putin tinism, the left is deaf and blind to the
“Night Wolves” motorcycle gang through perceived human rights violations and
“honouring the fight against the Fascist imperial ambitions of Russia, and mute
Germany,” and for “Russophobia becom- when talking about these issues. But they
ing the official foreign policy doctrine” of lose their inhibition when it comes to
Poland. Twice the presidential candidate criticising the West – especially the US,
of the SLD, Magdalena Ogórek, advocated the EU and NATO for aggression and
for a stronger partnership with Russia, try- provoking conflicts.
ing to put it as the European mainstream:
“The world needs Russia to fight terror- Péter Krekó is the director of the Political Capital
ism. Angela Merkel and Franocis Hollande Institute, a Budapest-based Central European
are conducting very balanced talks with political research and consultancy firm.
Russia and I am so proud of this.”
The infamous and aforemen- Lóránt Győri is a geopolitical analyst at Political
tioned, Mateusz Piskorski, a well-known Capital.
pro-Russian political figure in Poland,
personally embodies the pro-Putin coali-
tion of the radical left and right. Piskorski
started his career around extremist or-
ganizations and later became an MP of
the far-right Self-Defence of the Republic
of Poland in 2005. Later he became one
of the organizers of the “election busi-
12 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
FIRE AND
BRIMSTONE
The Proliferation of Deception
and Dread in Central Europe
Disinformation campaigns
in the US are growing in
sophistication, and many
across the Atlantic are
learning the same tricks
13EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
GALAN DALL
F
or most of us who don’t everyday skill we have all had to quickly TRANSLATING THE PARANOIA
block or unfollow those adopt. Just as we were getting hold of this The above is hardly surprising consider-
with differing political fake news debacle, we have reached the ing all the recent tactics used to influence
opinions, our daily news- next stage of this propaganda strategy: elections in Western Europe as well as the
feeds are constantly being judgment before publishing. US, but the question at hand is if the same
bombarded with spuri- To see this plan in action, we can occurrence is happening in post-commu-
ous stories of politicians look back to last June when the western nist societies?
from across the spectrum media world was caught in eager anticipa- The situation in Central Europe is
engaged in a smorgasbord of conspiracies. tion of Megyn Kelly’s NBC interview with trickier to diagnose because many far-
The strategy is to overwhelm the reader, Alex Jones, the founder of Info Wars (if right, nationalistic parties are currently in
and the public at large, with as many arti- ever a show name was more appropriate power and, a crucial difference from the
cles as possible on similar topics, so that for someone intent on disrupting coherent US, they also control many of the main-
the sheer number of pieces will convince narratives and espousing, often violent, stream media outlets.
people that there must be something solutions to conspiracies so far-fetched A recent report by Robert Gorwa
truthful in them, after all where there’s they crossed over into the farcical realm for the Oxford Internet Institute found
smoke…there’s more smoke. The pur- long ago). The content of the interview that there has been a considerable in-
pose is either to undermine established was of less importance, as the ratings did crease in the use of political bots, trolling
and reputable journalistic sources (many indicate, than the perception of its “fair- and fake accounts to amplify the propa-
of which are producing a large number of ness” (if you tend towards conservative gation of fake news throughout Poland.
credible, though controversial, articles) or beliefs) or if it was “hard-hitting” enough What is more interesting is that, while the
to obfuscate the situation until no one is (if you are more liberal leaning). consequences of these operations can be
certain of what is real. Apart from her previous journalistic extensive, the actual number of people dis-
Take, for example, the early hours sins and signs of bias, the critical response tributing this disinformation is incredibly
following the horrific Las Vegas shooting was that Kelly did a good job holding Jones small. Perhaps the critics worried about
where 59 people died and over 500 were accountable for some of his more outland- giving Alex Jones a bigger microphone
injured by a sole-gunman. Clearly nervous ish comments like when he claimed that were correct in their consternations.
about a public cry for background checks the Sandy Hook massacre – where 26 A similar situation is playing out in
and/or the implementation of meaningful people, mostly children, were killed by a neighbouring Czechia. There, a few small
gun legislation, alt-right and some right- gunman at a primary school – was staged but popular sites of unknown ownership
wing news agencies flooded both Google by actors. Some though were wary of giv- are peddling pro-Putin and anti-American
and Facebook with fabricated stories that ing Jones a larger audience to promote his material while spreading fear about immi-
the gunman was a “liberal Democrat” ideas which can aid in the spreading of dis- grants, refugees and Islam in general. But
who despised Donald Trump. It took only trust and discontent in society. what has been the effect of these websites
hours to disprove this fallacy because the Jones himself used the days before and yellow journalism on the Central
Las Vegas Police Department had not the interview to stoke the flames of his European public?
released any information on the mass “theory” that he will never be treated According to GLOBSEC, two-
murderer, but during that time, enough well by mainstream media, echoing one thirds of Poland’s population do not be-
articles had swamped the streams of those of Trump’s favourite excuses of “misrep- lieve the media is presenting an accurate
so keen to believe that gun violence isn’t resentation”; Trump himself has been a representation of reality. This can be
caused by guns that the rest of the story fan of Jones’ show, enough so to even call mostly attributed to the same methods
was drowned out. in and voice his support. Needless to say, mentioned above, a barrage of stories each
In today’s world, where there will most on the internet had already decided corroborating each other, but none worth
be support for any sound or dubious po- the interview’s value days before its airing, their weight in salt, yet many also attrib-
sition wished to be held, discerning what and this was the intended outcome, to ute this to government control of many of
information is trustworthy has become an skew minds. the main media outlets. The situation has
14 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
The situation in Central
Europe is trickier to
diagnose because many
right-wing, nationalistic
parties are currently
in power and, a crucial
gotten severe enough for the Czech gov- for proponents of tolerance; however, to
difference from the US,
ernment to set up a task force to combat those in his community (much like the they also control many
these disinformation campaigns. Jones interview above), his removal from
This is a laudable step in the right di- the UK is a feather in his cap; a true patriot of the mainstream media
rection, but as polls closed in late October, and Christian oppressed by “liberals” and
Andrej Babiš – the populist leader of the in his words “Jewish agents with British
outlets.
ANO party who has been on numerous passports” (original in Polish: ”żydowscy
occasions compared to Donald Trump agenci z brytyjskimi paszportami”) .
(businessman-turned-politician) – is set For people like Jones, Międlar, and
to become the next Prime Minister of even the current president of the US, re-
Czechia. porting factually what they have said is
On the surface, there is nothing an act of misrepresentation worthy of
wrong with a successful magnate turning retaliation.
to politics. However, his unique ace in the This past September saw the un-
hole is control over the Mafra media group veiling of some of the disinformation
which includes the number two newspa- campaigns used in the past year when
per (second only to the tabloid Blesk) and Facebook and Twitter released a trove of
number three internet news portal in the accounts – mostly run by Russian bots –
region. What will happen if the task force which actively promoted Donald Trump
above finds issue with something associat- for president. Instead of acting responsibly
ed with the likely future Prime Minister’s and attempting to secure the democracy
business handlings? A rather obvious po- he now leads by acknowledging these elec-
tential conflict of interest is around the toral assaults, Trump decided to exacer-
corner, and if there’s anything Czechia bate the situation by attacking Facebook
can learn from America, it is that potential itself and the media outlets that covered
threats become dangerous realities from the story.
one day to the next. As the fourth estate is far more en-
trenched in the US and Western Europe,
THE WOLF PLAYING SHEPHERD worries about these attacks on journal-
But who is the Alex Jones of Central Eu- ists and of deceitful reporting taking over
rope? Here we can look to Poland and without any oversight is less worrisome
the suspended-priest Jacek Międlar. He than in places like Central Europe where
has given many anti-Semitic and Islam- censorship was an unfortunate and unde-
ophobic speeches and is popular with sirable but accepted way of life for many
right-wing groups on both his blog and years. How easy it would be for it to return
Twitter account. Previously this year, as in the name of providing safety and secu-
the Guardian reported, Międlar was held rity from the “tormenting evils” of open
and refused entry into Britain on at least society.
two instances, in both cases he was to
speak at far-right rallies. The author is a journalist and editor based in
Międlar’s use of venom-filled rhet- Warsaw, Poland.
oric on his blog, Twitter and Facebook
page as well as his proclivity for inciting
prejudice seemed to justify the authori-
ties denying him entry in an apparent win
15EUROPE POLITICS IN THE BUZZ
FROM TWEETS
TO TANKS
INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT PSZCZEL ,
SENIOR OFFICER FOR RUSSIA AND THE WESTERN BALKANS,
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DIVISION, NATO HQ (FORMER DIRECTOR
OF NATO INFORMATION OFFICE IN MOSCOW)
About NATO’s complex approach
to information challenges.
Are Poland and Central Europe taking What strategy does NATO have concern- does not answer disinformation or prop-
part in informational warfare? ing this hybrid warfare? aganda with its own propaganda or dis-
If we take into consideration the coun- This is a very broad topic. Since 2014, information. We aim to present facts and
tries which are members of NATO, then NATO has developed and initiated a hy- our arguments in a dynamic way, using
they do not participate in any kind of war. brid strategy to deal with such threats. diverse platforms and tools. We do it
It is true however that the security envi- It encompasses many elements ranging via interaction with traditional media,
ronment has changed significantly over from a better coordination of intelligence but also through the internet and social
the last few years, and therefore so has products, work on resilience of our insti- media – see for example our “Setting the
the context and terms we are using to de- tutions and infrastructure, incorporating Record Straight” portal. But we also try
scribe it. The elements of hybrid war like hybrid scenarios in our exercises, as well to correct many “false facts or fake news”
disinformation, cyber-attacks – these are as cooperation with partner countries which target NATO and individual Allies
not abstract terms, but very real threats and the European Union. – by engaging with journalists, opinion
and challenges. These tools are not used NATO has 29 member states united formers and ordinary people.
by the NATO states foffensive purposes, by a collective defence pledge, forming a In the NATO family, there are many
but such actions or elements can be at- stable, permanent coalition that primari- so called Centres of Excellence, and two
tributed to the Russian Federation or the ly looks after the security of its members. with the highest public profiles are those
Islamic State. Moving to the issue of your main in- which deal respectively with cyber secu-
One such operation was the terest, information policy as a dimension rity and with Strategic Communications.
Crimean occupation in 2014 where we of our response to hybrid challenges, as is Both institutions help NATO and mem-
could see – for the first time in modern the case with other aspects, the first stage ber states by undertaking research,
history – the “little green men” being em- of our approach is analysis and situational running courses and workshops – real
ployed on a large scale. We all know who awareness. educational work.
they were and what they did, so let’s not Comparing to where we were a few This long-term effort does not hap-
forget that their first acts involved taking years ago, our awareness of, for example, pen solely within NATO borders. The
over and occupying local media centres. how social media are used for aggressive fact that Sweden, a non-NATO country,
There was also a disinformation cam- aims of disinformation has improved a has already trained thousands of its civil
paign, and a military exercise seemingly great deal. NATO’s situation awareness is servants on how to deal with the problem
used as a decoy which preceded the op- an essential starting point because if we of disinformation shows that the threat
eration in Crimea. So, the answer from lack the tools to identify the problem, it has an international character. People
the Allied side is no, we do not engage in is hard to devise optimum countermeas- who work in specific spheres are likely
information warfare, but if we talk about ures against it. to face certain kinds of disinformation
the negative and aggressive actions in the The second question is what can be attacks, and if they are made aware of
informational sphere, then there is plenty done in a particular situation. We, first of this then they will know how to react and
of evidence to suggest that others may see all, need to stick to our mandate and our would hopefully share their knowledge
it differently. principles. This means simply that NATO among their communities.
16 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017POLITICS IN THE BUZZ EUROPE
One paradoxical advantage we ing next to the EU’s Federica Mogherini, Does Poland at all need to be ready to
have in NATO is that we have been the described hybrid threats as “a combination react and resist such kind of threats?
target of disinformation for many years, of covert and overt operations and meas- What is the priority action for Poland?
only the methods have changed some- ures: everything from propaganda, from On the one side, the Polish society is very
what. Recognizing this, NATO’s Public disinformation to actually the use of regular resistant towards any misinformation
Diplomacy Division (PDD) and other forces – from tweets to tanks.” campaigns directed by foreign countries.
NATO representatives and experts are Returning to the challenges posed It is not easy to persuade Poles in believ-
very active in organising and participating by Russia, it is interesting to compare our ing something which is not true as they
in a variety of seminars and conferences, agendas and thus approaches. For NATO have a high level of awareness following
debating both cyber and disinformation a “comprehensive approach” is a concept years of communist propaganda. On the
threats (which often go together). These which aims to ensure synergy of different other hand, there is no state, including
topics also come up high on the list of kinds of resources – civilian, military and Poland, which can ignore fully well fi-
issues discussed with parliamentarians Strategic Communications – in order to as- nanced disinformation operations, some
from all member states. This last point sure stability. To illustrate: for many years of them devised on individual basis and
is crucial if we are to contribute to long- now, we have been working in order to sta- targeting specific recipients.
term solutions, such as for example me- bilise Afghanistan. We know that ensuring One hears of plans of the Polish
dia literacy projects. security is an essential task. Without secu- MOD to create a centre to deal with cyber
International cooperation is essen- rity there can be no development. But sta- threats. This certainly sounds like a very
tial. It is not a coincidence that among the ble institutions, rule of law, support of the good idea, a route taken by other allies too.
42 areas which were collectively defined local population and economic prospects But one should also take into account that
as priorities for joint work by the EU and are in turn factors without which long-term potential opponents are always improving
NATO, one of the first agreed items was security will not be guaranteed. their methods, and they are not stingy
disinformation. Unfortunately one gets an impres- with resources, so our approach should be
Recently, there was the ceremonial sion that from the Russian perspective, a a comprehensive one, using a mixture of
opening of the Helsinki Centre of Excellence hybrid approach applied in many regions military and civilian capabilities and insti-
for Countering Hybrid Threats. While es- in Europe and beyond is serving a very tutions, at both the state and local level.
tablished under the EU aegis, this Centre different purpose which has more to do A good example of work in this do-
has close links to NATO. The Secretary with destabilisation. For example, we are main was a conference (co-sponsored by
General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, stand- well aware that 2/3 of negative online PDD) on hybrid threats hosted in Szczecin
comments on social media about NATO’s in October. It brought together represent-
enhanced Forward Presence (bringing atives from the Polish parliament, aca-
many Allied troops to the Baltic States demia, the military, business and media.
and Poland) are generated by Russian There were a lot of presentations and dis-
online accounts operated by bots. And cussions on policies, best practices from
these comments have nothing to do with divergent experiences: ranging from crisis
the real debate, with transparency and management systems at a city level to air-
the truth: they aim to denigrate, under- port security. But participants could also
mine our governments, distract soldiers take part in a specialised workshop where
and destabilise the region. business expertise was shared on practical
solutions to improving security of cyber
space, e.g. on protection from hackers’ at-
tacks – which is badly needed today.
Not only NATO and the EU should
act but also on more local levels there
should be coordinated actions. This is a very
long-term process when it comes to such
measures as raising awareness of citizens of
dangers of hybrid threats and disinforma-
tion, as teaching university students, im-
proving resilience of critical infrastructure
or honing the role of military forces. There
are many good experts in Poland and their
expertise should be fully utilised. But other
Illustration: Paweł Kuczyński
states, including those among the Visegrad
Four, have a lot of very useful experience, be
it on the government level or non-govern-
mental organisations. So, it is very impor-
tant to share our knowledge, our experience
and available tools among states, organisa-
tions and ordinary citizens.
17ECONOMY SOCIAL MEDIA
WHAT ARE MEDIA
CONSUMPTION TRENDS IN V4
Advertisement market The following data was provided by the weCAN network and compiled from
three CANNUAL reports, the most recent of which was released in October
already knows which 2017. The network was formed by strong and successful independent
agencies of Central and Eastern Europe. Created in 2010 by the Hungarian
media are followed and full service agency Café Communications, weCAN covers 16 countries from
generate value Estonia to Bulgaria and from Slovenia to Russia.
3 takeaways Set your revenue strategy around digital advertising.
1 This sector is rapidly growing and has a potential to
from the CANNUAL
be a larger part of the economy than in Germany and
report for V4
many other EU countries.
publishers and
editors: Content marketing is more important than simple ads.
2 The digital sector is booming in V4 and has generated
a high demand for digital content.
3 You have 3 seconds to go mobile. The biggest growth in
the digital sector is in the area of mobile devices. In this
medium, the attention span is dramatically short though
weCAN ranking 2017
It attempts to estimate the economic importance of their advertising market. Selected countries.
HUMAN GDP PER COUNTRY AD SPENDING weCAN
DEVELOPMENT INDEX CAPITA INDEX PER CAPITA RANKING
CZ — 0.878 CZ — 16,700 CZ — 119 CZ — 0.71%
PL — 0.855 SK — 14,900 HU — 59 PL — 0.52%
SK — 0.845 HU — 11,500 SK — 59 HU — 0.52%
HU — 0.836 PL — 11,000 PL — 58 SK — 0.39%
RO — 0.802 RO — 8,600 RO — 17 RO — 0.18%
USA — 1.09%
weCAN Ranking – a new tool for understanding prospects for advertising marked in CEE
UK — 0.99%
The weCAN ranking is an index that shows the percentage of the ad spending per capita within a country’s nominal GDP.
We calculated both baseline data (GDP per capita and ad spending per capita) using the number of population older DE — 0.62%
than 14 to ensure that the basis of the calculation only includes advertising target groups with independent purchasing
power. The WeCAN ranking reveals whether the advertising market as an economic sector is stronger or weaker than
what the overall economic performance of a country would suggest. source: Cannual 2017 Report
18 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017SOCIAL MEDIA ECONOMY
Trends in advertising pie
in Visegrad Countries
Share of advertising budgets for different type of media
Note: Hungarian numbers are unexpectedly high with advertisement campaigns 2014–2016,
2014 2015 2016
TV 29% 29% 31%
Digital 47% 48% 45%
Czech
Press 13% 13% 15%
CZ
Radio 5% 4% 4%
TV 31% 31% 30%
Digital 30% 33% 37%
Hungary
Press 21% 19% 17%
HU
Radio 6% 5% 5%
TV 47% 44% 43%
Digital 31% 35% 38%
Poland
Press 9% 8% 6%
PL
Radio 7% 7% 7%
TV 46% 44% 41%
Digital 28% 32% 39%
Slovakia
Press 13% 12% 9%
SK
Radio 5% 5% 4%
Internet penetration in the region online & ad spending per capita (EUR)
40.000 90%
82%
79%
35.000 75% 78% 74% 74% 80%
34,29 73% 69% 69%
66% 67% 67%
30.000 62% 62% 70%
25.000 60%
20.000 50%
15.000 15,89 15,68 40%
15,10
10.000 11,26 11,23
30%
9,13
5.000 5,21 10%
4,16 3,97
3,33 2,97 2,66 2,28
0 0%
CZ PL HU SK SL EE RU LV LI HR BG RO RS UKR
Online ad spending/capita Internet penetration
19ECONOMY SOCIAL MEDIA
The
More Vulnerable to Disinformation
than You Might Think
MIRIAM LEXMANN
P
There’s no shortage of Russian “fake ublic opinion data is crucial to understand-
ing how and why disinformation is gaining
news” stories, “troll factories” and ground.
A recent series of public opinion
“disinformation” across the media, surveys by the International Republican
yet the understanding of how this Institute (IRI) of the Visegrad Four (V4)
countries and Germany revealed fascinating
affects populations in Europe remains insights into areas of vulnerability and resil-
ience to Russian disinformation. The polls were commissioned
relatively unsophisticated. by IRI’s Beacon Project, an initiative that equips European
It’s clear that there’s a problem, but stakeholders with the tools to counter Russian meddling and
protect European democracy from the corrosive effects of
less clear what can be done about it. disinformation.
20 VISEGRAD INSIGHT 2 (11) | 2017SOCIAL MEDIA ECONOMY
Correlation between trust in media
and perceptions
Correlation on the
between state
trust in of the country,
media
“ALTERNATIVE”
outlook on the future MEDIA
and perceptions on the state of the country,
outlookright
(using track
on the / wrong track as a proxy).
future
(using right track / wrong track as a proxy).
Correlation between38%
HUNGARY: Overall
trust
50%
in media
and perceptions on the state of the country,
HUNGARY:on
outlook Overall 38% 50%
the future
(using right track / wrong track as a proxy).
Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48%
Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48%
HUNGARY: Overall 38% 50%
Among those who think media is biased 20% 64%
Among those who think media is biased 20% 64%
Among those who think media is unbiased 42% 48%
SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59%
SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59%
Among those who think media is biased 20% 64%
Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51%
Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51% Those who think media is unbiased
SLOVAKIA: Overall 40% 59% Those
V4 who think
33%media is unbiased
Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% Germany
V4 33%44%
Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% Germany 44%
Among those who think media is unbiased 49% 51% Those who get most of their news from
CZECH: Overall 53% 45% state broadcasters
Those
Those who
who think media
get most is unbiased
of their news from
CZECH: Overall 53% 45% state broadcasters
V4
V4 33%
33%
Among those who think media is biased 28% 72% Germany
V4
Germany 57%33%
44%
Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Germany 57%
Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Those
Those who
who get
get most
most of
of their
their news
news from
CZECH: Overall 53% 45% from
state online sources
broadcasters
Those who get most of their news
Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% from
V4
V4 online sources
23%
33%
Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% Germany
Germany
V4 57% 23% 11%
Among those who think media is unbiased 59% 40% Germany 11%
POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those who read or watch
get most “alternative”
of their news media
sources
from Every
online Day or Occasionally
sources
POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those who read or watch “alternative” media
Among those who think media is biased 37% 59% sources
V4
V4 Every Day
31% or Occasionally
23%
Germany
V4
Germany 31% 14%
11%
Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37%
Germany 14%
Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37%
POLAND: Overall 31% 58% Those
Those who
who Never
read orread or watch
watch “alternative” media
“alternative”
sources Everymedia
Dayread
or Occasionally
Among those who think media is biased 16% 78% Those who Never or watch
“alternative”
V4
V4 50%media
31%
Among those who think media is biased 16% 78%
Germany 75%
Germany
V4 50% 14%
Among those who think media is unbiased 50% 37%
Germany 75%
GERMANY: Overall 42% 54%
Those
Those who
who read
Never“alternative” media & say they
read or watch
GERMANY: Overall 42% 54% do so because it is “fun and exciting”
“alternative”
Those media
who read “alternative” media & say they
Among those who think media is biased 16% 78%
do
V4 so because
V4 50% it
25% is “fun and exciting”
Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51%
Germany
V4
Germany 75% 25% 16%
Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51%
Germany 16%
GERMANY: Overall 42% 54%
Those who read “alternative” media & say they
Among those who think media is biased 33% 61%
do so because it is “fun and exciting”
Among those who think media is biased 33% 61% source: The Center for Insights in Survey Research (a
V4
project 25%
of International Republican Institute), Ipsos
Among those who think media is unbiased 47% 51%
country
Germany offices in the Czech16%
Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovakia and Germany, 2017.
Face-to-face interviews, samples: 1,016 in the Czech
Among those who think media is biased 33% 61% Republic; 1,024 in Slovakia; 1,000 in Hungary; 1,020
in Poland; 1,630 in Germany
21You can also read
