WHY DID THE KREMLIN MASS ITS FORCES NEAR UKRAINE? - EURASIA PROGRAM
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EURASIA PROGRAM
WHY DID THE KREMLIN MASS ITS FORCES
NEAR UKRAINE?
ROB LEE
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Author: Rob Lee The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. Design: Natalia Kopytnik © 2021 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute August 2021
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www.fpri.org
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Introduction
elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders.3 To put
During March and April 2021, the
this in perspective, the Russian military
Russian military conducted a large-scale
has approximately 850,000-900,000
buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine,
servicemembers in total, and 168 constant
including Crimea, which Russia annexed
readiness BTGs, according to Russian
in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.4 If these
TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social
estimates were accurate, the Russian
media sites showing Russian military
military massed roughly 10-15% of its total
equipment, including tanks, infantry
manpower and approximately one third
fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense
of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders.
systems, moving toward or appearing
in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The In response to the buildup, Chairman of
United States Department of Defense’s the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark
spokesperson John Kirby told reporters Milley, National Security Advisor Jake
that the Russian buildup was even larger Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all
than during the peak of the fighting called their Russian counterparts to
in 2014.1 Ukrainian officials estimated discuss the situation. U.S. European
that the Russian military buildup would Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status
reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops to its highest level. The buildup also
with more than fifty-six battalion tactical coincided with an increase in fighting
groups (BTG).2 United States defense along the line of contact, with at least 36
officials gave a lower estimate that 48 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in
BTGs had moved into the border area and 2021.5 The movement of Russian forces
80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or led to intense speculation about Russia’s
1 “Russian military buildup near Ukraine larger than in 2014- Pentagon,” Reuters, April 19, 2021, https://www.reuters.
com/world/middle-east/russian-military-buildup-near-ukraine-larger-than-2014-pentagon-2021-04-19/.
2 Matthias Williams and Robin Emmott,” Ukraine says Russia will soon have over 120,000 troops on its borders,”
Reuters, April 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-reach-over-120000-troops-ukraines-bor-
der-week-ukraine-says-2021-04-20/; “В Минобороны Украины оценили общую численность стягивающихся к
украинской границе российских войск в 110 тыс. человек,” Interfax, April 14, 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.
asp?rid=1&nid=548437&lang=RU.
3 Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, “Satellite Images Show Russia’s Expanding Ukraine Buildup,” Wall
Street Journal, April 20, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/satellite-images-show-russias-expanding-ukraine-build-
up-11618917238.
4 “Russian Army operates around 170 battalion tactical groups — defense chief,” TASS, August 10, 2021, https://tass.
com/defense/1324461.
5 Yuras Karmanau, “Ukraine says 2 soldiers killed in east amid Russia tensions,” Associated Press, May 7, 2021, https://
apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-europe-3f9f33dfafe0dbdef1beda466a514e5c.
2
RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
intentions, including fears of a large- launch rocket systems and Iskander-M
scale ground invasion. However, U.S. short-range ballistic missile systems and
intelligence indicated that a large-scale other heavy equipment, would remain at
ground invasion was unlikely because of the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh
a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad
hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics 2021 strategic exercise in September.9
necessary for such an operation.6 Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly
Likewise, EUCOM commander General whether all of the equipment and units
Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside
was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian of Crimea would also return to their bases,
ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming nor how those units were employed
weeks.7 during the snap inspection.
On April 22, after the end of a large- Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement,
scale exercise at the Opuk training area U.S. defense officials said that Russia had
in Crimea, which included an amphibious removed only “a few thousand” troops
landing, a helicopter air assault operation and that there were approximately 80,000
with two companies, and a multi-battalion servicemen near Ukraine’s borders,
airborne operation with more than two despite Shoigu’s order for most of those
thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles units to return to their permanent bases
parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport by May 1.10 Thus Russia can still escalate
aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the
announced that the winter verification immediate threat of a serious escalation
tests for the Western and Southern of fighting in the Donbas appears to have
Military Districts had been a success passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
and the troops would return to their
permanent bases.8 However, he indicated
that equipment from Central Military
District’s 41st Combined Arms Army,
which included BM-27 Uragan multiple
6 Barbara Starr, Jennifer Hansler, and Oren Liebermann, “US and other NATO members pledge support to Ukraine
while walking fine line with Russia,” CNN, April 14 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/14/politics/us-nato-ukraine-russia/
index.html.
7 John Grady, “EUCOM Commander: Russia Not Likely to Invade Ukraine Soon,” USNI News, April 15, 2021, https://
news.usni.org/2021/04/15/eucom-commander-russia-not-likely-to-invade-ukraine-soon.
8 “На учениях в Крыму десантировались более 2 тыс. военнослужащих ВДВ,” Interfax, April 22, 2021, https://www.
interfax.ru/russia/762679.
9 Andrey Arkadiev, “Войска, задействованные в учениях на юге РФ, вернутся в пункты постоянной дислокации
до 1 мая,” Zvezda, April 22, 2021, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20214221457-nI2NT.html.
10 Helene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes, “80,000 Russian Troops Remain at Ukraine Border as U.S. and NATO Hold
Exercises,” New York Times, May 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-putin-russia-ukraine.
html#click=https://t.co/5wfRlh52T1.
3
FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 4 Max Kukurudziak/Unsplash
RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
Explaining Russia’s Actions
could have been the United States
Before Shoigu’s announcement, there and NATO instead of Ukraine. Shoigu’s
were three explanations for Russia’s
announcement that troops would return
actions. First, that these movements were
to their permanent bases a week after
purely part of a training exercise designed
President Biden called President Putin
to test the Russian Armed Forces. Second,
to request a summit led some analysts
that they were the prelude to a significant
to argue that this was a successful
military escalation that would involve
attempt at compellence. But Russian
sending Russian forces beyond the line
officials never provided a single, clear
of contact in the Donbas or Crimea. Third,
demand from Washington, and we would
that Russia was building up its forces
have expected to see other actions as
near Ukraine for coercive or signaling
part of a compellence campaign, such
purposes. A Russian signaling action could
as aggressive intercepts of American
have had two main targets. First, it could
aircraft and ships in neutral waters or
have been aimed at Ukraine. In this case,
renewed fighting in Idlib province in
the buildup may have been undertaken to
Syria or Libya. Instead, it appears Putin
strengthen Russia’s deterrence capability
accepted a “tactical victory” by agreeing
against a potential Ukrainian offensive in
to the summit with President Biden, but
Crimea and the Donbas by demonstrating
not that this was necessarily the aim of
Russia’s ability to defend those regions
the buildup.11 A better explanation is that
and lending credibility that it would
the buildup was aimed at deterring future
move to protect them. The actions could
actions from NATO or the United States,
also have been part of a compellence
such as a renewed push to allow Ukraine
campaign designed to change Ukraine’s
to join NATO, to continue to sell arms to
behavior. However, since Russia already
Kyiv, or to apply new sanctions against
had sufficient combat power permanently
Russia. This was a demonstration that
based near Ukraine’s borders to defeat
Russia could respond asymmetrically to
any potential Ukrainian offensive, the
anti-Russian policies adopted by the US
massing of forces in the region was likely
and NATO by employing military force
not directed at Kyiv.
against Ukraine.
The second primary target of either a
deterrence or compellence strategy
11 Henry Meyer and Irina Reznik, “Putin Is Keeping the West Guessing and That’s Just Fine With Him,” Bloombrg, April
24, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-24/putin-is-keeping-the-west-guessing-and-that-s-just-
fine-with-him.
5FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Training Exercise
of Russian units. Quickly sending a
The Russian military often conducts
significant number of military personnel
large exercises, particularly at the end of
and equipment via rail on short notice is a
the winter period when units are tested
useful capability to test.
so that senior leaders can determine
whether they can complete their However, this buildup was atypical.
assigned missions. Exercises in Crimea Unlike normal exercises, an unusually
and near Ukraine’s borders also are not large number of military units were
abnormal. The region is a priority for the involved, including units from different
Russian military. The possibility that Kyiv military districts that were deployed near
could attempt to retake the Donbas or Ukraine’s borders. Most notably, the
Crimea remains a serious threat and its action included part of the Central Military
deterrence is a critical mission for the District’s 41st Combined Arms Army
Russian military. Befitting the level of (elements of the 74th and 35th Motorized
threat and importance the Russian military Rifle Brigades, 120th Artillery Brigade, 6th
attaches to this mission, the regions Tank Regiment, and 119th Missile Brigade)
surrounding Ukraine, which fall under as well as units from the Russian Airborne
the responsibility of the Russian Western Forces’ (VDV) 76th Air Assault Division
and Southern Military Districts and Black and 98th Airborne Division, based more
Sea Fleet, have all been priorities for new than 400 miles from Ukraine’s borders.13
equipment and the formation of new units, This is normal for the Russian military’s
including three motorized rifle divisions annual strategic exercise—this year’s
that were officially established in 2016 exercise, Zapad 2021, will be held in the
on paper. The Southern Military District Western Military District in September—
is currently in the process of upgrading but uncommon for smaller training events.
the 19th and 20th Motorized Rifle Brigades
Indeed, some of the units and systems that
into divisions as well.12 In addition, the
were transferred from the other military
Russian military often conducts snap
districts are army-level assets. In addition,
inspections as a means for senior officers
the announcement of the exercise
to determine the actual level of readiness
12 Roman Krezul and Alexey Ramm, “А теперь «20-я»: легендарное гвардейское соединение вернется в строй,”
Izvestia, April 25, 2021, https://iz.ru/1156655/roman-kretcul-aleksei-ramm/teper-20-ia-legendarnoe-gvardeiskoe-soed-
inenie-vernetsia-v-stroi; “19-я мотострелковая дивизия Южного военного округа.” Altyn73, December 28, 2020,
https://altyn73.livejournal.com/1443160.html.
13 “Russian Ground Troop Units and Iskander ballistic missiles identified at Ukrainian border by Janes,” Janes, April 8,
2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russian-ground-troop-units-and-iskander-ballistic-missiles-iden-
tified-at-ukrainian-border-by-janes.
6RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
Russian military combat readiness exercises on April 22, 2021 along the Ukrainian border. (mil.ru)
by Russia’s Southern Military District machinery complained to government
commander, Army General Alexander officials that the Russian military was
Dvornikov, made no mention of units disrupting their ability to supply domestic
from other districts that would participate. customers, though this also could be a
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said result of the Russian MoD requisitioning
on April 13 that Russia redeployed “two these rail cars on short notice.15
armies and three VDV units” to Russia’s
The exercise was announced with little
western borders, but only specified which
warning. The Russian MoD’s leadership
units—and made the first public statement
did not brief foreign defense attaches, as
that units from the Central Military District
it normally does before large exercises
were involved—after announcing the
in part to reduce foreign concerns. In
verification tests were over.14 The amount
addition, Russia is supposed to notify
of military equipment moved by rail was
other Organization for Security and Co-
so great that manufacturers of agricultural
operation in Europe (OSCE) members
14 “Russia redeploys 2 armies, 3 airborne units to western border in view of NATO threat – Shoigu,” Interfax, April
13, 2021, https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/71572/; Andrey Arkadiev, “Войска, задействованные в учениях
на юге РФ, вернутся в пункты постоянной дислокации до 1 мая,” Zvezda, April 22, 2021, https://tvzvezda.ru/
news/20214221457-nI2NT.html.
15 Olga Nikitina, Alexey Polukhin, and Natalia Skorlygina, “В России срывается тракторный завоз,” Kommersant,
March 29, 2021, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4750465.
7FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Russian military combat readiness exercises on April 22, 2021 along the Ukrainian border. (mil.ru)
under the 2011 Vienna Document on provided few details about the buildup
Confidence and Security Building even though the movement of military
Measures anytime it conducts any kind equipment was very visible for weeks and
of unusual military activity. Although included several army-level and division-
Ukraine requested a meeting with level assets and other very capable
Russia regarding these exercises, Russia systems. All these factors suggest that
declined to attend the meeting or provide these movements were for more than just
further details, according to the United an exercise. They were intended to send
States Mission to the OSCE.16 a signal.
The Southern Military District also
conducted the most recent strategic
annual exercise, Kavkaz 2020, in
September, so of all of Russia’s military
districts, it should have been the least in
need of conducting such a large exercise
on short notice. The Russian military
16 “Meeting Requested by Ukraine under Vienna Document Chapter III Regarding Unusual Russian Military Activity,”
U.S Mission to the OSCE, April 10, 2021, https://osce.usmission.gov/meeting-requested-by-ukraine-under-vienna-docu-
ment-chapter-iii-regarding-unusual-russian-military-activity/.
8RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
Ground Assault beyond Crimea and
the Donbas
and light artillery cannot destroy, and
The most concerning possibility was
they are often used in training to support
that the buildup was preparation for a
tank and motorized rifle units breaking
large-scale intervention by the Russian
through enemy defenses.17 In addition,
Armed Forces beyond the current line of
T-72B3 tanks with mine rollers and plows,
control in the Donbas or Crimea, possibly
UR-77 mine-clearing systems, IMR-2M
with the aim of seizing more territory.
obstacle-clearing vehicles, and other
Indeed, the specific military units and
engineering systems were spotted on the
equipment that moved towards Ukraine’s
move near Ukraine. If Russia intended
borders were the types we would expect
to conduct an armored assault through
to see in a Russian ground assault. These
Ukrainian defenses, these are systems
included heavy artillery, such as 2S7M
Russia would employ.
Malka 203mm self-propelled guns, 2S4
Tyulpan 240mm mortars, and BM-27 Observers also spotted Iskander-M
Uragan 220mm multiple launch rocket short-range ballistic and cruise missile
systems (MLRS)—all of which are army- systems with an official maximum range
or district-level assets—as well as plenty of 500km (tests have demonstrated the
of medium 152mm 2S3 Akatsiya, 2S19 actual range is greater than 650km),
Msta-S, and 2A65 Msta-B howitzers, and likely from the Central Military District’s
short-range TOS-1A thermobaric multiple 119th Missile Brigade.18 The Southern and
launch rocket system (MLRS). Western Military Districts already have a
total of six Iskander-M brigades. Although
These MLRS and artillery pieces would
the Ashuluk training area in Astrakhan
be critical for suppressing or destroying
is often used for live-fire exercises for
Ukrainian fortified defenses or artillery
long-range systems from other military
in support of a Russian ground assault.
districts, including the Iskander-M
The heavy 2S7M, 2S4, and TOS-1A are
and S-400 air defense systems, these
particularly effective at penetrating well-
Iskander-M systems were never relocated
fortified defensive positions that medium
17 Alexey Ramm and Bogdan Stepovoy, “Система выжигания: в армии создадут батальоны тяжелых огнеметов,”
Izvestia, October 22, 2019, https://iz.ru/928820/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi/sistema-vyzhiganiia-v-armii-soz-
dadut-batalony-tiazhelykh-ognemetov; Evgeny Andreev, Bogdan Stepovoy, and Alexey Ramm, “Артиллерия
наращивает мощь,” Izvestia, December 17, 2017, https://iz.ru/675176/evgenii-andreev-bogdan-stepovoi-aleksei-ramm/
artilleriia-narashchivaet-moshch.
18 “Russian Ground Troop Units and Iskander ballistic missiles identified at Ukrainian border by Janes,” Janes, April
8, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russian-ground-troop-units-and-iskander-ballistic-missiles-
identified-at-ukrainian-border-by-janes; “Баллистическая ракета комплекса “Искандер-М” упала в Казахстане,
пролетев более 600 километров,” BMPD, January 13, 2020, https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3903873.html.
9FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Russian military combat readiness exercises on April 22, 2021 along the Ukrainian border. (mil.ru)
near Astrakhan, which indicates that including its 76th Guards Air Assault
their deployment near Ukraine’s border Division based in Pskov, whose forces
was for other purposes. In addition, took part in some of the heaviest fighting
some of the Russian Ground Forces’ in the Donbas in August-September
best-equipped tank and motorized rifle 2014. Much of the VDV equipment that
formations, including those with T-72B3 arrived in Crimea was likely from the 56th
and T-90A tanks and BMP-3 infantry Independent Air Assault Brigade based
fighting vehicles, were moved near the in Kamyshin, Volgograd, which Sergei
border; many are from the Southern Shoigu announced on March 25 would
Military District’s 58th Combined Arms be restructured into a regiment as part of
Army but were redeployed from the North the 7th Mountain Air Assault Division. Its
Caucasus.19 new permanent base is in Crimea where
an independent air assault battalion was
Many of the units arriving also came from
previously based.20
Russia’s elite Airborne Forces (VDV),
19 “Мотострелковые соединения 58-й армии ЮВО переброшены на учения в Крым,” Interfax, April 16, 2021,
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/761607.
20 “В Москве под руководством главы военного ведомства прошло заседание Коллегии Минобороны России,”
Russian Ministry of Defense, March 25, 2021, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350817@
egNews.
10RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
These elite mechanized air assault, Russia also redeployed a number
motorized rifle, and tank units arrived near of Southern Military District aviation
Ukraine along with critical supporting units to Ukraine’s borders, including
assets, such as Infauna and Borisoglebsk-2 fifty helicopters and combat aircraft to
electronic warfare systems, as well Crimea.22 This included Mi-28N, Mi-28UB,
as air defense systems, including the Ka-52, and Mi-8 helicopters—likely from
long-range S-300PM2 Favorit; medium- the 55th and 487th Helicopter Regiments
range Buk-M2 and Buk-M3 systems; and and 16th Army Aviation Brigade—and
short-range Pantsir-S, Tunguska-M1, and Su-30SM and Su-27 fighters, Su-24 and
Strela-10 systems. Many of these systems Su-34 bombers, and Su-25SM3 attack
are designed to escort Russian maneuver aircraft.23 Russia’s first operational
units into battle and to provide protection unmanned combat aerial vehicle, the
from enemy aviation, UAVs, precision- Orion or Inokhodets, took part in the
guided munitions, and munitions from deployment as well.24
multiple launch rocket systems. Social
Unlike its ground assets, the Russian
media videos have also shown high-
military did not need to redeploy many
level communications and command
aircraft closer to Ukraine’s borders
and control units and equipment near
because of their greater range. However,
the border, including the army-level
deploying its shortest-range aircraft, such
P-260T Redut-2US digital communication
as Su-25SM3 and helicopters, in Crimea
system.21 A large-scale ground assault
provided the Russian military with greater
would require sophisticated command
options in a potential escalation with
and control and communications
Ukraine. Russia had the lift capacity to
capabilities like these. The deployment of
transport multiple companies of soldiers
so many high-level assets organic at the
via helicopter along Ukraine’s southern
army or district level indicate that this was
coast if necessary. Russia also deployed
not a normal battalion- or brigade-level
an A-50U airborne early warning and
exercise.
control (AEW&C) aircraft based in Ivanovo
21 “Russian Ground Troop Units and Iskander ballistic missiles identified at Ukrainian border by Janes,” Janes, April 8,
2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russian-ground-troop-units-and-iskander-ballistic-missiles-iden-
tified-at-ukrainian-border-by-janes.
22 “Over 20 Russian Black Sea Fleet warships hold joint drills with aircraft in Crimea,” TASS, April 20, 2021, https://tass.
com/defense/1280235.
23 Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, “Satellite Images Show Russia’s Expanding Ukraine Buildup,” Wall
Street Journal, April 20, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/satellite-images-show-russias-expanding-ukraine-build-
up-11618917238.
24 Russian Ministry of Defense, “Министр обороны РФ Сергей Шойгу прибыл в Крым, где в четверг состоится
основной этап межвидовых учений войск Южного военного округа и ВДВ, которые идут в рамках внезапной
проверки боеготовности,” VK, April 22, 2021, https://vk.com/mil?w=wall-133441491_420427.
11FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
that took part in the exercise in Crimea.25 landing craft; and a variety of support
The Russian MoD claimed that all fifty ships in the Black Sea. Although they
of the aircraft deployed to Crimea had could likely only muster seven or eight
returned to their permanent bases by large landing ships at the same time,
April 26.26 Russia had the capacity to conduct an
amphibious assault on Ukraine’s coast
Lastly, Russia deployed an abnormally
with one reinforced naval infantry (or
large number of ships, particularly
VDV) battalion with air defense, artillery,
amphibious ships, to the region. This
and other support elements without
was likely the largest amphibious naval
requiring the ships to make multiple trips.
grouping in the Black Sea since the fall
A second battalion could likely be landed
of the Soviet Union. The Caspian Flotilla
within hours, and Russia could insert an
sent fifteen ships, including three Project
air assault company—or a battalion, if
1204 Shmel-class artillery boats and eight
additional aviation assets were moved to
landing craft (including all six of its Serna-
the region—by helicopter.
class landing craft), which entered the
Black Sea on April 17. The Northern and Because of the short distances, Russia
Baltic Fleets each deployed two of their could also conduct an independent
Project 775 Ropucha-class amphibious helicopter assault or raid along Ukraine’s
large landing ships, which crossed the coast even without an amphibious
Bosphorus into the Black Sea on April 17 operation. A Russian amphibious assault
as well. These are in addition to the Black on Ukraine’s coast was a very unlikely
Sea Fleet’s seven Project 775 and Project possibility—amphibious operations
1171 amphibious ships and several landing are notoriously complex and difficult
craft, though one Ropucha-class landing to execute—but the sheer amphibious
ship departed the Black Sea for Syria capability meant that Ukraine could not
during the buildup. ignore the possibility. Russia also had
the capability to drop a VDV regiment by
In mid-to-late-April, the Russian Navy had
parachute, which it demonstrated during
a total of eleven large landing ships (each
the exercise at the Opuk training area on
capable of transporting a naval infantry
April 22 by reportedly parachuting more
company as well as tanks, artillery, and
than two thousand paratroopers and sixty
other armored vehicles); more than
BMD-2 and BTR-D armored vehicles from
twelve Serna, Ondatra, BK-16, or BK-18
the VDV’s 98th Guards Airborne Division
25 Thomas Bullock, “Russia continues to reinforce Ukrainian border, begins exercises in Black Sea,” Janes, April 21,
2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/russia-continues-to-reinforce-ukrainian-border-begins-exercis-
es-in-black-sea.
26 Anna Berestovaya, “Самолеты и вертолеты авиации ЮВО и Черноморского флота вернулись из Крыма,” Zvez-
da, April 26, 2021, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2021426326-5g925.html.
12RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
(mil.ru)
13FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft.27 the Donbas, from Crimea, and from the
Belgorod, Kursk, and Bryansk Oblasts
These forces were in addition to the
on Ukraine’s northeastern border. Russia
Southern Military District and Black Sea
could also conduct an amphibious assault
Fleet’s ample capabilities. The Southern
along Ukraine’s coast or a helicopter
Military District has long been a priority
assault or airborne operation, possibly in
district for the Russian military, with
support of a ground offensive. Ukrainian
a higher percentage of professional
forces had to spread thin in response.
soldiers, permanent readiness units,
and modern equipment than any other Nonetheless, a Russian military incursion
district. Upgrading the Black Sea Fleet, beyond the line of contact was always
including its ground forces based in unlikely for several reasons. First, the
Crimea, has also been one the Russian buildup was relatively slow but very
Navy’s priorities since the annexation in public. Russia made little effort to hide
2014. the movement of its forces to Ukraine’s
borders. They could have placed tarps
As an example, Crimea is already well-
over the vehicles being transported via
defended with four S-400 air defense
rail, moved them at night, and prevented
battalions, which have been on combat
Western reporters from getting close
duty there since 2018, though S-300PM2
to their camps. Instead, the security
with Pantsir-S short-range air defense
situation in Ukraine, in particular the
systems have also been spotted in videos
Donbas, was a focus for Russian officials
near Ukraine’s borders. In addition, the
and state-owned televisions networks
Black Sea Fleet has six submarines
during the buildup, forfeiting the element
and seven surface ships that can carry
of surprise.28
long-range Kalibr cruise missiles, which
rotate through deployments in the Operational security failures, particularly
Mediterranean Sea. Between these Kalibr- via social media, during the fighting in the
equipped submarines and ships and the Donbas in 2014-2015 led to a concerted
Iskander-M brigades, Russian military effort by the Russian military to crack
commanders near Ukraine’s borders have down on these mistakes. It seems unlikely
a robust long-range precision-guided that Western reporters could get so
strike capability. close to a Russian military camp, or that
significant army-level military equipment
With its buildup in the Western and
would be moved in a way that they could
Southern Military Districts, Russia could
be easily spotted and uploaded to social
conduct an armored offensive from
27 Andrey Arkadiev, “Тысячи бойцов, десятки единиц техники: опубликованы кадры массового десантирования
из Ил-76 в Крыму,” Zvezda, April 22, 2021, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20214221822-Td0s1.html.
28 Diana Magnay, ‘‘Russia: Inside the Kremlin’s Military Buildup Along the Ukraine Border,’’ Sky News, April 12, 2021,
https://news.sky.com/story/russia-inside-the-kremlins-military-build-up-along-the-ukraine-border-12272418
14RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
Russian Black Sea Fleet ships in Russian-occupied Crimea in May 2015. (Vadim Indeikin/Wikimedia)
media, unless this was intentional.29 This security purposes. This indicates that this
gave Ukraine time to call up its reserves, movement of equipment was designed
move reinforcements, and transfer more to send a signal than in preparation
equipment—possibly including American of a military offensive.
Javelin anti-tank guided missiles, which
Second, there is not an objective
are currently spread out across the
sufficiently important that it would
country in storage facilities—to units
necessitate a ground assault and the
near the line of contact.30 Moreover, the
associated repercussions. Despite op-
buildup has relied heavily on rail, with
eds published each year arguing that
no public indication that Russia’s military
Russia has tried to seize more Ukrainian
transport aviation has played a large role
territory, such as by creating a “land
in moving this equipment. Air transport
bridge” to Crimea from the Donbas—
would normally be used if Russia
the completion of the Crimean Bridge in
needed to quickly mass its forces, and it
2019 between Crimea and the Russian
would be a better option for operational
29 Diana Magnay, “Russia: Inside the Kremlin’s military build-up along the Ukraine border,” Sky News, April 12, 2021,
https://news.sky.com/story/russia-inside-the-kremlins-military-build-up-along-the-ukraine-border-12272418.
30 Lara Seligman and Natasha Bertrand, “Can Ukraine deploy U.S.-made weapons against the Russians?” Politico, April
12, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/04/12/ukraine-us-missile-weapons-russia-480985.
15FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba meet in Washington D.C., August 2021.
(U.S. Embassy in Ukraine)
mainland solved this issue—there is little even leading Sweden or Finland to join
evidence that Russia has ever sought this. the alliance. It would also spark additional
Indeed, controlling a narrow strip of land sanctions from the United States and the
on the coast would leave it vulnerable European Union. A further collapse of
to a Ukrainian offensive that could cut relations with the U.S. and EU could make
off Russian lines of communication, and Russia more dependent on China for
it would require more Russian forces to trade and economic cooperation.
defend. In addition, Russian forces could
The one part of Ukraine that has been
have taken more territory in 2015.
mentioned as a potential target for a
Instead, Russian policy to Ukraine since Russian invasion is the Northern Crimean
2014 has largely focused on retaining and Canal. Crimea is facing a water shortage,
defending the territories it has seized and in part caused by Ukraine’s decision to
implementing the Minsk accords to its block the canal that takes water from the
advantage. A full-fledged ground invasion Dnieper River to Crimea. This shortage
could potentially threaten the Nord Stream has led parts of Crimea to ration water
II pipeline between Russia and Germany, use and has significantly reduced the
and it would likely unite NATO, possibly amount of arable land in Crimea, harming
16RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
its agriculture. Some analysts have Finally, if Russia was looking for a pretext
suggested that Russia could seize the for a military operation, it already had
canal and the area around it to secure one. A five-year old child was tragically
Crimea’s water supply. Instead, Russia killed in an explosion in the village of
is currently implementing a 50-billion- Oleksandrivske in the self-proclaimed
ruble plan to ameliorate the situation by breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic
repairing pipes, digging new wells, and (DPR) on April 3. Russian state-controlled
other measures that are supposed to news outlets like Pervy Kanal reported
double Crime’s water supply by 2024.31 that the child was killed by a Ukrainian
drone strike. Vladimir Putin’s spokesman
Securing the canal would complicate
Dmitry Peskov said that it would be
Russia’s security situation in Ukraine,
difficult to believe that this was not true.32
as its current border in Crimea is mostly
However, Ukraine’s defense ministry
separated by water. This would likely
called the allegation “fake news” and the
require more troops to be stationed there
independent Russian news site Telekanal
permanently; there would also not be the
Dozhd reported that his death was not
patina, however tenuous, that this was led
caused by a drone strike, but instead likely
by Ukrainians since this operation would
from picking up an explosive device.33
originate from Crimea, not the Donbas.
Regardless, if Russia had wanted to mount
There is also no guarantee that the
a large offensive operation in the Donbas,
canal could simply be turned on quickly,
this could have been used as pretext.
as it does not appear to have been
well maintained. Any military operation
involves significant, unknown risks, and
an invasion to seize the canal and its
surrounding would almost certainly be
far more expensive than the alternative
efforts to solve Crimea’s water problems.
31 Anton Troianovski, “Where Ukrainians Are Preparing for All-Out War With Russia,” New York Times, May 8, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-canal-crimea.html; Clara Ferreira Marques,
“Crimea’s Water Crisis Is an Impossible Problem for Putin,” Bloomberg, March 19, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2021-03-19/russia-vs-ukraine-crimea-s-water-crisis-is-an-impossible-problem-for-putin; Nikolay Pozd-
nyakov Lyubov Lezhneva, “Крымский рост: как Россия продолжит развивать полуостров,” Izvestia, March 18, 2021,
https://iz.ru/1139131/nikolai-pozdniakov-liubov-lezhneva/krymskii-rost-kak-rossiia-prodolzhit-razvivat-poluostrov.
32 “В Донецке в результате атаки украинского беспилотника погиб ребенок,” Pervyy kanal, April 2, 2021, https://
yandex.ru/turbo/1tv.ru/s/news/2021-04-03/404242-v_donetske_v_rezultate_ataki_ukrainskogo_bespilotnika_pogib_re-
benok; “Russia to investigate reported killing of child in Ukraine attack,” Al Jazeera, April 5, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2021/4/5/russia-to-investigate-reported-killing-of-child-in-ukraine-attack.
33 “Убитый мальчик в Донбассе: что правда, а что ложь в истории, подхваченной российской пропагандой,”
Telekanal Dozhd, April 6, 2021, https://tvrain.ru/teleshow/vechernee_shou/donbas-527651/;
17FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Deterrence or Compellence?
Rather than preparing for a potential
The public and slow buildup of combat invasion, there are two better
power near Ukraine’s borders instead
explanations for why Russia massed
appears to be largely demonstrative in
combat power near Ukraine’s borders:
nature. Russia has deliberately left its
deterrence and compellence. Deterrence
intentions ambiguous. The Russian MoD’s
and compellence both involve threats,
leadership could have provided details
typically connected to military force,
of the movement of units and timeline
intended to influence another country’s
of the declared exercises as confidence-
decision-making through coercion.
building measures, but chose to only
Deterrence is designed to dissuade the
provide certain details at the end of the
target from taking a future action, whereas
buildup, without a full explanation as to
compellence threatens force unless the
why these actions were necessary.
target changes its current behavior.
Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement
If Ukraine was the target, then Russia’s
that the units would move back to their
actions could have been aimed at retaining
permanent bases, U.S. defense officials
deterrence vis-à-vis Ukraine in case Kyiv
and Ukrainian President Zelensky
used military force to retake Crimea or
both said that only a few thousand had
the Donbas. Otherwise, the buildup could
departed, leaving approximately 75,000
have been part of a compellence strategy
troops near Ukraine’s borders, according
designed to force Ukraine to make a
to Zelensky.34 The head of Ukraine’s
concession or change its behavior.
state security service, Ivan Bakanov,
gave an even higher figure, estimating The local balance of combat power and
that 100,000 Russian troops were still the credibility of the threat are both
deployed near Ukraine.35 The same is critical to the strength of deterrence
true for the amphibious ships from the and compellence strategies. In the case
Caspian Flotilla, Northern Fleet, and Baltic of Crimea and the Donbas, there is little
Fleet, which all appear to be still located doubt that Russia has the military capability
in Sevastopol or the Black Sea. Therefore, to prevent Ukraine from retaking either
Russia still retains the capacity to use region by force, given that Russia has a
military force in Ukraine on short notice. stronger military, both in general and in
34 “President Zelensky says there are still 75,000 Russian troops on the border with Ukraine,” Meduza, May 6, 2021,
https://meduza.io/en/news/2021/05/06/president-zelensky-says-there-s-still-75-000-russian-troops-on-the-border-with-
ukraine.
35 “Ukraine says Russia still has 100,000 troops near its border,” Reuters, May 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/
europe/ukraine-says-russia-still-has-100000-troops-near-its-border-2021-05-11/.
18RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
19
(mil.ru)FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
the region. In addition, Russia has made have denied they are planning to retake
it clear it would defend both regions. the Donbas.38 Khomchak went further,
Vladimir Putin has demonstrated during saying there is no “purely military solution”
his two decades in power that he is not to the Donbas situation.39 Even though
afraid to use military force. a Ukrainian offensive is highly unlikely,
some Russian analysts believe that
Perceptions are ultimately more
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky
important in deterrence, even if they are
may try to retake the Donbas to improve
incorrect. Many Russian sources argued
his popularity at home or to win support
the buildup was a response to Ukraine
from NATO.40
having strengthened its forces near the
Donbas, which a number of Russian By building up its forces near Ukraine,
analysts claimed could be preparation for Russia strengthens its deterrence in
an impending offensive.36 The Ukrainian several ways. It demonstrates Russia
military has also become a much more can reinforce Crimea and the Donbas
effective fighting force since 2015, with with substantial combat power if fighting
improved training and purchases of escalates. It also shows that Russia
modern military equipment, most notably retains escalation dominance, as Russia
Turkish TB2 unmanned combat aerial can bring a greater quantity and quality of
vehicles (UCAV) that played a critical role forces and equipment to bear, regardless
in fighting in Idlib, Libya, and Nagorno- of further Ukrainian arms imports. Lastly,
Karabakh last year.37 it is a demonstration of resolve. Russia is
signaling to Kyiv, as well as Washington
In addition, Russia’s leadership may
and NATO, that it will defend the Donbas
be concerned that Ukraine feels
and Crimea even at the cost of a further
emboldened with a new and more
deterioration in relations with the West.
supportive administration in Washington,
though Ukrainian officials, including the Statements from Russian officials
Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in- during the buildup also indicated that
Chief, Colonel-General Ruslan Khomchak, deterrence concerns may have driven
36 Ruslan Pukhov interview with Nikolay Nelyubin, “«Вероятность начала большой войны и русской мас-
штабной интервенции на Украину пока что низкая»,” Fontanka, April 7, 2021, https://www.fontanka.
ru/2021/04/07/69852671/?fbclid=IwAR1E3FZTQsnrVYRvszKirljnK2e1tvwt5vv8euLaf4sRSprNHOQH4FZLkyA.
37 “”Скоро начнется»: зачем украинцы резко нарастили силы в Донбассе,” RIA Novosti, April 12, 2021, https://ria.
ru/20201204/donbass-1587543617.html.
38 General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, “The reports spread by the aggressor state by the russian federation
about the alleged “preparation of Ukraine for the attack on Donbas” are not true and are in the nature of a targeted dis-
information campaign,” Facebook, April 9, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/1893527870816461.
39 “Главком ВСУ оценил шансы вернуть Донбасс военным путем,” RIA Novosti, December, 27, 2020, https://ria.
ru/20201127/donbass-1586543642.html.
40 “Политолог назвал 6 целей Зеленского в войне на Донбассе,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 8, 2021, https://
www.mk.ru/politics/2021/04/08/politolog-nazval-6-celey-zelenskogo-v-voyne-na-donbasse.html.
20RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
DPR military parade in Donetsk, May 2018. (Andrew Butko/Wikimedia)
the buildup. They offered three aims for Russia had taken “appropriate measures”
this deterrence. During an inspection in response to this NATO buildup before
of the Northern Fleet, Defense Minister mentioning the forces being deployed
Sergei Shoigu said that NATO is building to its western borders near Ukraine.41
up its forces and military infrastructure Shoigu indicated Russia was responding
in the Arctic, Baltic region, and the Black primarily to the NATO Defender Europe
Sea area and that the intensity of air exercise and not Ukraine’s actions.
and naval reconnaissance near Russia’s
Second, Dmitry Kozak, the deputy head
borders has increased. He accused
of Russia’s presidential administration,
NATO of holding forty exercises a year in
indicated that Russia’s actions were in
Europe with a “clear anti-Russian bias.”
response to the threat of an offensive
Shoigu mentioned the upcoming NATO
by Ukraine. He said renewed fighting
Defender Europe 2021 exercise and said
41 “Министр обороны России генерал армии Сергей Шойгу в ходе поездки на Северный флот провел рабочее
совещание в Североморске,” Russian Ministry of Defense, April 13, 2021, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/
more.htm?id=12354311@egNews.
21FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
could mark the “beginning of the end” made it difficult to interpret Russia’s
for Ukraine if it escalated sufficiently.42 actions during the buildup. One of the
Although Shoigu on April 13 said rationales for the buildup was that it was
verification checks should be completed in response to Ukraine’s actions; another,
in two weeks, Vladimir Shamanov, in response to NATO’s actions; and the
the Chairman of the Duma’s Defense third, in response to both Ukraine and
Committee and the former commander NATO’s actions.
of Russia’s Airborne Troops, said that the
The buildup may also have been intended
return of these mobilized units to their
as compellence. In contrast to deterrence,
permanent bases after the exercise would
compellence is the threat or use of force
depend on the situation on the other side
to compel a target to change its current
of their border with Ukraine, which also
behavior. Compellence seeks to alter
appears to support the argument that
the status quo while deterrence aims to
this was to deter a Ukrainian offensive.43
maintain it. If the target does not change
Additionally, Russian Deputy Foreign
its actions or make concessions, the
Minister Sergei Ryabkov emphasized
country employing compellence will use
Russia will continue to defend Russian-
force to punish the recipient until it does,
speakers in the Donbas.44
which could require a cycle of escalating
The third rationale was provided by violence. The point of compellence is not
Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman the use of military force itself, but simply
Maria Zakharova, who criticized Ukraine to alter the target’s behavior. Ideally, the
for building up its forces near the Donbas compeller’s goals are achieved without
and not implementing the Minsk accords. having to use force. As with deterrence,
In particular, she warned Ukraine against military capabilities and credibility are
joining NATO, which would “lead to important in attempts at compellence.
a large-scale rise in tensions in the The capacity to inflict pain on the target
southeast, possibly causing irreversible needs to be real, as does the credibility
consequences for Ukraine’s statehood.”45 to employ it if the demands are not met.
This often involves a shorter timeline than
This ambiguity about what specific
deterrence and requires the compeller to
Ukrainian or NATO action, or possible
go through with its threat if the target does
future action, drove Russia’s response,
not change its behavior. Compellence
42 “Ukraine conflict: Moscow could ‘defend’ Russia-backed rebels,” BBC, April 9, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-56678665.
43 “Возвращение войск РФ с юга страны будет зависеть от ситуации по ту сторону границы - Шаманов
“Интерфаксу,”” Interfax, April 13, 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=548344&lang=RU.
44 Daryna Krasnolutska, “Ukraine Tells Russia to Pull Back Troops as U.S. Warns of Costs,” Bloomberg, April 12, 2021,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-04-12/ukraine-tells-russia-to-pull-back-troops-as-u-s-warns-of-costs.
45 “Ukraine’s NATO accession would lead to large-scale rise in tensions — Russian diplomat,” TASS, April 9, 2021,
https://tass.com/politics/1275949.
22RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
NATO ships exercise in the Black Sea, July 2021. (NATO)
aims to alter another country’s incentive of a military buildup by looking at the
structure and make complying with the equipment alone will not necessarily
compeller’s demands the preferable provide a clear picture. Indeed, a country
course of action. attempting to compel its neighbor might
want a buildup to look exactly like the
The problem is that it can be difficult
preparation for a large-scale ground
to determine whether a country is
offensive in order for the threat to be
focused on deterrence or compellence,
greatest
particularly with the multiple demands
and justifications mentioned by Russian The buildup of forces around Ukraine
officials. Most weapon systems are not could have been part of a compellence
purely offensive or defensive, but instead strategy against Ukraine from Russia.
can be employed in multiple roles. As Latent combat power could inflict
an example, tank units are effective at substantial pain on Ukraine. Since Russia’s
leading an offensive, but they are also intentions are not fully known, Ukraine
critical in a defensive role to reinforce must consider the worst-case scenario as
defensive positions and counterattacks. a possibility. If Kyiv believes a renewed
The same is true for artillery and MLRS. ground invasion or use of heavy military
Thus, attempting to interpret the purpose force is possible, even if unlikely, it may
23FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
decide that making a small concession helmet-cam footage that appears to be
would be preferable to forestall such of a well-equipped Russian sniper team
a possibility. If Russia’s actions were from the FSB’s Special Purpose Center
aimed at compellence, Kyiv would need operating along the front lines in the
to take some action to satisfy Russia’s Donbas. Ukraine alleged that that footage
demands, otherwise Moscow could use was taken on the same day a Ukrainian
force to demonstrate its resolve and alter serviceman was killed by sniper fire.46
Ukraine’s cost-benefit analysis. Using snipers or ATGM teams has the
advantage of appearing to be part of the
As an example, if Russia is determined
normal fighting along the line-of-contact
to resolve the water supply problem in
and is thus more easily deniable.
Crimea, it does not necessarily need to
seize the canal. A cheaper option would In addition, Russia could have escalated
be to use threats or limited military force with greater artillery or MLRS fire than
to compel Ukraine to open the canal once normal along the line-of-contact. This
again without occupying the entire area. could involve using artillery already
That force needs to be sufficiently painful based in the Donbas, or escalation
and the threat of future punishment with heavy Russian artillery, such as the
sufficiently credible to alter Kyiv’s cost- 2S7M Malka, 2S4 Tyulpan, or TOS-1A
benefit analysis. To achieve this, Russia MLRS systems. But employing these
could have taken limited escalatory systems would be less deniable since
steps as part of a compellence campaign they are not in service with the Russian-
against Ukraine. Russian air defenses backed separatist groups in the Donbas.
could have shot down a Ukrainian TB2 Russia could use them in a limited role
UCAV, which are increasingly flying or attempt to destroy Ukrainian artillery,
closer to Crimea and the Donbas. This armor, or defenses to demonstrate how
might be preferable, as it would not painful a further escalation would be. A
cost any Ukrainian lives, but it would still heavy bombardment on a narrow part of
demonstrate that Turkish TB2 would have the front would show Kyiv that Ukraine
far less success operating against Russia, would struggle to prevent an armored
which has a very capable integrated air breakthrough after a further artillery
defense system, unlike Armenia or Syria. barrage. A less likely possibility is that
Russia could have launched a short-
Russia could also have deployed more
range ballistic or cruise missile from an
sniper or anti-tank guided missile teams
Iskander-M system.
from its special operations forces to
target Ukrainian servicemen along the All these options would be designed to
line of contact more aggressively. Last coerce Ukraine into changing its behavior
May, the Ukrainian military published with the threat of future punitive actions.
46 Ray Furlong, “Video Purportedly Shows Russian Snipers In Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 20,
2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/video-purportedly-shows-russian-snipers-in-ukraine/30624198.html.
24RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky visits the Mykolaiv and Odesa regions. (Office of the President of Ukraine)
Indeed, Russia has already demonstrated What is not fully clear is what Russia
some possibly compellent behavior by was demanding from Ukraine if this was
limiting access through the Kerch Strait and an attempt at compellence. In addition
detaining a Ukrainian diplomat, allegedly to Crimea’s water situation, analysts
for receiving classified information.47 have speculated that Russia wants the
Other potential compellent actions Ukrainian government to: implement the
could involve Russia initiating another Minsk agreement; remove sanctions on
naval altercation with Ukrainian ships, Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, a
as with the 2018 Kerch Strait incident, or close associate of Vladimir Putin; reopen
conducting unsafe intercepts of Ukrainian three pro-Russia domestic television
or NATO aircraft in the Black Sea. Russia channels associated with Medvedchuk;
could also escalate its use of cyberwarfare halt or reduce Ukrainian forces
or employ electronic warfare as part of a reinforcements near the Donbas; and
compellence campaign. deescalate rhetoric about the Donbas.48
47 Jeff Seldin, “US, NATO Slam Russian Plan to Block Parts of Black Sea,” April 16, 2021, https://www.voanews.com/eu-
rope/us-nato-slam-russian-plan-block-parts-black-sea.
48 Roman Olearchyk, “Ukraine imposes sanctions on Putin ally Viktor Medvedchuk,” Financial Times, February 19,
2021, https://www.ft.com/content/5acf9374-bed9-4f2b-99e2-5965764ffd0e; Maxim Samorukov, “Are Russia and
Ukraine Sliding Into War?” Carnegie Moscow Center, April 5, 2021, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/84250
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