What is the new geopolitical map after the Taliban's return to power?

August 2021

What is the new
geopolitical map after the
Taliban’s return to power?
Reflections on the peace deal and its significance for international
Peace and Security

AVERA – COMMENTARY
By Brahim Laytouss – Head of AVERA Department

INTRODUCTION
15 August 2021, the day the international press reported the fall of Kabul, will forever
remain engraved in the memory of Afghans. Several observers have squarely put the
blame on former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani as he kept forestalling the
implementation of his obligations of the Doha Agreement with the Taliban – also
known as the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan, despite being signed with
the Taliban on 29 February 2020, over a year ago, in Qatar.

However, the effectuation of the agreement proved from the onset very difficult due
to a lot of distrust on both sides. For example, the agreement included the release of
5,000 Taliban prisoners, in exchange for 1,000 prisoners held by the Taliban. The
Taliban used the government’s delay as justification to speed up its advance towards
Kabul after the US troops and their allies withdrew rather suddenly from Afghanistan.
The US President, Joe Biden, in his recent press conference, trying to cover up the
failed US diplomacy and aiming to avoid more loss of face, reiterated that he will
continue the withdrawal of the military with determination and ensure a safe return
by 31 August.

Although some opportunities can still be found in some of the provisions of the signed
peace agreement to stop or at least reduce some of effects of war, destruction, and

What is the new geopolitical map after the Taliban’s return to power? | Brahim Laytouss Brussels
International Center

poverty the country had to endure for several decades now, for many Afghans the
future perspective looks increasingly bleak1.

Will the territory of Afghanistan once more become a local and international
battleground and a source of danger and instability in the future? Is there still hope
that the different stakeholders come together, or leaders stand together to govern the
country's affairs with great skills and an open policy that takes global geopolitical
affairs into account and sets out the road map for building a strong and modern
democratic rule of law?

One of the main issues the Islamic world often directs towards the USA and the West
in general, is that the propagation of universal values and shaping of democracy is too
often approached from a political biased perspective, which on the ground often
translates in playing on ethnic and sectarian divisions and which subsequently
consolidates into a climate of discrimination and collusion at a regional level and the
emerging of double standards. Moreover, while the USA vigorous promotes
democracy, women’s rights, political reforms, human rights and others, the
implementation of it is done selectively and depending on country and region. This is
because social and political issues are more often approached and prioritized from a
USA (security) perspective, rather than an economic, social and humanitarian, cultural
and historical perspective, specific to that country and region.

As such problems are rarely tackled locally at the grassroots level. Yet without a vision
that can win the hearts and mind of most of the populations and can transcend
different ethnic and local diverging interests, a military driven solution will always fall
short.

THE ORIGIN OF THE TALIBAN

The origin of the Taliban goes back to the opposition of various fractions and groups
of anti-communist Muslim guerrillas (mujahidin) - backed by the USA and later
involving foreign fighters -, against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)
in support of the Afghan communist government during the Afghan War (1979-1989).
An opposition that eventually forced the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan
in 1989.

Even before that, there was already a lot of direct or indirect regional meddling and
support for conflicting Afghan parties which has been deemed largely responsible for
the failure of the international community's efforts, in particular the United Nations,

1 VersteegJoris, vijf verklaringen voor de machtsovername van de Taliban, Clingendael spectator, Den
Haag , 2021

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to implement stability and peace in Afghanistan since the 1980’s. Thus, for decades it
remained an arena of proxy wars fought by different powers.2

Parties and movements supported from abroad included: the Islamic Party led by
Galbuddin Hekmatyar of the Pashtuns, supported by Pakistan; the Islamic Society of
the Tajiks led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud, supported by Iran
and India; and General Abdul Rashid Dostum in the north, supported by Russia. All of
them formed an obstacle to political compromise, common solutions and the failure
to create state institutions, infrastructure and provide public services to the people.

Other factors exacerbating the situation include the strategic location of Afghanistan,
which has borders with six countries, forming a meeting point of the Middle East,
Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent; and its diverse ethnicity that has been at
odds with each other for centuries. Among these the best known are the Pashtuns,
who make up 42% of the population; the Tajiks forming 32%; the Hazaras forming 8%
- Shiites who joined the Taliban ranks in 2007; the Uzbeks, who make up 7%; the
Turkmen 4%; and the Baluchs with 2% of the population. Still several other minorities
groups have Afghanistan as their home.

The Taliban appeared within this turbulent war environment with the aim of
establishing an "Islamic system and introducing sharia in a narrow understanding of
the term and based on their rigid interpretation with the Hanafi jurisprudence.3 The
movement chose for itself the name "Taliban”, which means "students", referring to
those who have received an education in Sharia religious schools. It was Mullah
Muhammad Omar who founded the Taliban movement in September 1994 with 50
students from religious schools in the southern province of Kandahar. The movement
was initial mainly made up from the Pashtun majority areas in the east and south of
the country and the first objective was to fight widespread crime, in particularly
looting, kidnappings, rapes, drug gangs and corruption, and as such bring security to
the cities. This was welcomed by part of the population living in a country that was
largely lawless, thorn apart by tribal strive and various factions fighting to expand their
influence and territory 4. Since the main political factions failed to from a coalition
government on the one hand and were largely exhausted and degraded in their
capabilities on the other hand, the Taliban was able to gain rapid influence. As such
the movement quickly grew to 15,000 members and has today more than 75,000
fighters.5

Ever since, the Afghan state has struggled to manage the country’s affairs and find
unity, leading many to consider Afghanistan, with a population of about 28 million, as

2                   ‫مشوع األوسط الكبي وتداعياته السياسية واإلقتصادية ر‬
 ‫ دار‬،‫ القاهرة‬،‫واليبوية‬                                              ‫ ر‬،‫عبدالرحمن النقيب عبد الرحمن‬
                                                      ‫ر‬
‫السالم ط‬1‫ ص‬، 178 ،2010

3،‫الطبعة الثانية‬،‫القاهرة‬،‫الشوق‬‫ دار ر‬،‫ طالبان جند هللا ف المعركة الغلط‬،‫فهم هويدي‬2001
                   ‫ر‬                               ‫ي‬                        ‫ي‬
4،‫اتيج للدراسات‬
              ‫ مركز الفكر اإلسي ي‬،‫ مأزق الحرب وآفاق السالم‬، ‫طالبان أفغانستان‬
5 ‫ وكالة األناضول بتاري خ‬،‫ أفغانستان وطالبان رحلة الحرب والسالم‬02/03/2020

https://www.aa.com.tr/ar

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a failed state. It is true that any country that fails to invest in the development of its
population and scientific research and fails to ensure a peaceful mechanism for power
succession and transfer will socially and economically decline and severely limit the
welfare and wellness of its population. According to the Asian Development Bank,
47.3% of the Afghan population was living below the national poverty line in 2020 6
despite the massive USA funds flowing into the country, while also the security
situation has been deteriorating over the years. It is exactly the lack of hope and trust
in the government for a better tomorrow that opens up the doors for division,
radicalization and extremism.

THE DOHA AGREEMENT
Shortly after the Obama administration announced its intention to withdraw their
military presence in 2012 - understanding that it could not militarily win the war on
terror against the Taliban in Afghanistan and that a political solution was required,
Qatar announced the opening of a political office for the Taliban in Qatar in June
2013.

File photo of US Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban's top political
leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar signing the peace agreement, Doha | ANI Photo

Factors contributing to the USA foreign policy change and initiating negotiations
with the Taliban included:

       •   The lack of domestic support for the continuation of the USA military
           presence in Afghanistan that was therefore used as an important election
           topic during presidential elections campaigns to win over the electorate.

6   https://www.adb.org/countries/afghanistan/poverty

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•    The high cost of the war and American presence in Afghanistan, estimated at
         between USD 760 billion (according to the USA Defense Department) and
         USD 2 trillion and over (Oxfam) – adding to about USD 65,0007 per minute.

    •    The high cost of human lives: not only did 4,200 American soldiers and more
         than 1,100 of allied troops lost their lives in Afghanistan, but also an
         estimated 240,000 Afghans.

    •    The realization that the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan could not
         decisively be won military.

    •    A shifting priority in USA policies from the war on Islamic terrorism and
         nation building toward a focus on new and pressing domestic and
         international economic and geopolitical issues, in particular the growing
         military, economic and geopolitical influence from China. It must be noted
         however that by pulling out, the USA ceded additional influence on China,
         Russia and other regional powers in Afghanistan.

Between the establishment of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar and the Doha
Agreement 11 rounds of negotiations took place.

The Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan itself consisted of four main
points:

    •    Providing safeguards and the implementation of mechanism to prevent any
         group or individual using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the USA
         and its allies.

    •    Establishing processes, guarantees and implementation mechanisms for the
         withdrawal of all foreign troops according a specific and agreed timetable.

    •    Initiating and facilitating intra-Afghan negotiations, starting in March 2020.

    •    Implementing a permanent ceasefire and joint future Afghan roadmap.

THE AFGHAN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND TERRORIST RISK TODAY

Now that the Taliban is controlling most of Afghanistan the main question is whether
it will once more become a haven for Islamic extremist and terrorist organizations and
how it will affect the international security situation.

The question is especially relevant since Al-Qaeda still has more than 300 of its
members present in Afghanistan8, including leadership figures, spread across 15
Afghan provinces that pose a real threat to not only the USA and its allies, but even
‘Islamic’ countries deemed to be not radical enough.

7The New Humanitarian.org 27/02/ 2008
8 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/mideast/potential-al-qaeda-resurgence-afghanistan-worries-u-s-
officials-n 12/08/2021 and consulted on 20/08/2021

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Moreover, ISIS has been using the Khorasan province as a beachhead for disseminating
propaganda, recruitment, and military mobilization since 2015. ISIS considers
Afghanistan one of the most active and promising areas to recruit members and
fighters. As a result of their propaganda, many Taliban fighters have defected and
instead embraced the even more radical, violent, and extremist ideologies of ISIS,
joining their cause. Apart from recruitment, Afghanistan is also very attractive for ISIS
because the availability of training camps and various types of advanced weapons than
can be used in their training and education.

Afghanistan is further appealing to jihadist for several symbolic reasons. Firstly, it is
the place where under the leadership of Osama bin Laden an international radical
jihadist alliance was first launched with banner “The Global Front to Fight Jews and
Crusaders". Bin Laden was eventually killed by US troops in 2011. Maybe even more
so, Afghanistan gained an almost mythical status of invincibility by forcing – in recent
history – both USSR and USA troops out of their country. Finally for Jihadist
movements, it was the first Islamic Emirate to give shelter to the Mujahidin (Islamic
fighters)9, regarding them as guests and offering them the right to asylum, despite
their terrorist status.

Still, it must be noted that there are stark differences between the ideology of the
Taliban on the one hand and ISIS and Al-Qaeda on the other (with even ISIS and Al-
Qaeda differing on key points as we have explained in previous articles).

Al-Qaeda, founded by Osama bin Laden, is a jihadist organization that calls for fighting
the far enemy, which translates into the West and the Zionists. Terms such as
crusaders and Zionists often appear in their ideological vocabulary to reinforce their
hostility towards others.

ISIS on the other hand, which emerged from the womb of al-Qaeda after Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi established its foundations in Iraq, calls for the establishment of an Islamic
caliphate and for combating the internal enemy, i.e. other Muslims, who in their view
are infidels, apostates and traitors who must be fought since they do not strictly
enforce Sharia on themselves.

With this in mind, it must be understood that the Afghan Taliban is in essence not
Salafist, though its ideology does contain elements that seems Salafist in terms of
extremism and innovation. Moreover, the movement has no ambitions for
geographical expansion or fighting the far enemy. The Taliban is even reported to have
fought fierce battles against IS encroaching influence in several Afghan provinces since
2015.

However, even within the Taliban movement there are sections that have increasing
strong organizational and ideological ties with ISIS and Al-Qaeda, for example the so-
called Haqqani network, led by Sharaf al-Din Ibn Sheikh Jalal al-Din Haqqani. The
possibility is real that, as happened in the past, some of those faction will influence the

9 https://www.greelane.com/nl/geesteswetenschappen/problemen/definition-of-mujahideen
17/02/2021

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Taliban accordingly or even overthrow the current leadership. Some factions are
indeed particular powerful and well-organized such as the Pakistani Taliban also
known as the Mujahidin Shura Council or the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose
number is estimated at more than 35,000 fighters.

The current Taliban’s leadership seems to be aware of this balancing act, and its
current willingness and openness for negotiations and focus on aligning and
disciplining their own basis is certainly encouraging, though it offers no guarantees or
immunization against more radical and extremist currents.

Adding to those concerns is the weakness of the Taliban’s political thinking and the
simplicity of its ideology. The movement focus is hardly on economic and social
development of the country but rather on detailed jurisprudence rulings and
formalities, such as the prohibition on shaving the beard, the compulsion and
obligation of the Chador10 and Niqaab11 for women, the banning of music and
television etc. Instead of shaping behavior and development through education,
guidance, gradualism, promoting initiative and providing incentives, the Taliban’s
approach is almost entire focused on prohibitions and the threat of punishment. An
externality of this approach is the excessive focus on small issues at the expense of the
big picture and abandoning the jurisprudence and teachings to embody the heart,
spirit, and worldview of the religion.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FROM AFGHANISTAN

Military intervention and nation-building surpassing socio-economic, local, ethnic, and
historical considerations have proven to be unfruitful to bring political stability,
security and economic development. Once the continuous flow in financial and
military aids dissipates, the invested efforts and established systems will implode on
themselves, starting a new cycle of domestic and international issues and more
migration waves towards the West.

Nation building and socio-economic stability require instead a long-term vision over
several generations with the active involvement of the local population, and a strong
educational system addressing both immediate needs within the current socio-
economic context and a path towards the future - though still anchored in traditional
culture (including the religious aspects of it). It is by building on the latter that
structural solutions for eliminating violent extremism can be developed that both
resonate and are effective.

Equally, a peace agreement without strong incentives to comply, flexibility to adapt to
new developments and mechanisms to reinforce commitments can hardly be seen as
a step forward.

10 A robe that covers the entire body of the woman, except the face.

11 A veil that covers the face and leaves the eyes (usually) free.

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One should also not forget that conflicts and discrepancies, even in democratic
societies, hold the seed – through a dialectical process - for bringing the essence of
their contradictions in the open and device solutions that transcend those differences.
However, this requires active listening, openness, sensitivity to other cultures and
views (including validating the logic of each perspective in their specific socio-
economic, cultural, and historical context) and higher-order thinking and facilitation
capabilities.

Finally, the world should become increasingly aware of the cost of short-term
opportunistic geopolitical policies in temporary allowing corruption, nepotism, and
collusion. Once the precedent is set and tolerated, it sets not only a bad example for
anyone else, but it also undermines any long-term moral leadership and influence.

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|      About the BIC

The BIC is an independent, non-profit, think-and-do tank based in the capital of
Europe that is committed to developing solutions to address the cyclical drivers of
insecurity, economic fragility, and conflict the Middle East and North Africa. Our goal
is to bring added value to the highest levels of political discourse by bringing systemic
issues to the forefront of the conversation.

|      Author

Brahim Laytouss | Head of AVERA Department