Venezuela in Light of Anti-American Parties and Affiliations in Latin America - Army University Press
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Venezuela's disputed President Nicolás Maduro carries the army commander’s baton 24 June 2017 as he arrives for Army Day celebrations
at Fuerte Tiuna in Caracas, Venezuela. Maduro joined the army celebration while thousands marched in the streets of the capital to demand
restraint from government security forces after more than seventy people had been killed during almost ninety days of protests seeking his
removal. (Photo by Fernando Llano, Associated Press)
Venezuela in Light
of Anti-American Parties
and Affiliations in
Latin America
Lt. Col. Geoff Demarest, JD, PhD, U.S. Army, Retired
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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A s the economy in Venezuela collapsed over the
course of the last several years, media coverage
of the situation increasingly focused on the
steep decline in living standards of the general popula-
tion, the resulting misery, and the emergence of mass
Cuban presence funded in turn by the Russians, Chinese,
Turks, Iranians, and others.
As a result, the notion of a military coup has had far
less effective meaning than has been accorded to it, not
just because there is no incentive for a coup, but because
refugee flows to neighboring countries. Correspondingly, a replacement of Maduro and his cronies by any of
the media broadcast many voices and a multiplicity of Venezuela’s current senior military leaders would likely
opinions regarding how the United States and other be no more than self-coup theatrics by the same orga-
governments should respond. The ruling socialist regime nizational hierarchy. Venezuelan army generals remain
in Caracas (hereinafter, Bolivarian) has been reason- materially secure because of lucrative relationships with
ably blamed for the tragedy, leading some of the more illicit drug and other transnational criminal enterprises.
assertive opinions to call for senior Venezuelan military They have also been allowed to arrange for safe places
leaders to abandon obedience to Nicolás Maduro as for their families to live—contingent, of course, on their
their chief executive and instead align their loyalty to loyalties. Moreover, their position is enhanced by their
the regime’s political opposition, which has gained a control of weapons, of which the opposition has none.
compelling share of formal internal and external recog- (However, that the loyalties of senior Bolivarian mili-
nition. Although there have been localized mutinies, the tary leaders is maintained by material benefits does con-
military services in general remained notably unre- stitute a vulnerability.) One might assume that some of
sponsive. The central reason for this unresponsiveness these leaders could be swayed to betray their Bolivarian
is that the senior military leadership is part of the same masters if offered an alternative package of positive ma-
corrupt hierarchy that caused the catastrophe. Recently, terial benefits, but such an offer only addresses one half
humanitarian concerns among foreign political leaders, of an “offer he can’t refuse.”
especially those of South American countries, resulted in It is particularly disconcerting that, even if the op-
diplomatic measures being taken against the Maduro re- position were to successfully oust the current Bolivarian
gime. The hope was apparently to force a regime change regime as led by Maduro, maybe 15 percent of a popula-
by isolating the Maduro administration diplomatically, tion of about twenty-seven million might remain loyal or
by strangling its finances, and therewith, perhaps, by obedient to Bolivarian party leadership. Accordingly, the
instigating an internal coup of some kind. However, to aftermath of a successful overthrow of the dictatorship
the general mystification of the media and pundits alike, could present a residual and persistent armed struggle.
Maduro showed sufficient political resilience to main- While certainly an
tain his position within the Bolivarian hierarchy. improvement, a simple Lt. Col. Geoffrey
Adding to the complexity and danger of the situa- overthrow would not Demarest, U.S. Army,
tion was the direct presence of Russian military forces, preclude the unfortunate retired, holds an MSS
with small military contingents deployed to Venezuela. continuation of the re- from the Army War
Russian presence operations have also included the peri- gional irregular war that College, a JD and a PhD in
odic visitation of nuclear-weapons-capable aircraft and has been going on for de- international studies from
large warships, the overall intention evidently being to cades, frustrating efforts Denver University, and a
undergird the Bolivarian dictatorship and its resolve. in neighboring countries PhD in geography from the
The prevailing sense of confusion in the media Colombia and Brazil to University of Kansas. After
emanates in part from a convergence of (1) inadequate resolve their own secu- a period of practicing law
consideration of Venezuela’s place in the greater cir- rity issues. Colombia’s in Colorado, he has since
cum-Caribbean context and (2) wishful thinking regard- fifty-year war against the 2000 been the senior
ing the actual vulnerabilities of the Maduro dictatorship. Revolutionary Armed Ibero-America research-
Bolivarian rule, if not Maduro’s role in it, has been all but Forces of Colombia er at the Army’s Foreign
impervious to a military coup as such. The military senior (Fuerzas Armadas Military Studies Office. He
leadership is broadly co-opted into the greater regime’s Revolucionarias de has lived and traveled ex-
criminal enterprise, if not its ideology, guided by a large Colombia-Ejército del tensively in Latin America.
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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Pueblo, or FARC-EP,
hereafter referred to as
FARC) should serve
to dampen hopes of
some complete defeat
of leftist military power,
or the attainment of
complete civil rest. The
FARC war was never
confined to Colombia.
The current Venezuela
problem, in other words,
is in no way confined to
Venezuela, nor will it be.
It is also not going to be
satisfactorily addressed
without admitting the
full geographic scope of
the war, clearly naming Venezuela’s disputed President Nicolás Maduro (left) joins the president of the Venezuelan National Constituent
those organizational Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, to celebrate the two hundredth chapter of the “Con el Mazo Dando” program 12
entities that are culpable, April 2018 on set in Caracas, Venezuela. Cabello is host of the program that is broadcast on the Venezuelan state
channel, Venezolana de Televisión. (Photo courtesy of the Bolivarian Government of Venezuela)
and bringing coercive
pressure to bear directly
F
against them. ormer senior Venezuelan general Diosdado Cabello is widely reported to be the cur-
In an effort to help
rent head of the Cartel of the Suns, a criminal drug-trafficking syndicate made up of
the reader gain a bet-
senior Venezuelan generals who work closely with the Colombian drug cartels that
ter understanding of
reputedly have insinuated themselves into all branches of the Venezuelan armed forces and
the intertwined forces
negatively affecting National Guard. The Cartel of the Suns reportedly originated in the 1990s among junior
Venezuela and the entire military officers working at the Colombian-Venezuela border who became involved in drug
region, this article iden- trafficking by initially taking bribes and assisting drug cartels with smuggling operations, and
tifies a malign network then expanding their scope of operations as they moved up in rank. Today, this syndicate
of diverse organizations ostensibly has on the payroll virtually all two thousand senior leaders of the military together
that exists in Latin with many former military leaders and civilian officials now working in civilian government
America and provides administration. One asserted result of the military’s deep involvement in extremely lucra-
a series of observations tive drug-trafficking relationships is that there is little incentive for senior military leaders to
that illuminate how the abandon the current status quo in support of a change in government leadership. As a
organizations in that result, Cabello has emerged to be one of the most powerful political figures in Venezuela,
network relate to each perhaps having more actual power over the armed forces than Venezuela's disputed Presi-
other. It is intended to
dent Nicolás Maduro himself. As a result, some observers assert that Cabello and the Cartel
unravel some unneces-
of the Suns are so deeply entrenched in Venezuela’s civil administration that they will remain
sary complications in the
in place even if Maduro is forced to leave office. For detailed press reports on the reput-
analysis of dangers and
prospects in northern ed Venezuelan kleptocracy, visit https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/venezuela-ma-
South America and the fia-state/ and https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yw8e4y/venezuelas-government-is-so-cor-
Caribbean. Hopefully, rupt-it-basically-has-its-own-cartel.
it will inform reader
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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ALBA
Bolivarian Alliance
for the Peoples of
Our America
Cuba
Communist Party of Cuba Venezuela
United Socialist Party of Venezuela El Salvadoran
Dominican Farabundo Martí
National Liberation Front
Republic
Dominican Liberation Party
Bolivia
Movement for Socialism–Political
Instrument for the Sovereignty
Uruguay
Broad Front
St. Vincent & of the Peoples
the Grenadines Nicaragua
Unity Labour Party Sandinista National
Liberation Front
Mexico Panamanian Brazilian
Permanent Conference São Paulo Forum
National Regeneration Democratic Workers' Party
of Political Parties of Latin America Movement Revolutionary Party
and the Caribbean
(Graphic by author)
Figure. Interrelated Political Parties and International
Organizations of Latin America
perspectives as they consider various calls to action, The network’s components are woven by ideology,
whether internal or external. material objectives, and overlapping leadership and
representation. So, to a degree, they are better analyzed
The Anti-American Network as a regional composite threat rather than as individual
in Latin America organizations. Again, observing political parties and their
To better understand the threat that the situation in interrelationships can be as revealing, if not more, for the
Venezuela implies for the entire hemisphere, one needs purposes of geopolitical prediction and planning, than
only to become familiar with the ideological signaling would assessing the region using national states or coun-
and collaborative habits of an armful of organizations tries as the standard units of action.
whose leaders appear to be principally responsible for To that end, this article offers an overview of the
Venezuelan suffering. There exists in Latin America a structure of those political parties and international
sophisticated network of interrelated political parties and organizations most relevant to the current goings-on
international organizations (depicted in the figure) that in northern South America and the Caribbean. It
bear watching because they are actively anti-American, highlights a network of revolutionary-left parties and
antiliberty, and generally destructive.1 concludes with a working hypothesis regarding the
It would be useful and prudent for security analysts network’s conspiratorial prospects.
and policy makers to be cognizant of these organizations First Tier. The Cuban Communist Party (Partido
and their interrelationships, intentions, and capacities. Comunista de Cuba or PCC) with its subordinate
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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Workers’ Party President Gleisi Hoffmann (center right) attends a demonstration 7 April 2019—the anniversary of the incarceration of former
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva—outside the jail where Lula is being held in Curitiba, Brazil. While Lula serves a twelve-year sentence
for corruption and money laundering, he and his party maintain his innocence and claim persecution by political enemies to prevent him from
running again for president. (Photo by Denis Ferreira Netto, Associated Press)
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista the PCC and PSUV. The PLD (along with other leftist
Unido de Venezuela or PSUV) are at the apex of the parties of several smaller island countries in the Antilles)
regional anti-American network collective.2 Also, may be of note at this time, given the strategic geograph-
although not currently in control of the reins of its ic location of Hispaniola and the rest of the Antilles in
country’s central government, the Brazilian Workers’ terms of international smuggling routes.5 The PLD, how-
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT) is a third lead- ever, seems to be in a more tenuous geopolitical position
ing organization within the whole network.3 (than, say, the Sandinista or Bolivian MAS parties) as to
Second Tier. After the PCC, PSUV, and PT, the sec- public support of the PSUV.6
ond tier of groups are the Sandinista National Liberation Key Political Party Umbrella Organizations. There
Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional or FSLN) are numerous other expressly anti-American parties of
in Nicaragua, Movement to Socialism (Movimiento peripheral significance, with the extended set conveniently
al Socialismo or MAS) in Bolivia, and the Dominican outlined in the membership rolls of two major umbrel-
Liberation Party (Partido de Liberación Dominicana or la organizations, the Forum of São Paulo (Foro de São
PLD) in the Dominican Republic. These organizations Paulo or FSP) and the Permanent Conference of Political
wield enhanced influence within the composite in that Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean (Conferencia
they control their respective country-level governments.4 Permanente de Partidos Políticos de América Latina y el
All three have positively associated themselves with Caribe or COPPPAL).7
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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Members of the Forum of São Paulo (Foro de São Paulo) from Latin America and the Caribbean meet 13 April 2015 in Caracas, Venezuela,
to ratify their support for Venezuela's disputed President Nicolás Maduro. The meeting was held in the face of a U.S. decree issued by
President Barak Obama declaring the South American country a threat to U.S. national security. (Photo courtesy of the São Paulo Forum)
Key Trans- or International Facilitating have enjoyed increasing levels of impunity inside
Organizations. Finally, several regional internation- Venezuelan territory.9 With regard to those groups
al organizations are prominent within the collective. specifically, in the past few years, FARC has taken
These include the Union of South American Nations on a mixed character as a political party and armed
(Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or UNASUR), the force. FARC did not shed its revolutionary socialist
Community of Latin American and Caribbean States orientation after having nominally signed an agree-
(Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños or ment to end its war with Colombia, nor did it shed its
CELAC) and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples drug-trafficking portfolio. Meanwhile, the ELN has
of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de displaced the FARC as the preeminent Colombian
Nuestra América or ALBA).8 guerrilla warfare structure. It uses Venezuela as a
sanctuary territory, with its senior leadership com-
Transnational Criminal Organizations manding from Havana. In both cases, the FARC and
Additionally, parts of the party network are in- the ELN are heavily involved in illegal drug trade,
volved at various points and depths with international illegal mining activities, and other criminal activities.10
organized criminal organizations and activities of Also worth noting is criminal implication of members
various types. Several, for instance, have been openly of the PSUV, the Brazilian PT, and the Forum of São
and mutually supportive of, and by, the FARC and Paulo in the Odebrecht scandal, which is perhaps
the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación the largest international corruption enterprise in the
Nacional or ELN). Both the ELN and FARC history of the hemisphere.
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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Extraregional Governmental Support South, and a serpent will be born from the
The whole of this organizational fabric is difficult to egg of an eagle.”
visualize through the lens of the international country It is imperative to continue moving for-
system, but we can reasonably presume the compo- ward with the consolidation of CELAC as a
nents will display certain behaviors. Among these mechanism of genuinely Latin American and
behaviors is propagandistic and material cooperation Caribbean joint political action, based on the
with governments outside the hemisphere that are of concept of unity in diversity.16
security concern to the United States. Such outside na- United Socialist Party of Venezuela. The PSUV’s
tions prominently include the governments of Russia, official page references, and provides online, the Libro
China, Iran, and perhaps Turkey.11 Rojo (Red Book), the founding document of the party,
Cuban Communist Party. The EcuRed website, in which the party’s ideological identifiers are listed.
which is evidently an official Cuban government site bill- The lead item listed as a founding principle is “Anti-
ing itself as a “Project of the Constitution of the Republic capitalist and Anti-imperialist.”17 The PSUV’s web page
of Cuba,” lists Communism, anti-imperialism, Marxism- also features an article on the 2018 FSP conference in
Leninism, and Martiism as the main planks of the party’s Havana, noting that the conference called for solidarity
political ideology, and lists the FSP and COPPPAL as its in support of Venezuela, Nicaragua, and the people of
main international affiliations.12 According to an EcuRed Brazil. Interestingly, this call for solidarity was voiced by
essay, the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba defines the prime minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
the PCC as the “organized Martiist and Marxist-Leninist Ralph Gonsalves, who spoke to the gathering.18
vanguard of the Cuban nation, the highest directive force Brazilian Workers’ Party. The PT's official web
of the Society and the State.” The EcuRed website also page does not feature an assertion regarding its interna-
hosts a page for the Nicaraguan FSLN.13 tional affiliations or mention the Forum of São Paulo.19
The PCC hosted the Forum of São Paulo’s 2018 The current president of the party is Gleisi Hoffmann,
plenary meeting in Havana. A senior PCC central com- but Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff are
mittee member opined, better known as ex-presidents of the country. Rousseff
This is about left forces uniting without losing was impeached and removed from office in 2016. The
their identities, but on the basis of a political PT nevertheless ran her as a senate candidate from
program. What is impossible is transforming Minas Gerais state in the October elections, but she
society without the unity of left forces, and lost. Lula, meanwhile, was convicted in 2017 of cor-
that they take power. At this time, there is ruption and is now serving a jail sentence. He too was
nothing more solid than the FSP, in which nevertheless leading in opinion polls as a PT candidate
existing problems can be discussed, as well as for the presidency. One of his disciples and a stand-in
ways to build unity.14 candidate, Fernando Haddad, then lost the general
Raúl Castro, who recently relinquished his position election to Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro is considered
as president of Cuba, remains the PCC leader. Regarding anti-PT. Although the PT is now out of power, it can
the PCC’s international affiliations, the web page of the hardly be considered powerless. In early February, the
International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ PT announced a new alliance of several of Brazil’s far-
Parties, as well as those of COPPPAL and the FSP, list the left parties to oppose the new president.20
PCC as a member.15 While addressing key positions in The Forum of São Paulo. The FSP was established
international policy, Raul Castro said in 2016, in 1990 by Fidel Castro and Lula, the purpose being to
Despite the fact that we have never encour- encourage mutual support among the region’s revolu-
aged other countries to abandon this organi- tionary leftist parties and to build strategic solidary in
zation, I must reiterate what was expressed the face of the post-Soviet reality in which major support
in Brazil, some years ago now, paraphrasing of indigenous socialist movements had stopped. In
José Martí, that before Cuba returns to the addition to the on again/off again governmental control
OAS [Organization of American States], “the exercised by parties noted in the previous paragraphs,
ocean of the North will join the ocean of the there are several other FSP parties currently exercising
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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(5) Alternative
Democratic Pole (Polo
Democrático Alternativo)
(6) Here for Socialism
(Presentes por el Socialismo)
(7) Patriotic Union
(Unión Patriótica)
(8) Citizen Power
Movement (Movimiento
Poder Ciudadano)
All of the above-listed
Colombian parties favor
continuation of the agree-
ment reached between the
administration of former
Colombian President Juan
Manuel Santos and the
Manolo Pichardo speaks at a Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean FARC. This is notewor-
(Conferencia Permanente de Partidos Políticos de América Latina y el Caribe, or COPPPAL) meeting 2 June thy because the FARC-
2016. COPPPAL activities focus on supporting regional progressive actions of like-minded organizations— government agreement,
mainly socialist, communist, and left-leaning labor and populist/nationalist political parties—aimed at es-
tablishing and extending the influence of socialist-oriented regimes and policies. (Photo by Mihail García its future and the future of
via Wikimedia Commons) several institutions and legal
mechanisms created under
its aegis, can significantly
the offices of the chief executive of their respective affect the power of the anti-American network generally.21
countries. These include the PAIS Alliance (Alianza The most immediate change in the prospects of
PAIS [Patria Altiva y Soberana]) party in Ecuador, the the FSP as the primary umbrella organization for
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente leftist parties came with the October 2018 election
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional or FMLN) of anti-PT Bolsonaro as president of Brazil. As a
in El Salvador, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio or FA) Colombian observer noted, “With Bolsonaro, the
in Uruguay, and the National Regeneration Movement Forum of São Paulo, strategic center of the disastrous
(Movimiento Regeneración Nacional or MORENA) in Latin-American left (Castro, Lula, and Chávez) should
Mexico. Ecuadoran President Lenin Moreno appears disappear.”22 In Mexico, recently elected President
currently to be distancing PAIS and his government Andrés Manuel López Obrador (popularly known as
from the Bolivarian block, apparently favoring improved AMLO), who appears to have had a personal affin-
relations with the new anti-Bolivarian administration ity for the Cuban Revolution, created MORENA,
in Colombia. The Salvadoran FMLN recently lost an which is a party member of the FSP.23 AMLO and
election and will soon be out of power, while MORENA, MORENA, however, may prefer to exercise regional
a relatively new construction, has potential to greatly influence through its presence in COPPPAL than in
increase its profile within the overall network. the FSP because COPPPAL employs more Mexican
According to the FSP official website, Colombian personnel and has a distinctly Mexican provenance.
parties in the FSP include the following: Permanent Conference of Political Parties of Latin
(1) Patriotic March (Marcha Patriótica) America and the Caribbean. The lead article on the offi-
(2) Progressive Movement (Movimiento Progresista) cial COPPPAL website in late October 2018 asserted the
(3) Green Alliance Party (Partido Alianza Verde) successful conclusion of COPPPAL’s thirty-sixth plenary
(4) Colombian Communist Party (Partido meeting that month in Panama City.24 The president of
Comunista Colombiano) COPPPAL is Manolo Pichardo, from the Dominican
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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Representatives participate in the Special Meeting of the Council of Heads of State and Government of the Union of South American Na-
tions (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas or UNASUR) to transfer the pro tempore presidency of UNASUR 4 December 2014 in Guayaquil,
Ecuador. Founded by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez as an alternative to the Organization of American States, which he asserted was
an instrument of U.S. colonial domination, UNASUR activities focus on supporting regional progressive actions of like-minded organiza-
tions aimed at establishing and extending the influence of socialist-oriented regimes and policies. (Photo courtesy of the Government of
Chile via Wikimedia Commons)
Republic (where COPPPAL currently has its headquar- of the Forum of São Paulo. Gustavo Carvajal Moreno,
ters). Pichardo used part of his speech to the gathering to member of Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary
express support for the imprisoned Brazilian Luiz Inácio Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI), is
Lula da Silva.25 Although COPPPAL seems to have fewer COPPPAL’s vice president. COPPPAL projects an
overt member parties than the Forum of São Paulo, the academic effort through the Instituto de Formación
two have in common their being communities of parties Política Gustavo Carvajal Moreno, which according to
with ideological affinity rather than being forums of gov- the COPPPAL website offers an academic program on
ernments.26 In terms of institutional health and influence, political leadership for the twenty-first century. Notably
COPPPAL may fare better than the Forum of São Paulo among the class offerings is something titled, “The
during the next few years if for no other reason than the Importance of CELAC in the Current Political Context.”
recently elected Mexican president is decidedly socialist Community of Latin American and Caribbean
and pro-COPPPAL, whereas the recently elected presi- States. According to its website, “CELAC is an inter-
dent of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, is decidedly antisocialist and governmental mechanism for dialogue and political
opposed to the Forum of São Paulo. agreement … By mandate of the Heads of State and
COPPPAL also might experience some participation, Government, CELAC is the unified voice of the region
funding, and mission expansion as a result of UNASUR’s on issues of consensus. Regarding the representation of
contraction, even while the latter is an ostensibly govern- Latin America and the Caribbean; CELAC takes its fac-
ments-based international organization. Notably, Jorge ulties to act as spokesman for the community with other
Arias of the Cuban PCC is listed as an adjunct executive countries and regional blocs.”28
secretary on the COPPPAL website.27 The last summit conference of the organization (its
Pichardo is a member of the PLD, the party of the fifth) was held in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, in
country’s president. The PLD is also listed as a member January 2017.29 The CELAC website does not provide
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9LATIN AMERICAN NETWORKS
complete information regarding attendance but does States Naval Base in Guantánamo … must be a
include a document styled the “Political Declaration relevant element of the process of normaliza-
of Punta Cana, Summit V of the Chiefs of State and tion of relations between the two countries.32
Government of CELAC.”30 Of interest among the nu- CELAC is a product of organizational and diplo-
merous resolutions in that declaration is the following matic efforts by leaders in the PCC and PSUV but
regarding the control of Venezuela: with a less decidedly South American continental
We support the process of national dialog in flavor than UNASUR. Launched circa 2011, it is
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela be- newer than UNASUR and seems to have a relatively
tween the Government and the opposition compact geographic and bureaucratic footprint cen-
of said country, under the oversight of the tered on the Caribbean as well as a smaller budgetary
Secretary General of UNASUR, Ernesto overhead. As for extraregional relations, the following
Samper, ex-presidents José Luis Rodríguez statement is revelatory:
Zapatero, Leonel Fernández, Martín Torrijos,
and the special representative of his Holiness
Pope Francisco … and under the principle of Supporters listen as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia–Peo-
respect for non-intervention in the internal ple’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército
affairs of States.31 del Pueblo or FARC-EP) leader Rodrigo Londoño, known by his nom
de guerre Timochenko, speaks 1 September 2017 during the launch-
Also of note,
ing of the new political party Revolutionary Alternative Common
We consider the return to the Republic of Force at the Plaza de Bolivar in Bogotá, Colombia. (Photo by Jaime
Cuba of the territory occupied by the United Saldarriaga, Reuters)
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Regarding the representation of Latin by the United States. It is older than both UNASUR
America and the Caribbean; CELAC and CELAC, having been founded circa 2003. ALBA
takes its faculties to act as spokesman for is styled as a governments-based international orga-
the Community with other countries and nization, and while smaller in terms of participating
regional blocs. This includes the CELAC di- countries (currently nine) than UNASUR or CELAC,
alogue with the European Union, China, the it presents itself as the most decidedly resolute in sup-
Russian Federation, the Republic of Korea, port of the PCC and PSUV.35 Ecuador and Honduras
the Cooperation
Council for the
Arab States of the
Gulf, Turkey and
Japan.33
Union of South
American Nations.
UNASUR was created
circa 2005–2008
on the initiative of
Hugo Chávez as an
alternative to the
Organization of
American States.
Its purpose, beyond
the typical structure
for sinecures and
fluidity of travel for
party loyalists, was to
create another formal
mechanism in interna-
tional law for influence A National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) guerrilla poster 7 March 2007 at the León de Greiff
within the hemisphere Auditory, National University of Colombia in Bogotá. The poster reads "Ni Rendición, Ni Entrega," which trans-
lates to “Neither Surrender, Nor Yield.” (Photo by Julián Ortega Martínez via Wikimedia Commons)
and beyond. As with
other international
organizations formed
under the auspices of the PCC, PSUV, and PT, UNASUR were early members but the governments of those two
expressly excluded the United States. Perhaps due to countries have quit the alliance. Ostensibly focused
its obvious control by and preference for the owners on economic facilitation among its members, ALBA
of Latin American twenty-first-century socialism, the advances PCC and PSUV positions on a complete
organization never enjoyed universal support among range of international issues. Notably, the Dominican
the national governments of the hemisphere. After the Republic’s government does not appear to be repre-
deaths of Chávez and Fidel Castro, and the general swing sented as an official member.
to the right of the hemisphere’s ideological pendulum, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—Army
UNASUR today finds itself in precipitous decline.34 of the People. In August 2017, together with voting
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our delegates from the Clandestine Communist Party of
America. ALBA was also formed by PCC and PSUV Colombia, FARC rebranded itself as a political party; the
leaders as a counterbalance to the Organization of the Alternative Revolutionary Force of the Majority (Fuerza
American States and has its headquarters in Caracas. Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común or FARC). But
At its founding, it specifically excluded membership even the latter seems to maintain, at least informally, the
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Venezuela's disputed President Nicolás Maduro marches with members of the Venezuela’s armed forces 27 January 2019 during military exercises
at Fort Paramacay in Naguanagua, Carabobo State, Venezuela. (Photo courtesy of the Office of the President of Bolivaran Republic of Venezuela)
lettering FARC-EP, with the EP standing for Army of further define themselves one from the other, both
the People (Ejército del Pueblo).36 organizationally and geographically.39 We should also
The entity was to be a nonviolent political party with keep in mind Diego Molano’s observation about the
the attendant legal attributes and privileges. Since late third FARC—that FARC and National Liberation
2016, prospects of the electoral-politics FARC have been Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional or ELN) may
bound up in the power-sharing agreement the FARC have a highly cooperative relationship.
reached with then Colombian President Juan Manuel National Liberation Army. In its beginnings a uni-
Santos. One leading analyst, Diego Molano, observed that versity- and urban-based insurgency, the ELN has long
rather than two FARCs, we might recognize three, been the lesser sibling to FARC. Yet, while the FARC
One FARC as a political party, which has was attempting to demobilize as a result of agreements
not abandoned the [illicit drug trafficking] with the Colombian government, the recent FARC
business … Another FARC as dissidents that reorganization and possible internal schism may have
continue to manage all the crops, routes, and redounded to the benefit of the ELN as it moved to fill
to attack the population. And another that an insurgent void left by the demobilizing FARC forces.
camouflages itself within the ELN in order to As a result, there are some indications that we may be
continue with the business.37 witnessing the ascendance in status of the ELN within
In a later development, there are indications that the Bolivarian movement, especially as an enforce-
FARC might be experiencing an internal schism, ment arm of its PSUV and PCC hosts within and near
with some of its leadership more personally bound Venezuelan country borders.
to the political potential of the agreement with the Regarding the overall increase in ELN activity,
Colombian government and others of FARC secre- especially inside Venezuela, there has been ample
tariat returning or clinging to the more belligerent reporting, including to the effect that it is a welcome el-
business model.38 FARC and FARC-EP may soon ement within the Bolivarian control structure.40 FARC
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
12LATIN AMERICAN NETWORKS
and ELN are perhaps to be considered two of several of power by the PCC and PSUV would directly affect
Bolivarian armed forces. the status quo of control (mostly in Venezuelan territory)
Traditional forces. Other organizational elements over natural resource exploitation infrastructures. The
of the anti-American network worthy of our concern natural resources flowing from or through Venezuelan
include the several intelligence services of the PCC territory reasonably constitute the single greatest material
and PSUV, as well as the formalized military wings of prize in Latin America for several extraregional actors.
those parties, including the country-level regular armed Those most affected would include the current re-
forces that the PCC and PSUV control.41 Of note gimes in Russia, China, and Iran, all of which have placed
among the latter are the Bolivarian National Armed major economic bets to secure portions of Venezuela-
Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana or FANB) based natural resource potential. Additionally, a signif-
and its subordinates, including the Bolivarian National icant weakening of the PCC would in turn be likely to
Guard of Venezuela (Guardia Nacional Bolivariana de weaken the secondary members of the consortium as well
Venezuela or GNB). There may exist some amount of as other of the region’s transnational smuggling cartels.
discord and disaffection within and among these more As for the handful of international organizations
formal pieces of the network.42 Still, it appears that the facilitating the network, those organizations (FSP,
PCC continues to consolidate and strengthen its domi- COPPPAL, CELAC, UNASUR, ALBA) would
nant position as to their control.43 weaken without the active presence of the PCC and
its oversight. Given their membership rolls and stat-
Prospects ed purposes, those organizations appear unsuitable
The recent ascendance to power of anti-leftist polit- as partners or vehicles for United States plans and
ical parties and party alliances in Colombia, Brazil, and programs. Contrarily, they might best be considered
Argentina presents a potentially existential threat to as targets for monitoring and debilitation. As a final
some of the organizations of the leftist network described note, it would be a useful strategy-making practice
in this article.44 That antileft threat could accelerate with- to discuss developments within the region accord-
in the next few years as the incoming administrations ing to affiliated political party identities and their
consolidate control over their respective government associating multinational organizations rather than
apparatuses, especially intelligence services. These new by country name (e.g., “Venezuela” or “Cuba”). The
administrations could come to challenge the core or apex engine of the region’s effective anti-Americanism and
organizations within the consortium—the PSUV and, threat to U.S. interests is less a phenomenon to be
ultimately, the PCC. associated with countries than it is with certain of
If indeed there exist reasonable prospects of mor- the region’s political parties acting in concert. These
tal blows being delivered to the power of the PSUV are the real loci of destructive coercive power in the
and PCC, several extraregional entities are likely to be region. For example, any discussion of the future of
alarmed enough to take active countermeasures, as they Venezuela that does not revolve around the actions,
could lose consequential global strategic advantage were reactions, and survivability of the PCC is incomplete
the two parties to be disempowered.45 For example, a loss and necessarily misleading.
Notes
1. It is not a purpose of the present article to build an argument deliberations and forums; ally with extraregional powers that are
as to what makes any of the organizations listed herein anti-American generally considered strategic antagonists or adversaries of the
and destructive. Readers at all familiar with the region will recog- United States, including most prominently, Russia, China, and
nize that the organizations listed as part of the conspiracy meet (by Iran; and run regimes from which the United States has withdrawn
self-admission or according to multiple official U.S. government or diplomatic recognition.
other credible sources) one or more of the following criteria: Destructive: Organizations that have leaders who are the subjects
Anti-American: Organizations that explicitly claim to be of international criminal indictments or have been convicted for
anti-American (if perhaps under the phrases anti-imperialist or criminal behaviors are listed by the U.S. government as terrorist
anticapitalist) exclude U.S. representation in their multinational organizations; are documented as illicit drug traffickers by United
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
13LATIN AMERICAN NETWORKS
States and international counterdrug law enforcement agencies; are a Nicolás Maduro” [Dominican legislators show their support for
similarly documented as illegal mining entrepreneurs; are similarly Nicolás Maduro], HispanTV, 1 February 2019, accessed 8 May
documented as accessories to or participants in human trafficking; 2019, https://www.hispantv.com/noticias/dominicana/410089/
are support organizations dedicated to separating U.S. territory from legisladores-apoyo-maduro-golpe-eeuu-guaido.
the United States; have caused mass involuntary outmigrations; have 7. Foro de São Paulo [Forum of São Paulo] (website), accessed
been complicit in or directly involved in the continuous destruction 8 May 2019, http://forodesaopaulo.org; Conferencia Permanente
of the natural environment, including in neighboring countries; have de Partidos Políticos de América Latina y el Caribe [Permanent
been complicit in or directly involved in the destruction of econom- Conference of Political Parties of Latin America and the Caribbe-
ic infrastructure, including in neighboring countries; or that have an or COPPPAL] (website), accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.
otherwise offended. copppal.org/.
2. “Partido Comunista de Cuba” [Communist Party of Cuba], 8. Unión de Naciones Suramericanas [Union of South American
EcuRed, accessed 7 May 2019, https://www.ecured.cu/Parti- Nations or UNASUR] (website), accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.
do_Comunista_de_Cuba; Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela unasursg.org/; Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
[United Socialist Party of Venezuela], accessed 15 May 2019, (CELAC) (website), accessed 8 May 2019, http://celacinternational.
http://www.psuv.org.ve. org/; Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [Boli-
3. Partido dos Trabalhadores [Brazilian Workers’ Party or PT] varian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America or ALBA] (website),
(website), accessed 7 May 2019, http://www.pt.org.br/. accessed 13 May 2019, http://www.portalalba.org.
4. La Voz del Sandinismo [The Voice of Sandinismo] (website), 9. Fernando Tineo, “El ELN se instaló en el Zulia” [The ELN
accessed 7 May 2019, http://www.lavozdelsandinismo.com/; “Frente_ installs itself in Zulia], Venepress, 7 September 2018, accessed 8
Sandinista_de_Liberación_Nacional” [Sandinista National Liberation May 2019, https://venepress.com/article/El-ELN-se-instalo-en-el-
Front], EcuRed, accessed 13 May 2019, https://www.ecured.cu/ Zulia1536339159281; Sebastiana Barraéz, “Las FARC se reagrupan
Frente_Sandinista_de_Liberación_Nacional; “Dirección Nacional en Apure” [The FARC regroups in Apure], Costa del Sol (radio), 28
MAS-IPSP” [National Leadership of MAS-IPSP], MASI-PSP (website), September 2018, accessed 8 May 2019, http://www.costadelsolfm.
accessed 13 May 2019, http://www.masipsp.bo. net/2018/09/28/sebastiana-barraez-las-farc-se-reagrupa-en-apure/.
5. On the geographic relationship of Hispaniola to the drug 10. Geoffrey Demarest, “ELN and FARC Seek Sanctuary,”
trade, see Tristan Clavel, “Trafficking Routes Up for Grabs After Fall OE Watch 8, no. 11 (November 2018): 62, accessed 30 May
of Top Caribbean Drug Kingpin,” InSight Crime, 17 August 2017, 2019, https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/
accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/ oe-watch-past-issues/251377.
trafficking-routes-up-for-grabs-after-fall-top-caribbean-drug-king- 11. On this point, see, for instance, Elizabeth Burgos, “Venezu-
pin/; Christopher Woody, “Here’s How Drugs Are Getting Smuggled ela, puerta de entrada de los nuevos imperios” [Venezuela, port
from South America to the US,” Business Insider, 14 September 2017, of entry of the new empires], Revista Zeta, 10 November 2017,
accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.businessinsider.com/heres-how- accessed 8 May 2019, http://revistazeta.net/2017/11/10/vene-
drugs-are-getting-smuggled-from-south-america-to-the-us-2017-9; zuela-puerta-entrada-los-nuevos-imperios/; “Rusia y Turquía, los
“17 Caribbean, Latin American Nations Named as Major Drug aliados de Maduro ante crisis en Venezuela” [Russia and Turkey,
Producing or Transit Countries,” News Americas Now, 2 March 2016, Maduro’s allies in facing the crisis in Venezuela], El Colombiano
accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.newsamericasnow.com/17-ca- (website), 4 December 2018, accessed 8 May 2019, http://www.
ribbean-latin-american-nations-named-as-major-drug-produc- elcolombiano.com/internacional/venezuela/nicolas-maduro-pres-
ing-or-transit-countries/; “Full Circle: An Old Route Regains Popular- idente-de-venezuela-viaja-a-rusia-para-reunion-con-vladimir-pu-
ity with Drugs Gangs,” Economist (website), 24 May 2014, accessed tin-FJ9759272, Martin Arostegui, “New Air Bridge Reflects Iran’s
8 May 2019, https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2014/05/24/ Growing Influence in Venezuela,” VOA [Voice of America], 15
full-circle; Office of National Drug Control Policy, “Transit Zone Op- April 2019, accessed 30 May 2019, https://www.voanews.com/a/
erations,” accessed 8 May 2019, https://obamawhitehouse.archives. new-air-bridge-reflects-iran-s-growing-influence-in-venezu-
gov/ondcp/transit-zone-operations; United States Senate Caucus on ela/4876719.html.
International Narcotics Control, Preventing a Security Crisis in the Ca- 12. “Partido Comunista de Cuba [Communist Party of Cuba].”
ribbean (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, September 2012), accessed 13. Ibid.
8 May 2019, https://www.drugcaucus.senate.gov/sites/default/files/ 14. José Ramón Balaguer Cabrera, “São Paulo Forum, a Vital Battle
caribbean%20drug%20report.pdf. for Unity,” interview by Bertha Mojena Milián, Granma, 1 September
6. This is reflected in the ambivalent course taken by Dominican 2018, accessed 8 May 2019, http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2018-07-16/
Liberation Party (PLD) leaders during the January 2019 challenge sao-paulo-forum-a-vital-battle-for-unity.
of Juan Guaidó to the Venezuelan presidency. On January 24, the 15. “List of Participants of the 19th International Meeting of
foreign ministry stated that it did not recognize Maduro’s second Communist and Workers’ Parties, St. Petersburg, 1-4 of November
term but also did not recognize Guaidó. PLD legislators, mean- 2017,” accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.solidnet.org/.galleries/doc-
while, rallied in support of Nicolás Maduro. “República Dominicana uments/Participants-List.pdf.
reafirma que no reconoce el segundo mandato de Maduro pero 16. Raúl Castro Ruz, “The Development of the National Economy,
no declara su apoyo a Guaidó” [Dominican Republic reaffirms that along with the Struggle for Peace, and Our Ideological Resolve,
it does not recognize the second term of Maduro but does not Constitute the Party’s Principal Missions: 7th PCC Congress Central
declare its support for Guaidó], Europa Press, 24 January 2019, Report, Presented by First Secretary Raúl Castro Ruz,” Granma, 18
accessed 8 May 2019, https://www.europapress.es/internacional/ April 2016, accessed 8 May 2019, http://en.granma.cu/cuba/2016-
noticia-republica-dominica-reafirma-no-reconoce-segundo-man- 04-18/the-development-of-the-national-economy-along-with-the-
dato-maduro-no-declara-apoyo-guaido-20190124173154.html; struggle-for-peace-and-our-ideological-resolve-constitute-the-par-
Stephanie Andújar, “Legisladores dominicanos manifiestan su apoyo tys-principal-missions.
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
14LATIN AMERICAN NETWORKS
17. Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party Way Back Machine, accessed 9 May 2019, https://web.archive.org/
of Venezuela or PSUV), Libro Rojo [Red Book], http://www.psuv.org. web/20161023044831/http://copppal.org/contenidos/institucional/
ve/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Nuevo_Libro_Rojo_PSUV.pdf. partidos_miembros.php. The current official COPPPAL website did
18. “Foro de São Paulo llama a defender a Venezuela, Nicaragua not have an accessible list of members but an archived site, Way Back
y el pueblo de Brasil” [Forum of São Paulo calls on defense of Vene- Machine, includes a list of member parties, including parties from
zuela, Nicaragua and the people of Brazil], PSUV, 16 July 2018, http:// Caribbean islands that are not sovereign countries. There is consider-
www.psuv.org.ve/temas/noticias/foro-sao-paulovenezuelanicara- able overlap of membership with the Forum of São Paulo and all of
guapueblobrasilsan-vicente-y-granadinasministroralp-gonsalves/#. the parties appearing to be leftist.
XNsQ_X_9nIU. Although Gonsalves did not attend the inauguration 27. “¿Quiénes Somos?” [Who are we?], COPPPAL (website),
ceremonies for Nicolás Maduro this January, Saint Vincent and the accessed 9 May 2019, https://www.copppal.org/quienes-somos-2/.
Grenadines did send government representation and, as of this writ- 28. “CELAC,” CELAC International (website), accessed 9 May
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May 2019, http://www.pt.org.br/pt-psol-psb-e-rede-formalizam-blo- accessed 9 May 2019, https://celac.rree.gob.sv/estado-miembro/. The
co-de-esquerda-em-oposicao-a-bolsonaro/. Like the PT, the Brazilian latter two websites list thirty-three member states.
Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Brasileiro or PSB) is a member of the 29. “CELAC: Cumbres” [CELAC: Summits], SELA (website),
Forum of São Paulo. accessed 9 May 2019, http://www.sela.org/celac/cumbres/.
21. Ricardo Ferro, “Colombia y el peligroso Foro de Sao Paulo 30. “Declaración Política de Punta Cana, V Cumbre de Jefas y
[Colombia and the dangerous Forum of Sao Paulo],” PanamPost, 13 Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la CELAC” [Political Declaration
August 2018, accessed 30 May 2019, https://es.panampost.com/ of Punta Cana, Summit V of the Chiefs of State and Government of
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22. John Marulanda, “Bolsonaro: a la derecha, sin uniforme” media/2463711/declaracion-politica-de-punta-cana.pdf.
[Bolsonaro: To the right, without uniform], Periódico Debate, 10 31. Ibid.; Compare this to EFE, “Aznar afirma que la crisis de
October 2018, accessed 9 May 2019, http://www.periodicodebate. Venezuela no se resuelve con diálogo político” [Aznar states that the
com/index.php/opinion/columnistas-nacionales/item/20813-bol- crisis in Venezuela will not be resolved with political dialog], Panam
sonaro-a-la-derecha-sin-uniforme; see also Álvaro Riveros Tejada, Post, 16 October 2018, accessed 9 May 2019, https://es.panampost.
“El corazón del Brasil late a la derecha” [Brazil’s heart beats to the com/efe-panampost/2018/10/16/aznar-venezuela/.
right], Eju TV, 10 October 2018, accessed 14 May 2019, https://eju. 32. “Declaración Política de Punta Cana.”
tv/2018/10/corazon-del-brasil-late-a-la-derecha/. 33. “CELAC,” CELAC International (website).
23. Rubén Cortés, “La raíz cubana de López Obrador” [López 34. Andrés Felipe Gama, “Iván Duque sugiere a países aban-
Obrador’s Cuban base], América 2.1, 2 July 2018, accessed 9 May donar la Unasur por ser cómplice de la dictadura Venezolana” [Iván
2019, http://americanuestra.com/la-raiz-cubana-de-lopez-obra- Duque suggests that other countries abandon UNASUR for being
dor; Carina García, “AMLO es la persona con más autoridad moral: an accomplice of the Venezuelan dictatorship], Radio Santafé,
Castro” [AMLO is the person with the greatest moral authority: 30 June 2018, accessed 9 May 2019, http://www.radiosantafe.
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“Países y partidos miembros” [Member countries and parties], FARC], Caracol Radio, 27 July 2017, accessed 15 May 2019,
MILITARY REVIEW ONLINE EXCLUSIVE · JUNE 2019
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