The Scots Crown and the Restitution of Port Royal, 1629 1632

JOHN G. REID

The Scots Crown and the Restitution
of Port Royal, 1629 - 1632 *

   Compared with the efforts of Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth century,
the nations of northern Europe, including Scotland, were slow to engage in
colonisation. Nonetheless, while the respective crowns and state authorities
of northern Europe were too preoccupied both internally and in Europe to
take any active interest in the New World, the sixteenth century did see a
considerable growth in skills and concepts which would later become relevant
to colonisation. Continued interest in the Newfoundland fishery — an
important aspect of the economic life of France and England — brought
about a closer and keener awareness of North America and of the possibilities
of extended landings there, even on a temporary basis; and it provided pools
of expertise and manpower that could be drawn upon for voyages not only
of commerce but also of colonisation. The fishery, and later the fur trade,
also built up a mercantile network which could provide a basis for financing
colonisation. Further experience and expertise were provided, particularly
in England, by privateering voyages directed against the Spanish in the West
Indies and in South America. The same is true of efforts to find a north-
western passage to the Far East. While none of these activities had any
necessary connection with colonisation as such, they added to the potential
which existed in northern Europe. Once this potential was released by
political stabilisation, colonising attempts would be the likely result.
   Since stabilisation in northern European nations occurred coincidentally,
the first thirty years of the seventeenth century saw a proliferation of con-
flicting claims to those American lands which were considered promising and
which were far enough removed from the still-awesome power of Spain. The
first phase involved the claiming of vast tracts of American land defined by
latitudes. The first definition of the French colony of Acadia came in 1603
with a commission to Pierre du Gua, Sieur de Monts, as royal lieutenant-
general between the 40th and 46th degrees of latitude. Three years later, the
 English royal charter for colonisation of Virginia granted the territory be-
 tween the latitudes of 38 and 45 degrees to a group of promoters centred in
 Plymouth, as "the second colony of Virginia"; by the New England charter
 of 1620, these limits were adjusted to the 40th and 48th parallels. In 1614,
 furthermore, the States-General of the Netherlands granted that area be-

*   The author wishes to thank Dr. Thomas J. Condon, Mr. Cedric Haines, Ms. Janet E. Moodie
    and Dr. Peter Toner for their valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.

40       Acadiensis

tween the latitudes of 40 and 45 degrees to a consolidated New Netherlands
Company.
   It was into this confused situation that the colony of New Scotland was first
projected in 1621. Scottish marine interests during the sixteenth century had
continued in traditional patterns, established during three centuries of peace
with continental European powers — a coastal fishery, and extensive trade
with France, the Netherlands and the Baltic, as well as with England and
Ireland. Nevertheless, even in the sixteenth century, there is evidence of
some slight growth of interest in voyages to southern Europe and to New-
foundland.1 The union of the crowns in 1603 also made available to Scots, and
particularly to those Scots who removed to England with the royal court,
the legacy of English experience in voyages to America. Moreover, both
Scottish and English crowns, co-ordinating their efforts after 1603, had
promoted colonial projects in the Celtic areas of the respective realms: the
English crown in Ireland, and the Scots crown in the Highlands and Islands.
Such projects added greatly to the sum total of experience which was
carried forward into the colonial endeavours of the seventeenth century. 2
   Among the recipients of these legacies of experience was Sir William
Alexander, a Scottish poet and minor landowner, whose literary accomplish-
ments were instrumental in obtaining the favour of James VI. Knighted in
1609, at the approximate age of thirty-two, Alexander became a member of
the Scots Privy Council in 1615 and thereafter served the Scots crown con-
tinuously until his death in 1640 in a variety of capacities. 3 Early in his
career in London, Alexander began to take an interest in colonial schemes
in Newfoundland; and the quickened interest in colonisation after 1620 led
him to consider colonisation as a means of advancing his own personal for-
tunes. Thus it was at Alexander's prompting that James VI wrote to the Scots
Privy Council on 5 August 1621, noting that "sundry other kingdomes, as
like wyse this our kingdome [England] of late, . . . have renued their names
imposeing them thus upoun new lands", and instructing the Privy Council to

1    See Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 247-50;
     Thomas N. Devine and S. G. E. Lythe, "The Economy of Scotland Under James VI: A Re-
     vision Article", Scottish Historical Review, 50 (1971), pp. 100-5.
2    On these colonising projects, see Gordon Donaldson, The Scots Overseas (London, 1966),
     ch. II; William Cook Mackenzie, History of the Outer Hebrides (Paisley, 1903), chs. VII,
     VIII, IX; George Hill, An Historical Account of the Plantation of Ulster at the Commence-
     ment of the Seventeenth Century, 1608-1630 (Belfast, 1877); David Beers Quinn, The
     Elizabethans and the Irish (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English
     Colonization: From Ireland to America", William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 30 (1973),
     pp. 575-98.
3    Thomas H. McGrail, Sir William Alexander, First Earl of Stirling (Edinburgh, 1940); Daniel
     Cobb Harvey, "Sir William Alexander", in George W. Brown, ed., Dictionary of Canadian
     Biography thereafter cited as DCB] (Toronto, 1966), I, pp. 50-4.

Acadiensis 41

prepare "a signatour under our great seale of the . . . lands betweene New
England and Newfoundland . . to be holden of us [ by Sir William Alexander]
from our kingdome of Scotland . . . ."4
   The lands in question lay south of the latitude of 48 degrees, and were thus
technically within the New England patent of 1620. Indeed, Alexander had
certainly received encouragement from the English colonial promoter Sir
Ferdinando Gorges, and Gorges later wrote that the territory had been
"assigned" by him to Alexander.5 As Alexander made clear, however, New
Scotland was at no stage merely an English scheme under a Scottish figure-
head: "I shew them that my Countrymen would never adventure in such an
Enterprize, unlesse it were as there was a New France, a New Spain and a
New England, that they might likewise have a New Scotland". 6 The royal
charter, sealed on 29 September 1621, accordingly declared that New Scot-
land was to be held by Alexander from the Scots crown and joined to the
realm of Scotland.7 The colony would have no formal connection with the
kingdom of England. Alexander, for his part, emphasized the particular
benefits which the colony could offer to Scotland. In addition to the general
hopes for the honour and glory of empire, for an increase in trade and for
 the acquisition of strategic goods such as timber and naval stores, Alexander
 addressed himself to more specifically Scottish concerns. Scotland would at
 last be able to make productive use of that part of its population which had
 been accustomed to serve in foreign armies. Since it was generally agreed
 that Scotland had an abundance of labour, and with, as Alexander observed,
 "the necessities of Ireland . . . neere supplied", American colonisation could
 provide an eminently acceptable outlet. 8 Such were the considerations em-
 bodied in the royal letter of intent in August 1621 and renewed in a further
 letter to the Scots Privy Council from the new king, Charles I, in July 1625.9

4   John Hill Burton, et ai, eds., The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (38 vols., Edin-
    burgh, 1877-1970), ser. I, XII, p. 774. In this article, dates are normally rendered according
    to the Gregorian (New Style) calendar, which was in force in Scotland and France at this
    time, rather than according to the Julian (Old Style) calendar which was still retained by
    England. Exceptions are indicated by the parenthetical addition of 'O.S.'. Where Old Style
    dates are used, the years are invariably modernised to begin on 1 January.
5   Sir William Alexander, An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1624), p. 32; Sir Ferdinando
    Gorges, "A Brief Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancement of Plantations
    into the Parts of America", Maine Historical Society Collections, II (1847), p. 48.
6   Alexander, Encouragement, p. 32.
7   The charter is printed in John George Bourinot, "Builders of Nova Scotia", Proceedings
    and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, ser. 2, 5 (1899), sec. 2, pp. 104-21.
8   Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 38-9. See also Donaldson, Scotland, pp. 252-5; for dis-
    cussion of the complexities of the relationship between Scottish economy and population,
    see Devine and Lythe, "Scottish Economy", p. 97.
9   Burton, PC Register, ser. I, XII, pp. 773-4; ibid., ser. II, I, p. 80.

42      Acadiensis

   Since the territory of New Scotland was devined in the charter by land-
marks rather than by latitudes, Alexander claimed with some justification
"that mine be the first National Patent that ever was cleerly bounded within
America by particular limits upon the Earth". 10 Extending north and east
from the length of the Ste. Croix river as far as the St. Lawrence river, the
grant comprehended the modern Maritime Provinces and the Gaspé; all of
these lands were conveyed to Sir William Alexander, his heirs and assigns,
as "one entire and free lordship and barony which shall be called in all
future time by the aforesaid name of New Scotland".11 Thus defined, the
Scottish grant further complicated the pattern of European claims. With New
England, the proposed Scottish colony had for the moment a friendly under-
standing; with New Netherland, the potential area of conflict was not large,
concerning only the southern part of what was later to become peninsular
Nova Scotia. With New France, on the other hand, the area of conflict was
much more considerable. This was especially true after 1627, when a new
Company of New France was granted "tout le longue des costes depuis la
Floride . . en rengeant les costes de la mer jusques au Cercle Artique pour
latitude". 12 From the start, Alexander was well aware of this conflict, al-
though he did not, as a Scotsman, emphasize competition with France as
heavily as he did the Englishman Gorges. 13 In fact, a review of the French
colonisation of Acadia led Alexander to the conclusion that the French were
only "sleightly planted" there. 14
   When Alexander remarked upon the slightness of the French hold upon
Acadia he was, of course, quite right, although his reasons — he blamed
laziness and internal quarrels among the French colonists — were superficial.
The truth was that no European country had yet found a practical way to
make good its vast territorial claims in North America. Although by 1621
both France and England had been attempting for fifteen years to emulate
the example of extensive colonisation which had been set by Spain in central
and South America, the only settlements which had been established were
small and isolated communal habitations perched precariously on the coasts
of America. While these settlements resembled the Portuguese trading
factories in Africa and Asia, for France and England they were the un-

10 Alexander, Encouragement,    p. 32.
11 Bourinot, "Builders of Nova Scotia", pp. 104-7, 118-9.
12 Collection de Manuscrits Contenant Lettres, Mémoires, et Autres Documents Historiques
   Relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, Recueillis aux Archives de la Province de Québec, ou Copiés
   à l'Etranger (Québec, 1883), I, pp. 65-6.
13 See Sir Ferdinando Gorges, "A Brief Relation of the Discovery and Plantation of New
   England", in Henry Sweetser Burrage, ed., Gorges and the Grant of the Province of Maine
   (Portland, 1923), pp. 142-3.
14 Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 36-8.

Acadiensis          43

welcome creations of necessity rather than of choice, products of the gap
between vast conceptions and inadequate techniques and resources. If
North American colonies had contained mines of precious metals requiring
inland establishments for their exploitation, or even if colonies could have
become staging points for the Far Eastern trade through a north-western
passage to the Pacific, then they would have been unquestionably useful and
valuable. As it was, the colonies established, such as the English settlements
at Sagadahoc and Jamestown and their French counterparts at Quebec and
Port Royal, had succeeded only in absorbing large amounts of capital without
visible return. The communal habitation, at first intended simply as a base
for the more extensive exploration of a colony and its resources, had tended
to become the whole of the colony. Such an establishment could carry on
the fishing and fur trades, but for these commercial purposes single voyages
could be cheaper and more convenient than colonisation. When such a
prominent observer as the Duc de Sully, the chief minister of Henry IV of
France, failed to see any value in North American colonisation, he was not
being obstinately unprogressive, but was raising a real question. 15
   The New Scotland colony was certainly not exempt from the difficulties
which plagued all European attempts in North America. Lack of capital was,
as always, a grave hindrance, and was one principal reason why an expedition
of 1622-23 returned without having founded a settlement. 16 The institution
of an order of Knights-Baronets in 1623, a measure consciously modelled
upon the Ulster baronetcies, was intended to bring in up to 450,000 merks,
or £22,500 sterling, through baronets' compulsory contributions to the
colony.17 Although opposition to the new order by small barons (whose
status was threatened) was overcome, under-subscription of the order re-
mained a fundamental problem.18 Whether through scepticism regarding the
New Scotland colony, dislike of the parvenu Sir William Alexander, who had
recently become royal Secretary for Scotland, or both of these, the Knights-
Baronetcies were little in demand. Despite a deliberate easing of procedural
formalities associated with the order, rather defensive assertions that Alex-
ander had used the colony's funds honestly, and threatening letters to indi-

15 See Marcel Trudel, Histoire de la Nouvelle-France; Le Comptoir, 1604-1627 (Ottawa.
   1966), p. 14.
16 See Alexander, Encouragement, pp. 33-4; also William Robert Scott. The Constitution and
   Finance of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (Cambridge, 1912),
   II, p. 318.
17 Burton, PC Register, ser. I, XIII, pp. 650-1. Each of the anticipated 150 baronets would
   pay 1000 merks, as well as supplying six colonists or paying a further 2000 merks in lieu.
18 See Cosmo Innés et al., eds., The Acts of the Parliament of Scotland ( 12 vols., Edinburgh,
   1844-75), V, p. 184; also Charles Rogers, ed., The Earl of Stirling's Register of Royal Letters
   Relative to the Affairs of Scotland and Nova Scotia from 1615 to 1635 (Edinburgh, 1885),
   I, p. 18.

44      Acadiensis

viduals implying that their future advancement would depend upon their
accepting the title of Knight-Baronet as "a nixte steppe to a further title",
relatively few Knights-Baronetcies were ever conferred. 19 A Privy Seal
register records only ninety up until 1638, though some twenty others may be
added from other sources. 20 None of these was ever taken up in New Scotland,
and the expenses of Sir William Alexander were never significantly defrayed
thereby.
   Nevertheless, Alexander proceeded with his efforts, making extensive
inroads on his personal wealth. By the summer of 1628 a fleet had been
assembled at Dumbarton under Alexander's son, the younger Sir William.
Long delayed in Dumbarton by financial difficulties and by desertions
among the prospective colonists, the fleet eventually set sail for America
in the spring of 1628.21 By this time, the outbreak of war between Charles I's
kingdoms and France had given the younger Alexander the company on at
least part of his voyage of the brothers Kirke, English privateers who were
active in efforts to capture the St Lawrence settlements from the French,
in which they succeeded in 1629.22 In 1629 also, after Alexander had wintered
elsewhere in America — perhaps on the Gaspé coast or at Tadoussac — two
New Scotland settlements were established, on Cape Breton and at Port
Royal, 23 although the Cape Breton settlement, under the command of Lord

19 Burton, PC Register, ser. II, I, p. 365; Rogers, Stirling's Register, I, pp. 30, 68, 118-9.
20 Privy Seal Register PS5/1, Scottish Record Office [hereafter SRO], Edinburgh. See also
   David Laing, ed., Royal Letters, Charters, and Tracts, Relating to the Colonization of New
   Scotland and the Institution of the Order of Knights Baronets of Nova Scotia, 1621 to 1638
   (Edinburgh, 1867), pp. 120-3. Later Knights-Baronetcies were conferred, but purely as
   titles of honour.
21   Dumbarton Burgh Records, printed as an appendix to McGrail, Alexander,         pp. 233-5;
     Burton, PC Register, ser. II, II, pp. 313-4.
22   See Marcel Trudel, The Beginnings of New France, 1524-1663 (Toronto, 1973), pp. 174-5.
23 It should be pointed out that this date has been challenged, most recently in McGrail,
   Alexander, pp. 236-45. Evidence in favour of dating the settlement in 1629 has been mar-
   shalled in George Pratt Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, 1620-1686 (Glasgow, 1922), pp.
   214-26; a further useful review of the evidence is included in Daniel Cobb Harvey, "Sir
   William Alexander and Nova Scotia", Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society, 30
   (1954), pp. 19-22. Without repeating the arguments advanced, it would seem conclusive
   that those Scots and Englishmen who favoured retention of Port Royal by the Scots crown
   in the peace negotiations of 1629-32 never denied that the Scots settlement had been made
   there after the interim Peace of Suza, which had provided that all conquests made after 23
   April 1629 should be restored. In a diplomatic dispatch of 22 June 1631, the king himself
   stated, in relation to Quebec and Port Royal respectively, "that one of these places was
   taken and the plantation made in the other after the peace". Charles I to Sir Isaac Wake,
   Ambassador in France, 22 June 1631, State Papers (Foreign), SP78/89, f. 210, Public Record
   Office [hereafter PRO J, London. Also implied in this statement, of course, is the assertion
   that Port Royal had not then been "taken", as had Quebec, but had been peacefully occupied
   in fulfilment of the long-standing New Scotland grant.

Acadiensis 45

Ochiltree, was seized in September and destroyed by a French raiding
force.24 This raid served as a reminder that both the Kirkes and the Alex-
anders were regarded as trespassers by the French; furthermore, both the
seizure of Quebec by the Kirkes and the settlement of New Scotland had
taken place, albeit unknowingly, after the conclusion of an interim peace
treaty at Suza in April of 1629. Thus it was with the sure prospect of eventual
French demands for restitution that the surviving New Scotland settlement
at Port Royal faced its first winter in 1629-30.
   A further problem which arose during that winter, and one which had
affected all infant European settlements in North America, was disease. In
1630, Claude de la Tour, a veteran French coloniser who had resided in
Acadia for some twenty years, reported that "il estoit mort trente Escossois
de septante qu'ils estoient en cet hyvernement, qui avoient esté mal accom-
modez". 25 Also acute was the problem, characteristic of communal colonies,
of excessive dependence upon the mother country. In early 1630, Sir William
Alexander the elder became progressively more agitated in London as he
attempted to find capital with which to send out relief. On 9 February, he
wrote to the Earl of Menteith, the President of the Scots Privy Council, of
his worry "concerneing my sone's supplie, whereupon his saftie or ruine doth
depend . . . ; there is no monie to be had here [in London] and therefore
whatever happen, I wold the ship that is fraughted at Leith [in Scotland]
were hasted away with some twentie or threttie good fellowes, and so much
for provisions as she may carie . . . ."26 Apparently this broad hint was
heeded, but the very urgency of the need for Menteith's help illustrates the
dependent position of the colony.27
   On the other hand, there are indications that in some respects the Scottish
colony, by the admittedly modest standards of other European attempts in
North America, was succeeding rather well. One prerequisite for the sur-
vival of a communal colony was to have harmonious Indian relations, since
the Indians played an essential role in communicating techniques for sub-
sisting in the American environment, and in providing furs by way of trade.
There was also the practical consideration that Indian hostility would almost
certainly result in the destruction of any tiny European settlement which
incurred it. In the case of the Scottish settlement at Port Royal, good rela-
tions seem to have been early established. The colonists were visited shortly
after their arrival by "2 savages in a Canou", and a few weeks later by "9

24 Petition of Captain Constance Ferrar, December 1629, State Papers (Colonial), CO 1/5, no.
   41, PRO; Memorial and Information of Lord Ochiltree, January 1630, ibid., nos. 46, 47.
25 Henry Percival Biggar, ed., The Works of Samuel de Champlain (Toronto, 1922), VI, p. 176.
26   William Fraser, ed., The Red Book of Menteith (Edinburgh, 1880), II, pp. 111-2.
27   Ibid., p. 113.

46 Acadiensis

savages in a Shalles [shallop] from S. Johns River with beaver skines and
hydes [who] gave the generali a present". 28 Further, a contemporary reported
in a letter of February 1631 that Charles I himself had been visited by friendly
Indians from the area of the Scottish colony: "there came last week to London
the king, queen and young prince of New Scotland. This king comes to be of
our king's religion and to submit his kingdom to him . . . ."29
   There were also indications that even those French who still remained in
Acadia might be willing to convert to the Scottish allegiance in return for
certain guarantees. Captured by the Kirkes in 1628, Claude de la Tour was
carried to England, where he apparently met with Alexander. The subsequent
episode is the subject of conflicting evidence, but it seems clear that Alex-
ander made an agreement with La Tour that he and his son, Charles (also a
long-standing resident of Acadia), would be made Knights-Baronets, an agree-
ment which Alexander fulfilled on 30 November 1629 and 12 May 1630 re-
spectively.30 By the agreement, the La Tours would hold an area in the
southern part of the New Scotland peninsula, from the Cloven Cape to Mir-
liquesh, would divide the fur trade with Alexander, and would be free to
make settlements on their territory; in return, they promised "d'estre bons et
fidèles sujets et Vasseaux dudit Roy [d'Escosse], et luy rendre toute obéis-
sance et assister vers les Peuples a la reduction dudit Pais et Coste d'Ac-
cadie". 31 The evidence of Samuel de Champlain, without giving credence to
a more dramatic contemporary account by Nicolas Denys, suggests that La
Tour was unable to convince his son to endorse this agreement and the
father himself abandoned the Scottish allegiance later in 1630, after supplies
had been sent to his son by the Company of New France. 32 However, a sur-
viving fragment of a letter of the Scots crown in February 1630, referring to

28   Anonymous Account of New Scotland, 1630, Hawthornden MSS, vol. IX, f. 149, National
     Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, MS 2061.
29   Quoted in George Patterson, "Sir William Alexander and the Scottish Attempt to Colonize
     Acadia", Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, 10 (1892), sec. 2,
     p. 95.
30   Laing, Royal Letters, Charters and Tracts, p. 122. For a commentary upon some of the ques-
     tions involved, see Robert Le Blant, "La Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution
     de l'Acadie, 1627-1636", Revue d'Histoire des Colonies, 42 (1955), p. 74; and George
     MacBeath, "Charles de Saint-Etienne de la Tour", and "Claude de Saint-Etienne de la
     Tour", DCB, I, pp. 592-98.
31   Articles of Agreement between Alexander and La Tour, 6 October 1629, Egerton MSS,
     vol. 2395, f. 17, British Museum, London. The dating of this document, 6 October 1629 at
     Port Royal, is perhaps suspect. See LeBlant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la
     Restitution", p. 74. There is no reason, however, to doubt the authenticity of the contents.
32   Biggar, Works of Champlain, VI, pp. 172-5; Nicolas Denys, Description Géographique et
     Historique des Costes de l'Amérique Septentrionale avec l'Histoire Naturelle du Pais, éd.
     William Francis Ganong (Toronto, 1908), pp. 477-9.

Acadiensis        47

letters received from "Charles St. Estienne (de la Tour] Baronne", suggests
that the younger La Tour may not have been altogether unflinching in his
rejection of the Scots offer.33 The very fact that such an agreement was
seriously considered illustrates that the Scottish settlement at Port Royal
was sufficiently well rooted to be impressive even to its enemies. Further
corroboration of the increasingly strong position of the Scots colonists can
be found in the report of a lieutenant of the La Tours, after their decision to
give allegiance to France rather than to Scotland. In the summer of 1631 this
report brought news to France "comme les Escossois ne se resoudoient point
à quitter le Port Royal, mais qu'ils s'y accommodoient de jour à autre, et y
avoient fait venir quelques mesnages et bestiaux pour peupler ce lieu qui ne
leur appartient que par l'usurpation qu'ils en ont fait".34
   While the small-scale communal style of colonisation was very far from
fulfilling the European ideal of extensive colonisation on the Spanish model,
a worthwhile start had been made, and on 13 May 1630 Charles I addressed
an encouraging letter to Sir William Alexander the younger. Praising Alex-
ander's "carefull and provident proceeding for planting of a colonie at Port
Royall, which may be a means to setle all that cuntrie in obedience", the
king offered "hartlie thankis for the same, and doe wish you (as wee are
confident you will) to continow as you have begunne, that the wark may be
brought to the intendit perfectione"; this, he continued, "wee will esteem as
one of the most singulare services done unto us . . . ."35 This was a remarkably
emphatic endorsement of the Alexanders' progress in New Scotland. Yet
only eight months later, on 17 February 1631, a decision was taken in London
that, in return for certain French concessions, which included the payment
of the outstanding balance of the dowry of Charles I's French queen, Henri-
etta Maria, the Port Royal colony would be evacuated. 36 This decision, made
in response to French demands during the negotiations which followed the
interim Peace of Suza, preceded by more than a year the signing of the
final peace treaty at St-Germain-en-Laye on 29 March 1632. Nevertheless,
the abandonment of Port Royal was ordered by Charles I on 4 July 1631,
was eventually implemented in late 1632, and virtually closed the history of
settlement in New Scotland.37 Although the king was still insisting on 24
April 1633, in a letter to the Commissioners for the Plantation of New
 Scotland, "that our said Viscount [Sir William Alexander the elder, now

33 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 420.
34 Biggar, Works of Champlain, VI, p. 199.
35 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 439.
36 "Contents of a letter to be written to his Majesties Agents at Paris", 17 February 1631,
   SP 78/88, ff. 145-6, PRO.
37 Royal Order for the abandonment of Port Royal, 4 July 1631, CO 1/6, no. 17, PRO; see
   also Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution", p. 84.

48       Acadiensis

raised to the nobility as Viscount Stirling ] . . . shall prosecute the said
work", no such attempt was ever made. 38
   Why was New Scotland apparently so easily given up, after a decade of
endeavour and at a time when the colony was beginning to establish itself
securely? Historians of New Scotland have addressed themselves to this
question and have usually found the answer in the flawed personal character
of Charles I, in the faulty statesmanship of himself and his government,
or in both. Most scathing in their treatment of Charles were late nineteenth-
century historians, often connected with the modern Province of Nova
Scotia, who wrote specifically about the efforts of Sir William Alexander.
"It is difficult to account", wrote Rev. George Patterson in 1892, "for the
conduct of Charles throughout these proceedings. It seems to manifest
stupidity or duplicity altogether inexplicable, or as we are inclined to believe
a large mixture of both". 39 Stupidity, or duplicity? Charles Rogers, writing
in 1885, was inclined to believe that the former rather than the latter was the
key to the episode, and blamed "a vacillating policy".40 Also on the side of
stupidity was J. B. Brebner, who in 1927 decided that "one can be charitable,
and attribute his [Charles I'sl actions to the undoubted confusion of geo-
graphical knowledge and nomenclature". 41 Other historians of New Scotland
have tended to attribute the restitution to a duplicity arising from Charles's
financial difficulties and his consequent anxiety to obtain the balance of the
queen's dowry. W. F. Ganong observed in 1908 "that Canada and Acadia
were to be returned to France, for reasons which were personal with the two
Kings and concerned not the good of their empires". 42 G. P. Insh similarly
concluded in 1922 that "like a later . . . Scottish colonial scheme [a refer-
ence to the Darien scheme of 1698], the Nova Scotia enterprise was to be
sacrificed to the exigencies of English Royal policy".43 Between Ganong and
Insh, a useful impression is gained of the complex interaction of the interests
of the respective crowns of Scotland, England and France; but Charles I
remains as the cynical destroyer of the New Scotland colony.
   Clearly there was a discrepancy between the stated aims of the Scots
crown, which continued even after 1632 to avow its support for the re-
establishment of New Scotland, and the actual results of the treaty of St.-
Germain. Among those who have taken serious note of this are H. P. Biggar,
T. H. McGrail and D. C. Harvey. In explaining the paradox, however, even
these historians have invariably fallen back upon the alleged personal
38 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 664.
39 Patterson, "Sir William Alexander and the Scottish Attempt", p. 99.
40 Rogers, Stirling's Register, I, p. xxxvii.
41   John Bartlet Brebner, New England's Outpost (New York, 1927), p. 26.
42   Denys, Description Géographique et Historique, Introduction, p. 4.
43   Insh, Scottish Colonial Schemes, p. 85. This statement is reaffirmed in George Pratt Insh,
     "Sir William Alexander's Colony at Port Royal", Dalhousie Review, 9 (1929-30), pp. 438-47.

Acadiensis 49

deficiencies of Charles I. Biggar in 1901 concluded a thorough and balanced
narrative treatment of the treaty negotiations by observing that the king
"seems to have taken the surrender of Port Royal very lightly", and believed
"the real truth" to be "that Port Royal was sacrificed on account of the
King's pressing need of money".44 McGrail, while giving Charles I credit for
having "fully intended the abandonment of the colony by his subjects to be
merely temporary", nevertheless argued in 1940 that the colony had lost its
chance of survival because "Charles had . . . used it to gratify his own selfish
desires".45 Harvey similarly asserted in 1954 that the king's "vision was
dazzled by the prospects of getting the 400,000 crowns still owing in his
wife's dowry".46 Duplicity, stupidity, financial rapacity: with all the variations
which have appeared in interpretations of the restitution of Port Royal, the
motives and aims of the Scots crown have invariably been portrayed as crude,
self-defeating and unsavoury in character. Yet a re-examination of the
evidence sheds grave doubts upon these interpretations.
   The lines along which the negotiations between French and British would
be pursued in 1629-32, and the bounds of possible areas of serious disagree-
ment as regards North America, were quickly established after the interim
treaty of Suza had ended actual hostilities on 24 April 1629.47 The French
position was clearly stated in a memorial later in 1629, demanding the restora-
tion both of Quebec and other parts of Canada which had been seized by the
Kirkes in the summer of 1629, and of "les places de la Cadye" which had been
settled by the Scots shortly afterwards. The French made no distinction
between the occupied areas of the St Lawrence region and those of Acadia,
holding both to be exclusively French territory which had been occupied by
English and Scots after the interim treaty: were restitution not agreed, re-
newal of warfare was threatened. The memorial also noted that provisional
agreement had already been reached over Canada, while the British had
asked for further negotiations over the settlements in Acadia. 48
44 Henry Percival Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France (Toronto, 1901),
   pp. 160, 163-4.
45 McGrail, Alexander, pp. 117-8.
46   Harvey, "Alexander and Nova Scotia", p. 25.
47   Although in 1629-32 there was no realm of 'Britain', it has been decided here to apply the
     term 'British' to the negotiators of Charles I, for two reasons: first, for convenience, and,
     second, because Charles himself often used the title of "Roy de la Grande Bretagne", under
     which he would eventually sign the treaty of St-Germain.
48   Mémoire sur la restitution du Canada et de l'Acadie par les Anglois, 1629, Correspondance
      Politique, Angleterre [hereafter C P A J , vol. 43, ff. 290-1, Affaires Etrangères, France, in
     transcript in Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa. The same memorial promised to allow
     "les Anglois" to remain in certain areas of Acadia where they were already settled, "moyen-
     nant qu'ils vivent comme nos amys et que l'on conviendra des bornes et des limites entre
     les Ungs et les aultres". It seems clear that this refers to the New England settlements,
     which were established on territory included in the vast extent of the original Acadia grant
      of 1603.

50 Acadiensis

    On 2 March 1630, the French ambassador in London, Charles de l'Aupes-
 pine, Marquis de Châteauneuf, confirmed that Charles I was willing to give
 up the conquests in Canada, but was undecided on the question "du Cap
 Breton et Port roial".49 The royal indecision regarding Port Royal was also
 remarked upon later in March, in a letter from Robert earl of Nithsdale, a
 Scottish nobleman who favoured a close understanding with France, to a Mr.
 Scott of London. The passage is somewhat obscure, but is suggestive never-
theless: "for the mater of Canada he [Châteauneuf] will get contentment
for that which [is] in the pouer of the Counsell of England; and for Sir
 William Alexander's part, I know ther is means eused be the man he fears
 that the King may give satisfaction leykweyis; and I hope it sail prevail". 50 In
 the following month, a meeting between Charles and Châteauneuf further
clarified their respective positions, not entirely to the satisfaction of either
side. As the English Secretary of State, Sir Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dor-
chester, wrote to Sir Isaac Wake, Ambassador in France, a private agree-
 ment had been reached that Quebec would be restored "because the French
were removed out of it by strong hand". On the question of the Scottish
settlement, however, Châteauneuf had "seemed to go away ill satisfyed, that
he could not obtayne a direct promise from His Majesty for the restoring of
Port Royall, joyning to Canada, where some Scottish men are planted under
the title of Nova Scotia". While Charles had promised "thus much that unies
he found reason as well before, as since the warre, to have that Place free*
for his Subjects plantation, he would recall them", Dorchester recalled to
Wake that the Scots had "there seated themselves in a place where no French
did inhabite", 51 and furthermore expressed a belief that on this point Château-
neuf had spoken "rather out of his owne discourse . . . then by Commission".52
   On Port Royal, Charles I was clearly unsure of his ground. He was prepared
to stand fast if assured that the Scottish right was a legitimate one, dating from
before the late war, and he doubted the strength of the French commitment
to Acadia; but he was unwilling to become involved in a controversy with
Châteauneuf until provided with stronger and more detailed arguments. It
was in this context that the king sent his letter of encouragement to the
younger Alexander on 13 May 1630; his "hartlie thankis" to Alexander and
hopes for the continuance of the colony were not inconsistent with his
diplomatic discussions and his ensuing effort to find arguments which would

49 Châteauneuf to Bouthilier, 2 March 1630, ibid., vol. 44, ff. 32-7.
50 William Fraser, The Book of Caerlaverock: Memoirs of the Maxwells, Earls of Nithsdale,
   Lords Maxwell and Harries (Edinburgh, 1873), p. 119.
51 This was quite literally true, since the French of Acadia had not had their headquarters at Port
   Royal itself since 1623. See Azarie Couillard-Després, Charles de Saint-Etienne de la Tour,
   Lieutenant-Général en Acadie at Son Temps, 1593-1666 (Arthabaska, P.Q., 1930), pp. 143-8.
52 Dorchester to Wake, 25 April 1630, SP 78/86, f. 253, PRO.

Acadiensis 51

justify the retention of New Scotland. On 3 July the king wrote to instruct the
Scots Privy Council to investigate the whole matter: "as we ar bund in dewtie
and justice to discherge what we ow to everie nyghbour prince, so we most
have a care that none of our subjects doe suffer in that which they have under-
t a k e upon just grounds to doe ws service". "We desyer", the letter continued,
"to be certifeid how far we and our subjects are interessed therein, and what
arguments ar fitt to be used when any question shall occurre concerneing
the same, for the defence thairof . . . ."53
    In reply, the Convention of Estates, an enlarged version of the Privy
Council which approximated to the Parliament in membership and in certain
of its powers, "having dewlie considderit the benefite arysing to this king-
dome by the accessioun of Newscotland and of the successfull plantatioun
already made there by the gentlemen undertakers of the same", unanimously
agreed on 31 July "that his Majestie sail be petitioned to mainteane his right
of Newscotland And to protect his subjects undertakers of the said plantation
in the peacable possessioun of the same As being a purpose highlie concern-
ing his Majesties honnour and the good and crédite of this his ancient king-
 dome". On royal invitation, and no doubt encouraged by the personal
 presence of Sir William Alexander, the Convention on the same day ratified
 and confirmed anew the order of Knights-Baronets. 54 The Privy Council,
 for its part, wrote to the king on 9 September "by order from the Estaits"
 to urge that he resist "the title predendit by the Frenshe to the lands of
 New Scotland".55 Enclosed was a statement drawn up by Alexander of
 "Reasons alleaged by the Scottish Adventurers for the holding of Port Royal",
 in which Alexander derived the king's title to New Scotland from the voyages
 of Cabot, and recalled the removal of the French from Acadia in 1613 by
 the raiding Englishman Samuel Argali, several years after which "a Colonie
 of Scottish was planted at Port Royal, which had never been repossessed
 nor claimed by the French since they were first removed from the same". Not
 only had the local Indians recognised Charles I's authority, but so had La
 Tour, "cheef commander of the few French then in that Countrie", who had
 found "the coming in of the Scottish necessary for his securitie" and had
 therefore decided on "turning Tenant". The king, it was argued, was honour
 bound to protect all of these subjects, and "this business of Port royall can-
 not bee made Lyable to the articles of the peace, seeing there was no act of
 hostilitie comitted thereby, a Colony only being planted upon his Majesties
 owne ground." 56

53 Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 463.
54 Innes, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, V, pp. 223-4.
55 Burton, PC Register, ser. II, IV, pp. 46-7.
56 "Reasons alleaged by the Scottish Adventurers for the holding of Port Royal", 1630, CO 1/5,
   no. 102 (i), PRO.

52 Acadiensis

      While support of the Convention and the Privy Council for New Scotland
 was predictable, in view of Alexander's active efforts in his own interest, the
 royal appeal for counsel had been met with a positive response. The British
 position in the treaty negotiations with France was now converted into one of
 defence of the Scottish right to Port Royal, and thus into direct conflict with
 the French insistence upon restitution. In the event, the French stood firm.
 On 7 December 1630, the British negotiators, René Augier and Henry De Vie,
 reported to Dorchester than even an attempt to have the matter postponed
 to future negotiation had been categorically refused by the French: Château-
 neuf, by now recalled to France as Chancellor, had replied "que le fait dudit
 Port Royal estoit joint avec le reste". 57 The negotiators agreed, however, with
 Dorchester's earlier estimation that this attitude arose rather from Château-
 neufs personal pride than from any more calculated French regard for
 Acadia. What the Chancellor wished, they wrote on 17 December, was
 "l'exécution des choses qu'il dit luy avoir esté promis [allegedly promised, that
 is, while Châteauneuf had been in London as ambassador] touchant le Port
Royal, de quoy il fait encore son affaire propre . . . ." 58 On 21 January
 1631 Augier and De Vie reported to Dorchester on certain mercantile
clauses which had been agreed, but added that "le different du Port Royal
 . . . est l'unique accroche de l'exécution de ce que dessus, e t . . . seul empesche
aujourd'hui cette liberté et utilité réciproque". Châteauneuf, they went on,
still persisted in his view that the vital point was that "les Escossois n'y [ to
New Scotland] ont jamais envoyé aucune plantation en vertu desdit patentes
sinon depuis cette dernière paix", and that "Mr. Alexandre Secretaire
d'Escosse . . . seul empesche par son interest particulier que ces deux Cour-
connes ne jouissent de benefice de la paix". The French demanded the annul-
ment of the agreements between Alexander and La Tour and Charles I's
permission to remove the Scots from Port Royal "sans prejudice de l'Alli-
ance qu'il [the French king] a avec la Nation et Royaume d'Escosse".59
     This latter proposal could not be acceptable to Charles, but a week later,
in a further report from Augier and De Vie, it became even clearer that the
Acadian question was posing a grave danger to the whole basis of the peace.
"The only difficulty", went the report, "resteth in the accommodation of
the business of the Porte-Royall". Worse still, the negotiators themselves,
as they informed Dorchester with dutiful frankness, felt that the French

57 De Vic and Augier to Dorchester, 7 December 1630, SP 78/97, ff. 459-60, PRO. For notes
   on Augier and De Vie, see Charles Harding Firth and Sophie Crawford Lomas, Notes on the
   Diplomatic Relations of England and France, 1603-1688: Lists of Ambassadors from England
   to France and from France to England (Oxford, 1906), pp. 10-11.
58 De Vic and Augier to Dorchester, 17 December 1630, SP 78/87, f. 501, PRO.
59 De Vic and Augier to Dorchester, 21 January 1631, SP 78/88, ff. 38-9, PRO.

Acadiensis   53

argument was "unanswerable", unless Alexander could improve the quality
of his own contentions. They believed that the French would not yield, and
passed on a report that a French fleet of eight or ten ships was ready in
Brittany to go to the recovery of Port Royal.60 Thus, by late January 1631.
the question of Port Royal threatened to lead to a resumption of war between
Britain and France. For Charles I, this situation was as surprising as it was
uncomfortable. As he was to remark a few weeks later to the French Am-
bassador, "places taken and held upon that whole continent of America
have never binne drawne so into consequence by the Princes of Europe as
thereupon to frame dispute for interruption of treatyes betwixt kingdomes
and States . . . ."61 Yet the fact remained that the French were insisting
upon the restitution of Port Royal, even after the British agreement to restore
Quebec, and were apparently prepared to hazard the peace accordingly.
France had recently obtained a degree of relief in its involvement in the
Thirty Years' War through the conclusion of the treaty of Barwalde with
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden on 23 January, and thus would henceforth be
able more easily to afford a renewal of war with Charles I. Charles, on the
other hand, as king of England, was particularly anxious for peace, as he was
still in the early stages of his personal rule and could not afford to wage war
without parliamentary grants.62 For all that, as king of Scotland he did not
wish to lose face by repudiating his obligations in New Scotland, thereby
embarrassing his Secretary for Scotland, Alexander; nor did he wish to lose
the benefits in trade and prestige potentially offered by New Scotland.
   Thus caught in a perplexing dilemma, the king and his advisors were ready
to seize upon a further aspect of the report of Augier and De Vie of 28
January, which seemed to offer both an explanation of the French behaviour
and a possible way of winning both peace with France and the retention of
New Scotland. In the opinion of the negotiators, the French, and especially
Châteauneuf, were more interested in Port Royal as a point of honour than
in Acadia as a colony. Rumour had it, moreover, that the Port Royal fur trade
"will not amount to above 800 or lm. [ 1000] skinnes of Orignac by the
yeare, and a few more Castors". De Vie and Augier therefore suggested a
strategy: "if Sir William Alexander wolde exchange that Seate for some other
upon the same coast, and not farr distant from the porte Royall, and some
meanes were founde to indemnize him of parte of the charges hee hath been
att to make his plantation, it may bee that wolde give them satisfaction here
in pointe of honour". 63 At a meeting in London on 17 February, the king

 60 De Vie and Augier to Dorchester, 28 January 1631, ibid., ff. 50-1.
 61 Dorchester to De Vic and Augier, 2 March 1631, ibid., f. 196.
 62 See Danie! Patrick O'Connell, Richelieu (London, 1968), pp. 254-5; and Godfrey Davies,
    The Early Stuarts, 1603-1660 (2nd ed., Oxford, 1959), pp. 66-7.
 63 De Vic and Augier to Dorchester, 28 January 1631, SP 78/88, ff. 50-1, PRO.

54 Acadiensis

 and his advisors on foreign affairs decided to take this opportunity for a
settlement. 64 The evacuation of Port Royal, with the temporary abandonment
of New Scotland, was unpalatable and inconvenient, but it had the great
 advantage of securing peace. It also had the further advantage of giving
Charles I the chance to require other French concessions as quid pro quo: it
was decided to demand certain restitutions of English ships and prisoners, as
well as the payment of the balance of Queen Henrietta Maria's dowry. Not
least, the evacuation avoided any necessity of giving up New Scotland al-
together and promised an opportunity of resuming activities in the colony
within a short time.
   The results of this meeting were duly conveyed to the negotiators in a letter
drafted by Dorchester on 2 March. In the letter, the Scottish claim to Port
Royal was asserted at some length, and New Scotland described as insepar-
able from the realm of Scotland; nevertheless, if a real peace would be the
result, if the French would fulfill the required conditions, and if the French
would guarantee not to molest the La Tours (a requirement which presented
no difficulty, since the La Tours had already been accepted back to the
French allegiance), the king would "dispense with all other considerations". 65
On 1 April, at Dijon, these terms were privately agreed. 66 Their formal accep-
tance in London was communicated by the king to Wake in a dispatch of 22
June, announcing his purpose of "laying a foundation of a firmer friendship
[with France] than hath beene of late yeares . . . ." From Port Royal, the
king went on, "such of our Subjects as are there planted shall retire, leaving
these parts in the same state they were before the peace. Which we doe not
out of ignorance, as if we did not understand how little we are hereunto
obliged . . . but out of an affection and desire to comply with our good
brother the French king in all things that may frendly and reasonably, though
not rightly and duly, bee demanded of us". 67
   On 10 July, a royal warrant to Sir William Alexander ordered the demoli-
tion of the Scots fort at Port Royal; eighteen days later a formal act was
issued under the Great Seal of Scotland, for transmission to the French king,
relinquishing Port Royal. Both documents made it clear, however, that, as
the agreement was understood in Scotland, the intent was that "Port Royall
shall be putt in the estate it was befor the beginning of the warre, that no
pairtie may have any advantage ther dureing the continuance of the same,

64   "Contents of a letter to be written to his Majesties Agents at Paris", 17 February 1631,
     ibid., ff. 145-6.
65   Dorchester to De Vic and Augier, 2 March 1631, ibid., f. 196.
66   "Escript concerté à Dijon", 1 April 1631, ibid., f. 344.
67   Charles I to Wake, 22 June 1631, SP 78/89, f. 210, PRO.

Acadiensis 55

and without derogation to any preceiding right or title . . ." The formal act
declared that the relinquishment was made "without any prejudice to our
right or title or those of our subjects in perpetuity". At this stage, there was
not even any admission on the Scottish side that the upshot would be in any
sense a restitution of Port Royal to the French; although the French crown
was made responsible for arranging the details of the Scots evacuation, and
would thus necessarily send an expedition for this purpose, Port Royal was
to be left "altogidder waist and unpeopled" 68
   As was consistent with this strategic withdrawal, the relinquishment of
Port Royal was accompanied by the bestowal of a number of advancements
upon Sir William Alexander, which displayed, as they were intended to do,
the continuance of royal confidence and favour towards him not only as a
subject and as Secretary for Scotland but also as a coloniser. The patent
creating Alexander viscount of Stirling had been prepared in September of
1630, "for the good and faithfull service done be him to his Majestie and for
his chargeable undertaking of the plantatioun of New Scotland"; after exhi-
bition to the Privy Council, it was delivered on 5 July 1631.69 On 10 July, the
very day on which the warrant for demolition of the Port Royal fort was
dated, Stirling was elevated to the bench of the court of session and a precept
was issued to the Treasurer of Scotland ordering that Stirling be assigned
any royal profits arising from the coinage of copper farthings. Two days later,
a royal instruction to the Treasury enjoined that special care be taken that
Stirling "should enjoy the whole benefite belonging unto his place", that is,
the profits of his office of Secretary for Scotland.70 Later elevated to be first
earl of that name, Stirling continued to enjoy royal favour throughout the
 1630s. In early 1632 a royal warrant for the sum of £10,000 sterling was
issued "for satisfaction of the losses that the said Viscount hath, by giveing

68   Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, pp. 544, 547-8. Historians have usually in the past regarded
     the Scots crown's formal act as one restoring Port Royal to France. The terms of the act,
     however, seem to indicate rather an empowerment of the French king to arrange for the
     Scots evacuation, without any implied notion of restitution. It should be noted that the
     translation of this document from the original Latin in McGrail, Alexander, pp. 243-4,
     appears inaccurate; the document's heading, "Pro Rege Gallorum", for example is erron-
     eously taken to imply "the delivering up to the French king of . . . Port Royal". The trans-
     lation used in McGrail was apparently taken directly from a rather dubious source: Ephraim
     Lockhart, An Historical View of the Province of Nova Scotia and other Territories in Ameri-
     ca (Edinburgh, 1836), attached to a Narrative of the Oppressive Law Proceedings and Other
     Measures Resorted to by the British Government and Numerous Private Individuals to
     Overpower the [self-styled] Earl of Stirling and Subvert his Lawful Rights, Written by
     Himself, p. 39.
69   Burton, PC Register, ser. II, IV, p. 269.
70   Rogers, Stirling's Register, II, p. 543, 544, 546.

56 Acadiensis

 ordour for removeing of his Colony at our express command". This order
 was most emphatic that the grant was in no way "for quyting the title, right,
 or possession of New Scotland, or of any part thereof, bot onlie for satis-
faction of the losses . . . ; we are so far from abandoning of that bussines
 as we doe heirby requyre yow [the Exchequer] and everie ane of yow to
 afford your best help and encouragement for furthering of the same . . . ."71
    This latter affirmation was reflected in virtually every royal reference to
 New Scotland throughout the decade. As early as 12 July 1631, the Privy
 Council was instructed to consider the best means to further prosecute the
New Scotland scheme: "we wilbe verie carefull to mainteane all our good
subjects who doe plant themselffis ther . . . ." A royal letter to the Knights-
Baronets just over a year later assured them of the continuance of New
 Scotland despite "the Colonie being forced of late to remove for a tyme by
 means of a treatie we have had with the French". 72 On 28 June 1633, all of
Stirling's patents and rights in New Scotland were specifically confirmed by
the Scots Parliament, and in the Privy Council in the following February "a
letter was produced from his Majestie tuiching the furtherance of the planta-
tion of New Scotland and ane Act passed thereupon accordinglie". 73 Knights-
Baronetcies issued until 1638 continued, moreover, to carry grants of
American land.74
   And yet, the continuance of New Scotland never had any basis in American
reality. Despite the repeated affirmations to the contrary, the surrender of
Port Royal and the shipping of the colonists to Le Havre, where they arrived
on 11 February 1633, was a crushing blow to the colony. If the course of
action of the Scots crown was basically neither dishonest nor foolish, why
did its aims miscarry so completely? In essence, the crown had made two
understandable but fundamental miscalculations, which were compounded
in their results by a particular mischance. The mischance lay in the death of
Dorchester on 25 February 1632, at a crucial point in the negotiations.
As a result of Dorchester's illness and of the ensuing hiatus before his business
was taken up by the other Secretary of State, Sir John Coke, there was a
lapse of several months in correspondence between London and Sir Isaac
Wake, who had by now taken over the negotiations in France. Writing to
Coke on 13 April, Wake complained of delays and expressed his hope "that
some of your Secretaries will take notice of the receipt of my letters, which
comfort I have wanted now five months together". 75 An apologetic reply

71 Ibid., pp. 575-8.
72 Ibid., pp. 545, 619. Italics mine.
73   Innes, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, V, p. 43; Burton, PC Register, ser. II, V, p. 209.
74   For an example, see the "Procuratory of Resignation by William, Earl of Stirling", 31 Decem-
     ber 1636, GD 17/501, SRO.
75   Wake to Coke, 13 April 1632, SP 78/91, ff. 120-21, PRO.

Acadiensis 57

from Coke could not repair the damage already done, which was two-fold
as regards New Scotland. First, no notice had been taken of a dispatch from
Wake of 20 January which contained a first hint that the French plan for
Acadia might involve more than the salving of a point of honour. The French,
Wake had reported, were planning an expedition to repossess Quebec; so
much was to be expected. In addition, however, "Mr. de Razilly is to trans-
port himself into those parts with five or six ships well provided, and 800
soldiers besydes mariners, who may perhaps trench uppon our plantation in
New England".76 Wake apparently believed at this stage that Razilly was
bound for Canada rather than for New Scotland, and doubted in any case
whether the French had any "ill intention". Nevertheless, it was Razilly who
did eventually go to Acadia as royal lieutenant-general; furthermore, the
support given by the Company of New France to the La Tours, hitherto on a
small scale, had taken the more permanent form in late 1631 of the con-
struction of a small fort on the St. John river.77 Thus, had Dorchester been
able to correlate this development with the reports passed on by Wake, he
might have been alerted to the possibility that he had underestimated the
French regard for Acadia.
    The second damaging aspect of Wake's unfortunate isolation lay in the
 eventual terms of the treaty of St-Germain, which were more favourable to
France than had been envisaged in 1631. Indeed, Charles I on 29 April 1632
informed Wake through Coke that "though for his own honour, hee will not
free himself from the disadvantage and burden cast uppon him, by disavowing
those ministers to whom hee gave his powers, openly to that king and
state; yet as to yourselves, hee disavoweth both your and Mr. Burlamachis
 [another British agent involved in the negotiations] proceedings as being
without his Commission or allowance".78 While the principal points enumer-
ated by Coke concerned Canada and not New Scotland, a subtle change had
been made by Wake in the British position regarding the latter. The British
 understanding in 1631 had been that Port Royal was to be left "waste and
 unpeopled", and a basic distinction had been carefully maintained between
 the removal of the Scots from Port Royal and the restitution of Quebec. In
 the eventual treaty, however, Charles I was obliged "de rendre et restituer
 a Sa Majesté Très Chrestienne, tous les lieulx occupez en la Nouvelle France,
 la Cadie et Canada". 79 Moreover, Wake had written from Paris on 9 April to
 "those of Cadie and Port Royal" that they should surrender Port Royal when
 summoned to do so by "Monsr. Razilly, or by some other in his name".' 0 This

76   Wake to Dorchester, 20 January 1632, ibid., ff. 12-3.
77   See Le Blant, "Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France et la Restitution", p. 81.
78   Coke to Wake, 29 April 1632, SP 78/91, ff. 146-7, PRO.
79   Collection de Manuscrits, I, p. 88.
 80 Wake to "those of Cadie and Port Royal", 9 April 1632, SP 78/91, f. 106, PRO.