The Impact of Escobar and the Procurement Collusion Strike Force on Procurement-Related False Claims Act Settlements
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The Impact of Escobar and the Procurement
Collusion Strike Force on Procurement-Related
False Claims Act Settlements
By Samuel B. Knowles, Dawn E. Stern, and Thomas E. Daley
Collusion Strike Force
(PCSF) to focus on anti-
trust issues in the procure-
ment context. The PCSF is
an interagency partnership
consisting of prosecutors
from U.S. Attorney’s Of-
fices and the Department of
Justice Antitrust Division,
as well as investigators from
the Federal Bureau of Inves-
Samuel B. Knowles Dawn E. Stern Thomas E. Daley tigation and a broad range
of federal agencies. As of
Introduction March 2021, the PCSF reportedly had uncovered con-
The civil False Claims Act (FCA) has long been a signif- duct that led to approximately 35 related investigations.
icant enforcement tool available to government authori- To gauge the impact of Escobar and the PCSF through
ties and relators. As discussed below, the FCA prescribes an objective lens, we reviewed publicly available infor-
penalties that may be multiples of the actual damages mation related to FCA settlements for procurement-relat-
or, in rare cases, even the underlying contract value. Al- ed fraud from 2011 to 2014 and 2018 to 2020. Although
though the premise of the FCA—punishing those seek- there are discernable differences from year to year in
ing to defraud the government for personal gain—makes the number, dollar value, and type of FCA procurement
sense, many contractors believe that the government settlements, our analysis demonstrates that the overall
has turned the FCA into an enforcement mechanism landscape has not significantly changed.
under which the government seeks disproportionate For example, with the exception of three unusually
damages in cases that merely reflect gaps in contractor large settlements in 2011 and 2014, the total amount of
compliance programs or that otherwise should be ad- procurement-related settlements generally was between
dressed as a breach of contract. $200 and $300 million each year. Also, settlements relat-
In particular, under the FCA “implied certification” ed to pricing and billing allegations and multiple award
theory, the government could receive the bargained- schedule allegations consistently accounted for the great-
for benefits under the contract for a fair and reasonable est number of settlements each year—approximately
price, yet still seek to recover treble damages and penal- 70% of the total annually. These numbers indicate that,
ties based on allegedly knowing regulatory noncompli- while contractors should continue to monitor the im-
ance. In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the portant developments related to Escobar and the PCSF,
viability of the implied certification theory in Univer- they should understand that the greatest risk, by far, re-
sal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar.1 mains the traditional risk: the routine pricing and billing
Many observers hailed Escobar as a defining moment in of government contracts. Escobar has arguably provided
FCA jurisprudence, predicting significant curtailment in a more detailed roadmap for contractors seeking to miti-
enforcement actions, heavier burdens for plaintiffs, and gate FCA risks, but the enforcement machinations and
more potential defenses. resulting settlements have largely continued unabated.
More recently, in 2019, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice has focused on another type of misconduct in gov- I. Background
ernment acquisition, establishing the Procurement As relevant to this article, the FCA imposes liability
on an individual or entity that “knowingly presents, or
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
Samuel B. Knowles and Dawn E. Stern are Washington, D.C.– payment or approval” or “knowingly makes, uses, or
based partners with DLA Piper. They assist companies with a range
of government contract matters. Thomas E. Daley is an associate in causes to be made or used, a false record or statement
the same office; he is a member of the firm’s Government Contracts material to a false or fraudulent claim.”2 A party liable
practice. under the FCA is subject to a “civil penalty of not less
Volume 57, Number 2 The Procurement Lawyer 3
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.than $5,000 and not more than $10,000” per violation, request payment, but also makes specific representations
as adjusted for inflation, “plus 3 times the amount of about the goods or services provided; and second, the
damages which the Government sustains because of the defendant’s failure to disclose noncompliance with ma-
act of that person.”3 terial statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements
The FCA, however, “is not an ‘all-purpose antifraud makes those representations misleading half-truths.”14 In
statute or a vehicle for punishing garden-variety breaches reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court stated that
of contract or regulatory violations.’”4 To establish liabil- it “need not resolve whether all claims for payment im-
ity, the government must prove that there was “(1) a false plicitly represent that the billing party is legally entitled
statement or fraudulent course of conduct; (2) made with to payment” because “[t]he claims in this case do more
the requisite scienter; (3) that is material; and (4) that re- than merely demand payment.”15 The Supreme Court ex-
sults in a claim to the Government or conceals, decreas- plained that the claims at issue in Escobar “fall square-
es, or avoids an obligation to pay the Government.”5 The ly within the rule that half-truths—representations
FCA defines materiality as “having a natural tendency that state the truth only so far as it goes, while omit-
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or ting critical qualifying information—can be actionable
receipt of money or property.”6 misrepresentations.”16
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in The Supreme Court then addressed whether, under an
Escobar, the circuit courts of appeals disagreed as to the implied certification theory, a party should be liable only if
scope of the implied certification theory under the FCA,7 the party fails to disclose a contractual, statutory, or regu-
which imposes liability when a party, in requesting pay- latory violation that the government expressly designat-
ment, makes certain representations that “are mislead- ed as a condition of payment.17 The Supreme Court stated
ing because of the omission of violations of statutory, that the FCA “does not impose this limit on liability” but
regulatory, or contractual requirements.”8 As discussed that “not every undisclosed violation of an express condi-
below, the Supreme Court in Escobar recognized the va- tion of payment automatically triggers liability.”18 Rather,
lidity of the implied certification theory, provided that the focus should be on the “materiality requirement.”19
the omission is “material.”9 Many contemporaneous ob- The Supreme Court described the materiality require-
servers posited that the “new” definition of “materiality” ment as “rigorous” and “demanding.”20 A misrepresenta-
set forth in Escobar, and attendant effect on the govern- tion is not material if it is “minor or insubstantial,” as the
ment’s burden of proof, could impact the frequency and False Claims Act is not designed to punish all types of
dollar value of procurement-related FCA settlements. fraud.21 The “Government’s decision to expressly iden-
As also discussed below, another post-Escobar de- tify a provision as a condition of payment is relevant [to
velopment in the FCA context that could conceivably the materiality inquiry], but not automatically disposi-
impact the frequency and dollar-value of procurement- tive.”22 Proof of materiality may include, “but is not nec-
related FCA settlements is the establishment of the De- essarily limited to, evidence that the defendant knows
partment of Justice’s PCSF in 2019. Although the PCSF that the Government consistently refuses to pay claims
is focused on procurement-related violations of antitrust in the mine run of cases based on noncompliance with
law such as bid-rigging and price-fixing, the government the particular statutory, regulatory, or contractual re-
may assert that such a violation also forms the basis for quirement.”23 On the other hand, a misrepresentation
an FCA action if, for example, the government is fraudu- may not be material “if the Government pays a particu-
lently induced into entering a contract or the contractor lar claim in full despite its actual knowledge that certain
submits “false” invoices under a resulting contract.10 requirements were violated” or “if the Government regu-
larly pays a particular type of claim in full despite actual
A. Escobar and Its Aftereffects knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”24
In Escobar, the Supreme Court “granted certiorari to Commentators hailed Escobar as “one of the most im-
resolve the disagreement among the courts of appeals portant [FCA] decisions in recent history”25 and a “wa-
over the validity and scope of the implied false certifi- tershed moment in FCA jurisprudence”26 because of its
cation theory of liability.”11 The Supreme Court noted discussion of the implied certification theory and mate-
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit riality. Since the issuance of Escobar, courts have con-
“had rejected this theory, reasoning that only express tinued to address “open questions regarding falsity and
(or affirmative) falsehoods can render a claim ‘false or materiality.”27
fraudulent,’” while others “have accepted the [implied In addition, in 2018, the Department of Justice made
certification] theory” but differed in its application.12 changes in response to Escobar, issuing what has come
The Supreme Court determined, as an initial matter, to be known as the “Granston Memo.”28 In order to help
that “the implied false certification theory can, at least “curb[] meritless” qui tam actions, the Granston Memo
in some circumstances, provide a basis for liability.”13 Ac- provides a nonexhaustive list of factors that the gov-
cording to the Supreme Court, the implied certification ernment should consider when seeking dismissal of qui
theory may serve as a basis for liability when at least two tam actions pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A).29
conditions are satisfied: “first, the claim does not merely The Granston Memo identifies the following factors: (1)
4 The Procurement Lawyer Spring 2022
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.whether the qui tam complaint is facially lacking in merit, From the public FCA settlements, we identified the
(2) whether the action duplicates a preexisting govern- “procurement-related” settlements. Generally, a procure-
ment investigation, (3) whether the action threatens to ment-related FCA settlement is a settlement that re-
interfere with an agency’s policies or administration of its solves an alleged violation of the FCA relating to either
programs, (4) whether dismissal is necessary to protect (i) a prime contract between the government and a con-
the Department of Justice’s “litigation prerogatives,” (5) tractor or (ii) a subcontract between a prime contrac-
whether dismissal is necessary to safeguard classified infor- tor and a subcontractor that supports a prime govern-
mation and national security interests, (6) whether the ex- ment contract.39 The definition of a procurement-related
pected costs are likely to exceed any expected gains, and FCA settlement used for this article does not include, for
(7) whether there are procedural errors.30 example, settlements related to billing for prescription
B. Procurement Collusion Strike Force
In 2019, the Department of Justice created the Procure-
ment Collusion Strike Force (PCSF), which focuses “on
deterring, detecting, investigating and prosecuting anti- The full impact of the PCSF
trust crimes, such as bid-rigging conspiracies and relat-
ed fraudulent schemes, which undermine competition remains to be seen, as most
in government procurement, grant and program fund-
ing.”31 The PCSF is an interagency partnership consist- investigations are ongoing.
ing of prosecutors from the Department of Justice Anti-
trust Division, prosecutors from U.S. Attorney’s Offices,
investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General,
the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General, and medications that were not actually dispensed40 or settle-
other partner federal Offices of Inspector General.32 Ac- ments related to false claims made in connection with a
cording to Daniel Glad, the Director of the Procurement research grant.41
Collusion Strike Force, the PCSF “stands ready, able, As outlined below, for purposes of this article, we di-
and willing to investigate and prosecute procurement vided the procurement-related FCA settlements into
fraud at any level.”33 nine distinct categories. The examples provided in the
As of November 2020, the PCSF had trained over 500 list below are illustrative and do not contain an exhaus-
federal, state, and local agencies on recognizing collu- tive list of all the types of settlements that could be in-
sion risks in the procurement process.34 In 2020, the PCSF cluded in the categories.
trained over 8,000 agents, investigators, and auditors on
the heightened risks of collusion and fraud attributable to 1. Pricing and Billing: These settlements include Truth
the COVID-19 pandemic.35 The PCSF also created a new in Negotiations Act violations, inflated labor
“form of data analysis that uses sophisticated algorithms hours, misbilling of costs, billing of unallowable
that continuously learn as they are exposed to new data.”36 costs, and inaccurate rates, prices, or expenses.
According to the Department of Justice, as of March 2. Statutory Compliance: This type of settlement in-
24, 2021, the PCSF had “uncovered conduct” that led to cludes false claims made in connection with laws
approximately 35 related investigations.37 To date, the such as the Buy American Act, Trade Agreements
PCSF appears to be focused on core antitrust issues such Act, Berry Amendment, Service Contract Act,
as bid-rigging and price-fixing. The full impact of the Davis-Bacon Act, and Byrd Amendment.
PCSF, however, remains to be seen, as most of its investi- 3. Compliance with Specifications: Settlements in this
gations are ongoing.38 category relate to product substitution, failure to
meet specifications, falsified or improper testing,
C. Methodology of FCA Settlement Analysis inaccurate engineering calculations, and counter-
As discussed above, we analyzed FCA settlements feit or defective products and parts.
for calendar years 2011 through 2014, as well as 2018 4. Multiple Award Schedule: In this category, we in-
through 2020. We choose those calendar years in order cluded settlements related to alleged failures to
to determine what effect, if any, the Supreme Court’s comply with the requirements of a multiple award
2016 decision in Escobar and the creation of the PCSF schedule contract, including the Price Reductions
have had on the frequency or amounts of procurement- clause and the obligation to disclose commercial
related FCA settlements. To do this, we compiled and sales practices. This category also includes other
reviewed publicly available FCA settlements that were alleged false claims involving a multiple award
announced during those years on the Department of Jus- schedule contract, such as defective pricing and in-
tice’s website, as well as settlements announced on the accurate billing.
websites of individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices. 5. Small Business Regulation: Settlements in this
Volume 57, Number 2 The Procurement Lawyer 5
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.category relate to alleged false claims regarding paid $199,500,000 to settle allegations that it failed to
small business status and eligibility for other socio- comply with the price reductions clause of its General
economic programs. Services Administration (GSA) Schedule contract and
6. Proposal Misrepresentation: This category addresses failed to provide GSA with current, accurate, and com-
false claims made in connection with a proposal, plete information about its commercial sales practic-
such as misrepresenting a corporate relationship or es.42 At the time, the Department of Justice touted the
misrepresenting that key personnel possess active settlement as “the largest False Claims Act settlement
security clearances. that the GSA has ever obtained.”43 Earlier that year, in
7. Improper Conduct: These settlements include those April 2011, a telecommunications company paid $93.5
involving, among other things, antitrust viola- million in connection with a GSA contract. Specifical-
tions, bribery, improper hiring of a government ly, GSA alleged that the telecommunications company
official, failure to disclose a contingent fee on a overcharged the government when it invoiced GSA for
foreign military sales contract, and mislabeling various federal, state, and local taxes and surcharges in
country of origin. violation of the terms of its contract.44 Combined, these
8. Labor Qualifications: This category involves claims two settlements account for $293 million, or more than
that the contractor or subcontractor used employ- half of the total settlements paid in 2011 (and more than
ees who lacked the required qualifications, train- all of the settlements in 2013). Notably, removing these
ing, or clearances. two settlements from the analysis puts the overall 2011
9. Kickbacks: As the title indicates, this category in- payments at $245 million, which is in line with pay-
cludes FCA settlements related to a contractor ments in the other years.
providing or receiving kickbacks. Similarly, in December 2014, a subsistence contractor
pled guilty to criminal charges of major fraud against the
When a settlement did not fit into one of the above- United States in connection with a contract to supply
identified categories, we labeled it as Miscellaneous for food and water to troops in Afghanistan. In addition to
purposes of our analysis. Additionally, when a settlement pleading guilty to the criminal charges, the subsistence
related to more than one category, we assigned it to the contractor paid $146 million to settle three civil matters
category that appeared to be the primary allegation in alleging that it overcharged the Department of Defense
the case. for costs related to the transport of fuel, food, water, and
After sorting the procurement-related FCA settle- cargo in Afghanistan. This settlement accounts for over
ments into the appropriate categories, we determined the a third of the overall payments in 2014 and, once again,
frequency and monetary amounts for each of the calen- removing this settlement from the calculation puts the
dar years addressed in this article. As discussed below, we 2014 total payments at approximately $279 million,
identified noteworthy trends among the years analyzed. which is consistent with payments in the other years.
In addition to the differences in the overall totals, the
II. Analysis of Settlement Data above chart demonstrates that there were above-average
The trends observed during the 2011–2014 time period settlement totals in a few categories across each of the
and the 2018–2020 time period are summarized below. years. Once again, it appears that these differences are
Additionally, the lack of an identifiable impact related driven by a few large settlements in the relevant catego-
to the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Escobar and the ries rather than by a shift in the types of cases pursued by
PCSF on procurement-related FCA settlements, as re- the government. First, the settlements involving the soft-
flected in a comparison of procurement-related FCA set- ware company and the subsistence contractor account
tlements occurring during 2011–2014 and 2018–2020, is for the higher-than-average settlement amounts under
discussed in Section III.C below. the 2011 Multiple Award Schedule category and the 2014
Pricing and Billing category, respectively.
A. Trends from the 2011–2015 Time Period Similarly, the $122 million settlement total related to
1. Summary of 2011–2015 Settlements kickbacks in 2011 was driven by two large settlements
The chart on the facing page summarizes the procure- that year out of the Eastern District of Arkansas. Spe-
ment-related FCA settlements occurring during calen- cifically, a professional services company agreed to pay
dar years 2011–2015. $63.675 million to resolve allegations that it received
kickbacks in connection with its recommendation of cer-
2. Differences Across 2011–2015 Settlements tain hardware and software to the government, as well
The most noticeable difference among the years sum- as inflated prices and rigged bids in connection with cer-
marized in this chart is the government’s significantly tain technology contracts.45 That same year, a computer
higher recoveries in 2011 and 2014. A review of under- technology company entered into a $46 million settle-
lying data demonstrates that the difference is directly at- ment to resolve claims that its recently purchased subsid-
tributable to two large settlements in 2011 and one in iary paid kickbacks to system integrator companies in ex-
2014. Specifically, in October 2011, a software company change for recommendations that government agencies
6 The Procurement Lawyer Spring 2022
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.purchase the subsidiary’s software products.46 Moreover, settlements remained relatively consistent across the
the two largest settlements in 2015, a $75.5 million pay- years—2011, 35 settlements; 2012, 29 settlements; 2013,
ment by a cloud computing company and its distributor,47 33 settlements; 2014, 38 settlements; and 2015, 27 settle-
account for the entire Multiple Award Schedule category ments—and there does not appear to be a single, identi-
for that year, and a $30 million settlement by an informa- fiable reason for the slight increase in 2014 or the lower
tion security company (and its parent company) for alleg- number in 2015. Further, as discussed above, other than
edly failing to comply with contractual quality require- the three large settlements that drove the higher gov-
ments48 explains the higher-than-average value in the ernment recoveries in 2011 and 2014, the total amount
Compliance with Specifications category for 2015. of procurement-related settlements was consistently be-
Thus, while there were differences in the values of tween $200 million and $300 million each year. In addi-
certain settlement categories and in the total settlements tion, the average amount per settlement is relatively con-
paid during 2011–2015, the differences were driven by stant; indeed, when removing the three large settlements
large settlements rather than a trend in particular areas. in 2011 and 2014 discussed above, the average for each of
those years is $7.4 million and $7.5 million, respectively,
3. Similarities Across 2011–2015 Settlements making the range in the average settlement amount even
Although there are outliers in some of the categories smaller (from $5.8 million to $11.2 million).
across the 2011–2015 time frame, there also are nota- There also are important trends when looking across
ble instances in which the government’s recoveries re- the years within each category. Most notably, the Mul-
mained consistent. The number of procurement-related tiple Award Schedule and Pricing and Billing categories
Procurement-Related FCA Settlements, 2011–2015
2011 Total 2012 Total 2013 Total 2014 Total 2015 Total
Amount of Amount of Amount of Amount of Amount of
Category Settlements Settlements Settlements Settlements Settlements
Compliance with $26,586,493 $68,477,160 $15,799,228 $31,500,000 $73,680,000
Specs
Kickbacks $122,575,000 $3,000,000 $5,700,000 $5,227,200 $0
Labor Qualifications $400,000 $702,000 $0 $14,800,000 $12,750,000
Misc. (OCI) $0 $0 $0 $1,500,000 $0
Misc. (Supervision of $5,635,000 $0 $0 $0 $0
subcontractors)
Misc. (Unequal access $24,676,000 $0 $0 $0 $0
to information)
Multiple Award $220,240,000 $70,628,000 $72,750,000 $35,450,000 $75,500,000
Schedule
Pricing & Billing $122,506,239 $145,335,242 $78,197,500 $301,998,807 $78,825,000
Proposal $0 $0 $9,250,000 $0 $0
Misrepresentation
Small Business $5,600,000 $6,750,000 $4,969,947 $15,578,000 $9,450,000
Regulation
Statutory Compliance $9,870,216 $3,450,000 $7,063,902 $19,580,000 $9,600,042
Total $538,088,948 $298,342,402 $193,730,577 $425,634,007 $259,805,042
Total # of Settlements 35 29 33 38 27
Avg. Amt. Per $15,373,970 $10,287,669 $5,870,624 $11,200,895 $9,622,409
Settlement
Volume 57, Number 2 The Procurement Lawyer 7
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.consistently contained the highest procurement-related 2. Differences Across 2018, 2019, and 2020 Settlements
settlement payments in each year. In fact, across all years, The government’s higher recovery amounts in 2018 are
these two categories account for 70% of the total settle- due, in large part, to the differences in Improper Con-
ments paid. The third-highest category was Compliance duct settlements occurring in 2018 versus 2019 and
with Specifications. In general, the other categories repre- 2020. The government recovered significantly more in
sented small percentages of the overall recovery each year, 2018 for Improper Conduct cases ($133,339,000) than
and any spikes in a given year were attributable to a spe- in 2019 ($52,313,250) and 2020 ($88,057,577). Much
cific settlement. For example, the Statutory Compliance of this difference, as well as much of the difference in the
category was consistently less than $10 million, with the average settlement values in these years, is attributable
exception of 2014, when there was $19.5 million in settle- to three related settlements that occurred in 2018. Spe-
ments in that category. Of that total, $8.3 million was paid cifically, three South Korean companies agreed to pay a
by a medical equipment company to resolve claims that it total of $120,669,000 to settle FCA violations related to
sold products that did not comply with “country of origin” the companies’ “decade-long bid-rigging conspiracy” for
requirements.49 Similarly, while there were generally no re- fuel contracts at bases in South Korea.51 For their roles
coveries related to Unequal Access to Information in most in the alleged bid-rigging conspiracy, the three compa-
years, the $24 million recovered in 2011 relates to one pro- nies agreed to pay $42,621,000,52 $71,866,000,53 and
curement in which government officials allegedly shared $6,182,000,54 respectively. Note that these antitrust-re-
nonpublic information in order to ensure that the contrac- lated settlements preceded—and presumably motivat-
tor and its teaming partners were awarded a contract.50 ed—the establishment of the Procurement Collusion
The one exception is that the 2014 spike in settle- Strike Force in 2019.
ments related to Small Business Regulation is attributed Another area where settlements varied during 2018–
to six unrelated cases on this issue involving settlements 2020 is the Pricing and Billing category. In each of those
ranging from $400,000 to $4.5 million. Thus, unlike in years, there were approximately eight Pricing and Billing
the other areas, this outlier is not driven by one case. settlements. The government recovered $53,406,613 in
2018 and $76,382,865 in 2020 from such settlements, but
B. Trends from the 2018–2020 Time Period only recovered $13,574,056 from such settlements in 2019.
1. Summary of 2018–2020 Settlements This difference was caused by a few large settlements.
The below chart summarizes the procurement-related FCA For example, in 2018, a defense contractor agreed to pay
settlements during calendar years 2018, 2019, and 2020. $27.45 million to resolve claims that it allegedly violated
Procurement-Related FCA Settlements, 2018–2020
2018 Total 2019 Total 2020 Total
Amount of Amount of Amount of
Category Settlements Settlements Settlements
Pricing & Billing $53,406,613 $13,574,056 $76,382,865
Statutory Compliance $2,525,000 $30,500,000 $702,000
Compliance with Specifications $94,180,003 $74,939,820 $18,596,924
Multiple Award Schedule $0 $21,570,000 $26,087,789
Small Business Regulation $19,120,264 $31,424,714 $10,753,309
Proposal Misrepresentation $10,760,000 $3,000,000 $4,950,000
Improper Conduct $133,339,000 $52,313,250 $88,057,578
Labor Qualifications $0 $900,000 $962,747
Kickbacks $124,440 $2,158,718 $12,738,684
Total $313,455,320 $230,380,558 $239,231,896
Total # of Settlements 37 37 38
Avg. Amount Per Settlement $8,471,765.41 $6,226,501.57 $6,295,576.21
8 The Procurement Lawyer Spring 2022
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.the FCA by “overstating the number of hours its em- 2019 versus 2020 was that there was not a Compliance
ployees worked on two battlefield communications con- with Specifications settlement in excess of $30 million
tracts.”55 Also in 2018, a shipping services company agreed in 2020. Indeed, in 2020, the value of Compliance with
to pay $20 million to resolve FCA claims that it “knowing- Specifications settlements typically was a few million
ly overbill[ed] the U.S. Navy under contracts for ship hus- dollars or less. One Compliance with Specifications set-
banding services.”56 In 2020, a team of government con- tlement that was an outlier in 2020 concerned a mining
tractors collectively paid $57.75 million to resolve claims equipment company that paid $10,896,924 to resolve al-
that the companies “fraudulently overcharged the U.S. legations that the company had “produced and sold sub-
Department of Energy (DOE) in connection with its oper- standard steel components for installation on U.S. Navy
ation of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) proj- submarines.”61
ect” by submitting inflated labor hours and by billing for There also was some consistency among the Small
work that was not actually performed.57 Business Regulation settlements in 2018 ($19,120,263.90
The Pricing and Billing settlements in 2019 were gen- in settlements) and 2019 ($31,424,714.20). The amount
erally smaller than in 2018 and 2020; for instance, in
2019, an aerospace company paid $2.6 million “after self-
disclosing its overbilling of the government and its prime
contractors.”58 The total value of the aerospace compa-
ny’s settlement is similar to the other Pricing and Billing
settlements that occurred in 2019. While there were differences in the
Thus, while there were differences in the total values total values of certain settlement
of certain settlement categories during 2018, 2019, and
2020, the differences were primarily driven by large set- categories during 2018, 2019, and
tlements. The varying size of the settlements was a sig-
nificant factor as to why the government recovered more 2020, the differences were primarily
than $300 million in 2018 but only approximately $230
million in 2019 and 2020, respectively. driven by large settlements.
3. Similarities Across 2018, 2019, and 2020 Settlements
There were a number of similarities between the gov-
ernment’s recoveries in 2018, 2019, and 2020. As noted
above, the total number of procurement-related settle-
ments in 2018 (37 settlements), 2019 (37 settlements), the government recovered per settlement for alleged vi-
and 2020 (38 settlements) was remarkably consistent. olations of small business regulations during 2018 and
The total value of procurement-related FCA settle- 2019 was roughly $3,750,000 per settlement. There were
ments in 2019 ($230,380,558) and 2020 ($239,231,896) several higher-value Small Business Regulation settle-
was also very similar. The value of such settlements was ments during 2018 and 2019, including a settlement be-
higher in 2018 ($313,455,320), but, as discussed above, tween the government and the majority owner and
that is primarily due to a few large settlements occurring former chief executive officer of a military equipment
during 2018. supplier who agreed to pay $20 million to settle claims
In 2018 and 2019, the government recovered a sub- that the former chief executive officer “caused [the com-
stantial amount from settlements related to Compliance pany] to falsely represent that it qualified as a small busi-
with Specifications, recovering $94,180,003 in 2018 and ness concern when it failed to do so.”62
$74,939,820 in 2019. The government had at least one As with the Compliance with Specifications settle-
Compliance with Specifications settlement in excess of ments, the value of the Small Business Regulation set-
$30 million in both 2018 and 2019. In 2018, the govern- tlements again dipped in 2020. The government only
ment executed a settlement with a Japanese company recovered $10,753,309 from Small Business Regulation
and its American subsidiary under which the companies settlements in 2020, even though there were a higher
agreed to pay $66 million to resolve claims that the com- number of such settlements in 2020 than in either 2018
panies violated the FCA by selling “defective Zylon fiber or 2019. In fact, in 2020, there were multiple Small Busi-
used in bullet proof vests.”59 In 2019, a contractor agreed ness Regulation settlements with values of less than
to pay $34.6 million to resolve claims that it allegedly $750,000. Examples of those settlements include a settle-
“caus[ed] a government contractor to invoice [the Missile ment in which a joint venture paid $310,000 to resolve
Defense Agency] and NASA for aluminum extrusions claims that it took “advantage of the Disadvantaged
that did not comply with contract specifications.”60 Business Enterprise (DBE) program”63 and a settlement
The value of Compliance with Specifications settle- in which an engineering company and two of its em-
ments dipped in 2020 to $18,596,924. The main differ- ployees paid $672,352 to settle allegations that the com-
ence between the value of these settlements in 2018 and pany improperly obtained funds from the Small Business
Volume 57, Number 2 The Procurement Lawyer 9
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.Innovation Research and Small Business Technology that the Department of Justice continues to scrutinize
Transfer programs.64 and hold contractors accountable based on a broad range
One other area where there was some consistency of alleged improprieties to the tune of hundreds of mil-
among the settlements in 2018–2020 was the Proposal lions of dollars annually. Thus, the legislative push to
Misrepresentation category. The government recovered a amend the FCA through the False Claims Amendments
relatively modest amount in proposal misrepresentation Act of 2021,67 is not supported by the post-Escobar settle-
settlements in 2018 ($10,760,000), 2019 ($3,000,000), and ment data; rather, the legislation appears to be a solution
2020 ($4,950,000). These settlements typically involved in search of a problem.
a contractor paying to resolve claims that the contractor The settlement data also do not reflect any impact, as
misrepresented the materials it would use under a con- yet, of the PCSF. This is not surprising, of course, as the
tract.65 There also were settlements in which a contrac- PCSF was formed in 2019 and was undoubtedly slowed in
tor paid to resolve allegations that it misrepresented, in 2020 and beyond by the COVID-19 pandemic. It is not
its proposal, that it did not have an organizational con- hard to imagine, however, that the PCSF will result in
flict of interest.66 an increased number of antitrust-related settlements in
the Improper Conduct category in the future, similar to
C. Impact of Escobar and the Procurement Collusion Strike those that occurred in 2018. What is unclear is wheth-
Force on Procurement-Related FCA Settlements er such an increase also will increase the government’s
It is often the case that contemporaneous predictions of total recoveries in future years or, instead, simply reflect
paradigm shifts and far-reaching, or “watershed,” impli- a realignment of enforcement priorities without a net in-
cations tied to a single event turn out to be overstated. crease in total recoveries.
With approximately five years of perspective since Escobar, it The data suggest that annual fluctuations in settle-
is perhaps early to draw a definitive conclusion as to the ment amounts, numbers of settlements, average settle-
long-term significance of the case, but the settlement ment amounts, and types of FCA allegations settled are
attributable to the distinct complexities of individu-
al FCA cases and to prosecutorial discretion. As noted
above, large settlements can skew averages and dispro-
portionately affect metrics for specific years and catego-
ries, and it is these large settlements that are responsible
Predictions from the plaintiff’s bar for most of the material fluctuations in FCA settlement
statistics over time. Although tempting to speculate
that Escobar would diminish the or draw inferences as to the impact of Escobar and the
government’s FCA enforcement PCSF, the available information does not show a clear
connection. Rather, the settlement data suggest a consis-
actions have not come to fruition. tent number of FCA settlements each year, across a rela-
tively consistent set of compliance issues, with substan-
tial recoveries by the government.
III. Conclusion
In sum, Escobar was a significant decision for FCA juris-
data that we reviewed suggest that the impact of Esco- prudence, and creation of the PCSF was a noteworthy en-
bar does not lie in reduced or materially different FCA forcement focus that likely will increase antitrust-related
enforcement patterns. Escobar has justly received much FCA settlements in the future. However, based on the
attention from the contractor community based on its data we reviewed from 2011 to 2014 and 2018 to 2020, nei-
careful consideration of the “implied certification” theo- ther has yet had a significant impact on the amount or fre-
ry and its delineation of factors relevant to a materiality quency of procurement-related FCA settlements.
determination. Still, as measured by FCA settlements,
life under the FCA for federal contractors and govern- Endnotes
ment enforcement authorities is proceeding, in many re- 1. 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998 (2016).
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A)–(B).
spects, without substantial change. 3. Id. § 3729(a)(1).
Notably, predictions from the plaintiff’s bar that Esco- 4. United States ex rel. Janssen v. Lawrence Mem’l Hosp., 949
bar would diminish the government’s FCA enforcement F.3d 533, 540 (10th Cir.) (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc.
actions have not come to fruition. As the post-Escobar v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016)), cert. de-
settlement information illustrates, the FCA continues nied, 141 S. Ct. 376 (2020).
5. Id. at 539 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
to be a powerful enforcement tool, and initiatives such 6. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4). The False Claims Amendments
as the PCSF and the recent creation of the Civil Cy- Act of 2021 (S. 2428, 117th Congress (2021)), which current-
ber-Fraud Initiative confirm the government’s continu- ly is awaiting a vote in the Senate, proposes to amend the FCA
ing commitment to such enforcement. The data indicate by, among other things, changing the statutory definition of
10 The Procurement Lawyer Spring 2022
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.“materiality.” The proposed amendment seeks to add language justice-department-announces-procurement-collusion-strike-
providing that, “[i]n determining materiality, the decision of the force-coordinated-national-response.
Government to forego a refund or to pay a claim despite actual 32. Id.
knowledge of fraud or falsity shall not be considered dispositive if 33. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Director of the Procure-
other reasons exist for the decision of the Government with re- ment Collusion Strike Force Daniel Glad Delivers Remarks at
spect to such refund or payment.” ABA Section of Public Contract Law’s Public Procurement Sym-
7. Jason M. Crawford & Brian Tully McLaughlin, Materiality posium (Oct. 13, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/
Rules! Escobar Changes the Game, 59 Gov’t Contractor, no. 18, director-procurement-collusion-strike-force-daniel-glad-deliv-
May 10, 2017, ¶ 135. ers-remarks-aba-section (Remarks as Prepared for Delivery: The
8. United States v. Tilton, 880 F.3d 1302, 1313 (11th Cir. 2018). Procurement Collusion Strike Force: A Whole-of-Government
9. Id. Approach to Combating a Whole-of-Government Problem).
10. Courts have stated that fraud-in-the-inducement is a well- 34. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney Gen-
established theory for recovering damages under the FCA. See In eral Makan Delrahim Delivers Remarks on the Future of Antitrust
re Baycol Prod. Litig., 732 F.3d 869, 876 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The Su- (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-at-
preme Court first recognized fraud-in-the-inducement as a viable torney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-future-antitrust
theory of FCA liability” in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 (Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the American Bar Associa-
U.S. 537 (1943)). Recently, however, a judge of the U.S. Court of tion Antitrust Law Section Fall Forum: “Here I Go Again”: New
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a concurring Developments for the Future of the Antitrust Division).
opinion questioning whether fraud-in-the-inducement was a valid 35. Id.
theory under the FCA, as the “text of the FCA does not readily sug- 36. Id.
gest liability for fraudulent inducement as a separate cause of ac- 37. PCSF Expansion and Early Success, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
tion.” See United States ex rel. Cimino v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 3 https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-
F.4th 412, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Rao, J., concurring). spring-2021/pcsf-expansion-and-early-success (Mar. 24, 2021).
11. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Esco- 38. The Department of Justice recently announced the cre-
bar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1998 (2016). ation of a Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative. The goal of this initiative
12. Id. at 1998–99. is to “utilize the False Claims Act to pursue cybersecurity related
13. Id. at 1999. fraud by government contractors and grant recipients.” Press Re-
14. Id. at 2001. lease, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Deputy Attorney General Lisa O. Mona-
15. Id. at 2000. co Announces New Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative (Oct. 6, 2021),
16. Id.; see also id. at 2000–01 (“By using payment and other https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/deputy-attorney-general-lisa-o-
codes that conveyed this information without disclosing Ar- monaco-announces-new-civil-cyber-fraud-initiative. The impact
bour’s many violations of basic staff and licensing requirements of this initiative remains to be seen, but its creation opens the pos-
for mental health facilities, Universal Health’s claims constituted sibility that DOJ will pursue this as another area for FCA exposure
misrepresentations.”). for government contractors under the implied certification theory.
17. Id. at 2001. 39. Our scope of review did not include court-issued judgments
18. Id. in which the government recovered damages as a result of viola-
19. Id. tions of the FCA.
20. Id. at 2003. 40. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Pa., Philadel-
21. Id.; see also id. at 2004 (“We emphasize, however, that phia-Based Pharmacy Owners Agree to Pay $400,000 to Resolve
the False Claims Act is not a means of imposing treble damag- False Claims Act Liability (July 23, 2019), https://www.justice.
es and other penalties for insignificant regulatory or contractual gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-based-pharmacy-owners-agree-
violations.”). pay-400000-resolve-false-claims-act-liability.
22. Id. at 2003. 41. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Duke University to Pay
23. Id. U.S. $112.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Re-
24. Id. at 2003–04. lated to Scientific Research Misconduct (Mar. 25, 2019), https://
25. David L. Douglass & Robert T. Rhoad, Lessons Learned on the www.justice.gov/opa/pr/duke-university-agrees-pay-us-1125-mil-
Second Anniversary of Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. lion-settle-false-claims-act-allegations-related.
Escobar, 60 Gov’t Contractor, no. 21, June 6, 2018, ¶ 174. 42. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Oracle Agrees to Pay
26. Andy Liu & Robert T. Rhoad, The False Claims Act: Yesterday, U.S. $199.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Lawsuit (Oct.
Today and Tomorrow—What a Long Strange Trip It’s Been—Part II— 6, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oracle-agrees-pay-us-
Today, 61 Gov’t Contractor, no. 39, Oct. 23, 2019, ¶ 309. 1995-million-resolve-false-claims-act-lawsuit. At a high level, the
27. Joshua S. Bolian, Escobar and the False Claims Act: Clearer Price Reductions clause requires contractors to disclose to GSA
After a Year of Interpretation, Am. Bar Ass’n: Com. & Bus. Litig., discounts given to its commercial customers and to pass along re-
Dec. 18, 2017, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/ ductions in such discounts to its government customers.
committees/commercial-business/articles/2017/fall2017-escobar- 43. Id.
false-claims-act-clearer-after-year-interpretation/. 44. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Verizon Communications
28. See Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Dir., Com. Pays United States $93.5 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Al-
Litig. Branch, Fraud Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Factors for Evalu- legations (Apr. 5, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/verizon-
ating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A) (Jan. 10, communications-pays-united-states-935-million-resolve-false-
2018), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4358602/Me- claims-act-allegations.
mo-for-Evaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf. 45. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Accenture Pays
29. Id. U.S. $63.675 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allega-
30. Id. tions (Sept. 12, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
31. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department accenture-pays-us-63675-million-settle-false-claims-act-allegations.
Announces Procurement Collusion Strike Force: A Coordi- 46. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Oracle America to Pay
nated National Response to Combat Antitrust Crimes and United States $46 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allega-
Related Schemes in Government Procurement, Grant and Pro- tions Against Sun Microsystems (Jan. 31, 2011), https://www.
gram Funding (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ continued on page 26
Volume 57, Number 2 The Procurement Lawyer 11
Published in The Procurement Lawyer, Volume 57, Number 2, Spring 2022. © 2022 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion
thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.Just., https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1111226/
download (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
54. Hanjin Transp. Co., Ltd. Settlement Agreement, U.S. Dep’t
of Just., https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1111221/
download (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Northrop Grumman Sys-
tems Corporation to Pay $27.45 Million to Settle False Claims
Act Allegations (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
northrop-grumman-systems-corporation-pay-2745-million-set-
tle-false-claims-act-allegations.
56. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., D.C., United States Settles
Lawsuit Alleging That Contractor Falsely Overcharged the Unit-
ed States Navy for Ship Husbanding Services (May 29, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/united-states-settles-lawsuit-
alleging-contractor-falsely-overcharged-united-states-navy.
57. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Wash., Bechtel &
Aecom, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Contractors, Agree to
Pay $57.75 Million to Resolve Claims of Time Charging Fraud at
Doe’s Hanford Waste Treatment Plant (Sept. 22, 2020), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-edwa/pr/bechtel-aecom-us-department-en-
ergy-doe-contractors-agree-pay-5775-million-resolve-0.
58. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of N.Y., Long Island
Aerospace and Defense Contractor Agrees to Repay $2.6 Million
in Overbillings to the United States (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.
justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/long-island-aerospace-and-defense-con-
tractor-agrees-repay-26-million-overbillings.
59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Japanese Fiber Manufac-
turer to Pay $66 Million for Alleged False Claims Related to De-
fective Bullet Proof Vest (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/
IMPACT OF ESCOBAR opa/pr/japanese-fiber-manufacturer-pay-66-million-alleged-false-
continued from page 11 claims-related-defective-bullet.
60. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Va., Com-
justice.gov/opa/pr/oracle-america-pay-united-states-46-million- pany Agrees to $46 Million Penalty for Falsifying Test Re-
resolve-false-claims-act-allegations-against-sun. sults (Apr. 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/
47. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., VMWare and Carahsoft company-agrees-46-million-penalty-falsifying-test-results.
Agree to Pay $75.5 Million to Settle Claims That They Con- 61. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., W. Dist. of Wash., Bradken
cealed Commercial Pricing and Overcharged the Government Inc. Pays $10.8 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations
(June 30, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/vmware-and- and Enters into Deferred Prosecution Agreement (June 15, 2020),
carahsoft-agree-pay-755-million-settle-claims-they-concealed- https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/bradken-inc-pays-108-mil-
commercial-pricing. lion-settle-false-claims-act-allegations-and-enters-deferred.
48. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Investigations Ser- 62. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former CEO of Virginia-
vices Agrees to Forego at Least $30 Million to Settle False Claims Based Defense Contractor Agrees to Pay $20 Million to Settle
Act Allegations (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ False Claims Act Allegations Related to Fraudulent Procurement
us-investigations-services-agrees-forego-least-30-million-settle- of Small Business Contracts (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.
false-claims-act-allegations. gov/opa/pr/former-ceo-virginia-based-defense-contractor-agrees-
49. Igor Kossov, Smith & Nephew to Pay $8M pay-20-million-settle-false-claims-act.
to Settle FCA Suit with VA, Law360 (Sept. 3, 63. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., E. Dist. of Pa., Two Compa-
2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/573721/ nies in Business Together Agree to Pay $310,000 to Resolve DBE
smith-nephew-to-pay-8m-to-settle-fca-suit-with-va. Fraud Allegations Arising from Platt Memorial Bridge Paint-
50. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., SAIC and Others to Pay ing Project (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/
U.S. More Than $22.6 Million to Resolve False Claims Allega- pr/two-companies-business-together-agree-pay-310000-resolve-
tions (Sept. 29, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/saic-and- dbe-fraud-allegations-arising.
others-pay-us-more-226-million-resolve-false-claims-allegations; 64. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of Kan., Engineering
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Lockheed Martin to Pay $2 Mil- Firm in Kansas to Pay $672,352 to Settle False Claims Allegations
lion to Resolve Allegations Resulting from Fraudulent Submission (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ks/pr/engineering-
of Government Contract (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/ firm-kansas-pay-672352-settle-false-claims-allegations.
opa/pr/lockheed-martin-pay-2-million-resolve-allegations-result- 65. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Asphalt Contrac-
ing-fraudulent-submission-government. tor to Pay $4.25 Million to Settle Claims That It Misled the Gov-
51. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Three South Korean ernment as to the Materials Used to Pave Road (Sept. 10, 2020),
Companies Agree to Plead Guilty and to Enter into Civil Settle- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/asphalt-contractor-pay-425-mil-
ments for Rigging Bids on United States Department of Defense lion-settle-claims-it-misled-government-materials-used-pave.
Fuel Supply Contracts (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ 66. See Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Off., Dist. of Colo., U.S. At-
opa/pr/three-south-korean-companies-agree-plead-guilty-and-en- torney Announces $110,000 Settlement with Tech Company and
ter-civil-settlements-rigging-bids. Its CEO to Resolve Allegations of False Claims on Defense Pro-
52. GS Caltex Corp. Settlement Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of Just., curement Contract (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1111231/download co/pr/us-attorney-announces-110000-settlement-tech-company-
(last visited Nov. 5, 2020). and-its-ceo-resolve-allegations.
53. SK Energy Co., Ltd. Settlement Agreement, U.S. Dep’t of 67. S. 2428, 117th Cong. (2021).
26 The Procurement Lawyer Spring 2022
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thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.You can also read
