SYRIAN CONFLICT: COMPLEXITIES AND PROSPECTS AHEAD - INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP) WORKING PAPER - Institut für Sicherheit
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
INSTITUTE FOR SECURITY POLICY (ISP)
WORKING PAPER
SYRIAN CONFLICT:
COMPLEXITIES AND
PROSPECTS AHEAD
by Alexey KHLEBNIKOV
VIENNA 2021TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 3
II. MILITARY DIMENSION .................................................................................................... 4
III. POLITICAL DIMENSION ................................................................................................... 6
IV. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION ........................................................................................ 9
V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION ....................................................................................12
VI. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................14
1ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Alexey Khlebnikov is a political risk analyst and consultant with extensive research and
consultancy experience. He is a Research Fellow at Eurasian Strategies, a MENA expert at
the Russian International Affairs Council as well as a strategic advisor to Doctors without
borders mission in Moscow. Alexey did numerous research stays in the region including in
Syria, Israel and Egypt. He was an Edmund Muskie fellow (2012-2014) at the University of
Minnesota Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs and a research fellow at SAIS Johns
Hopkins University (2013), Central European University (2012) and the Moshe Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern (2011) and African Studies of Tel Aviv University. In 2014-2017
he was the senior editor at analytical publication Russia Direct.
2I. INTRODUCTION
There is already nine years of the conflict in Syria left behind, and it is still far from its final
settlement. Although the intensity and scale of military activities have significantly
decreased, the overall situation in the country remains very unstable and is complicated by
the whole set of factors: military, political, international, socio-economic. That said, Syria
jumped into 2021 with solid baggage of issues that require more attention now than
previously, as they are becoming more urgent and controversial for all actors involved.
The current state of the Syrian conflict may be analyzed through dividing it into four key
dimensions – military, political, international, and socio-economic – each having a set of
issues and challenges which thus far complicating the conflict’s settlement.
3II. MILITARY DIMENSION
Despite the fact that the military stage of the conflict is winding down, it still remains among
the key issues for the parties involved. De facto Syria is currently divided into three zones
each of which with a foreign military presence and in 2021 there is little to no prospect for
changing such a situation.
The first zone is controlled by the government forces and accounts for about 62-65% of the
entire territory. Although Russian and Iranian/pro-Iranian forces are present in these areas,
they do it upon the Syrian government official request. Both Moscow and Tehran have no
intention to leave Syria or scale down their military presence neither in 2021 nor in the
following years. This factor also prevents other states – Turkey and the USA – from pulling
out from Syria.
The second zone is controlled by Kurds-dominated and US-backed Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF) who hold about 30% of the country, mainly east and northeast Syria. In
addition, US forces also control an area around al-Tanf in southeast Syria on the border with
Jordan and Iraq, in addition to their military presence in the country’s east and northeast.
The third zone is controlled by Turkey and Turkey-backed Syrian opposition armed groups.
These territories are de facto occupied by Ankara, account for about 4% of the country, and
include bigger part of Idlib, northern Aleppo and northern Hasakah provinces. Turkish
forces are present on the ground having their own observation posts, with about 10,000-
15,000soldiers in Idlib governorate,1 over 10,000 units of military hardware and even air-
1
Turkey set to consolidate its presence in Idlib. 21.10.2020 // TRT World //
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/turkey-set-to-consolidate-its-presence-in-idlib-40736
4defence systems 2 . In addition, the Turkish military is also present in a buffer zone in
northeast Syria established in October 2019 providing support to the Syrian armed groups
within the Syrian National Army.
So far, none of the mentioned-above foreign forces is going to leave Syrian territory and
there is no clarity on when it is going to happen. Therefore, the situation on the ground is far
from being in line with declared principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and, thus
far, there is no prospect for re-establishing country’s unity. Therefore, despite localization of
the military activities in Syria, the risk of a large-scale military escalation in 2021 still exists.
Another important problem in the military dimension is Israeli attacks on the Iranian/pro-
Iranian targets inside Syria. Presence of Iranian forces in Syria, deployment of its missiles to
the country or their transfer to Hezbollah serve as a legitimate reason for Israel to launch
airstrikes on the Syrian territory. This situation has several negative impacts. First, it creates
additional risks of harming Russian military advisors who are present in the majority of
units within the Syrian Arab Army. Second, it brings Iranian military presence in Syria and
risks related to that to a spotlight which is also negatively perceived in the US and Europe
who use this issue to pressure Iran. Third, it allows Israel to promote anti-Iranian and anti-
Syrian rhetoric internationally, exposing their alleged plans to harm the state of Israel, thus
lowering chances for international relegitimization of Damascus.
2
Turkey’s military movement | Forces continue withdrawing from Murek base, and bring in 15 new vehicles
to “de-escalation zone”. 20.10.2020 // Syrian Observatory for Human Rights //
https://www.syriahr.com/en/188942/
5III. POLITICAL DIMENSION
Although Russian foreign ministry notes “positive dynamic” in work of the Syrian
Constitutional Committee and its Drafting Commission, the real progress on political track
is yet to come.3 The progress depends not only on the two parties’ ability to compromise but
also on a whole set of factors that influence their behaviour.
First, is the Syrian government’s inflexibility on political reforms and excessive demands of
the opposition. Undoubtedly, Damascus views itself victorious and doesn’t feel obliged to
make concessions to the defeated side which is the opposition. But at the same time, if the
Syrian government wants ultimately to launch a genuine intra-Syrian reconciliation process
it needs to become more flexible in order to reach compromises. Here is some demographic
data which gives an understanding of why Damascus will inevitably have to deal with its
political opponents.
The pre-war population of Syria was about 21 million. According to the UN data, in 2020 it
is estimated at about 17.6 mln living inside the country and about 6.6 mln refugees residing
abroad which makes a total of 24.2 mln Syrians residing in the country and those who left
during the war years.4 Out of 17.6 mln in Syria, about 6 mln live outside of the government-
3
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s opening remarks and answers to media questions at a joint news conference
following talks with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of the Syrian Arab Republic Faisal Mekdad,
Moscow. 1712.2020 // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation //
https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/conflicts/-
/asset_publisher/xIEMTQ3OvzcA/content/id/4493285?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA&_101_I
NSTANCE_xIEMTQ3OvzcA_languageId=en_GB
4
USA for UNHCR. Syria Refugee Crisis // https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/syria/
6held areas – about 3 mln in Idlib and about 3 mln in Kurdish-held areas.5 Therefore, about
11.6 mln Syrians live in government-controlled areas. It means that 65% of Syrians who
reside in the country live in the government-controlled areas, and 47% of all Syrians
including those who fled the country. This is to say, that in order to launch a genuine intra-
Syrian reconciliation process Damascus inevitably needs to build relations with its political
opponents/rivals. The Syrian government still has to reconcile at least six million of its
citizens who live inside the country in order to reunite Syria. Otherwise, it is going to be hard
to reclaim legitimacy domestically and internationally. This is why, it is hard to expect that
2021 Syrian presidential elections, which are planned to be conducted just in Damascus-
controlled areas, will help relegitimization of the regime and contribute to intra-Syrian
reconciliation.
In addition, the reconciliation process and return of the refugees are also connected to
Damascus ability to create necessary conditions for those processes. At the moment
Damascus has neither enough capacity nor will to do that.
At the same time, the Syrian opposition still remains fragmented and unable to create a
united front which legitimately represents all Syrians who are out of Damascus control (who
are 6.6 mln refugees and 6 mln of Syrians living in Syria out of the government-controlled
areas). With that, the opposition has high expectations and demands while at the same time
quite limited instruments to affect the situation on the ground. Such setting naturally
obstructs progress in the work of the Constitutional Committee and in the political track.
5
"Targeting Life in Idlib". Syrian and Russian Strikes on Civilian Infrastructure. 15.10.2020 // Human Rights
Watch // https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/10/15/targeting-life-idlib/syrian-and-russian-strikes-civilian-
infrastructure#
7The second factor is the lack of success inside officially reconciled areas, namely south Syria,
which is going through quite volatile time after it was back under the government control.6
The very limited success of Russian-sponsored attempts to smoothen the reconciliation
process in southern Syria (Deraa, Suwaida, Quneitra provinces) testifies to the complexities
of such post-conflict processes.
The third factor which complicates the political process is the absence of progress in talks
between Damascus and Syrian Kurds who control about 30% of the Syrian territory with
major oil fields as well as with over 40% of all agricultural lands. Without re-integrating
these territories back and striking an agreement with Kurds, Damascus won’t be able to
reunite the country, to catalyze its economic revival and to create a solid foundation for post-
conflict reconstruction.
Moreover, the political process is tightly connected to the economic dimension as much
needed international aid and reconstruction funds will flow to Syria under the condition of
the ongoing and genuine political process which is de facto absent.
6
Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria. 19.11.2020 // Syria Transition Challenges Project //
Geneva Centre for Security Policy // https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/russias-increasing-stalemate-
southwest-syria?fbclid=IwAR1wOySiAYKox2hiVuzXMTK532dakKaqhC-kvVugFaiPo_OouhAFGdPwYrE
8IV. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
The conflict in Syria has become internationalized since the first months of 2012 involving
various regional and international actors. Today, policies and behaviour of these actors have
an important influence on the conflict’s flow, while the lack of international consensus on
how to deal with Syria prevents the conflict from being settled and the country from being
reconstructed.
First, the important factor is the risk of rising tensions between different powers involved in
Syria: Russia, Turkey, Iran, the USA, Israel.
Despite leaders’ convincingly-friendly rhetoric, Russia and Turkey still have different views
on Idlib, north Aleppo, northeastern Syria. Turkish support to the Syrian opposition and
approach to the Kurdish issue are also among issues where Moscow and Ankara do not
always see eye to eye. Although Moscow and Ankara managed to find the formula which
allows them so far to avoid confrontation, there is still enough room for more difficulties to
appear in 2021.
With the military phase of the conflict coming to an end, there is an increased number of
topics which become more problematic for Russia and Iran in Syria.7 For example, among
these issues are excessive present of the Iranian military in south Syria which continuously
provokes Israeli air-strikes, increased influence of Iranian military advisors within Syrian
Arab Army and in paramilitary structures, which hinders Russian attempts to reform and
7
Russia and Iran in Syria and Beyond: Challenges Ahead. 22.12.2020 // Russian International Affairs Council
(RIAC) //
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/activity/workingpapers/russia-and-iran-in-syria-and-beyond-challenges-
ahead/?fbclid=IwAR1CSH-WYZ047W-xr1EVMfWKd_OU0pl3scN3PKhsuwcgG78q1rCMNn3hvKY
9restructure Syrian armed forces.8 In addition, there is rising competition in the economic
sphere between Moscow and Tehran, different approaches to the political process in Syria,
and uncomfortable for Tehran Russia-Israel warm relations which complicate Russia-Iran
coordination in Syria.9 This is not to say, that the two countries will stop their coordination
in Syria or their cooperation in the country is doomed to fail, but to underline that there are
more complications down the road.
Russia and the USA also have enough disagreements which rise risks of escalation in Syria.
Over the last year, there were numerous cases of so-called “desert rallies” between Russian
military police and US military patrols who were trying to block each other while following
their patrolling routes in northeastern Syria.10 Luckily, so far it did not lead to any serious
incident or confrontation, but the risk is still there.
The second factor is US Syria policy under Biden. There is a lot of questions about the new
administration approach vis-à-vis Damascus and Syrian Kurds, Turkey and Iran. Biden’s
desire to re-engage with Tehran to revive JCPOA may well affect Iran’s positions on Syria or
quite the opposite – failure to revive the nuclear deal may cause Iran’s harsher stance in the
region, including in Syria.11 Washington also plans to increase its help to the Syrian Kurds
which potentially may cause more frictions between Turkey and Kurds, Turkey and the USA.
8
Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria. 19.11.2020 // Syria Transition Challenges Project //
Geneva Centre for Security Policy // https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/russias-increasing-stalemate-
southwest-syria?fbclid=IwAR1wOySiAYKox2hiVuzXMTK532dakKaqhC-kvVugFaiPo_OouhAFGdPwYrE
9
Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance? An Interim Report. Issue Brief.
June 2019 // Atlantic Council. Rafik Hariri Center For The Middle East //
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/06/Russia_and_Iran_in_Syria_a_Random_Partnership_or_an_Enduring_Alliance.p
df
10
Russia blames US for military convoy crash in Syria. // Financial Times //
https://www.ft.com/content/d170d2b6-80cb-4011-97fc-f8ff3d1a94bb
11
Biden Interview On Reviving Iran Nuclear Deal: ‘Hard, But Yeah’. 02.12.2020 // Iran International //
https://iranintl.com/en/world/biden-interview-reviving-iran-nuclear-deal-‘hard-yeah’
10Ankara is quite vocal about its attitude towards Kurdish YPG forces and, so far, all attempts
to find a compromise which could satisfy all parties – Turks, Kurds and Americans – have
not succeeded. On top of that, US military presence in Kurdish areas in Syria prevents
Moscow and Damascus from striking a deal with the Kurds and uniting the country. Thus,
the USA move on Syria-related issues in 2021 will definitely have an impact on the conflict’s
flow, not necessarily making it easier to resolve.
The third factor which also has an important influence on the Syrian crisis is the future of
intra-Arab reconciliation on Syria. In other words, Arab nations’ ability to rebuild relations
with Damascus will play a key role in Syria’s economic and political reconstruction. In order
to accelerate economic reconstruction, Syria needs to be back into the Arab family and
regional market which can provide serious resources. This factor is also re-enforced by the
nature of new US administration approach to the Arab countries in general: whether
Washington will sanction its Arab partners for restoring economic and political ties with
Damascus; will it continue to put additional economic and political obstacles for intra-Arab
reconciliation on Syria; or will it clearly formulate realistic condition about what Damascus
has to do in order to get sanctions lifted. There is a lot of uncertainty and variables that are
hard to predict. Hopefully, 2021 and first steps of Biden’s Middle East policy will add some
clarity.
11V. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Nine years of the war, domestic economic problems, Western sanctions, instability and
crisis in Lebanon, continuous territorial disintegration of the country – all of these factors
made the current socio-economic situation in Syria immensely difficult. In 2020 COVID-19
pandemic together with the US Caesar Act and forest fires exacerbated it even further.
It is clear that the Syrian government doesn’t have the capacity and domestic resources to
cope with this crisis on their own. It is also clear, that there are a lot of obstacles, including
regional and international, that prevent foreign aid and sources to flow into Syria somehow
easing the life of ordinary citizens. Together with that, Damascus’ inflexibility and slow
progress on political track withhold evolution of the Western approach to economic aid to
Syria which could bring some economic relief. Without regional and international funds
reconstruction of Syria as an economically viable and politically stable state is simply
unrealistic and unsustainable. Russia and Iran, that experience their own economic
problems, cannot provide needed funds, while China is unwilling to chip in a lot due to
numerous risks, including the risk of being sanctioned by the USA. As a result, the socio-
economic situation in Syria is dire and there is a little hope that in 2021 it will dramatically
change.
That said, ongoing territorial fragmentation of Syria remains a major obstacle for improving
the current economic and social situation in the country. As long as Syria remains divided
into de-facto three areas – Damascus-controlled territories, Turkey-occupied northwest and
north of the country, and US-Kurds controlled northeast and east of Syria – the country won’t
be able to start a genuine process of recovery. Until Syria restores its territorial integrity and
economic ties within the country any economic recovery seems extremely problematic.
12Reconciliation with some Arab states (UAE and Bahrain) which slowly started in 2018 is
another important condition for Syrian economic and social revival. Syria has to be
reintegrated back into the Arab market and family to fully benefit from the investments and
aid its Arab peers can provide. Although US-authored Caesar Act created additional
obstacles for the Arab countries to re-engage with Damascus, they will likely continue this
trend as Syria is important for them not only form the economic perspective but also as a
playground to deter Iran and Turkey.
13VI. CONCLUSION
All four dimensions of the Syrian conflict are intertwined and present different sides of one
conflict which requires a very complex approach to their solution.
To start the Syrian economy’s revival, Damascus needs to restore the territorial integrity of
the state, lift Western sanctions and attract foreign sponsors. For that, it needs to strike deals
with Kurds, Ankara and Washington making the latter leave the country, to convince the US
and EU to lift sanctions and allow economic aid to flow in. To make it happen Damascus will
be required to undertake political reforms, and limit Iran’s presence in Syria, which it is
unlikely to do. And in order to do all of this the Syrian government needs to coordinate with
Russia and Iran who have their own agendas and priorities in Syria which makes it almost
impossible to find a middle ground for everyone.
Although it looks quite unrealistic to solve all of the existing major issues and challenges in
2021, it is helpful to understand how one is connected to another and try to deconstruct the
most essential issues and solve them, which will help to catalyze resolution of the others.
This year is going to be another difficult year for Syria but hopefully, it will add more clarity
to the steps all actors involved need to take.
14You can also read
