SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING DURING ELECTIONS - CASES AND BEST PRACTICE TO INFORM ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS - Open Society Foundations
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SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING DURING ELECTIONS CASES AND BEST PRACTICE TO INFORM ELECTORAL OBSERVATION MISSIONS
AUTHORS
Rafael Schmuziger Goldzweig
Bruno Lupion
Michael Meyer-Resende
FOREWORD BY
Iskra Kirova and Susan Morgan
EDITOR
Ros Taylor
© 2019 Open Society Foundations
uic b n dog.
This publication is available as a PDF on the Open Society Foundations website under a Creative
Commons license that allows copying and distributing the publication, only in its entirety, as long as
it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations and used for noncommercial educational or public
policy purposes. Photographs may not be used separately from the publication.
Cover photo: © Geert Vanden Wijngaert/Bloomberg/Getty
opensocietyfoundations.orgExperiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
CONTENTS
3 FOREWORD
5 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
7 INTRODUCTION
9 CONTEXT
9 Threats to electoral integrity in social media
9 The framework of international election observation
10 The Declaration of Principles of International Election Observation
12 WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER MISSIONS DOING ON SOCIAL
MEDIA DISCOURSE?
14 WHAT ARE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DOING?
17 WHAT ARE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS DOING?
17 European civil society
19 A glimpse beyond Europe
21 Non-government initiatives: Europe & beyond
23 Topics/objects of analysis
24 Platforms
26 Monitoring tools
1Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
27 GUIDELINES FOR EOMS
27 Monitoring of social media vs traditional media
29 Cooperation between actors and information exchange partnerships
29 Dealing with data
29 Working in different contexts
31 SWOT analysis for EOMs in social media monitoring
32 RECOMMENDATIONS
35 ANNEX 1: SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION
ORGANIZATIONS
36 ANNEX 2: BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE INITIATIVES ANALYSED
(based on interviews)
36 a. Non-governmental initiatives
40 b. Governmental/inter-governmental initiatives
2Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
FOREWORD
Concern over online interference in elections is now parties can easily become manipulative too – whether
widespread – from the fallout of the Cambridge it is the use of bots and paid trolls to engineer false
Analytica scandal to the pernicious effects debates and narratives, the misuse of personal data
messaging apps have had in elections in Kenya or or the targeting of political advertising at voters.
Brazil. Yet regulatory and monitoring efforts have Some of this activity might be illegal, but much of it is
lagged behind in addressing the challenges of how unregulated – to the detriment of our electoral rights.
public opinion can be manipulated online, and its
impact on elections. As the authors of this report point out, freedom
from manipulative interference of any kind is a
The phenomenon of online electoral interference is core element of the right to vote and participate
global. It affects established democracies, countries in political life, and enshrined in the International
in transition, and places where freedom of expression Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
and access to information are tightly controlled.
Until recently independent election observation
At the Open Society Foundations we have supported missions and their assessments represented the
research looking at a wide variety of electoral most authoritative voice on the conduct of elections.
contexts – ranging from the last German federal Not any more. Traditional election observers have
elections to the Brazilian presidential election, the found themselves entirely unprepared to address
American midterms and the European Parliament these new challenges, particularly since there has
elections. As this experience revealed domestic and been little rule setting in this new field.
international, state and non-state actors manipulate
information online in order to shape voters’ choices The regulatory gap between online and offline
or simply confuse and disorient citizens, paralyze political communication and elections is staggering.
democratic debate and undermine confidence in Even as monitors track broadcast media and
electoral processes. These players often act in ways advertising, elections are manipulated online.
that are indistinguishable, with some direct and
indirect cooperation taking place. Initial responses by recent international electoral
observation missions in Kenya, Georgia and Nigeria –
The result is detrimental to the quality of our public as described in this report – have aimed to highlight
debate and our ability to deliberate issues and seek false information or hate speech disseminated during
common solutions as societies. election periods. This approach follows a similar
focus by regulators and platforms on uncovering and
Much attention has focused on foreign threats, removing false or harmful content online. Germany’s
following the revelations of Russian interference NetzDG and the UK’s white paper on Online Harms
in the US 2016 presidential elections, or on the are examples, as are content oversight boards such
hyperactivity of the far right online which pushes as the one established by Facebook. These types of
anti-establishment views into the center of debates. measures can harm free expression and offer only
Yet digital campaigning by mainstream political partial solutions.
3Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
Content moderation has limited impact, as it is easy selling users’ personal data for targeted advertising
to circumvent red-flag language caught by algorithms in order to generate revenue. The current debates
and much of it still relies on users’ own reporting on data protection and microtargeting, and the rules
of problematic material. Most importantly, it raises put in place by Facebook and Google to ban foreign-
free speech concerns and serious questions about funded advertising at election times, are a start.
the legitimacy of online platforms – or governments
for that matter – to act as arbiters for online speech. But fundamental questions of what should be legal
Deep knowledge of specific contexts – to address and illegal in digital political communication have
challenges like the misuse of Facebook to spread yet to be answered in order to extend the rule of
radicalization in Myanmar, for instance – is also electoral law from the offline to the online. Answering
critical, or important cultural tropes will be missed. these questions would help determine the right
Places where there is a history of election-related scope for online election observation, too.
and other violence are particularly sensitive in this
respect. This scoping report explains why social media is
one of the elements of a democratic, rule-of-law
From the perspective of election observers, trying to based state that observer groups should monitor.
cope with the volume of information and the speed It aggregates experience from diverse civil society
at which stories or memes can go viral has made the and non-governmental initiatives that are innovating
task of monitoring content on social media around in this field, and sets out questions to guide the
elections seem impossible. development of new mandates for election observers.
In this new landscape, balanced and comprehensive The internet and new digital tools are profoundly
oversight of elections and the online sphere will reshaping political communication and campaigning.
require innovation. In addition to focusing on the But an independent and authoritative assessment
content, we need to start thinking about the online of the impact of these effects is wanting. Election
architecture that enables these distortions of the observation organizations need to adapt their
democratic debate and the influence of malign mandate and methodology in order to remain relevant
actors. Much of this architecture stems from the and protect the integrity of democratic processes.
business model of web platforms, which relies on
Iskra Kirova and Susan Morgan
Open Society Foundations
4Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The international election observation community • Disinformation initiatives have a headstart: they
has lagged in its response to new threats to have already been experimenting with methods
electoral integrity in social media. Challenges from of monitoring social media and in reporting
disinformation campaigns, incitement to violence on outputs. They have technical knowledge
and manipulative public relations campaigns of tools for monitoring, even though there is
online hardly figure when international election no established overall framework to address
observers report their findings. During the many social media/online disinformation in elections.
recent controversies on disinformation in elections, While some initiatives try to approach the issue
international Election Observation Missions (EOMs) with intensive technological developments
contributed little, because the traditional election using software and AI solutions, others focus
observation methodology did not provide any means on content-specific aspects of disinformation,
to analyse this emerging area of concern. A survey of narrowing down the analysis to lines of enquiry
eight major election observation organizations shows that are specific to their political contexts.
that they understand the problem and are ready to
address it, although only a few have taken concrete • Reactive vs long-term observation: initiatives
to tackle disinformation tend to be reactive.
steps to do so (see Annex 1 for details).
Often, they try to follow developments in real
time and to intervene by debunking stories
The European Union and the National Democratic
and alerting platforms, authorities or the wider
Institute (NDI) have been more proactive, as have
public. Traditional election observation does not
smaller election specialists from MEMO98 (Slovakia)
directly react to electoral developments, to avoid
and Democracy Reporting International (author of
becoming part of the campaign. For this reason, it
this report). The much-needed connections between
usually only provides an overall assessment of the
election observers and other communities such as
electoral process after election day.
data analysts and journalists, academic researchers
and disinformation experts are beginning to be • Ecosystem vs single players: Several initiatives
made. to fight disinformation work in coordination with
other groups, such as factcheckers or journalists.
Feedback from the principal international election The major EOMs are stand-alone actors. They
observation organizations and the outcome of exchange information with other groups but aim
interviews with experts from 18 governments and to give an overall verdict based exclusively on their
non-governmental actors that engage in monitoring own findings. EOMs tend to be more visible, but in
disinformation on social media (details in Annex recent elections reports by disinformation groups
2), highlights the contrasts as well as the space for may have eclipsed the coverage of traditional
synergies: election observers’ findings.
5Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
• Experimentation: Disinformation groups the challenges - such as the size of the data, the
experiment with social media monitoring focusing shortcomings of existing software for social media
on different tools, platforms, actors and forms monitoring and the comparison between contexts.
of expression. International election observers
follow their set methodologies. International These provide a lot of material for election observers
election observation is a politically sensitive to consider and to develop further. To make the
activity, mostly based on an invitation by the host analysis of social media in elections more effective,
government, so international observers have little we recommend:
scope for experimentation.
• Guidelines & methodology: International • That disinformation monitors and election
observers create more links and co-operate more
election observers follow a detailed methodology,
systematically;
the essence of which is written into the Declaration
of Principles for International Election Observation • Civil society initiatives provide a set of best
from 2005. In the disinformation field there is no practices that do not put the reputation of EOMs at
agreed framework, and discussions on overall risk when monitoring the impact of social media
questions of methods, tools, approaches and during elections. These initiatives should be
ethics of social media monitoring are still in the adopted.
early stages. Reports on disinformation usually
include neither assessment nor measurement of More recommendations can be found at the end of
the impact or relevance of certain disinformation the report. The organizations and initiatives covered
campaigns. in this report do not provide a comprehensive list of
each relevant actor or method used. However, the
Given that disinformation monitoring by non-EOMs case studies provide ideas and approaches that can
is more developed, there are good practices to guide the monitoring efforts of EOMs.
be found in the work of these groups on many of
6Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
INTRODUCTION
Social media platforms have become a major are having positive results. Some of the companies
influence on elections: they are increasingly behind these platforms have enforced self-regulatory
being used to shape political opinion and beliefs measures which usually increase the requirements
generally, and in electoral periods they influence for users running political ads or advertise on matters
voter choices. Reports from many countries have of national interest. They have created several Ad
shown that disinformation attempts to manipulate Libraries to increase transparency about who runs
elections, be it via discrediting campaigns, external such ads and which groups are being targeted.
influence or trying to suppress voter turnout. Some Legislative efforts may help guide monitoring
may represent violations of electoral or other rules, efforts in the future, but regulatory initiatives both
while others may not be illegal in national legislation, at the national1 and international2 levels need to
but are nevertheless inconsistent with the idea of be developed further before they can provide clear
fair campaigning as outlined in international law. guidelines for electoral observers.
Besides disinformation, social media also facilitates
the placement of paid political and issue-based ads, Election Observation Missions – whether
targeted to the preferences of different groups of international missions or domestic observer groups –
voters. used to provide an authoritative voice on the integrity
of a given election. However, with social media
Referring to legislation when it comes to social now an important aspect of electoral dynamics and
media monitoring poses an additional challenge legislation failing to respond to its challenges, these
to initiatives that wish to use it as guidance when missions have lost relevance, since their assessment
defining the scope of their analysis. So far, regulation does not usually include an analysis of the role of
on what is acceptable or not when it comes to social social media. Instead, it has been left to investigative
media use for political purposes is very fragmented, journalists, monitoring initiatives, data protection
and in the very few countries where laws have been groups, intelligence services and factcheckers to
put in place, it is still too early to assess whether they reveal disinformation on social media.
1 The NetzDG is an example of legislation applied by Germany to address hate speech on social media platforms. Other initiatives
aiming at regulating aspects of social media have been attempted in France, UK, Italy, Czech Republic and others (in Goldzweig et.
al (2018) “Beyond Regulation: Approaching the challenges of the new media environment”, Dahrendorf Forum. Available at: https://
www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Beyond-Regulation_Final.pdf
2 Such as the EU Action Plan against Disinformation. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-
homepage/54866/action-plan-against-disinformation_en
7Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
Election observers have only belatedly woken up • State actors in the EU that track disinformation;
to the challenges. Some have started introducing
expertise to their missions and a few have published • Non-state actors that look at disinformation in the
EU, with a few examples from beyond the EU.
initial scoping papers and results. This paper will look
at these emerging practices, identify good examples
The study is based on oral and written interviews or
and compare them to disinformation analysis done
surveys with eight election observation organizations
by non-election observer groups (groups that do
and with interlocutors from 18 governments or
not observe elections as their core business). We
non-governmental organizations that monitor
have studied three main groups of actors for this
social media for political purposes. We also
comparison:
reviewed published documents from six initiatives.
This study was researched and written by Rafael
• The main organizations that deploy international Schmuziger Goldzweig (DRI Social Media Research
election observation missions based on
Coordinator), Bruno Lupion (researcher) and Michael
the ‘Declaration of Principles’, the leading
Meyer-Resende (DRI Executive Director).
methodological document;
8Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
CONTEXT
THREATS TO ELECTORAL INTEGRITY THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL
IN SOCIAL MEDIA ELECTION OBSERVATION
The Oxford Internet Institute notes: The reference framework for election observation
is grounded in human rights. The principle
“The number of countries where formally organised organizations that deploy observers either apply
social media manipulation occurs has greatly increased, obligations and commitments that their member
from 28 to 48 countries globally. The majority of growth states freely adhered to - for example in the case
comes from political parties who spread disinformation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation
and junk news around election periods. There are in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU) and
more political parties learning from the strategies the Organization of American States (OAS) – or to
deployed during Brexit and the US 2016 Presidential international human rights obligations, in the case
election: more campaigns are using bots, junk news, and of countries that deploy observers to countries other
disinformation to polarise and manipulate voters.”3 than their own. This is the case for the EU, the NDI
and the Carter Center.
While it is clear that social media is used to
manipulate discourse and opinions around elections. The right to vote in elections and to stand as a
The way this is done varies according to a set of candidate (Article 25 International Covenant for
variables still to be defined. Are they being carried Civil and Political Rights) provides the cornerstone
out by domestic actors or foreign powers? Is it a in this framework, with other political rights
coordinated action or attempts from several groups? being equally essential - such as the freedoms of
Do they rely on automated bots, human trolls, paid expression, opinion and assembly and the right
advertising or sharing by sympathetic networks? to an effective remedy (independent courts) to
Which narrative strategies do they use? What type address possible rights violations. The framework of
of disinformation should be tracked when it comes election observation encompasses the elements of a
to electoral influence? The guiding principles of democratic, rule-of-law based state which observer
electoral observation missions can shed light on groups monitor for an extended period – belying the
some of these questions. journalistic caricature of a blind focus on election
day.
3 Bradshaw, S., Howard, P.N., Challenging Truth and Trust: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation, p3
9Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
Discourse on social media fits into this framework
from several perspectives. Most importantly,
THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
freedom of expression implies that ”everyone shall OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
have the right to freedom of expression; this right
OBSERVATION
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of Initiated by the NDI in 2005, several leading
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in international election observation missions – under
the form of art, or through any other media of his the aegis of the UN – endorsed the Declaration of
choice.” (Article 19 ICCPR). Principles of international election observation, which
have been backed by more than 60 groups. They
Social media are an important tool to expand form the basis for the annual meeting of leading
these freedoms, but when manipulated they can international observer organizations. The principles
undermine them. Much of the debate on freedom set out the recognised international approach for
of expression is concerned with restrictions, and election observation, and serve as a quality seal
less with a manipulative use of social media and that contrasts the practices of fake observer groups
other online content. However, the right to vote that have sprung up in authoritarian states. They
and to participate in political life is also concerned elaborate the foundation of democratic elections in
with the systemic aspects of opinion formation human rights.
(and not only expression). The UN’s Human Rights
Committee (the monitoring body of the International They define international election observation as:
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), noted in its “(...) the systematic, comprehensive and accurate
General Comment 25 (the right to vote and political gathering of information concerning the laws,
participation): processes and institutions related to the conduct
of elections and other factors concerning the
“Persons entitled to vote must be free to vote for any overall electoral environment; the impartial and
candidate for election and for or against any proposal professional analysis of such information; and
submitted to referendum or plebiscite, and free to the drawing of conclusions about the character of
support or to oppose government, without undue electoral processes based on the highest standards
influence or coercion of any kind which may distort or for accuracy of information and impartiality of
inhibit the free expression of the elector’s will. Voters analysis. (…) observer missions must make concerted
should be able to form opinions independently, free of efforts to place the election day into its context and
violence or threat of violence, compulsion, inducement or not to over-emphasise the importance of election day
manipulative interference of any kind.”4 observations.”5
4 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment 25, 1996, point 19
5 Point 4 of the Declaration
10Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
The Declaration also states that its endorsers • Accuracy: the analysis of social media is a new
“recognise that international election observation field with many discussions about the accuracy of
missions must be of sufficient size to determine different methodologies. There are wide-ranging
independently and impartially the character of debates, for example, on what a social bot is, what
election processes in a country and must be of disinformation means and how to measure the
sufficient duration to determine the character of sentiments of written texts.
all of the critical elements of the election process
in the pre-election, election-day and post-election • Impartiality: disinformation and hate speech can
emanate from many political sources. Observers
periods.”6
would need to follow all of those that may have a
significant impact.
Applied to social media, these principles raise several
challenges, especially in view of the huge amount • Drawing of conclusions: the research on the
of material being posted on social media during an impact of social media on political opinion
electoral period: and voter choice and behaviour is not rich,
and it is difficult to determine the impact of
• What would a systematic gathering of discourse on disinformation. 900,000 Americans saw the
social media look like? What would be the criteria headline that falsely claimed that Pope Francis
and the plan for doing so? had endorsed Donald Trump as the best candidate
for President. But how much weight does one false
• Comprehensive: is it realistic that observers could story carry when people consume news every day?
comprehensively assess the social media sphere?
As the US 2016 elections showed, unexpected • Sufficient size: if it was possible to gather a
problems may be discovered much later, such comprehensive, accurate and systematic view of
as the disinformation campaigns by the Russian flaws in social media discourse, how big would
‘Internet Research Agency’. Will observers be able that mission be?
to detect significant problems while an election is
unfolding? This paper surveys the practice and intentions of
international election observer groups on social
media monitoring and explores what other groups
are doing in this field, in particular in the EU, in order
to provide inspiration for tradition election observers.
6 Point 19 of the Declaration
11Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
WHAT ARE INTERNATIONAL
OBSERVER MISSIONS DOING ON
SOCIAL MEDIA DISCOURSE?
International EOMs have only belatedly started to data collection and analysis tools. It has an internal
pay attention to social media discourse. The question guidance note on ‘disinformation and electoral
of social media figured in discussions of the annual integrity’.
meeting on the Declaration of Principles, the main
meeting of international election observers, in 2017 The EU included a chapter on the analysis of ‘online
and 2018. However, while this forum has addressed related content’ in its Election Observer Handbook9. It
many questions of methodology in detail, it has only follows the chapter on the monitoring of traditional
discussed the bigger picture when it comes to social media, and mostly explores the role of online
media. Of the international groups, the NDI and the media and looks at freedom of expression issues
EU seem so far to have been the most agile. (restrictions of content) and hate speech issues. It
does not cover the question of public discourse on
The NDI included in its 2017 Kenya report a social media and the disinformation threat. So far
paragraph summarizing the country’s social EU EOMs have only provided limited information on
media landscape and highlighting examples of online content and social media.
disinformation campaigns. They also addressed
the problem of disinformation in the mission sent Recent EU EOMs sometimes included a short
to Liberia on that same year, despite not addressing chapter with an overview of the social media
specifically the role of social media due to extremely landscape (main networks, numbers of users)10
limited internet penetration7. The organization and some impressions on their use, but most of
posted a long-term ‘disinformation analyst’ to its them contained little information on social media
Georgia election observation mission in 20178. In its discourse, and no structured monitoring nor
support of domestic election observer groups, NDI quantification of social media activity during the
has started providing technical assistance, including campaign.11
7 NDI. Available on pp42-43 at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Final%20Interational%20Election%20
Observation%20Mission%20Report%20-%20Liberia%202017%20Presidential%20and%20Legislative%20Elections%20%282%29.
pdf
8 NDI. Available on p12 at: https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI-GE%20EOM%202017-%20IR-ENG.pdf
9 EU Election Observer Handbook, Third Edition, 2016
10 Final Report EU EOM to Pakistan, 2018
11 Final Reports of EU EOMs to Lebanon 2018, Zimbabwe 2018, Tunisia 2018, Liberia 2017
12Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
The EU is currently undertaking many activities to These initiatives are in addition to a wide-ranging
improve the capability of EU EOMs, including effort to deal with EU internal disinformation
challenges.
• the inclusion of a digital analyst in an EU EOM for
the first time (Nigeria); Annex 1 provides an overview of the status quo of the
principal international election observation groups.
• a workshop on EOM monitoring of online
campaigns, held by the EODS project;
• Democracy Reporting International will bring
together a working group under the EU-funded
Supporting Democracy project to develop a
methodology for social media monitoring in
elections for the use of any interested group
(international or national).
13Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019 WHAT ARE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DOING? Overall, governments seem to take a more cautious Governments and intergovernmental bodies appear approach to social media monitoring than civil to mainly deal with disinformation as it relates to society organizations do. This is probably because factual inconsistencies around the electoral process it may be perceived as surveillance of individual and, when it comes to the origins of disinformation, citizens or that a government is trying to get an external actors (state and non-state alike). The informational advantage - even if only publicly following table summarizes some initiatives. available data (public posts on social media) are monitored without a focus on individuals. 14
Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
TABLE 1
Government initiatives on social media monitoring
GOVERNMENT
EUROPE/INTERGOVERNMENTAL
Body Country / Has ever monitored or is Focus on domestic Scope Range Software/
organization monitoring elections? actors or foreign tools used
Which ones? influence
NATO StratCom NATO / Round the clock Both Monitors Twitter Tools built
Center of Based monitoring not specifically automation, and in-house
Excellence in Latvia in election periods bots and VKontakte
trolls
Swedish Sweden Swedish 2018 Both Monitors Twitter Tools built
Defence elections influence and in-house
Research operations, discussion
Agency threats to boards
elections
East StratCom EU Yes, but not exclusively. Focused Monitors TV, BrandWatch
Task Force Got budget and new on Russian disinformation webpages,
employees to monitor run- influence on Facebook
up to the 2019 European the Eastern and
Parliament elections Neighbourhood Twitter
German Germany No. Initiatives to counter Both, with a greater Positive
Ministry of disinformation by focus on foreign narratives
Foreign Affairs disseminating German influence regarding
- -
facts/narratives in foreign Germany
countries as a public to counter
diplomacy tool disinformation
Policy France Yes, but not Foreign Monitors
Planning comprehensive. Published influence disinformation
Staff (CAPS), a concept paper & case campaigns,
Minister for study on the ‘Macron leaks’ harmful
- -
Europe and narratives,
Foreign Affairs12* media
ecosystem,
bots and trolls
Inter-ministerial Denmark No. Issued an action plan Focus on Monitors
task force: to build resilience ahead of Russian influence
Ministry of the 2019 General Danish influence campaigns
- -
Justice, Defence Elections (disinformation)
and Foreign
Affairs13*
Centre against Czech Yes, 2017 Presidential Focus on Monitors
Terrorism and Republic Elections. The Centre Russian disinformation,
Hybrid Threats monitors threats related to influence foreign
- -
(Ministry of the internal security of the propaganda
the Interior)14* Czech Republic, including and terrorism
disinformation campaigns threats
* Based on desk research and not interviews.
12 Available at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/manipulation-of-information/article/joint-report-by-the-
caps-irsem-information-manipulation-a-challenge-for-our
13 Available at: http://um.dk/en/news/newsdisplaypage/?newsid=1df5adbb-d1df-402b-b9ac-57fd4485ffa4
14 Available at: https://www.mvcr.cz/cthh/clanek/centre-against-terrorism-and-hybrid-threats.aspx
15Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019 Government initiatives are generally more focused Obviously, governments may do much more on geopolitical aspects of electoral monitoring - through intelligence agencies, which cannot namely attempting to avoid external actors (state and be assessed by this study (a report by Privacy non-state alike) from influencing national elections. International15 explores the limits of data collection This is the case when we look at the French, German, from intelligence agencies, but does not cover Czech and Danish examples, which also focus on how intelligence services monitor social media in questions related to security and terrorism threats. elections). When it comes to initiatives monitoring national Two intergovernmental initiatives – the East elections, the Swedish government seeks to avoid StratCom Task Force and the NATO StratCom factual inconsistencies around the management Center of Excellence – have different scopes: the of the electoral process. It monitored online former is an EU initiative to spot, debunk and commentary and discussion boards on Swedish compile disinformation narratives led by Russia, websites to look for posts that conveyed a threat to while the latter is a research centre that channels the Swedish elections, such as planned attacks on expert opinion to NATO. polling stations. 15 Available at: https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/55/social-media-intelligence 16
Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
WHAT ARE CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANIZATIONS DOING?
The following sections map 17 initiatives from
non-governmental actors in the field of social media
EUROPEAN CIVIL SOCIETY
monitoring during elections. They were selected Many initiatives are experimenting with social
based on desk research on the 28 EU member media monitoring of political trends in Europe. We
states and relevant initiatives in the US and other interviewed nine initiatives at the European level
non-European countries. Potential interviewees to understand details on the monitoring exercise
were contacted via email from 17 December 2018 they have done, as well as the phenomena they are
onwards, and interviews were conducted between monitoring on each platform and the tools used for
19 December 2018 and 24 January 2019. A more the analysis. The following table summarizes the
comprehensive description of each organization/ initiatives.
initiative can be found in Annex 2 of this study.
17Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
TABLE 2
Non-governmental initiatives on social media monitoring (Europe)
NON-GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES
(civil society, academia, think tanks, consultancies)
EUROPE
Organization/ Country Has monitored or will Domestic Phenomena Range Software,
Initiative monitor social media in actors or foreign tool or
which elections? influence service used
EU Disinfo Lab Belgium Italian 2018 Federal Both Disinformation Twitter Visibrain,
Elections and Gephi
hyperactivity
Prague Czech Czech Parliament Election Both Disinformation, Websites and Versus
Security Republic in 2017 and Senate and but also looking Facebook public
Studies Presidential Elections in at broader pages
Institute 2018. Will monitor the EU context
Parliament Election in 2019
Debunk.eu Lithuania Not the main focus, but Prioritise Disinformation Websites and Tool built
will monitor Lithuanian foreign Facebook public in-house
Presidential and Municipal influence pages. Plans
Elections in 2019 to include TV
broadcasters and
video using speech
to text technology
Stiftung Neue Germany 2017 German Federal Both Disinformation Websites, TalkWalker
Verantwortung Elections Facebook public
(SNV) pages and posts
and Twitter
European Czech Czech Presidential Foreign Disinformation Websites and -
Values Think- Republic Elections in 2017 and (Russia) and hostile Facebook pages
Tank / Kremlin Parliament Elections in influencing
Watch 2018 activities
Oxford UK Not the main focus, but Both Political Facebook and Tools built
Internet monitored the 2017 UK bots and Twitter in-house
Institute (OII) / General Election and disinformation
Computational several others
Propaganda
Project
Bakamo.Social UK 2017 French Election Both Disinformation Twitter TalkWalker
and thematic
or emotional
patterns
EASTERN EUROPE
Atlantic Ukraine 2019 Ukrainian Presidential Foreign Disinformation, TV broadcasters Semantic
Council / Election influence, cyberattacks, and webpages Visions
Ukrainian mainly Russia kinetic
Election Task operations
Force
International Georgia Georgian 2018 Presidential Both Violation of Facebook Fact-a-lyzer
Society for Fair Elections electoral laws,
Elections and disinformation
Democracy and Russian
(ISFED) narratives
18Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
European initiatives by civil society during elections
have multiplied since 2017. Without an overarching
A GLIMPSE BEYOND EUROPE
methodology to follow, the projects focused on To complement the survey of European initiatives,
different aspects and adapted to the restrictions it is useful to consider some specific projects from
of data that can be collected (especially in relation outside Europe that focussed on monitoring social
to Facebook), as well as the needs of the specific media in elections. Non-governmental initiatives
political contexts. In terms of phenomena, the focus around the world are helpful in identifying rising
was on monitoring disinformation (during and trends and challenges that can inform the work of
outside elections); in the case of Eastern Europe, EOM on social media monitoring. This section lists
with a particular focus on disinformation campaigns eight organizations in the US, Brazil and Nigeria that
coming from Russia. are working nationally or globally in topics related to
disinformation, Russian interference and monitoring
Some initiatives explored in detail the use of social of paid ads.
media in specific elections (Bakamo.social, ISFED,
SNV, Prague Security Studies Institute), while others
tried to actively fight disinformation in partnership
with factcheckers (Debunk.eu). Selected best practice
from such initiatives will be featured in the final
section of this report.
19Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
TABLE 3
Non-governmental initiatives on social media monitoring (outside of Europe)
NON-GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES
(civil society, academia, think tanks, companies)
OUTSIDE OF EUROPE / GLOBAL
Organization/ Country Has monitored or will Focus on domestic Phenomena Range Monitoring
Initiative monitor social media actors or foreign software, tool or
in which elections? influence service used
Alliance for US Monitored electoral Foreign Disinformation Twitter Own platform
Securing content during the influence based on
Democracy / run-up to the US 2018 (Russia) Twitter API.
Hamilton 68 midterm elections Version 2.0
Dashboard developed by
Graphika
Atlantic Council US French and German Both, highlights False Several, Buzzsumo,
/ Digital Forensic elections in 2017, when foreign accounts, false including CrowdTangle,
Research Lab Mexican and Brazilian influence narratives, Facebook, Sysomos and
elections in 2018, bots and Twitter Twitonomy,
European Parliament, disinformation and among others
Indian and South YouTube
African elections in
2019
International US / EU Monitoring also Both, with a Disinformation Websites, Versus
Republican captures run-up to greater focus and hostile Facebook,
Institute / elections on foreign foreign Twitter
Beacon Project influence influence
Getulio Vargas Brazil 2018 Brazilian General Domestic, Polarisation, Facebook,
Foundation Elections with some disinformation, Twitter,
-
/ Digital references to bots YouTube
Democracy Room foreign
Center for Nigeria/ 2019 Nigerian Not specified Disinformation WhatsApp Surveys and
Democracy and UK presidential elections focus groups
Development
West Africa
(CDD) &
University of
Birmingham
Who Targets Me* UK / Monitored political Not specified Not specified Facebook Browser
Global ads since it was extension for
launched in 2017 Chrome or
Firefox
Political Ad US Monitored political Not specified Not specified Facebook Browser
Collector / ads since it was extension for
ProPublica* launched in 2017 Chrome or
Firefox
Ad Analysis / US / Monitored political Not specified Not specified Facebook Browser
Mozilla* Global ads since it was extension for
launched in 2018 Firefox
* Based on desk research and not interviews
20Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
Overall, such projects share the same trends as In light of its promise to make ad libraries available
the European initiatives: some are more focused in other countries, Facebook temporarily blocked
on one specific topic (the Hamilton 68 Dashboard access to such tools in January 2019, citing privacy
focuses on Russian influence) while others take the concerns. In response to this move, ProPublica said
broader national context into consideration (Digital that the information provided by Facebook was
Democracy Room looks into political polarisation incomplete and that the organization has routinely
and public discourse online in Brazil). publicised ads run by organizations that were not
recorded in the archive17. According to Who Targets
It is worth highlighting three initiatives that tried to Me, the core functions of their extension are still
address the need for transparency regarding paid working and able to collect data from ads, but
ads on Facebook, a concern that gained traction after Facebook has blocked access to some components of
the Russian Internet Research Agency placed paid the extension.
ads during the 2016 US election which were seen by
10 million people, according to Facebook16. Three
initiatives (Who Targets Me, Political Ad Collector NON-GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES:
and Ad Analysis) tried to bypass the lack of data
disclosure surrounding paid ads by asking users to
EUROPE & BEYOND
install browser extensions that scraped details about Table 4 summarizes the actions of non-governmental
Facebook ads shown to them. The first two, launched initiatives in Europe and around the world,
in 2017, offered details about targeted political ads on comparing monitored phenomena and platforms.
Facebook, while the third, launched in October 2018,
has not had much time to be tested.
16 Facebook Newsroom. Available at: https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/hard-questions-russian-ads-delivered-to-congress/
17 The Verge (2019). Available at: https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/28/18201361/facebook-political-ad-transparency-tools-blocked-
user-data-privacy
21Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
TABLE 4
Non-governmental initiatives matrix
NON-GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVES MATRIX: WHO HAS MONITORED OR IS MONITORING WHAT, ON WHICH PLATFORM?
Websites / Traditional
Facebook WhatsApp Twitter YouTube discussion media
boards (TV, radio)
Disinformation/ Debunk. CDD & Hamilton 68 Digital Debunk. Ukrainian
information eu, Prague University of Dashboard, EU Democracy eu, Prague Election
manipulation Security Studies Birmingham, Disinfolab, SNV, Room, Security Task Force
Institute, SNV, Digital Oxford Internet Digital Studies
Kremlin Watch, Forensic Institute, Forensic Institute,
Oxford Internet Research Digital Forensic Research Kremlin
Institute, Lab Research Lab Watch,
Digital Forensic Lab, Beacon Ukrainian
Research Project, Digital Election
Lab, Beacon Democracy Task Force,
Project, Digital Room, Bakamo. SNV, Beacon
Democracy Social Project,
Room, ISFED Digital
Forensic
Research Lab
Bots/trolls Digital Forensic Oxford Internet
Research Lab Institute,
Digital Forensic
Research
Lab, Digital
- - - -
Democracy
Room, Hamilton
68 Dashboard,
EU Disinfolab,
Bakamo.Social
Russian Debunk.eu, Hamilton 68 Debunk. Ukrainian
influence Kremlin Watch, Dashboard, eu, Kremlin Election
Beacon Project, EU Disinfolab, Watch, Task Force
ISFED Beacon Project, Ukrainian
- -
Bakamo.Social Election
Task Force,
Beacon
Project
Political ads Who Targets
Me, Mozilla
Ad Analysis,
ProPublica
22Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
Topics/objects of analysis Lastly, the link between disinformation and paid
political or issue ads remains a central aspect when
Most of the initiatives covered focus on it comes to social media monitoring. As mentioned,
disinformation, with investigations of Russian the browser extensions Who Targets Me, Ad Analysis
influence associated with many of them. Bots, and ProPublica18, which tried to collect information
trolls and the role of internal groups were studied on ads, had difficulties to access Facebook data.
mainly by initiatives looking at different political Facebook has started providing information about
debates online, not necessarily during elections political ads through its Ad Library. The Ad Library
(namely the Oxford Internet Institute and the Digital is officially available for all countries and territories
Forensic Research Lab). Some projects focused on – from Antarctica to Western Sahara. What is
the role of internal groups and their use of social unclear, however, is the amount of data included in
media. Stiftung Neue Verantwortung research each of the Ad Libraries. Browsing for information
concluded that the Alternative für Deutschland within them, we notice that libraries in the U.S., UK
party and far-right groups used disinformation as an and Brazil are much more complete than the ones
important political mobilisation strategy during the available for Nigeria and Tunisia, for example. There
2017 German parliamentary election campaign. The are similar discrepancies in the Ad Libraries available
Digital Democracy Room also found that right-wing for EU countries. So far, detailed information is
groups were prone to use disinformation to mobilise available about active and inactive ads in the U.S.,
voters during the Brazilian elections. with a consolidated list of organizations that paid for
political ads and data easily searchable by keywords
Debunk.eu in Lithuania stands out for its use of or organization names. For other countries (Nigeria,
AI to automatically spot news articles with a high for example), none of this data is available. One can
probability of being disinformation, and the support only look into active ads and search for the pages
of a network of volunteers and newsrooms to confirm who are running them – it is not possible to check for
and debunk them. Beacon Project developed a web inactive ads or search for ads using keywords19.
crawler that scrapes and sorts predefined sources
within a given country. It offers a free tool to partner Google also launched an EU-wide searchable ad
organizations, one of which is the Prague Security library for political ads, but it allows only searches for
Studies Institute, which will use this platform to candidates and advertisers – not by topic20. Twitter
monitor the 2019 European Parliament elections committed to make all political ads related to the
in the Czech Republic. Another initiative in the European Parliament elections available in its Ads
Czech Republic is Kremlin Watch, which looks Transparency Centre, providing a list of all registered
for disinformation supporting Russian interests organizations allowed to place political campaign
in around 40 websites in the Czech language and advertising21. As with Facebook, these measures do
their Facebook pages, not necessarily related to not apply in several other countries.
elections. The Ukrainian Election Task Force focused
on the March 2019 presidential elections and aims Apart from their efforts to make political ads
to highlight disinformation to an international more transparent, the companies increased the
audience, rather than to the Ukrainian public. requirements for those posting political ads on
18 ProPublica (2019). Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-blocks-ad-transparency-tools
19 More detailed information about the differences between ad libraries in the US and the EU is available here: https://democracy-
reporting.org/facebooks-ad-library-for-european-parliament-elections-seven-steps-to-make-it-more-useful/
20 Google Ad Library: https://transparencyreport.google.com/political-ads/region/EU?hl=en
21 Available at: https://ads.twitter.com/transparency/i/political_advertisers
23Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
their platforms. These include the obligation to have been influential in the recent elections in Brazil.
prove registration in the relevant country, which The private messaging app is widespread in the
makes foreign funding of political campaigns more country, and actions taken by Facebook and Twitter
difficult. For example, Facebook requires residency in to fight disinformation networks in their platforms
Australia, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel, Thailand, may have prompted campaigners to become more
Ukraine, UK, EU countries and the U.S. to run ads active on WhatsApp, an encrypted platform.
in these countries22. Google requires all election ads
to show a disclosure identifying who paid for them The use of WhatsApp is being monitored in the
and, like Facebook, says that sponsors of posts must current election campaign in Nigeria. Researchers
be registered in the country where the political ad who analysed its impact in Sierra Leone indicated
is being run. However, this currently applies only that its use is closely related to offline social
to the EU, India and the U.S.23. The certification structures. The mean size of groups in West Africa
process was also implemented by Twitter in the and Latin America is bigger than the ones in Europe,
U.S., Australia, India and the EU24. While these meaning that the viral aspect of such platform varies
requirements do not apply to all countries where from country to country and is related to cultural
these companies do business, they are being habits, socioeconomic conditions and the level of
gradually implemented, and can influence the scope connectivity available to users (particularly when it
of observation by EOMs. The more data companies comes to mobile vs fixed broadband access).
make available, the more there is to observe and
analyse. Assessing the stated policy of the firms and Facebook has received attention outside Europe
whether it is being implemented is an obvious area because of its political importance as the most
for observation. popular social media platform. Twitter attracts
similar attention for the ease of collecting and
analysing data and because it is a service typically
Platforms used for political debates. WhatsApp is a rising
In Europe, non-governmental initiatives have platform for the manipulation of public opinion
focused on two platforms: Facebook and Twitter. in elections in Brazil and Nigeria. A few of the
Websites, discussion boards and traditional media researched initiatives mentioned the role of
are also seen as relevant, mainly in countries that fear YouTube, but none of them monitored platforms
Russian interference, given the relative prominence such as Instagram, Reddit and Gab, or Telegram,
of state-backed Russian media outlets such as Russia VKontakte, WeChat or Weibo. Research has been
Today and Sputnik. done on some of these platforms2526, but they were
not mentioned in the interviews conducted by this
Beyond Europe, the fact that WhatsApp and YouTube study.
are hardly monitored or analysed leaves gaps, given
the influence both platforms have in shaping political The social media landscape is dynamic, and
opinion and voter choice. WhatsApp was reported to observers should stay tuned to trends and monitor
those that are relevant.
22 Available at: https://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051#
23 Available at: https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595?hl=en
24 Available at: https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/restricted-content-policies/political-content.html
25 Bandeira, Luiza (2018) “#ElectionWatch: Migration to Gab in Brazil“, DRFLab. Available at: https://medium.com/dfrlab/
electionwatch-migration-to-gab-in-brazil-67a1212c4c76
26 Nithyanand, Rishab (2018) “Russian propaganda spread on our site before 2016 election“, Data and Society. Available at: https://
datasociety.net/output/reddit-russian-propaganda-spread-on-our-site-before-2016-election/
24Experiences of Social Media Monitoring During Elections: Cases and Best Practice to Inform Electoral Observation Missions May 2019
FIGURE 1
Social media landscape and dynamics
Great focus of analysis on the importance “Free speech” platforms gaining
of Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter ground (US, Brazil)
Video and image content becoming central Non-western social media platforms
to information consumption (especially (VKontakte, Weibo, Telegram, WeChat...)
when it comes to spreading disinformation) with presence in Eastern Europe and Asia
Other social networks such as Gab and Reddit are information consumption on social media. On
benefitting from the shifting preferences of social Twitter, video content generates ten times more
media users, and gaining attention from users who engagement than text-only tweets28. Disinformation
question the community guidelines enforced by often uses manipulated or misleading video content.
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and others. This trend makes platforms such as Instagram and
Brazilians and U.S. Americans are among the top YouTube important tools for disinformation, but few
users of Gab, with spikes in registrations during the of the initiatives researched for this study have been
Charlottesville unrest and the recent presidential looking at these platforms.
elections in Brazil27. While neither is likely to
overtake other social media platforms in popularity, Lastly, non-Western social media such as Weibo,
they are spaces where extremist groups can organise WeChat, VKontakte and Telegram, among others,
themselves online without controls, offering them a present a challenge when it comes to social media
quick way to coordinate disinformation campaigns monitoring in contexts where they coexist with
and inflammatory speech on other social media Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp. This is the case in
platforms. some Eastern European countries, where VKontakte
and Telegram have a relatively important presence,
When it comes to content, visual forms of alongside Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp.
communication are increasingly central to
27 APublica (2018). Available at: https://apublica.org/2018/12/rede-social-de-ultradireita-chega-ao-brasil-com-acenos-a-bolsonaro/
28 Twitter Business. Available at: https://business.twitter.com/de/blog/5-data-driven-tips-for-scroll-stopping-video.html
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