Singapore | 21 February 2022 Examining Climate-Conflict Links in Southeast Asia Darren Cheong* - ISEAS-Yusof ...
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ISSUE: 2022 No. 15
ISSN 2335-6677
RESEARCHERS AT ISEAS – YUSOF ISHAK INSTITUTE ANALYSE CURRENT EVENTS
Singapore | 21 February 2022
Examining Climate-Conflict Links in Southeast Asia
Darren Cheong*
Southeast Asia is one of the regions projected to be most affected by climate change. In this picture,
people walking through a flooded area following heavy rain in Bandung, Indonesia, on 3 November
2021. Photo: Timur Matahari, AFP.
* Darren Cheong is Research Associate at the Regional Strategic and Political Studies
Programme (RSPS), ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• There has been a recent growth in studies dedicated to uncovering links between
climate and conflict in Southeast Asia.
• This article synthesises the findings of 11 rigorous peer-reviewed studies conducted
in various Southeast Asian countries to produce insights on the exact mechanisms
linking climate and intra-state conflict in the region.
• Three mechanisms linking climate and conflict are highlighted (1) economic
deprivation, (2) strategic considerations by organised armed groups and (3) elite
exploitation.
• The risks of climate-linked conflict are most significant for rural communities that
depend heavily upon agriculture for their livelihoods, as well as in regions where
there is pre-existing armed conflict.
• Climate adaptation strategies that reduce the adverse impacts of climatic events can
provide an avenue to mitigate the risks of climate-linked conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
The security implications of climate change have become a focus for world leaders and
global policymakers in recent years. One of the leading security concerns about climate
change is its potential to spark violent intra-state conflict.1 With this growing interest in the
possibility of climate change being related to conflict, researchers have also focused on
uncovering whether such a link exists and if so, how they are linked.
There have been protracted debates about whether climate change is indeed linked to violent
conflict. While some studies have been unequivocal about the existence of a climate-conflict
link, others note that the empirical findings across studies have not been consistent and
robust. 2 Experts have agreed that it is difficult to make broad generalisations about the
findings of such studies and that the existence of climate-conflict links should be
contextualised in specific local or country settings.3
Even though Southeast Asia is one of the regions projected to be most affected by climate
change, the vast majority of studies looking into the climate-conflict link have not been in
the region. 4 Nevertheless, there has been growing research interest in the region, and a
number of studies have looked at specific pathways linking climate change to conflict.
While research in the region is still relatively nascent, there is growing indication that a
climate-conflict link is supported by evidence in the literature and that policymakers should
take note of climate-related conflict risks. Synthesising the findings of 11 peer-reviewed
studies on climate and conflict in Southeast Asia, this article aims to provide evidence-based
perspectives on the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict in the region. In the
context of these studies and for the purposes of this article, conflict is defined as intra-state
violence that can occur on various scales. Smaller-scale civil conflict will involve events
such as violent protests, riots or forced evictions while larger-scale civil conflict can involve
insurgencies, rebellions and terrorist activity. These insights will be helpful in crafting
prevention and mitigation strategies that target climate-related conflict.
The articles reviewed in this article were found using Boolean search strings on two
academic databases: ScienceDirect and Web of Science. These studies come from various
disciplines – economics, political science, geography, and anthropology – and both
quantitative and qualitative studies were reviewed. A list of these studies can be found in
the Appendix.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: CLIMATE DISASTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
As the mechanisms linking climate and conflict are often mediated through climate
disasters, this section will provide a broad overview of the latter, occurring in the region.
There is a growing consensus amongst climate disaster attribution studies that climate
change has been a key factor in increasing the likelihood and intensity of climate disasters
in recent decades.5
In Southeast Asia, there has been a considerable increase in climate-related disaster events
(floods, extreme temperatures, droughts, landslides, storms, and wildfires) in recent
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decades. We note this increase in Figure 1, a histogram depicting the number of climate
disasters from the 1960s to the present day. With each decade, climate disasters have indeed
been becoming more frequent, with countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam
and Thailand bearing the brunt of this increase.
Figure 1: Histogram of Climate Disasters from 1960 to 2020
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Emergency Events Database
(EM-DAT) (2021)
This histogram is also broadly reflective of recent climate risk indicators. Table 1 provides
a summary of the various human and economic costs of climate disasters for Southeast
Asian countries, alongside the most recent 2021 iteration of Germanwatch’s long-term
climate risk ranking, a widely used index measuring climate vulnerability.6 Five Southeast
Asian countries – Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia – rank
amongst the top 20 most vulnerable countries globally. From Table 1, we can see that these
countries have also faced high costs from climate disaster events over the last two decades
– with thousands of fatalities, millions affected, and billions of US dollars in damages.
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Table 1: Summary of Climate Risk Indicators for Southeast Asian Countries
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the Germanwatch’s Climate Risk Index
(2021) and the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) (2021)7
Based on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report8
that climate change will exacerbate the frequency and intensity of climate disaster events,
it is reasonable to expect that these costs will continue to increase. Bearing in mind the costs
of climate disasters in Southeast Asia, the subsequent sections provides a detailed
breakdown of the exact mechanisms linking climate and conflict.
CLIMATE AND CONFLICT: EVIDENCE-BASED MECHANISMS
Early research on climate and conflict has been met with scepticism because of its
preoccupation with uncovering broad correlations between climatic events and instances of
violent conflict. While the existence of such correlations serves as a useful starting point for
investigation into the climate-conflict link, they do not offer insights into the potential
mechanisms that may be driving these correlations. The reason for this can be seen in Figure
2, which shows a climate disaster density map of the Philippines, overlaid with locations of
conflict events9 between 2000 to 2019.
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Figure 2: Climate Disaster Density Map (2000 – 2019) and
Location of Conflict Events (2000 – 2019) in the Philippines
Source: Generated by author based on data from the Geocoded Disasters (GDIS) Dataset (2021)10
and Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (2021).11 Note: Conflict
Event points have been set to be slightly transparent to highlight clusters of armed conflict events.
Points which are darker indicate a high occurrence of conflict events while points which are lighter
indicate a lower occurrence of conflict events. The climate disaster density map was generated using
kernel density estimation.
The figure demonstrates that there is indeed a correlation between climate and conflict.
Areas of high to medium disaster density experience a higher concentration of violent
conflict, indicated by the darker hues of the conflict event points. From Figure 2, we cannot
glean insights about what exactly might be driving this correlation. There might also be
arguments that the Philippines can be characterised as a country with pre-existing tensions,
most notably those associated with the Maoist and Moro insurgents. It is thus unclear if and
how climate-related factors play a role in creating conflict in the Philippines.
The studies reviewed under this article have however circumvented the pitfalls of past
correlational studies through the incorporation of rigorous and highly localised context-
specific research designs that have allowed them to discern if, when, and under what
circumstances climatic processes have led to conflict in Southeast Asia. There can, thus, be
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a high degree of confidence in the insights gained from these studies. The following sections
outline the three main mechanisms identified in these studies, linking climate and conflict
in the region: (1) economic deprivation, (2) the strategic considerations of organised armed
groups, and (3) elite exploitation.12
Mechanism 1: Economic Deprivation
The proposition that climate and conflict are linked through economic deprivation is
theoretically motivated by economic theory related to opportunity costs. If adverse climatic
events undermine economic output and livelihoods, there might be the expectation that the
opportunity costs of conflict would decrease and that anti-state grievances might arise.13
Research evaluating the existence of such an effect has primarily been focused on
agricultural communities whose incomes are heavily climate dependent.
Several studies have validated economic deprivation as a mechanism linking climate and
conflict in Southeast Asia. In a 2016 quantitative study using provincial-level conflict data
in Indonesia between 1993 and 2003, researchers found that reductions in rice yields,
because of increases in temperatures during the rice-growing season, were a determinant of
future upticks in violent conflict. 14 This increase in conflict is predicated on continued
reductions of rice production per capita. In other words, on average, provinces that
experienced increases in temperatures and reduced rice yields can prone to face increases
in conflict incidences in the future. Conflict in this context has been defined as collective
violence, where violence is perpetrated by groups. Examples include riots and acts of
terrorism.
Another study in 2018 in the Philippines utilised data from military incident reports
produced by the Philippine army to explore the effects of rainfall shocks on violent
conflict.15 These reports reflected instances where either government forces or insurgent
groups had initiated attacks on one another. They concluded that above-average rainfall
during wet seasons, which resulted in decreased agricultural yields due to flooding, led to
more casualties and conflict incidents being reported in the subsequent year. This effect was
particularly pronounced in provinces that dedicated a larger proportion of land to rice
production, the Philippines’ most important crop and the main source of income for millions
of farmers.
Aside from studies regarding land agriculture, a 2016 study on 260 coastal districts in
Indonesia found a link between climatically induced reductions in fisheries output and
increases in sea-piracy activity.16 The author argues that this phenomenon is driven by the
opportunity costs of participating in piracy being reduced for fishermen whose livelihoods
have been threatened by climatic conditions.
Apart from Indonesia and the Philippines, few Southeast Asian countries have been the
research focus for such research. This is not to say that economic deprivation as a
mechanism for climate-linked conflict does not exist in the rest of Southeast Asia. Given
that millions of people in the region depend on agriculture for their livelihood, it is
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reasonable to expect that future climate disasters can foment similar conflict-stirring
conditions in other parts of Southeast Asia.
Table 2 provides a country-by-country breakdown of the economic contributions of the
agricultural sector to Southeast Asia. We can see that the sector constitutes a considerable
percentage of many Southeast Asian countries’ GDPs. More importantly, significant
proportions of their populations rely on the sector for employment.
Table 2: Economic Dependence on Agriculture in Southeast Asia
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2021)
The sixth IPCC assessment report projects that Southeast Asia will face increased
precipitation levels, more intense tropical cyclones, and higher flood levels under future
climate change scenarios. 17 More intense and frequent climate disasters can certainly
aggravate the risk of conflicts, especially in agriculturally dependent regions.
Mechanism 2: Strategic Considerations by Organised Armed Groups
In the wake of destructive climate disasters, organised armed groups may take advantage of
the unrest to reorganise and bolster their own positions. This mechanism for climate-linked
conflict is typically applicable to Southeast Asian countries where there are ongoing
insurgencies or rebel activities.
Following climate disasters, insurgent groups have been known to actively entice disaster
victims to join their movements. This enticement works in tandem with the economic
deprivation mechanism, where disaster-affected communities will find the opportunity costs
of participating in conflict to be reduced. In a 2016 study on all 81 provinces in the
Philippines, researchers found that precipitation shocks in the form of droughts, floods and
storms, coincided with significant escalations of violence during four ongoing insurgencies
between 2001 and 2007.18 Provinces that experienced these shocks were found on average
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to have increased onsets of violent insurgent activity. These escalations were linked to
ramped up recruitment efforts by insurgent groups, who sought to play up political
grievances following the loss of livelihoods from climate disasters. A case study supported
by interviews which the author conducted was when the Communist Party of Philippines-
New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), under the guise of providing aid, organised indoctrination
sessions to encourage villagers to join the group. Such recruitment drives subsequently
fortified their ranks and motivated them to engage in more insurgent activity.
As climate disasters may similarly diminish the food supplies of insurgent groups, some of
these groups engage in conflict to bolster dwindling resources. In a 2017 study on Thailand,
researchers analysed the case study of the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C)
in Songkhla province in the south during the extreme droughts of 2004.19 As a response to
the onset of droughts, farmers in the province had stockpiled rice in their fields in
anticipation of future depressed rice outputs. This motivated the BRN-C to conduct raids on
rice fields in various parts of the province to capture and control rice fields during the
drought. These raids were extremely violent and often involved killing, beheading, and
beatings. Part of the evidence supporting these claims was a Thai Ministry of Interior report
in 2005 highlighting a 90 per cent increase in the number of villagers killed by insurgents
in Songkhla province during the 2004 droughts.
These studies echo the point that climate change can be understood as a threat multiplier
that amplifies the risks of existing security issues. That being said, it is not completely
certain that armed conflict perpetrated by insurgent groups will flare up whenever climate
disasters occur. Whether or not armed groups choose to take advantage of unrests during
climate disasters will be heavily contingent upon the specific disaster and local contexts.
For instance, typhoons Bopha and Haiyan in 2012 and 2013 were found to have weakened
two rebel groups, the CPP-NPA and National Democratic Front (NDF) in the Philippines.
In a study of those cases, the author concluded that this weakening was likely to be
temporary and to be due to the typhoons being especially devastating in areas where the
groups were active.20
Mechanism 3: Elite Exploitation
The third mechanism, elite exploitation, does not come about as a direct consequence of
climate disasters. Rather, the mechanism involves local elites, under the veil of
humanitarian assistance and climate change mitigation/adaptation policies, seeking to gain
a foothold in ongoing land conflicts with local communities.
In the wake of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, local populations in the island of Sicogon were
forced by the local political elite to waive their rights to land on the island.21 In exchange,
they would receive either a lump-sum cash payout or a house at a relocation site in the
mainland, along with immediate disaster assistance. The parcels of land the indigenous
populations resided on stood in the way of a planned tourism project and was the source of
ongoing land conflict between local communities and the local elite. Preying on the local
populations’ desperation following typhoon Haiyan, the local elites saw an opening to
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dispossess them of their lands. Those who refused the offer for payouts or relocation
reported becoming victims of constant harassment and threats.
To be sure, such conflicts can also take place in the absence of climate disasters. There is,
for example, an ongoing pattern of local elites in Southeast Asia justifying land grabs using
the veil of climate change adaptation or mitigation – a phenomenon commonly referred to
as “green-grabbing”.
In Myanmar’s Northern Shan State, a 2020 study found that the justification for hydropower
projects along with the Salween River has increasingly been framed in terms of climate
change mitigation.22 Villagers had also stated that this sort of framing had become more
prominent since talks about dam-building began in the early 2010s. Many villagers opposed
to the dam were ultimately forced to vacate lands the government wanted to acquire as part
of the hydropower projects.
Elsewhere in Cambodia’s Greater Aural region, the expansion of flex crops used for biofuel
production ignited conflicts between local communities and local companies backed by the
governing elite.23 Increasing the use of biofuels had been touted as a form of climate change
mitigation strategy amongst global policymakers, and in 2010, the Cambodian government
awarded large land concessions to two sugar companies owned by a tycoon closely
associated with the country’s political elite. These companies encroached upon farmland
belonging to local communities. Evictions soon turned violent, and villagers reported
bulldozers, backed by army battalions, clearing their lands without warning.
In a separate region of Cambodia, in the Prey Lang Forest, a 34,007-hectare land concession
was awarded to a Korean company, Think Biotech, by the Cambodian government in 2010
to execute a reforestation project under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM).24 Local communities residing within the concession were forced to
give up rights to the land. In 2013, approximately 300 villagers organised local protests
outside Think Biotech’s offices in Kratie province, seizing two company trucks in the
process. Think Biotech’s activities continue to face resistance and protests from local
communities to this day. Ironically, the project’s green credentials are now in doubt. The
concession now consists of a monoculture timber plantation, whose creation had involved
industrial-scale slash and burn activity. The initial aim of CDM accreditation was also
dropped because the requirements to provide proof of emissions reductions were deemed
“too complicated”.25
These case studies demonstrate that climate change can provide an avenue for local elites
to assert control over resources, which might, in turn, spark conflict. In many Southeast
Asian countries where land rights for rural communities are often lacking, there will be risks
of elite exploitation leading to conflict. No doubt, such exploitation is not new, but climate
change policies have now provided a new legitimation for local elites to justify land grabs.
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CONCLUSION AND POLICY DIRECTIONS
Climate-conflict research in Southeast Asia is still nascent. The studies reviewed for this
article certainly do not provide a definitive assessment of the climate-conflict link in the
region. However, they can be seen as a cross section of Southeast Asia’s climate-conflict
risk landscape, and certain important insights about the exact mechanisms linking climate
and conflict can be gleaned from them.
The main takeaway is that climate-related conflict will typically play out where livelihoods
are heavily dependent upon climatic factors, i.e., in agriculture or fishery. The propensity
for locals to participate in conflict in response to adverse climatic events will decrease if
policies are in place to mitigate the economic harm suffered by communities during climate
events.
Measures that reduce the impact of climatic events on agricultural yields have been
suggested as a potential mitigation strategy for climate-linked conflict. 26 For instance,
building irrigation infrastructure, diversifying crops and improving access to climate-smart
agriculture technologies are some of the policy paths that governments can consider. These
also have other economic and environmental benefits that will make them particularly
attractive to local or federal governments.
Regarding land conflicts linked to “green grabbing”, these can be mitigated with improved
land rights for rural populations that have typically relied on customary land tenures that
have little to no formal recognition. Increasing the level of transparency and accountability
in environmental impact assessments for projects justified in the name of climate change
mitigation/adaptation will also be needed. In this regard, the role of local non-government
organisations who are familiar with local environmental contexts will be important.
Since climate change is projected to severely impact Southeast Asia in the near future,
climate-conflict research that is contextually sensitive to the region is needed more than
ever.
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Appendix: The Southeast Asia Climate-Conflict Studies Analysed for this Article
Author(s) Title Journal Year
Arnim Schneidel and Forest plantations and climate Land Use Policy 2018
Courtney Work change discourses: New powers of
‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia
Benjamin Bagozzi, Ore Droughts, land appropriation, and The Journal of Politics 2017
Koren, and Bumba rebel violence in the developing
Mukherjee world.
Benjamin Crost, Claire Climate change, agricultural Journal of Environmental 2018
Duquennois, Joseph H. production and civil conflict: Economics and Management
Felter, and Daniel I. Evidence from the Philippines
Rees
Carol Hunsberger, Linking climate change strategies World Development 2018
Courtney Work, and and land conflicts in Cambodia:
Roman Herre Evidence from the Greater Aural
region.
Colin Walch Weakened by the storm: Rebel Journal of Peace Research 2020
group recruitment in the wake of
natural disasters in the Philippines
Joshua Eastin Hell and high water: Precipitation Political Geography 2018
shocks and conflict violence in the
Philippines
Maria Angelina Uson Natural disasters and land grabs: Canadian Journal of 2018
The politics of their intersection in Development Studies
the Philippines following super
typhoon Haiyan
Nicolas Gatti, Kathy Can irrigation infrastructure American Journal of 2021
Baylis, and Benjamin mitigate the effect of rainfall Agricultural Economics
Crost shocks on conflict? Evidence from
Indonesia
Raul Caruso, Ilaria Climate change, rice crops, and Journal of Peace Research 2017
Petrarca, and Roberto violence: Evidence from Indonesia
Ricciuti
Saturnino M. Borras Jr, Climate change and land: Insights World Development 2016
Jennifer C. Franco, and from Myanmar
Zau Nam
Sebastian Axbard Income opportunities and sea American Economic 2016
piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from Journal: Applied Economics
satellite data
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1
UN Security Council. “The UN Security Council and Climate Change” Security Council Report. 21 June
2021. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/climate_security_2021.pdf
2
Koubi, Vally. “Climate change and conflict.” Annual Review of Political Science 22 (2019): 343-360.
3
Mach, Katharine J., Caroline M. Kraan, W. Neil Adger, Halvard Buhaug, Marshall Burke, James D.
Fearon, Christopher B. Field et al. “Climate as a risk factor for armed conflict.” Nature 571, no. 7764
(2019): 193-197.
4
Adams, Courtland, Tobias Ide, Jon Barnett, and Adrien Detges. “Sampling bias in climate–conflict
research.” Nature Climate Change 8, no. 3 (2018): 200-203.
5
Carbon Brief. “Mapped: How climate change affects extreme weather around the world”. Carbon Brief. 21
February 2021. https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-weather-around-
the-world; Ornes, Stephen. “Core Concept: How does climate change influence extreme weather? Impact
attribution research seeks answers.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115, no. 33 (2018):
8232-8235.
6
Eckstein, David, Vera Künzel, and Laura Schäfer. Global Climate Risk Index 2021. Who Suffers Most from
Extreme Weather Events: Weather Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019. German Watch, 2021.; von
Uexkull, Nina, and Halvard Buhaug. “Security implications of climate change: A decade of scientific
progress.” Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 1 (2021): 3-17.
7
Guha-Sapir, Debby., Regina Below and Phillipe Hoyois. EM-DAT: The CRED/OFDA International
Disaster Database (29 December 2021), distributed by Université Catholique de Louvain. www.emdat.be.
8
IPCC. Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. [Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, A.
Pirani, S.L. Connors, C. Péan, S. Berger, N. Caud, Y. Chen, L. Goldfarb, M.I. Gomis, M. Huang, K.
Leitzell, E. Lonnoy, J.B.R. Matthews, T.K. Maycock, T. Waterfield, O. Yelekçi, R. Yu, and B. Zhou (eds.)].
Cambridge University Press, 2021.
9
Conflict events are defined as incidents where armed force was used an organised actor, against another
organised actor, or against civilians, which resulted in at least one direct death at a specified date and
location.
10
Rosvold, Elisabeth L., and Halvard Buhaug. “GDIS, a global dataset of geocoded disaster locations.”
Scientific Data 8, no. 1 (2021): 1-7.
11
Pettersson, Therése, Shawn Davies, Amber Deniz, Garoun Engström, Nanar Hawach, Stina Högbladh, and
Margareta Sollenberg Magnus Öberg. “Organized violence 1989–2020, with a special emphasis on Syria.”
Journal of Peace Research 58, no. 4 (2021): 809-825.
12
An earlier study provided the mechanism framework that is utilised in this paper. Nordqvist, P., &
Krampe, F. (2018). Climate change and violent conflict: sparse evidence from South Asia and South East
Asia. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
13
Salehyan, Idean, and Cullen S. Hendrix. “Climate shocks and political violence.” Global Environmental
Change 28 (2014): 239-250.
14
Caruso, Raul, Ilaria Petrarca, and Roberto Ricciuti. “Climate change, rice crops, and violence: Evidence
from Indonesia.” Journal of Peace Research 53, no. 1 (2016): 66-83.
15
Crost, Benjamin, Claire Duquennois, Joseph H. Felter, and Daniel I. Rees. “Climate change, agricultural
production and civil conflict: Evidence from the Philippines.” Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 88 (2018): 379-395.
16
Axbard, Sebastian. “Income opportunities and sea piracy in Indonesia: Evidence from satellite
data.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 8, no. 2 (2016): 154-94.
17
IPCC. Sixth Assessment Report.
18
Eastin, Joshua. “Hell and high water: Precipitation shocks and conflict violence in the Philippines.”
Political Geography 63 (2018): 116-134.
19
Bagozzi, Benjamin E., Ore Koren, and Bumba Mukherjee. “Droughts, land appropriation, and rebel
violence in the developing world.” The Journal of Politics 79, no. 3 (2017): 1057-1072.
20
Walch, Colin. “Weakened by the storm: Rebel group recruitment in the wake of natural disasters in the
Philippines.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 3 (2018): 336-350.
13ISSUE: 2022 No. 15
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21
Uson, Maria Angelina M. “Natural disasters and land grabs: The politics of their intersection in the
Philippines following super typhoon Haiyan.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies/Revue canadienne
d’études du développement 38, no. 3 (2017): 414-430.
22
Borras Jr, Saturnino M., Jennifer C. Franco, and Zau Nam. “Climate change and land: Insights from
Myanmar.” World Development 129 (2020): 104864.
23
Hunsberger, Carol, Courtney Work, and Roman Herre. “Linking climate change strategies and land
conflicts in Cambodia: Evidence from the Greater Aural region.” World Development 108 (2018): 309-320.
24
Scheidel, Arnim, and Courtney Work. “Forest plantations and climate change discourses: New powers of
‘green grabbing’ in Cambodia.” Land Use Policy 77 (2018): 9-18.
25
Ibid, 10.
26
Gatti, Nicolas, Kathy Baylis, and Benjamin Crost. “Can irrigation infrastructure mitigate the effect of
rainfall shocks on conflict? Evidence from Indonesia.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 103,
no. 1 (2021): 211-231.
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