Shadows over the European Elections
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NO. 50 NOVEMBER 2018 Introduction
Shadows over the European Elections
Three Scenarios for EU-sceptical Parties after the 2019 Elections
Nicolai von Ondarza and Felix Schenuit
For a long time, the elections to the European Parliament (EP) were considered second-
order elections with little political significance. But for the elections coming in 2019,
they are turning into a decisive vote on the future of the European Union (EU) – not
only because the EP has gained in importance, but especially because the European
party system is undergoing fundamental change. Whereas established parties are
losing support, right-wing populist and EU-sceptical parties have been growing across
Europe. At the same time, there are increased efforts to unite the traditionally frag-
mented EU-sceptical forces into a collective movement. Even though there is no dras-
tic increase expected in the number of EU-sceptical Members of European Parliament
(MEPs) in the next parliamentary term, a reorganisation of the EU-sceptical spectrum
could be the prelude to drastic changes in the political structure of the EU.
Traditionally, the European election year than “second-order elections”, a series of
is regarded in Brussels as a “year of institu- simultaneous national votes that serve,
tional transition”. From the start of the EP above all, to send a message to the respec-
election campaigns in the spring, all the tive national governments. European politi-
way up to the planned election of the new cal issues, on the other hand, have played
Commission, most of the year is devoted to only a minor role in previous EP election
this transition. Since the Treaty of Lisbon campaigns.
and the introduction of the Spitzenkandida- In 2019, however, the elections will take
ten principle in 2014, the Presidency of the place under changed circumstances. After
Commission is also directly linked to the almost a decade of “crisis mode”, the future
elections. In addition, the Parliament has to development of the EU is more contro-
approve the entire Commission, including versial than ever. In March 2019, just eight
the High Representative of the Union for weeks before the European elections, the
Foreign and Security Policy. As the term United Kingdom will (probably) be the first
limit of the European Council President member to leave the EU. As a result, the
also expires in November 2019, the entire EP will, for the first time, be comprised of
leadership of the EU will be renewed. fewer MEPs than before: only 705 (see SWP
At the level of the member states, how- Comment 10/2018). More than six months
ever, the EP vote has so far been little more before the elections, candidates for the
Spitzenkandidaten are also pushing their way through the work of their EP political
into the European public arena – even groups. Nevertheless, they fulfil four impor-
earlier than in the last elections. tant functions in the EU’s political system.
At the same time, party systems across Firstly, they play a quite considerable
Europe are changing, albeit in varying role in reconciling the interests of national
degrees: In almost all elections since 2014, parties, and thus serve as an integration
established parties have lost support, where- factor in European politics. For instance,
as the levels of fragmentation of party sys- the heads of state and government and/or
tems and the share of votes cast by EU- party leaders of the large party families,
sceptical parties have grown in many cases. such as the European Peoples Party (EPP)
But liberal, pro-European forces also have a or the Party for European Socialists (PES),
figurehead who is outside the existing party coordinate themselves before each Euro-
spectrum: French President Emmanuel pean Council. There is, of course, also con-
Macron. tinuous coordination among the party
This makes the European elections a groups in the EP, which often have close
challenge for the EU’s political system. On links to their national parties.
the one hand, the informal “grand coali- Secondly, the European political parties
tion” between the Christian democratic and and their parliamentary groups are the
conservative European People’s Party (EPP) main players for obtaining a majority in
and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists the EP, where there is no formal coalition,
& Democrats (S&D), which traditionally meaning that majorities must always be
dominates the EU, must for the first time established on a case-by-case basis. Here,
fear for its majority in the EP. On the other the party groups act like coherent political
hand, Matteo Salvini, chairman of the players. Despite their character as umbrella
Italian Lega Nord, and Stephen Bannon, organisations, the major parties in particu-
right-wing populist agitator from the lar have, with a few exceptions, succeeded
United States, have formulated the goal in establishing parliamentary discipline in
of uniting EU-sceptical parties and making the EP instead of voting along national lines.
them the largest faction in the EP. Thirdly, the parties are also becoming
increasingly important for filling top EU
positions. This has become clear in the
European Parties: Between strengthening of the EP through the Treaty
Alliances of Convenience and of Lisbon and the Spitzenkandidaten principle,
Genuine Communities of Interest which was applied for the first time in 2014.
Filling the posts of the European Council
In principle, European parties cannot be President and the High Representative of
equated with national parties in terms of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy
organisational character, unifying effect, has also been linked to proportional rep-
and assertiveness. The Treaty on European resentation of the parties.
Union (TEU) recognises parties at the Euro- Fourthly, European parties and joint
pean level that “contribute to forming parliamentary groups in the EP offer addi-
European political awareness and to ex- tional resources and legitimacy for national
pressing the will of citizens of the Union” parties. Paradoxically, it was precisely the
(Article 10, TEU) and party financing struc- EU-sceptical parties that benefited the most
tures have been established. However, Euro- from the EP’s financial resources and the
pean parties are not associations of citizens, stage it provided. For instance, both Nigel
but umbrella organisations of national par- Farage and Marine Le Pen used their
ties. So far, they have been much weaker speeches in the European Parliament to
than their national member parties in gather social media attention, and used
terms of election campaigns, programmes, their legitimacy as MEPs to take part in
and finances. They are mainly visible televised debates, despite neither having
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
2won a seat in their national Parliament at been represented at the European level for
the time. some time. Already in the first direct elec-
tions in 1979, a handful of Eurosceptic
MEPs were elected to the EP, followed in
EU-sceptical Parties in Strasbourg 1984 by the then still clearly right-wing
extremist Front National. Since the desired
The size and composition of the EU-scep- “national international” per se contains a
tical camp, which is still the most frag- contradiction, the parties concerned have
mented one in the EP, are critical compo- long failed to establish a stable European
nents in determining the composition and group or party that can survive several legis-
direction of the next European Parliament. lative periods. In the 2014 European elec-
In the summer of 2018, Stephen Bannon, tions, the number of EU-sceptical MEPs rose
former advisor to US President Donald to such an extent that they were able to
Trump, announced building a movement form three separate parliamentary groups.
to support right-wing populist parties
across Europe. The declared goal is to form EU-sceptical Factions and
a large right-wing populist group with up to Parliamentarians
one-third of the MEPs in the 2019 European
elections – thereby weakening the liberal The largest of these three is the European
European order from within. Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group.
Even though Bannon’s proposal generated It currently has 73 members from 19 EU
significant media attention, it should be member states. In addition to its liberal
noted that he jumped on an already mov- economic orientation, the ECR originally
ing train: Even before the European elec- followed a moderately EU-sceptical model.
tions in 2014, the French National Front, Accordingly, the majority of its members
the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the supported the membership of their coun-
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and the tries in the EU, but they called for returning
Italian Lega Nord had agreed on right-wing to a focus on the internal market and inter-
populist cooperation. After these four had governmental decision-making procedures.
performed worse than expected in the Since 2016 at the latest, however, the UK
2014 elections, they formed the Europe Conservatives, who have dominated the
of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group the ECR, have been advocating for Brexit. At
following year. In 2017, the leaders of the the same time, the group has expanded to
above parties, plus the German Alternative include MEPs who are more sceptical about
for Germany (AfD), met in Koblenz to sup- the EU. These include the Sweden Demo-
port each other in the ongoing election cam- crats, who are in favour of an EU exit refer-
paigns and to push for policy changes in endum. However, the course of the Brexit
Europe. The objective is clearly stated: negotiations have made it clear that Brexit
Salvini, party leader of Lega Nord, wants to also threatens the future of the ECR: With
create a European alliance to unite all EU- the Conservatives leaving the EP, the Polish
sceptical, national-conservative, and right- Law and Justice (PiS) party remains the only
wing populist movements in Europe and to large party within the ECR.
close the borders of the EU. It is a substan- Even more uncertain is the future of the
tial challenge for the existing order in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
Union. (EFDD) group, the second smallest group in
So far, the spectrum of EU-sceptical par- the EP, with 42 MEPs. It was formed after
ties in the European party system ranges the 2014 elections and has no common
from those that are moderately critical of electoral manifest. From the outset, it has
the EU to the anti-EU parties of right-wing been a mere alliance of convenience be-
populists, and even those with a right-wing tween the UK Independence Party (UKIP)
extremist character. These currents have and the Italian Five Star Movement. The
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
3lowest common denominator has been the mentarians. In 2014, the AfD started with
populist, EU-critical stance and the interest seven MEPs as part of the more moderate
in parliamentary resources for political ECR group. After several internal party
groups. With Brexit (most likely) happening splits and exclusion from the ECR, only one
at the end of March 2019, the 19 UKIP MEPs AfD member is formally still represented in
will exit the EP. This means that the EFDD the EP and sits in the EFDD parliamentary
would no longer be able to claim parlia- group. A connection to the ENF is also
mentary group status, at least before the being discussed in the party.
European elections in 2019, because a
necessary criterion – namely bringing to- Orbán and the Future of the EPP
gether at least 25 MEPs – would no longer
be fulfilled. In any case, the second pillar But the ambitions for a collective move-
of the EFDD – the 14 MEPs of the Five Star ment are not limited to the existing EU-
Movement – is acting more like an inde- sceptical factions: Salvini, among others,
pendent group than as a part of the EFDD, has invited Hungarian Prime Minister
most recently since trying to join the Al- Viktor Orbán to join an EU-sceptical rally-
liance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ing group. Orbán’s Fidesz party has been a
(ALDE) in 2017. In Italy, the party has – at member of the EPP since Hungary joined
least rhetorically – softened its EU-critical the EU. The EPP sees itself as a pro-Euro-
stance. The smaller parties in the EFDD pean party that advocates values such as
should therefore reorient themselves after the rule of law, democracy, and the strength-
the European elections, at the latest. ening of civil society. Orbán, on the other
The ENF group has 35 MEPs, almost hand, is pursuing his goal of an “illiberal
half of them from the French National Rally democracy” in Hungary and has already
(Rassemblement National, formerly Front had the freedom of the press and the activ-
National). It is the smallest and youngest ities of foreign non-governmental organi-
group in the EP. Its member parties are sations restricted. Orbán is increasingly
characterised by their strict rejection of the sceptical about European integration in its
EU as a whole and also their right-wing current form and criticises the fact that it
populist to right-wing extremist positions. is interfering too deeply with national sover-
The ENF is the only one of the three groups eignty. The AfD has declared both Salvini
in the EU-critical spectrum that is not sig- and Orbán, amongst others, as their “natu-
nificantly affected by Brexit. Several repre- ral allies in Europe”. In terms of policies,
sentatives of the parties in the ENF, such as there are overlaps between Orbáns Fidesz
former ENF MEP and current Italian Interior with EU-sceptical, right-wing populist par-
Minister Matteo Salvini, want to transform ties, especially in migration policy, but also
the ENF into a movement of EU-critical with the growing levels of rejection of the
parties after the European elections. current path of European integration.
Finally, there are still 23 non-attached Until 2018, the EPP leadership had opted
MEPs in the European Parliament, most for dialogue and rejected EU legal proceed-
of whom can be counted towards the EU- ings against Hungary. In September 2018,
sceptical spectrum. These include parlia- however, the majority of EPP MEPs voted
mentarians from the National Democratic in favour of initiating such proceedings
Party of Germany and the Hungarian Jobbik against Hungary under Article 7 of the TEU,
party, which have been judged to be so ex- whereas the EU-sceptical groups ECR, EFDD,
treme by their colleagues that, so far, none and ENF voted largely in favour of Fidesz.
of the EU-sceptic groups have wanted to The EPP leadership and Fidesz stressed after
admit them. The future of the AfD in the the vote that the party would neither leave
EP is also in question – it can hope for a the EPP nor be excluded. However, Orbán
double-digit number of MEPs in view of its publicly toyed with the idea of cooperating
poll results and the many German parlia- with national conservative forces. He under-
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
4pinned this idea during a meeting with shrink overall. In addition, a number of
the Lega Nord leader, Salvini, at which time new or hitherto non-attached parties are
they announced a joint “anti-migration likely to enter Parliament. These include
front” and positioned themselves in the Macron’s La République En Marche! (LREM)
same ideological camp. In doing so, they party, which is expected to work with the
clearly distinguished themselves from Presi- ALDE group, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La
dent Macron. The latter, in turn, attacked France Insoumise (LFI) party, which is ex-
the EPP and stressed that one party could pected to join the European United Left–
not be the political home of Angela Merkel Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). In addition,
and Viktor Orbán at the same time. there are a number of new parties, most
of which belong to the EU-sceptical party
spectrum. Before and after the elections,
Expected Changes in the intensive negotiations on the accession of,
EU-sceptical Spectrum and changes in, political groups are to be
expected. The results of these talks depend
The strength of EU-sceptical forces in the on both political and personal factors and
next European Parliament thus relies on can therefore hardly be predicted, but they
two factors – how well the individual par- will nevertheless have a considerable influ-
ties do in the EP elections, and how well ence on the size of the respective parlia-
they are able to work together in the Par- mentary groups.
liament afterwards. There is some evidence that the EU-scep-
Six months before the elections, the tical spectrum will retain the same (high)
chances of success of the individual parties level of seats – slightly more than 20 per
can only be inaccurately assessed by polls. cent – in the European Parliament after
The European elections, with their 27 the elections and will not increase it. This
simultaneous national elections, are par- may come as a surprise when one considers
ticularly susceptible to deviations in the that EU-sceptical parties have gained popu-
polls, low turnouts, and changes in voters’ larity in national elections in almost all EU
intentions. Moreover, very few EU countries member states since 2014. Apart from the
have conducted meaningful surveys on the fact that political reports pay significant
European elections so far. attention to the right-wing populist parties,
Our initial forecasts (see Figure 1, p. 6) this forecast can be explained by two factors.
of possible outcomes of the European elec- On the one hand, the EU-sceptical spec-
tions show, however, that the ENF and trum is proportionally the most affected by
the EFDD – in contrast to almost all other Brexit, as the two largest groups of EU-scep-
parliamentary groups – are expected to tical MEPs to date (UKIP and UK Conserva-
increase their share of seats. Apart from tives) will be leaving the EP. On the other
these two, only the ALDE can expect growth. hand, some EU sceptics already achieved
Although the polls offer little more than a impressive successes in the 2014 European
preliminary, cautious orientation, it is very elections, predating their significant nation-
likely that the informal “grand coalition” al successes since then. These include, for
between the EPP and the S&D could lose its example, the French National Front, the
parliamentary majority for the first time Dutch PVV, and the Danish People’s Party.
since direct elections began in 1979. New gains for EU-sceptical parties in the
The ECR would suffer losses because of 2019 European elections can therefore be
the departure of the UK Conservatives. The expected primarily from parties that had
EPP and the S&D must both fear significant not achieved a breakthrough in 2014 but
losses. The Greens/European Free Alliance have since been successful at the national
(EFA) are currently polling very high in a level. This applies, above all, to the Italian
few member states (Germany, Luxemburg, Lega Nord, the German AfD, partially the
Netherlands), but are also expected to Austrian FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats.
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
5Figure 1
Possible outcomes of the 2019 elections to the European Parliament
Compared to 2014, the fundamentally tics, who reject the depth of integration
critical faction of the EU sceptics can there- but want to retain the Union as such, to
fore expect greater growth. fundamental EU opponents, whose declared
goal is to abolish the Union, or at least lead
Three Scenarios their country out of it. Secondly, the issue
of migration is a matter of disagreement.
It remains open whether, and in which con- Northern and Central European populists,
stellation, the parties of the EU-sceptical for example, reject the distribution of refu-
spectrum will cooperate in the next Par- gees, whereas Southern Europeans demand
liament. So far, as shown, they have been solidarity from their EU partners. Thirdly
divided into three smaller groups and a and finally, a “national international” suf-
number of non-attached MEPs, who by fers from the fact that the emphasis on
themselves have less influence than a larger national identity and sovereignty contra-
group. For substantive reasons, there is dicts European cooperation.
little likelihood that cooperation will con- Yet, for reasons of power politics, there is
tinue to be enforceable in the future. The a significant incentive for right-wing popu-
votes in the course of the last parliamentary lists and EU-critical parties to symbolically
term reveal that only the ECR has achieved underpin their strength after the European
the status of a group being capable of elections with a joint parliamentary group
acting with group discipline. that is as large as possible. At the same
There are also substantial differences time, this would give them even more op-
between the EU-sceptical parties. This ap- portunities to demand speaking rights in –
plies, above all, to three of their core politi- and resources from – the EP.
cal issues. First, the parties have quite dif- Three possible scenarios for the future
ferent stances towards the EU. The spec- development of the right-wing populist and
trum still ranges from moderate EU scep- EU-sceptical spectrum after the 2019 elec-
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
6tions can be formulated from this mixed The ENF should fulfil the necessary
situation. Scenario A – a continuation of condition of having 25 MEPs from at least
the status quo with the three fragmented seven member states. With parties such as
factions – can almost be ruled out. The the AfD, the French Rassemblement National,
EFDD, in particular, has been nothing more the FPÖ, and the PVV now firmly anchored
than an alliance of convenience since it was in the national political system, the ENF
founded and, during the course of the legis- would have a much more stable composi-
lative period, it has lost what few ties it had tion than before. However, a balance of
that bound it together. Without UKIP as the power and common political goals would
main pillar, the remaining parties will tend have to be found in such a group that is
to turn to other political groups. The Five composed of strong parties from Italy,
Star Movement from Italy will play a key Austria, France, and Germany. This could
role. As the second pillar alongside UKIP, it be a great challenge for the parties, as some
has already distanced itself in the current of them are dominated by individuals (Italy
legislative period from the EFDD and partly and France), or shaped by discussions about
from earlier anti-EU/euro rhetoric. In 2019 the political orientation, such as the AfD in
it could again increase the number of its Germany.
MEPs and become one of the largest national Without the Conservatives from the UK,
parties in the EP. the ECR would have to reconstitute itself
In scenario B, the EU-sceptical camp and would, in the future, be more strongly
would concentrate on two factions along influenced by Central and Eastern Europe-
the axis of EU scepticism. Accordingly, the an national conservatives. But the group
EFDD would disappear, the ECR would take could continue to play its hybrid role, co-
on the rather moderate EU-sceptical, eco- operating with the EPP and ALDE on eco-
nomically liberal parties, and the ENF nomic issues, but adopting a more oppo-
would assemble the fundamentally EU- sitional stance on issues of European policy
sceptical, globalisation-critical parties and conservative values.
within its ranks. In scenarios B and C, For both groups, there would also be the
we have also included the projection that potential for enlargement in the group of
Macron’s LREM will cooperate with the non-attached MEPs and new or as-of-yet
ALDE, and Mélenchon’s LFI with the Euro- unattached parties. Beyond the announce-
pean Left (GUE/NGL). ment of the results, it therefore remains
According to current forecasts, some 46 interesting to observe which camp could
EFDD seats would have to be reallocated. form the larger group in this scenario, the
This would affect the AfD and the Five Star ECR or the ENF. In view of the current fore-
Movement, in particular. Currently, it casts and the diversity of right-wing parties,
seems most plausible that the AfD will join scenario B seems to be the most plausible
the ENF. The Five Star Movement, on the one at the moment.
other hand, has recently weakened its Finally, in scenario C, the parties in-
EU-sceptical position and announced the volved would – according to Salvini’s or
founding of a new group after the 2019 Bannon’s declared goal – be able to form
elections. However, it is still completely an EU-critical collective group uniting all
unclear whether – and with which part- parties of the EU-sceptical spectrum.
ners – this can succeed. If this does not According to Salvini’s vision, this should
succeed, the Five Star Movement would not only include the parties of the ECR, the
probably opt for no faction rather than EFDD, and the ENF, but also win the sup-
forming a faction with Salvini in the ENF or port of the right wing of the EPP, above all
strongly value-conservative parties such as that of Viktor Orbán.
the Polish PiS in the ECR. In scenarios B and In numerical terms, such a collective
C, it is therefore still assigned to the inde- movement would certainly have the poten-
pendents. tial to become the largest, or second largest,
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
7group in the EP. For this to happen, how- parliamentary term about which one will
ever, the serious political differences between become the largest EU-sceptical group: the
these parties would have to be bridged. A softer eurosceptic – but rather constructive
taboo break would also be necessary with – ECR, or the right-wing populist faction
regard to cooperation between the previous around actors such as Salvini and Le Pen.
right wing of the EPP, the ECR, and the The extent of fragmentation in the EU-
tough opponents of the EU. Although this sceptical camp will not only determine how
scenario cannot be completely ruled out, much influence its supporters can exert on
it is more likely that the ENF will become the replacement of the Commission Presi-
stronger and gradually try to poach parties dent and the European Council President.
© Stiftung Wissenschaft from the ECR or EPP. It will also be inter- It will also be crucial to what extent EU-
und Politik, 2018 esting to see whether parties considered to sceptical parties and MEPs can shape policy
All rights reserved be clearly right-wing extremists will be in- areas such as migration policy.
vited to become members of a collective How united or disunited the EU sceptics
This Comment reflects
faction. are will also have fundamental consequences
the authors’ views.
for the future interactions between European
The online version of institutions. If the eurosceptic and right-
this publication contains Outlook wing populist forces in the EP strengthen,
functioning links to other doubts will grow as to whether Parliament
SWP texts and other relevant
The scenarios illustrate what is at stake in can continue to be regarded as a reliable
sources.
the 2019 European elections. If the EU-scep- engine of the European integration process.
SWP Comments are subject tical camp remains as fragmented as before, Majorities for federal reform processes will
to internal peer review, fact- Parliament’s work will remain largely un- be even more difficult to find in the next
checking and copy-editing. changed. A collective movement, on the parliamentary term than before.
For further information on other hand, would even have the chance to Regarding the overall integration pro-
our quality control pro-
form the largest parliamentary group in the cess, it appears that the forthcoming Euro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp- EP – though still be far from a parliamen- pean elections could be a step towards a
berlin.org/en/about-swp/ tary majority. However, because the politi- fundamental reorientation of the European
quality-management-for- cal orientations of the EU-sceptical parties integration project. After years of crisis, the
swp-publications/ diverge greatly, it seems more realistic election campaigns will focus primarily on
at the moment that two factions will be the EU’s self-perception. With the defeat
SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
formed along the axis of EU scepticism and of Marine Le Pen in the French presidential
Politik divide the parties assembled in the EFDD elections of 2017, many parties – includ-
German Institute for amongst the ECR and the ENF. ing those that are fundamentally sceptical
International and The decisive factor will be the negotia- about the EU – have decided to no longer
Security Affairs tions on future party affiliations after the question the EU itself or the membership
elections – not only between the parties of their respective country. Instead, they are
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin already represented in Parliament, but also now calling for fundamental changes to the
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 with the new ones. The election results EU’s value base. Among the many political
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 alone will therefore hardly provide enough challenges, the question of whether Euro-
www.swp-berlin.org information about the majority situation in pean integration will continue to follow a
swp@swp-berlin.org
the next parliamentary term. Rather, it can cosmopolitan ideal or whether it will turn
ISSN 1861-1761
be assumed that the parliamentary groups towards a course of isolation is therefore
will change again and again in the course becoming more and more pressing.
(Updated and revised of the next election period and will try to
English version of add further members to their ranks.
SWP-Aktuell 58/2018) If we can trust current predictions, the
two camps will compete throughout the
Dr Nicolai von Ondarza is Head of the EU / Europe Division at SWP,
Felix Schenuit is Research Assistant of the EU / Europe Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 50
November 2018
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