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No. 62 18 June 2009
russian
analytical
digest
www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de
Russia’s National Security Strategy
■■ Analysis
Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment 2
By Marcel de Haas, The Hague
■■ Analysis
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020 6
By Henning Schröder, Berlin
German Association for Research Centre for East Center for Security
DGO East European Studies European Studies, Bremen Studies, ETH Zurichrussian
analytical russian analytical digest 62/09
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Analysis
Medvedev’s Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment
By Marcel de Haas, The Hague
Abstract
President Dmitry Medvedev has been in office for more than a year, making this a suitable moment to offer
a provisional assessment of his external security policy by analyzing his major security documents and state-
ments. In July 2008, several months after his inauguration as president, Medvedev launched his first ma-
jor security document, the Foreign Policy Concept. Shortly after the Russian-Georgian conflict of August
2008, Medvedev introduced a second security policy initiative, this time in the form of a statement on ma-
jor policy principles. The next month, in September 2008, Putin’s successor approved a specific strategy for
the Arctic region. And in May 2009 President Medvedev ratified Russia’s first National Security Strategy.
Russia’s military doctrine, the third pillar of the “troika” of the country’s security policy hierarchy after the
strategy and the foreign policy concept is expected to appear in a new edition during the course of 2009.
Foreign Policy Concept (July 2008) Cooperation Organization (SCO) – a political, eco-
On 12 July 2008, Medvedev signed a new edition of nomic and security grouping of Russia, China and four
the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), promulgating his Central Asian CIS states – for its role in creating a net-
first security document as president. The most salient work of partners in the Asia–Pacific Region.
entries in the document dealt with Russia’s internation- The FPC clearly reflected Moscow’s policy prior-
al status, Euro-Atlantic security structures and (securi- ities of the time. The document stressed that Russia
ty) cooperation with Eastern actors. As to its position had restored its international standing and was pur-
in the international arena, the FPC described Russia suing its own national interests instead of being influ-
as a great power with a full-fledged role in global af- enced by the desires of other actors. This stance repeat-
fairs and as one of the influential centers in the mod- ed policy statements from Putin’s 2007 and 2008 se-
ern world. Because of its status as a resurgent “great” or curity documents. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian
“super” power, Russia claimed to exert a substantial in- conflict might also be considered as a policy action re-
fluence on international developments. In line with its flecting these views. The rejection of Western security
strong international position, the FPC made it clear that actions – such as the existing Euro-Atlantic security ar-
Russia would protect the rights and legitimate interests chitecture, NATO expansion and the US missile shield
of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad. – had been incorporated into Russia’s security policy
With regard to Euro-Atlantic security, the FPC de- during the latter part of Putin’s second term, where-
scribed Moscow’s desire to create a different region- as Medvedev launched the proposal for a new Euro-
al collective security and cooperation system than the Atlantic security architecture in June 2008. The em-
one currently employed by the West, thereby ensuring phasis on partners – states and organizations – in the
the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the East coincided with Moscow’s closer ties to China and
FPC rejected further expansion of NATO, especially the upgrading of CSTO and SCO from, respectively,
concerning Ukraine and Georgia. The document also a treaty and a grouping into full-fledged organizations
reiterated Moscow’s opposition to the planned US mis- in recent years.
sile defence shield in Europe. The FPC devoted considerable attention to energy,
The Concept heavily emphasized the East, asserting both in terms of security issues and resources. This ap-
deepened engagement in the format of the Russia-India- proach was also in line with Putin’s 2007 and 2008 state-
China Troika, with China and India bilaterally and in ments. Energy became a consistent part of Moscow’s se-
the Russian–Chinese strategic partnership. In addition curity thinking due to its ability to produce high reve-
to this, the FPC explicitly mentioned the Collective nues and its use as an instrument of power, particular-
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – a Russian-led ly during the gas conflicts with Ukraine.
military alliance of seven states of the Commonwealth Another structural aspect of the Kremlin’s securi-
of Independent States (CIS) – as a key instrument for ty mindset included in the FPC was the importance of
maintaining stability and ensuring security in the CIS. being a nuclear power. The document repeatedly men-
The foreign policy paper also referred to the Shanghai tioned the importance of the strategic nuclear deterrent,
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but also noted the option of negotiations aimed at re- Federation until 2020 (NSS).” The NSS replaced the
ducing the number of nuclear weapons. National Security Concepts of 1997 (Yeltsin) and 2000
Overall, the emphasis in this document on strength- (Putin). The document took a wide view of security and
ening ties with India and China and with CSTO and included chapters on developments in international se-
SCO, in combination with its opposition towards the curity, national interests, priorities and threats, ensuring
current (Western-orientated) European security struc- national security in the field of military security and de-
ture, gave the impression that Russia’s interest in seeking fence, social security, the welfare of citizens, the econo-
security arrangements was moving from West to East. my, science-technology-education, health care, culture,
and the environment.
Foreign and Security Policy Principles Concerning national interests and priorities, the
(August 2008) document listed defence and state and societal secu-
Soon after the Russo-Georgian conflict, in a 31 August rity as the first priorities for Russia’s national security,
television interview, President Medvedev further elab- followed by social-economic concerns, such as increas-
orated his views on foreign and security policy by an- ing the quality of life and economic growth. According
nouncing five principles that would presumably guide to the NSS, Russia’s ability to defend its national se-
Russian action: curity depended above all on the country’s econom-
1. International law must have primacy; ic potential.
2. Multi-polarity should replace the US-dominated un- In the military sphere, the paper stressed that par-
ipolar system; ity with the USA in strategic nuclear weapons should
3. Russia has no intention of isolating itself, seeking be gained or maintained. Furthermore, the strategy as-
friendly relations even with the West; serted that Russia should develop into a global power,
4. Russia considers it a priority to protect Russians since it was already one of the leading powers influenc-
wherever they may be. Russia responds to any ag- ing world processes. Another interest was the protection
gressive act against its citizens or Russia; of Russian citizens in the so-called “near abroad”.
5. Russia has privileged interests in certain regions. The NSS emphasized the interdependence between
Russia’s military actions in Georgia colored the Western civil stability and national security, stating that social-
reaction to Medvedev’s principles. Because Russia had economic development was as important as military
just invaded not only the separatist regions of Abkhazia security. A highly ambitious economic objective in the
and South Ossetia, but also Georgia proper, critics ques- NSS is to become the world’s fifth largest economy in
tioned Russia’s commitment to the primacy of interna- terms of GDP (Russia ranked eighth in 2008 according
tional law. Russia’s unhappiness with the unipolar sys- to the International Monetary Fund and the Central
tem and US policies, along with its declarations pro- Intelligence Agency World Factbook).
tecting Russians abroad represented traditional state- Traditionally, a crucial element of Russian strategic
ments of Russian security thinking. However, in the policy papers has been threat perception. As to threats,
light of Russia’s conflict with Georgia, this reference to Medvedev’s strategy pointed out the policy of a num-
the protection of Russian minorities received a different ber of leading countries, which seek military suprema-
connotation. Russia justified its use of military force in cy by building up nuclear, as well as conventional, stra-
Georgia’s separatist regions as necessary to protect the tegic arms, unilaterally developing anti-ballistic mis-
Russian minority in South Ossetia. Estonia and Latvia sile defences and militarizing space, which may trigger
accordingly viewed Medvedev’s statements as threats, a new arms race. Another threat is NATO“s expansion
considering the presence of Russian minorities on their near Russia“s borders and attempts to grant the mil-
territory. Particularly controversial was Russia’s asser- itary alliance a global role. Non-compliance with in-
tion of its “privileged interests,” especially regarding ternational arms control agreements represents anoth-
Georgia and Ukraine; this declaration emphasized the er threat. Energy security was now also brought in as
Russian view that the former Soviet space was its sphere a threat, backed by the claim that competition for en-
of influence from which the West should stay out. ergy resources might create tension, which could esca-
late into the use of military force near Russian borders
National Security Strategy until 2020 (May and those of its allies. In addition to external threats,
2009) the document also listed domestic perils, such as demo-
On 12 May 2009 Medvedev signed a decree approv- graphic problems, poverty, insufficient health care, ter-
ing the “National Security Strategy of the Russian rorism, separatism, radicalism, extremism, organized
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crime, corruption, and the danger of worldwide pan- nity”, “National defence”, “Raising the quality of life”
demics. and “Economic growth”. The strategy described ener-
Overall the NSS demonstrated a balanced approach gy as a power instrument, strengthening Moscow’s in-
to the full scope of security dimensions. The foreign fluence in the international arena and providing a re-
and military security dimension comprised seven out source to use as strategic deterrence. The latter was pos-
of the 16 pages of the NSS. The remaining pages dealt sibly a hint to the policy of cutting-off energy supplies
with other, especially domestic, security concerns. Thus, for economic, but also for political, purposes, respec-
the NSS was more than simply a military-oriented doc- tively to Belarus and Ukraine, as was again demon-
ument. However, when it came to external security strated in January 2009. In addition to describing en-
threats, an overload of (military) threats from the West ergy as a tool of power, the NSS defined it as a strate-
demonstrated the traditional approach of Russian secu- gic security asset, asserting that increasingly scarce en-
rity thinking, reflecting Russian fears that the country ergy resources can create a threat if energy-poor states
is encircled by enemies, creating a need to seek allies attempted to gain control of assets held by energy rich-
and create buffer zones against such dangers. states, such as Russia, which could cause armed con-
The NSS mentioned a large number of objectives to flicts. In addition to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea,
be reached in all security dimensions, but it remains to the Arctic region was mentioned as a prime source of
be seen whether these can be achieved. However, for the energy resources. This approach corresponded with the
first time in a strategic security document, the NSS con- Kremlin’s 2020 and beyond strategy on the Arctic, en-
cluded with a number of indicators, such as economic dorsed by Medvedev in September 2008.
growth, the unemployment rate and the level of mili- According to the NSS, the main military threats
tary modernization. If these indicators are monitored came from the West, i.e. the USA and NATO. The ref-
and policy is adjusted accordingly, then the chances of erence to non-compliance with international arms con-
successfully reaching the targets will be better than if trol agreements probably referred to the USA’s unilater-
no benchmarks had been provided. al annulment of the Ant-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Just as Putin’s National Security Concept of 2000 in 2002, as well as to the refusal of the NATO mem-
reflected concerns raised by the Kosovo conflict of 1999, ber states to ratify the Adapted Conventional Forces in
the NSS also exhibited present-day policy priorities. Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1999, which caused Russia to
Most important was the desire that Russia should devel- suspend this treaty in December 2007.
op into a global power. This aspiration was a clear con- The statements on nuclear arms in the NSS were
tinuation of the thinking in the latter years of Putin’s ambiguous. On the one hand, Russia stressed mod-
presidency. Then Russian leaders claimed that other ernization of its strategic nuclear deterrent, probably to
countries could no longer ignore Russian interests since counterbalance its weak conventional forces and to un-
Russia had restored much of its lost status. Other cur- derline its position as a superpower. Hence, the strat-
rent and continuing Russian policy positions in the egy focused on maintaining nuclear parity with the
strategy were rejections of further NATO enlargement USA in reply to its European missile shield and an as-
and the US missile defence shield in Europe, efforts to sumed US nuclear strike doctrine. On the other hand,
promote a new European security architecture, and an the NSS also proposed nuclear disarmament. Since a
emphasis on the need to modernize Russia’s armed forc- large part of Russia’s nuclear deterrent was out of date,
es. Another vital and recurring policy point was the pro- the talks with the USA on nuclear reductions, started
tection of Russian citizens in the “near abroad”, since in May 2009, were most likely aimed at destroying the
this issue was used by Moscow to legitimize its invasion obsolete weapons and maintaining Moscow’s modern
of Georgia in August 2008. The reference in the NSS to nuclear arms.
the role of Russian military contingents in conflict ar-
eas promoting international stability was probably also Conclusion
related to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the course of his first year in office President Dmitry
Energy has been gaining weight in Russian secu- Medvedev has presented three major security statements,
rity thinking since Putin’s second presidential term. namely the FPC, a statement on key policy principles,
Indicative of the crucial importance given to energy and the NSS. In comparing these three initiatives, a first
(resources and security) was that the NSS mentioned conclusion is that they all were similar. First, they all
this item more than five times, respectively in the emphasized a multipolar world, guided by internation-
chapters dealing with “Russia in the world commu- al law, without unilateral domination, such as by the
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USA. Second, the three statements mentioned Russia’s East (China, India, CSTO and SCO); energy as a pow-
desire to cooperate and maintain friendly relations with er tool and strategic asset; and nuclear arms as confir-
all countries, including the West. Third, every security mation of Russia’s great power status.
scheme underlined the protection of Russians abroad as A further conclusion is that the main features of
a policy priority. And fourth, all plans – whether open- Medvedev’s security initiatives reflect to a large extent
ly or concealed in other entries – asserted that Russia Putin’s security policy documents of 2007 and 2008.
had privileged interests in certain regions, such as the Hence, Medvedev’s foreign security policy so far does
former Soviet space. not introduce a new course in Russian security thinking,
Whereas Medvedev’s statement of August 2008 was but merely extends that of his predecessor Putin.
limited to enumerating policy principles, the FPC and What should the West do in response to Moscow’s
the NSS explained policy platforms in detail. Additional policies? In order to effectively “press the reset button”
policy priorities shared by the FPC and the NSS were: between the West and Russia, the USA and Europe
Russia’s return to a great power status capable of in- need to enhance their talks with the Kremlin and dis-
fluencing international developments; interests as the cuss with Russian officials in public the alleged Western
starting point for foreign and security policy; rejection threats to Russia. Convincing the Kremlin to drop its
of the West’s security programs, such as the existing zero-sum security policy of the 19th century and to en-
Euro-Atlantic security architecture, NATO expansion ter the realities of the 21st century is the main challenge
and the US missile shield; emphasis on partners in the that lies ahead for Western policy makers.
Table: Chronology of major security documents and statements (2008–2009)
Date Policy document
12 July 2008 Foreign Policy Concept approved by RF President
31 August 2008 Statement by Medvedev on principles of foreign/security policy
12 May 2009 National Security Strategy until 2020 ratified by presidential decree
Expected 2009 Revised Military Doctrine
About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas is Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael in The Hague. This article is partly derived from Russia’s Foreign Security Policy of Putin, Medvedev and
Beyond, which will be published by Routledge around February 2010.
Literature
• Ivanov, V. (2009) “Taynaya strategiya Rossii”, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 27 March.
• Kremlin (2008) “Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy through to
2020”, 8 February, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/08/1137_type82912type82913_159643.
shtml (accessed 26 March 2009).
• Kremlin (2008a) “Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels Channel One, Rossia”, NTV,
31 August; http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_type82912type82916_206003.shtml (ac-
cessed 19 January 2009).
• MID (2007) Overview of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, 27 March, Russian: “Obzor vneshney politiki
Rossiykoy Federatsii”, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/3647DA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4DD (accessed
17 January 2009).
• MID (2008) The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 12 July, English: http://www.mid.ru/ns-
osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/cef95560654d4ca5c32574960036cddb?OpenDocume
nt; Russian: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204108.shtml (accessed 19 January 2009).
• SCRF (2009) National Security Strategy until 2020, 12 May, Russian: “Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti
Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda”, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html (accessed 15 May 2009).
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Analysis
Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020
By Henning Schröder, Berlin
Abstract
The Russian leadership presented a new national security strategy in May 2009. This document is intended
to define an officially recognized system of strategic priorities and measures in the area of domestic and for-
eign policy that will ensure long-term national security and guarantee the sustainable development of the
state. The role of Russia as a major power is defined confidently in the new strategy paper. As a “key subject
in the evolving multipolar system of international relations”, Russia aims to play a dominant role together
with the US, China, and other great powers. On the other hand, the authors of the “Strategy 2020” have
failed to formulate a convincing threat picture. Classic Soviet-era threat perceptions are loosely juxtaposed
with notions relating to the risks associated with globalization. From this, certain inferences may be drawn
as to the assertiveness of President Dmitry Medvedev’s administration. The president and his team have not
managed to maintain control of the discussion on the security policy concept and to integrate the positions
of the agencies involved into a coherent line of argumentation. Nevertheless, the “Strategy 2020” assigns a
high priority to economic development – evidence that Medvedev and Vladimir Putin are realistic in their
assessment of the status quo in Russia. Only an increase in economic output will give Russia the means to
substantiate its claim to great power status. Medvedev succinctly summarized this approach in his presen-
tation of the “Strategy 2020” by summing it up with the formula “Security Through Development”.
The Dilemma of Russian Foreign Policy disparate forces within the political leadership, with
The Russian Federation is certainly not in an enviable their highly divergent conceptions of security, and en-
situation when it comes to foreign or security policy. sure their commitment to a common policy.
Devoid of significant alliances, with an economic output
comparable to that of France, and a standard of living The Run-Up to “Strategy 2020”
that is far below that in Europe at large, it must find the As understood in Russian politics, a national security
means to secure a huge territory and overextended bor- strategy should define the officially recognized system
ders, end the violent conflicts in the Northern Caucasus, of strategic priorities and measures in the fields of do-
and maintain the strategic nuclear balance with the US. mestic and foreign policies that guarantees the long-
At the same time, the Russian leadership is laying claim term national security and sustainable development of
to act as a hegemon in the post-Soviet space and as a the state. Similar documents have been published in
great power on the international stage. The question is the past. The May 2009 “Strategy 2020” replaced a
whether Russia has the economic, military, and politi- national security conception that had been passed on
cal potential to resolve security issues successfully and 17 December 1997. A revised version of that document
to back up its international ambitions. The fundamen- was confirmed by then president Putin in May 2000.
tal problem to be resolved by the country’s foreign and Since then, however, the international state of affairs
security policy is the disparity between aspirations and has changed considerably. The attacks on the World
resources. That dilemma is further aggravated by the in- Trade Center in September 2001 and the weakening of
ternational financial crisis and plummeting energy pric- the US in the wake of its attack on Iraq, the Eastern ex-
es, which have hit the Russian economy hard. pansion of the EU and NATO in 2004, the rising ener-
The “Strategy for Russia’s National Security to 2020”, gy prices, the “color revolutions” in the CIS of 2003–4,
which Russian President Medvedev signed on 12 May the South Ossetian conflict in 2008, the international
2009, must deal with this state of affairs; it must sin- financial crisis, and the plummeting oil price in 2008
gle out the domestic and foreign threats and indicate – all of these factors affected the international standing
ways of extracting the country from this difficult situ- of Russia both positively and negatively.
ation. At the same time, the document also sheds light The national security strategy had to be adapted to
on the extent to which the president and his adminis- the changing international situation. Preparations be-
tration are able to coordinate the various agencies and gan in 2004 on Putin’s instructions. But the work was
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slow to get off the ground, for reasons that remain un- Council was presented with a draft on 24 March; how-
clear. The Security Council may have lost influence dur- ever, it was agreed that the final decision would be de-
ing the tenure of former foreign minister Igor Ivanov, layed by a month. The official reason given was that of a
who acted as secretary of the Security Council from “purely technical” revision. However, Nikolai Patrushev,
April 2004 to July 2007, and may therefore have been the secretary of the Security Council, declared that a
unable to assert itself against the “power structures” – number of new and partially contradictory sugges-
the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior, and tions for changes had been made. Some in the Defense
the intelligence services. After Ivanov’s resignation in Ministry, for example, reportedly wanted the immigra-
July 2007, the position was not immediately filled – an- tion of Chinese people to the Far Eastern part of Russia
other sign of the Council’s declining relevance during to be framed as a threat – a demand that was not taken
Putin’s second term in office. Ivanov’s ongoing obliga- up by the reviewers. Colonel General Georgii Shpak, a
tions were taken on by his deputy, Valentin Sobolev. It former commander of the airborne forces and now as-
was not until May 2008, after Medvedev’s election as sistant to the head of the presidential administration,
president, that the latter appointed a new secretary of explained that the delay was needed to reassess whether
the Security Council, namely Nikolai Patrushev, who any additional risks for Russia might arise from the in-
had served as head of the domestic intelligence service, ternational financial crisis. Russian media outlets touted
Federal Security Service (FSB), until the government another reason, according to which President Medvedev
reshuffle. was deliberately holding back the strategy until after his
meeting with US President Barack Obama in mid-April
Medvedev’s New Start in order to gain a clearer picture as to the future course
In June 2008, President Medvedev ordered that work of relations with the US. These contradictory announce-
on the security strategy be resumed. The task was hand- ments reflect the many voices involved in the editorial
ed to an interministerial working group at the Security process and their lack of coordination. Apparently, as
Council that included representatives of the govern- of March 2009, the divergent departmental interests
ment, the presidential staff, the president’s plenipoten- had not been resolved and the parties involved had not
tiary representatives to the federal districts, the Academy been brought to agreement on a concept.
of Sciences, and major corporations as well as individ-
ual experts. The work wore on until 2009. Meanwhile, The “Strategy 2020” and the New System of
the government, which was separately elaborating a Strategic Planning
“concept for long-term socio-economic development to On 24 April, after the revision of the draft had been
the year 2020”, was quicker to reach a result. Its paper, completed, it was adopted and passed on to the pres-
which deals with issues of economic and social develop- ident. He enacted the “National Security Strategy of
ment, was completed in autumn 2008 and enacted by the Russian Federation to 2020” by decree on 12 May.
Prime Minister Putin’s decree on 17 November. The document is intended to constitute a framework of
Meanwhile, the draft security strategy passed sorts for a series of further concepts, three more of which
through several levels of scrutiny. The scientific adviso- are to be presented in the course of 2009: a new mili-
ry board of the Security Council discussed the paper’s tary doctrine, which is being elaborated by a working
approach and methods, which were then approved by group headed by former chief of the general staff Yuri
the president. The draft was subsequently discussed in Baluevsky; a doctrine for food security to 2020; and a
all federal districts. The governors and the speakers of conceptual document for state and national policy. The
the regional parliaments participated in these regional “Strategy” itself dovetails with the concept for long-term
debates. Furthermore, the presidium of the Academy of socio-economic development to 2020 that the govern-
Sciences discussed the paper and its content was coordi- ment already adopted in November 2008.
nated with all of the members of the Security Council, Together with the “Strategy 2020” document, de-
i.e., the prime minister, the head of the presidential ad- cisions were adopted on the “Foundations of Strategic
ministration, the ministers of defense, interior, and for- Planning in Russia” together with a list of criteria and
eign affairs, the representatives of both chambers of par- indicators for national security. Taken together, these
liament, and the heads of the domestic and foreign in- documents are to create the basis for a system of strate-
telligence services. gic planning encompassing all state authorities. Each
In early February 2009, the Russian media an- department must now present individual strategic plans
nounced that the concept was “nearly done”. The Security for its portfolio. According to a list put together by the
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Security Council, 135 strategies, concepts, and white- ty weapons, including the risk that such weapons might
papers are to be elaborated to cover all areas from bank- be acquired by violent political groups; illegal activities
ing to agricultural policy. As part of the new strategic in the fields of cybernetics, life sciences, and high tech-
planning system, these concepts are to be reviewed an- nology; global information warfare; and the destabili-
nually by the Security Council. If this system of stra- zation of economic development and democratic insti-
tegic planning is put into practice, it will significant- tutions. Further threats identified include nationalism,
ly boost the power of the Security Council. Its appara- xenophobia, separatism, demographic problems, the
tus will then be authorized to intervene in the work of drug trade and human trafficking, organized crime, the
all portfolios. spread of pandemics, and lack of water. These risk fac-
tors can also be found in threat analyses used by other
A Profusion of Threat Perceptions European states. Notably, this list does not refer to any
The “Strategy 2020” document itself is visibly more volu- immediate military threat to Russia.
minous than its predecessor document. In 7,300 words The chapter on “National Defense”, however, takes
(compared to the earlier paper’s 5,000 words) and 112 a different approach. It makes critical reference to the
paragraphs, it deals with such diverse topics as national “policy of a number of leading foreign countries that are
defense, economic growth, health policy, ecology, and aiming to achieve a dominant military superiority, es-
culture as well as their significance for Russia’s nation- pecially in the field of strategic nuclear forces…” This
al security. The document begins with the confident as- phrase is obviously directed against the US, which is
sertion that “Russia has overcome the results of the po- also reproached for its intention to build up a global
litical and socio-economic systemic crisis at the end of missile defense system and militarize outer space. In
the 20th century…” and defines Russia’s new role in the the chapter on “Security of State and Society” – a new
world from this starting point. It claims that the coun- term first introduced in this strategy paper – espionage
try has overcome nationalism, separatism, and terror- by foreign services and individual persons is identified
ism, secured its territorial integrity, and restored the ba- as the main threat, together with the activities of vio-
sis for enhancing its competitiveness and defending the lent political groups. It is noticeable that foreign espio-
interests of the nation as a “key subject in the emerg- nage is ranked as a higher threat than terrorism, even
ing multipolar system of international relations”. Thus, though attacks on security forces are on the rise in the
the “Strategy 2020” depicts a Russia that has overcome Northern Caucasus and several republics are on the
its domestic crisis, has resurged economically, and de- brink of civil war.
mands to be accorded equal status with the other great The chapter on “Raising Russian Citizens’ Standard
powers. of Living” defines a completely different kind of threat.
The document identifies a qualitatively new geopo- It refers primarily to the international financial cri-
litical situation that has come about through the emer- sis, but also to the struggle for energy, water, and food
gence of new centers of economic growth and political as well as Russia’s lack of technological development.
influence. Russia counts itself among these, regarding Raising the standard of living is regarded as an impor-
itself as a leading economy that is internationally com- tant instrument for combating corruption and orga-
petitive and features a strong arms sector, a huge store of nized crime. Ensuring a stable supply of food and af-
natural resources, and pragmatic politics. The implica- fordable medicine is considered an important goal of a
tion of this self-perception for Europe is that the region- national security strategy.
al security architecture, based on NATO as its corner- In the chapter on the economy, the authors main-
stone, is outdated. Indeed, it is regarded in the “Strategy ly concentrate on the further development of indus-
2020” as a “threat to the provision of international se- try, which they hope will reduce Russia’s dependence
curity” that must be amended accordingly. on exports of raw materials. A failure of this effort is
In the sections that follow, a broad range of per- regarded as a potential threat, as is the loss of control
ceived threats is developed. The authors of the chap- over the nation’s resources and the deteriorating state
ter on “The Contemporary World and Russia: Current of its resource base. The stated goal is for Russia to as-
State and Developmental Tendencies” mainly take their cend to become one of the world’s five most productive
cue from global risks. Threats to Russia’s national in- economies in the middle term. This is, however, an ex-
terests are seen as emanating from the unilateral use of tremely ambitious target. According to the latest World
force in international relations – an obvious reference Bank figures, which refer to the year 2007, Russia was
to the US and NATO; the proliferation of mass casual- ranked in eighth place – with economic power being rat-
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ed in terms of purchasing power parity – or in eleventh social stability, not in terms of economic power or mili-
place based on the World Bank’s Gross National Income tary potential. There is no question that in this chapter,
framework (Atlas Method). Since the country owed this the experts in domestic and social policy have prevailed
rank mainly to high income derived from energy ex- over the foreign policy, military, and intelligence com-
ports, the decline of energy prices will make it difficult munities. Whether this applies to security policy in gen-
to catch up with the US, Japan, China, India, Germany, eral is a question that must remain unanswered.
France, and the UK. Finally, the “Strategy 2020” also
identifies risks in other areas: Discrepancies in the lev- “Security Through Development”
el of development between the various Russian regions, Overall, the “Strategy for Russia’s National Security
the backwardness of science and technology, and the to 2020” is an incomplete document that does not at-
shortcomings of the public health system. Additional tempt to present a comprehensive risk analysis, but
threats identified include the falsification of Russian his- merely lists political threats. Thus, conservative ex-
tory and the danger of climate change. pert Konstantin Sivkov, the first vice president of the
Academy of Geopolitical Issues, regarded the document
Metrics for Threats as “flippant”, since it does not even attempt to identify
Overall, one gets the impression that the “Strategy 2020” the causes of the global crisis, which he believes are to
paper was written by several authors whose threat per- be found in the behavior of the US. Viktor Ilyukhin,
ceptions diverge radically. Classic enemy perceptions a Communist who for many years presided over the
of the Soviet age are loosely juxtaposed with notions Duma’s Security Committee, described the “Strategy
linked to the risks of globalization. The lead editors 2020” as being “completely inadequate to the state of
have failed to homogenize these perceptions in the fi- affairs”, since it made no reference to the shortcomings
nal version of the paper and to compile them into a sin- of Russian industry – underperformance in the areas
gle, concise threat perception. The “Strategy 2020” ap- of engineering, information technology, and machine
parently constitutes a compromise paper that includes tool manufacturing. Even a liberal publication such as
the competing views of several institutions without at- Yezhednevny Zhurnal (“Daily Journal”) criticized the
tempting to unify them. The editors themselves seem paper for being too vague: “The list of threats is a lob-
to have been aware of this inadequacy. Thus, in a brief byists’ list.” It claimed that each department had assert-
conclusion, they listed a hierarchy of criteria for mea- ed its influence in order to ensure that its own interests
suring the gravity of threats. This list of criteria identi- were entrenched in the strategy document.
fies seven metrics against which the future state of na- Indeed, it appears that each chapter of the docu-
tional security should be measured: ment was written by a different agency. The “Strategy
1. The level of unemployment. 2020” does not even attempt to formulate a coherent,
2. The level of social inequality (measured as the ratio structured risk analysis. It simply assembles threat per-
of the top ten percent income bracket compared to ceptions. It offers no clues as to which of the compet-
the bottom ten percent income bracket). ing views out of this jumble of risk perceptions will de-
3. The inflation rate. termine the future course of politics – the FSB’s fear of
4. National debt (internal and external) in relation to foreign espionage, the military’s fear of NATO, the lib-
GDP. eral economists’ concern for economic development, or
5. Expenditures for health coverage, culture, education, the establishment’s fear of social unrest. This allows us
and science in relation to GDP. to draw certain inferences as to the Medvedev admin-
6. The annual modernization standard of weapons sys- istration’s ability to assert itself. The president and his
tems and military gear. team have not been able to control the discussion over
7. The availability of qualified staff in the military and the security policy concept and to integrate the posi-
engineering/technical fields. tions of the government bodies involved into a coher-
This list is remarkable for listing priorities whose consis- ent line of argumentation. Apparently, one year into his
tency with the rest of the text is limited. Some aspects, term of office, Medvedev has not yet managed to as-
such as economic growth and investment, are not men- sert his authority across the entire administrative appa-
tioned at all, while others, such as armament and the ratus. It should not come as a surprise that the intelli-
size of military capabilities, are only referred to in pass- gence services and the military leadership have a world-
ing. Social security is clearly accorded priority over mil- view of their own, but the president must be capable of
itary security. National security is measured in terms of subordinating their activities to his own political goals.
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This is not sufficiently apparent in the “Strategy 2020” nation. An “orange scenario” – a development resem-
document. It is possible that this is due to the person- bling that in Ukraine in 2004/5 – is just as unaccept-
al involvement of the secretary of the Security Council. able to the Medvedev administration as it was to Putin
Nikolai Patrushev served for many years as the director at the time.
of the FSB. His affinity to the work of the intelligence The high priority accorded to economic development
services and his desire to expand the security apparatus in the relevant chapters of the “Strategy 2020” shows
into an efficient instrument of control are reflected in that Medvedev and Putin alike are realistic in their as-
the national strategy. It remains to be seen to what ex- sessment of the status quo in Russia. By banking on
tent he can assert himself vis-à-vis the presidential ad- economic growth, they are pursuing the only possible
ministration and other agencies. course that can resolve the dilemma of Russian foreign
On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that policy. Only increasing economic output can ensure
the “Strategy” identifies targets for foreign policy that that Russia has the means to back up its claim to great
already constitute policy guidelines today. One of these power status. It can only gain international prestige and
is Russia’s claim to be acknowledged as a great pow- security by the further growth of its national economy,
er, its determination to maintain control over the na- accelerated innovation, and fostering science and tech-
tion’s natural resources, and its intention of maintain- nology. This is succinctly summarized in the formula
ing social stability in the country. It follows that Russia used by Medvedev while presenting the “Strategy 2020”:
will oppose a liberalization of the energy market, “de- “Security Through Development”.
mocracy promotion”, and the fostering of civil-society Translated from German by Christopher Findlay
organizations by external actors with equal determi-
About the Author
Prof. Dr. Hans-Henning Schröder is a lecturer in Modern Eastern European History at the University of Bremen.
Reading Tip
For opinion polls on Russians’ view of Russia’s role in the world, for a documentation of ceilings on arms and equip-
ment as stipulated by the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and for an overview of international organi-
zations in Europe please see Russian Analytical Digest 55/09, “The Role of Russia in Europe’s Security Architecture”,
18 February 2009, http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=RESSpecNet&fileid=A50453B9-9939-C477-
F4B8-15D53BC0C0E9&lng=en or via the website of the Russian Analytical Digest http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/
rad/details.cfm?lng=en&id=96690
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digest
About the Russian Analytical Digest
Editors: Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder
The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East
European Studies [Forschungsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de)
and the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich). It is
supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the
German-language Russlandanalysen (www.laender-analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and
Eurasia (www.res.ethz.ch), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian Analytical Digest covers political, econom-
ic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations.
To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad
Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University
of Bremen is dedicated to socialist and post-socialist cultural and societal developments in the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe.
The Research Centre possesses a unique collection of alternative culture and independent writings from the for-
mer socialist countries in its archive. In addition to extensive individual research on dissidence and society in socialist
countries, since January 2007 a group of international research institutes is participating in a collaborative project on
the theme “The other Eastern Europe – the 1960s to the 1980s, dissidence in politics and society, alternatives in cul-
ture. Contributions to comparative contemporary history”, which is funded by the Volkswagen Foundation.
In the area of post-socialist societies, extensive research projects have been conducted in recent years with emphasis
on political decision-making processes, economic culture and the integration of post-socialist countries into EU gov-
ernance. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested pub-
lic. This includes regular email services with nearly 20,000 subscribers in politics, economics and the media.
With a collection of publications on Eastern Europe unique in Germany, the Research Centre is also a contact
point for researchers as well as the interested public. The Research Centre has approximately 300 periodicals from
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The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is a Swiss academic
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The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center’s research
focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, state failure and state building, and
Swiss foreign and security policy.
In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree course for
prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA pro-
gram in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS), offers and develops specialized courses and study programs
to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students, and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in
Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tai-
lored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy com-
munity, and the armed forces.
The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes
manages the Comprehensive Risk Analysis and Management Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on NATO
and the Warsaw Pact (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian
Security (RES) Network.
Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.
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Editors: Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder
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