Right-Wing Extremism as Terrorism and the Law's Relation to Violence
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Right-Wing Extremism as Terrorism and the
Dialogue
Law’s Relation to Violence
Kris Millett Amy Swiffen
Concordia University, Canada Concordia University, Canada
kris.millett@concordia.ca amy.swiffen@concordia.ca
Introduction
The Canadian government recently expanded the concept of terrorism to include violence motivated by
white supremacy and misogyny, among other things (Ansari 2020; Nasser 2020). These ideologies were
grouped together as “right wing extremism” (RWE) and identified as an important terrorism threat in Canada
(Public Safety Canada 2018).1 Support for this move to respond to RWE violence with anti-terrorism
measures has gained momentum in the wake of recent high-profile incidents of white supremacist and
misogynistic violence.2 In 2021, the federal Parliament unanimously passed a motion asking the government
to designate the Proud Boys a terrorist organization and to “use all available tools to address the proliferation
of white supremacists and hate groups” (Jackson 2021). Shortly after, the Canadian government designated
several right-wing groups as terrorist entities under Canada’s Criminal Code (Crosby 2021).3 This came six
months after Canada was the first country to pursue terrorism charges for violence motivated by male
supremacist ideology (Nasser 2020).
In the face of longstanding criticisms that the Canadian security apparatus does not take the threat of right-
wing extremist violence seriously, some have lauded these steps for shifting anti-terrorism’s focus away
from racialized communities (Ansari 2020; see also Farooq 2021). Our discussion explores a different line
of response, specifically engaging with a subset of criticisms against using the anti-terror response to RWE
by authors arguing on behalf of racialized and Muslim communities. Inspired by these criticisms, we draw
on the theory of Walter Benjamin to explore the meaning of an anti-terrorism response that does not exclude
misogynist and white supremacist violence but rather divides it into sanctioned and unsanctioned forms.
1 According to the Government of Canada, RWE “is traditionally driven by hatred and fear, and includes a range of
individuals, groups, often in online communities, that back a wide range of issues and grievances, including, but not
limited to: anti-government and anti-law enforcement sentiment, advocacy of white nationalism and racial separation,
anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, anti-immigration, male supremacy (misogyny) and homophobia” (Public Safety
Canada 2018: 8).
2 A similar situation exists in the United States. President Joe Biden called the Capitol rioters “domestic terrorists,”
and his administration has since refocused US security agencies toward combating right-wing extremism (Rohde
2021; Bergengruen and Hennigan 2021).
3 As Crosby’s (2021) contribution to this Dialogue describes, the Canadian government listed thirteen new groups,
four identified as “ideologically motivated, violent extremist groups” and nine as “Islamist” groups.
Millett, Kris, and Amy Swiffen. 2021. Right Wing Extremism as Terrorism and the Law’s Relation to
Violence. Surveillance & Society 19(3): 364-368.
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/index | ISSN: 1477-7487
© The author(s), 2021 | Licensed to the Surveillance Studies Network under a Creative Commons
Attribution Non-Commercial No Derivatives licenseMillett and Swiffen: Right Wing Extremism as Terrorism From “Homegrown” Terrorism to Right-Wing Extremism The domestic security and legal infrastructure that emerged in Canada post-9/11 has been directed toward containing “homegrown” terrorism. This was framed as a “new” phenomenon, implicitly linked to Muslim diaspora communities. This initial framing excluded violence motivated by Christian extremist beliefs, white supremacy, or misogyny (Millett 2020). Consequently, surveillance studies scholars have shown how anti-terrorism measures have created a “pervasive system of surveillance” disproportionately targeting Muslim communities (Monaghan and Molnar 2016: 395) while pathologizing dissent and criminalizing aspects of Muslim identity (Razack 2008; Pantazis and Pemberton 2011; Qureshi 2015). Now there are criticisms against extending the anti-terrorism response to RWE violence by authors arguing on behalf of racialized and Muslim communities. This includes Parker’s (2021) contribution to this Dialogue showing how policy changes in response to domestic right-wing terrorism “become incorporated into the policing of communities of color, particularly Black Muslim communities.” These arguments seem, at first, to be standing on somewhat counter-intuitive grounds—opposing actions that appear intended to protect racialized and Muslim communities. With this acknowledged, these critics lay out a series of arguments for why expanding the definition of terrorism to include right-wing extremism is not beneficial. These criticisms can be summarized in three points: “Terrorism” is a problematic social construction. Attempts to expand the definition of terrorism to include white supremacist and misogynistic violence may in fact provide cover for everyday forms of racial and sexist oppression. For example, feminist researchers have expressed worry that the issue of domestic violence will be “pushed aside” if resources are focused on the large-scale attacks that meet the relatively high legal requirements for a terrorism conviction (Moran 2020). An anti-terrorism response does not address structural white supremacy. Some argue anti-terrorism laws targeting right-wing violence will not make racialized communities safer because they fail to address white supremacy within the state and legal system. For example, Walia (2021b) argues Canada already has tools to combat terrorism and the failure of security agencies to use them to target right-wing violence represents a choice rather than a lack of means. One of the primary sources of violence for marginalized groups is the police and legal system itself. The concept of terrorism implies a threat from outside, yet much of the discriminatory violence these groups experience is linked to interactions with the legal system, especially the criminal legal system (Swiffen 2018a). Thus, critics worry expansion of policing and security powers will perpetuate a system “that preys on the most vulnerable” (Kundnani and Theoharis 2019). As Walia (2021a) puts it, the state is “invested in the very same violence we want to end.” In the face of the increased threat of right-wing violence, some critics argue for reducing the power of national security agencies (Bahdi and Ahmad 2020) and rolling back anti-terrorism laws (Kundnani and Theoharis 2019). One thing that comes out of these arguments is the idea that legal power cannot be separated from the violence that marginalized groups face. This makes designating white supremacist and misogynistic violence “terrorism” complicated because these forms of violence exist within the legal system and in everyday interactions. If anti-terrorism laws will not address this structural violence, it stands to ask how we ought to interpret the recent moves seemingly in this direction by the Canadian government. What does it mean for a settler-colonial state like Canada to define white supremacist and misogynist violence as criminal terrorism? What does it mean about the law’s relation to violence that groups targeted by such violence would oppose it? This is where thinking in more depth about the relationship between law and violence is important. Surveillance & Society 19(3) 365
Millett and Swiffen: Right Wing Extremism as Terrorism The Law’s Relation to Violence Walter Benjamin’s (1978) concept of law provides insight into the relationship between law and violence that is applicable to the questions above. Benjamin developed his concept in an essay called “Critique of Violence,” written in Germany after the First World War and in the lead up to the Third Reich.4 Benjamin begins by asking about the conditions of possibility for legal violence. What defines the legitimate use of violence by the legal system? In Benjamin’s terminology, legal acts are forms of “law-preserving” violence whose legitimacy refers back to the idea of an original founding violence (Benjamin 1978; also see Derrida 2002). Examples of law-preserving violence would include the criminalization of “drugs,” “homegrown” terrorism, and so on. Benjamin (1978) also describes law-founding violence, which would be things like war and revolution. In the settler-colonial context, law-founding violence could be imagined in the assertion of Crown sovereignty and law-preserving violence in the contemporary overincarceration of Indigenous people. In this sense, Benjamin argues the law is “alloyed” to violence in that it always has a link to violence and violence has law-making potential, even in democratic systems (Swiffen 2018a: 135). In this sense, law does not exclude violence but rather divides it into “legal” and “non-legal” forms. Benjamin asks about the principle underlying the division. That is, what makes a given instance of violence legal versus non-legal (Swiffen 2018a). He notes violence used by individuals for private ends is normally considered non-legal, even when the ends are justified or coincide with legal ends (Benjamin 1978). This means it is not the purpose of the violence that makes the difference, nor its justness. It is simply the fact it is used outside the law. Benjamin (1978) concludes the division between legal (legitimate) and non-legal violence is about the power to decide the difference in the first place. The division is empty in any other sense. What is important is rather the capacity to make the division. Legal prohibitions on the use of violence by private individuals and entities are about preserving this power, according to Benjamin (1978). There are several insights to take away from this analysis in regard to the state’s classification of RWE violence as terrorism. First, the legal category of “terrorism” divides violence, but it does not exclude it. As Walia (2021b) observes, “the discourse of ‘terrorist’ is most commonly deployed against those considered outside the state,” yet at the same time “whiteness is the state.” Branding RWE violence “terrorism” (a highly mediatized area of public concern) is a show of force, precisely because it reflects a power to define the legality of violence itself. These divisions of violence become “points of normalization” for the violence in legal acts (Swiffen 2018a: 138). Benjamin’s (1978) theory shows us that the extension of the category of terrorism to include white supremacist and misogynistic violence is not merely a contradiction in the state’s treatment of violence; it is a dialectical relation. In designating RWE violence as terrorism, the state is dividing it into sanctioned and unsanctioned forms. White supremacism and misogyny within the legal order are not excluded by this move. The division of violence (rather than its exclusion) is the law’s reaction to the law-making violence at its own origin. Thus, Benjamin (1978) helps elucidate what is at stake in defining white supremacy and misogynistic violence as terrorism and how white supremacy and misogyny can be simultaneously sanctioned and unsanctioned. The space between is a buttress for the law’s monopoly on defining the legality of violence. Conclusion The decisions of governments to treat right-wing violence as terrorism has been taken by some as a sign that they are moving away from a highly criticized focus on Muslim and racialized communities. However, criticisms of the anti-terror response by authors arguing on behalf of racialized and Muslim communities say the state itself is racist and treating white supremacist violence as terrorism does not address this. Walter Benjamin’s (1978) concept of law as a relation of violence helps reconcile these two perspectives with the idea that legal prohibitions do not exclude violence but rather divide it in a regulated way. All legal actions 4 For a more in-depth discussion of Benjamin’s essay, see Amy Swiffen (2018b). Surveillance & Society 19(3) 366
Millett and Swiffen: Right Wing Extremism as Terrorism
are “alloyed” to violence, and for the Canadian colonial-settler state, this means racist and sexist forms of
violence are indeed sustained through the law. Categorizing non-legal forms of white supremacist and
misogynist violence as “terrorism” does not contradict this. At the same time, the recent enthusiasm in
Canada and the United States toward countering RWE as terrorism does suggest that there is something
threatening to the legal order about how current non-state forms of this violence manifest. As RWE becomes
folded into the category of “Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism” along with left-wing,
environmentalist, and Indigenous movements (Crosby 2021), it is worth considering how this innovation in
official counter-terrorism discourse may further extend the system of surveillance already enacted against
Muslim communities toward other perceived challenges to liberal state hegemony in a time of renewed
radical politics.
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