Repression and Autocracy as Russia Heads into State Duma Elections
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NO. 40 JUNE 2021 Introduction Repression and Autocracy as Russia Heads into State Duma Elections Sabine Fischer Russia is experiencing a wave of state repression ahead of parliamentary elections on 19 September 2021. The crackdown is unusually harsh and broad, extending into pre- viously unaffected areas and increasingly penetrating the private sphere of Russian citizens. For years the Russian state had largely relied on the so-called “power verti- cal” and on controlling the information space through propaganda and marginalisa- tion of independent media. The political leadership, so it would appear, no longer regards such measures as sufficient to secure its power and is increasingly resorting to repression. The upshot is a further hardening of autocracy. Even German NGOs are experiencing growing pressure from the Russian state. This trend cannot be expected to slow, still less reverse in the foreseeable future. Repression – wherever it occurs – involves of repression – restrictions and violence – restrictions (of civil rights and liberties) and have increased noticeably in recent months. physical violence. Russia has seen a string The state continues to rely primarily on the of political assassinations and assassination former but has also expanded its use of the attempts over the past decades. The poison- latter. ing of Alexei Navalny is only the most recent case, following on the spectacular murder of Boris Nemtsov in February 2015 What Is New? and numerous other attacks at home and abroad. In Russia’s Chechen Republic, Three aspects are new. The measures are, Ramzan Kadyrov has entrenched violence firstly, much larger-scale. During the against opponents and civil society as the nationwide demonstrations in late January foundation of his power. and early February 2021 alone more than Few of these crimes have been properly 11,500 individuals were detained. Protestors investigated, and the Russian state denies were subjected to violence and detainees’ any involvement or responsibility. Security rights were violated. The security forces also forces crush protests. Torture is common- cracked down on journalists. place in Russian prisons. Civil rights and Since January several thousand adminis- liberties are heavily curtailed. Both forms trative penalties have been issued in con-
nection with the protests. The proportion lawyers. In mid-April the Moscow state
of “administrative detentions” (compared to prosecutor applied to have the FBK and
fines) has jumped in comparison to earlier other organisations associated with Navalny
years. More than 130 criminal investiga- designated as “extremist organisations”. In
tions have been initiated and a number of parallel the State Duma amended the law
long prison sentences already imposed. on “extremist organisations” which now
The “offences” included participation in prevents their members from standing in
unauthorised demonstrations, violation of elections (even if their membership ended
administrative and Covid prevention rules, before designation). On 9 June the FBK,
and inciting minors to join protests. Action Navalny’s regional offices and his Citizens’
against social media likes and reposts about Rights Protection Foundation were – as
the protests has also been stepped up. The expected – classified as “extremist”, with
human rights organisation OVD-Info, which far-reaching political and legal consequenc-
documents abuses and provides legal sup- es not only for activists but potentially also
port, states that: “The scale of detentions, for hundreds of thousands of private donors.
administrative and criminal prosecution in Anticipating this outcome, FBK had already
connection with the protests in January- dissolved its nationwide structures on 29
February 2021 is undoubtedly the largest April to shield its staff.
in the entire history of modern Russia.” Independent media have also come under
The protests were triggered by the deten- pressure. Three editors of the student news-
tion of opposition politician Alexei Navalny paper DOXA were charged in mid-April with
after he returned to Moscow on 17 January inciting minors to participate in the pro-
2021. On 2 February a Moscow court sen- Navalny protests and have been under
tenced him to two years and eight months house arrest since then. In May two promi-
imprisonment for violating parole from nent independent Russian-language media
an earlier sentence – which the European outlets, Meduza and V-Times, were declared
Court of Human Rights had already declared “foreign agents”.
politically motivated and called on the Rus- More than ninety organisations are cur-
sian government to rescind. rently classified as “foreign agents” and face
State institutions and Navalny’s nation- existential challenges. They are required to
wide teams published widely diverging display the designation prominently in all
estimates of the size of the demonstrations public statements, with the intention of
between January and April. Photographs discrediting them. They are also subject to
prove that thousands of people took to the heightened bureaucratic scrutiny, which
streets on 23 and 31 January in more than ties up time and resources and is especially
120 Russian cities. These were thus the burdensome for smaller organisations and
biggest demonstrations since the mass pro- natural persons. The label deters Russian
tests against election fraud in 2011/12. donors and targeted entities quickly find
themselves in existential financial difficul-
Secondly, repression has expanded to tar- ties. Meduza responded with
get organisations and groups that were pre- a crowdfunding campaign that attracted
viously largely untouched. The arrest of 80,000 donors within the space of just a few
the well-known lawyer Ivan Pavlov on accu- days. Other media, organisations and
sations of disclosing confidential informa- individuals lack such capacities. V-Times
tion caused consternation, for example. announced on 3 June that it was closing
Pavlov is the head of Team 29, a group of down. The state campaign
lawyers working to uphold civil rights that against Meduza, V-Times and DOXA repre-
also represented Navalny’s Anti-Corruption sents a bitter setback for Russia’s inde-
Foundation (Fond Borby s Korruptsii, FBK). pendent media landscape.
His arrest was understood as signalling
an expansion of state repression to include
SWP Comment 40
June 2021
2Thirdly, in a departure from previous prac- Why Now?
tice, the state is increasingly encroaching
on the private sphere and turning its atten- The proximate cause of the clampdown is
tion to the politically unorganised. Since the Duma election on 19 September 2021.
the protests at the beginning of the year The state is bulldozing anything that could
hundreds of citizens across the country be regarded as a political alternative to the
have been visited by the security forces at ailing ruling party United Russia.
home or work and warned, summonsed, The root cause, however, is the protracted
fined or detained. Moscow’s public CCTV legitimacy crisis of the Russian political
systems have been used for large-scale system. Its roots lie in the simultaneity of
facial recognition for the first time. These societal modernisation and political auto-
measures also affect citizens who did not cratisation that has characterised the rela-
actually participate in the protests, with tionship between state and society since
security forces questioning neighbours the 2000s. The contradictions were initially
and family members. Numerous dismissals masked by economic growth and increasing
across the country were apparently asso- prosperity. That phase ended with the eco-
ciated with participation in or mobilisation nomic crisis of 2008/09 and the suppression
for the protests. The most spectacular case of mass protests during the 2011/12 Duma
involved about one hundred employees and presidential elections.
of the Moscow metro, who lost their jobs Traditionalism, nationalism, strong
in mid-May for supporting the protests. leadership and geopolitical confrontation
The repression has been accompanied with the West became the central legitimis-
by a wave of new legislation designed ing narrative of the Russian state after
to hamper opposition and civil society Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin in
activities and expand the state’s scope for 2012 and annexed the Crimea in 2014.
repression. At the end of 2020 it was made The wave of patriotism generated by the
possible to designate natural persons as “Crimea effect” lasted only four years. The
“foreign agents” if they receive financial pension reform announced in summer
support from abroad. The right to demon- 2018 was widely regarded as the state ulti-
strate has been further curtailed and new mately tearing up the implicit “social
possibilities have been created to suppress contract” that had offered material security
political speech in the internet and social in return for political passivity. Since then,
media. A new law on education came into the oscillation of public protest and state
effect at the beginning of June to control repression has grown increasingly fierce.
the discussion and dissemination of politi- Notable protests occurred in summer 2019
cal issues in education, training and scien- in Moscow around the City Duma election
tific contexts, as well as international and from July 2020 in Khabarovsk after the
research collaborations. The laws on “ex- sacking and detention of Governor Sergei
tremist” and “undesirable” organisations Furgal. The protests of winter and spring
were also drastically toughened in June. 2021 represent the continuation and pro-
All the while the pressure on opposition visional culmination of this development.
politicians grows. Many have left the coun- Moreover, the sharpening legitimacy
try, most recently the former Duma deputy crisis sees the state increasingly concerned
Dmitry Gudkov. As the expanding extent for its stability. So far it has failed to foster
and changing quality of state repression in other sources of legitimacy and appears
recent months demonstrates, the state is no incapable of dealing with political dissent.
longer limiting itself to clamping down on But the widely postulated fear stalking
prominent opponents. Russia's rulers should not be overstated.
The state ultimately trusts in the proven
effectiveness of its instruments. From the
perspective of the political leadership, for
SWP Comment 40
June 2021
3example, the repression of 2011/12 was a Putin’s approval by contrast is back at 67
success, with the protests ebbing rapidly percent after a pandemic-related slump to
away after the showdown on Bolotnaya 59 percent in spring 2020. That trend is ex-
Square in May 2012. pedited by an official narrative that the
The current dynamic of repression is pandemic has been defeated, along with the
largely characterised by two contextual lifting of many restrictions even during the
factors that have ramped up the domestic second wave in autumn and winter 2020/21.
political temperature since 2020. For a time That does nothing to change the ongoing
the Covid-19 pandemic appeared to threaten legitimacy crisis, which divides Russian
the constitutional reform designed to se- society into a slowly growing dissatisfied
cure the existing political system and keep minority that is willing to protest and a
Putin in the presidency. The virus over- declining majority who continue to support
shadowed the entire year, affected the Rus- the political system – however reticently –
sian economy and – although the official out of traditionalism, resignation or fear of
figures are much lower – likely change. Surveys must be interpreted with
cost several hundred thousand lives. the utmost caution in authoritarian con-
But the real political bombshell of 2020 texts like the Russian, however. It is quite
was the political crisis in neighbouring possible that respondents will play down
Belarus. From the very outset its protest their criticisms for fear of repercussions,
movement became a sounding board for even in anonymous surveys. If that were
the hopes and fears of Russia’s rulers and the case Levada’s figures, which point to
opposition alike. The Kremlin quickly about 35 percent dissatisfaction, would be
backed Belarusian President Alexander an underestimate.
Lukashenko and indicated that “regime The Russian state’s repression strategy
change” in Minsk was a red line. The leverages this social polarisation by boost-
“autocratic alliance” between Moscow and ing anti-liberal and anti-Western propaganda
Minsk now appears permanent. The fall directed towards the traditionalist and/or
of Lukashenko, who wages war on his own change-averse majority while increasingly
population, would represent a bitter defeat vigorously suppressing and silencing the
and create a fatal precedent for Moscow. critical minority willing to protest. The
The two countries’ domestic politics are political leadership can even expect repres-
now more closely intertwined than ever. sion of the minority to earn it new legiti-
macy among sections of the majority by
“protecting” them from dreaded instability.
Effectiveness and Consequences of It is hard to predict where this process will
the Latest Repression lead. Much depends on whether the next
generation of activists choose to move ab-
From the state’s perspective the repression of road or withdraw from politics – or con-
the first half of 2021 is already a “success”. tinue to work to change the country from
The latest surveys by the independent Levada within despite growing risks. Willingness
Centre show willingness to protest declin- to emigrate has certainly increased steadily
ing significantly since January, while sup- over the past decade.
port for those who took to the streets has also Phases of repression also alter the politi-
fallen. Navalny’s public recognition has risen cal system. They strengthen the actors
since August 2020 – but not his political of repression, in the sense of granting the
support. He is in prison, many of his closest security forces greater sway within the
collaborators have fled abroad, and his orga- power apparatus. In this way repression
nisations are hamstrung by court verdicts creates structural realities that are difficult
and new legislation. Navalny and his col- to reverse. Here again this continues a trend
laborators will find it difficult to pursue of the past decade, which has seen the power
their political goals under these conditions. of the security services steadily expanding.
SWP Comment 40
June 2021
4Social change is held back by state policies ment for Democracy. Designated organisa-
designed to shore up power. Dissent is sup- tions are forced to cease all work in Russia
pressed by ever harsher means: fragmented, immediately in order to avoid further
atomised and neutralised. This mechanism endangering their Russian partners. This
also functions at the level of the political makes the latter’s situation even more
elites, whose members can regularly find precarious, as the number of foreign part-
themselves in the sights of political repres- ners and funding sources declines.
sion. EPDE, DRA and LibMod are participants
The interlocking dynamics in Russia and in the German-Russian Petersburg Dialogue.
Belarus leave little grounds for hope of Mos- By banning them, the Russian leadership is
cow (or Minsk) dropping broad repression signalling that its efforts to eliminate criti-
as an increasingly central instrument of cism and dissent will make no exceptions
power. Given that Moscow unconditionally even for such a venerable dialogue project.
supports Lukaschenko’s suppression of There are indications from the Russian
the Belarusian popular movement, the big State Duma that German party-political
question is whether Russia eventually might foundations could also be targeted, specifi-
go down the Belarusian path. In any case cally mentioning the Green-affiliated Hein-
the latest developments are associated with rich Böll Foundation. The German side of
a clear hardening of Russian autocracy that the Petersburg Dialogue has suspended all
makes opening and compromise – whether joint activities until further notice, making
internal or external – unlikely for the in- their resumption conditional on delisting.
definite future. Moscow’s action against German NGOs
underlines the isolationist tendencies in
Russian foreign policy and demonstrates
Transnational Repression – Ger- the drastic deterioration in German-Russian
man Organisations also Affected relations since autumn 2020. The political
crisis in Belarus and the Navalny poisoning
On 26 May 2021 the Russian prosecutor have further chilled an already frosty rela-
general designated three German NGOs tionship. The next German government
“undesirable”: the German-Russian Ex- will have to base its Russia policy on the
change (DRA), the Centre for Liberal Moder- assumption that the domestic political
nity (LibMod) and the Forum of Russian- hardening will make understanding and
Speaking Europeans. The Berlin-based Euro- compromise with Moscow even more
pean Platform for Democratic Elections difficult. At the same time this creates an
(EPDE) had already received the label in almost unsolvable conflict of goals for Ger-
2018. The 2015 law on “undesirable organi- man and European Russia policy:
sations” prohibits non-Russian organisa- The EU’s five guiding principles for rela-
tions that supposedly threaten the Russian tions with Russia are designed to deter
state from operating within Russia. The law Russian transgressions at all levels, in the
was significantly tightened to coincide with shared neighbourhood and towards the EU
the listing of the three German organisa- and its member states. They also seek to
tions. It allows members of designated orga- encourage and develop people to people
nisations to be prevented from entering contacts with Russian society. But the nega-
the country and puts Russian citizens and tive dynamic at the political level of the
residents who cooperate with them under relationship severely narrows the possibili-
the risk of criminal prosecution. ties, especially where Moscow is doing
The Russian ministry of justice currently everything to isolate Russian society. This
lists 34 foreign organisations as undesir- undercuts the EU’s fifth principle, people-
able. Seventeen – or half – are American. to-people contacts and support for civil
But they also include a string of European society. The banning of German NGOs and
organisations such as the European Endow- suppression of the Petersburg Dialogue
SWP Comment 40
June 2021
5demonstrate this very clearly. Germany and
the EU have already had to adapt their co-
operation with Russian civil society to in-
creasingly restrictive conditions and operate
with extreme sensitivity to the difficult con-
text. The need now is to continue – how-
ever cautiously – along that path and at
same time to signal to the Russian people
that the EU remains genuinely interested
in engaging with them.
© Stiftung Wissenschaft Germany and the EU will also have to
und Politik, 2021 ready themselves for increasing emigration
All rights reserved from Russia and Belarus. These people will
need support. But they – like the Russian
This Comment reflects
community in general – can also be impor-
the author’s views.
tant interlocutors and potential communi-
The online version of cators into Russian society. People-to-people
this publication contains contacts with Russia were abruptly inter-
functioning links to other rupted by the pandemic, and will remain
SWP texts and other relevant
difficult even after it is overcome. The ques-
sources.
tion of visa-free travel for Russian citizens
SWP Comments are subject has long been a bone of contention within
to internal peer review, fact- the EU. It now becomes crucial in order to
checking and copy-editing. maintain at least minimal direct contact
For further information on with Russian society.
our quality control pro-
cedures, please visit the SWP
website: https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/about-swp/
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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
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ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
doi: 10.18449/2021C40
Translation by Meredith Dale
(English version
of SWP-Aktuell 46/2021)
Dr. Sabine Fischer is Senior Fellow in the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division.
SWP Comment 40
June 2021
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