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House of Commons
Transport Committee
Putting passengers
first: disruption at
Gatwick, Christmas Eve
2013
Fourteenth Report of Session 2013–
14
Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report
Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed 31 March 2014
HC 956
Published on 11 April 2014
by authority of the House of Commons
London: The Stationery Office Limited
£0.00The Transport Committee The Transport Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Department for Transport and its Associate Public Bodies. Current membership Mrs Louise Ellman (Labour/Co-operative, Liverpool Riverside) (Chair) Sarah Champion (Labour, Rotherham) Jim Dobbin (Labour/Co-operative, Heywood and Middleton) Jim Fitzpatrick (Labour, Poplar and Limehouse) Karen Lumley (Conservative, Redditch) Jason McCartney (Conservative, Colne Valley) Karl MᶜCartney (Conservative, Lincoln) Mr Adrian Sanders (Liberal Democrat, Torbay) Chloe Smith (Conservative, Norwich North) Graham Stringer (Labour, Blackley and Broughton) Martin Vickers (Conservative, Cleethorpes) Powers The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the internet via www.parliament.uk. Publication The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the internet at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom. A list of Reports of the Committee in the present Parliament is at the back of this volume. The Reports of the Committee and the formal minutes relating to that report are available in a printed volume. Written evidence is published on the internet only. Committee staff The current staff of the Committee are Mark Egan (Clerk), Nick Beech (Second Clerk), Richard Jeremy (Committee Specialist), Adrian Hitchins (Senior Committee Assistant), Stewart McIlvenna (Committee Assistant) and Hannah Pearce (Media Officer) Contacts All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Transport Committee, House of Commons, 14 Tothill Street, London SW1N 9NB, The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 6263; the Committee’s email address is transcom@parliament.uk
Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 1
Contents
Report Page
Summary 3
1 Introduction 5
2 What happened at Gatwick? 9
Timeline 9
Contingency planning 10
3 Passenger welfare 12
Loudspeakers, refreshments, toilets 12
Information 12
Passenger Champions 13
Compensation 14
4 Conclusion 16
Conclusions and recommendations 18
Formal Minutes 20
Witnesses 21
Published written evidence 22
List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament 24Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 3 Summary In the early hours of Christmas Eve the basement of the North Terminal at Gatwick Airport flooded, causing some electrical systems to fail. As a result, 72 of the 260 flights due to leave Gatwick on Christmas Eve were cancelled, affecting over 11,000 passengers. This report looks at some of the lessons to be learnt from this episode, focusing in particular on passenger welfare. Passengers complained to us about: — Poor and often inconsistent provision of information about what was happening; — Lack of clarity about who was in charge; — A lack of basic facilities, such as toilets and drinking water; and — Confusion about what expenses passengers could be reimbursed for, particularly if alternative flights had to be arranged. These issues have been raised before, highlighting problems with how passengers are looked after by airports and airlines during periods of disruption. The problems at Gatwick at Christmas Eve should be a wake-up call for airports across the UK to get on top of operational resilience issues. Disruption of whatever nature should be met with well-drilled plans, familiar to airport operators, airlines, and other contractors, which put passenger interests first. The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) now has a role in overseeing operational resilience at Heathrow and Gatwick. We make some detailed recommendations about what should be in operational resilience plans. We expect CAA to give us its assessment of the quality of the plans. Gatwick commissioned a review of the problems which occurred on Christmas Eve which recommended that the airport should appoint passenger champions at each of its terminals, to focus on passenger welfare. We welcome this and would like to see this proposal implemented more widely. However, airlines are formally responsible for passenger welfare: there must be operational agreements between airlines and airports about when airports should step in and how costs should be allocated. We recommend that Government review this issue. There is a wider problem with complex EU legislation on passenger rights to compensation when flights are delayed or cancelled. We recommend that CAA bring forward proposals by the autumn for improving the provision of information to passengers about their rights at times of disruption. We also recommend that the Government push for amendment to the proposed new EU regulation on this issue to include electronic means of alert and information dissemination.
Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 5
1 Introduction
1. In the early hours of Christmas Eve the basement of the North Terminal at Gatwick
Airport flooded, causing some electrical systems to fail. As a result, there were no check-in
or flight information systems in the terminal; facilities for checking in and reclaiming
baggage were limited; and many toilets, which were reliant on electronic flushing
mechanisms, were out of action. 1 easyJet was the airline most affected by the disruption.
Seventy-two of the 260 flights due to leave Gatwick on Christmas Eve were cancelled,
affecting over 11,000 passengers. 2
2. In recent years we have looked closely at how the UK’s transport networks cope with
severe winter weather. In 2011 we reported on how Heathrow and Gatwick airports had
been affected by heavy snow. 3 One of our principal recommendations was that airports
should draw up passenger welfare plans and that there should be a mechanism for airports
to reclaim costs incurred in looking after passengers from airlines which had not
discharged their legal responsibilities. 4 The Government broadly welcomed these ideas but
said it was for airports to make their own arrangements. 5
3. The problems at Gatwick on Christmas Eve again raised the issue of how passengers can
be better looked after during periods of disruption at airports. We have published 30
submissions from members of the public about their experiences: we have picked out some
of their comments in the box below. The views we were sent reflected a common set of
themes:
• Poor and often inconsistent provision of information about what was happening;
• Lack of clarity about who was in charge;
• A lack of basic facilities, such as toilets and drinking water; and
• Confusion about what expenses passengers could be reimbursed for, particularly if
alternative flights had to be arranged.
Passengers’ comments on the disruption at Gatwick 6
When I arrived at Gatwick North Terminal it was obvious that something was wrong.
There were hundreds and hundreds of people queuing to check in, no signs, no
1 Disruption at Gatwick Airport Christmas Eve 2013, Report by David McMillan to the Board of Gatwick Airport Ltd,
Feb 14 (hereafter McMillan report) p10.
2 McMillan report p11. There were also 73 cancelled arrivals, affecting nearly 5,000 passengers.
3 Transport Committee, Fifth Report, 2010-12, Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter
weather in December 2010, HC794.
4 Ibid, paragraph 52.
5 Transport Committee, Sixth Special Report, 2010-12, Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter
weather in December 2010: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of Session 2010–12, HC 1467.
6 All comments taken from written evidence.6 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 announcements, and no one appeared to be being checked in. We joined the check in queue, and queued for around 4 hours. There was no information or explanation of any kind given by the airport. Word spread among the passengers that the computers had failed and we were being checked in manually–Maya Lester. There was certainly an occasion when a man stood on a table in the Easy Jet area at the far end from where I was. I have no idea how many people were between him and me but a great number. Many were distressed and crying or shouting children. Around me, no one could hear him or had the smallest idea what he was talking about. I suspect that may have been true for most of the large departure area through which wound the massive queue to the only functioning loo. There appeared to be a loud speaker public address system since it was playing an occasional loop saying how bad the weather had been. I was among many who could not understand why it was not used–David (Lord) Triesman. As a result of BA staff’s unwavering refusal to speak to customers or provide any information in the terminal, we received no food and drink vouchers at any stage during our 11 hours at Gatwick. We were also unaware that it was extremely unlikely that our luggage would be on the plane (if we ever did get away). Had BA staff advised us that there was a high chance of our luggage not being on the plane, we would have bought some essentials from the airport to alleviate the stress and discomfort which followed–Neil and Jennifer Smith. Contrary to subsequent reports in the media, we were not offered water or food vouchers and the queues for the coffee and food shops were escalating throughout this period. By the time we were able to enter the shop after queuing, there was little food available to purchase. More shockingly, the washroom facilities in the terminal were appalling. The toilets were a disgrace. They did not flush and the putrid stench was overpowering–Malini Majithia. Had Gatwick airport or Easyjet implemented any kind of contingency plan or had the honesty to inform passengers around midday that flights from the North terminal would not leave, thousands of unfortunates might have been able to make alternative arrangements, but no, they were unprofessional in the extreme and simply abandoned passengers to their fate–H. Michael McAlinden. All this time, no food was provided at any point by Easyjet (13 hours total), some bottles of water were handed out in the North terminal, but no information about our rights–Dr Sylvia Baron. Easyjet failed at every stage to notify the public of what was happening and what they were doing to rectify it. They also failed to notify anyone of their rights to compensation or to cancel the flights–Daniel Salt. No seating for people who were not fortunate to be in a lounge, lying on the floors, sitting on stairs, no facilities for young families. Total lack of competence, lack of communication, lack of representation and total disgrace to leave minimum staff on Information desk to deal with constant queries and agitated and frustrated passengers–Lisa Ciccone. Things can go wrong, there can be unexpected catastrophic events, to leave customers in a
Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 7 state of complete ignorance is unforgiveable for any customer-focused organisation. In so far as any information appeared to be available, it came from mobile telephone conversations passengers were making with people outside the airport–Grenville Burrows. We only discovered that our flight was cancelled when our son called us from France to say that he had seen it on the easyJet website, around 6pm. I went to the information desk which was by then only being manned by the police and was surrounded by a huge crowd. I managed to get confirmation that our flight had been cancelled but no clues as to when or whether it might be rescheduled–Sharon and Peter Matthews. Finally, after a 13 hour wait on the floor of Gatwick airport, our flight number suddenly appeared on the long list of the ‘Easyjet’ cancellations. We were exhausted and desperate. I called my parents and explained that we could not come. My whole family was in tears. My mother could not even speak. All the preparation and the efforts they had put into spending this Christmas with their only grandson was meaningless thanks to the joint effort of ‘Easyjet’ and Gatwick airport–Stefano Andreani. Thousands of people were struggling to discover in numerous piles of abandoned luggage their own. There was not enough light in the room so most of us were simply struggling in the darkness. After so much time waiting, only a few of us still had battery in their phones in order to use them as flash lights so we were simply trying to do something in the darkness. It took us more than 4 hours to find our luggage (and believe us, we were extremely lucky)–Dr Michael Sialaros. 19 hours without food or fluid; 15 hours standing; 15 hours without access to toilets; 2 days lost holiday; 2 nights lost sleep–Janet Coombs. We managed to secure the last chicken in the “long hours” Sainsbury on our own High Street for our Christmas dinner the next day, but our luggage was lost at Gatwick until the 28th with no information given which also gave us a huge amount of distress … and no presents at Christmas! … We missed Christmas with our loved ones and this gave all of us a lot of upset feelings and sadness. As far as we were concerned our Christmas was cancelled–Anna Powell. 4. We are grateful to the people who wrote to us about their experiences on Christmas Eve. Thousands of people endured a very difficult and stressful day and for many the disruption ruined carefully made plans for Christmas celebrations. We expect Gatwick and the relevant airlines to respond to the people who contacted us, addressing the points they raised, and to confirm to us that they have done so. 5. We heard oral evidence from Gatwick Airport and easyJet on 7 January to find out what had gone wrong and to ask about passenger welfare. We asked for further written information from both parties, including minutes of meetings on the day and Gatwick’s
8 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
contingency plans. 7 We are grateful to Gatwick and easyJet for their assistance with our
inquiry.
6. Gatwick commissioned one of its non-executive directors, David McMillan, to review
the airport’s flood prevention plans, its contingency planning, communication with
passengers and passenger welfare. 8 His report (‘the McMillan report’) was published on 26
February. As far as we are aware, his analysis, aspects of which we discuss in more detail
below, has not been challenged. Gatwick has accepted his recommendations and set aside
up to £30 million for them to be implemented. 9 The McMillan report deals
comprehensively with a number of issues we discussed in oral evidence with Gatwick
Airport and easyJet, including flood prevention and Gatwick’s command structure in times
of emergency. We see no reason to challenge Mr McMillan’s conclusions on these matters.
7. Many staff at Gatwick, working for the airport, the airlines, and other operators such
as the baggage handlers, worked extremely hard to keep flights operating on Christmas
Eve and to look after passengers. We acknowledge their efforts.
8. In the next chapter we briefly describe what happened at Gatwick on Christmas Eve,
focusing in particular on contingency planning. Our third chapter will focus on passenger
issues before we make some concluding remarks in our fourth chapter.
7 Gatwick Airport (TWR 0044). Some material not published.
8 McMillan report Annex 1.
9 http://www.mediacentre.gatwickairport.com/News/London-Gatwick-sets-aside-30-million-as-a-resilience-fund-
following-recommendations-of-review-into-8c6.aspx.Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 9 2 What happened at Gatwick? Timeline 9. The problems at Gatwick began on 23 December when strong winds led to the diversion of 35 inbound aircraft away from the airport. easyJet was particularly affected and the McMillan report states that Christmas Eve would have been “a challenging day for the airport” even without the flooding. 10 10. Winter 2013-14 was the wettest in modern times in southern England and there was frequent heavy rain throughout December. 11 River and water table levels were high. 12 The Met Office predicted that 49.6mm of rain would fall at Gatwick in the 24 hours from 9am on 23 December. 13 Stewart Wingate, Gatwick Airport’s Chief Executive Officer, told us that 68mm of rain fell, “significantly exceeding the Met Office forecasts and causing the worst flooding in the airport’s living memory”. 14 11. At 4.40am on 24 December the River Mole and Crawter’s Brook broke their banks. This led to the flooding of three airfield sub-stations; standby generators were activated and the airfield continued to operate. 15 Shortly afterwards rainwater poured in through the power cable conduit system, flooding the electrical switch rooms in the North Terminal. Flooding of this sort, due to the volume and intensity of rainfall, had not previously happened in the 25 years since the terminal opened. 16 Nor were the problems it caused foreseen in the airport’s flood risk assessment. 17 12. The flooding of the terminal had an immediate impact on passengers who were beginning to arrive for morning departures. Departure boards were not working and most passengers could not be checked in or drop their bags. 18 Some electrical systems were working, which made it harder for passengers to understand what had gone wrong. 13. At 10am it was decided to move passengers (other than those for British Airways flights) from the North to the South Terminal to check in. Once processed, passengers would be bussed back to North Terminal departure gates. 19 Gatwick told us that airlines had consented to this plan, 20 although this was disputed by easyJet. 21 The airline told us 10 McMillan report p9. 11 http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/summaries/2013/december. 12 McMillan report p6. 13 Met Office (TWR 0029) section 4.1. 14 Q2. Also Met Office (TWR 0029) section 9.1. 15 McMillan report pp 10, 15. And Q2. 16 McMillan report p15. 17 McMillan report p15. 18 But see British Airways (TWR 0035) paragraph 2.2. 19 McMillan report p43. 20 Gatwick Airport (TWR 0044) paragraph 1.4. 21 EasyJet (TWR 0045) section 3.
10 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
that Gatwick had too few buses and bus drivers available to move passengers around in the
numbers required to make the plan work. 22 However, the McMillan report said the
principal problem was the number of people who moved in an uncontrolled manner from
the North to the South Terminal and overwhelmed easyJet’s check-in desks, after easyJet
sent passengers a text message about the switch. 23
14. Delays to processing passengers in the North Terminal led to easyJet cancelling a
number of flights late in the day, because air crew were coming to the end of their shifts. 24
Some passengers had to disembark from aircraft they thought would shortly depart.
Stranded passengers were left with the task of extracting their luggage from a dark baggage
reclaim area. Many ended up leaving the airport in the early hours of the morning without
their luggage and struggling to find transport home. 25
Contingency planning
15. A number of passengers questioned whether the airport and airlines had contingency
plans for dealing with disruption. 26 Gatwick offered a robust defence of its contingency
planning, arguing that aspects of four plans had been brought into effect on Christmas
Eve. 27 It said “contingency plans are regularly shared and practised with airline partners,
who are invited to provide feedback on a regular basis”. 28 easyJet disputed this, saying: 29
We have not seen a contingency plan for electrical problems in the North
Terminal. Nor had we seen a plan for any similar kind of event, such as the
North or South Terminal, or parts of them, becoming inoperable for any
other reason. We had also not seen any plan for a single terminal operation.
Consequently we had not been in a position to agree a plan.
16. In his report, David McMillan said that switching passengers from one terminal to
another was not envisaged in any Gatwick contingency plan, although it had been achieved
in a different context following a power failure in the South Terminal on 16 October
2013. 30 He recommended that the airport’s contingency plans be reviewed “in close
collaboration with airlines and ground handlers” and that plans should “be made available
to the entire airport community”. 31
22 EasyJet (TWR 0045) sections 1 and 6 and Qq 4, 9 and 18.
23 McMillan report p27.
24 McMillan report p27.
25 For example, see H. Michael McAlinden (TWR 0015) paragraphs 7-9 .
26 For example, see Daniel Salt (TWR 0005), Dr Lilly Evans (TWR 0006) and Janet Coombs (TWR 0019).
27 Gatwick Airport (TWR 0044) paragraph 9.2.
28 Gatwick Airport (TWR 0044) paragraph 7.5.
29 EasyJet (TWR 0045) section 3. Also Q88.
30 McMillan report p20.
31 McMillan report p25.Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 11
17. Gatwick’s contingency planning failed to deal with the circumstances that arose on
Christmas Eve. In particular, the decision to move passengers from the North to the
South Terminal had not been well tested. We are particularly concerned by suggestions
that the airport’s contingency planning had not properly involved major airlines. 32
Contingency planning at airports should be a collaborative exercise in which airlines,
ground handlers and other significant contractors are fully involved. The Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA) is now responsible for overseeing operational resilience issues at both
Heathrow and Gatwick. 33 We recommend that the CAA ensure that the airports’
contingency plans have been developed with the airlines and other relevant parties, that
the plans are properly tested and widely disseminated.
18. . Gatwick helpfully provided us with minutes of the meetings on Christmas Eve
between Gatwick and the airlines about how to handle the crisis. However, easyJet told us
that these were “not distributed. No specific action points arose from the meetings”. 34
19. The McMillan report said that participants in meetings on Christmas Eve came away
“with different understandings both of the situation faced by the airport and of the
proposed actions to deal with that situation”. The report recommended that “each meeting
should arrive at an agreed airport status” and “each meeting should end with an agreed
summary of actions which should be shared amongst participants”. 35 It is basic good
practice for meetings to be minuted in such a way as to identify agreed actions and for
those minutes to be shared with, and agreed by, participants. We recommend that, as
part of its oversight of operational resilience at Heathrow and Gatwick, the Civil Aviation
Authority ensure that this good practice is followed in future.
32 British Airways (TWR 0035) paragraph 5.2.
33 Transport Committee, Sixteenth Special Report, 2013-14, Ready and waiting? Transport preparations for winter
weather: Government Response to the Committee's Tenth Report of Session 2013–14, HC1139, pp6-7.
34 EasyJet (TWR 0045) section 2.
35 McMillan report p23.12 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 3 Passenger welfare Loudspeakers, refreshments, toilets 20. We have already listed the main problems passengers told us they faced on Christmas Eve. 36 Some should be relatively straightforward to put right. For example, when electronic systems go down, airports should have loudspeakers available so that staff can communicate with large groups of passengers. Airports should also consider making arrangements with local suppliers of portable toilets and refreshments, such as bottled water, which could be invoked during periods of disruption. Information 21. Inadequate or inconsistent provision of information was raised with us by numerous passengers. The McMillan report noted that there were times on Christmas Eve when Sussex Police had to take on responsibility for giving information to passengers. 37 Sussex Police said this was because airport and airline staff put too much emphasis on resuming the airport’s flight schedule and too little on passenger safety and welfare. It also drew attention to the problems caused by inconsistent information emanating from staff on the ground, the internet, social media and text messages to passengers from airlines. 38 Mr McMillan concluded that a significant contributory factor to confused information provision was a decision by staff from Menzies, a passenger handling firm, to stop updating a key database so that staff could focus on assisting with check-in. 39 Sussex Police is to be commended for its role in maintaining public order and looking after the interests of passengers at Gatwick on Christmas Eve. 22. Problems in providing information for passengers, particularly during periods of disruption, are common across transport modes: but they should not be regarded as inevitable. We agree with the recommendation of the McMillan report that “joint processes should be developed with key airlines to ensure clarity and continuity of information is maintained on all channels of passenger communication”. 40 We recommend that CAA oversight of airports’ operational resilience should include consideration of the arrangements they make to ensure that passengers are kept informed during times of disruption and that information provision is consistent across different means of communication. 36 Paragraph 3. 37 McMillan report p28. 38 Sussex Police (TWR 0042) paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3. 39 McMillan report p27. 40 McMillan report p28.
Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 13
Passenger Champions
23. Mr McMillan recommended that: 41
Each terminal should have a Passenger Captain, whose sole responsibility on
occasions of disruption should be to ensure that passenger welfare concerns
are met. This should extend, exceptionally, to the airport providing welfare
services that would normally fall to airlines, if it were clear that these were
not being provided in an acceptable manner.
We fully support this proposal, which chimes with our own 2011 recommendation that “if
airlines fail to meet their obligations to accommodate stranded passengers, airports should
be prepared to step into the breach”. However, we also pointed out that airlines, not
airports, have legal responsibility for passenger welfare. Consequently, we expressed
support for “measures by which airport operators could reclaim the costs of providing
support to stranded passengers from airlines which had not discharged their legal
responsibilities”. 42
24. In response to this point, the Government said:
Any stranded passengers will be best looked after when airlines, airports,
handling agents and other staff across the airport all work together to provide
care and assistance. Where there is an identified need for passenger welfare
plans to help prepare for, and coordinate, such efforts, they should be
encouraged. However, the legal responsibility to provide care and assistance
to passengers remains that of airlines. It is important that any initiatives to
bolster the provision of passenger welfare during periods of disruption, for
instance through passenger welfare plans, do not create any uncertainty in
this area.
Airport stakeholders may wish to include in their welfare plans a process to
enable any party to the plan that has suffered financial harm as a result of the
failure of any other party, to meet its obligations under the plan to claim
financial compensation from that party. The CAA's view is that any such
process must be reciprocal, to enable, for example, airlines to claim for
compensation if the airport has failed to meet its obligations under the plan,
but also to enable airports to claim for compensation from airlines that have
not met their obligations (particularly in relation to caring for passengers in
accordance with their legal obligations).
25. We endorse the recommendation of the McMillan report that Gatwick should
appoint Passenger Champions for each of its terminals, who will focus on ensuring that
passengers’ needs are prioritised. We recommend that CAA encourage other airports to
take similar steps.
41 McMillan report p29.
42 Transport Committee, Fifth Report, 2010-12, Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of the winter
weather in December 2010, HC794, paragraph 52.14 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
26. Under EU law, airlines must provide care and assistance to passengers during delays:
this can vary from food and drink to a hotel room. 43 In some circumstances passengers
who feel that their airline is not being helpful can assume their own care and charge the
costs they incur back to the airline. In our view, there is a crucial role for airports during
cases of severe disruption, when airline staff are likely to be overstretched, to provide
welfare services that would normally be the responsibility of the airlines. Airports could
step in before harassed and unhappy customers are forced to pay for their own care and
assistance. This would have the benefit of reducing the number of individual claims for
reimbursement that airlines would have to deal with and also ensure that travellers are not
unnecessarily out of pocket. It would be crucial for airlines and airports to reach
operational agreements about when airports should step in and how costs should be
allocated. We recommend that the Government review this issue in the light of the
McMillan report.
Compensation
27. Passengers’ entitlements to compensation when flights are cancelled or delayed are set
out in EU regulation 261/2004. 44 In summary, save for ‘exceptional circumstances’,
passengers whose flights are cancelled at short notice are entitled to a refund or a new
flight; meals and refreshments; hotel accommodation (where necessary); and cash
compensation for inconvenience. 45 The rules are complex and there is a significant body of
case law dealing with matters such as the definition of “exceptional circumstances” and
precisely what can be claimed for. In early 2013 the European Commission announced a
package of measures to give air passengers new and better rights to information, care and
re-routing when they are stranded at the airport; and better complaint procedures and
enforcement measures to help passengers obtain the rights to which they are entitled. 46
28. Passengers told us that they did not understand what they were allowed to claim for or
how to claim. There was confusion about whether a flight booked on another carrier would
be paid for by the original airline and whether a claim could be made for a taxi ride home
rather than a night in a hotel. easyjet told us that it had adopted a “no quibble” policy in
relation to Christmas Eve claims, but we received evidence of claims, some of them quite
modest, being disputed and of inconsistencies in the information given to passengers. 47
29. There is considerable scope for passengers to be better informed about their rights
when flights are delayed or cancelled and how to enforce those rights. The European
Commission is proposing that notices about passenger rights to compensation be
prominently displayed in all passenger areas at airports and that written notices are made
43 http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=2211&pagetype=90&pageid=15437.
44 EU regulation 261/2004. For a concise guide see HC Lib Standard Note SN233.
45 http://www.caa.co.uk/default.aspx?catid=2226&pageid=15601
46 If agreed the new rights are likely to be introduced from 2015. For details see EC press notice, “Commission
proposes new measures to strengthen air passenger rights”, 13 March 2013
47 For example see Miss Alice Carver (TWR 0018), Dr Michalis Sialaros (TWR 0020) and John Narcisi (TWR 0024).Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 15 available to passengers. 48 In our view this is far from adequate in a world where many people get their information from smart phones and tablets. We believe it should be a requirement on EU airlines to email or text passengers eligible to make a claim information from the relevant national authority (such as CAA) about their rights. We recommend that CAA bring forward proposals by the autumn for improving the provision of information to passengers about their rights at times of disruption. We also recommend that the Government push for amendment to the proposed EU regulation at Transport Council to include electronic means of alert and information dissemination. 48 Article 13 of the draft Regulation (2013/0072 (COD)).
16 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
4 Conclusion
31. Explaining the decisions taken on Christmas Eve, Stewart Wingate said: 49
On any other day, I am sure that we would have decided to cancel flights, but,
given that it was Christmas Eve and given the imperative to try to get
passengers to their destination, we took the decision to move those flights, on
an unprecedented scale, to the south terminal. We had some success. Half of
the north terminal flights did indeed depart on Christmas Eve, but we are
very sorry for the disruption that we caused to the passengers who were on
the other half of those flights—67 flights—because they did not depart from
the airport.
Gatwick’s determination to get people on their flights for Christmas was commendable.
However, a number of passengers pointed out that if their flights had been cancelled at the
start of the day they would have had an opportunity to make alternative travel plans. 50 In
addition, with fewer passengers at the airport, easyJet would have had a better chance of
processing those that remained and getting more flights away. We concur with Mr
McMillan’s conclusion that a “can-do mentality does … need to be tempered with sober
reflection on a day of difficulty as to what infrastructure and staff are available … and what
this means it is possible to deliver on that day”. 51
32. We also agree with Mr McMillan’s recommendation that “Gatwick should work with
airlines to develop much clearer operational protocols to develop guidance on threshold
conditions that would trigger the cancellation or postponement of flights”. 52 CAA should
consider how this recommendation might be extended to cover other airports.
33. None of the issues discussed in our report is new. Contingency planning,
communications and passenger welfare were all covered in the Begg report into the
disruption at Heathrow due to snow in December 2011, themes we then picked up in our
2011 report on the disruption to transport caused by snow and ice. 53 The CAA recently
told us that it had “already given industry some guidance about what is expected” in
relation to oversight of operational resilience: “if the plans produced by airports over the
spring and summer do not include all appropriate elements, we will use our licence powers
to require this to be remedied”. 54 The problems at Gatwick at Christmas Eve should be a
wake-up call for airports across the UK to get on top of operational resilience issues.
49 Q4.
50 For example Anna Lotocha (TWR 0030) and Julia Plana Soria et al (TWR 0032).
51 McMillan report p23.
52 McMillan report p29.
53 http://www.heathrowairport.com/static/HeathrowAboutUs/Downloads/PDF/BeggReport220311_BAA.pdf and
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/794/79406.htm#a14.
54 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmtran/1139/113905.htm.Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 17 Disruption of whatever nature should be met with well-drilled plans, familiar to airport operators, airlines, and other contractors, which put passenger interests first. 34. If our largest airports cannot demonstrate that they can look after passengers’ interests we expect the CAA to act. We recommend that the CAA inform us of its assessment of the operational resilience plans which are being produced by Heathrow and Gatwick and of what action it proposes to take in relation to any elements which it thinks are unsatisfactory.
18 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
Conclusions and recommendations
Introduction
1. We expect Gatwick and the relevant airlines to respond to the people who contacted
us, addressing the points they raised, and to confirm to us that they have done so.
(Paragraph 4)
2. Many staff at Gatwick, working for the airport, the airlines, and other operators such
as the baggage handlers, worked extremely hard to keep flights operating on
Christmas Eve and to look after passengers. We acknowledge their efforts.
(Paragraph 7)
Contingency planning
3. Gatwick’s contingency planning failed to deal with the circumstances that arose on
Christmas Eve. In particular, the decision to move passengers from the North to the
South Terminal had not been well tested. We are particularly concerned by
suggestions that the airport’s contingency planning had not properly involved major
airlines. Contingency planning at airports should be a collaborative exercise in which
airlines, ground handlers and other significant contractors are fully involved. We
recommend that the CAA ensure that the airports’ contingency plans have been
developed with the airlines and other relevant parties, that the plans are properly
tested and widely disseminated. (Paragraph 17)
4. It is basic good practice for meetings to be minuted in such a way as to identify
agreed actions and for those minutes to be shared with, and agreed by, participants.
We recommend that, as part of its oversight of operational resilience at Heathrow
and Gatwick, the Civil Aviation Authority ensure that this good practice is followed
in future. (Paragraph 19)
Passenger welfare
5. Sussex Police is to be commended for its role in maintaining public order and
looking after the interests of passengers at Gatwick on Christmas Eve. (Paragraph 21)
6. We recommend that CAA oversight of airports’ operational resilience should
include consideration of the arrangements they make to ensure that passengers are
kept informed during times of disruption and that information provision is
consistent across different means of communication. (Paragraph 22)
Passenger champions
7. We endorse the recommendation of the McMillan report that Gatwick should
appoint Passenger Champions for each of its terminals, who will focus on ensuring
that passengers’ needs are prioritised. We recommend that CAA encourage other
airports to take similar steps. (Paragraph 25)Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 19
8. It would be crucial for airlines and airports to reach operational agreements about
when airports should step in and how costs should be allocated. We recommend that
the Government review this issue in the light of the McMillan report. (Paragraph 26)
Compensation
9. We recommend that CAA bring forward proposals by the autumn for improving the
provision of information to passengers about their rights at times of disruption. We
also recommend that the Government push for amendment to the proposed EU
regulation at Transport Council to include electronic means of alert and information
dissemination. (Paragraph 27)
Conclusion
10. CAA should consider how [the McMillan report’s] recommendation [that Gatwick
should work with airlines to develop much clearer operational protocols to develop
guidance on threshold conditions that would trigger the cancellation or
postponement of flights] might be extended to cover other airports. (Paragraph 32)
11. The problems at Gatwick at Christmas Eve should be a wake-up call for airports
across the UK to get on top of operational resilience issues. Disruption of whatever
nature should be met with well-drilled plans, familiar to airport operators, airlines,
and other contractors, which put passenger interests first. (Paragraph 32)
12. We recommend that the CAA inform us of its assessment of the operational
resilience plans which are being produced by Heathrow and Gatwick and of what
action it proposes to take in relation to any elements which it thinks are
unsatisfactory. (Paragraph 34)20 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
Formal Minutes
Monday 31 March 2014
Members present:
Mrs Louise Ellman, in the Chair
Jim Fitzpatrick Chloe Smith
Karen Lumley Graham Stringer
Mr Adrian Sanders Martin Vickers
Draft Report (Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013), proposed by the Chair,
brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraphs 1 to 34 read and agreed to.
Text box and summary agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report be the Fourteenth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of
Standing Order No. 134.
[Adjourned till Monday 7 April at 4.00 pmPutting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 21 Witnesses The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the Committee’s inquiry page at www.parliament.uk/transcom. Tuesday 7 January 2014 Question number Stewart Wingate, Chief Executive, Gatwick Airport, William McGillivray, Product Development Director, Gatwick Airport, Jason Holt, Head of Gatwick, easyJet, and Peter Duffy, Customer Director, easyJet Q1-90 Dave Ward, Route Managing Director for London and South East, Network Rail, and Chris Burchell, Chairman, rail National Task Force Q91-124
22 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 Published written evidence The following written evidence was received and can be viewed on the Committee’s inquiry web page at www.parliament.uk/transcom. TWR numbers are generated by the evidence processing system and so may not be complete. 1 CAA (TWR 001) 2 East Sussex Rail Alliance (TWR0002) 3 Gatwick Airport (TWR0003) 4 Charles Ellis (TWR0004) 5 Daniel Salt (TWR0005) 6 Dr Lilly Evans (TWR0006) 7 Lord Triesman (TWR0007) 8 Tommy Abdy Collins (TWR0008) 9 Sharon and Peter Matthews (TWR0009) 10 Margaret Thomas (TWR0010) 11 Grenville Burrows (TWR0011) 12 Susan and David Watts (TWR0012) 13 Anna Powell (TWR0013) 14 ATOC (TWR0014) 15 Hugh Michael McAlinden (TWR015) 16 Jaume Mateu-Moreno (TWR0016) 17 Dr Sylvia Baron (TWR0017) 18 Alice Carver (TWR0018) 19 Janet Coombs (TWR0019) 20 Dr Michalis Sialaros (TWR0020) 21 Andrew Baxter (TWR0021) 22 Andrew Price (TWR0022) 23 Alessandra Scalici (TWR0023) 24 John Narcisi (TWR0024) 25 Environment Agency (TWR0025) 26 Malini Majithia (TWR0027) 27 East Sussex Rail Alliance (TWR0028) 28 Met Office (TWR0029) 29 Anna Lotocha (TWR0030) 30 Julia Plana Soria, Jordi Plana Juliachs and Julia Plana Soria (TWR0032) 31 Lisa Ciccone (TWR0033) 32 Melissa O'Connell (TWR0034) 33 British Airways (TWR0035) 34 Maya Lester (TWR0036) 35 Neil and Jennifer Smith (TWR0037) 36 Claire Rozette (TWR0039) 37 Juan Amador (TWR0040) 38 Thomson Airways (TWR0041) 39 Sussex Police (TWR0042)
Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 23 40 Office of Rail Regulation (TWR0043) 41 Gatwick Airport (TWR0044) 42 easyJet (TWR0045) 43 Stefano Andreani (TWR0046) 44 A Cordiner (TWR0047)
24 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
List of Reports from the Committee
during the current Parliament
All publications from the Committee are available on the Committee’s website
at http://www.parliament.uk/transcom.
The reference number of the Government’s response to each Report is printed in
brackets after the HC printing number.
Session 2013–14
Seventeenth Special Land transport security–scope for further EU HC 1192
Report involvement?: Further Government Response to the
Committees Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13
Thirteenth Report Forging ahead?: UK shipping strategy HC 630
Twelfth Report Future programme 2014 HC 1143
Eleventh Report Safety at level crossings HC 680
Tenth Report Ready and waiting? Transport preparations for HC 681 (HC 1139)
winter weather
Ninth Report High speed rail: on track? HC 851 (HC 1085)
Fifteenth Special Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast competition: HC 1086
Report Government update on the Laidlaw and Brown
reports
Eighth Report Access to ports HC 266 (HC 1083)
Seventh Report Local authority parking enforcement HC 118 (HC 970)
Seventh Special Report The new European motorcycle test: Government HC 656
Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of 2009–10
Sixth Report Flight Time Limitation: Follow-up HC 641 (HC 795)
Fifth Report Access to transport for disabled people HC 116 (HC 870)
Fourth Report Cost of motor insurance: whiplash HC 117 (CM 8738)
Third Report The work of the Vehicle and Operator Services HC 583 (HC 678)
Agency (VOSA)
Second Report Future programme: 2013–14 HC 438
Fifth Special Report The European Commission’s 4 Railway Package:
th
HC 439
Government Response to the Committee’s Twelfth
Report of Session 2012–13
Third Special Report Rail 2020: Rail Delivery Group and Passenger Focus HC 81
responses to the Committee’s Seventh Report of
Session 2012–13
Fourth Special Report Land transport security—scope for further EU HC 177
involvement?: Government Response to the
Committee’s Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13
Second Special Report Marine Pilotage: Government Response to the HC 79
Committee’s Ninth Report of Session 2012–13
First Report Aviation strategy HC 78 (HC 596)
First Special Report Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise HC 80
competition: Government Response to the
Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2012–13Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013 25
Session 2012–13
Twelfth Report The European Commission’s 4th Railway Package HC 1001(HC 439)
Eleventh Report Land transport security—scope for further EU HC 875
involvement?
Ninth Special Report Rail 2020: Government and Office of Rail Regulation HC 1059
Responses to the Committee’s Seventh Report of
2012–13
Tenth Report The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the HC 1018
Maritime Incident Response Group: follow up:
Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth
Report of 2012–13
Ninth Report Marine Pilotage HC 840
Eighth Report Cancellation of the InterCity West Coast franchise HC 537
competition
Eighth Special Report Plug-in vehicles, plugged in policy?: Government HC 884
Response to the Committee's Fourth Report of
Session 2012–13
Seventh Report Rail 2020 HC 329
Sixth Report The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the HC 647
Maritime Incident Response Group: follow up
Fifth Report Future programme: autumn and winter 2012–13 HC 591
Fourth Report Plug-in vehicles, plugged in policy? HC 239
Third Report Competition in the local bus market HC 10 (HC 761)
(Incorporating
HC 1861–i–iii)
Fifth Special Report Flight Time Limitations: Government Response To The HC 558
Committee's First Report Of Session 2012–13
Fourth Special Report Air Travel Organisers' Licensing (Atol) Reform: HC 557
Government Response To The Committee's
Seventeenth Report Of Session 2010–12
Second Report Road safety HC 506 (HC 648)
Incorporating HC 1738
First Report Flight time limitations HC 164
Incorporating HC 1838
Third Special Report Sulphur emissions by ships: Government Response to HC 87
the Committee’s Sixteenth Report of Session 2010–12
Second Special Report Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the HC 15
Department for Transport 2011–12: Government
Response to the Committee’s Fifteenth Report of
Session 2010–12
First Special Report Draft Civil Aviation Bill: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny: HC 11
Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth
Report of Session 2010–12
Session 2010–12
Seventeenth Report Air Travel Organisers’ Licensing (ATOL) reform HC 1798
Sixteenth Report Sulphur emissions by ships HC 156126 Putting passengers first: disruption at Gatwick, Christmas Eve 2013
Fifteenth Report Counting the cost: financial scrutiny of the HC 1560
Department for Transport 2011–12
Fourteenth Report Cable theft on the Railway HC 1609 (HC 1933)
Thirteenth Report Draft Civil Aviation Bill: Pre-Legislative Scrutiny HC 1694
Twelfth Report Cost of motor insurance: follow up HC 1451 (HC 1934)
Eleventh Report Thameslink rolling stock procurement HC 1453 (HC 1935)
Tenth Report High Speed Rail HC 1185–I (HC 1754)
Ninth Report Out of the jam: reducing congestion on our roads HC 872 (HC 1661)
Eighth Report Bus Services after the Spending Review HC 750 (HC 1550)
Seventh Report Taxis and private hire vehicles: the road to reform HC 720 (HC 1507)
Sixth Report The Coastguard, Emergency Towing Vessels and the HC 948, incorporating
Maritime Incident Response Group HC 752–i (HC 1482)
Fifth Report Keeping the UK moving: The impact on transport of HC 794 (HC 1467)
the winter weather in December 2010
Fourth Report The cost of motor insurance HC 591 (HC 1466)
Third Report Transport and the economy HC 473 (HC 962)
Second Report Financial Scrutiny of the Department for Transport HC 683
First Report Drink and drug driving law HC 460 (Cm 8050)
Tenth Special Report The proposal for a National Policy Statement on HC 1598
Ports: Government Response to the Committee Fifth
Report of Session 2009–10
Third Special Report The performance of the Department for Transport: HC 549
Government response to the Committee’s Fourth
Report of Session 2009–10
Second Special Report Update on the London Underground and the public- HC 467
private (PPP) partnership agreements: Government
response to the Committee’s Seventh Report of
Session 2009–10
First Special Report The major road network: Government response to HC 421
the Committee’s Eighth Report of Session 2009–10You can also read
