Politics and Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
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Analysis
The government of Iraq, led
by Prime Minister Mustafa
Politics and Security
al-Kadhimi, faces a number
of complex, interconnected
problems and challenges,
both political and security-
in Iraq:
related, domestic and foreign.
Confronting these issues and
finding solutions for them
is crucial, as failure to deal
Challenges and
with them will only allow
them to mount, in addition to
causing broader and deeper
complications in the political
Opportunities
landscape which could lead to
the breakdown and collapse
of the al-Kadhimi government.
This study discusses the most
important of these problems and
challenges and recommends
appropriate solutions.
Dr. Adel Abdulhamza Thgeel
July 2020
1Politics and Security
in Iraq:
Challenges and
Opportunities
Dr. Adel Abdulhamza Thgeel
July 2020
3Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
The author bears full legal responsibility for the contents of his
work, and this work does not reflect the opinion of any
governmental body.
Al-Ogaili, Adel Abdulhamza Thgeel
Politics and Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities / Adel Abdulhamza Thgeel Al-Ogaili
Amman: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020.
24 pages
Publisher: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan and Iraq Office
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan Office
P.O. Box 941876
Amman 11194
Jordan
Email: fes@fes-jordan.org
Website: www.fes-jordan.org
Not intended for sale
©Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Jordan & Iraq Office - Jordan Office
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored, distributed, or transmitted, in whole
or in part, in any form or by any means, whether by electronic or mechanical methods, including photocopying,
recording, or use of any information storage and retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the
publisher.
The opinions expressed in this study do not necessarily represent the views of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or its
editors. Each author bears sole responsibility for the content of the part he wrote.
• Cover and internal design: Kamal QasimContents
Contents
Introduction 6
Entrenched Problems 7
2.1 Clientelist-Confessionalism 7
2.2 Compound Crises 9
2.3 Lingering Disputes 10
2.4 Security Vulnerability and Terror Threats 11
2.5 The Rivalry Game and the Struggle for Influence 13
Deferred Opportunities 16
Recommendations: 19
5Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
1
Introduction
Al-Kadhimi, who served as the director of sooner or later. The al-Kadhimi administration’s
the Iraqi National Intelligence Service since effort is impeded by numerous challenges
2016, came to prominence as a compromise which the executive authority must confront,
candidate who was acceptable to the political including the following:
blocs, in addition to enjoying the support of • The narrow timeframe for solving Iraq’s
the United States and being welcomed by crises and problems
Iran. On 7 May, the Iraqi Parliament gave his • The scope of the governmental task of
cabinet and government program a vote of holding early elections
confidence. This occurred in the midst of a • The government’s lack of effective tools,
political crisis that had lasted more than seven due to both domestic and foreign pressure
months since the outbreak of popular protests exerted upon it
on 1 November 2019. The protests drew • The Iraqi government’s lack of a supportive
the support of the marja’iyya (senior Shi’ite parliamentary bloc to rely on while
clergy) in Najaf, forcing former prime minister pursuing reforms
Adil Abdul-Mahdi to submit his resignation
in November 2019. Among the main issues The pursuit of reforms requires substantial,
driving the protests were: rampant corruption painful sacrifices. However, the nation’s
in branches of the state, poor government health and economic crises have left popular
performance, mounting errors without real forces both unprepared and unable to make
solutions, and regional and international such sacrifices, which strips the government
interventions in Iraq, which turned the country of the necessary popular support. In light
into an arena for settling scores. of this complex situation, will the new Iraqi
government be able to implement its reforms
The fundamental challenge facing the new without a domestic confrontation? Will it
Iraqi government is the extent to which it seeks be able to keep Iraq neutral in the US-Iran
to change the political status quo – which is conflict? And does it have the time and the
precisely what the political elites are working tools to find alternative courses of action and
vigorously to preserve. This has resulted in solutions?
opposing visions which are bound for collision
6Entrenched Problems
2
Entrenched Problems
The government of Iraq, led by Prime Minister interdependent relationship between patrons
al-Kadhimi, faces a number of complex and and clients—part of the equation of clientelist
interconnected problems and challenges, corruption—seen in the ongoing role of mutual
both political and security-related, foreign favors on the basis of cronyism, subservience,
and domestic. Confronting these issues and and dependency. Thus, a system of clientelism
finding solutions for them is crucial, as failure was erected on the basis of a hierarchy of
to deal with them will only allow them to political and financial clout, quid pro quos in
mount. If these issues go unsolved, it would the interest of the powerful and influential,
further complicate the political landscape and and exploitation of the nation’s resources for
might lead to the breakdown and collapse of personal and partisan favors. Beneficiaries of
the al-Kadhimi government. With this in mind, this system are able to mobilize their supporters
it is possible to identify the main problems. to counter any threat to their position, which
impedes state institutions’ ability to function
2.1 Clientelist-Confessionalism in an impartial, professional manner and curb
The current government came into existence in inconsistent and unequal treatment.
the midst of systemic problems and upheaval
in both foreign and domestic affairs. Among Clientelist-confessionalism manifests not
the main problems is confessionalism, which only in the executive branch, but also in the
emerged as part of a government where power performance of the legislature, leading to
is divided along ethno-sectarian lines, as well as the parliament’s disregard for the separation
through mutual understanding between ruling of powers and interference in the functions
elites, which led them to monopolize power. of the executive branch. Under the notion of
Consequently, the government became subject confessionalism, maximum pressure is applied
to these very actors, moving more towards
to the executive authority for the benefit
an autocratic system than a democratic one,
of partisan or sectarian interests, and the
despite the democratic principles on which it
parliament has ceased to be able to carry out its
was founded. This was accompanied by an
proper role of oversight over the functioning of
7Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
the Iraqi government. The result is overlapping Commission of Integrity.2 Disagreements have
interests between the two branches, arisen between the Supreme Judicial Council
particularly as regards accountability, which of Iraq and the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq
is subject to mutual understandings between regarding their respective powers and their
the political forces or simple convergence of places within the Iraqi judicial system. The
interests, usually at the expense of the general resultant dilemmas, conflicts of interest, and
legal disputes have impacted the legal status of
public. No-confidence votes against ministers
both bodies, as there are numerous loopholes
are merely a demonstration of intersecting
in the constitutional and legal regulation
interests between blocs, rather than any issue
concerning the judicial branch’s makeup.3 This
of paramount national interest.1 This situation
has weakened the law and caused citizens to
also led to Parliament passing laws which
lose faith in it (or at least shaken their trust),
contradicted, or were at least inconsistent with,
leading them to resort to narrow sub-identities
the Iraqi constitution, such as the budget law
such as tribe to provide them protection.
and the share it allocates to Kurdistan. Despite
the Constitution’s stipulation that revenues Clientelist-confessionalism is not limited to the
be distributed and that oil and gas belong to domestic level, but has become a foreign affairs
all Iraqis, Kurdistan controls oil revenues at issue as well. Indeed, successive governments
the federal government’s expense, to such a have only risen to power in light of regional
degree that it only hands over 250,000 barrels and international confessionalism, any breach
per day to the federal government. of which would impact political stability. At
the forefront of this phenomenon are US and
Interference and confessionalism affect the Iranian interventions and their conflicts and
judicial branch as well. One public opinion consensus-building efforts in the Iraqi arena.
survey shows that more than 58% of people The flaws in the political system are structural,
believe that the judiciary is not independent, rather than stemming from individuals, and
thus any change that fails to address these
that it is subject to pressure and political
flaws is meaningless and may even exacerbate
interference, and that there are deliberate
the problem.
obstructions of the role of the public
prosecution. Furthermore, its jurisdiction
2 Governance Center for Public Policies (2018):
overlaps with that of other bodies such as the “Governance Indicator of Democratic Transformation
in Iraq 2017 - 2018 Faltering democracy”, Baghdad:
Al-Hasheme Publishing, 71.
3 Nabeel Mahdi Zowein and Haider Mohammed
Hassan (2020): “The Truth between Supervision and
1 Governance Center for Public Policies (2020): Independence: A Study of the Dilemma between the
“National Index for Democratic Transformation in Supreme Judicial Council and the Federal Supreme
Iraq 2018 - 2019, Stagnant Transition”, Baghdad: Al- Court”, Rewaq Baghdad Center for Public Policy, 3
Hasheme Publishing, 54. April, (https://bit.ly/2BDBEc3)
8Entrenched Problems
2.2 Compound Crises of Health figures, by 26 June the total case
The formation of the Iraqi government was count had reached 41,193 with 1,559 deaths.
7
accompanied by compound political, public With the overcrowding of hospitals and the
health, and economic crises. Since each crisis government resorting to regional quarantines,
is connected with the other two, all must be the health sector has begun to suffer due
confronted at once. But does the government to a shortage of funds and poor quality of
have the ability to do so, given limited means service. This is heading towards a national
and the lack of a domestic consensus? state of emergency where the government
will be administratively impotent and devoid of
At the forefront of these crises are the political will. If the administration’s response
protests which erupted in early October is ineffective, then it will almost certainly face
2019. On a fundamental level, they were popular outrage at some stage in the future.
driven by social and economic demands, Political forces and armed factions opposed to
violations of sovereignty, public outrage at al-Kadhimi may exploit this to build opposition
poor governance, and the public’s rejection of and overthrow him.
rampant corruption in state institutions, which
had turned them into fiefdoms for the ruling Alongside these two crises there is a severe
elites.4 By the measure of the 2018 Corruption economic crisis. In January and February 2020,
Perceptions Index, Iraq achieved a score of 18 oil revenues reached nearly $6 billion USD per
out of 100 and came in 168th place out of month, only to drop by 80% in April and May
to 1.5 billion dollars per month due to the
the 180 countries included in the ranking.5
collapse of oil prices and the reduction of Iraq’s
Unemployment and poverty are widespread
market share of oil exports in accordance with
among youth, reaching 27.5% and 20.5%
the OPEC+ agreement.8 In a rentier state that
respectively in 2018.6 On top of this is a health
is more than 90% reliant on oil revenues, a
crisis resulting from the inadequate response to
crucial question presents itself as to whether
the COVID-19 pandemic, which has lessened
the government will be able to meet its
but not completely stopped the protests. Daily
financial obligations, pay the salaries of civil
cases have risen noticeably, especially since
servants, and provide essential services.
the start of June, surpassing one thousand
cases per day. According to the latest Ministry
4 Hasan, Harith (2020): “A Vehicle for Revolution”,
Carnegie Middle East Center, 2 March, (https://
carnegie-mec.org/diwan/81226)
5 https://www.transparency.org/files/content/
pages/2018_CPI_FullResults.zip 7 https://baghdadtoday.news/FlightStats
6 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central 8 “The Al-Kadhimi Administration in Iraq: Challenges
Organization for Statistics: Monitor Survey and and Opportunities for Success”, Emirates Policy
Assessment of Poverty in Iraq 2018. Center, 27 May 2020, (https://bit.ly/2AqjHwS)
9Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
This situation has impacted the government’s new prime minister that the anger is real
ability to address the protestors’ demands and and will not dissipate, that the demand is for
fulfill its promises to them. It has also raised accountability and improved governance, and
doubts about the government’s ability to hold that the protests are as strong today as they
accountable the groups which, according to were seven months ago.11
the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Iraq, are accused of killing more than 490 2.3 Lingering Disputes
protestors.9 It remains to be seen whether the Al-Kadhimi has inherited lingering disputes
government will reveal the fate of the activists with the government of the Kurdistan Region
and journalists who were arrested months ago, of Iraq. There are many issues of contention
whether it can handle holding early elections, between the federal government and this
and whether it can provide a safe electoral region, which it must face in order to avoid
environment by keeping armed groups under negative impacts on security, political, and
control and preventing them from buying economic stability. The issues include Article
votes. Thus, among the challenges faced by the 140 of the Constitution of Iraq, the 2007
Iraqi government, these formidable crises strip Draft Federal Oil and Gas Law, the federal
it of its ability to fulfill its promises. Though the government’s demand for transparency in
popular protests dwindled after the previous oil sales and revenues at government points
government was forced to resign, public of entry and airports, the reinstatement of
outrage is now greater than ever before, the a federal budget share for the Kurdistan
consequence of which will be a worsening of Region, and the enforcement of all oil deals
the political, social, and economic conditions in between Erbil and Baghdad in order for Erbil
the country. The dramatic collapse in oil prices to receive a share of the federal budget.
will force the government to adopt austerity Further demands are to resolve the Peshmerga
issue in terms of its affiliations and working
measures, causing a rise in unemployment
mechanisms, and the nature of its relationship
and poverty rates. Most likely, the ensuing
to the federal government and to the military
frustration will produce a new wave of protests,
laws in force. These demands are seen as
which may be more intense and violent than
difficult and unfeasible given that since 2003,
before.10 The protests are a reminder to the
the government of the Kurdistan Region of
9 “Demonstrations in Iraq: Kidnappings, Torture, Iraq has pursued a policy of fait accompli and
and Enforced Disappearances in the Context of the
Ongoing Demonstrations in Iraq, Human Rights
threatening to escalate crises.
Special Report, 3rd Update”, Baghdad: United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, 23 May 2020, 2.
10 Young, Michael (2020): “Has the Coronavirus Crisis 11 Halawa, Hafsa et al. (2020): “Iraq special briefing:
Permanently Silenced the Protests in Iraq?”, Carnegie The challenges facing Prime Minister Mustafa al-
Middle East Center, 23 April, (https://carnegie-mec. Kadhimi”, Middle East Institute, 12 May, (https://
org/diwan/81620) bit.ly/2XDu3Cw)
10Entrenched Problems
2.4 Security Vulnerability and Terror Threats obligation to engage in jihad, which played a
In the realm of security, the Iraqi government significant role in liberating the territory and
faces two fundamental challenges. The first defeating ISIS. The Popular Mobilization Forces
relates to weapons restrictions by the state, a was formed and organized by Law 40 in 2016,
goal which the prime minister made clear in his reflecting the role of armed factions. Although
government program. The second challenge is these factions are joined under the banner
to counter the resurgence of ISIS. of the Popular Mobilization Forces, there is
a major dispute over their roles, vision, and
The most prominent challenge facing the new underlying doctrine. Despite their connection
government, and one which is closely related with the PMF, they are separate, independent
to security, political, and even economic entities, armed factions with political wings
benefits, is that of curbing armed groups in which enable them to intervene in political
the country which are in competition with affairs. Some are linked to the Supreme Leader
one another. The main task is to control the of Iran’s vilayat-e faqih doctrine, making their
movement and activities of non-governmental roles transnational. Thus, the factions are a
actors, namely armed factions and groups, strategic ally for Iran and a central component
which have amassed significant military force to its strategy in the region, both for countering
as well as a political and security role which the United States in Iraq and for their role in
affords them freedom of movement, action, Syria. This puts the factions in conflict with the
and influence.12 The new government must vision of the Iraqi state, and in contradiction
establish its authority over the Iraqi Security with Article 9 of the Constitution of Iraq as well
Forces in order to achieve true stability in the as the Popular Mobilization Forces law. The
country, as Iraq is burdened by the presence divide only continues to widen as the armed
of a variety of paramilitary units. This is due in factions continue to oppose any substantive
part to the weakness of its regular army, which reform which could be detrimental to their
was dismantled and reconstructed following interests and their vision.
the 2003 US invasion as part of the process
to undo the legacy of the previous dictatorial Additionally, these factions dominate the
regime. The army had to be rebuilt again after administration and leadership of the Popular
collapsing in the face of Islamic State attacks Mobilization Forces, of which 80% is affiliated
14
in 2014.13 In June of the same year, Ayatollah with the factions, which neutralizes the
al-Sistani’s fatwa was issued on the collective influence of other actors participating in this
12 Hasan, Harith: op. cit.
14 Rudolf, Inna (2020): “The Future of the Popular
13 Frantzman, Seth J. (2020): “Iraq’s New Prime Minister Mobilization Forces after the Assassination of Abu
Needs to Take Control of His Security Forces”, 16 Mahdi al-Muhandis”, Philadelphia: Foreign Policy
June, (https://bit.ly/31gjGHj) Institute, April, 4.
11Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
institution.15 This has led to disputes between their existence is a major security challenge for
the factions and impacted their performance, the Iraqi government.
driving a segment of the Popular Mobilization
Forces’ formations to associate with other The other challenge involves the return of ISIS
bodies, as in the case of the al-Abbas Combat in Iraq, and the likelihood that the events of
Division, the Imam Ali Combat Division, the 2014 could repeat themselves. Since suffering
Ansar al-Marja’iya Brigade, and the Ali Akbar regional defeats in 2017, the Islamic State
Brigade. All of these groups severed their has recovered and is waging a strong and
ties with the Popular Mobilization Forces to steady resurgence as a rebel force within Iraq.
instead affiliate with the General Commander It has recovered its tactical effectiveness and
of the Iraqi Armed Forces.16 Armed factions reimposed its presence throughout numerous
pose a complex situation in Iraq’s political areas, as shown by an annual comparison of
and security landscape. Previous governments attacks it carried out in 2019 and 2020. From
failed to contain or deal with them, so the the 292 attacks it carried out in the first quarter
Iraqi government has a significant challenge in of 2019, there has been a 94% increase to
getting them under control. 566 attacks in the first quarter of this year.17
This is driven by several factors, including the
On top of these factions, the Kurdistan Region following: the establishment of strongholds in
of Iraq has its special security forces known as rugged terrain which the Iraqi Security Forces
the Peshmerga. Though the organization is struggle to reach;18 the lack of major fighting
formally under the command of the Ministry capabilities with which to eliminate the
of Peshmerga Affairs within the regional remnants and roots of ISIS; poor leadership
19
government, dozens of its battalions are closely of elite Iraqi troops; these troops’ slow
recovery from the losses they incurred from
affiliated with the two dominant political
2014 to 2017 in the war against ISIS;20 military
parties in Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Democratic
Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, in
17 Michael Knights and Alex Ameida (2020): “Remaining
clear contradiction to the principles of Iraq’s and Expanding: The Recovery of Islamic State
Operations in Iraq in 2019 - 2020,” CTC Sentinel,
constitution. Since these armed groups lack May. 1.
any central government authority, play political 18 Aaron Y. Zelin and Michael Knights (2020): “The
Islamic State’s Resurgence in the COVID Era? From
roles, and generally have competing goals, Defeat to Renewal in Iraq and Syria”, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3322, 29
May, (https://bit.ly/3eOW1Rz)
15 Al-Hashimi, Hisham: “The Conflict over Loyalty and 19 Al-Hashimi, Hisham (2020), “ISIS in the First Quarter
Marja’iyya within the Popular Mobilization Forces”, of 2020”, Baghdad: Sippar Center for Analysis and
(https://bit.ly/2MG4ISh) Expectation Management, 30 April, 1.
16 Al Qaysi, Majid (2020): “The Necessary Military Steps 20 “‘The Return of ISIS to Iraq’: Has the Organization
to Defeat the Remnants of ISIS in Iraq”, situational Enter the Rebuilding Phase?”, Washington: Al-
assessment, International Strategic and Political Hurra-Translations, 6 June 2020, (https://arbne.
Research Center, 7 May, (https://bit.ly/2AOkwQ8) ws/2UgWT9I)
12Entrenched Problems
leaders who were seen as close to the US had withdrawn nearly all of their trainers.24
getting redeployed from combat command in Thus, the Iraqi government is left to face the
response to pressure from the armed factions;21 challenge of countering terrorism alone.
domestic unrest owing to widespread
anti-government protests; security forces’ 2.5 The Rivalry Game and the Struggle for
preoccupation with establishing order amidst Influence
the COVID-19 pandemic, which has required The task facing Iraq’s new government today
redeployment and repositioning; and the lack is to strike a balance between the United
of coordination and leadership among the States and Iran, the two rival powers in Iraq, to
actors waging battle against ISIS, including the ward off the risk of Iraq turning into an arena
Iraqi Security Forces, the Popular Mobilization for their conflict. The process of forming any
Forces, the Tribal Mobilization Forces, and the government is the first of many fronts in the
Peshmerga.22 On top of this, the international struggle between the US and Iran to extend
coalition against ISIS suspended its air and their influence in Iraq. Clearly, coexistence is
reconnaissance operations and reduced its not easy, as there has been a tilt to one side or
capacity to provide counsel and escort to the other, which has persisted over successive
Iraqi troops. This was due to rising tensions governments.25
and strikes exchanged between Washington
and Tehran and its allies, following the Iraqi US-Iran relations have not been good in
parliament’s resolution on 5 January 2020 to recent years, but tensions began to escalate
end the presence of troops in the country, after Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear
in the aftermath of the US assassination of agreement in May 2018, and with his
Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds adoption of a new policy known as “Maximum
Force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Pressure.” The situation worsened after the
Corps, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy US assassinated General Qasem Soleimani and
chief of the Popular Mobilization Force, on Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, launching a phase of
3 January 2020.23 Then came the COVID-19 dangerous escalation between the US on one
situation, leading coalition and NATO training side, and Iran and the armed factions on the
missions to suspend their operations for other.26 The Iraqi government found itself stuck
two months. By 29 March, Australia, Spain,
France, New Zealand, Portugal, and Holland 24 Michael Knights and Alex Almeida: op. cit. 14.
25 Kawas, Mohamad (2020): “Iraq after the Formation
of Al-Kadhimi’s Government: Opportunities and
21 Michael Knights and Alex Almeida: op. cit., 13 - 14.
Expectations”, Emirates Policy Center, 13 May,
22 “The Return of ISIS to Iraq”, op. cit., 1 - 3. (https://bit.ly/2A2HOSD)
23 Jiyad, Sajad (2020): “With ISIS Resurgent, Can 26 Wolf, Albert B. (2020): “To Stop a US-Iran War,
Iraq’s New Government Avoid a Repeat of the Finlandize Iraq: By treating Iraq as a neutral zone,
Past?”, World Politics Review, 30 June, (https://bit. Washington and Tehran can avoid conflict”, Foreign
ly/2BJbFQx) Policy, 11 May, (https://bit.ly/3feByGn)
13Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
between the United States and Iran, with the outcomes and consequences of the strategic
US prepared to deprive Iraq of military aid or dialogue to which the US invited Iraq last April.
use economic measures to force Iraq to adopt The realities enshrined by the dialogue may be
a stance more favorable towards American antithetical to Iran’s expectations and desires,
forces. President Donald Trump has warned as it could produce long-term ramifications.
Iraq that if it were to expel American troops in Moreover, the dialogue will define the nature
accordance with the parliament’s resolution, and extent of US-Iraqi relations for the coming
the US “will charge them sanctions like they’ve period, especially in regards to military,
never seen before, ever.”27 Additionally, security, economic, cultural, and political
Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves are in New dimensions of cooperation, which the US
York, and the US administration has explicitly will put on the negotiating table with its Iraqi
warned that it could restrict or prevent Iraq counterpart. This is in addition to establishing
from accessing these funds. At a time of falling a new pathway within the Iraqi government
oil prices and an acute economic crisis which for dealing with Iran’s presence and influence
will greatly impact Iraqi revenues, inability within the country. Iran is concerned about
to access foreign exchange reserves could what these American preconditions would
be devastating.28 A complete US withdrawal mean for the future of the relationship between
from Iraq would give Iran a strategic victory - Baghdad and Tehran.30 These are the driving
especially considering Trump’s determination factors behind Tehran’s efforts to re-establish
to contain Iran’s regional ambitions and make its position in Iraq, create a new generation
this a cornerstone of his foreign policy in the of more extremist militant groups, and invest
region - and ensure Iranian control of Iraq. in the groups in order to better respond to
the US presence in Iraq.31 Its first step may be
Meanwhile, Iran has called for an end to the US propagating the accusation that al-Kadhimi,
military presence, pressing its allies to make this as director of the National Intelligence Service,
a reality, not to mention the statement by the was complicit in the killing of Iranian Quds
Supreme Leader of Iran that American troops Force commander Qasem Soleimani and
will be driven out of Syria and Iraq.29 This is the Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy chief of the
product of Iran’s anxiety regarding the possible Popular Mobilization Forces; encouraging
parties and factions allied with it to undertake
27 Al-Bedaiwi, Adel (2020): “The Crisis of Iraqi-American
Relations”, Baghdad: Intellectual Dialogue, 51,
March, 4.
30 Fahas, Hasan (2020): “Tehran and the Prospective
28 Geranmayeh, Ellie (2020): “Iran, Iran, and the Strategic Dialogue Between Washington and
Specter of American Sanctions”, Baghdad: Al-Bayan Baghdad”, Independent Arabia, 28 May, (https://
Center for Planning and Studies, 13 April, (https:// bit.ly/2MnIww3)
bit.ly/2MzxdkG)
31 Farzin Nadimi and Hamdi Malik (10), “Qaani’s
29 “Khamenei: American Troops Will Be Driven Out of Surprise Visit to Baghdad and the Future of the
Syria and Iraq”, Hawar News Agency, (https://bit. PMF”, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 10
ly/2Xvemxt) April, (https://bit.ly/36QcJxj)
14Entrenched Problems
a stronger pressure campaign by blaming the The Iraqi government thus faces a test. It must
government for the causes of the economic ensure an orderly military relationship with
crisis; or indirectly inciting protests to rally Washington, while not allowing American
people against the Iraqi government. Iran may military and civilian units in Iraq to be exposed
also urge its political allies in parliament to take to attacks by armed actors. At the same
stances against al-Kadhimi based on his failure time, it cannot allow Iraqi territory to be
to carry out the parliamentary resolution to used for American operations against Iran
end the presence of foreign troops.32 or Iraqi actors without Baghdad’s approval.
32 “Al-Kadhimi’s Government in Iraq: Challenges and
Chances of Success”, Emirates Policy Center, 27 May,
(https://bit.ly/2AqjHwS)
15Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
3
Deferred Opportunities
The prime minister has a relatively wide margin to give the government a chance, describing
in which to maneuver, owing to his role as it as the compromise between the demands
head of the intelligence services. He possesses of the movement, partisan interests, and the
precise sensory data which other political powers that dominate the political process.
figures may lack, as well as the ability to lead The government has pledged to the protestors
the intelligence services through a minefield to complete the transitional phase as quickly
of threats which the country knows all too as possible, and to promptly undertake urgent
well. This reveals a key aspect of the man’s tasks such as passing an election law with
personality and his ability to engage with all of all the necessary reviews and modifications;
Iraq’s internal contradictions. He knows how completing the final version of the Law of
to coexist with the contradictions of foreign the Independent High Electoral Commission;
agendas surrounding Iraq. providing all that is needed in order to hold
elections as soon as possible; and amending
In regard to the protests, the Iraqi government’s the Political Parties Law that was passed in
opportunity arises from the fact that the 2015. It has also ordered its entire security
supreme religious authority [marja›iyya] in apparatus to release all detained protestors;
Najaf backs most of the protestors’ demands. track down abductees; identify those who
Some political forces have embraced the have carried out assassinations and bring
demands as well, and the protestors have them before a court of law; and form a high
gained the support of the United Nations. Most legal commission to research and investigate
importantly, the Iraqi government announced all events that transpired around the protests.
its support for the protestors, implemented
a ceasefire to protect them, freed protestors On the topic of Kurdish relations, one of the
who were arrested, and involved influential government’s most promising opportunities
figures from the protests in political decisions. is their strong Kurdish support, which may
Additionally, youth groups representing the facilitate a breakthrough in the form of a
protest movement are increasingly inclined sustainable agreement between Erbil and
16Deferred Opportunities
Baghdad. Erbil has demonstrated its readiness responding by attaching the PMF to the
to solve these outstanding differences, with military institution under the command of the
Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq general commander of the Iraqi Armed Forces.
Masrour Barzani affirming that his government This gives al-Kadhimi the ability to restructure
has taken serious steps in talks with Baghdad the PMF in such a way as to ensure that it is
to resolve disputes that have festered for subject to existing military laws. These are
years. This shows that his government is encouraging signs just a few weeks after the
prepared to settle these issues with the new government’s formation,34 as they indicate
government of Iraq, come together with the how serious al-Kadhimi is about reforming the
federal government to form two commissions deep divisions in the country.
to resolve financial and oil-related disputes
between the two sides, and enter into intensive
negotiations to reach a final compromise over In the fight against ISIS, there are local
the unresolved issues, in accordance with the and international expectations of making
Constitution. significant headway in the battle against this
terrorist organization, because al-Kadhimi
In regards to security, the federal government comes from an important security body.
has moved to put competent leadership at Moreover, the Iraqi military now possesses
the helm of the Counter Terrorism Service greater experience and efficacy after years of
through a restructuring that includes the battling ISIS. ISIS has also failed in its attempts
appointment of Abdel-Wahab al-Saadi. For to recreate the incubator that helped it to
Minister of Interior, it appointed Othman ready its ranks before the events of 2014,
al-Ghanimi, a prominent, professional, and and it has found that these regions are better
patriotic figure who previously served as chief prepared to resist it.35 ISIS is not as strong as it
of staff of the army. Having such leadership at was prior to 2014, when it was trying to build
the head of these security institutions restores momentum in the early stages of its ultimate
their effectiveness and their ability to regain recovery from defeat.36 The Global Coalition
the initiative, combat terrorism, and address against Daesh has affirmed that it will continue
corruption and lack of accountability.33 The to combat ISIS in Iraq and Syria and create
government has also supported the leadership proper conditions to vanquish the terrorist
of the “Atabat” units and the religious organization. This remains the sole objective
establishment in their objection to some
34 Knights, Michael (2020), “Kadhimi as Commander-in-
factions’ monopoly over the leadership and Chief: First Steps in Iraq Security Reform”, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, PolicyWatch 3317, 19
control of the Popular Mobilization Forces, May, (https://bit.ly/2BzJUcZ)
35 Al-Hishami, Hisham (2020): “ISIS in the First Quarter
of 2020”, op. cit., 1.
33 Sajad Jiyad: op. cit. 36 Aaron Y. Zelin and Michael Knights, op. cit.
17Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
of the Coalition through its comprehensive, the US granting Iraq a 120-day exemption
multilateral effort.37 Likewise, the ministers of from the prohibition on purchasing Iranian
defense of NATO agreed in May to enhance electricity and gas, which was issued when al-
the alliance’s training mission in Iraq, and that Kadhimi assumed office. Pompeo emphasized
the alliance should focus on preventing the that “this gesture is aimed at showing our
return of ISIS.38 The United States reiterated its desire to help provide suitable conditions for
commitment to providing air, intelligence, and the success of the al-Kadhimi government.”
advisory support to Iraq’s forces in the fight Similarly, the US embassy announced its
against ISIS.39 support for the new government in fighting
the COVID-19 pandemic. Through its foreign
In regards to the struggle for influence, Iraq minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran voiced
held the first sessions of its strategic dialogue its support for the formation of the new
with the United States on 11 June 2020 to Iraqi government under the leadership of
set the stage for bilateral cooperation and al-Kadhimi, as well as its preparedness to
chart a course for future relations between work together to overcome the country’s
the two countries, in an effort to reduce the problems. This message was reiterated by
fog of ambiguity. The United States pledged Iran’s ambassador to Baghdad, Iraj Masjedi.
to provide Iraq with political, economic, and This paves the way for an opportunity to de-
medical support, as well as a timetable for escalate US-Iran relations in Iraq.
the withdrawal of its troops. This followed
37 “Joint Communique by Ministers of the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS”, media note, U.S.
Department of State, 4 June, (https://bit.ly/3dzO4j2)
38 Al Qaysi, Majid (2020): “The United States and Iran
in Iraq: What Is Next After the New Strategic Shift”,
report, Istanbul: International Strategic and Political
Research Center, 10 - 11.
39 “Warmly Welcome Al-Kazemi: Pompeo Pledges
Financial Support to Iraq to Recover ‘Instantly’”,
Washington: Al-Hurra, 4 June 2020, (https://arbne.
ws/2MxqCak)
18Recommendations:
4
Recommendations:
• The Prime Minister should act as the armed groups and factions. Furthermore,
missing channel of communication the government should seek to strengthen
between the United States and Iran in the role of the US in supporting the Iraqi
the Iraqi arena. This would be the most Armed Forces through trainings, technical
important positive development for Iraq, support, and air support rather than
especially as both sides are determined to operations related to ground fighting.
make no concessions.
• With Denmark assuming control of the
• The government of Iraq should involve NATO alliance, the Iraqi government
relatively impartial mediators, such as should discuss training contracts, support,
European nations, to create channels of military and security consultation, and
communication and dialogue between logistics support so as to ensure the final
the United States and Iran, and establish defeat of ISIS and develop Iraqi military
rules of engagement that protect Iraq’s capabilities.
autonomy and prevent further escalation.
• The al-Kadhimi government should turn
• In addition to the bilateral strategic towards European Union nations and
dialogue with the United States, it is strengthen its cooperation with them,
time for Iraq to open a bilateral strategic as their presence is uncontroversial
dialogue with Iran surrounding the full domestically and the EU is not involved
range of issues pertaining to the two in a struggle in the Iraqi arena. This
neighboring countries. can be done by discussing European
interests in Iraq, especially in the areas of
• The government should seek to steer the counterterrorism, achieving stability in the
strategy of the US and the US-led coalition country, and improving living conditions
in Iraq towards combating and defeating in such a way as to reduce the influx of
ISIS, and away from confrontations with refugees into Europe.
19Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Jordan & Iraq Office - Politics and
Security in Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities
• The Iraqi government must set feasible administrative and political duties prevents
goals and avoid overly ambitious ones. the country from falling into the clutches
Initiatives should be defined so as to be of clientelism; favoritism; and political,
achievable; for example, identifying the administrative, and financial corruption.
issues where there is least resistance to It will consolidate state institutions, giving
reform, and targeting these issues first. them momentum, durability, accumulated
This approach will generate momentum experience, and independence. All of
for subsequent reforms that are larger this helps the government function in
and more fundamental. The government an effective and influential way in both
should pursue gradual reform to create a foreign and domestic affairs.
balance between reform and the status
quo. It should also seek to build allies in • The foremost goal of the government must
the Iraqi parliament for support. be to begin a new political era by working
to provide the requisites for reform of
• The Iraqi government should form a the electoral system (an electoral law, an
national bloc that transcends subnational electoral commission, a political parties
identities and narrow affiliations, with law, a conducive electoral environment);
the aim of backing up the executive as it setting a deadline for early elections, the
pursues reforms. outcomes of which may yield positive
political change; and taking care not to
• The Council of Representatives should neglect the execution of other duties such
undertake a comprehensive review of as preserving security and sovereignty and
the legal structure of the judiciary and its ensuring that the needs of citizens are
components in order to strengthen the met.
judiciary’s independence. Furthermore,
it should establish a single authority • The government should embark on
to coordinate between the judiciary’s establishing the Youth Advisory Council
components and to achieve integration. as promised, in order to coordinate
government steps related to reform,
• The system of oversight and accountability communicate with protestors, and follow
must be reformed, and the role of the up on their demands.
public prosecution must be strengthened.
• The structure of the Popular Mobilization
• There must be separation between the Forces should be applied in such a way as
political and the administrative aspects of to ensure enforcement of its law and its
the state’s executive institutions. Separating orders; prevent any one party from taking
20Entrenched Problems
control of the PMF; and ensure that it is legal situations have been investigated,
subject to military law in force. and no village or town should be left
uninhabited.
• The Tribal Mobilization Forces should be
better armed in order to play a significant • Intelligence efforts should be coordinated
role in hunting down the remnants of ISIS. by a specific authority so as to bypass
bureaucratic unwieldiness and inefficiency
• The Iraqi Armed Forces should be made in information processing.
better prepared, and the forces of the
Counter Terrorism Services should be • Non-military cooperation between Iraq
increased. Capabilities also must be and the United States should be bolstered.
improved in the areas of military oversight, In light of the spread of the COVID-19
monitoring, reconnaissance, and pandemic, such cooperation is particularly
combatting the financing of terrorism. important in order to manage this crisis
through the provision of best practices
• Displaced families must be returned to and American medical support in Iraq.
areas of residence where the security and
21About the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung - Jordan & Iraq Dr. Adel Abdulhamza Thgail
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung is a nonprofit Dr. Adel Abdulhamza Thgail is a political scientist
organization committed to the values of social who teaches in the Department of Political Science
democracy. It is the oldest political foundation in at the University of Baghdad. He has participated in
Germany, founded in 1925 as the political legacy a number of conferences and academic seminars
of Friedrich Ebert, the first democratically elected within the field of political science and outside of
German president. it. He has published a number of papers, among
the most prominent of them “The Effect of
The goal of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung – Jordan Strategic Use of Resources to Achieve the Goals
& Iraq is to promote and encourage democracy of the State,” “A Strategic Way of Visualizing
and political participation and support progress Iraqi Foreign Affairs,” “Strategic Options in Iraq:
toward social justice and gender equality. We also Turkish Relations,” “The Effect of NATO on the
contribute to environmental sustainability, peace, Future of American-European Relations,” “The
and security in the region. Effect of Geopolitical Principles in Post-Cold War
American Strategic Vision,” and “Geopolitics and
Likewise, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung - Jordan & the Concept of the Biome.”
Iraq office supports building and strengthening
civil society and public institutions in Jordan
and Iraq. We work extensively with civil society
institutions and across the political spectrum to
establish platforms for democratic dialogue, hold
conferences and workshops, and issue policy
papers on current political issues.The fundamental challenge facing the The pursuit of reforms requires In light of this complicated,
new Iraqi government comes from substantial, painful sacrifices. compound situation, will the
the extent to which it seeks to change However, the nation’s health and new Iraqi government be able to
the political status quo, which the economic crises have left popular implement its reforms without a
political elites are working vigorously forces both unprepared and unable to domestic confrontation? Will it be
to preserve. This has resulted in make such sacrifices, which strips the able to neutralize the Iraqi arena with
opposing visions which are bound government of the necessary popular regards to the US-Iran conflict? And
for collision sooner or later. The al- support. does it have the time and the tools to
Kadhimi administration’s effort is find alternative courses of action and
impeded by numerous challenges solutions?
which the executive authority must
confront.
For more information on this subject:
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