Police Accountability in the USA: Gaining Traction or Spinning Wheels?
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1665
Article
Police Accountability in the USA: Gaining
Traction or Spinning Wheels?
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Carol A. Archbold*
Abstract Police accountability has long been a topic of discussion and debate among police practitioners, politi-
cians, and scholars. This topic re-emerges every time there is highly publicized police shooting or incident of police
misconduct. This article provides an overview of the current state of police accountability in the USA. This overview
includes several examples of the ways in which police accountability has been enhanced in recent years at the local,
state, and federal levels. Next, several obstacles to the progression of police accountability in the USA are discussed
including a lack of ‘buy-in’ by some police personnel; limited research on the efficacy of common police account-
ability tools; lack of financial resources; lack of support and guidance by the federal government in recent years; and
police unions. Finally, the article concludes with suggestions for overcoming some of the impediments associated
with police accountability in the USA.
The last 5 years have been marred with violent po- While many of the cases involve minor infractions,
lice–citizen encounters that have resulted in the a portion of the cases involves more serious acts
deaths of many Americans. According to the including 22,924 cases of excessive force; 3,145
Washington Post, there have been 5,929 fatal allegations of rape, child molestation, and other
shootings of people by on-duty police officers acts of sexual misconduct; and 2,307 cases of
since 2015, with approximately 1,000 of those domestic violence (Kelly and Nichols, 2020). Even
shootings occurring in 2020 (Washington Post, though the previously described police–citizen
2021). While half of the people shot and killed by encounters represent a small fraction of the mil-
the police are White, people of colour are killed by lions of police–citizen contacts that occur annually
the police at a disproportionately high rate in the USA, the actions of police officers during
(Washington Post, 2021). Non-lethal acts of police those encounters resulted in serious injuries,
death, as well as an unquantifiable amount of
misconduct have also drawn public attention in
diminished trust and legitimacy in the eyes of the
recent years. In June 2020, USA Today published
public.
an article detailing the contents of a national
Many deadly shootings and acts of police
database of approximately 200,000 cases of police
misconduct have been recorded by officer body
misconduct based on records from police agencies,
cameras or people using their personal cell phones.
prosecutors’ offices, and other state agencies.
*North Dakota State University, Department of Criminal Justice, Dept. 2315 P.O. Box 6050, Fargo, ND
58108–6050. E-mail: carol.archbold@ndsu.edu
Policing, Volume 15, Number 3, pp. 1665–1683
doi:10.1093/police/paab033
Published by Oxford University Press 2021. This work is written by a US Government employee and is in the public do-
main in the US.1666 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
These recordings have been made available for review boards is that citizens are actively involved
public consumption through various social media in the oversight of the police. Over half (61%) of
platforms and media outlets. Increased media at- the 100 most populated cities in the USA have a ci-
tention focused on these encounters has led to vilian review board, with 22 boards created since
peaceful protests and social unrest in cities across 2014 (Fairley, 2020). In December 2020, the
the USA, along with a renewed call for account- National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law
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ability-based police reform. Enforcement Website (2020) listed 131 civilian re-
view boards located in cities across the USA (this
count does not include jurisdictions that utilize
Current state of police police auditors/monitors). The number of civilian
accountability in the USA oversight boards fluctuates over time as new
Accountability occurs when police officers and boards are created and others are revamped, sus-
police organizations are held responsible for effect- pended, or abandoned.
ively delivering services to their community, while Many municipal police agencies have also
treating people fairly, with dignity, and within the employed body cameras to increase officer ac-
countability. The Bureau of Justice Statistics
boundaries of formal law (Walker and Archbold,
reports that 47% of police agencies utilized body
2020). This issue is important to citizens because
camera technology in 2016 (Hyland, 2018). Early
they expect the police to act in a manner that
intervention (EI) systems are another common ac-
reflects their purpose in society—that is, to
countability tool used by some police agencies. EI
promote public safety and uphold the rule of law.
systems are data-driven programmes that track
When officers fail to meet public expectations and
problematic performance by police officers so that
take actions that fall outside of what formal law
supervisors can intervene before officers’ problem-
dictates, citizens must have some process available
atic behaviours result in citizen complaints, costly
to them to report such behaviours. Accountability
litigation, incidents resulting in serious physical
also has important implications for police person-
harm or death to citizens or officers, or police offi-
nel. Police officers need to feel confident that their cers losing their jobs (Walker et al., 2000). Law
colleagues will conduct their work in a lawful Enforcement Management and Administrative
manner that does not jeopardize their safety or the Statistics (LEMAS) data indicate that 44% of all
safety of others; that does not result in people reporting police agencies utilized EI systems in
questioning their professional integrity or expose 2007, with larger police agencies adopting EI sys-
them or their police agency to costly litigation, tems at twice the rate as small police agencies
and that allows them to maintain a trusting, (Shjarback, 2015).
cooperative relationship with the community they Many police executives across the USA have
serve. Thus, it is in the best interest of both citizens changed use of force policies, and now provide
and the police to make police accountability a specialized training to reduce the likelihood that
priority in the USA. officers will use (or misuse) deadly force. A recent
During the last decade, there has been some study using shooting data from the Dallas (TX)
effort to increase police accountability at the local, Police Department found that a policy which
state, and federal levels in the USA. For example, requires mandatory reporting of firearm ‘pointing’
many municipalities have implemented civilian re- was associated with a reduction in ‘threat percep-
view boards to increase police accountability. tion failure’ shootings (when officers mistakenly
Review boards vary in composition, size, and func- shoot someone because they believed that the per-
tion; however, a shared element across all civilian son had a weapon) (Shjarback et al., 2021). InPolice Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1667
addition to the use of force policy changes, some police officer in the state to eventually be equipped
police agencies provide officers with de-escalation with a body camera (Petrella, 2021).
training to reduce the use of force during encoun- New York Governor Andrew Cuomo initiated
ters with community members. In 2017, 16 states state-wide police reform when he issued an
across the USA had mandated de-escalation train- Executive Order in June 2020 requiring all 500 po-
ing for police officers; however, many states have lice departments across the state to create and
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no minimum number of hours set for this type of submit accountability plans by spring 2021
training (Gilbert, 2017). The statistics associated (Villeneuve, 2020). Each agency must create a for-
with each of the previously mentioned account- mal accountability plan using guidelines provided
ability strategies indicate that some municipal- by the Governor’s Office which includes changes
level community leaders and police executives are related to community engagement; increasing
taking steps to increase accountability within their transparency by making agency data and policies
organizations and communities. accessible to the public; civilian oversight of the
Many state political leaders are also responding police; utilization of accountability-based technol-
to the renewed call for police reform by passing le- ogy within police agencies (such as EI systems and
gislation meant to increase police accountability. body cameras); strategies to reduce racial dispar-
According to the Vera Institute of Justice, 34 states ities in police–citizen interactions; and changing
the culture within New York police agencies, to
and the District of Columbia passed 79 bills, ex-
name a few (New York State Police Reform and
ecutive orders, and resolutions making changes to
Reinvention Collaborative: Resources and Guide
laws associated with police accountability in 2015
for Public Officials and Citizens, 2020). Any police
and 2016 (Subramanian and Skrzypiec, 2017).
agency that does not submit an accountability
This is a notable increase as there were approxi-
plan to the state will no longer be eligible for fu-
mately 20 changes made to laws associated with
ture funding (New York State Governor’s Website,
police accountability from 2012 to 2014.
2020). This executive order increases the likeli-
Some recent examples of state-level police re-
hood that police agencies will take the necessary
form include the following: In July 2020,
steps to increase accountability because their fund-
Connecticut passed a police reform law that makes
ing is contingent upon it. Another benefit resulting
it easier for citizens to file lawsuits against individ- from this executive order is that police reform will
ual officers in state court (Polansky, 2020). The occur within hundreds of police agencies all at
catch is that officers will only be held financially li- once, instead of just a few agencies choosing to
able if it can be proven that they knowingly broke make changes.
the law. This law does not erase qualified immun- During the last decade, the most significant step
ity; instead, it creates a more thorough review pro- taken to increase police accountability at the fed-
cess, which can result in the decertification of eral level took place in 2014, when President
officers involved in misconduct. In December Barrack Obama created the President’s Task Force
2020, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker, on 21stCentury Policing. The purpose of this Task
signed legislation that included the creation of a Force was to examine police-related problems and
new civilian-based panel that can revoke officers’ recommend actions resulting in police reform.
licenses for involvement in misconduct, and The Task Force made several recommendations
requires police officers to intervene if they witness aimed at repairing fractured police–community
fellow officers using unnecessary or excessive force relationships. Specifically, they recommend that
(Stout, 2020). In January 2021, the Illinois General police officers utilize procedural justice strategies
Assembly passed legislation that requires every when interacting with residents in their1668 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
communities. Procedural justice involves police transparency can be achieved is by police agencies
officers treating citizens in a way that makes them posting this information on department websites
believe that they have been treated fairly, with re- (perhaps included in annual reports), where it is
spect, and that they were given an opportunity to easily accessible to community members.
explain their actions during encounters with the Furthermore, the Task Force suggests that police
police (Tyler, 1988). This strategy is based on the agencies involve citizens in the development and
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idea that citizens will view the police as a legitim- alteration of department policies. This collabora-
ate group if they believe that the police treated tive effort allows public voices to be heard and it
them fairly. also signals to the public that the police value their
De-escalation training and changes to depart- input.
ment use of force policies are also specifically men- Another central theme found within the Task
tioned in the action steps of the Task Force Force report includes increasing police account-
Report. Even though there is no consensus on a ability. Task Force members believe that increased
definition of de-escalation within the context of accountability contributes to police legitimacy by
the policing profession; in general, it has been ensuring that officers will do their job based on
described as training that teaches officers to slow police training, department policies, and taking
down, create space between themselves and the actions based on formal law. Increased account-
citizen involved in the interaction, and to use ability also means that officers will be properly
communication strategies to defuse volatile situa- supervised while on duty, by police supervisors on
tions that could otherwise result in some use of the streets and in some cases, also by virtual super-
force (Engel et al., 2020). The Task Force report vision using technology, such as body cameras and
also advises police agencies to change department EI systems to monitor officer performance.
policies to mandate that officers use de-escalation Despite efforts to increase accountability at the
techniques when they encounter potentially local, state, and federal levels, we continue to see
dangerous situations. Some police agencies now media accounts of police-involved shootings and
require officers to file formal reports describing acts of police misconduct. These incidents also
how they utilized de-escalation techniques during continue to involve people of colour at a dispro-
volatile situations. After the death of George Floyd portionately high rate. It would be naı̈ve to think
during the summer 2020, the Minneapolis (MN) that these incidents would completely stop after
Police Department changed its use of force report- police agencies begin utilizing accountability strat-
ing policy to require all police officers to docu- egies; however, it is reasonable to expect that we
ment how they utilized de-escalation techniques would see fewer of these incidents over time.
during dangerous encounters, regardless if they Currently, it is difficult to identify specific
ended up using force or not (Forliti, 2020). trends associated with acts of non-lethal police
In addition to procedural justice and de- misconduct on a national level, because police
escalation, the Task Force recommends that police agencies are not required to track and report these
agencies operate in an open and transparent incidents in any systematic way. In addition,
manner to increase trust and legitimacy with the American police agencies only recently started
public. An example of this includes the police pro- reporting police-involved shootings to the Federal
viding public access to information, such as citizen Bureau of Investigations (FBIs) in 2019.
complaints filed against officers, police–citizen Unfortunately, only 41% of all federal, state, local,
contact data, arrest data, as well as public access to and tribal police agencies voluntarily submitted
department policies (including use of lethal and shooting data for 2019, and participation only
non-lethal force policies). A simple way that increased to 42% in 2020 (Federal Bureau ofPolice Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1669
Investigations Website, 2021). To be able to accur- being disciplined for minor policy violations, re-
ately assess how and if police accountability strat- duce their ability to use discretion, and create
egies influence the prevalence of police-involved issues regarding officer safety and privacy
shootings and acts of police misconduct, all (Headley et al., 2017; White et al., 2018; Young
American police agencies would have to be and Ready, 2018). There is also some evidence that
required to report these incidents to the FBI annu- command staff and police supervisors do not fully
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ally. In addition to the lack of systematically col- support the use of body cameras (Smykla et al.,
lected data, there are several factors that may 2016; Snyder et al., 2019). To increase ‘buy-in’ for
impede the progression of police accountability any police reform strategy, officers and supervisors
efforts in the USA. should be given an opportunity to provide input
prior to implementation, and police leaders should
be prepared to answer questions that police per-
Obstacles to police accountability sonnel have regarding proposed changes within
The decentralized nature of American policing, their organization (Rosenbaum and McCarty,
which consists of over 18,000 independent local 2017).
and state police agencies, makes police reform on The lack of ‘buy in’ by police personnel may
a national level difficult and slows the progress of also be influenced by the culture found within po-
lice organizations. Police culture involves officers’
reform down to a snail’s pace. It is likely that we
attitudes associated with cynicism and mistrust of
are not yet seeing any significant changes related
citizens and supervisors, authoritarianism, loyalty
to police accountability on a national level because
to fellow officers, resistance to change, aggressive
some police executives have not taken any steps to
enforcement of the law, and secrecy (Paoline,
make accountability a priority in their organiza-
2003). Many of the Task Force recommendations,
tions. The police executives that have taken steps
such as an increase in the oversight and account-
to increase accountability or are planning to take
ability of officers, transparency of organizational
those steps in the future, face several barriers both
data and operations, and increased collaboration
before and after implementation that can hinder
with members of the public, diametrically conflict
the success of these accountability strategies. with many of the attitudes associated with police
culture.
Lack of ‘buy-in’ by police personnel
A lack of ‘buy in’ by police personnel is a potential Limited research on the efficacy of police
roadblock to increasing accountability within accountability strategies/tools
American police agencies. Some patrol-level offi- When making the decision to implement strategies
cers and supervisors may not support the use of to increase officer accountability, police executives
accountability strategies and technology. For ex- should seek out practices and technology that have
ample, research conducted on police officers’ per- been deemed effective through scientific evalu-
ceptions of body cameras has generally found that ation. Unfortunately, police executives will find
officers have positive or neutral feelings towards limited research (and in some cases conflicting
the use of body cameras, and in some cases, offi- research) on the effectiveness of many of the ac-
cers’ perceptions of this technology became posi- countability tools/strategies recommended by the
tive over time (Maskaly et al., 2017; Lum et al., Task Force.
2019). There are also studies that found some offi- For example, limited research has been con-
cers are resistant to the use of body cameras as ducted on the efficacy of EI systems. The few eval-
they believe it will increase the likelihood of them uations that have been conducted on this1670 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
accountability tool produced mixed findings. A differences in the success of EI systems in police
systematic review of research on EI systems identi- agencies that voluntarily use EI systems compared
fied only seven studies conducted in the USA dur- with agencies that were mandated to use this tech-
ing the last two decades (Gullion and King, 2020). nology as part of a consent decree agreement. The
Walker et al. (2000) conducted one of the earliest findings revealed no statistical differences in the
evaluations of EI systems in police agencies in mean rates of citizen use of force complaints after
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Minneapolis (MN), Miami-Dade (FL), and New EI systems were utilized by police agencies or dif-
Orleans (LA). All three police agencies reported ferences in the mean rate of force complaints
reductions in use of force and citizen complaints when comparing police agencies that voluntarily
filed against officers after the implementation of implemented EI systems with agencies that were
an EI system. An evaluation in the Pittsburgh (PA) mandated to do so.
Police Bureau found a reduction in use of force A study published shortly after the review by
and search and seizures a year after the EI system Gullion and King (2020) also found problems with
was implemented as part of a consent decree the effectiveness of an EI system. James et al.
agreement (Davis et al., 2005). Similar findings (2020) analysed a random sample of police–citizen
emerged from an evaluation within the Los incident reports for officers who were flagged by
Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Researchers discov- an EI system, along with reports for officers who
ered a reduction in use of force, citizen com- were not flagged by the EI system to determine if
plaints, officer-involved shootings, and litigation there were differences in officer performance. In
related to use of force (Bobb et al., 2009). Research general, they discovered that officer performance
in a northeastern police department found a re- was similar when comparing the two groups. This
duction in citizen complaints, but also discovered means that the EI system was not able to distin-
that arrests (including proactive arrests) also guish officers with problematic performance from
decreased after an EI system was utilized, suggest- those who were not flagged by the EI system. The
ing that police officers may have been avoiding only differences found between the two groups of
contact with citizens (Worden et al., 2013)—this is officers were that officers flagged by the EI system
sometimes referred to as de-policing or no contact, performed slightly better during the ‘observe and
no complaints policing. assess’ phase of crisis situations, and were slightly
Two of the seven evaluations reviewed by more likely to use reasonable force against suspects
Gullion and King (2020) discovered problems when compared with officers who had not been
with the accuracy of EI systems. Specifically, an EI flagged by the EI system (James et al., 2020). Also,
system in a southern police department did not women were over-represented in the group of offi-
flag police officers with the highest number of cers flagged by the EI system in this police agency.
force incidents (Lersch et al., 2006). This is prob- When considering the mixed results produced
lematic as the purpose of an EI system is to iden- from the limited number of EI system studies, po-
tify officers exhibiting poor work performance, lice executives may be left wondering if EI systems
and alert police supervisors so they can intervene will help them increase accountability within their
before officers’ behaviours result in something organizations, and if implementing an EI system is
more serious (such as serious injuries or death, or worth the financial investment. Additional re-
loss of employment for officers). Another study search is needed to better understand the complex-
analysed LEMAS data from 2003 and 2007 to see if ities associated with this accountability tool.
police agencies that utilize EI systems experienced The Task Force report also recommends that
a change in rates of citizen complaints of force police executives provide de-escalation training for
(Shjarback, 2015). This study also looked for any officers to reduce the use of physical force, keepingPolice Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1671
both citizens and officers safe. But, does this train- civilian review boards (6.6 per 100 officers). He
ing influence officers’ attitudes and behaviours also found that the overall percentage of sustained
during dangerous encounters with citizens? Robin complaints was lower in jurisdictions with civilian
Engel et al. (2020) recently conducted a systematic oversight (6%) compared with jurisdictions that
literature review of published evaluations of de-es- did not have civilian oversight (11%) (Hickman,
calation training. They identified 64 publications 2006). Police agencies that used internal affairs to
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that fit the criteria for inclusion in their review. investigate complaints of force had a slightly
They discovered that there are no publications fea- higher percentage of sustained complaints (8–9%)
turing an evaluation of the efficacy of de-escalation compared with police agencies in jurisdictions
training in the criminal justice discipline. Most of with civilian review boards (6%). This finding is
the evaluations were conducted on de-escalation surprising since a common reason that jurisdic-
training in the professions of nursing and psych- tions implement civilian review boards is because
iatry, and only 3 of the 64 evaluations used ad- of the perception that citizen complaints will less
equate research designs that could draw out any likely be sustained if the police (internal affairs)
meaningful conclusions regarding the impact of are policing themselves.
the training (Engel et al., 2020). The fact that there Several years later, Terrill and Ingram (2016)
is no scientific research on the efficacy of de-escal- analysed citizen complaint data from eight cities
ation training within the context of policing leaves across the USA. They found that citizen com-
police executives in a situation where they must plaints were 78% more likely to be sustained in
make decisions about utilizing this type of training jurisdictions where the disposition decisions of
without any real evidence that it will work. complaints made by internal affairs were also
Civilian oversight boards are also mentioned in reviewed by an external civilian oversight board
the action steps of the Task Force report as a (Terrill and Ingram, 2016). There are many con-
mechanism to increase police accountability. textual factors that could explain the differences in
Community leaders will struggle to find research the findings from the Hickman (2006) and Terrill
on the effectiveness of oversight boards, even and Ingram (2016) studies including the local pol-
though they have existed in the USA as far back as itical climate within individual jurisdictions, the
the 1920s (De Angelis et al., 2016). Researchers composition and structure of the oversight boards,
have struggled with evaluations of civilian over- and the presence and strength of police unions, to
sight boards because there are several types of name a few. Additional research is needed to better
boards with varying composition, structure, and understand the impact of civilian oversight boards
operational differences (Ferdik et al., 2013). There on the accountability of officers.
is also difficulty in deciding which outcome meas- There is one accountability tool that has
ures to use to determine effectiveness. received a significant amount of attention from
A few researchers have examined the impact of researchers—police body cameras. A recent study
civilian review boards on police outcomes using identified 119 published reports and peer-reviewed
sustained complaints against police officers as a studies on police body cameras as of the end of
measure of effectiveness. In 2006, Matthew December 2019 (Gaub and White, 2020). Many of
Hickman analysed citizen complaints of police use these studies examine the extent to which body
of force drawn from the 2003 LEMAS dataset. He cameras influence the behaviours and attitudes of
discovered that police agencies located in jurisdic- officers and citizens. The early studies looked for
tions with civilian review boards had a higher rate behavioural changes using outcome measures such
of force complaints (11.9 per 100 officers) com- as use of force incidents and citizen complaints.
pared with police agencies in jurisdictions without Many of the early studies found positive results—1672 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
specifically, a reduction in the use of force and citi- memo, Police Chief Williams of the Phoenix (AZ)
zen complaints (see Maskaly et al., 2017 for an Police Department stated that ‘costs for a new EI
overview of early literature). system ranged from $952,000 to $2.08 million,
Two recent reviews by Cynthia Lum et al. (2019, which does not include personnel or additional
2020) produced less positive assessments of this hardware costs needed to support a new system’
technology. After conducting a review of 70 stud- (City of Phoenix - Office of the Police Chief,
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ies, Lum et al. (2019: 93) concluded that body 2020). A report by the Police Executive Research
cameras ‘have not had statistically significant or Forum (PERF) lists the total annual cost for one
consistent effects on most measures of officer and body camera ranging from $1,125 up to $2,883,
citizen behavior or citizens’ views of the police’. which includes the cost of the camera, data stor-
Lum reviewed 30 body camera studies for her age, equipment maintenance, and staff (PERF,
2020 publication—this time only including studies 2018: 52). These prices may be manageable for po-
that utilized randomized controlled trials or quasi- lice agencies employing a small number of officers;
experimental research designs, and that measured however, the costs will add up quickly as the size
police and citizen behavioural outcomes (Lum of the police agency increases.
et al., 2020). They concluded that body cameras It has been suggested that local and county-level
governments could cover the costs (or some of the
do not have significant effects on officers’ behav-
costs) associated with accountability-based police
iours including use of force, making arrests, and
reform by using resources that are otherwise used
other activities. However, they did find that body
to pay for costly litigation. Some municipalities
cameras reduced citizen complaints filed against
and counties across the USA include a line item in
police officers, but were unsure why complaints
their annual budgets devoted to anticipated pay-
declined (Lum et al., 2020).
ments for liability and litigation cases involving
The conflicting assessments of the efficacy of
police personnel (Archbold, 2005). In New York
body cameras could leave some police executives
City, the Office of Management and Budget set
wondering if they should invest or continue to in-
aside $697 million in 2019 and $733 million in
vest in this technology. A recent report by the
2020 to pay for liability and litigation-based pay-
Police Executive Research Forum (2018) noted outs associated with city employees (Carrega,
that the most common reason given by police lead- 2020). Payouts specifically associated withNew
ers to deploy body cameras was to promote ac- York Police Department (NYPD) officers include
countability, transparency, and legitimacy. If police $237.4 million in 2018 and $220.1 million in 2019
executives are unsure that body cameras will help (Carrega, 2020). Los Angeles (CA) county also sets
their agency promote these items, their decision to aside funds for anticipated litigation and liability
implement body cameras becomes difficult. payouts annually. For fiscal year 2018–19, the
budget included $148.5 million for anticipated liti-
Limited resources gation/liability claims; $91.5 million of that was
Police executives interested in utilizing account- used to pay for settlements and judgements involv-
ability strategies within their organizations must ing employees of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s
find resources to pay for that expense. Changes Department (Carrega, 2020). It could be argued
made to department policies and training often re- that the resources set aside for anticipated litiga-
quire additional expenditures of agency resources. tion and liability payouts should be used to invest
All the accountability tools/strategies previously in accountability strategies that could ultimately
discussed in this article require a significant finan- reduce litigation and liability incidents involving
cial commitment. For example, in a June 2020 officers in the future.Police Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1673
There is limited information on the cost-savings policies and practices with the goal of improving
resulting from the implementation of accountabil- their relationship with their community and ul-
ity-based strategies and technology, and most of timately increasing accountability, without the
this research focuses on body cameras. A 2017 study worry of financial costs (Charles, 2017).
conducted within the Las Vegas Metropolitan Unfortunately, the focus of the CRITA programme
Police Department revealed a cost-savings associ- dramatically shifted away from accountability and
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ated with the use of body cameras. Specifically, the towards crime control in 2017 after the change in
researchers discovered an annual estimated cost presidential administration (Barrett, 2017). Fewer
savings of $2,909–$3,178 per user, due to fewer resources directed towards accountability-based
complaints of misconduct and having to use fewer police reform by the federal government in recent
resources to investigate allegations of misconduct years have likely contributed to the slow progres-
(Braga et al., 2017). The Police Executive Research sion of police accountability in the USA.
Forum (2018) conducted a cost–benefit analysis
looking at lawsuits and body cameras. They found Lack of support from the federal
a reduction in litigation costs after body cameras government
were implemented in Mesa (AZ), Phoenix (AZ), Earlier in this article, the creation of the
but not in Dallas (TX). The researchers noted that President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing
caution should be taken when interpreting these (2015) was identified as one of the most influential
findings because litigation data are sensitive to steps taken by the federal government to increase
outliers and the outliers may be independent from police accountability in the USA. The Task Force
effects of body cameras (Police Executive Research report continues to serve as a valuable guide for
Forum, 2018). Additional research is needed to police executives interested in making changes
fully understand the extent to which accountability within their organizations today. In addition to
strategies and tools reduce liability and litigation creating the Task Force, the Obama administration
costs. also provided financial resources for police agen-
Finding extra resources to cover the expense cies interested in implementing technology meant
associated with the implementation of account- to increase accountability (such as body cameras),
ability tools is likely to be a challenge in most and also supported federal oversight of police
jurisdictions across the USA and would likely be agencies involved in controversial shootings and
even more challenging in jurisdictions where local that have been accused of civil rights violations
governments are defunding the police. In the past, (Faturechi, 2020). The federal government played
the federal government has made resources avail- a significant role in leading the effort to reform
able to police agencies to ease the financial burden policing in the USA from 2008 to 2016.
associated with police reform. In 2015, President With the change in administration in 2017,
Obama worked with the Department of Justice to many of the accountability-focused reform efforts
provide $20 million in competitive grants to police that started during the Obama administration
agencies interested in utilizing body cameras were radically altered or discontinued. As dis-
(Fritze, 2015). In 2016, the Department of Justice cussed in an earlier section of this article, signifi-
provided $12 million to support the Collaborative cant changes were made to the CRITA programme
Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance in 2017 when the accountability-based focus of
(CRITA) programme. The CRITA programme was that programme was redirected towards crime
a voluntary process by which law enforcement control (Barrett, 2017). The decision to shift the
agencies could request help from the federal gov- focus of the CRITA programme was heavily
ernment to evaluate and suggest changes to criticized by people involved in police reform1674 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
during the Obama administration. Ronald Davis, accountable for abuses or acts of misconduct
former head of the Community Oriented Policing (Joebiden.com, 2021). We will likely learn more
Services (COPS) Office, suggested that the changes about President Biden’s plan to reform American
to the CRITA programme no longer make it col- policing in the near future.
laborative reform as there would no longer be any
in-depth assessment of police policies and practi- Police unions
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ces by a neutral third party (Mallonee and Prior to the 1960s, police unions had little influ-
Watkins, 2017). Instead, police agencies receive ence in police governance in the USA. An increase
training and strategies centred on crime reduction, in public criticism directed towards the police dur-
which is something that the COPS Office already ing the 1960s led to the emergence of legally recog-
provides police agencies. nized police unions (Walker, 2016). Early on, the
Another accountability-based practice that work of police unions centred on activities typical
receded under the Trump administration is the to most unions, such as securing fair salaries, ben-
use of pattern or practice investigations by the efits, and safe working conditions. As police
Department of Justice. Pattern or practice investi- unions gained strength in the 1970s by increasing
gations are used to reform consistent practices of their membership and creating strong political
excessive force, biased policing, and other uncon- connections, the scope of their work expanded be-
stitutional practices by police officers (Civil Rights
yond the typical activities of unions.
Division—US Department of Justice, 2017). These
Today, police unions are considered an influen-
investigations are conducted to ensure that police
tial force in many American police agencies. They
agencies lawfully and fairly provide services to
influence operational elements within police
people in their communities. In instances where
organizations, which in turn, limit the authority of
there is evidence of a pattern of police misconduct,
police leaders. Some police unions have become
police agencies work to resolve the issues using an
deeply entrenched in politics. This involvement is
order enforced by a federal court called a consent
demonstrated by them creating political action
decree. Twenty-five consent decrees were initiated
committees to make financial contributions to
during the Obama administration, while just one
candidates running in elections at the local, state,
investigation was initiated during the 4 years of
the Trump administration (Valverde, 2020). The and federal levels (Perkins, 2020). Records from
lack of interest in federal oversight of police agen- the US House and Senate indicate that police
cies was confirmed when then US Attorney unions have spent approximately $47.3 million at
General Jeffrey Sessions proclaimed that ‘it is not the federal level for lobbying and campaign contri-
the federal government’s responsibility to manage butions in recent elections (Perkins, 2020).
non-federal law enforcement’ (Valverde, 2020). Campaign contributions provide police unions
With the most recent change in administration with leverage to influence decisions made regard-
at the federal level in 2021, the pendulum could ing city charters and state legislation, which ultim-
swing back to the place where police accountability ately impact the work of police officers. Police
is held at a high level of importance by the federal unions also use their resources to shape public
government. While on the campaign trail, Joe perceptions of political candidates. For example,
Biden hinted at this change when he committed to some police unions sponsor advertisements which
properly funding the COPS programme so that it suggest that a candidate is ‘soft’ on crime, which
can play a role in the reformation of American po- in turn, can influence whether the candidate will
lice departments, and he vowed to empower the win his/her political race (McCorkel, 2020).
US Department of Justice to hold police agencies The ability of police unions to influence politicalPolice Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1675
leaders has led to the creation of contractual and oversight board in these jurisdictions, or the over-
legislative barriers that can thwart police reform sight board would be severely limited in its in-
efforts. As a result, police unions have been identi- volvement in the investigation of officer
fied as a major impediment to the progression of misconduct (which defeats the purpose of having
police accountability in the USA (Walker, 2012). an oversight board).
Police unions use the collective bargaining pro- Police unions also have a say in the process citi-
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cess to negotiate contracts that include myriad zens use to file formal complaints against police
restrictions related to investigations and disciplin- officers. Some jurisdictions require citizens to no-
ary actions involving police officers, as well as gen- tarize their complaints before they are turned in
eral oversight of the police (Rushin, 2017). It is for investigation, and in some cases, citizens are
common for union contracts to contain require- required to provide sworn statements or video-
ments allowing officers to challenge adverse per- taped testimony to accompany formal complaints
sonnel decisions made by their superiors (Rushin, (Honolulu Police Department Website, 2021).
2017). In some jurisdictions, union contracts over- Union contracts also determine how long citizens
ride city charters, state laws, and have even stalled have to file a complaint after an incident has
the enforcement of federal consent decrees in sev- occurred. If they fail to file a complaint within the
eral cities across the USA (Emmanuel, 2016; specified period, their complaint will not be inves-
Barker et al., 2020). Police union contracts are tigated (Levinson, 2017).
negotiated in private settings in all but eight states Collective bargaining agreements also influence
in the USA, which leaves no opportunity for scru- the use and handling of officer employment
tiny or feedback from the media or community records, including disciplinary records and record-
members (McCorkel, 2020). ings of officers on duty. ‘Purge clauses’ make it dif-
Police leaders struggle to hold officers account- ficult to identify which officers have a history of
able when restrictions are placed on the proce- misconduct allegations because police unions re-
dures used to investigate officers accused of quire police agencies to destroy disciplinary records
misconduct. Collective bargaining agreements dic- after a specified period of time (typically 2–5 years;
tate how investigations will be conducted includ- McCorkel, 2020). Purge clauses also make it diffi-
ing the time of day that officers can be questioned, cult for police agencies to implement EI systems, as
how long officers are questioned, as well as the it is typical to use a variety of officer records as
number of investigators that can be present during measures to track problematic work performance.
questioning (Bellisle, 2020). It is also common for Also, police departments interested in utilizing
police officers to review all the evidence against body cameras would have to negotiate who would
them prior to them being questioned (McCorkel, have access to body camera footage, and how long
2020). In some jurisdictions, police officers the footage will be stored by the police agency.
involved in deadly force incidents are given a Another way that police unions exert control
specified period before they can be questioned over accountability efforts of police leaders is to
about the incident and can have a union represen- require that police officers have the right to appeal
tative or attorney present during questioning decisions made in disciplinary cases to an arbitra-
(McCorkel, 2020). Many collective bargaining tor or arbitration board. In some jurisdictions, po-
agreements include restrictions requiring that only lice unions get to choose which arbitrators are
sworn police personnel can be involved in the in- included in a pool that is used when officers file
vestigation of police officers. This means that it appeals of decisions made by their superiors
would be next to impossible to create a civilian (Burger, 2017). This has led to some police chiefs1676 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
choosing not to take any disciplinary action Much of what is known about American police
against officers who deserve it, or allowing officers unions is the result of investigative reporting by
to resign (instead of being punished or fired), media outlets. In general, there has been limited
which means that officers leave the agency with a research on police unions in the USA (National
clean record allowing them to seek employment in Academy of Sciences, 2004). This is surprising
another police agency without any problems given the level of influence that police unions have
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(Barker et al., 2020). had in American police agencies for decades. Some
Arbitration can also lead to the rehiring of po- of the research on police unions focuses on the
lice officers who have been previously fired, often content of collective bargaining agreements/con-
with retro-active pay (Bellisle, 2020). This makes it tracts and how those provisions restrict police
difficult for police leaders to permanently remove leaders from holding officers accountable.
officers involved in acts of misconduct and misuse Campaign Zero, is a non-profit group that anal-
of force. This issue was highlighted during the yses police practices in the USA to identify solu-
summer of 2020 after the death of George Floyd in tions to end police violence, increase police
Minneapolis, MN. The Star Tribune revealed that accountability, and develop legislation to reform
over the last 20 years, approximately half of the the police (Campaign Zero Website, 2021). In
80 police officers who were fired by police agencies
2016, this group reviewed police union contracts
across the state of Minnesota were rehired after
in 81 of the 100 most populated US cities and dis-
they appealed to an arbitration board (Bjorhus,
covered that 72 cities allow police officers to ap-
2020). Rehiring fired police officers is not just a
peal disciplinary decisions to an arbitrator or
problem in Minnesota. In 2017, the Washington
arbitration board. This review also found that
Post reported that police chiefs from 37 of the larg-
union contracts in 63 cities have three or more
est police agencies across the USA were required
provisions that act as barriers to accountability.
to rehire approximately one-quarter of the officers
In 2017, Reuters conducted a similar analysis of
they previously fired (Kelly et al., 2017). The
82 police union contracts in large US cities and
Washington Post article noted that officers who
found that most of the contracts require police
were rehired after being fired were involved in ser-
departments to erase officer disciplinary records
ious acts of misconduct including sexual abuse,
lying, being drunk on duty, and driving a gunman (in some jurisdictions after 6 months; Levinson,
from the scene of a shooting where someone died. 2017). The review also discovered that in 18 cities,
Police leaders also have the option to negotiate a records of officer suspensions are purged after
financial settlement to convince previously fired 3 years (in some places less than 3 years).
officers not to return to their position. This was Approximately half of the union contracts allow
the case for a St Anthony (MN) police officer who officers being investigated for misconduct to re-
fatally shot Philando Castille during a traffic stop view the entire contents of their investigative file
in July 2016. After the officer was acquitted of prior to their interrogation (Levinson, 2017).
criminal charges, the city agreed to pay the officer Written consent provided by police officers is
$50,000 not to return to his position in the St required before police agencies can provide public
Anthony Police Department (Barker et al., 2020). access to documents associated with internal
These are just a few examples that demonstrate investigations and prior disciplinary actions taken
how police leaders face many restrictions resulting against police officers in 18 cities. Union contracts
from police union contracts when they try to hold set time limits for citizens to file complaints of
police officers accountable for their actions. misconduct against officers in 17 cities.Police Accountability in the USA Article Policing 1677
Stephen Rushin (2017) analysed 178 police community leaders, and political leaders work to-
union contracts from the largest police depart- gether to come up with feasible solutions.
ments across the USA and discovered that 88% of
the contracts included at least one provision that
limits police leaders’ ability to hold officers ac-
Where do we go from here?
countable. His review revealed that many contracts The title of this article includes a question regard-
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ban civilian oversight of the police; place restric- ing the progression of police accountability in the
tions on interrogation of officers facing allegations USA—gaining traction or spinning wheels? On
of misconduct; require police agencies to destroy one hand, it could be argued that police account-
officers’ disciplinary records; prohibit the collec- ability is gaining traction in the USA as several
tion and investigation of anonymous citizen com- police leaders are taking steps to increase account-
plaints; and limit the timeframe of internal ability within their organizations, whether it be
investigations (Rushin, 2017). changing policies, increasing and improving train-
Most recently, Harris and Sweeney (2021) exam- ing, or implementing strategies and technology
ined police union contracts from 47 of the largest meant to hold officers accountable. It could also
cities in the USA. They discovered that all 47 con- be argued that we currently have the highest level
tracts had at least one provision that would impede of police accountability in the USA than any other
the investigations of officers involved in acts of time in our country’s history. On the other hand,
misconduct. Restrictions are placed on citizen there is also some evidence of spinning wheels, as
complaints of misconduct in 39 union contracts. there is currently limited research on the efficacy
The restrictions include time limits on filing com- of most of the police accountability tools and
plaints, the names of complainants are provided to strategies suggested by the Task Force report; there
officers who are named in complaints, not allowing is a lack of systematic data collection of police mis-
anonymous complaints to be filed, and the legal conduct incidents (on a national level); there has
penalties for filing false complaints are printed on been less support and leadership provided by the
complaint forms. Provisions related to police inter- federal government in recent years to advance po-
rogations were included in 29 union contracts. The lice accountability forward; police unions continue
restrictions include a mandatory waiting period to negotiate contracts that contain provisions that
prior to interrogations, as well as restrictions on stymie accountability efforts of police leaders, and
the length of interrogations before officers are there are still many police leaders who have not
allowed a break. Finally, 45 of the union contracts taken any steps to make accountability a priority
include provisions related to discipline, such as ex- in their organizations.
pungement of records after a specified period, the So, where do we go from here? Based on the as-
use of sick leave days to offset suspension, and im- sessment of the current state of police accountabil-
pose statutes of limitation on discipline (Harris ity in the USA presented in this article, we still
and Sweeney, 2021). All the provisions found with- have work to do. Advancing police accountability
in police union contracts in this study are threats further in this country will only be possible
to police accountability. All of the previously men- through the actions and commitment of political
tioned obstacles to police accountability create leaders, police leaders and police personnel,
challenges for police executives and community researchers, and American citizens. This is a com-
leaders who want to increase accountability within plex issue that warrants input and action from a
their organizations and communities. Many of the variety of groups—this is not something that po-
impediments can be overcome if police executives, lice leaders can do on their own.1678 Policing Article C.A. Archbold
The US federal government must step back into When asked which strategies they consider to
a leadership role by providing support and resour- be most effective in improving the police-
ces to help police agencies make changes that will community relationship, police leaders identi-
enhance accountability. Government leaders must fied increased face-to-face contact with citi-
require police executives that have not taken any zens; educating the public about policing;
steps to increase accountability to do so now. It utilizing strategies associated with transpar-
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has been said that making meaningful changes ency, accountability, and legitimacy; and
within American police organizations is challeng- holding listening sessions on difficult topics
ing—in fact, it has been compared to ‘bending with community members.
granite’ (Guyot, 1979). However, resources and When asked about their greatest hopes for
support from federal and state government could help from the next presidential administra-
make this process less difficult. tion, the most common responses included
Results from a recent survey indicate that some federal support for law enforcement; reform
police leaders are looking to the federal govern- measures (many identified reforms listed in
ment for help. In November 2020, the PERF ana- the Task Force report); healing the current
lysed surveys completed by 375 police executives divide in our society between democrats and
asking about their views of priorities for the next republicans, as well as between the police and
presidential administration. Here are some signifi- their communities; become more educated
cant findings from this survey: about how the police conduct their work; and
Police executives identified the top two con- enhancing accountability by giving police
executives the power to fire officers involved
cerns for the next presidential administration
in acts of misconduct. They mentioned that
as increasing public trust in the police and
they would like to see limitations placed on
addressing the call for police reform. This
police unions and arbitrators, so that these
finding suggests that some police leaders are
groups cannot reverse their decisions related
thinking about issues (such as strengthening
to the discipline or firing of problematic offi-
police-community relationships) that can be
cers (PERF, 2020).
partially solved by enhancing police account-
ability within their organizations.
The findings from this survey create a list for the
When asked which areas they would like to see Biden administration identifying specific resources
federal grant assistance available in the future, and support that police executives need to strength-
the top three answers included training, re- en relationships with their communities and to
search on ‘what works’ in policing, and grants advance police accountability in this country.
for police equipment. Police executives identi- Another way that political leaders can help po-
fied de-escalation training, bias-free policing/ lice executives increase accountability within their
community engagement, and training to help organizations is to work with police unions to re-
officers respond to mental health calls as the move provisions within union contracts that pro-
top three choices of training. Body cameras hibit police leaders from holding their officers
and less than lethal technologies were the top accountable. As noted earlier in this article, col-
two types of technologies they would like to lective bargaining agreements often usurp city
see government funding for in the near future charters, state legislation, and in some cases court
(EI systems also made the list but was men- orders that are enforced at the federal level (con-
tioned less frequently by police executives). sent decrees).You can also read
