Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence: A Comparative Analysis of Post-Uri and Pulwama
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence:
A Comparative Analysis of Post-Uri and Pulwama
Crisis
Almas Haider Naqvi
Ph.D. Scholar at School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR), Quaid-i-Azam
University (QAU), Islamabad.
E-mail: s.almasnaqvi@gmail.com
Abstract
Escalations and wars between Pakistan and India have been regular feature due
to continued hostility since both emerged as sovereign states; caused by Kashmir
as unresolved agenda of partition and security dilemma. Persistent enmity led to
the nuclearization of South Asia, ever since both countries have acquired nuclear
capabilities with the aim to deter aggression of other party, such capability is
considered as key stability factor theoretically due to mutually assured
destruction. However, escalations and intrusions from both sides after the
declared nuclearization of South Asia below the threshold of nuclear escalation;
challenges traditional concept of deterrence stability. Post nuclearized South
Asia; escalations specifically Kargil-1999 and post Pulwama-2019 crisis
undermines deterrence theory tactical level. Deterrence as a traditional concept
elucidates “developing capabilities to deter and prevent the states from
belligerent actions against the enemy or otherwise with the sense of potential
retaliation and risk of severe consequences‟. Putting in perspective deterrence
theory, this article to provide a comparative analysis of escalations emerged after
so-called Indian surgical strikes after the two separate terror attacks in Kashmir
valley: Uri and Pulwama. It will also attempt to answers the following research
questions why Pakistan did not respond to the Indian claimed strikes after Uri
attack and chooses to retaliate India with similar thrust after Balakot Strikes.
Contextualizing nuclear weapons, capabilities and doctrines in South Asia how
can deterrence stability explain the escalations below the nuclear threshold?
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 19Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
Keywords: Escalation, nuclear, credibility, deterrence, stability, India,
Pakistan, surgical strikes.
Introduction
P
akistan and India grown up with intrinsic animosity, since
inception neighboring rivals entails into various escalations,
conflicts, and wars. India with hegemonic and expansionist
designs pursued aggressive strategic postures in the region while
Pakistan’s threat perception emanating from Indian belligerence
compelled to evolve credible cost-effective -reactionary-strategies. South
Asian nuclear powers Pakistan and India were at brink of full-scale war after
the Balakot strikes in February 2019. Delhi reportedly threatened to launch
six missiles against Pakistan when Pakistani air force shot down Indian
aircraft and captured pilot. Islamabad reciprocating threatens with “three
times more” missiles against India.1 Post Pulwama Indian strike at Balakot
was accounted as the first time in the history an aerial attack by a nuclear state
violating another nuclear state’s airspace. For scholars after the overt South
Asian nuclearization, it was first time when a crisis escalated to such
dangerous level. Balakot strikes triggered debate globally, majority
questioned credibility of deterrence stability in South Asian context. India
intends to make new normal such strikes below the nuclear threshold, as it
was second attempt of so-claimed surgical strike within three years (2016-
2019). Unlike Balakot escalation, post Uri crisis never escalated to a
dangerous level. Nonetheless, Modi regime claimed surgical strike taught the
lesson to Pakistan however, Islamabad termed it an “illusion”.
Post Uri and Pulwama escalations to be contextualized the credibility of
nuclear deterrence in South Asia putting into perspective nuclear weapons,
capabilities, and doctrines of two countries. Evolution of competing strategies
of both countries may cause unending arm race, raising the risk of nuclear
war. Taking India first, initially New Delhi holds the postures that India is not
interested in building large nuclear forces, triggering arms race and never
pose nuclear weapons for war fighting purposes, as a nuclear state opts
restrained, considering nuclear weapon as a “minimum” deterrent, taking it as
last option in case of attacks by adversaries China and Pakistan.2 Pakistan’s
stance stood similar, declaring nuclear weapons as minimum credible
deterrent and No First Use (NFU) against the nonnuclear states, vividly no
NFU against India. In the last two decades, practically beyond the rhetoric,
reality suggest otherwise, nuclear arms race stood a regular feature, New
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 20Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
Delhi and Islamabad both remained the same as Washington and Moscow’s
Cold War competition.
Contrary to the declaratory claims of “credible minimum deterrence”
India and Pakistan competes for a balancing against each other and
continuously enhanced their nuclear devices and delivery systems. Pakistan
and India contain over 100 nuclear devices, and number growing gradually.3
Along with the technological advancements in nuclear capabilities,
inventories of delivery systems also modernized over the passage of time.
Both pursued modernization of weaponry with enhancing air, sea, and land-
based capabilities. Advancement of air and land-based delivery systems with
incorporation of varying launch configurations and strength such as moveable
land-based missiles, bomber aircrafts, multiple range based ballistic and
cruise missiles; sea capabilities were enhanced with the incorporation of
submarine-launched missiles. Pakistan and India intended to pursue
dynamism in capabilities for their ballistic missiles by achieving Multiple
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV).
Over the years, both sides have been involved to enhance operational
preparedness of respective nuclear forces. India has been interested to create
damage-control counterforce targeting options in the crisis, similarly Pakistan
with the deploying tactical nuclear weapon system, the short-range Nasr
missile into its nuclear delivery inventories. The range enabled it to have
nuclear surprise within a short time span and deny Indian conventional
advantage.4 Maintenance of de-mated and unassembled form of nuclear
weapons is long established practice by the hyped by both countries as a
stabilizing measure, could well be eroding.5 Pursuing hedging policies, India
have been engaged in research and development of ballistic-missile defenses
(BMD), 6 purchase of Russia air defense system S-400 tilted the strategic
balance towards India. Islamabad perceives strategic vulnerability and tempts
to acquire countervailing offensive capabilities, seeking such delivery
systems into its nuclear as well as conventional inventory to deter India from
belligerent intentions and actions. Indian quest to acquire sophisticated
nuclear and related technologies to achieve “rough qualitative parity” with
China in the nuclear capabilities; however, it would trigger the Indo-
Pakistani nuclear rivalry.7
Moreover, anxiety of nuclear analysts in South Asia continuously
increasing that both countries are stepping beyond the imperatives of
minimum deterrence, assured, survivable second-strike capabilities. India
wants “escalation dominance” by modernization and incorporation of
sophisticated weapons and defense systems. Synergize these weapons with
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 21Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
the war fighting forces and doctrines. Similarly, Pakistan pursues “Quid Pro
Quo Plus” to counter Indian limited strike to counter Indian limited strike
strategy. This article also analyze credibility of nuclear deterrence and
Kuhn’s Escalation Ladder, identifying the causes and reasons how
alternative strategies, doctrines and capabilities of both nuclear states
challenge the deterrence at tactical level and why it works at strategic level.
Nuclear Deterrence Theory and South Asia
In military strategies the initial concept of deterrence can marked out into
the work of Greek Historian Thucydides’ “History of the Peloponnesian
War”, wherein he sketches deterrence idea reporting a dialogue when
representative of Corcyra1, who is lobbying for Athenian support, argues that
through an alliance with Corcyra “you will certainly become stronger, and
this fact will make your enemies think twice before attacking you”.2
Deterrence theory had not been widely accepted until the late 1950s when
Bernerd Brodie, military strategist in his book Strategy in the Missile Age and
Thomas C. Schelling’s The Strategy of Conflict, put the idea into analysis. In
The Absolute Weapon, Atomic Bomb and World Order, Brodie argues
“atomic bomb is one of the most persuasive deterrents to adventure in atomic
warfare that could be devised” Brodies’ believes If a nation intends to launch
an attack must fear retaliation, in fact with vivid perceptions that if a state is
planning to destroy enemy’s cities, its own will also be destroyed with may
be extended destruction. The clash yields little, in case of intentions
transformed into actions.
Conventionally the military establishment’s chief purpose has been to
win wars but with the incorporation of nuclear weapons in the respective
weapon inventories, the chief objective becomes how to prevent or avert the
wars.3 For Thomas Schelling deterrence is creating a ‘threat’ (with
incorporation of such capabilities with appropriate communication) to prevent
a belligerent or harmful action from the enemy.4 Similar meaning can be
extracted from Micheal Mazarr’s conception of deterrence as discouragement
and dissuasion of a state from taking aggressive actions.5 Phil Williams
argues deterrence is government’s attempt to prevent unwanted attacks by
threatening to wage unbearable costs upon the adversary in case of action.6
Henry Kissinger underlines that incorporation of nuclear devices into the
weaponry, strategy becomes for military establishments not wage wars but to
prevent wars, “the nuclear age turned strategy into deterrence” while
deterrence becomes not more than an obscure intellectual or a mental
activity.7 Summing up, the concept of deterrence is much debated in nuclear
age and extensive academic endeavors made the explicit image conceiving
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 22Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
deterrence as a systemic and coordinated attempt by a state with appropriate
communication, to prevent adversaries from coercion and conversion of
belligerent intentions to actions.
Debate among the various scholars if looked into the South Asian
context where two neighboring countries holds considerable numbers of
nuclear devices with appropriate delivery systems, we need to offer a
flexible concept of deterrence. Dr. Jaspal argues deterrence in South Asia
context, India and Pakistan objectify nuclear deterrence to deter the enemy
from even conceiving aggression; signaling potential adversaries;
enhancing bargaining influence; lessen dependency upon allies; and gain
military autonomy by reducing reliance of arms purchase from the
external resources.8 He further argues since 1970 nuclear capability for
Pakistani decision makers as preference to deter India.9 Competition in
conventional weaponry with India perhaps disadvantageous for Pakistan,
as its economic kitty does not match with the Indian basket, so it becomes
difficult to compete with India conventionally. The availability of
conventional weaponry, its life span and required goodwill with the
foreign powers made a difficult choice. Nuclear capability for Pakistan has
increased its liberty of sub-conventional actions against India, but for
India nuclear weapons are essential to reassert the relevance of
conventional war as an instrument of policy.
A theoretical framework is being developed regarding nuclear
deterrence in South Asia applying Mazarr’s ideas of deterrence by
punishment rather denial, direct instead of extended, general rather
immediate, required to take broader definition over narrower one. For
Mazrre deterrence by denial means to deter, evolving strategies ensuring
with such belief among the potential adversaries from action does not
yields desirables and actions are either infeasible or susceptible to
succeed. Deterrence by punishment, however suggest strategies
communicated the clear messages of the severe consequences in terms of
more destructive retaliation or tight economic sanctions, in case of nuclear
escalations or belligerent action. Mazrre evolved ideas of direct and
extended deterrence to make it explicit image to understand, direct
deterrence means to prevent from direct attack on its own territory,
however extended deterrence are the strategies of the state to prevent
aggression upon the third parties, as allies or partners. Temporally, Mazrre
builds concepts general and immediate deterrence. General deterrence
strategies of the governments wage to prevent non-crisis situation and long
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 23Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
term threats, unlikely immediate deterrence emphasizes upon the
strategies for the prevention of attacks in crisis situation.
Mazrre also put his efforts upon scopic image of deterrence; he comes up
the two blocks for defining deterrence, narrowest and broadest definitions.
Narrowest definition confines the concept of deterrence to merely appliance
of military capabilities, tools and strategies to prevent unwanted actions; however
broader concept of deterrence inculcate other instruments and tools other than
the military one, such as economic sanctions, diplomatic exclusion, or
information operations. Mazrre argues that along with credibility, capability
and communication, deterrence success required motivations, clarity and
confidence for deterrent actor. For motivations it needs to understand “If a
state sees little reason to undertake aggression, it will not be hard to deter; if it
has acquired an urgent sense that only an attack will safeguard its interests, it
may become almost impossible to stop.”10 While the clarity second broad
criterion for deterrence success is that the defender should be as clear as
possible about what it is trying to deter, as well as what it will do if the threat
is ignored.11 Third criterion for deterrence success is confidence which
manifest “the potential aggressor must believe that the defender has the
capability and will to do what it threatens”12. Nuclear deterrence could be a
“threat” to adversary making sure to “refrain” from waging a nuclear or
conventional attack, as the most fundamental criterion and requirement for a
successful deterrence it must ‘shatters’ or ‘diminishes’ confidence of
adversary in peacetime military planning or calculating war consequences. In
South Asian context two cases will be analyze applying this Mazrre’s
framework of deterrence, crisis between India and Pakistan evolved after Uri
attacks, Indian so called surgical strikes and post Pulwama crisis. Before the
comparing and analyzing the given crises put into the perspective the nuclear
weapons, capabilities and doctrines of two countries.
South Asia: Nuclear Weapons, Capabilities and Doctrines
Since India and Pakistan has acquired the nuclear weapons and
transformed respective strategies, numbers of nuclear warheads are
continuously increasing, according to recent and reliable estimates
Pakistan stood superior in numbers of warheads with 150 to 160 estimated
in 2020 while India holds 140–150.13 Both the countries intentionally
developing technologically advanced weapons and delivery systems, both
deployed alarming nuclear dyad of fighter bombers and land based
ballistic missiles. In peacetimes mostly de-mated nuclear weapon systems
and delivery vehicles are separately located in proximity.14 Nuclear-
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 24Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
capable Indian aircrafts Mirage 2000 H with 1850km range while Jaguar
IS/IB 1600km are considered, most reliable nuclear delivery systems in
Indian inventories.15 Similarly Pakistan’s nuclear capable delivery system
includes F-16A/B with 1600km range and bomber Mirage III/V, with
2100 kilometers range. India do have reliable four operational land-based
nuclear capable ballistic missiles with short-range (250 km) Prithvi II, the
700 km medium-range Agni-I, 2000 km intermediate-range Agni-II and
3200 km Agni-III16 last three are considered as solid-fueled, road-or rail-
mobile systems.
Indian inventory equipped with the Dhanush 400 km (sea-based
nuclear-capable missile) capable to launch from Sukanya-class patrol
vessels, but lesser range make it vulnerable to attack. Nevertheless, India
is paying much heed on the deployment of SLBM capability. Indian first
nuclear-capable submarine, the Arihant roamed on “deterrent patrol” in
2018.17 The Arihant, when fully operationalize to be equipped with the
SLBM K-15 Sagarika, (with an extended range of 700 kilometers) and K-
4 SLBM, range 3500 kilometers. Pakistan’s nuclear dyad is also equipped
with reliable delivery systems deploys six nuclear capable, land based,
road mobile missile systems: short-ranged (200 km) Abdali, short-ranged
(300 km) Ghaznavi, and short ranged 70 km Nasr, intermediate-ranged
(900 km) Shaheen-1, intermediate-ranged (1250 km) Ghauri, and
intermediate-ranged (2000 km) Shaheen-2 . Ground-Launched Cruise
Missile (GLCM), short-ranged (350 km) Babur, which is also nuclear
capable and road mobile, also includes in Pakistani inventories of delivery
systems. Pakistan also tested a sea-based version of the Babur and,
eventually, an SLBM capability, but the operational realization of a
Pakistani nuclear triad is many years off. Both nuclear states claim to have
nuclear doctrines of credible minimum deterrence.18
Nevertheless, India is slightly shifting from this doctrine of ‘no first use’
to ‘first use’. Availability of data on necessary numbers of arsenal and their
qualitative characteristics remains a challenge as none of the government
made public all the data. In this context, defining ‘credible minimum’ is to
make sure survivable second strike capabilities; instead both countries are
pursuing triad of sea-land-air based weapons which is beyond the credible
minimum. Pakistan and India both are less transparent in their nuclear
capabilities and expression of the data, ambiguity and uncertainty made
difficult to analyze the deterrent postures. Indian rationale for nuclear
weapons is to ‘deter nuclear attack’ while prevention of conventional
aggression is considered a side benefit of possessing nuclear weapons.
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 25Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
India, however traditionally holds no first use, doctrine with public
stance that usage of nuclear weapons will be only in response to
adversary’s first attack.19 On the other hand, Pakistan’s doctrinal stance
does not match with the Indian NFU, it hold specific appliance of nuclear
weapon intended to deter both nuclear and conventional aggression,
because of asymmetry of conventional capabilities between the two
countries. Inclusion of short range Nasr missile system in the Pakistan’s
nuclear delivery systems manifests intentions to create nuclear deterrence
against conventional aggression. Nutshell, Former Director General (DG)
of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, explains
the bottom line of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine as the nuclear weapons will
be used “only if the existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake.”20
Uri Attack and Fake Surgical Strike
On 18 September, 2019 around 5:30am four militant attacked throwing
17 grenades in three minutes on Brigade headquarters of Indian Military at
Uri, located adjacent to Line of Control, and around 20 forces were killed. A
gun ballet lasts more than six hours culminates with the killing of all the four
so-called militants. The terror activity is taken as follow up of already tense
situation in valley after Indian security forces’ shootout of Burhan Wani July
2016 which sparked protests across Kashmir, fuels another phase of Kashmir
Movement, resultantly 96 people died and thousands of injuries is taken as
pretext of Uri attack. Although there may be no direct link could be
established between Wani’s death and Uri. Prime Minister Narendara Modi,
who remained critical over the predecessor Manmohan Singh government for
not taking retaliatory actions holding Pakistan responsible for Mumbai attacks
of 2008, pledged the nation “those behind this despicable action will not go
unpunished”. Ram Madhav, national secretary general of Bhartia Janta Party
(BJP), further fueled the situation by declaring: “For one tooth, the complete
jaw. The days of so-called strategic restraint are over.” Such statements
caused intensification of already tense situation. India blamed Pakistan based
militants outfits for the attack. As the provocation mounts India’s DGMO
hints linking “foreign terrorists” with Pakistan because their weapons had
“Pakistani markings.”21
Rajnath Singh, Indian Home Minister specifically tagged “Pakistan is
a terrorist state”.22 Just like prior crisis, national security leadership of
India put their heads together how to punish Pakistan. Modi was held a
meeting at his residence on September 19 attended by Home Minister,
Defense Minister, Finance Minister, and National Security. Military
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 26Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
leadership briefed the meeting that that Pakistan has “raised its defensive
posture along the Line of Control” strengthening its positions and Indian
military response would be risky.”23 Indian reluctance after the Uri attacks
and determining how to respond Pakistan testifies deterrence posture.
Modi was briefed by Lt Gen. Ranbir Singh the Indian DGMO, on
September 22 briefed and his security team brought an option to plans of
strikes at the LOC to punish Pakistan, (LOC strike Options).24 An
American analyst George Perkovich in his article “Indian’s Options in
Pakistan” identified Indian predicament about military options. He asserts
“India still lacks military options that could satisfy its strategic objectives,
the first of which is to get the Pakistani army to demobilize the most
potent anti-India militant groups.”25
Considering military options and its possible outcome Perkovich
intimates in three basic points that one LOC Strike options could be
counterproductive. Firstly, harming Pakistani army does not yield the
demobilization of anti-India militants across Pakistan. Secondly, inflicting
major damage to Pakistani military could provoke usage of nuclear
weapon avoid defeat. Thirdly, reluctance of use of force signal lack of
Indian resolve, which consequently encourages Pakistani military.”26 On
the other hand, civil and military leadership in Pakistan out rightly rejected
the Indian accusations of Pakistani involvement in Uri attack, however
held responsible India for ongoing violence in Kashmir and termed it cross
border fire exchange. Pakistan’s Prime Minister then Mian Nawaz Sharif
criticizes India at his UN General Assembly speech on September 21,
killing of Burhan Wani by Indian forces provoked latest Kashmiri intifada,
indicates that new generation of Kashmiri youth stood against the illegal
Indian occupation.27 The crisis couldn’t further escalated for two reasons,
despite the fact that Indian soldier’s intrusion into Pakistani administered
territory Kashmir, Madarpur-Titrinot of Poonch sector.28 Pakistan never
acknowledged it as surgical strike, if Nawaz government accepted it as
surgical strike it has to respond back to India, may instigate further
escalation, similarly international independent analysts categorized as
precision strikes alongside the LOC then surgical strikes. Post Uri crisis
Indian reluctance shows intentions ‘shatters’ with the fear of potential
retaliation.
Pulwama Saga and Balakot Strikes
On 14 February, vehicle-borne suicide bomber, Adil Ahmed Dar,
young Kashmiri from Pulwama, a district of Indian Held Kashmir,
ambushed at a convoy of Indian security personal carrying vehicles,
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 27Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
caused death of 46 police personals and the assailant. India blames
Pakistan based militant outlet Jesh-i-Muhammed (JeM) ignoring Prime
Minister Imran Khan Government’s commitment of action if Indian
claims prove true. Same day Modi tweeted in threatening tone “a befitting
reply will be given to the perpetrators of the heinous attack and their
patrons.”29 On 15 February Jesh-i-Muhammad claimed the responsibility.
As an immediate response to the attacks Indian Finance Minister
announced in his tweet that India withdrawn MFN status, basic customs
duty raised to 200 percent on all goods from exported Pakistan.30 From
Pakistani side PM Imran Khan offered India for cooperation in
investigating car bombing, with a clear warning it will retaliate if Pakistan
is attacked, but India rejected the offer. On 26th February 2019,
approximately 02:54am, 8 Indian fighter plans violated the line of control
from the Indian held Kashmir and dropped payloads in the proximity of
Khyber Pakhtunkhawa’s small town Balakot. Contrary claims came up
after the attack, Indian claims of hitting terror camps were rejected by
Pakistani officials, though establishes the fact that Indian plans crossed
Pakistani’ boarder dropped the payloads without any causality.
First time in the history, air strike was conducted from one nuclear
power to another nuclear power since the nuclearization of South Asian
adversaries led to the brink of nuclear war. Indian Foreign Secretary in a
statement asserted Indian strikes in Balakot, number of terrorists, trainers,
and senior commanders at Fiayeen camps of JeM were eliminated. The
camp was being headed by Moulana Yousuf Azhar, the brother in law of
JeM Chief, Masood Azhar.31 Director General, ISPR then tweets varying
facts, accepting Indian aircrafts’ intrusion into the Pakistani territory from
Muzafarabad sector. Indian aircrafts dropped payloads in haste fellan near
Balakot, because of Pakistan Air Force timely and effective response,
resultant no casualties and damage. Pakistan declared Indian strikes as
“act of aggression” even then clarifying Indian claims massive destruction
DG ISPR Major General Asif Ghafoor claims “there is not even a single
brick in the debris”.32 PM Imran Khan chaired a special meeting of
National Security Committee attended by civilian and military leadership,
rejected Indian claims of targeting terrorist camp, expressing resolve “to
respond Indian air raids on its territory.”33 Forum warned India with clear
words “India has committed uncalled for aggression to which Pakistan
shall respond at the time and place of its choosing.” 34 PM Khan chaired a
meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA), on 27th February
attended by both civilian and military leadership, options how to respond
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 28Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
India were discussed, the forum authorized the military to respond
decisively and comprehensively to any aggression or misadventure by
India.35
On 27th February 2019, a day after Indian attack, according to a
retired fighter Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail who is well-known as an
aviation historian says in his article two fighters of Indian air force Su-
30MKI and Mirage 2000I was patrolling in Indian Held Kashmir
area. PAF’s two pilots JF-17 engaged Indian formations into a deception.
According to ISPR’s initial releases, PAF downed two Indian fighter
aircrafts and one pilot caught by the villagers, Abhi Nandan, however was
release just within 48 hours. Ministry of Foreign Affairs says in a
statement "the sole purpose of this action was to demonstrate our right,
will and capability for self-defense. We do not wish to escalate, but are
fully prepared if forced into that paradigm."36 Pakistan’s message went
well to the Indian quarters, if further escalation precedes the risk of
nuclear weapons. If we apply Kahn’s escalation ladder to Pakistan-India
escalations it may be clear that South Asia strategic environment is quite
different then US-Soviet strategic competitions.
Taking first rung of escalation ladder according to Kahn is Sub-Crisis
Maneuvering which he names Don’t Rock the Boat Threshold, beings with
apparent crisis, political, economic, and diplomatic gestures, solemn and
formal declarations. To somehow it could be fit into the rung, however,
the second escalation ladder Traditional in Crises, in which he him
Nuclear War is Unthinkable Threshold, not all tenets fulfilled but
harassing acts of violence appeared in terms of Pulwama then a dramatic
military confrontations qualifies the second ladder. In case of Balakot,
though escalation jumped into intense crises with provocative breaking off
the diplomatic relations. Therefore, on 26th February nuclear capability
couldn’t India deter strike within Pakistan at the tactical level but when on
27th February Pakistan Air Force responded with same thrust deterrence
worked at strategic level. Proximity, history of wars, long standing
conflict over Kashmir, emotive response behavior, conventional
imbalance must be contextualized in South Asian deterrence stability.
Conclusion
Overt nuclearization of South Asia becomes stability factor when
India and Pakistan conducted series of nuclear tests, the notion of nuclear
deterrence remained dominant idea since then among the scholars that a
full scale war is not possible between two South Asian nuclear states
recognizing condition of mutual assured destruction. Pre-nuclear
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 29Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
escalations, conflicts and wars between Pakistan and India were not
dangerous as considered in post nuclear age. Since both countries became
nuclear powers, experts were firm with the belief that possibility of full
scale conventional war between Pakistan and India has been shrunk
recognizing condition of mutually assured destruction.
In case of post Uri so called Indian surgical strikes, couldn’t cause for
further escalation, because Pakistan’s denial questioned the credibility of
India strikes and even western analyst acknowledged it as ‘precision’ rather
surgical strikes. Post Uri strikes neither were accepted by Pakistan nor
recognized by the independent international analysts. On the other hand,
Balakot strikes were sheer violation of boarder dropped the payloads as
signature, compels Pakistan to respond with similar thrust. On 26th February
nuclear capability couldn’t India deter strike within Pakistan but when
Pakistan Air Force responded with same zeal on 27th February with the clear
message further escalations may be similarly retaliation, could be much
devastating than expected. It means if deterrence does not work at tactical
level but well worked at strategic level, because escalations couldn’t proceed
further. Balakot strikes could be understood in space of conventional
brinkmanship with specific reference to nuclear age in South Asia.
*****
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 30Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
References
1. Vick, Alan. Some Thoughts on Deterrence. No. RAND/P-6916. RAND CORP SANTA
MONICA CA, 1983.
2. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, New York, Penguin Edition, 1972.
3. Brodie, Bernard, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York,
Harcourt, 1946.
4. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966),
p. 69.
5. Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrence. RAND, 2018.
6. Phil William, “Nuclear Deterrence”, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett, Phil
Williams, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Concepts, Vol. 1 (Great Britain: Holmes
& Meier Publishers, Inc., 1987), p. 115.
7. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 608.
8. Jaspal, Zafar Nawaz. "Paradox of deterrence: India-Pakistan strategic relations." Strategic
Studies 29, no. 4 (2009): 46-71.
9. Ibid.
10. Mazarr, Michael J. Understanding Deterrence. RAND, 2018.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Nuclear weapon modernization continues but the outlook for arms control is bleak: New
SIPRI Yearbook out now, 15 June, 2020. https://www.sipri.org .
14.Devin T. Hagerty, “India’s Evolving Nuclear Posture,” Nonproliferation Review 21, nos.
3–4 (September-December 2014): 299–300, 304–05.
15. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrine, and
Dangers (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), 15–16, 19; Gaurav
Kampani, “India’s Evolving Civil-Military Institutions in an Operational Nuclear
Context,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, June 30, 2016
(http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-evolving-civil-military-institutions-in-
operational-nuclear-context-pub-63910).
16. The Agni-III’s precise operational status is ambiguous. See Kristensen and Korda, “Indian
Nuclear Forces, 2018,” 363; Joshi and O’Donnell, India and Nuclear Asia, 25, 39.
17. “INS Arihant Completes First Deterrent Patrol: PM Narendra Modi Lauds ‘Historic’
Moment,” Indian Express, November 27, 2018.
18. Hagerty, “India’s Evolving Nuclear Posture,” 300–06.
19. Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, “India’s Counterforce Temptations: Strategic
Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities,” International Security 43, no. 3 (Winter 2018/19):
16–21.
20.P. Cotta-Ramusino and M. Martellini, “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear
Strategy in Pakistan: A Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network-Centro Volta,”
Pugwash Online Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Como, Italy, January 14, 2002.
(www.centrovolta.it/landau/NuclearSafetyNuclearStabilityAndNuclearStrategy.aspx).
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 31Pakistan-India Escalations and Nuclear Deterrence
21. “Rising Tensions in Kashmir,” New York Times, September 23, 2016.
22. “India Backs Off Major Retaliation,” Reuters, September 22, 2016.
23. Praveen Swami, “Uri Terror Attack: Avoid Rash Military Action, Commanders Advise
Government,” Indian Express, September 20, 2016.
24.Shishir Gupta, “Mission LOC: How India Punished Pakistan with Surgical Strikes,”
Hindustan Times, October 3, 2016.
25. “India Backs Off Major Retaliation,” Reuters, September 22, 2016.
26. Perkovich, “India’s Options in Pakistan.”
27. “Statement by His Excellency Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif,” General Debate of the
71st Session, UN General Assembly, September 21, 2016.
28.M Ilyas Khan, India’s ‘surgical strikes’ in Kashmir: Truth or illusion? Accessed on 4
January, 2022 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790
29. https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/01/india-pakistan-conflict-timeline.html
30.Ibid.
31.Indian Foreign Secretary’s statement on 26 February, 2019, www.mea.gov.in, accessed on
21 December, 2021.
32. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/2/26/pakistan-says-will-respond-to-indian-air-
raids-on-its-territory
33. Ibid.
34. https://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_detailes.php?pr_id=2707
35 https://pmo.gov.pk/press_release_detailes.php?pr_id=2699
36 https://www.dawn.com/news/1466347
FORESIGHT: Global Challenges and Strategies Journal 32You can also read
