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Pacific Safety of Navigation Project
Risk assessment for
Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
April 2019
PA C I F I C S A F E T Y
O F N AV I G AT I O N
Pacific Community | spc@spc.int | www.spc.int
Headquarters: Noumea, New Caledonia
PROJECT
GEM
G e oscie nce, Ene rgy a nd Ma ritim e
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
Risk assessment for
Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
April 2019
Francesca Pradelli, Salesh Kumar and Epeli Waqavonovono
Geoscience, Energy and Maritime Division, Pacific Community
Pacific Community
Suva, Fiji, 2019
© Pacific Community (SPC) 2019
All rights for commercial/for profit reproduction or translation, in any form, reserved. SPC authorises the partial
reproduction or translation of this material for scientific, educational or research purposes, provided that SPC and
the source document are properly acknowledged. Permission to reproduce the document and/or translate in whole,
in any form, whether for commercial/for profit or non-profit purposes, must be requested in writing. Original SPC
artwork may not be altered or separately published without permission.
Original text: English
Pacific Community Cataloguing-in-publication data
Pradelli, Francesca
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project: risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati /
Francesca Pradelli, Salesh Kumar and Epeli Waqavonovono
1. Navigation – Kiribati.
2. Navigation – Safety measures – Kiribati.
3. Anchorage – Kiribati.
4. Harbors – Anchorage – Kiribati.
5. Harbors – Safety regulations – Kiribati.
6. Harbors – Risk assessment – Kiribati.
7. Transportation – Safety – Kiribati.
8. Transportation – Law and legislation – Kiribati.
I. Pradelli, Francesca II. Kumar, Salesh III. Waqavonovono, Epeli IV. Title V. Pacific Community
387.1099681 AACR2
ISBN: 978 982 00 1221 9
Photo credit: Sonal Aujla, SPC
Prepared for publication at SPC’s Suva Regional Office,
Private Mail Bag, Suva, Fiji, 2019
www.spc.int | spc@spc.int
Printed by Printhouse Limited, Suva, Fiji, 2019
Contents
Executive summary.....................................................................................................................1
1 Background..........................................................................................................................4
2 Description of the waterway.................................................................................................5
3 Stakeholder meeting............................................................................................................6
4 Hazards and risks..................................................................................................................6
4.1 Types of hazards................................................................................................................................................7
4.2 Risk factors...........................................................................................................................................................7
5 Scenarios..............................................................................................................................9
5.1 Grounding...........................................................................................................................................................9
5.2 Allision...................................................................................................................................................................9
5.3 Foundering..........................................................................................................................................................9
5.4 Structural failure..............................................................................................................................................10
5.5 ‘Other scenario’................................................................................................................................................10
6 Probability and impact....................................................................................................... 10
7 The acceptability of risk...................................................................................................... 11
8 Risk control options............................................................................................................ 12
9 Costing the risk control options........................................................................................... 13
10 AtoN programme 5-year budget plan (2020–2024)............................................................... 14
11 Recommendations.............................................................................................................. 14
Recommendation 1 (addressing grounding scenario) ..............................................................................15
Recommendation 2 (addressing grounding scenario)...............................................................................15
Recommendation 3 (addressing grounding scenario) ..............................................................................16
Recommendation 4 (addressing grounding scenario) ..............................................................................17
Recommendation 5 (addressing allision scenario)......................................................................................18
Recommendation 6 (addressing allision scenario)......................................................................................18
Recommendation 7 (AtoN)...................................................................................................................................19
12 Conclusion..........................................................................................................................20
Annex A. Stakeholders in the Betio Port risk assessment............................................................. 21
Annex B. Hazards identified for Betio Port..................................................................................22
Annex C. Possible scenarios identified for Betio Port...................................................................23
Annex D. Risk assessment matrix for Betio Port.......................................................................... 24
Annex E. MICTTD AtoN programme 5-year budget plan (2020–2024)...........................................25
Annex F. Aids to navigation in Betio Port.................................................................................... 31
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
Executive summary
Kiribati is a signatory to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), of which Chapter V
Regulation 13.1 requires the contracting governments to provide “such Aids to Navigation (AtoN) as the volume
of traffic justifies and the degree of risk requires.”
Kiribati is one of the 13 targeted Pacific Island countries and territories of the Pacific Safety of Navigation Project
implemented by the Pacific Community (SPC)and funded by the International Foundation for Aids to Navigation
(IFAN), whose aim is to improve safety of navigation in the Pacific region through enhanced AtoN capacity and
systems.
During Phase 1 of the project, in 2017, the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse
Authorities (IALA) and SPC developed the simplified IALA risk assessment tool (SIRA), a simple qualitative tool
to enable smaller states to meet their international obligation of providing AtoN by conducting waterways risk
assessments.
During Phase 2 of the project, in September 2018 SPC conducted a risk assessment of the Betio port area using
the SIRA tool. This report details the risks identified, the estimated costs in the event of an incident, the risk
control options suggested, and their costs.
Betio is the major international port in Kiribati, and was therefore identified as a priority for the risk assessment by
the Ministry of Information, Communication, Transport and Tourism Development (MICTTD). The port consists
of one domestic jetty, one patrol boat jetty and one international jetty. During peak fishing season the port
accommodates around 15 fishing vessels, including motherships; most of these ships stay in the anchorage area
and do not come alongside the wharf. There are 10 domestic ferry service providers in Kiribati. The Police Marine
Division operates a Pacific-class patrol boat. No cruise ships and an average of one yacht call at the port each year.
Kiribati’s maritime stakeholders identified ten possible scenarios: four groundings in the vicinity of Betio Port,
two allisions, one foundering, two structural failure scenarios and one other scenario. Upon discussion with the
AtoN officer, from the ten possible scenarios six were further assessed for risk control options. For each scenario,
the cost of the incident was estimated and a risk score was given, taking into account the probability of the
incident happening and its potential impact on the country. Risk control options were then identified. The risk
scores for the scenarios under the current situation were then compared with the new risk scores if the risk
control options were put in place.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
New
Risk
Scenario Risk control option risk
score
score
Grounding of vessels on the 8 m unmarked shoal 6 Install a port-hand lit buoy on the shoal 2
at the port-hand side of the channel entrance,
especially at night
Grounding of vessels at the shallow domestic 15 Dredge the wharf and channel 3
wharf
Grounding of vessels between the entrance and 10 Install a new leading light at Bikeman Island 5
Bikeman point
Grounding of vessels on an unmarked wreck near 6 Place a wreck-marking buoy on the wreck 2
the domestic anchorage area
Allision of vessels with AtoN in the channel 6 Enlarge or extend the anchorage area away 3
from the channel
Allision of vessels with the domestic wharf 6 Install fenders on the wharf; and KFL building 2
reduces background lighting
The main outcome of the risk assessment process in Kiribati was seven recommendations which aim to reduce
the risks to safety of navigation to an acceptable level for stakeholders. The recommendations and the costs of
their implementation are outlined below.
Recommendation 1
To reduce the risk of vessels grounding on the 8 m unmarked shoal at the port-hand side of the entrance channel, it is
recommended to install a port-hand lit buoy on the shoal
Cost
Buoy (including installation) AUD 40,000
Annual maintenance cost AUD 603
Recommendation 2
To reduce the risk of grounding at the shallow KPA wharf, it is recommended to dredge the channel and berthing area
Cost
Dredging AUD 150,000
Recommendation 3
To reduce the risk of grounding near Bikeman Island, it is recommended to install a new leading light on the island
Cost
Leading light (including installation) AUD 20,000
Annual maintenance cost AUD 603
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
Recommendation 4
To reduce the risk of grounding on an unmarked wreck near the domestic anchorage area, it is recommended to install a
wreck-marking buoy
Cost
Buoy (including installation) AUD 40,000
Annual maintenance AUD 603
Recommendation 5
To reduce the risk of vessels alliding with AtoN in the channel to Betio Port, it is recommended to enlarge and extend the
anchorage area
Cost
Enlarging/extending the anchorage area AUD 200,000
Recommendation 6
To reduce the risk of vessels alliding with the domestic wharf, it is recommended to install fenders, and to reduce the intensity
of light from the KFL building
Cost
Fenders (including installation) AUD 100,000
Reducing KFL light intensity None
Annual maintenance AUD 1000
(estimated at 1% annually of the total cost)
Recommendation 7
To further improve safety of navigation in Betio Port, it is recommended that the Marine Division procures a suitable vessel for
its activities; that the No. 2 port lateral mark is repositioned so that it marks properly the edge of the approach channel into
Betio Anchorage; and that consideration is given to dredging and enlarging the channel.
Cost
No cost supplied for this recommendation
As part of the Pacific Safety of Navigation’s work on supporting the MICTTD, an AtoN programme 5-year budget
plan for the delivery of safe navigation services for the whole of Kiribati was drawn up. The budget plan includes
both capital and recurring expenditure.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
Kiribati Marine Division (MICTTD) - AtoN programme 5-year budget plan 2020–2024
Kiribati Marine Division - AtoN Programme 5-year Budget Plan 2020-2024
$250,000 140,000
120,000
$200,000
100,000
Expenditure (AUD)
Light dues (AUD)
$150,000 80,000
Capital Recurring
$100,000 60,000
Light due collection expenditure expenditure Total (AUD)
(forecasted) (AUD) (AUD) 40,000
2020 $31,530 $134,850 $75,637 $210,487 $50,000
20,000
2021 $32,800 $157,325 $77,884 $235,209
2022 $37,832 $27,325 $64,884 $92,209 $0 0
2023 $39,362 $107,325 $72,884 $180,209 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
2024 $40,954 $7,325 $62,884 $70,209
Recurring expenditure (AUD) Capital expenditure (AUD) Light due coll ection (forecasted)
$182,477.38 $434,150 $354,175 $788,325
* Light dues forecasted amount is taken from 2018 Kiribati National Budget Book
* Costings of risk control options covered under Tarawa Safety of Navigation Risk Assessment have been factored in:
-In 2020, procurement and installation of a port-hand buoy, wreck mark and leading light to mitigate the risk of groundings
- In 2021, dredging of old KPA wharf to mitigate groundings
- In 2022, extending of anchorage area to mitigate allisions
- In 2023, procurement and installation of fenders for wharf to mitigate allisions
* Maintenance costs for new procured equipment have been factored into the maintenance costs under recurring expenditure
1 Background
In early 2016, with support from the International Foundation for Aids to Navigation (IFAN), the Pacific Community
(SPC) started the Pacific Safety of Navigation Project in 13 Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs)1. The
project aims to improve safety of navigation in the Pacific region through enhanced aids to navigation (AtoN)
capacity and systems, and hence support economic development, shipping and trade in the Pacific region
through safer maritime routes managed in accordance with international instruments and best practices.
During Phase 1, which ended in July 2018, SPC worked in close collaboration with the International Association
of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) to conduct technical, legal and economic
assessments in the 13 PICTs, to identify needs and gaps in these areas. Another significant output of Phase 1
was the development of a new tool for risk assessment in small island developing states, the simplified IALA risk
assessment tool (SIRA). In June 2018, IALA trained personnel in 12 of the 13 PICTs on the use of SIRA to conduct
AtoN risk assessments in their countries.
Phase 2 of the project builds on the Phase 1 assessments and tools developed, to further assist in building capacity
to develop and maintain AtoN in PICTs. Activities include conducting risk assessments (as required by Regulation
13 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea – SOLAS); developing safety of navigation policy
and a legal framework; improving budgetary management; and supporting regional coordination related to
safety of navigation in the Pacific.
In September 2018, the Kiribati Ministry of Information, Communication, Transport and Tourism Development
(MICTTD) invited SPC to assist in conducting a risk assessment of Betio Port, the country’s most visited port by
both international and domestic vessels. This report describes the risk assessment, which was carried out using
the SIRA methodology.
Kiribati is a maritime nation, with a large percentage of citizens working in or around the maritime industry.
Shipping is critical to the economic and social welfare of the people of Kiribati, and safe navigation is vital to
secure this welfare and to protect the environment.
1 Cook Islands, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga,
Tokelau, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
Kiribati is a signatory to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention.
Regulation 13 of Chapter V of the 1974 SOLAS Convention (as amended) states that “each Contracting
Government undertakes to provide, as it deems practical and necessary either individually or in co‐operation
with other Contracting Governments, such aids to navigation as the volume of traffic justifies and the degree of
risk requires.”
The SIRA risk management process comprises five steps that follow a standardised management or systems
analysis approach:
1. identify hazards
2. assess risks
3. specify risk control options
4. make a decision
5. take action.
SIRA is intended as a basic tool to identify risk control options for potential undesirable incidents that Kiribati
should address as part of its obligation under SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 12 and 13. The assessment and
management of risk is fundamental to the provision of effective AtoN services.
The assessment involved a stakeholder meeting as a first step, to gather the views on hazards and risks in the
Betio Port area from those directly involved with or affected by AtoN service provision. Information provided
by this step was then used by Kiribati AtoN officer and IALA SIRA certified officer Mr Eritaia Tauro and SPC to
complete the full risk assessment matrix, based on six identified possible scenarios.
2 Description of the waterway
Betio is the major international port in Kiribati, and was identified as a priority by MICTTD for the risk assessment.
The port has one domestic wharf, one international wharf and a maritime police patrol wharf. Access to the
wharfs is through a shallow and winding channel. There are 11 AtoN around the port.
Vessels that frequent the port include tankers, military ships, fishing vessels and private craft. The international
wharf can accommodate vessels with a maximum draft of 7 m alongside. During peak fishing season the
anchorage accommodates around 15 fishing vessels, including motherships; most of these ships stay in the
anchorage area and do not come alongside the wharf. There are 10 domestic ferry service providers in Kiribati.
The Police Marine Division operates a Pacific-class patrol boat. No cruise ships and an average of one yacht call
at the port each year.
The domestic wharf has very shallow depths alongside, ranging from less than 2 to 5 m, which poses a major
challenge for domestic vessels accessing the wharf at low tide. Visibility can be reduced to 0.2 nautical miles
in bad weather conditions, which often occur between the months of November and April. There are several
hazards such as buoys, wrecks, shoals and the narrow and shallow passage that can pose problems for maritime
traffic.
Chart BA729_1 covers the Betio Anchorage at a scale of 1:25,000 (Figure 1).
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiFigure 1. Chart of Betio Anchorage at 1:25,000 scale.
3 Stakeholder meeting
As the first step of the SIRA process, a stakeholder meeting was organised in Tarawa on 25 September 2018, which
aimed to gather the points of view of individuals, groups and organisations involved with or affected by AtoN
service provision in Betio Port. The stakeholders included the Kiribati Ports Authority, shipping agents, maritime
police, maritime safety administration, fishers and others (Annex A). During the workshop the participants were
divided into groups according to their experience and background. They then helped identify potential hazards
and possible scenarios in Betio Port using the latest chart of the port, other tools such as marine traffic data, and
their experience.
4 Hazards and risks
A hazard is something that may cause an undesirable incident. Risk is the chance of injury or loss as defined as a
measure of ‘probability or likelihood’ and ‘severity or impact’. Examples of injury or loss include an adverse effect
on health, property, the environment or other areas of value.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiThe purpose of the stakeholder meeting was to generate a prioritised list of hazards specific to Betio Port. For
the risk assessment, SPC and the MICTTD AtoN officer worked together to discuss the risks associated with the
identified hazards and identify risk control options and recommendations.
The list of hazards identified for Betio Port is given in Annex B.
4.1 Types of hazards
Twenty-four hazards were identified that were grouped into the following six categories:
yy natural hazards, such as floods, storms, earthquakes, biological hazards and other natural phenomena;
yy economic hazards such as inflation, depression, and changes in tax and fee levies;
yy technical hazards such as system or equipment failure, fire, explosion, obsolescence, air/water pollution,
failure of communications systems and degradation of data quality;
yy human factors such as errors or omissions by poorly trained, fatigued or stressed persons, linguistic
challenges, violations, sabotage and terrorism;
yy operational hazards such as groundings, collisions, striking and other unwanted events; and
yy maritime space hazards, such as competing uses for maritime space leading to increasingly crowded
waterways.
The above six types of hazard have the capability to generate seven different types of losses:
yy health losses including death and injury;
yy property losses including real and intellectual property;
yy economic losses leading to increased costs or reduction of revenues;
yy liability loss resulting when an organisation is sued for an alleged breach of legal duty; such cases must
be defended even if no blame is assigned. Liability losses are capable of destroying or crippling an
organisation;
yy personnel loss when services of a key employee are lost;
yy environmental losses (negative impact on land, air, water, flora or fauna); and
yy loss of reputation or status.
4.2 Risk factors
Any risk analysis needs to consider the range of factors that contribute to the overall risk exposure. Table 1 lists
some of the factors that could be taken into consideration when identifying hazards for waterways and ports.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiTable 1. Risk factors relating to marine navigation.
Navigational Waterway Short-term Long-term
Ship traffic Traffic volume
conditions configuration consequence consequence
Quality of vessels Deep draught Night/day Depth/draft/ Injuries to people Health and safety
operations under-keel impacts
clearance
Crew competency Shallow draught Sea state Channel width Oil spill Lifestyle
disruptions
Traffic mix Commercial Wind conditions Visibility Hazardous Fisheries impacts
fishing vessels obstructions material release
Traffic density Recreational Currents (river, Waterway Property damage Impacts on
boats tidal, ocean) complexity endangered
species
Nature of cargo High speed craft Visibility Bottom type Denial of use of Shoreline damage
restrictions waterway
Participation rate Passenger ships Ice conditions Stability (siltation) Reef damage
in routing systems,
such as VTS
Background AtoN mix and Economic impacts
lighting configuration
Debris Quality of
hydrographical
data
Risk is evaluated to allow attention to be focused on high-risk areas, and to identify and evaluate factors
which influence the level of risk. Once all the risks have been assessed, they are then evaluated in terms of
the documented needs, issues and concerns of the stakeholders, and the benefits and costs of the activity, to
determine the acceptability of the risk.
Zero risk is not often realised, unless the activity generating the risk is abandoned. Rather than striving to reduce
the risk to zero, authorities should reduce the risk to ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP; Figure 2).
Figure 2. Graphical representation of the levels of risk. The risk level boundaries (negligible/ALARP/intolerable)
are purely illustrative.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiIt is important to remember that, when communicating with stakeholders about risk, perception is usually
different to reality. People make judgements of the acceptability of a risk based on their perceptions, rather
than on scientific factors such as probability. The public’s perception of a risk may be influenced by many things,
including age, gender, level of education and previous exposure to information on the hazard. Public perceptions
of risk may therefore differ from those of technical experts.
5 Scenarios
During the stakeholder meeting and discussions with the AtoN officer, 24 hazards were identified which could
lead to a number of different incidents (scenarios). Each hazard was considered carefully and the scenarios
it could cause were identified and recorded. From the 24 hazards, 10 different scenarios were identified and
categorised into five different types: grounding, allision, foundering, structural failure and ‘other scenario’. All
the 10 scenarios are discussed in this section but, following consultation with the MICTTD AtoN Officer, only
the 6 grounding and allision scenarios were further assessed in the risk assessment. Annex C describes the 10
scenarios.
5.1 Grounding
There were four grounding scenarios identified for Betio Port. The probability of grounding depends on many
factors including bathymetry around the port area, draft of the vessels accessing the port and meteorological
conditions such as prevailing wind speed and direction. Grounding on a wreck was a possible scenario due to
the presence of unmarked wrecks near the jetty. Grounding on the hard bottom could happen due to the narrow
passage at the entrance at the fairway buoy. Grounding on the hard bottom could also occur because of an unlit
transit light on Bikeman Island, as well as limited visibility around sunset. Grounding was also a concern due to
navigational aid failure on board the vessels. Grounding on the soft bottom was a possible scenario for local
vessels accessing the old KPA wharf, which has depths from less than 2 to 5 m due to siltation at the wharf. Most
local vessels can only access the wharf at high tide.
5.2 Allision
The possibility of a vessel striking a fixed human‐made object such as a wharf or mooring buoy depends on
the position of such structures along the route and the density of traffic. Two different allision scenarios were
identified for Betio Port: allision with AtoN and allision with the wharf. Allision with AtoN usually occurs when
AtoN are unlit or when vessels pass too close to them. Allision with AtoN can also occur when vessels are
towed through the narrow and winding passages. One of the causes of allision with the wharf is the glare from
background lights at the Kiribati Fish Limited (KFL) building. This usually occurs while ships are trying to come
alongside. Another cause of allision with the wharf is when ships drift at anchor close to the wharf during strong
winds.
5.3 Foundering
Foundering is defined as a vessel sinking that is not the result of an earlier collision; for example a vessel
might founder if its cargo shifts during bad weather. Foundering at Betio wharf was identified as a possible
scenario due to ship quality together with the inexperience of crews operating the vessels. Foundering because
of heavy weather, with vessels springing leaks and eventually breaking apart, was also identified during the
stakeholder consultation. However this was judged to be a very rare event which would occur only in exceptional
circumstances and not more than once every 20 years.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati5.4 Structural failure
Structural failure could be a failure of the vessel itself or of a feature external to the vessel. This can be caused
by extreme environmental conditions, poor maintenance or malicious interference. Local domestic vessels in
Kiribati are usually of wooden structure and are prone to structural failure. Structural failures of external features
such as navigation aids could cause grounding of vessels on port approaches to Betio. However this was judged
to be a very rare event which would occur only in exceptional circumstances and not more than once every 20
years.
5.5 ‘Other scenario’
A scenario caused by technical hazards such as fire was also discussed for Betio Port.
6 Probability and impact
SIRA specifies five levels of probability (Table 2) and five levels of impact that each type of scenario would create
(Table 3). Each scenario is allocated a score for both probability and impact, and the risk value is calculated from
the product of these scores. In this step of the process, the probability and consequences associated with each
scenario were estimated and discussed with the AtoN officer.
Table 2. Levels of probability specified for the simplified IALA risk assessment tool (SIRA).
Classification Score Probability
Very rare 1 Very rare or unlikely, will occur only in exceptional circumstances and not more than once in
20 years
Rare 2 Rare, may occur every 2–20 years
Occasional 3 Occasional, may occur every 2 months to 2 years
Frequent 4 Frequent, may occur once every week to every 2 months
Very frequent 5 Very frequent, may occur at least once every week
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiTable 3. Levels of impact specified for the simplified IALA risk assessment tool (SIRA).
Service
Human impact Environment
Description Score disruption Financial criteria
criteria criteria
criteria
Insignificant 1 No service No injury to humans; Loss, including No damage
disruption apart possible significant nuisance third-party losses,
from some delays of less than
or nuisance USD 1000
Minor 2 Some non‐ Minor injury to one or more Loss, including Limited short-term
permanent loss individuals, may require third-party losses, damage to the
of services such hospitalisation of USD 1000– environment
as closure of a 50,000
port or waterway
for up to 4 hours
Severe 3 Sustained Injuries to several individuals Loss, including Short-term damage
disruption to requiring hospitalisation third-party losses, to the environment
services such as of USD 50,000– over a small area
closure of a port 5,000,000
or waterway for
4–24 hours
Major 4 Sustained Severe injuries to many Loss, including Long-term to
disruption to individuals or loss of life third-party irreversible
services such as losses, of USD damage to the
closure of a major 5,000,000– environment over a
port or waterway 50,000,000 limited area
for 1–30 days or
permanent or
irreversible loss of
services
Catastrophic 5 Sustained Severe injuries to numerous Loss, including Irreversible
disruption to individuals and/or loss of third-party losses, damage to the
services such as several lives of over USD environment over a
closure of a major 50,000,000 large area
port or waterway
for months or
years
7 The acceptability of risk
Having determined probability and impact scores by consensus, the risk values are calculated by multiplying
these scores, as shown in the matrix in Table 4. To determine whether the risks are acceptable or not, SIRA
specifies four colour‐banded levels of risk (Table 5). These colours are superimposed on the matrix in Table 4.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiTable 4. Risk value matrix.
Table 5. Categories of risk, and action required.
8 Risk control options
The objective of the risk assessment was to identify risk mitigation options for each undesirable incident that
would, if implemented, reduce the risk to a level as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) and which would be
acceptable to stakeholders. Before any risk control decisions were made, they were communicated through the
stakeholder consultation process. The risks were evaluated in terms of the overall needs, issues and concerns of
the stakeholders. The mitigation options include:
yy new or enforcement of existing rules and procedures;
yy improved and charted hydrographical, meteorological and general navigation information;
yy enhanced AtoN service provision;
yy improved radio communications; and
yy improved decision support systems.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiTable 6 shows the risk scores for the scenarios under the current situation, and the new risk scores after mitigating
the risk. The detailed risk control options for Betio Port are shown in the risk control matrix in Annex D.
Table 6. Risk control options for Betio Port, Tarawa, and changes in risk score.
New
Risk
Scenario Risk control option risk
score
score
Grounding of vessels on the 8 m unmarked shoal 6 Install a port-hand lit buoy on the shoal 2
at the port-hand side of the channel entrance,
especially at night
Grounding of vessels at the shallow domestic 15 Dredge the wharf and channel 3
wharf
Grounding of vessels between the entrance and 10 Install a new leading light at Bikeman Island 5
Bikeman point
Grounding of vessels on an unmarked wreck near 6 Place a wreck-marking buoy on the wreck 2
the domestic anchorage area
Allision of vessels with AtoN in the channel 6 Enlarge or extend the anchorage area away 3
from the channel
Allision of vessels with the domestic wharf 6 Install fenders on the wharf; and KFL building 2
reduces background lighting
9 Costing the risk control options
The outcomes of the risk assessment are essentially qualitative and subjective, based on the expert opinions of
the stakeholders. The next step is to reach consensus on which risk control options to action. The risk control
options are prioritised to facilitate the decision-making process.
Costing of the options is part of the decision-making process. Most of the control options identified require
funding. Costs must cover capital, labour and other resources needed for planning and implementation, as well
as costs of operation and maintenance throughout the life cycle under consideration. Maintenance is important
to ensure that AtoN equipment and systems continue to perform at the levels required for mariners to safely
navigate the waterways.
The control measures need to be both effective in reducing risk, but also cost-effective. The cost of the measures
should not normally exceed the reduction in the expected value of the loss.
The cost of the options should be evaluated over a time frame equivalent to the economic or useful life of the
facilities and assets associated with the option.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati10 AtoN programme 5-year budget plan (2020–2024)
For the MICTTD to provide excellent AtoN services in Kiribati, an adequate level of resources needs to be
allocated to AtoN installment, maintenance and management. The SIRA team held discussions with a range
of stakeholders, and as part of the Pacific Safety of Navigation’s work on supporting MICTTD, a 5-year AtoN
programme budget plan for the delivery of safe navigation services for the whole of Kiribati was drawn up with
MICTTD (Annex E).
Currently, the MICTTD has an allocated budget for its navigation section. In 2018 this amounted to AUD 95,811,
which covered staffing, plant and equipment hire, communications and travel costs. This allocation funds the
Ministry’s mandated work around AtoN services. The AtoN budget submission of the Marine Division is scrutinised
according to the Ministry’s priorities as decided by the Secretary and his senior staff.
Light dues2 are collected from foreign ships that call at Betio Port and are deposited into the general government
consolidated fund. MICTTD handles two ring-fenced accounts – the Civil Aviation Fund and the Highway Fund,
both of which are special accounts separate from the consolidated fund. The Civil Aviation Fund collects airport
duty which is spent on upkeep costs of the airport, while the Highway Fund holds the road tolls collected at the
Nippon Causeway for its maintenance. There is currently no ring-fenced account for AtoN.
In meetings with the Ministry of Finance & Economic Development (MFED) it was clarified that investment in the
upkeep and management of AtoN will help to achieve the goals of the Kiribati Development Plan 2016–2019. The
MFED expressed interest in exploring how the ring-fencing of light dues might contribute. The Development
Coordination Committee which meets every year to deliberate over the national budget would be the forum for
presenting a discussion of ring-fencing for AtoN.
To improve the Marine Division’s budgetary planning for AtoN, the AtoN programme 5-year budget plan
(2020–2024) was drawn up in consultation with AtoN Officer and Supervisor Mr Tioti Bateriki. A comprehensive
costing of maintenance works and outer atoll visits already compiled by the Marine Division was built upon and
consolidated along general spending items. The risk control options from the SIRA risk assessment were also
costed and included. The risk control options have been staggered over the 5-year period to spread the cost.
It is suggested that the AtoN programme 5-year budget plan be used to assist the MICTTD in its own budget
submission and discussions for funding in the national budget.
A summary and detailed tables of the AtoN programme 5-year budget plan are given in Annex E.
11 Recommendations
A key outcome of the risk assessment undertaken at Betio Port is seven recommendations that aim to reduce the
risks to safety of navigation to an acceptable level for stakeholders.
2 Kiribati operates a ‘user-pays’ system where owners of vessels calling at port pay a light due that is currently set at net tonnage x AUD 1, with
a minimum charge of AUD 10.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiRecommendation 1 (addressing grounding scenario)
There is an 8 m unmarked shoal at the port-hand side of the entrance channel which presents a risk of grounding,
particularly at night. Currently vessels are allowed to access the port only during daylight hours due to the lack
of lit marks at the entrance passage.
It is recommended that a port-hand lit buoy be installed on the 8 m shoal at the entrance of the channel. It is
also recommended that annual maintenance be budgeted for to ensure that the AtoN equipment and systems
continue to perform at the levels required by mariners to safely navigate the waterways.
The costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Buoy (including installation) 40,000
Annual maintenance (see Annex E for details) 603
Recommendation 2 (addressing grounding scenario)
The old KPA wharf is very shallow at the entrance and the berthing area has depths of less than 2 m, as shown
below. Grounding is a risk for local vessels accessing this wharf and the slipway at the end of the wharf. Vessels
prefer to come alongside at high tide to avoid grounding.
It is recommended to dredge the entire length of the channel to 4 m so that domestic ships can access this wharf
at all times. This will prevent grounding and engine damage, and will help reduce ship downtime.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiThe costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Dredging 150,000
Annual maintenance 0 (no maintenance dredging required for the first 5 years)
Recommendation 3 (addressing grounding scenario)
The transit light at Bikeman Island is no longer functional, and vessels cannot access Betio Port at night due to
the risk of grounding.
It is recommended to install a new leading light on Bikeman Island, allowing vessels to enter port at all times.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiThe costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Light 20,000
Annual maintenance (see Annex E for details) 603
Recommendation 4 (addressing grounding scenario)
There is an unmarked wreck in the vicinity of the domestic vessel anchorage area at latitude 01°22’00.067861”N
and longitude 172°55’53.933349”E. During strong north-easterly winds, vessels that are anchored near the wreck
can drag anchor and can potentially ground on the wreck.
It is recommended that a wreck-marking buoy be installed near the wreck to warn mariners of the danger.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiThe costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Buoy (including installation) 40,000
Annual maintenance cost (see Annex E for details) 603
Recommendation 5 (addressing allision scenario)
Allision of vessels with AtoN marking the channel of Betio Port is an ongoing issue. This happens because the
channel is winding, and especially when vessels are towed in or out of the channel; and because the anchorage
is close to the AtoN and when ships drag anchor they can allide with the AtoN. Other issues contributing to this
scenario are lack of seamanship and technical issues on board the vessels, such as engine failures.
It is recommended that MICTTD enlarges the anchorage area and moves it away from the AtoN. Continuous
awareness and further training for local crews will also reduce the allision risk significantly; this could be addressed
through the MFAT-funded Pacific Maritime Safety Programme (PMSP).
The costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Anchorage area enlarged and extended away from the channel 200,000
Annual maintenance None
Recommendation 6 (addressing allision scenario)
Ships occasionally allide with the domestic wharf, especially during bad weather conditions, when they are
trying to come alongside the wharf or when they are anchored close to the wharf and drag anchor. Another
contributing factor for this scenario is the intensity of the background lights from the Kiribati Fish Limited (KFL)
building, which affect visibility at night when coming alongside the wharf.
It is recommended to install fenders on the domestic wharf and to reduce the intensity and direction of
the background lights from the KFL building. These measures aim to reduce the risk to as low as reasonably
practicable.
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiThe costs to implement this recommendation were provided by MICTTD as follows:
Recommendation Amount (AUD)
Fenders and installation 100,000
Change direction/reduce intensity of KFL lights None
Annual maintenance (estimated at 1% of total cost) 1000
Recommendation 7 (AtoN)
A site visit was organised by the Marine Division and the AtoN in Betio Port were looked at for their compliance
with IALA standards. It was found that all the AtoN needed major repair and maintenance (Annex F). The No. 2
port lateral mark has been laid in shoal water about 100 m north of the channel. Because pilotage is compulsory
this was not seen as an immediate problem, however there is a real risk that the master of a vessel might consider
it safe to pass close to this buoy believing it to mark the edge of the channel3.
Currently the Marine Division does not have a dedicated vessel to carry out its tasks, including repair and
maintenance of AtoN, but hires boats (both in Tarawa and in the outer islands). It is recommended that the Marine
Division procures a suitable vessel to carry out its activities. It is also recommended that the No. 2 port lateral
mark be repositioned so that it marks properly the edge of the approach channel into Betio Port. Consideration
should also be given to dredging and enlarging the channel.
3 IALA technical report 2016 (recommendation 33).
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati12 Conclusion
This report completes the risk assessment process as required by Regulation 13 of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS convention). It is also meant to guide MICTTD in delivering compliant AtoN
services and should be used in conjunction with IALA technical report 2016.
SPC can provide further support in relation to capacity development, AtoN services and management,
governance, and budget management to assist Kiribati in offering safe maritime routes and meeting the
country’s international obligations.
It is suggested that a consistent and wider approach is taken by Kiribati to include the delivery of hydrographic,
marine meteorology, maritime safety information and maritime search and rescue services in its governance
processes.
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiAnnex A. Stakeholders in the Betio Port risk assessment
Safety of Navigation Risk Assessment Stakeholder Meeting (Phase II) - Betio, Kiribati, 25 September 2018
Telephone
Name Job title Organisation Gender Email address
number
1 Natara T Biribo Manager Reitiniraoi Shipping M 73001982
2 Tetoma Uere General Manager Betio Fishermen Association M 73014330
3 Sekone Toua Manager Kiriwaru Fishermen Association M 73087810
4 Tibwe Ship Captain Oceanic Shipping Service M 75125050 oceanicshipping@gmail.com
Iaribwebwe
5 Barate Teuriaria Marine Surveyor MICTTD- Marine Division M 7301962 marine.surveyor2@mcttd.gov.ki
6 Tamaroa Tawaia Engineering Central Pacific Producers M 73015883 teikaueat@gmail.com
Supervisor Limited (CPPL)
7 Ekueta Iereima Manager Naverevere Fishermen M 73034282
Association
8 Aukitino Port Control and Kiribati Ports Authority (KPA) M 73018834 aukitinotauro@gmail.com
Tokintekai Stevedoring
Superintendent
9 Tiaeki Kiaroro Acting Maritime Marine Training Centre (MTC) M 75126086 lod.admin@mtc-tarawa.edu
Administration Officer
10 Toromon Katua Ship Captain Kiribati Seas Company Limited M 73019094 kiriseaco@gmail.com
(KSC)
11 Rimon Tororo Operations Manager Kiribati National Shipping M 73049352 trtoror@gmail.com
Limited
12 Kireata Ruteru Operations Manager Mauri Marine Shipping M 73013456 kireata.r6255@gmail.com
13 Abiete Tebuatei Senior Marine Radio MICTTD- Marine Division M senior.radio@micttd.gov.ki
Officer
14 Timau Kaikai General Manager Te Matau Shipping M 73008317 guadalupetimau@gmail.com
15 Tio Tamuera Operations Manager Butaritari Shipping M 73075139 tamueratio@gmail.com
16 Taonikua Assistant Operations Lu’s Marine Shipping Services M 73017849 stoverwindy@gmail.com
Marewenteang Manager
17 Tom Redfern Commanding Officer - Police Maritime Unit M 73045373 co-pmu@police.gov.ki
Patrol Boat
18 Teraakau Tii Agent Lykeit Shipping F lykeittrading@gmail.com
19 Ueneta Toorua Director Kiribati Meteorological Service M cmo@met.gov.fj
20 David Yeeting Manager DNY Shipping Services M 73028784
21 Riennang Ioane MSI & SAR Coordinator MICTTD- Marine Division M 73097992 riennang.ioane@mcttd.gov.ki
22 Joyce Maria- Senior Mineral Ministry of Fisheries and F 73012167 joyceeu@mfmrd.gov.ki
Uan Compliance Officer Marine Resource Development
(MFMRD) - Fisheries Division
23 George Taoaba Environment (MELAD) - Environment & M 73054845 georget@environment.gov.ki
Inspector Conservation Division
24 Bonnari Baikir Operations Manager Coral Sea Shipping Services M 73071859 buotanrouta@gmail.com
25 Tiroa Antonio Operations Manager Kiribati Oil Company Limited M 73041955 tiiroa@koil.net.ki
(KOIL)
26 Tioti Bateriki AtoN Supervisor MICTTD- Marine Division M 73004894 aton.supervisor@mcttd.gov.ki
27 Eritaia Tauro AtoN Officer MICTTD- Marine Division M
28 Bwebweteiti AtoN Hand MICTTD- Marine Division M 73017074 btseeroh05@gmail.com
Tongaiaba
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiAnnex B. Hazards identified for Betio Port
Hazard Remarks
Safe minimum depth (m) Out of 4 groups of stakeholders, 2 mentioned that SMD was a
hazard (both at the old jetty and the new jetty)
Proximity of danger (NM) Beacon No. 3, 0.01 NM, narrow passage, 8 m contours
Tide, wind, wave and tidal flow effect Strong easterly wind combined with the tidal flow can have an
Natural
effect on vessels entering/leaving the port
Low sun issues Entering the channel, the sun reflects on the water. Sunset
light can cause visibility issues too when leaving the channel
Background lighting The background lights from KFL can cause issues
Insufficient AtoN funding issues Light dues are collected from all ships but they go to the
Economic
government account and are not used for AtoN funding
Shipborne navaid failure Common issues with private and domestic vessels
Quality and validity of charted Charts not updated
information
Technical Loss of vessel control Loss of vessel control (e.g. steering)
AtoN failures Lack of maintenance, vandalism, allisions and not enough
AtoN
Substandard ships Substandard ships
Crew competency International vessels are not checked
Fatigue International vessels are not checked
Safety culture Not following standards/rules
Influence of alcohol and/or drugs Common issues with crew/alcohol problems have caused
groundings previously
Human
Availability and competency of 4 pilots are available in Tarawa
pilotage
Political issues? Control of vessel maintenance by government
Culture or language issues Foreign nationals visiting the ports have issues with
communications (Chinese crew)
Impact of small vessels Not compliant to port control procedures with vessel
movement
Fishing activities Can cause collisions
Operational
Poor passage planning Vessels not complying to SOPs
Poor promulgation of MSI Charts need to be updated
Poor response to marking new danger Poor communication with shipping agencies
The existence of wrecks and new Wrecks and missing lights
Maritime space dangers
Crowded waterway issues Limited anchorage for international vessels
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, KiribatiAnnex C. Possible scenarios identified for Betio Port
Scenarios Remarks
Grounding on rock Fishing vessels running aground near the fairway buoy; other vessels
running aground due to unknown depths and shallow water/narrow
passage on charts; grounding on rocks due to no transit light at Bikeman
Island; grounding due to sunset affecting visibility
Grounding Grounding on wreck Vessels dragging anchor at anchorage grounds on wreck
Grounding on soft bottom Local vessels accessing the old KPA wharf ground on soft bottom, due to
siltation
Others Groundings due to navaid failures on board
Aids to navigation Vessels alliding with AtoN, also while vessels are towed due to lack of
manoeuvrability
Allision Wharf Ships at anchor drift at high winds and collide with wharf; background
lighting from the KFL building can cause allision with wharf during
berthing
Sinking Local vessels anchored at Betio Port waiting for repairs/maintenance sink
Foundering
(e.g. MV Mataraoi)
Structural failure of vessel Local domestic vessels of wooden structure are prone to failure
Structural failure Structural failure of Ships can ground on port approaches due to substandard navaid
external features equipment
Engine fire Has occurred to one of the pilot boats and a local government-owned
Other
fishing vessel
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati24
Annex D. Risk assessment matrix for Betio Port
Further risk control options New New New risk Cost of risk Remarks
Consequences (short and long Existing risk control Probability Consequence Cost of incident
Scenario Description of incident Root cause (hazard) Risk score probability consequence score control
term) measures score score (AUD)
score score option (AUD)
1. GROUNDING
1.1 Grounding on rock Grounding at the Fairway buoy Shallow water and narrow Damage to ship's underwater hull Vessels are not permitted 3 2 6 4 million Install a port-hand buoy on 8 1 2 2 40,000.00 ALARP
passage and engine cooling system to enter passage during m shoal at the entrance of
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
night time the channel
1.2 Grounding on sand Domestic vessels accessing the Too shallow inside and at the Engine sucks dirt and this causes Vessels access wharf during 5 3 15 1.9 million Dredge old KPA wharf and 1 3 3 150,000.00 ALARP
old KPA wharf ground on entrance of the channel of old problems to engine cooling high tide channel to allow ships to
sand/mud KPA wharf system access wharf at all times
1.3 Grounding on rocks Vessels grounding between the Unlit transit light at Bikeman Damage to underwater hull due to Vessels do not access port 2 5 10 36 million Install new leading light at 1 5 5 20,000.00 ALARP
Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati
and sand entrance and Bikeman point island hard bottom at night Bikeman Island
1.4 Grounding on wreck Domestic vessels dragging Unmarked wreck and shallow Damage to hull None 3 2 6 500,000.00 Place wreck-marking buoy 1 2 2 40,000.00 ALARP
anchor during strong north- water of 3.9 m and 3 m on existing wreck
easterly wind and grounding on
wreck
2. ALLISION
2.1 Allision with aids to Vessels alliding with AtoN and Lack of shipmanship; technical Damage to AtoN structure and None 2 3 6 550,000.00 Enlarge or extend anchorage 1 3 3 200,000.00 ALARP
navigation also while vessels are towed issues (engine failure); vessel at also to the ships area away from the channel
anchor dragging
2.2 Allision with Vessels at anchor drift or drag Strong wind and high swell; Damage to the ship and Vessels choose to access 3 2 6 1 million Install fenders on the 1 2 2 100,000.00 ALARP
wharf/jetty during strong winds allide with background light from KFL wharf/jetty the wharf during calm domestic wharf; KFL to
wharf/jetty. Vessels coming building water reduce background lighting
alongside allide with the wharf
/jettyAnnex E. MICTTD AtoN programme 5-year budget plan (2020–2024)
Kiribati Marine Division (MICTTD) - AtoN programme 5-year budget plan 2020–2024
Kiribati Marine Division - AtoN Programme 5-year Budget Plan 2020-2024
$250,000 140,000
120,000
$200,000
100,000
Expenditure (AUD)
Light dues (AUD)
$150,000 80,000
Capital Recurring
$100,000 60,000
Light due collection expenditure expenditure Total (AUD)
(forecasted) (AUD) (AUD) 40,000
2020 $31,530 $134,850 $75,637 $210,487 $50,000
20,000
2021 $32,800 $157,325 $77,884 $235,209
2022 $37,832 $27,325 $64,884 $92,209 $0 0
2023 $39,362 $107,325 $72,884 $180,209 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
2024 $40,954 $7,325 $62,884 $70,209
Recurring expenditure (AUD) Capital expenditure (AUD) Light due coll ection (forecasted)
$182,477.38 $434,150 $354,175 $788,325
* Light dues forecasted amount is taken from 2018 Kiribati National Budget Book
* Costings of risk control options covered under Tarawa Safety of Navigation Risk Assessment have been factored in:
-In 2020, procurement and installation of a port-hand buoy, wreck mark and leading light to mitigate the risk of groundings
- In 2021, dredging of old KPA wharf to mitigate groundings
- In 2022, extending of anchorage area to mitigate allisions
- In 2023, procurement and installation of fenders for wharf to mitigate allisions
* Maintenance costs for new procured equipment have been factored into the maintenance costs under recurring expenditure
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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Risk assessment for Betio Port, Tarawa, Kiribati2020
Estimated Estimated
Notes
cost (AUD) cost (AUD)
Capital expenditure
Procurement
Procure: replacement buoy 30,000 Marine Division plans to procure a navigational buoy as replacement
Procure: port-hand buoy 30,000 As part of Tarawa SoN risk assessment, installation of port-hand buoy to mitigate risk of
grounding
Procure: wreck mark 30,000 As part of Tarawa SoN risk assessment, installation of wreck mark to mitigate risk of
grounding
Procure: marine lanterns 7,000 10 lanterns to be bought to replace current installations and keep as spares
Procure: leading light 20,000 As part of Tarawa SoN risk assessment, installation of leading light at Bikeman island to
mitigate risk of grounding
Freight 10,650 Estimated cost of freight and customs clearance cost of new AtoN equipment - freight
from Australia only. Free on arrival in Kiribati (approx. $765 per lantern, $1,000 per buoy/
mark)
Bench drill 3,500 Currently, the AtoN team of the Marine Division lacks a proper workshop to work on
AtoNs. This purchase will help in the installations of AtoNs
Motorbike 3,700 Purchase of a new motorbike to assist the Division in monitoring of AtoNs along the
Taraqa coast
Total capital expenditure 134,850
Recurring expenditure
Labour costs
Allowances 1396.00 Inclusive of welding, painting and diving allowances in island visits to Tarawa, Tabiteuea,
Nonouti, Abemama, Aranuka, Kuria, Maiana and Marakei
Overtime 13,000 Estimated overtime costs based on yearly expected sum
Temporary assistance - replacement 2,500 Costs for temporarily fill in when staff are on leave. Based on yearly expected sum
personal
Labourers 1,418 Hire of labourers during maintenance visits to atolls
Maintenance materials
Paint etc. 2128.6 Following painting needs in Tarawa, Nonouti, Abemama, Kuria and Maiana:
- Paint primer 4 ltrs
- Paint green 4 ltrs
- Paint red 4 ltrs
Galvanised pipe, PVC pipes and rivets 6,942 Purchase of galvanised pipes, sheets, rivets and PVC pipes during maintenance trips in
Nonouti, Abemama, Kuria, Maiana and Marakei
Cement 550 Purchase of 40 kg cement packs for maintenance of AtoNs in Arorae, Tamana, Nonouti,
Abemama, Aranuka, Maiana and Marakei
Service and repairs
Old AtoN motorbike 500
Service of current motorbike
Proposed new AtoN motorbike 1,000
Service of proposed AtoN motorbike
Electronic tools repairs 500
Repairs to electronic tools
Office supplies
New computer set 1,900 Proposal to purchase a new computer set in the first year to help with AtoN management
Travel and accommodation
Airfare 3,844 Return fare for two officers to conduct maintenance checks in Arorae, Tamana, TabSouth,
Nonouti, Aranuka, Abemama, Kuria and Maiana
Airport tax 360 Airport tax to be paid when visiting atolls
Fuel 41 Bike fuel on visits to Arorae, Tamana, Tabiteuea, Nonouti, Abemama, Aranuka, Kuria,
Maiana and Marakei
Boat hire 3,950 Boat hire includes the cost of boat hire when carrying out scheduled maintenance works
in Tarawa, Tabiteuea, Nonouti, Abemama, Aranuka, Kuria, Maiana and Marakei
Shipping cost of maintenance 6,700 Costs of shipping maintenance equipment to Nonouti, Abemama, Kuria, Maiana, Marakei
materials
Accommodation 6,772 Cost of accommodation during all 9 atoll visits
Other
Training 3,000 Estimated cost of training per year to send AtoN hand/supervisor to basic training, e.g.
welding or dive training
Contingency (10%) 19,135 10% of all other costs
Total recurring expenditure 75,637
Total budgeted expenses 210,487
Pacific Safety of Navigation Project:
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