OUTLOOK Research and development plan 2021-2024
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OUTLOOK
Research and development plan
2021–2024
Part 1
Research and development plan / Part 1 1
2 OUTLOOK
CONTENTS
4 Foreword
6 Primary challenges of the Armed Forces
11 Technology development
15 Our research
15 FFI’s goals, values and vision
16 FFI will elucidate the future for the Armed Forces
18 How FFI will help to improve operational capabilities
21 New equipment must be planned and used correctly
24 FFI as a technology incubator
30 Strategic partnerships
32 We will continue to develop our Total Defence capability
34 Organisation chart and management
Research and development plan / Part 1 3
FOREWORD
How FFI thinks and works
FFI is made up of 740 people working towards one goal – to use knowledge
and technology to strengthen Norway’s defence capabilities. Outlook
provides a brief outline of what we will be doing in the next four years to
reach that goal.
For many people, including many in the defence sector, life be- Here in Norway, FFI is responsible for much of the R&D work
hind the FFI fences at Kjeller and Horten is an unknown and al- and virtually all technological R&D in the defence sector. This
ien world. What do they all really do in there? gives us a very important role in the future, both in terms of Nor-
way’s efforts to strengthen international security policy collab-
In the first part of Outlook, you can read about this world from the oration, and in terms of developing the national technology and
FFI’s perspective. What challenges do we think that the defence industry base.
sector and Total Defence will face in the coming years? What are
the most important technology trends that will affect the Armed Research and development for national security
Forces’ operations, and what kind of security policy and econo- FFI aims to strengthen the Norwegian Armed Forces’ operation-
mic landscape will the Armed Forces have to operate in? al capability, cooperation with allies and Total Defence capability
through R&D work and utilisation of developments in techno-
In the final part, we will take a closer look at our research response. logy. If this is to succeed in a long-term perspective, deep insight
How will FFI help to tackle these challenges? What kind of re- and understanding are required. In the short-term, the same in-
search and development (R&D) is needed? This will show you what sight and understanding can be used to make the Armed Forces
we will be doing to achieve our seven new performance goals. that we have the best it can be at all times.
Knowledge and technology is power FFI mainly performs applied R&D. This means that we work
When we look at new knowledge or a new technology, there are closely with users to turn new knowledge and theory into real
two questions that we have to answer: 1. How can this be useful new technological solutions that the Armed Forces can apply in
for the Armed Forces or Total Defence? 2. How can we defend our- operations. This work tends to be based on extensive interna-
selves if an enemy uses the same technology? tional cooperation, mainly with NATO and close allies. Innova-
tion, trials and testing are a standard part of what we call R&D.
The international security policy landscape is dominated by In this respect, our operations are not as far away from practical
power shifts and superpower rivalries. Superpowers are increas- benefit and use than one might think.
ingly competing to be the leaders in technologies that could give
them a strategic advantage. There is a visible need to amass tech- We test and develop technology in locations where the
nological knowledge and use it as a tool for geopolitical power. Armed Forces have a presence
The biggest motivator behind this trend is the growth of China as FFI is the link between the Armed Forces, scientific teams and
a technological superpower. the companies that manufacture equipment used by the Armed
Forces. In this way, we help the Armed Forces to adopt new tech-
NATO has defined eight groundbreaking technologies (Emerging nology more quickly, and we contribute to technology develop-
and Disruptive Technologies – also known as EDTs). Develop- ment and value creation. Solutions that have been developed and
ments in these technologies are considered to be a very impor- tested by FFI go on to become products that create new jobs in
tant part of enabling NATO to maintain its technological lead. the Norwegian defence industry.
The EDTs are thereby also absolutely central to FFI’s future ope-
rations, and form the basis of the R&D plan. FFI aims to strengthen partnerships between the Armed Forces
4 OUTLOOK
FOREWORD
and industry in the years ahead, in order to help the Armed For- spond to challenges that are still developing and are becoming
ces adopt the new technology. FFI’s new innovation centre, ICE more complex. In the future, we will be a more visible adviser in
worx, will assume a key role in this work. this area, and we will play a key role in continuing to develop the
Norwegian Total Defence.
Norwegian niche products
But how can a small research institute in a small country keep We are ready for new missions
up with civil technology giants and rapid international develop- To fulfil our role as an agenda-setter for the development of the
ment? FFI cannot be a world leader in every area, but we intend Armed Forces and Total Defence, we must have independence
to be one in carefully selected fields of technology. If it is to be and freedom of research. For that reason, some of our income is
relevant to the Armed Forces, FFI has to be sensible and efficient in the form of core funding, which gives us security in terms of
in the way it prioritises resources. We will specialise in a range of long-term research and skills.
subjects. At the same time, we will concentrate on tasks that may
be difficult for other parties in Norway to tackle, where we can However, 80 per cent of FFI’s income does not come from regular
make a real difference for the Armed Forces. We will help Norway subsidies. FFI is the only subordinate agency in the sector that is
to develop technological systems that make us an attractive part- externally funded. This means that the defence sector and civil
ner for our allies, which will also give us access to their techno- actors involved in the Total Defence must pay for our services
logy and research communities. and skills. FFI relies on research planning and development by
the defence sector and Total Defence actors, and the money they
Missile development, from Terne to Penguin and now the Naval allocate for this.
Strike Missile (NSM) and Joint Strike Missile (JSM) is one exam-
ple of a Norwegian “niche product” in which FFI has played a key We are here for you. Use our knowledge.
role for several decades. NSM and JSM were purchased by the
United States and other allies because they are the best missiles
produced in the West. This helped to share the burden between
NATO members and improved the operational capability of the
alliance.
We have to take a fresh look at national security John-Mikal Størdal
As well as developing and advising on technology, our versatile Director General
specialist teams of economists, political scientists and systems
developers make us an important partner in the Armed Forces’
long-term planning work.
Our collective competence will also benefit society as a whole.
New threats and instruments affect various sectors. Every sector
of society could be the target of sabotage, crime or the use of force
or pressure. In many areas, there is no longer a clear distinction
between state security and societal security.
This also affects FFI’s role. Solutions and technology, such as
sensor technology used by the Armed Forces must be used to
From 1 July 2021 onward, John-Mikal Størdal will be Director of NATO STO’s Collaborative
improve societal security and preparedness wherever possible. Support Office. Espen Skjelland has been appointed Acting Director General of FFI from
Civil-military cooperation must be strengthened in order to re- 1 March 2021 until a new Director General is in place.
Research and development plan / Part 1 5
Soldiers from the Arctic Ranger Company from the Garrison
of Sør-Varanger on sniper and collaboration training with F-16
fighter aircraft from the Norwegian Air Force on the Halkavar-
re firing range, during the Cold Response 2020 exercise.
Photo: Simon Amdal / Armed Forces
6 OUTLOOK
PRIMARY CHALLENGES OF THE ARMED FORCES
Primary challenges
of the Armed Forces
Our researchers have prepared a “weather forecast” for the economic
and political landscape in which the Armed Forces must manoeuvre
in the future. Here are the most important strategic decisions we will
have to make and the problems we will have to tackle.
The global political, economic and social Ambitious regional superpowers
development trends that have dominated Internationally, the dominant line of con-
the security policy scene in recent years flict will be the confrontation between
are likely to continue and intensify in the China and the United States, in which the
We must get used to a world
next four to five years. American presidential election will have of increasing instability and
only a limited effect on the long-term uncertainty, in which we are
Security policy challenges competition for a hegemony, particu- always living with some kind of
The international order based on norms larly in Asia. An American shift towards confrontation or conflict.
and agreements is under pressure, and Asia, combined with the increasing am-
is largely being challenged by the super- bitions of countries like Russia and re-
powers who have regarded this order as gional superpowers in Asia, Africa and Combined with unfavourable eco-
an instrument of Western interests. What Latin America could lead to the estab- nomic and demographic trends, this
we are seeing instead is a scene involv- lishment of spheres of interest or zones is contributing to an ever-diminishing
ing more intense superpower rivalry and around the superpowers in which they European ability to influence global po-
confrontation, although the risk of armed grant each other the right to interfere. litical conditions and to safeguard the
conflict is considered to be small. For a small state like Norway which is close core interests of the European countries.
to Russia, this is a worst-case scenario in
However, this is helping to amplify a which we must be prepared to come under This trend is creating increasing chal-
trend in which the nature of conflicts will significant political and military pressure lenges for Norway as a small country that
change, with the use of power moving from without being able to count on immedi- relies on alliances. This increases our rel-
conventional military force to irregular ate support from our allies. In extreme ative dependence on the USA at a time
measures such as influence operations, circumstances, we must be prepared for when doubt has grown about the USA’s
cyber-operations, economic and social and plan for heavy military operations. ability to stand by its alliance commit-
destabilisation, etc. This means that it will ments, but when the Americans continue
become increasingly difficult to differen- A natural response to this would be to have national strategic interests in our
tiate between peace and war, between stronger European defence and security local area. At the same time, technological
societal security and state security. We cooperation. Stronger European defence and economic developments are making
must get used to a world of increasing in- cooperation would also help to strengthen it more and more difficult to maintain
stability and uncertainty, in which we are NATO, both militarily and politically. De- complete and balanced military forces.
always living with some kind of confronta- spite the establishment of the European These developments therefore bring a
tion or conflict, but in which the intensity Defence Fund (EDF) and talks about a Eu- need to make a range of difficult defence
can vary in line with political fluctuations. ropean defence union and European stra- policy assessments and decisions.
This tendency has been reinforced by the tegic autonomy, the European countries
Covid-19 pandemic, which so far seems to still do not seem to have come to sufficient • How can we develop comprehensive
have revealed social vulnerabilities that agreement on the challenges to bet- national strategies to detect a more
could be exploited for such purposes. ter coordinate their work on defence. unclear and complex set of threats?
Research and development plan / Part 1 7
PRIMARY CHALLENGES OF THE ARMED FORCES
• How can we achieve better multina- the long-term plan, later macro-economic that are a result of a worsening in the se-
tional defence cooperation to reduce uncertainties show that the GDP target is curity policy situation in recent years.
unit costs and ensure an optimum de- vulnerable to fluctuations: The Covid-19
fence capability per krone invested? pandemic has triggered a major recession There have been investments in new
in Norway, with the result that we have equipment. The investment percentage
• To what degree should we prioritise already reached the GDP target for 2020. in the defence budget is at a historic high.
focussing on reinforcing alliances Despite this, we cannot say that Norway’s More “invisible” capacities such as spare
at the expense of traditional national defence capability is any different to what parts, emergency stocks, maintenance
defence capabilities, when these will it would have been at 1.6 per cent of GDP, and communication systems have re-
already be inadequate if the reinforce- which is what we thought it would be at ceived less attention. These have had a di-
ment work is unsuccessful? the start of the year. However, the long- rect and negative effect on preparedness
term plan sets out a schedule for real eco- and endurance.
• What consequences should develop- nomic increases, regardless of the size of
ments in technology have on opera- GDP. It is important to follow this plan if However, since the last long-term plan,
tional concepts and the Armed Forces’ we are to ensure that there is a balance be- the government has increased invest-
administrative processes and systems? tween duties, structure and economy. ment in these supporting capacities, with
the result that the Armed Forces has im-
• Can and should we develop integrated However, there are numerous economic proved preparedness and endurance in
civil-military operational concepts factors that could rock this balance. One of recent years. However, such things take a
in which a broad range of conventional these is fluctuations in exchange rates. A long time, and the status in this area can-
and new measures are seen in the con- major component of a steadily increasing not be expected to be satisfactory much
text of counteracting the new threats? investment budget is exposure to foreign before the end of the decade.
currency risk, and this helps to create un-
Economic framework conditions certainty about the economic framework. A further challenge is that many of the
With the previous long-term plan (Prop. Is the framework sufficient to ensure that Armed Forces’ main systems are being
151 S (2016–2017)), there was a consider- the planned volume of turnover can con- replaced, which will weaken operational
able increase in investment in the Armed tinue, or is it too broad? If it is, there is a performance and availability for several
Forces. Analyses show that previous long- risk that the plan will have to be modified, years to come. It is therefore important to
term plans were underfunded, and that and that the modifications will be made maintain the high pressure needed to rec-
economic investment was needed if the where they can, and not necessarily where tify those things that are preventing the
economic gap was to be closed. one would have chosen if the costs had current Armed Forces from functioning
been more predictable. optimally, while at the same time manag-
Since then, the security policy landscape ing to look further ahead and planning for
has worsened. Further investment is The overall balance the Armed Forces that we want to achieve
needed if the Armed Forces are to be able The current long-term plan for the defence when all these new systems are in place.
to attend to the same duties. The current sector points out that the main challenges
long-term plan (Prop. 14 S (2020–2021)) are the inadequate preparedness, pres- The Armed Forces will always be in a state
assumes that there will be a considerable ence and endurance of the Armed Forces. of renewal. We must be capable of devel-
increase in the defence budgets in order to This reflects an imbalance between the oping the Armed Forces while keeping
make this possible. Armed Forces’ duties, structure and fi- them operational.
nances that developed since the end of the
Although NATO’s two per cent target has Cold War and that have continued to the Particular challenges
been the guide for the financial scale-up in present day, despite mitigation measures Bringing the Armed Forces’ operational
8 OUTLOOK
PRIMARY CHALLENGES OF THE ARMED FORCES
The Armed Forces will always be in a state of renewal.
We must be capable of developing the Armed Forces
while keeping them operational.
capabilities to a satisfactory level involves
some challenges that stand out as particu-
larly critical:
• Long-range, highly accurate mis-
siles are an increasing threat to the
most strategic capacities of Nor-
way and its Armed Forces. We must
improve our ability to resist these,
through both passive and active meas-
ures, such as protection, dispersal, mo-
bility and strengthening the Air Force.
• The digital and electromagnetic op-
erational environments are becom-
ing increasingly important domains of
warfare. Every day, we are vulnerable
to intelligence, criminal sabotage and
extortion (ransomware) in cyberspace.
But in a conflict, we must be able to ex-
pect cyberattacks against civil and mil-
itary installations. The Armed Forces
must improve its ability to resist at-
tacks and operate in conditions where
for example its own means of commu-
nication and data network have been
degraded through such attacks.
• In a situation in which new technolo-
gy increases the pace of operations
and gives an adversary weapons that
are effective at a long-range, there is a
greater need for oversight and situa-
tional awareness. The Armed Forces’
surveillance and intelligence capabili-
ties are therefore key capabilities, and
must be strengthened in the future.
Gray zones and the Total Defence
Concern is steadily increasing about what
are known as hybrid/composite threats
Air Force Artillery crew erecting antennae for NASAMS III (Norwegian Advanced Surface to
Air Missile System) during the Falcon Response 2020 exercise on the Air Force Rygge base. or grey zone challenges. Methods of influ-
Photo: Ingeborg Gloppen Johnsen / Armed Forces ence such as cyber operations and influ-
Research and development plan / Part 1 9
PRIMARY CHALLENGES OF THE ARMED FORCES
ence operations on social media are diffi-
cult to detect. It can be difficult to identify
which actors are behind them, and what
their intentions are. Such attacks can put
civil functions out of action, undermine
confidence in society and influence not
only political decision-making processes
but also a population’s attitudes and be-
haviour in peacetime.
To build up the ability to withstand such
threats, the Armed Forces and civil sector
must both become better at understand-
ing, detecting, analysing and managing
a broad set of measures in the cyber and
information domains, while safeguarding
privacy and freedom of speech.
Problems like these illustrate the recipro- Norwegian Cyber Defence Force’s operation centre at Jørstadmoen. Photo: Anette Ask / Armed Forces
cal interdependence between the Armed
Forces and civil society. The Armed For-
ces support the civil authorities in sev- ume, while the Armed Forces’ manpower ahead. While the outside world has high
eral areas, such as fisheries monitoring, concepts will be developed to build ro- expectations of the savings that can be
counterterrorism and search and rescue. bustness and endurance into the force achieved through efficiency measures,
But the Armed Forces are no less depend- structure. there is a major need within the Armed
ent on civil capacities throughout the Forces to modernise and professionalise a
spectrum of peace, crisis and war. Con- The Armed Forces’ ability to recruit and number of key operational areas. Modern-
sequently, this means that it can be just retain personnel must also be improved. ising the sector’s ICT systems and servic-
as effective for an attacker to strike civil Several important changes have been es is a critical component of success here,
targets as military targets. Fuel supply, implemented in recent years in the are- similar to the importance of improving
transport axes, telecommunication and as of personnel and competence that are the sector’s skills in administration and
other strategic capacities are vulnerable expected have a positive effect, includ- modernisation.
to long-range missiles, sabotage and cyber ing the military rank structure (OMT),
operations, to name but a few. Many steps education reform and the introduction FFI has previously found that the defence
have been taken to strengthen the Total of gender-neutral military service and sector has major problems in successful-
Defence in recent years, but there is still further developments in initial military ly implementing complex restructuring
a need to continue improving situational service. New technology and the intro- processes. This applies particularly to
awareness, reduce vulnerabilities and in- duction of new equipment will change the cases in which ICT is a central element
tensify civil-military cooperation. way problems are tackled and affect the and in which improving efficiency is an
Armed Forces’ need for skills. The Armed objective. The Armed Forces therefore
Personnel and competence Forces’ ability to change and adapt at the need not only to implement the planned
One of several key prerequisites need- same rate as developments in technology modernisation competently, but also to
ed by the defence sector if it is to meet will be pivotal to the success of this shift continue to identify new areas and oppor-
higher operative requirements and faster in competence. tunities for modernisation.
response times, is sufficient access to per-
sonnel with the relevant expertise. In the Modernisation
next long-term period, there is expected The Armed Forces need to adapt their
to be a gradual increase in personnel vol- support activities quickly in the years
10 OUTLOOKTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Technology development
The Armed Forces must use new technology effectively
if they are to survive in the battlegrounds of the future.
Throughout history, technology has emerged that has fundamen- the future is how the Armed Forces can make faster use of new
tally changed the rules of the game and the relative strengths on technology where it is relevant.
the battlefield. Planes, nuclear weapons, missile technology and
precision-guided weapons – all these innovations changed the Trends
terms of armed conflict and created completely new operational The NATO report “Science & technology trends 2020-2040”
concepts. highlights eight groundbreaking technologies, also known as
EDTs (Emerging and Disruptive Technologies). An investment
The question we must never stop asking ourselves is: in these technologies within the NATO alliance is considered to
which new technologies could have a pivotal effect on the be absolutely essential to maintaining the technological lead.
Armed Forces’ operations in the future? And this is not The eight areas are data, artificial intelligence, autonomy, space
just a question of which technologies we could make use of, technology, hypersonic technology, quantum technology, bio-
but what we may need to defend ourselves against. When technology and material technology. The disruptive effect is ex-
will these technologies be mature enough to be used? pected to come from different combinations of these eight. (See
And how can we best prepare ourselves for such developments? page 13.)
Relative strengths are changing The EDTs are absolutely key to FFI’s future activities. We must
The international technological balance of power also af- show how the Armed Forces’ operations are affected by the tech-
fects the Armed Forces. We are seeing two main trends nology trends so that we can take this into account when the
here: The technological military lead of the USA and West Armed Forces are planning for the future and procuring equip-
is shrinking, and civil technology development is becoming ment.
increasingly important. The USA is still the biggest in terms
of defence-related research and development. But the tech- Enormous operational opportunities
nological gap between the USA and countries like China Technological trends can never be regarded in isolation. A key
and Russia may be said to have narrowed in the last few dec- term is convergence – how can technologies be used together and
ades, partly because of the enormous economic growth in reinforce one another? A classic example of convergence is the
China and an extensive defence modernisation programme smartphone, where telephone, computer and camera were amal-
in Russia. gamated and changed the way we communicate, buy goods and
understand the world.
It is now the civil sector that spends the most on technological
development, in contrast to the Cold War period. Areas such as In a military context, sensor technology combined with autono-
biotechnology, autonomy and artificial intelligence are being mous swarms, unmanned systems and artificial intelligence
driven forward by the fact that they have a great commercial could converge. The technology could potentially give us a far
potential. Naturally, many of the new technologies also have a better understanding of a situation in real time. The party that
military application. Developments affect the threat landscape has command of this and can translate it into good decisions and
because the potentially harmful technology is also available to effective measures will have an enormous advantage over an ad-
non-state actors and individuals. versary who does not.
The speed of civil developments in technology also challenges Efficiency improvement
the lengthy military procurement processes. A key question for Technology can also lead to improvements in efficiency in the
Research and development plan / Part 1 11TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Technology is an important driver of develop-
ment in the Armed Forces and the rest of the
defence sector. Operations must be adapted
to the groundbreaking technologies that are
available, rather than the other way around.
Armed Forces. For example, an experiment is currently under- tion. Alternative concepts and new technologies must be consid-
way in which FFI and a civil technology firm are collaborating to ered more systematically and effectively during the initial stages
make logistics convoys partially unmanned. Such a concept could of equipment procurement projects.
have operational and financial benefits, and would put fewer lives
in danger. Whether we like it or not – automation and robotisa- Success in this area requires an efficient procurement practice
tion will reduce the need for human labour in many industries in and an ability to integrate new technology through testing, exper-
the future. An important question is how the Armed Forces can imentation and creative collaboration between the Armed For-
adopt such technology to improve efficiency, logistics or adminis- ces, industry and research communities. The basis for all this lies
tration. The goal of such efficiency improvements must be to en- in FFI’s core activity – research and development to build compe-
sure that soldiers are better supported and to free up manpower tence, and analyse and develop solutions for the new technology.
for important duties.
It goes without saying that FFI does not perform this work alone.
New vulnerabilities require cooperation To understand, standardise, procure and develop new technolo-
Technological developments mean that areas we previously con- gy, we depend on cooperation with allies, industry and national
sidered to be secure have become more vulnerable. An adversary and international technology communities.
can strike us with long-range precision weapons with little or no
warning. Cyberspace has become a domain of warfare in which In 2019, FFI published the report Defence technology trends
attacks can paralyse key support functions. We must analyse and – a general analysis of the impact of technology for an efficient and
understand these vulnerabilities in order to establish what kind relevant Armed Forces. In the report summary, FFI’s recommen-
of approach the Armed Forces should take. dations were translated into four general recommendations for
the defence sector.
The new threat landscape, in which non-state actors and indi-
viduals can strike civil and military targets, requires good coope- • We should prioritise the development of modern, high-tech
ration across sectors – or in other words, a fully-functioning To- Armed Forces.
tal Defence. The distinction between the Armed Forces’ duties,
the maintenance of state sovereignty, and societal security is no • We should rectify significant technological vulnerabilities.
longer as clear.
• We should make long-term investments in the most prom-
Technology also gives government agencies a bigger arsenal with ising technology areas.
which to influence an adversary’s population and operate in the
grey zone between war, crisis and peace, while we are unable to • We should build a stronger culture of innovation in the
identify whether a state actor is behind the activity. The Armed Armed Forces.
Forces cannot respond to such a threat scenario alone.
These recommendations remain just as relevant. FFI has many
Our recommendations projects and measures that aim to assist the Armed Forces in this
The Armed Forces need a holistic approach in which technolog- direction. You will be able to read more about them from page 16
ical opportunities and vulnerabilities are assessed alongside the onward.
development of doctrines, concepts, competence and organisa-
12 OUTLOOKTECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
New groundbreaking technologies
NATO has defined eight technologies (Emerging and Disruptive Technologies – EDTs)
which the alliance must follow up closely in their future technology development work.
The groundbreaking effects are most likely to occur when these technologies are com-
bined in new ways.
1 Big data and advanced analyses tant domain for future civil and military operations, particularly
Developments in data and computing power make it possible to in navigation, communication and surveillance. Developments in
structure, visualise, interpret and utilise complex and continually small satellites and sensors are expected to have a major impact.
increasing volumes of information faster and in new ways. In the By 2030, there are expected to be five times as many satellites as
military context, big data is particularly important in intelligence, there are now. This will drastically expand access to space-related
surveillance, reconnaissance and planning. Big data analysis can services. On the sensor side, microwave photonics could give us
provide a better decision-making basis and situational awareness, satellite-based radars with a much lower weight and higher perfor-
which in turn can provide operational and strategic advantages. mance than at present.
The technology can also help to optimise logistics and develop
new materials, sensors and training methods. 6
Hypersonic technology
Hypersonic weapons systems (missiles and vessels) are defined
2
Artificial intelligence as those which are manoeuvrable and operate at speeds higher
In simple terms, this involves algorithms that give machines the than Mach 5 (approx. 6,000 km/h). Speeds like these are reached
ability to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence when re-entering the atmosphere from space, or with the aid of
– such as recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing combined propulsion by rocket and scramjet engines. This tech-
conclusions or acting. Militarily, this technology provides new nology can be used for reconnaissance and long-distance attacks,
opportunities in areas such as decision-making support, situational also with swarms, and will represent a threat to large parts of the
awareness, planning, logistics, target selection and swarm tech- current force structure. Countermeasures against hypersonic and
nology, and will become essential as a support tool for the coor- manoeuvrable missiles, vessels or swarms are extremely challeng-
dination of autonomous and manned systems. The keywords are ing. At the moment, Russia and China seem to have got further
increased speed and precision in decision-making processes. than NATO and the USA in their developments in this area.
3 Autonomy 7 Biotechnology and human enhancement
Autonomy describes a system’s ability to interpret and react to This covers a broad research field in which biology, genetic tech-
its surroundings and make its own decisions in order to solve a nology, new materials, medicine and technological aids are used
problem. NATO is expecting autonomy to increase flexibility, en- and combined to strengthen or improve human properties. This
durance and effectiveness in military operations, not least through can be in the form of smart, biological or living sensors that moni-
the use of autonomous swarms. This technology is providing new tor our state of health, prevent injuries, provide diagnoses or warn
opportunities in areas such as urban operations, cyber operations, of chemical attacks. It can also involve developing various pros-
logistics and situational awareness, but also brings challenges in thetics, garments, sensors, the human-machine interface and exo-
terms of interoperability. skeletons used as equipment by soldiers in order to enhance their
senses and improve endurance and strength. Synthetic biology
4 Quantum technologies – defined as the design and development of modified or new bio-
Technology development based on the knowledge of quantum logical systems – makes it possible to give humans and organisms
physics – which describes matter and behaviour at the atomic and qualities that they would not have naturally.
subatomic scale – is another technology that is gaining momen-
8 Material technology (new materials and manufacture)
tum. Next-generation quantum technologies utilise the fundamen-
tal quantum physics phenomena of entanglement and superposi- This involves artificial materials with unique properties, for exam-
tion to make greater progress, mainly in complex calculations and ple those produced using nanotechnology or synthetic biology.
computing power, navigation and precision timing and position- We are expecting new materials to make military equipment and
ing, sensor and imaging technology, secure communication, ener- clothing lighter, stronger and more energy-efficient. There are par-
gy storage and material technology. In the military context, quan- ticularly high expectations of graphene and other 2D materials. For
tum technology could potentially give us secure navigation and example, we are expecting new materials to give us faster com-
positioning without GPS and satellite navigation, even under water. munication, more efficient energy storage, more sensitive sensors,
new signature-reducing materials and better heat protection at hy-
5 Space technology personic speeds. Additive manufacturing, also known as 3D print-
This includes all use of technology in space, which is defined as ing, enables the fast production, repair and use of new materials in
more than 100 km above sea level. This is an extremely impor- military contexts.
Research and development plan / Part 1 13Researcher Tønnes Frostad Nygaard
test-drives a four-legged robot from
Boston Dynamics.
Photo: Espen Hofoss / FFI
FFI’s goals
2021–2024
IMPACT
GOALS
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ operational capability, cooperation with allies and the Total Defence
capability are strengthened through R&D and utilisation of the technological development
1 2 3 4
Advice regarding the Operational capability is R&D-based knowledge is used Technological opportunities
formulation of defence policy improved through R&D-based in planning and implementation are utilised faster
is strengthened knowledge for operational of materiel investments
PRODUCTION
activities, education, training,
exercises and evaluation
GOALS
5 6 7
Knowledge production is strengthened The Total Defence and civil-military The national industry and technology
through strategic R&D cooperation with cooperation are strengthened base is strengthened through R&D
allies and selected actors through R&D and utilisation of the
technological developments
ACTIVITY
GOALS
Strengthened
Strengthened interaction Sound administration
corporate governance
Strengthened
GOALS
Appropriate competence
INPUT
Effective use of ICT leadership development
and adapted capacity
and employeeship
VALUES VISION
Creative, enterprising, FFI turns knowledge and ideas
broad-minded and responsible into an effective defence
Research and development plan / Part 1 15OUR RESEARCH
FFI will elucidate the future for
the Armed Forces
Our task is to see things in context, so that our defence
policy and strategic choices of direction form good
responses to the challenges faced by the Armed Forces.
The Ministry of Defence and Chief of De- • Finances: What will the total costs of
fence have both signalled that they would the Armed Forces be in the long term?
FFI’s production goal 1: like more support from FFI for long-term What opportunities are there to make
planning in the future. the Armed Forces and defence sector
more effective?
Advice regarding the An all-round institute
formulation of defence policy To provide advice on such a complex • Environmental analysis: Which
is strengthened
subject, FFI needs solid professional trends in high-level politics, techno-
knowledge in a range of disciplines, in- logy, economy, population and cli-
depth specialist knowledge of the Armed mate could be significant to the Ar-
Forces and its duties, and not least a solid med Forces? Which non-state actors
understanding of technology and joint could have an impact on Norwegian
operations. security?
FFI acts as a key advisor in the prepa- The key to providing good advice lies in • Total defence: How can the Armed
rations for a new long-term plan for the utilising the knowledge of the institute Forces and other civilian and public ci-
defence sector every four years. Here we across research projects. vil functions work together to streng-
provide comprehensive, research-based then Norway’s defence capability?
recommendations on arrangements for FFI’s overall input to the long-term
the Armed Forces over the next four years planning work is achieved by gathering We are now taking steps to further syste-
and in the longer-term perspective. FFI knowledge from many different R&D pro- matise how all this knowledge is collated
also makes a significant contribution to jects and specialist fields. These include: and to strengthen the work on long-term
the Chief of Defence’s Military Council planning.
(FMR). • Equipment procurement: What
kind of equipment is needed in order New project will draw all the threads
FFI’s Director General has meetings with to have effective and relevant armed together
the Ministry of Defence’s political leaders forces? In January 2021, we started a new pro-
twice every year. In 2020, we also establis- ject called “Strategic defence analyses”.
hed the “Military Technology Arena”, at • Combat structures: How techno- This project will look at the Armed Forces
which FFI and senior management of the logy and available equipment can be as a whole, across the various agencies. In
Armed Forces meet twice a year. Plenty of used to achieve the desired effect in a it, we will coordinate and collate the work
time is set aside here to discuss relevant joint operational concept. Can we use put in by FFI to the strategic development
topics at a confidential level. The mee- scenarios to concretise the Armed For- of the Armed Forces. The project will in-
tings discuss technological trends that are ces’ duties and analyse which operati- volve dialogue with the Ministry, Chief
significant to the Armed Forces, and the ons, concepts and strengths are needed of Defence Staff, Norwegian Intelligence
opportunities, limitations and risks of the to carry out these duties? Service, Norwegian Joint Headquarters
technology. and branches of the military.
16 OUTLOOKOUR RESEARCH
Chief of Defence Eirik Kristoffersen and Director General John-Mikal Størdal. Photo: Espen Wang-Naveen / FFI
Its main delivery will be an annual, con- velop and assess different operational
fidential report that analyses the balance concepts and contribute to technological,
between the Armed Forces’ duties, stru- conceptual and organisational innovation THE GREEN TRANSITION
cture and finances, and examines selected in the defence sector.
technology fields in depth.
Verbal advice Climate change is one of the big-
To enable the Ministry of Defence and Obviously, reports are not always the best gest challenges facing society, and it
Storting to make informed decisions, the way of delivering knowledge. Just as im- could begin to have a greater impact
project will illustrate the consequences portant as the formal deliveries and re- on security and defence policy. FFI
of setting different levels of ambition for ports is the running dialogue and the for- will help the research sector achieve
defence policy. We will show which risks mal and informal contact between FFI’s the UN’s sustainability targets and
Norway runs by putting different duti- researchers and the specialists in the de- the government’s climate targets
es and capabilities higher or lower on fence sector. alongside the green transition in the
the list of priorities. We will also make a wider community.
cost-benefit analysis of different choices Looking ahead, our goal is to find more
with regard to strengthening, procuring arenas in which to share our knowledge This involves looking at instruments
or phasing out major equipment and de- and reinforce our role as adviser. and environmentally effective mea-
partments. sures that are both financially viable
and strengthen the operational capa-
The project will prepare base scenarios bilities of the Armed Forces.
that describe possible future security
challenges for Norway. We will also de-
Research and development plan / Part 1 17OUR RESEARCH
How FFI will help to
improve operational capabilities
Knowledge is of little value to the Armed Forces
if it does not provide an advantage where it
really matters.
In the next long-term period, the Chief of ment, technology and changes in our al-
Defence would like to prioritise prepar- liances.
FFI’s production goal 2: edness and collaboration in the Armed
Forces. Norwegian forces will improve In the coming period, we are proposing
the speed at which they are ready for ac- new projects that will look at command,
Operational capability is tion and will be better prepared for crisis control and technology in joint opera-
improved through R&D-based and war. Joint operational cooperation tions. The projects will help to develop
knowledge for operational
will also be improved – both between operational analysis and joint operational
activities, education, training,
branches of service, with allies and with processes at the Norwegian Joint Head-
exercises and evaluation
the actors involved in the Total Defence quarters (NJHQ) and Norwegian Defence
concept. Staff.
An all-round institute Electronic warfare is a focus area for the
FFI carries out research and development Armed Forces. FFI has experts who can
work and provides advice at all levels of provide advice on how such measures can
the Armed Forces – everything from test- used in joint operations, and we can help
ing Primus stoves to providing general ad- to ensure that the scope of technological
vice about the long-term structure of the opportunities is utilised to maximum ef-
Armed Forces. We look at everything from fect.
microbiological threats to space techno-
logy. At the end of the day, everything we The work being performed on the Total
do should result in improved operational Defence 2040 project, in which FFI will
endurance and capability. But FFI also look at how the civil and military spheres
performs research activities specifically can cooperate in a total defence concept,
aimed at operations, education, exercises will help to improve the country’s resist-
and evaluation. ance and endurance during a crisis.
Planning operations Personnel and competence
Long-term defence planning generates In recent years, the Armed Forces have
debate and receives media attention. made major changes to their personnel
However, the Armed Forces also relies policy. These changes include an edu-
on planning at the operational level. If cation reform, gender-neutral military
different branches of the service are to service and the new rank structure for
collaborate, appropriate operational pro- military employees, in which the Armed
cesses and procedures are essential. Joint Forces have adopted a rank structure in
Norwegian operations must be developed line with that of NATO’s, with an officer
at the same pace as threats, new equip- corps (OF) and specialist corps (OR). FFI
18 OUTLOOKSoldiers from the Telemark Battalion planning an attack operation on Setermoen firing range in the multinational Cold Response 2020 winter exercise
in Troms. Photo: Ole-Sverre Haugli / Armed Forces
will now study how these reforms have source-intensive. Simulators connected craft, NH90 helicopter and new 212 CD
progressed and how they will affect the through a network can be a cost-effective submarines, to name but a few.
Armed Forces in the future. We also look alternative during exercises, training and
into how the Armed Forces can make bet- instruction. We are therefore proposing With respect to the F-35, FFI will help to
ter use of civilian expertise. several projects with simulator-based ensure that software, planning systems,
training and exercises that are available simulators, weapons and countermeas-
Exercises in the cloud. For example, we will further ures are tested and evaluated with the aim
In the future, the Armed Forces and Nor- develop the project with simulator-based of giving the aircraft full operational ca-
wegian Joint Headquarters will have bet- war games in order to analyse plans. pacity in 2025.
ter and more systematic access to FFI’s
knowledge in connection with major exer- Evaluation There will also be evaluations in terms of
cises. For example, FFI will be given a role A major element of procuring new equip- innovation and finding new applications
when the allied winter Cold Response Ex- ment involves evaluating how the equip- for technology. For example, in the com-
ercise is planned, implemented and evalu- ment works, and how it could be improved ing period we will evaluate satellite-based
ated in 2022 and 2024. This will also give or made better use of in operations. FFI communication services in order to see
FFI better access to the Armed Forces’ ex- will continue its support for the devel- how these systems can be used innova-
pertise, which is fundamental to our work. opment of domains of warfare and main tively in mobile communication in the
combat systems in the Armed Forces. We Armed Forces.
Training in joint operations and across will also help to operationalise the F-35
departments is time-consuming and re- fighter aircraft, maritime P-8 patrol air-
Research and development plan / Part 1 19Norwegian F-35A fighter aircraft at Keflavik Airport as part of the
Norwegian Air Force’s role during NATO’s Iceland Air Policing operation.
Photo: Torbjørn Kjosvold / Norwegian Armed Forces
20 OUTLOOKOUR RESEARCH
New equipment must be
planned and used correctly
One third of the defence budget will now be spent on investments.
Thorough specialist preliminary work must be performed, to allow us
to find the most effective way of using the equipment and avoid
investing in the wrong technology.
be more modular – i.e. systems made up procurement projects. The aim is to better
of independent modules based on which link in FFI’s collective expertise, and at an
FFI’s production goal 3: tasks are to be performed. earlier stage of procurement projects than
at present. We will start a special project
Mistakes must be discovered early focusing on this in 2021. This will involve
R&D-based knowledge is used FFI has a long history of supporting eve- training specialist researchers in plan-
in planning and implementa- ry phase of equipment procurement of ning, designing complex technical sys-
tion of materiel investments items such as fighter aircraft, submarines, tems, risk management and project mana-
air defences and surveillance radar sys- gement. The function of these researchers
tems. We have a broad range of specialist will be to act as bridges between FFI’s spe-
knowledge and operational insight. This cialists and the procurement projects.
means that we can provide invaluable
support in the technical assessments and Experiential learning
cost-benefit analyses involved in procure- We must learn from previous blunders
Investing in new equipment is one of the ment. and success stories. Procuring military
most important driving forces behind the equipment is a speciality. In the USA, this
development of effective and relevant ar- In recent years, we have also managed the is taught at several of the military univer-
med forces. In an era when technology is concept phases of some major, significant sities.
developing rapidly, it is vital to invest in projects on behalf of the Ministry of De-
equipment that utilises the technological fence, including regional air defence and A great deal of knowledge and experience
opportunities, and that can be updated new tanks for the Norwegian Army. Loo- can be obtained from the defence sector’s
throughout its lifespan, allowing the equ- king ahead, one of our goals is to assist at previous procurements. However, the ro-
ipment to be modified to suit tasks and the an earlier phase of several major procure- tation of personnel in the Armed Forces
threat landscape. ment projects for the Armed Forces. means that there can be poor institutional
memory and little experiential learning.
When we evaluate new equipment, desi- For many years to come, one third of
red effect must therefore be more im- the defence budget will be spent on in- Going forward, we will more clearly iden-
portant than structural solutions. If we vestments. This makes it important to tify what has worked well and less well
use what we want to achieve as a basis, avoid investing in the wrong technology. in these processes, so that we can bene-
and provide good descriptions of the ne- Experience shows that mistakes must be fit from this learning in future procure-
eds, goals and requirements that must be picked up on as early as possible in the ments.
fulfilled in order to achieve this effect, it process. It is considerably more expensive
becomes easier to analyse alternatives. to rectify mistakes at a later stage.
The trends we are seeing include the need At FFI, our staff will now start to improve
for systems to collaborate to a greater de- their skills in planning, implementing and
gree than in the past, and for systems to delivering conceptual work for equipment
Research and development plan / Part 1 21Investment projects in the Armed Forces
Here are some of the Armed Forces’ high priority investment projects in which
FFI may or will play a role in the future.
Soldiers and launcher from the Air Defence Battalion during the Cold Developing and mechanising the Finnmark Land Defence and Northern Brigade have been prioritised by the
Response exercise. Photo: Markus Engås / Armed Forces Chief of Defence. These are soldiers from the Arctic Ranger Company from the Garrison of Sør-Varanger
on sniper and collaboration training with F-16 fighter aircraft from the Norwegian Air Force, during the Cold
Response 2020 exercise. Photo: Simon Amdal / Armed Forces
AIR LAND
F-35 Long-range land-based weapons
FFI is supporting the procurement and ope- Land-based, long-range precision weapons have been proposed for
rational phase-in of the F-35, for example with Norway for 2026. Before we select the weapons, a Choice of Concept
weapons integration and getting the JSM Study will be performed, with the assistance of FFI. Important topics
approved for the F-35. The work will help to here are how the new weapons could complement and work with
ensure that the Armed Forces achieve the de- other weapons that can take out a target from a distance, and how
sired operational effect of the F-35 and FOC the systems could give adversaries new challenges and dilemmas to
(Full Operational Capability) in 2025. Weapons handle. At the same time, the weapons must be adapted to develop-
are important for operational capability. FFI is ments in surveillance and situational awareness.
helping to develop the JSM missile and cannon
ammunition for the F-35. Both of these are based Intelligence drones / tactical UAVs
on FFI’s long history of developing missiles and
The Intelligence Battalion is planning to procure UAVs (Unmanned
ammunition.
Aerial Vehicles) for intelligence, surveillance, target location and
reconnaissance. FFI has strong specialist teams in the technology
Air defence
behind drone swarms and unmanned aerial systems. We have set up a
The Chief of Defence’s plan and Long-Term
project that will support the procurement. Our job will be to contribute
Plan for the defence sector (LTP) illustrate an
to technology development and testing, enabling the system to be
urgent need to strengthen the air defence. We
must look into how the range of our air defence used under Arctic conditions and to fit into the existing framework.
could be increased. In the short term, the NA- The system will be developed in partnership with industry and users.
SAMS air defence system will be upgraded.
This system is made up of several components. Tanks
New missiles and sensor packages to obtain an The Northern Brigade’s manoeuvre battalions will be getting new tanks
overview of airspace are being discussed. FFI from 2025 onward. Tanks must undergo continuous development in
is ready to support this work with the specialist order to ensure that they are relevant throughout their service life.
documentation needed to select concepts and FFI has managed the Choice of Concept Study and will now analyse
specify requirements. performance, from single tanks to battalions, evaluate upgrades, and
provide advice on additional procurements in the project in order to
ensure that good use will be made of the tanks.
22 OUTLOOKP-8A Poseidon from the US Navy taking off from Andøya in 2016. In 2023, Norway will get five of these Student from the Armed Forces’ engineering academy during the Initial
maritime surveillance planes. Photo: Bjørn Volle / Armed Forces Entry 2017 exercise. Photo: Daniel Nordby / Armed Forces
SEA CYBER DOMAIN
P-8A Poseidon Virtual combat ICT
Norway has decided to buy five P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol The strategic use of information and commu-
planes for its Air Force. The planes will be in place in 2023 and nications technology (ICT) is critical to gaining
will be strategically important in terms of maritime surveillance, situational awareness, commanding operations and
underwater warfare and developing situational awareness. FFI using modern weapons effectively. The Norwegian
will help to make these planes operational in a comprehensive Defence Materiel Agency has been commissioned
anti-submarine warfare concept. This will include to acquire ICT to use at the tactical and technical
• adapting concepts for sonar operations to relevant areas conflict levels. The program (Mime) identifies,
and needs prioritises and implements procurements and
• supporting the Air Force with systems for operational plan- other actions on the basis of the anticipated op-
ning and for collecting, analysing and disseminating infor- erational effect. FFI is providing method support
mation from the P-8 planes in a joint operational concept and performing studies and analyses for Mime, for
• analysing operational problems such as availability, man- example with the procurement of a new tactical
power and maintenance accounts. radio system. FFI is also supporting the Mime
program in planning and implementing innova-
Submarines tion activities.
Norway is getting new submarines, which are scheduled for delivery
from 2029 onward. Our researchers are analysing the performance
of the new submarines’ combat system, including the sensor,
navigation, weapons, communication and battle management
systems. We are also working on the research and development
of power supply and battery safety in order to improve operational
capabilities. We are also working on performance calculations for
the tasks that submarines could be given in modern joint operational
warfare. This work will illustrate the ways in which the submarine
The Norwegian NorSat-3 satellite will reveal the identity of vessels that
could perform the duties for which it is intended. are actively trying to stay hidden. Graphic: FFI / UTIAS / SFL / ESA / NASA
NSM SPACE
New missiles will be developed between now and 2035. FFI is
supporting the technical development of seeker head and engine,
Situational awareness and communication in our
and we are supporting missile development through analyses of
northern regions is important in terms of main-
threats and scenarios in which missiles could have a role to play. In
taining and improving our operational capability
the future, it will be important to perform system studies of missiles
and for achieving a higher level of preparedness.
in order to keep up to date with developments and identify the
Norway already has a number of microsatellites
way forward for next-generation weapons.
and low-orbit satellites that provide us with valu-
able data. FFI has played a key role in developing
Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MCM)
these. And more are on the way. NorSat-3 will be
Protecting our waters from mines is important in order to protect
launched in 2021, fitted with a navigation radar
national and allied operations, particularly when we will receive
detector. Satellites with low-light cameras (Nor-
support from our allies. FFI is working with the Norwegian De-
fence Materiel Agency and Norwegian Navy on the development Sat-4) are also planned, as well as a satellite to test
and testing of a new concept. This will involve mine searches by better tactical communication in the High North
unmanned underwater vehicles, boats and planes, while a mother (MicroTac-Sat). As well as developing technical
ship controls the operation from a safe distance. This is a pilot solutions, FFI is also contributing knowledge about
project in the use of autonomous modular systems, which could the use of data from satellites, and supporting the
eventually be used in other domains of warfare. Armed Forces with the procurement and use of
large satellite systems.
Research and development plan / Part 1 23You can also read
