Organized Religion and Contestations of the Liberal Script. The Catholic Church, Body Politics, and Anti-Gender Mobilizations - Camilla ...
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Camilla Reuterswärd
Organized Religion and Contestations of the Liberal
Script. The Catholic Church, Body Politics, and Anti-
Gender Mobilizations
SCRIPTS Working Paper No. 07
Contestations of the Liberal ScriptCLUSTER OF EXCELLENCE “CONTESTATIONS OF SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER SERIES
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International Studies (ZOiS), and the Leibniz-Zentrum Script. The Catholic Church, Body Politics, and Anti-Gender
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Facebook: @scriptsberlinTABLE OF CONTENTS Author Abstract 1 Catholic Doctrine, Liberalism, and Body Politics 5 1.1 The Catholic Church and Liberalism: Mapping the Political Theology 6 1.2 Self-Determination and Human Rights in the Aftermath of World War II 7 1.3 Catholic Doctrine and Body Politics 8 1.4 From Human Dignity to Anti-Gender Ideology 9 2 Church Influence, Contestations, and Implications 11 2.1 Channels, Tools, and Strategies 11 2.2 The Catholic Church as a Global Non-State Actor 11 2.3 The Domestic Church: Clergy-State Relations, Legitimacy, and Mobilization 13 2.4 Discussion: Catholic Church Contestations and Implications for the Liberal Script 15 3 Conclusion 16 References
SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7 AUTHOR Camilla S. Reuterswärd earned her Ph.D. in Po- litical Science from the University of Wiscon- sin-Madison in 2019. Until October 2020 she was a postdoctoral fellow in the SCRIPTS Cluster of Excellence. In January 2021 she joined the Insti- tute of Development Studies, University of Sus- sex. Camilla’s research centers on gender and pol- itics with emphasis on public policy in developing contexts. Specifically, it focuses on how party pol- itics, religious institutions, and social movements shape policy processes related to issues such as abortion and same-sex marriage in Latin Ameri- ca. Her work has appeared in Development and Change and Social Politics and is forthcoming in Latin American Politics and Society. c.reutersward@ids.ac.uk 2
SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
Organized Religion and Contestations of the Liberal
Script
The Catholic Church, Body Politics, and Anti-Gender
Mobilizations
Camilla Reuterswärd
ABSTRACT
Policies that expand reproductive health and sexual the advances of feminist and LGBTQ+ movements
minority rights have met increasing resistance around and related policy agendas (Corredor 2019: 614;
the world over the past decade. Movements opposing Garbagnoli 2016: 187). In places as different as
so-called “gender ideology” have mobilized against a
Brazil and Poland, movement participants have
perceived threat to conservative values concerning life,
marched in support for policies that reflect con-
the family, identity, and sexuality. The Catholic Church
first coined the term “gender ideology” and has in its servative values concerning life, sexuality, and
role as a global NGO instigated transnational and do- the family that primarily target body autonomy
mestic anti-gender movements that seek to slow down rights (e.g. Paternotte/Kuhar 2017; Faur / Viveros
or reverse progressive policy. These Church-orchestrat- Vigoya 2020). Religious actors whose beliefs and
ed contestations challenge fundamental aspects of the objectives oppose what they consider the “gen-
liberal script, and in particular, the right to self-deter-
der agenda” – the dismantling of gender roles, ac-
mination as it pertains to body autonomy rights. This
ceptance of homosexuality and family diversity, as
paper focuses on the Catholic Church’s complex rela-
tionship with liberal thought and the various ways in well as reproductive rights – often spearhead an-
which it influences global policy. It highlights religious ti-gender mobilizations (Case 2016: 166). Catholic
institutions’ role in validating and challenging the lib- and Evangelical clergy have publicly voiced their
eral script and in so doing, addresses both the causes support for anti-gender movements and encour-
and implications of intensified contestations in con- aged parishioners to participate in street demon-
temporary times.
strations to show their discontent with liberal pol-
icy (e.g. Smith 2019).1
1 INTRODUCTION Religious institutions’ participation in anti-gen-
der manifestations can determine not only the
Over the past few decades, movements resisting number of people who take to the streets but al-
so-called “gender ideology” have emerged around so the political effects of mobilizations. One of
the world. In Europe, Latin America, and the US, the most fervent supporters of anti-gender move-
conservative actors have taken to the streets to ments, the Roman Catholic Church, coined the
demonstrate their opposition to gender equality, term “gender ideology” and plays a crucial role
and in particular, issues such as abortion, sexual
diversity, and gender identity rights (Butler 2019).
1 Although the Catholic Church is one of the leading anti-gender
These transnational movements oppose “gender proponents, a wide range of actors utilize this rhetoric (Corredor
ideology” in their strategy to push back against 2019: 617).
3SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
in triggering anti-gender mobilizations (Bracke/ according to their own convictions (compare Bör-
Paternotte 2016: 146). Known for its powerful po- zel/Zürn 2020; see also Oftestad 2019: 3). As such,
litical influence in many parts of the world, the the concept includes rights to make choices that
Church’s anti-gender rhetoric has fueled numer- concern bodies, sexuality, and gender identity –
ous mobilizations in Europe and elsewhere from for example, the right to freely choose the num-
2010 onwards (see e.g. Kuhar/Paternotte 2017). By ber and spacing of one’s children. Body autonomy
supporting anti-gender movements, the Catho- rights are thus an inherent aspect of the princi-
lic Church challenges core aspects of the liberal ple of self-determination and central to the lib-
script, for example the right to bodily autonomy, eral script. Yet despite its centrality, body politics
full citizenship, and a life free from discrimina- remain undertheorized relative to liberal thought.
tion.2 At the same time, the Church’s emphasis on
values that embrace self-determination, such as This paper aims to begin filling this gap by focus-
democracy, individual freedoms – including free- ing on a subset of actors that contest the liber-
dom of religion –, and human rights, makes it a al script through anti-gender mobilizations – re-
leading proponent and legitimizer of the liberal ligious institutions. It zooms in on the Catholic
script. How do we understand religious institu- Church, one of the main opponents of gender ide-
tions’ relationship with the liberal script and their ology around the world (Vaggione 2014; Bracke/
role in challenging its core tenets? Paternotte 2016). As leaders of one of the dom-
inant world religions, Catholic hierarchies enjoy
This working paper poses two overarching ques- close relations to many states across the globe
tions: 1) What is the relationship between the (see Htun/Weldon 2010). By focusing on the
Catholic Church and the liberal script? 2) What Church’s role in anti-gender mobilizations, the
role does the Catholic Church play in challeng- paper aims to shed light on the role of religious
ing the liberal script? In asking these questions, institutions in challenging the liberal script. Rath-
it addresses two central components of the Clus- er than focusing on Islam, it turns to other rising
ter’s overarching research aims – the causes be- religious-conservative forces – Christian church-
hind challenges to the liberal script and the im- es that consistently oppose policies that advance
plications of intensified contestations for politics the liberal script as it pertains to body autono-
and societies around the world in the 21st Cen- my rights. This includes issues related to gender,
tury (Börzel/Zürn 2020). The paper examines the sexuality, and the foundations of the societal or-
role that religious institutions play in challeng- ganization of reproduction and the family. The
ing a key aspect of the liberal script – the right to broader significance of understanding the role re-
self-determination – through a focus on body au- ligious institutions play in challenging the liberal
tonomy rights. Self-determination is understood script should not be underestimated. The Cath-
as an individual’s right to self-realization, that is, olic Church has millions of followers around the
to determine their own economic, social, and cul- world and substantively impacts global and do-
tural development, and it represents a form of in- mestic politics. Most recently, Catholic clergy have
ner freedom in which individuals live their lives sided with right-wing populists in limiting women
and sexual minorities’ rights in Poland and else-
where in Europe – a development that can help le-
2 While the Catholic Church is not a monolithic entity but rather
comprises a multitude of actors at different organizational levels,
gitimize parties and boost their electoral success.
it is largely homogenic when it comes to issues such as abortion
and same-sex marriage. Thus, while there is variation in church
activity and engagement globally, it is possible to speak of “a
The Catholic Church, one of the world’s dominant
Church” that challenges this aspect of the liberal script. religious institutions, is part of the liberal script.
4SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
It supports the idea of self-determination, broad- This paper is divided into two parts. The first part
ly conceived of as individuals’ right to determine addresses the Catholic Church’s position vis-à-vis
their own economic, social, and cultural develop- liberal thought. It begins by sketching the Church’s
ment – including life path and profession – and shifting relationship with liberalism over time be-
has since the end of World War II worked towards fore detailing its stance on body politics and the
a global society that embraces, respects, and pro- teachings that promote its current anti-gender ide-
vides possibilities for individual self-determina- ology stance. The second part of the paper turns to
tion. At the same time, Church support for liberal the Church’s role in challenging the liberal script,
values clashes with its advocacy for limited body focusing on its various channels of influence at
autonomy rights. By opposing reproductive health both global and domestic levels. In a subsequent
and sexual minority rights, Catholic clergy chal- discussion section, the paper briefly draws on em-
lenge ideas at the very center of liberalism. Thus, pirical research to more specifically outline how
while the Church forms part of the liberal script, the Church’s capacities render clergy influential
it is simultaneously a core contester. players in anti-gender mobilizations. The conclud-
ing section summarizes the main findings.
As the leader of global anti-gender movements,
the Catholic Church plays a key role in challenging
the liberal script. As a global Non-Governmental 2 CATHOLIC DOCTRINE, LIBERALISM, AND
Organization (NGO), the Church influences inter- BODY POLITICS
national organizations including the United Na-
tions (UN). It also wields substantive influence In 2004, the Pontifical Council on the Family
through the Holy See that acts as a sovereign en- through a letter to the Bishops of the Catholic
tity with direct access to heads of state. Moreover, Church indicated that the idea of gender might
considered a pillar of society in many parts of the “destroy feminine values important to the Church;
world, the Church’s legitimizing and mobilizing foster conflict between the sexes; and contest the
functions combined with its significant resourc- natural, hierarchical distinction between male
es and wide-reaching networks provide clergy and female upon which family values and social
with political leverage in many domestic settings. life are based” (Butler 2019). Twelve years later,
Where liberal values relative to gender, sexuali- an alarmed Pope Francis intensified the rhetoric
ty, and the family have advanced, the Church’s by declaring to Catholics all over the world that
attempts to intervene in political life have inten- God’s creation of man and woman and the natu-
sified, fueled not only by perceptions of a threat- ral order was in grave danger due to the rapidly
ening “gender agenda” but also growing levels spreading gender ideology. To understand what
of secularization and religious competition. The underpins the Church’s stance on body politics
Church therefore uses all of its channels of influ- and its connection to the liberal script, the next
ence to stimulate and support anti-gender mobi- sections outline the relationship between Catho-
lizations, including allying with other conservative lic doctrine and liberalism, focusing on the prin-
forces such as right-wing populists. This argument ciple of self-determination in the postwar era.3
sheds light on the complexity of religious actors
and their influence as well as the utility of using 3 As Oftestad (2019) notes, the Church’s relationship with liberal de-
mocracy has been complicated since the French Revolution. The pur-
the lens of body politics in understanding how pose of this section is not to engage deeply with the foundations of
challenges to the liberal script are constructed the Church’s moral-philosophical teachings, but rather, provide a brief
understanding of how its relationship with liberal thought has evolved.
in discourse and practice as well as the implica- To outline its full stance requires historical research that goes well be-
tions of intensified contestations in current times. yond the scope of this study. For a detailed account, see Oftestad 2019.
5SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
2.1 THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND The confrontation between Church and the mod-
LIBERALISM: MAPPING THE POLITICAL ern secular state revolved around the dogma of
THEOLOGY papal primacy and the Council declared the pope
infallible, thereby pushing the Church in a more
As a religious institution that historically relied on conservative direction (Wilde 2007: 3, 13). In re-
notions of hierarchy and obedience, the Catho- sponse to liberal demands for religious freedom,
lic Church’s relationship with liberalism has been the pope upheld the distinction between natural
complicated. From the 1800s onwards, the Church secular authority and supernatural spiritual au-
was caught in a struggle over modernity that led thority (Oftestad 2019: 60).
to a rejection of liberal thought. Over time how-
ever, cultural change forced Church hierarchies Pius IX’s successor, Leo XIII (1878–1903), wanted
to reconsider their position and slowly embrace to move beyond the Church’s confrontation with
liberal democracy as well as values related to modernity after decades of opposition. Rather
self-determination – in particular human rights. than guarding the institution from external at-
The Church’s shifting relationship with liberalism tacks, he aimed to openly engage with the world
must be understood in phases, defined by socio- (Laurent 2007). The Church should contribute to
political, economic, and cultural change, and the solving global crises by joining forces with state
positions of individual popes and their interpre- authorities to “defend peace and secure states
tations of key scriptures (Laurent 2007). against destructive forces and anti-Christian ide-
ology” (Oftestad 2019: 64). In modern industrial
During the 1800s, the Church faced modern ideas society, Pope Leo set out to solve the “worker’s
that advanced liberal democratic thought and question” – the main political and ecclesial topic
threatened its status. Secular state authorities of the time. He illustrated the dilemma through
had challenged the Church since the 1600s, and the confrontation between capitalism and social-
with the onset of modernity, the challenge sharp- ism – both equally undesirable. Leo considered
ened both in terms of ideology and actual poli- liberalism’s capitalism and market economy im-
tics (Oftestad 2019: 58). Despite the emergence moral and unable to provide a solution. Social-
of a liberal Catholicism that sought to reconcile ism was an over-reaction to capitalism: it abol-
the Church’s political ethics and liberalism, Pope ished private property and demonstrated only
Gregory XVI (1831–1846) went on a crusade against state absolutism and must therefore be reject-
liberalism both within and outside the Church. ed. The state, rather than limiting individuals and
His rejection of liberal democracy and its idea families’ autonomy, must secure their rights (Of-
of freedom lay in the notion that subjects must testad 2019: 65).
abide God-given authorities. To rise up against
political authority – clergy and nobility – was The Pope’s critique of capitalism and free-mar-
perceived to defy God’s order since rulers’ pow- ket liberalism also shaped ideas of freedom. In
ers derive from above. His successor, Pope Pius liberal democracy, freedom meant autonomy,
IX (1846–1848), confronted modern culture and yet the idea of individual, self-legislating citi-
politics that threatened not only papal author- zens that embrace a rational political discourse
ity but also the Church and Christianity at large was incompatible with Church doctrine. Accord-
by asserting its sovereignty vis-á-vis the mod- ing to Catholicism, man is subject to natural law
ern state. Anti-liberal ideas fed into the prepa- that “prescribes good and prohibits evil” and not
rations for the first Vatican Council in 1869 that absolutely self-legislating (Oftestad 2019: 67). The
specifically addressed the effects of modernity. Church’s view of human nature further clashed
6SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
with the modern liberal view. For the Church, man individual self-determination – including the right
is created by God and the purpose of human life to life and to be part of the common good – was
is communion with God in time and eternity. The fundamental came to substitute visions of a Cath-
right use of freedom is thus to obey God and com- olic state. The Church based its new embrace of
ply with his will (Carr 2012: 251). The modern man modern liberal democracy on its respect for in-
also has the goal of self-realization by break- dividual rights (Laurent 2007: 830; see also Oftes-
ing free from nature and socio-political struc- tad 2019: 203).5
tures, but he does so by creating his own history
through the various freedoms that liberal dem- The idea of human rights radically embraced lib-
ocratic states and societies offer. Such denial of eralism’s freedom and equality principles and the
God’s authority is according to Catholic beliefs a rights of the person became a central concept in
perversion that results from liberalism’s freedom Catholic philosophy and theology following the
(Oftestad 2019: 69). Second Vatican Council (Oftestad 2019: 169). Vat-
ican II initiated a process of aggiornamento (up-
2.2 SELF-DETERMINATION AND HUMAN dating) in which the Church renounced its claim
RIGHTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR II as the only universal church, accepted religious
freedom, and affirmed the separation of religion
Facing the challenge of constructing a new Europe and politics (Vaggione 2018a: 24). Principles of hu-
following the end of World War II, Church hierar- man dignity, freedom and tolerance provided the
chies saw the opportunity to renew Western ide- terrain for many Council discussions and contin-
als of humanity, enshrined in liberal democrat- ued in the post-conciliar period (Carr 2012: 245).
ic values, and inculcate them with the Catholic The case for a perspective based on universal hu-
spirit (Laurent 2007).4 This opportunity coincided man rights and stated in terms of emancipation
with a modernization project. The Church’s an- came to the fore with Pope John Paul II, who led
ti-liberal and anti-democratic past made it un- the Church through another era of political up-
able to respond to contemporary political devel- heaval. By the time the communist block under
opments. The Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) Soviet leadership disintegrated, the Church had
sought to bring the Church into dialogue with the moved beyond its skepticism to identify positive-
modern world and its fundamentally progressive ly with liberal democracy. The papacy of John Paul
outcome demonstrated a new openness toward II was characterized by a commitment to human
democracy and human rights (Wilde 2007: 4). The dignity that required human rights above all po-
encounter with totalitarian politics as well as the litical and religious freedom and the Pope strong-
establishment of the United Nations that gave ly voiced his perspective that totalitarian regimes
democracy and human rights an international threatened the guarantee of human freedom and
breakthrough prompted the Church’s new stance integrity (Oftestad 2019: 143–4). John Paul II em-
(Oftestad 2019: 203). The Council’s political theol- phasized the human person and repeatedly de-
ogy emphasized individual freedom and consid- manded respect for human rights, the protec-
ered securing modern freedoms a basic cultural tion of religious freedom, and securing individual
and political concern. Ideas that a liberal dem- rights vis-à-vis powerful states. He shared respect
ocratic state founded on human rights in which
5 It is important to note here that although the Church adopted
a general stance on human rights following Vatican II, national
4 There were however many struggles and inner conflicts within churches took vastly different approaches to the human rights
the Church during this time period. See Wilde 2007 and Oftestad violations in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the decades that
2019 for details. followed (see e.g. Gill 1998; Loveman 1998; Grzymala-Busse 2016).
7SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
for individual freedom and integrity founded in world, Vatican II ultimately failed to liberalize its
the idea that every society must guarantee indi- doctrine on birth control (Wilde 2007: 6, 124). In
vidual rights – otherwise a person’s life and devel- 1968, Pope Paul VI published Humanae Vitae –
opment would become impossible – and sought at times referred to as the birth control encycli-
to guide those tasked with building new demo- cal – that restated the Church’s rejection of arti-
cratic regimes in this direction (Oftestad 2019: 153; ficial birth control and upheld its traditional view
see also Carr 2012: 251). of marriage as strictly heterosexual. According to
Catholic doctrine, “the union of man and wom-
The Church’s critique of totalitarian states was an in marriage is a way of imitating in the flesh
testament to its engagement with liberal ideas the Creator’s generosity and fecundity” (Corre-
and in particular, the principle of self-determi- dor 2019: 621, citing Holy See 1995: 620). Abortion,
nation as the foundation for universal human sterilization and artificial birth control thwart the
rights. In the decades that followed, however, fundamental purpose of marriage – reproduction
it became evident that the Church remained in – and must be rejected (Oftestad 2019: 1). In 1975,
conflict with liberalism. While Pope John Paul II the Church published Persona Humana, a decla-
strongly defended the notion of individual free- ration on sexual ethics that strongly condemned
dom and rights, he also continued the Church’s homosexuality and reiterated the idea that only
natural law tradition. Central points of contention a man and woman can join together in marriage
came to revolve around issues related to sexuali- to establish a family in God’s name.
ty, marriage, and the family. Thus, by the time that
the Church embraced core aspects of the liberal Little changed under Pope John Paul II, whose tra-
script, issues such as abortion and homosexuali- ditional stance condemned abortion and main-
ty signified a major conflict between Catholicism tained a strict position against same-sex mar-
and liberalism’s principle of self-determination. riage. Just as Paul VI, John Paul II believed that
the first and most fundamental right of the human
2.3 CATHOLIC DOCTRINE AND BODY person is the right to life, which begins at con-
POLITICS ception, and must be legally protected from that
point. Prompted by John Paul II, who adopted a far
Although the Second Vatican Council ushered in more aggressive tone, the Church defended the
a new era of Church doctrine aligned with liber- right to life from conception to natural death as
alism’s self-determination principle, sex and pro- a fundamental and inalienable human right (Of-
creation remained taboo. The Holy See remained testad 2019; Laurent 2007: 833). The Pope main-
true to natural law and its prescribed order in tained that abortion violates the principle of a
terms of sexuality, marriage, and family, and re- human person’s dignity, abolishes man’s God-giv-
acted strongly against the postwar cultural shift in en purpose, and thus promotes intrinsic evil (Oft-
the Western world – in particular the sexual rev- estad 2019: 196). The posture that certain acts re-
olution that began in the 1960s (Oftestad 2019: lated to sexual morals are intrinsically wrong and
139). The Church’s view on sexual matters largely cannot be justified by cultural or historical cir-
remained the same post Vatican II, whose broad cumstances pertained in particular to the issue
teachings on human rights emphasized that abor- of abortion. John Paul II argued that “no circum-
tion, just as euthanasia and murder, are shameful stance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever
acts that dishonor God. The Church maintained a make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since
rigid moralism relative to sexual matters and de- it is contrary to the Law of God which is written
spite pressure from bishops in many parts of the in every human heart, knowable by reason itself,
8SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
and proclaimed by the Church” (Vaggione 2018: 24, particularly as they are manifest in family ar-
citing John Paul II 1995). To oppose what John Paul rangements and control over women’s sexuali-
II referred to as the “culture of death” became in- ty and role in reproduction” (Friedman 2003: 314).
creasingly important for the Church as legal abor- The Church labelled feminist and sexual diversi-
tion rights spread across the Western world from ty movements, which demanded the dismantling
the 1970s onward. The Pope’s 1995 Evangelium Vi- of regulations that “oppress sexual practices and
tae highlighted the new policies as attacks on hu- behaviors and enhance people’s autonomy and
man dignity and values that threaten life and the freedom in relation to sexual and reproductive
Christian message (Oftestad 2019: 155). practices and identities”, mobilizers and promot-
ers of a “culture of death” – a gender ideology that
In the post-war era, the main confrontation be- destroys life and the family (Vaggione 2018b: 37).
tween the Church and liberalism revolved around
the right to life and human dignity. John Paul II, From the mid-1990s onwards, the Vatican strength-
while admitting that the notion of human rights ened its role as guardian of rigid sexual morality
and democracy had improved human dignity in in defense of the “culture of life” and increasing-
ways that embrace life, also argued that liber- ly began to use anti-gender ideology as a rhe-
al thought, via its promotion of the principle of torical device to counter “the denaturalization
self-determination, had legitimized the “culture of the family and the degendering of social re-
of death” (Oftestad 2005: 156). In the years that lationships” (Corredor 2019: 620). In the early
followed, resistance to the so-called “culture of 2000s, Pope John Paul II stated that “mislead-
death” that aimed to legalize abortion, contra- ing concepts concerning sexuality and the digni-
ception, and same-sex marriage turned into an- ty and mission of the woman” were driven by spe-
ti-gender ideology. cific gender ideologies (Corredor 2019: 615). The
Pontifical Council for the Family further declared
2.4 FROM HUMAN DIGNITY TO ANTI- that a “feminist ideology [...] known as ‘gender’”
GENDER IDEOLOGY had produced misunderstandings of the com-
plementary difference between man and woman
As the global human rights agenda turned towards and “a growing confusion about sexual identity”
reproductive and sexual rights in the mid-1990s that “complicates the assumption of roles and the
onwards, Catholic ideology became increasingly sharing of tasks in the home” (Corredor 2019: 615).
threatened. Feminist and LGBTQ+ movements mo- Church hierarchies portrayed movements seeking
bilized for abortion liberalization, gender main- to advance gender and sexual equality policy as
streaming, and sexual diversity, and their gains, promoters of gender ideology since the basis of
concretized in the agendas of the series of United their claims suggested that gender identities are
Nations World Conferences in the first half of the cultural and social products deriving from inter-
1990s, presented a growing challenge to the Cath- actions between individuals and society at large
olic Church’s natural law-based doctrine. In the “without any reference to the true meaning of sex-
midst of intensified ecclesiastical opposition, an- uality” (Vaggione 2018b: 18, citing Pontifical Coun-
ti-gender ideology rhetoric emerged for the first cil for Justice and Peace 2004: 224). Gender ide-
time (Case 2016: 157). At the International Con- ology sought “to redefine, not only secular laws
ference on Population and Development in Cairo governing the sexes, sexuality, reproduction, and
in 1994, the Vatican joined similarly conservative the family, but human nature itself” (Case 2016:
actors in organizing vocal opposition to “issues 156). As such, “it poses a threat to Divine Creation
challenging the structure of gender relations,
9SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
that might potentially destroy it, which renders From embracing liberalism’s self-determination
gender ideology diabolic” (Bracke/Paternotte principle in the form of human rights at large, the
2016: 147). Catholic Church actively opposed social move-
ment-driven advances in reproductive health and
Benedict XVI continued John Paul II’s legacy of sexual diversity rights from the mid-1990s on-
rigid positions on sexual morality and was the wards. John Paul II articulated arguments to coun-
first pope to articulate opposition to gender. He teract the “culture of death” that soon gave way to
emphasized the destructive effects of moving be- the anti-gender rhetoric currently used to under-
yond a God-given natural order in which sex was mine efforts to improve gender equality global-
no longer a set binary that defined the individu- ly. In so doing, the Church abandoned its support
al. Already prior to his papacy, Benedict voiced his for human rights as they pertain to freedoms in
concerns about feminism, new reproductive tech- the reproductive and sexual sphere and compli-
nologies, and LGBTQ rights in the 1985 Ratzinger cated the relationship between Catholic doctrine
Report and over time adopted an apocalyptic vi- and the principle of self-determination. Thus, the
sion of how gender ideology threatens the “order Church exhibits a dual relationship with the liber-
of creation” and the stability of social reproduc- al script – support for human rights and freedoms
tion (Garbagnoli 2016: 188). In the 2004 Letter to at large but advocation for severe restrictions in
the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collab- areas where its natural-law doctrine clashes with
oration of Man and Woman in the Church, Bene- contemporary ideas of body autonomy.
dict XVI condemned “the obscuring of the differ-
ence or duality of the sexes” (Case 2016: 157, citing The Church’s crusade against gender ideology and
Ratzinger 2004). In the Pope’s view, the term “gen- calls for lay mobilization to defend the “culture of
der” risked destroying human ecology by eroding life” since the mid-1990s has aimed to ensure that
“the nature of the human being as man and wom- positive law conforms to natural law and its reli-
an” (Case 2016: 167; see also Garbagnoli 2016: 189). ance on a binary conception of sexual identity as
the foundation for marriage and procreation. In-
His successor, Francis I, has hitherto maintained fluencing laws and policies is a prioritized strate-
the Church’s rigid moral views on sexuality and gy as “civil laws are structuring principles of man’s
continued the crusade against gender ideology.6 life in society, for good or for ill. [They] play a very
Similar to Benedict XVI, Francis I has explicitly la- important and sometimes decisive role in influ-
belled gender ideology a main threat due to its encing patterns of thought and behavior” (Vaggi-
erosion of the (heterosexual) family and has com- one 2018a: 24, citing Congregation for the Doctrine
pared it to nuclear war in terms of its challenge of the Faith 2003). Since the Second Vatican Coun-
to nature itself (Vaggione 2018b: 37). Although op- cil, the Church has reaffirmed its responsibility to
posing gender ideology has not been at the cen- oppose secular laws when states fail to respect
ter of Francis’s papacy and is unlikely to figure at natural law’s “objective moral order” and claims
the forefront in coming years, his tenure has not a right to intervene in policies it considers rele-
signaled fundamental change in doctrine, only in vant – in particular those related to sexual poli-
pastoral approach (Case 2016: 168). tics (Vaggione 2014: 143). At times, it has succeed-
ed in countering progressive gender and sexuality
equality policy. To understand its influence in pol-
6 Although Francis I has assumed a slightly more liberal position icymaking processes, the next sections turn to the
relative to issues such as civil unions, his views on gender and
sexuality remain grounded in natural law and follows that of his
Catholic Church’s sources of political power and
predecessors (Case 2016). the various ways in which the institution impacts
10SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
global and domestic arenas in its pursuit to align formal diplomatic relations with states through
secular policy with its moral vision. the Holy See. The Holy See “allows the papacy to
act as a legal subject in international law” (Mc-
Larren/Stahl 2020: 190), and is the Church’s ec-
3 CHURCH INFLUENCE, CONTESTATIONS, clesial center, headed by the pope and staffed
AND IMPLICATIONS with the curia, administrators, and bureaucrats
who oversee the Church’s work worldwide (Ferrari
3.1 CHANNELS, TOOLS, AND STRATEGIES 2006: 34). The Church’s transnational organization
emanates from the Holy See that communicates
The Catholic Church is both a transnational and its moral principles and exercises influence and
national actor. Its influence as a global non-state social control (Vallier 1971: 483). The Pope thus
NGO as well as sovereign state (through the Holy serves as both the leader of the Church as well as
See) with millions of followers around the world head of state and coordinates the Church’s trans-
gives it a prominent role in challenging the liber- national efforts (Bradley 2009: 118).
al script. This hybrid role has developed over the
past few decades. The Church re-invented itself The Church’s dual role as both sovereign entity
as a civil society organization following the Sec- and global Catholic NGO helps promote its trans-
ond Vatican Council, which has intensified its in- national program and broaden its sphere of influ-
terventions – especially at the international lev- ence. The Church’s global network starts with the
el. From John XXIII (1958–63) onward, popes have Pope, the Vatican, and its diplomatic machinery,
increasingly viewed the Church as an internation- and trickles down to episcopal conferences, indi-
al actor uniquely situated to work for global uni- vidual dioceses, and parishes (Bradley 2010: 120).
ty. While the Church prior to Vatican II primarily As a result of its ties with states through diplo-
saw itself as a state among states, its self-con- matic missions, the Holy See has regular access
ceptualization has shifted towards a “non-govern- to high-ranking state authorities such as foreign
mental force for global social and political trans- ministries and diplomatic delegations and has
formation” notable in its transnational activism long held observer status in several Inter-Gov-
(Appleby 2012: 319). ernmental Organizations, for example, the United
Nations. The size of the Holy See’s Church mem-
3.2 THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AS A GLOBAL bership renders global leaders reluctant to alien-
NON-STATE ACTOR ate Catholics, who make up a significant portion
of constituents, and they rarely respond as harsh-
The Catholic Church is one of the oldest reli- ly to the Holy See as they might others (Ferrari
gious and political actors at the global level with 2006: 41, 44). Moreover, the Church’s hybrid char-
a unique identity in the international system. The acter allows the pope to address audiences and
Church is a political machine that wields substan- issues unconstrained by territorial borders and
tive influence over billions of followers, including the Holy See to cooperate with various actors (Mc-
heads of governments, and retains access to inter- Larren/Stahl 2020: 198).
national forums (Troy 2008: 68). On the one hand,
the Catholic Church is a global NGO that forms In addition to privileged access to state authori-
part of a transnational civil society and influenc- ties and ability to address issues that transcend
es international affairs through the UN and oth- state borders, the Church maintains a global net-
er arenas (Vaggione 2018b: 11). Yet it is also part work of formal and informal transnational ties that
of a sovereign state, the Vatican, that maintains range from the Vatican’s administrative structures
11SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
to domestic grassroots movements (Ryall 2001: final document did not utilize pro-choice lan-
41). The Church’s access to a world-spanning net- guage (Ferrari 2006: 33).
work of clergy and lay people is unique – no oth-
er NGO can claim such historical depth to its ties, In addition to participating in UN conferences, the
or such breadth of membership – and these trans- Church has created a global space for articulat-
national ties help generate international support ing its anti-sexual and reproductive rights agen-
for its causes (Ferrari 2006: 44; McLarren/Stahl da. Since 1994, it has organized a series of period-
2020: 198). These diverse transnational Catholic ic gatherings entitled World Congress of Families
movements have grown over the past fifty years, (WCF). These meetings serve as “spaces for stake-
prompted by the crisis of territorial state sover- holders from different regions to express distinct
eignty and the expansion of transnational civil so- discourses in defense of the family” (Vaggione
ciety from the 1970s onwards. The crisis provided 2018a: 26). The WCF gathers organizations that
the Church with an opportunity to revitalize an al- promote conservative Christian values globally
ready existing global Catholic civil society, and it and brings together anti-gay, anti-feminist and
developed an extensive network of activists that anti-abortion activists, religious leaders, politi-
make up semi-autonomous, mobile transnational cians and scholars who work on “pro-family” is-
movements (Haynes 2001: 157; Appleby 2012: 319). sues in defense against a global liberal agenda
that promotes gender theory (Kalm/Meeuwisse
The Church’s transnational advocacy movements 2020: 1–2). At the 2019 meeting in Verona, Kalm
and access to heads of state have given it a sig- and Meeuwisse observe that congress partici-
nificant presence and impact in international or- pants identified gender ideology as the greatest
ganizations and forums. As Corredor (2019: 621) threat against children – it destroys their souls,
notes, the “Holy See is the authoritative leader deprives them of love, takes away their right to
and most vocal Catholic actor at the internation- a heterosexual nuclear family, and muddies their
al level”. It seeks to diffuse its moral doctrine into conceptions of a “natural” sexual identity (Oftes-
international affairs. As a result of its commitment tad 2020: 9).
to the preservation of life, the Church has “devel-
oped itself into a respectable promoter of human The Catholic Church’s global position as a hybrid
rights and freedom” and a wide range of Catho- actor provides it with significant influence in the
lic actors support its efforts to influence transna- international realm. But beyond its global impact,
tional norms at the UN (Troy 2008: 69; Vaggione the Church also has domestic influence that de-
2018b: 23). For example, during the Cairo Confer- rives from its center that “coordinates and shapes
ence on Population and Development in 1994, the subsidiary field units’ actions by supplying norms,
US sought a final document with pro-choice lan- symbolic leadership, and authoritative decisions”
guage relative to abortion and a clear link be- (Vallier 1971: 479). As Vaggione notes (2018: 11), the
tween population and development. Since many Vatican is a “powerful axis of regressive politics”
other wealthy industrialized states supported its because it provides the guidelines that the Church
position, the US was certain its policy objective and its associated actors implement in diverse
would be realized – especially given that most national contexts. Indeed, the presence and in-
member states approved of almost ninety percent fluence of Catholic bishops, activists, lawyers and
of the draft language. Yet the Holy See did not, scholars complement the Church’s transnational
and together with its Latin American and Muslim activities in each country (Troy 2008: 68; Vaggione
allies, succeeded in derailing negotiations by fo- 2018: 24). The next sections turn to the Church’s
cusing solely on abortion and birth control. The various domestic channels of influence.
12SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
3.3 THE DOMESTIC CHURCH: CLERGY-STATE governors or opposition leaders in the eyes of
RELATIONS, LEGITIMACY, AND MOBILIZATION citizens, who are potential voters. Ecclesiastic au-
thorities are especially well suited to bolster the
With around one billion Catholics worldwide and legitimacy of political actors because they are of-
a presence in nearly every state, the Church re- ten considered “trustworthy pillars of society and
mains a major power and pillar of society in ma- above politics” – in particular among the faith-
ny countries (Ryall 2001: 41). In contrast to other ful who are more likely to confide in religious au-
NGOs, the Church carries a moral authority that thorities (Vaggione 2014: 23). Religious notions
has shaped much of its relations with states and of hierarchy, authority and obedience have his-
constitutes a major tool of influence (see e.g. Fer- torically operated to reinforce existing sociopo-
rari 2006). litical arrangements (Levine 2014: 29). A positive
association with the Church and, in particular, re-
In many Catholic countries, including in most of ligious authorities’ endorsement of political lead-
Latin America as well as Poland, Spain, and Ire- ers has helped reduce the costs of rule and en-
land, state and Church historically enjoyed close hanced governments’ legitimacy. For example, in
relations. In places where the Catholic Church Latin America, party leaders have relied on the
dominated the religious sphere, these relations dominant Catholic Church’s legitimizing support
provided high-ranking clergy with significant po- to bolster public trust and popularity (see e.g. Gill
litical influence that derives from the Church’s 1998; Loaeza 2013). The benefits of allying with the
legitimizing support of governments and above Church have provided incumbents with incentives
all, its moral authority. Support from religious to adopt policies that conform to Catholic doc-
institutions can legitimize rulers and their poli- trine, limiting the possibility of liberalizing gen-
cies – especially among the faithful who confide der policy (Htun 2003).
in religious authorities – an ability that trans-
lates into substantial political capital (Gill 1998). Church-state relations continue to be close in
As trusted moral authorities, religious institu- many countries. Although laws and regulations
tions commonly have high credibility among cit- commonly hinder clergy from direct, overt par-
izens. When political institutions go through ticipation in legislative processes, which citizens
public trust crises, the legitimizing support of generally dislike (see e.g. Pew Research Center
religious leaders – who are often considered to 2014), the Catholic Church has succeeded in in-
be above politics – “may be particularly effective fluencing domestic policy via indirect institution-
because their motivations are seen as more al- al access. Such access includes for example the
truistic and less corrupt than regime represen- ability to jointly formulate legislative bills, partic-
tatives” (Koesel 2014: 18)”publisher”:”Cambridge ipate in parliamentary committees and in some
University Press”,”publisher-place”:”New York”,”ti- countries, provide health care and education ser-
tle”:”Religion and Authoritarianism: Cooperation, vices. This type of informal, largely clandestine
Conflict, and the Consequences”,”author”:[{“- influence is never publicly partisan and negoti-
family”:”Koesel”,”given”:”Karrie”}],”issued”:{“- ations between clergy and authorities generally
date-parts”:[[“2014”]]}}}],”schema”:”https://github. occur behind closed doors allowing the Church
com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/mas- to become part of the state’s fabric (Grzyma-
ter/csl-citation.json”} . Religious leaders’ support la-Busse 2016: 10). Not all churches succeed in
for incumbents, their policies, or endorsement establishing this type of influence, however. On-
of certain candidates for government positions ly those with high moral authority – that is, who
can therefore enhance the trustworthiness of are perceived as “impartial, trusted, and credible
13SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
representatives of the national interest” and the 2009). Religious institutions in many parts of the
common good – succeed in establishing institu- world continue to be powerful allies to “pro-life”
tional access (Grzymala-Busse 2016: 3). In such movements that oppose gender ideology despite
contexts, national and religious identities have efforts to disguise their affiliation through secu-
fused. The Church can historically claim to have lar or civil ecumenic strategies. In Latin Ameri-
defended the nation, politicians show it respect, ca, much research points to the Catholic Church’s
and the public displays confidence in the institu- ability to incite collective action (see e.g. Yashar
tion. If incumbents become threatened, church- 2005; Trejo 2012). The wealthy, highly organized
es with high moral authority can ensure surviv- Church has facilitated anti-abortion organization
al by appealing to the nation and thereby stifle and bolstered conservative movements’ politi-
social unrest. In return, the Church gains institu- cal influence vis-á-vis feminist activists (Blofield
tional access. Churches with little moral authori- 2006, 2008).
ty may seek other forms of institutional access to
influence policy – for example form partisan coa- The Church also calls upon politicians to consider
litions – but risk losing it through its overt politi- their religious beliefs when casting votes on pro-
cal involvement (Grzymala-Busse 2016: 4). posed legislation pertaining to family, sexuality
and reproduction. The Church instructs legisla-
Yet pursuing alliances with party actors likely to tors, judges and public officials on how to behave
translate its preferences into policy has been a regarding provisions that oppose the Church’s of-
notable Church strategy. Parties, in turn, pursue ficial doctrine. In respect to topics such as the de-
such alliances depending on their need for elec- criminalization of abortion or the recognition of
toral support, their ideological self-conception, same-sex rights, the Church has produced doc-
and the structure of the churches in question (Gr- uments that guide public officials on what posi-
zymala-Busse 2016: 8). Elsewhere, particularly in tions to assume when these issues emerge on leg-
Latin America, Church-state relations have over islative agendas. In regard to bills that advance
time grown indebted and governments align their same-sex rights, “the Catholic lawmaker has a
politics with Church doctrine to pay back for the moral duty to express his opposition clearly and
years in which clergy protected state authorities publicly and to vote against it” (Vaggione 2018b:
rhetorically and physically (Htun 2003). This per- 29, citing Congregation for the Doctrine of the
tains in particular to countries such as Chile and Faith 2003: 10). In cases where legislation is al-
other Latin American states that experienced pe- ready approved, legislators must limit the harm
riods of authoritarianism during which the Cath- done by such a law and diminish its effect on cul-
olic Church protected democratic dissidents and ture and public morality (Vaggione 2018a: 26).
their political party homes. Once elected to of-
fice, the party might reward the Church with poli- Citizens are also called upon to mobilize domes-
cy concessions (Gill 1998; see also Loveman 1998). tically in defense of “natural” order relative to
the family and sexuality. In Evangelium Vitae, the
Beyond influencing state and party authorities, Pope stated that “Catholic intellectuals […] are
clergy can also mobilize other actors. This capac- called to be present and active in the leading cen-
ity in turn explains why authorities might want to ters where culture is formed, in schools and uni-
remain on good terms with the Catholic Church. versities, in places of scientific and technologi-
Clergy can mobilize people as well as affiliated cal research, of artistic creativity and of the study
organizations broadly via protests and may also of man. Allowing their talents and activity to be
collect signatures for various causes (see e.g. Fink nourished by the living force of the Gospel, they
14SCRIPTS WORKING PAPER NO. 7
ought to place themselves at the service of a new and La Manif Pour Tous that carry out large-scale
culture of life by offering serious and well docu- anti-gender manifestations in France and Spain
mented contributions, capable of commanding (Kalm/Meeuwisse 2020). Agenda Europe, one of
general respect and interest by reason of their the umbrella organizations represented within
merit” (Vaggione 2014: 147). the WCF consists of over one hundred anti-wom-
en’s rights and anti-LGBTQ organizations in over
3.4 DISCUSSION: CATHOLIC CHURCH thirty European countries. A Vatican-inspired pro-
CONTESTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR fessional network, it seeks to roll back reproduc-
THE LIBERAL SCRIPT tive health and sexual diversity rights in the re-
gion and is responsible for Poland’s 2016 abortion
The Catholic Church’s activities at global venues ban and policies to outlaw same-sex marriage in
such as the UN but also its own gatherings, such several countries in Central Europe (Datta 2018: 2).
as the World Congress of Families, serve to mo-
bilize a wide range of conservative actors from The Catholic Church not only influences politics
around the world that impact policy on both glob- at the global level, its dominant status in many
al and domestic levels. These forums provide ven- countries also allows it to impact domestic poli-
ues at which the Church and its allies strategize cy. In regions such as Latin America, the Church’s
and develop new ways to challenge the principle legitimizing and mobilizing capacity provides it
of self-determination that are later disseminat- with significant political leverage. In addition to
ed across the globe to contest progressive body this already impactful position, a new Catholic
autonomy rights. While the Church and its allies Church strategy has been to join forces with oth-
do not always succeed in obstructing internation- er religious actors, such as leaders of the Evangel-
al initiatives for gender equality, the Church as a ical churches that have made significant inroads
global actor can disseminate its messages that across the region in recent years (Pew Research
its affiliated members subsequently reproduce at Center 2014). Commonly depicted as rivals over
the domestic level. The Church’s anti-gender rhet- faithful in the pews, Catholics and Evangelicals
oric has spread from these international arenas have increasingly collaborated to obtain common
that provide opportunities for conservative ac- goals. Strategies that downplay religious identity
tors to meet in their own countries and promote have indeed facilitated broad anti-abortion mo-
these policies. As Corredor (2019: 613) notes, the bilization in Latin America, where it has not only
anti-gender mobilizations that started in France built networks among the non-religious but also
in 2011 and later spurred similar campaigns across facilitated mobilization across religious divides.
Europe – including in Italy, Croatia, Spain, Hun- By setting differences aside, the civil ecumen-
gary, Poland, Ukraine, and Germany – were all ic strategy brings Catholics and Evangelicals to-
grounded in the Church’s anti-gender ideology gether in the pursuit of a joint “pro-life” agenda
rhetoric. Moreover, the Catholic Church’s hybrid (Morán Faundes 2018). In Argentina, for example,
identity as both transnational NGO and sover- some activist groups appeal to Catholic or Evan-
eign entity with privileged access to important gelical audiences, whereas others present them-
heads of state provides it with an ability to ally selves as secular, which has at times succeeded in
with elites that can mobilize in their respective stalling debates on reproductive health and sex-
home countries. For example, participants in the ual diversity rights (Pecheny et al. 2016).
WCF were religious community leaders, govern-
ment ministers, or European Parliament members Strengthening conservative actors who jointly
and were linked to movements such as Hazte Oír mobilize against gender equality is therefore not
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