OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE POLICING IN NIGERIA
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AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE POLICING IN NIGERIA
Emmanuel C. Onyeozili
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Maryland Eastern Shore
Abstract
This paper traces the history of colonial social control and Policing in Nigeria,
and also reviews the literature and examines how colonialism demonized,
discredited, and supplanted the traditional system of policing. It establishes that
in place of the old (traditional) system, colonialism imposed a new (but alien)
militarized policing geared toward the colonial needs of political oppression and
economic exploitation without regard to the needs of the colonized. The post-
colonial state was thus bequeathed a corrupt police system that fails to cater to
the needs of the people. This unfortunate development explains the emergence of
“ethnic armies” in the face of corrupt and insensitive national police.
Introduction
In the face of ever increasing acts of lawlessness, social disorder, armed robbery, and
senseless vindictive assassinations in Nigeria, it has become necessary to look for causal
explanations that go beyond superficial semantics. This research work is therefore
intended to add to the body of literature that go to substantiate the claim that colonial
policing was not introduced to protect the lives and property of Africans. It was rather
introduced to protect colonial interests (traders and missionary agents) financed to serve
the economic needs of colonialism which is exploitation.
Additionally, this work will lend credence to the view that the present obstacles in the
way of effective policing in Nigeria is an inevitable aftermath of a colonial system
designed to conquer, displace, and suppress, for the sole objective of exploiting African
indigenous labor and resources. Nigeria needs to shade off neocolonial apron that has
stymied progress and embrace innovative approaches geared towards combating the
obstacles in the way of a detached professionalized police. Some of the options are
suggested in this work.
Study Methodology
The research on obstacles to effective policing in Nigeria is part of data collected over
several years. The study methodology is based on ethnographic observation of events as
they evolve over the years; from independence through the Nigerian civil war, various
military regimes, and (s)elected representative governments. It also includes analysis of
Nigerian newspapers and magazines, academic journal articles, books, archival materials,
and internet-based documented source materials. Other sources of data include
32AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
convenient sample personal (clarification) interviews of selected individuals and officials
whom the author felt have something relevant to contribute.
The Colonial and Post-independence Policing Experiment
The origins, development and role of the European type of police forces in Africa are
traceable to the nature of European interests in the continent and the reactions of the
indigenous people to their activities. With the advent of colonialism came the distortion
of the traditional institutions and values, which had from time immemorial sustained
harmonious relationship, peace, and security of lives and property in the pre-colonial
African communities. Thus, the legacy of Western plantation (and in some cases racist)
ideology is the portrayal of African societies and cultures as lawless and disorderly
(Onoge, 1993). This negative image had its roots in the long ordeal of the slave trade,
and later colonialism, which mediated modern Africa’s interaction with the West.
Following conquest, colonial rule was consolidated through a system that subjugated the
existing traditional informal law enforcement mechanism with the forceful imposition of
the Western idea of policing. Thus, the colonialists introduced new laws, which replaced,
or seriously threatened the efficacy of native laws and customs, traditional religions and
other sanctions, as well as indigenous tribunals and justice. Achebe (1959) recounted a
colonial demonstration of this assertiveness in his legendary Umuofia village:
…. the white men had also brought a government. They had built a court
where the District Commissioner judged cases in ignorance. He had court
messengers who brought men to him for trial…. They guarded the prison,
which was full of men who had offended the white man’s law. …. Some of
these prisoners were men of titles who should be above such mean
occupation (p. 160).
Where the Africans were slow in accepting the new ways, the colonial “master” made it a
duty to militarily make mincemeat of the community as an example for other
communities who may be contemplating resistance. Thus, Achebe (1959) summarized
this belligerence in his account of the arrogance exhibited by the colonial District
Commissioner in addressing some Umuofia elders reminiscing over their hero’s
(Okonkwo) suicide. Thus:
… Obierika with five or six others led the way. The Commissioner and his men
followed with their firearms held at the ready. He had warned Obierika that if he
and his men played any monkey tricks they would be shot (p. 189-190).
Since public safety, maintenance of peace and enforcement of legitimate laws are the
chief responsibilities of the civil police force (Adedipe, 1965), it is essential in this paper,
to trace the origin of this force in Nigeria. This approach would provide grounding for
the inevitable linkage between the nature of colonial policing and the total collapse of the
apparatus of law enforcement in Nigeria. For shortness of space, what is known and
33AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
would be said about Nigeria is that beginning in 1845, the British were getting
themselves much involved in the affairs of Lagos. They were also experiencing some
serious law-enforcement problems in their self-imposed task of protecting the lives and
property of the indigenous people, the European merchants, other businessmen, and
Christian missionaries (Tamuno, 1970).
In 1851 the British accused king Kosoko of trading in slaves and used its navy to
bombard Lagos into submission. It sacked King Kosoko, and installed the puppet Akitoye
on the throne of Lagos (Ikime, 1977). In 1861, ten years after the attack, Lagos was
“formally” annexed and made a British colony. Following annexation, the first major step
toward establishing the colonial police was taken by Mr. McCoskry who was appointed
Acting Governor of Lagos Colony following the sudden death of Consul Foote in 1861.
However, the circumstances surrounding this initiative predate 1861 and details will
forever be clouded in peculiar colonial pattern of deceit.
The Need for Nigerian Police
It is obvious that while Akitoye was willing to sign the British treaty in order to become
king, he was not willing to cede Lagos to the British. When he died in 1853, he was
succeeded by his son Dosunmu (Docemo in some versions), who in turn was pressured
into signing a treaty agreeing to British occupation of Lagos. This period between 1852
and 1861 was a period of informal jurisdiction and had an important bearing on the
origin, development, and role of the modern Nigerian police that began in Lagos
(Tamuno, 1970).
From what is now known and has been written by authors like Ikime (1977), and Ahire
(1991), is quite clear that Lagos was not bombarded in 1851 because Kosoko was a
notorious slave trader, nor did the British take over full powers in 1861 because
Dosunmu, the new Oba, had revived the slave trade. The real issue, therefore, was the
British determination to control the trade of Lagos and the Yoruba hinterland. However,
it was not long before they realized that the organizational arrangement in the Lagos area
during that period failed to provide the necessary security for commercial and other
pursuits.
Apart from the succession debacles which later plagued Lagos in the 1940s and 1950s,
there were other developments in the region that had important bearings on the security
of Lagos. These events were the consequences of the Yoruba wars of the 19th century
which threatened the security of areas like Ikorodu and Egbaland, which were Lagos’s
next-door neighboring kingdoms. Particularly alarming was the reality of the alliance
between the exiled King Kosoko and King Ghezo of Dahomey, which threatened lives
and the chances of “legitimate” commerce on Lagos Island (Tamuno, 1970).
Common sense and prudence, therefore, dictated anxiety on the part of the British Consul
and European residents to have armed forces at their disposal to protect their commercial
interests. In response Consul Foote proposed the establishment of a consular guard of
100 men to be permanently stationed in Lagos, and controlled by consular agents. This
34AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
marked the first idea of a police force in colonial Nigeria. Foote’s request, however, was
turned down because of the reluctance of the Foreign Office to commit British capital to
Lagos without assurance of any returns.
Unlike in Britain, Ahire (1991) argues that the emerging ruling class in colonial Nigeria
was a foreign and illegitimate one which sought to dominate and exploit the indigenous
people in the interest of its own metropolitan (British) economy. The effort of this
foreign ruling class to subdue the indigenous people, and to impose a careful surveillance
over them in order to forestall any popular rebellion, created an obsession with the
policing of public order.
The Early Hausa Police
In 1861 Acting Governor of Lagos Colony, McCoskry, therefore organized and
established the nucleus of the first police force—a Hausa constabulary of 30 men
(Tamuno, 1970; The Nigerian Police, 1981). This formation marked the beginning of the
first modern police in the history of Lagos. It was also the first modern police force in
the territories later designated Nigeria by the British (Tamuno, 1970).
One distinctive feature of the Hausa constabulary was that it was mainly military in
character, although the men did perform some civil police duties. For this, Ahire (1991)
points out that the 19th-century policing in Britain cannot be substituted wholesale for the
policing experience of colonial Nigeria, even though its basic logic is generally relevant.
For modern historians the paramilitary nature of the new police symbolizes the evidence
of imperial authority in Lagos. The police performed essentially beat duties at the trading
depots of the British merchants, and were the object of incessant attacks from the public
who resented their presence.
In the next year the strength of the constabulary was augmented to 100 men to form the
“Armed Police Force.” By October 1863 the strength rose to 600 and was called the
“Armed Hausa Police Force,” because it consisted mainly of Hausa-speaking ex-slaves
from Sierra Leone (Ahire, 1991). Earlier, in 1862, a battalion of the West Indian
Regiment had been moved from Gambia to Lagos to complement the new police force.
With the police in place, the new governor Mr. Henry S. Freeman who arrived in Lagos
on February 22, 1862 to take up responsibility as the first Governor of the Colony of
Lagos established four different courts—a police court, a commercial court, a criminal
court, and a slave court. The police court, manned exclusively by the police, settled all
petty cases. The criminal court, chaired by a stipendiary magistrate assisted by two
British (illiterate) merchants as assessors, handled the more serious cases, while the slave
court (staffed exactly like the criminal court) heard cases relating to slavery. The
commercial court, manned exclusively by British merchants, handled all cases of debts
and breach of contract (Ahire, 1991). From the organizational set up it was evident that
he intends to use the newly organized government force to “keep order and maintain law”
(Tamuno, 1970:37-38).
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VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
The relevance of this judicial set-up was fourfold. The first was the prominence given to
British commercial interests in the new system of courts. Second was the total absence of
Nigerians in a facet of judicial administration that had their interest as a prime target.
Third was the inextricable implication of the colonial government in private British
commercial concerns. Fourth was the obviously ominous future and inevitable public
perception of the colonial police who were employed by all these courts to maintain
social control.
I argue that this early employment of police resources to advance the colonial political
agenda in fact shaped the future of policing as an agency of oppression in the whole
history of Nigeria. Many other historians and criminologists—for example, Alemika
(1988), Ahire (1991), Ikime (1977), Crowder (1978a), Tamuno (1970), share the opinion
that the preoccupations of the police during the colonial era were tied solely to British
ambitions in Nigeria. Their view, according to Alemika (1988), has been that the
colonial state ultimately rests on force and violence, and the capacity to realize its
ambition in spite of opposition from the colonized peoples. In his words:
The colonial objectives were (to varying degrees during the phases of
colonialism in Nigeria) prosecuted through organized governmental
violence, vandalism and plunder on the part of the colonizers. . . . The
sundry administrative, coercive and surveillance organs (police, prisons,
courts, tribunals, “native” authorities, Residents and District Officers) were
established to prosecute, promote, and defend British imperialistic
interests in Nigeria (p. 164).
Worthy of note is the fact that imperial policing orientations and preoccupations have
been maintained and strengthened by postcolonial governments in Nigeria. Alemika
(1988) explains that despite formal independence, the political and economic conditions
of exploitation, oppression, and gross power and economic injustices that gave rise to
colonial policing policies have not been discarded. In other words, the nationalists
against who police terror and violence were used by the colonialists, and to whom power
was subsequently transferred at independence, cushioned themselves into employing
police brutality and terror against their opponents in post-independence political power
struggles.
As stated earlier, no sooner was the police force established and the rudiments of a
judicial bureaucracy set in motion than the “Armed Hausa Police” were employed in a
series of colonial government atrocities. In April 1865 for example, 118 constables along
with 18 marines from HMS Investigator and HMS Handy attacked the Egba force that
besieged Ikorodu, which the British considered a “friendly town.” In August 1865, 62
constables were used to attack Edinmo village for disturbing the peace of the
neighborhood (Ahire, 1991; Tamuno, 1970).
From the late 1860s, under Glover’s administration (Freeman’s successor), some
communities were allowed to choose one or two constables as “country police” or
District Police. Their duties were to patrol the outlying areas. By 1895, and owing to the
36AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
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completion of the “pacification” of Lagos, Police Ordinance No. 10 of 1895, dated 27
December, was passed establishing a civil police force called “The Lagos Police” as a
body distinct from the constabulary. In 1901 the constabulary was absorbed into the
West African Frontier Force (WAFF), thereby leaving the Lagos Police (civil police) as
the sole police force in Lagos (Ahire, 1991; Tamuno, 1970). The new civil police
comprised of a Commissioner, two Assistant Commissioners, one Superintendent, one
Assistant Superintendent, one Pay-and Quartermaster, one Sergeant-Major, eight
Sergeants, eight Corporals, 50 first-class “privates” and one master tailor (Tamuno,
1970).
It is the view of this writer that we might regard December 1895 as the year for the
“civilianization” of the Nigerian Police, as well as a base for the professionalization of
the force. Not only was the military constabulary replaced, but Governor Denton also
replaced the “Hausa boys” with indigenous Yoruba recruits. In his speech before this
radical departure, Denton observed that:
In our Hausa Force we have a body of men dissociated from the countries
immediately around Lagos both by birth and religion, and who are as a matter of
fact the hereditary enemies of the Yorubas. This is such an enormous advantage
in any interior complication that I should be sorry to see it abandoned if it be
possible to obtain a supply of recruits in any other way (Tamuno, 1970, p. 28).
In spite of their shortcomings, the new civil police had goals and clearly delineated duties. By a
further Police Ordinance (No. 14 of 1897), the Lagos police force was to become “an armed
force.” Its general duties included “the prevention and detection of crime, the repression of
internal disturbance, and the defense of the Colony and protection against external aggression.”
The ordinance further increased the force strength to include an armorer, and replaced the title of
“private” with “constable” (Tamuno, 1970). Although this change was mainly bureaucratic, as
most Yoruba-speaking members of the constabulary were absorbed into the new “all indigenous”
force, its principle was a milestone in the development of the police in Nigeria. It was also
obvious that the military complexion of the constabulary was present in the new force.
Qualifications and Training
Alemika (1988) has charged that the traditions of civility, efficiency, and submission to
the rule of law that constituted the bedrock of the British police system were not
emphasized in the establishment or running of colonial police forces in Nigeria. On the
contrary, he argues that law-and-order maintenance and riot suppression functions of the
police were emphasized to the exclusion of social services. In the Lagos Police, the
qualifications for the officer cadre, like those of the Assistant Commissioner of Police
until 1897, were “a sound knowledge of drill” in addition to a “clear practical knowledge
of criminal law as well as a sober judgment and great personal energy” (Tamuno, 1970,
p. 29). Except for a few officers attached to the force, and who had previous professional
police experience in criminal investigation, past service in the military seemed to be the
main criterion.
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Only a few of the forces developed sufficiently to carry out the primary task of
preventing, detecting and prosecuting crime. This is understandable, given the nature of
recruitment into the provincial forces, which required no specific educational standard.
The only requirement was physical fitness, and recruitment was largely based on the Oba
or chiefs’ patronage. Before 1959, the only form of training was drilling by the most
senior non-commissioned officer in the unit, an illiterate whose instructions were limited
to marching orders (Onoge: 179). Occasionally, Assistant District Officer in charge of
the police force gave lectures on the duties of a policeman, how to keep station records,
make arrests, and handle criminals.
In May 1906, the two police forces of the Colony of Lagos and the Southern Nigeria
Protectorate were amalgamated and designated the Southern Nigeria Police Force with
Mr. C.E. Johnstone as the Inspector General. It was not until 1930 that the two forces of
the amalgamated South and North (1914) were merged under the Inspector General Mr.
Claude W. Duncan. This merger, however, marked an important step in the evolution of
national police in Nigeria, and thus becomes relevant in the search for nationhood in a
developing colonial state (Tamuno, 1989:85). The force, now known as the Nigeria
Police Force became a focus of increasing public attention as measures for decolonization
hit center-stage during the constitutional conferences.
Deceptive Imperial Design
Generally, the police forces established during this period performed a principal duty
namely, the management of colonial disorder (the raison d’être for the establishment of
modern police in Africa). To make Africans (albeit Nigerians), amenable to colonial
exploitation and administration, the old social order, as already noted, was displaced
while new social systems were introduced. Policies were formulated to legalize the
integration of the continent into the expanding global capitalism. To manage the new
“colonial order”, the administration adopted authoritarian method of suppression and
repression. In Nigeria, series of armed military campaigns were waged between 1860 -
1914 as a result of the implacable political divide between the colonial interests and those
of the people. Popular aspiration of the people for freedom from oppression and
economic exploitation was brutally suppressed.
Beginning from the original participation in the conquest, the police played a leading role
in the consolidation of the colonial state and repression of the colonized (Onage: 177).
The central focus of the police establishment was the protection of the political and
economic interests of the colonial state rather than the contradictions among the people.
In other words, in “keeping the order” and “maintaining the law”, which were forcefully
imposed and sanctioned by the new imperial authority, the new police force played a
principal role in buttressing the new administrations policy under British authority
(Tamuno, 1970: 38).
To effectively perform such duties, the colonial police institutions had a distinct semi-
military character as they were trained in the use of firearms. For example, the Armed
Hausa Police were more like soldiers than police, and apart from their semi-military
38AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
duties in the districts adjoining Lagos Colony, they were useful adjunct to the imperial
troops needed for active service in the Gold Coast between 1872 and 1874 (Tamuno,
1970). The justification for this policy was fourfold. First, semi-military police helped to
reduce the cost of separate establishments in the respective territories by making it
possible for one man to do the work of two. Second is the absence of readily available
alternative sources of armed assistance to cope with emergencies. The third and most
crucial factor lay in the nature of the people’s reaction to imperial jurisdiction and rule.
Lastly, employing soldiers for civil duties would have exposed the inherent military
despotism in British rule.
In Nigeria, British efforts to establish effective control over the claimed protectorates
intensified the opposition of several chiefs and their people who fought for their
economic, socio-political and religious rights against the demands of the European
traders and Christian missionaries. Against this backdrop, there was the need for
deployment of troops and police as ready instruments of enforcing government orders
when peaceful overtures failed. Hence, by adept political maneuvering, the government
established and developed several police forces whose members not only received
training in the use of firearms but also carried out the duties normally performed by
soldiers.
Roots of Ineptitude
The efficacy of the philosophy and policies of any system of government in any given
society will depend on their faithful implementation. In this wise, the role of the police in
ensuring social justice, peace and harmony cannot be over-emphasized. In the
administration of justice in Nigeria, the police have the sweeping powers of arrest and
prosecution of offenders. However, this law enforcement agency has at various times
been criticized by both the general public and public officials in the exercise of their
powers.
Post-independence law in Nigeria is marked by entrenched colonial socialization.
Following freedom from the colonial masters, the political class in Nigeria perpetuated
the inherited hegemonic policing policy. While adapting to the Western culture, the
traditional values were compromised and this had adverse implication for the institution
of law enforcement. The oppression and suppression of the opposition groups in
immediate post independence era affected the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies.
Colonialism changed Nigerian traditional laws - its rules, institutions, procedures and
meanings (Mann and Roberts, 1991:5). The police officers that were recruited to
maintain law and order were mere colonial stooges without traditional values in areas
where federalism was adopted. The relationship between the central authority and the
regions was something but cordial. The jackboot socialization of early Hausa police
(Ahire, 1991; Alemika, 1988; Crowder, 1978a; Ikime, 1977; Tamuno, 1970),
unfortunately established the criteria for future relationship between the police and the
communities they (dis)serve.
39AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
VOL.1 NO.1: APRIL, 2005
The genesis of the inability of the Nigerian police to effectively carry out their duty is
traceable to the introduction of a single police force for the regional tiers of government.
The 1943 ordinance for example, made provisions for the organization, discipline, power
and duties of the Nigerian Police. Several subsequent Orders-in-Council culminated in
the Police Act, Cap.154, Laws of the Federation, 1958, which provided for the
establishment of a police force known as the Nigeria Police Force (Asemota: 391). A
single police force was thus imposed by the British in spite of protests by many Nigerians
like Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who, as the Premier of the Western Region considered it
“… wrong in principle and in practice for a regional government vested with the power
and authority to maintain law and order, to be without the means of discharging its
responsibility” (ibid: 392).
On the other hand, the adoption of a separate local police force in the northern part of
Nigeria in the Independence Constitution gave the politicians the opportunity to lynch,
harass and use violence against their opponents. Nwabueze (1992:120) put things in
proper perspective when he stated that “the local police forces in the North…were turned
into the local arms of the parties in power”. The implication of this statement is that any
criminal charges levied against a person who happened to have liaised with the ruling
party will be overlooked. The foregoing reality may have justified the reversion to a
single police force, which by its checkered origin, was ill-equipped to deal with politics
of development.
Obstacles to Effective Policing
Allegations leveled against the institution and its personnel, some of which have proven
to be true, include arbitrariness in exercising its power, corruption, perversion of justice,
and delays in the administration of justice. The question then is who or what should be
held responsible for these lapses? Put differently, what are the obstacles to effective law
enforcement in Nigeria?
Various factors have been blamed as constituting a stumbling block to the effective
administration of justice and efficient maintenance of law and order in Nigeria. Often
cited factors include, “god fatherism”, nepotism, ethnicism, corruption (Daily
Independent, 2005; The Daily Champion; The News, 2003; This Day, 2005; The
Guardian; The Punch, 2005; The Vanguard, 2005), early socialization, and language
differences (Tamuno, 1970, p.28). Others factors are institutional constraints such as
inadequate manpower (both in strength and expertise), insufficient education and
training, inadequate equipment, and poor conditions of service of the average policeman
(popularized by military dictatorships). There is also the constitutional problem, as
manifested in the Second Republic Nigeria which put the whole country’s police under
the presidency. Another important factor that has been neglected for many years, and
which was rightly pointed out by Alemika (1988); and Okereke (1995), is the perception
of the Police Force itself by the police officers and the community they serve.
In Nigeria, ethnicity or tribal influence, and clannish allegiance have been the major bane
to social engineering. Ethnicity is defined as that which pertains to a people, especially
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those groups sharing a common language and distinctive cultural patterns, and who
retain a consciousness based on such factors as language, legends, customs, and religion
(Kalusi 2000:112). As stated, it is at the root of break down in law and order in many
African countries today as in Nigeria: from the Putu and the Krio in Liberia; through the
Hutu and Tutsie in Rwanda; to the Shona and Ndebele in Mozambique.
In addition, there are problems of religious and/or inter-communal conflicts. Examples
include the intermittent Ife - Modakeke communal conflicts; the Umuleri - Aguleri
communal clashes; the Urhobo - Itsekiri political rivalry of ancient origin (Ikime, 1968);
the Kano - Sagamu tribal cum religious-related riots; the Tiv - Jukun internecine
skirmishes; and numerous others. On several occasions, the police took sides in the
ethnic or communal rivalry thereby exacerbating conflicts and diminishing police
reputation.
The Nigerian police brazenly participated in flushing out southeasterners from hiding
during the military pogrom and the 1966 massacre of Easterners in the north. It was an
event that led to Biafran secession and subsequent Nigerian civil war. The scars of the
genocidal war are yet to heal.
It is true that ethnic nationalism could be competitive and co-operative rather than
antagonistic and destructive in a true federation, but the deep seated animosity often
exhibited in inter-communal violence in Nigeria, and the attendant destruction is
disturbing. More alarming is the easy access to, and use of sophisticated weaponry by
any community that needs it. Even the police personnel, who may have privileged access
to records on remote causes and means of preventing these localized battles, may not be
willing to act either, because such battles are veritable training ground for arms dealing
for some of them (Daily Times, 2001).
“God-fatherism”, is the funding and abetting of vices and shielding “connected”
criminals from justice by government agents and highly placed officials entrusted with
the power and authority to investigate and prosecute such vices. It has become a
dominant issue in African polity and impedes the course of justice in virtually all the
countries in Africa. Many highly placed public officers in Nigeria are known to pervert
the course of justice by the virtue of their closeness to the seat of power. Often, the
police get sucked in, and this accounts for their complicity in several unsolved crimes
across the country. A case in point is the brutal murder of the former governor of old
East Central State, Anthony Ochefu, at Oturkpo (Benue State) in 1999 (The Guardian,
June 20, 2000). The police have been accused of releasing the seven suspected killers,
alongside with the traditional ruler fingered as the master-mind and the supplier of the
weapons used in killing the former governor. The former Inspector General of Police
(IG), Musiliu Smith still carries the burden of complicity in the murder for his inability to
bring the criminals to justice.
Later in 2002, the Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Bola Ige was murdered in
his home by hired assassins, albeit supposedly under the protection of five armed police
officers none of whom were present at their duty post to protect the chief law
41AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
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enforcement officer. Till his recent dismissal, no obvious effort was made by Tafa
Balogun, the (now) ex-Inspector General of corruption fame, to solve the murder and
bring the perpetrators to justice. Other similar incidents, and the failure of the police to
apprehend and prosecute the culprits, have led many Nigerians to pointing suspiciously
towards the presidency for unusual taciturnity in ordering the Inspector General of police
to deliver.
Other unsolved assassinations of political figures include the likes of Harry Marshal, an
All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) chief, and Aminosari Dikibo, the vice national
chairman (South-south zone) of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) (This Day, 2005).
There was also the double murder of barrister Igwe, the President of Anambra State Bar
Association, and his wife (The News, 2005) in which it is alleged that the police aided
and abated the crime, and let the perpetrators escape the country before commencing
investigation. These, and other similar actions, rightly fuel the suspicion of police
duplicity and belief that they are nothing but a bunch of hired guns in the secret service of
select criminal political godfathers.
Police corruption is another gangrene, which has eaten deep into the fabrics of law
enforcement apparatus in Nigeria as in other parts of the continent. Allegations of police
corruption erupt on daily basis. These come in various forms: extortion from motorists at
illegally mounted road blocks, collection of monetary gratification (bribery) in order to
alter justice in favor of the highest bidder. This cankerworm had deeply affected the
social image of the Nigeria Police perceived as a corrupt law enforcement agency. The
public opinion regarding the integrity of the police officer is that of “dirty Harry”.
The recent dismissal of the IG on January 17, 2005 on corruption-laden charges which
has brought out many of his bloody deals to the open leaves much to be desired in terms
of police image. It is alleged (The Punch, 2005) that the former IG opened fictitious bank
accounts into which bribe money and police service money were laundered. According to
The Punch, the account names and numbers into which the various sums were traced are:
Olatrade Nigeria Limited, account number: 02201191; Renovations Construction
Limited: 02201473; Caledonia Telecoms: 02201472; Yeboa Investment Limited:
02201475; Yeboa Nigeria Limited: 02201474; Aworo Nigeria Limited:02201278;
Inspector General’s Imprest Account: 02201436. A huge chunk of the N1.4 billion,
which the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) paid to the police for
security during the 2003 general elections, somehow found its way into the account of
Olatrade from the IG’s Imprest Account. On the whole, the top cop ran twelve different
accounts in Fountain Trust Bank in Lagos (This Day, 2005).
The former IG who an assistant Inspector General (AIG) described as an “an epitome of
corruption” (Daily Independent, 2005), is said to have $150 million in Swiss bank
accounts, $200 million in London, and N500 million in various denominations in Nigeria.
The same source quotes the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) as
confirming that about N1.9 billion has so far been recovered from him resulting in the
government impounding his travel passport as well as that of his wife, and planted 24
hour surveillance around the ex-IG. With a civil service salary, only the ongoing EFCC
42AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
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investigation will explain how he came to such wealth in the three years of becoming the
IG.
Additionally, the ex-IG is fingered in several criminal payoffs by especially Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP) state governors during the 2003 election, and by arrested
criminals to buy immediate release. The different payoff amounts range from N15
million to N350 million. He is also implicated in the payoff leading to the botched kidnap
attempt of the controversial Anambra State governor, Dr. Chris Ngige on March 10, 2003
(The News, 2003). The late AIG, Rapheal Ige who spearheaded the Anambra coup was
said to have demanded and received his own N15 million cut from the IG before
embarking on the risky project. With a month away from retiring, the IG assured Ige that
the maximum penalty if caught, will be immediate retirement, without any criminal
prosecution.
With the head of the police involved in this type of multi fraud scheme, one can see why
the Nigeria police cannot be effective in law enforcement. When the head is rotten, the
rot infects all rank and file of the police. To re-invent a new image for the police, the new
acting IG, Mr. Sunday Ehindero, has on his first press conference on assuming office on
January 18, 2005, unfolded a six-point program for the development of the Nigeria police
force and indicated that:
the era where neophytes would be assigned to investigate criminal offences is
gone….we are not going to put a tailor to go and investigate, we must have the
census of all those people with professional knowledge, accountants … we will
make use of them and nobody will be routinely posted to CID unless he has
something to offer (This Day, 2005).
He continues:
we have to look at our image…special attention must be focused on illegal check
points. Seme border and Mile 2 have more than 10 checkpoints. What image are
we giving to the international community? Of course you know what they do at
those checkpoints; we are more than ever prepared to bring sanity to that sector
of this country.
This paper also avers that language differences constitute another major barrier to
effective policing in Nigeria. In a plural and semi-illiterate society, people take recourse
to their ‘mother tongue’ in their day-to-day socialization. In such a society it is difficult
for a ‘foreigner’ or an ‘outsider’ (non native speaker of the given language) to effectively
communicate with the indigenes. This situation is true in Nigeria where as an example, a
Hausa speaking police officer in the multi linguistic Nigeria Police would find it difficult
to perform his duty of preventing social disorder in non Hausa-speaking Yorubaland or
Igboland. In recognizing this problem, the colonial police belatedly tried to rectify their
error when it emphasized essential, practical, but not academic knowledge of a language
to enhance the functions of the police officer in the civil society. The problem of
(mis)communication persists.
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Another obstacle to effective policing in Nigeria is the constitutional problem as
manifested in the Second Republic. Conflicts developed between 1979-83 around
whether a unified or decentralized force in a federal structure would better fulfill its role
of law and order maintenance in the society (Report of the Political Bureau, 1987; 104).
From all indications, the current practice of over- centralizing police control in the hands
of uncouth executive president who has used the police in silencing all opposition voices,
has proven to be a costly mistake for Nigeria. Oftentimes, the police have colluded with
groups and taken sides depending on what benefits who.
Closely connected to this, is the participation of the Police in state political governance
during the military regimes of 1966-75 and 1984-99 respectively (Asemota: 397). Some
police officers were appointed state governors by military juntas, thereby getting them
involved in political governance. This greatly reduced their neutrality as their allegiance
shifted from maintenance of peace in a civil society, to compromising the integrity of the
department in the effort to retain juicy political appointment.
In his analysis of problems of the police, the former Minister of Police Affairs, David
Jemibewon, attributed the phenomenon of “Nigerian factor” as the reason why the
Nigeria Police does not perform creditably. This phenomenon among others encompasses
the factors mentioned above. In his analogy, he stated that:
Here in Nigeria, police arrests a man (and) before you know it, one Alhaji,
one Reverend or one Chief will be phoning. The offender himself will
prostrate on the road, or the affluent one will bribe his way… (The
Guardian, June 20, 2000)
Nepotism and ethnicism is favoritism shown to relatives or friends in preferential
appointments and promotions. In Nigeria, it is common knowledge that the higher
echelon of the military and the police, is dominated by particular sections of the country,
and promotions often follow the same pattern. Within the police, protégés are appointed
to head the departments they are not qualified to hold, while career-minded officers are
posted to police “Siberia” for not “playing ball”. The dismissed IG, Tafa Balogun, is said
to have promoted his driver (whom he uses as front in his extortion of money from state
commissioners of police) to Chief Security Officer (CSO), while some state
commissioners were redeployed for not bringing in enough kickbacks (The News, 2003).
In addition to condoning ineptitude, this practice promotes mediocrity at the expense of
meritocracy. It is important to note that either by omission or commission, the practice
represents the vestiges of colonialism.
Aftermath of Police Ineffectiveness in Law Enforcement
The effective sustenance of the society is hinged on an efficient law enforcement process
(Obasanjo and Mabogunje, 1992:27). It is not so with Nigeria where crime and violence
is moving on a fast lane. Given the spate of violence, and the level of degeneration in the
body polity, one may be right to conclude that the Nigeria Police have exhibited glaring
44AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
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inadequacies, and demonstrated incapacity to effectively enforce the law and maintain
order in the society. It is no longer safe to walk alone even during the day. Robberies,
assassination, arson, looting of public treasury, and child-theft amongst other vices, have
become the rule rather than the exception.
The several years of military misrule traumatized the average Nigerian to a point where
life has become meaningless. By a calculated design, the military junta so much
politicized and ethnicized the police to a point where espirit de corps is utterly
nonexistent. In the hope of perpetuating self-succession, and destroying police
cohesiveness, the police were owed several arrears of salary as a way of subjecting them
to mental anguish and inactivity. By the time the country returned to democratic rule in
1999, what was left of the initial not-too-efficient law (non)enforcement agency, was an
unarmed, demoralized, rag-tag semi-zombies. Most of them survive by naked extortion
from commercial drivers at various illegal checkpoints set up for that purpose.
It is against this background that one can begin to comprehend the reason for the total
collapse of police ineffectiveness in law enforcement. It also explains why some police
themselves join and become members of armed robbery gangs. Some others rent out or
sell their rifles to armed robbers for an agreed fee. No wonder the widespread public loss
of confidence in the police, as well as the rising wave of armed robberies by criminals
emboldened by their close connection to the police. It could therefore be argued that by
helping to arm the criminals, the police are constituent part of police ineffectiveness.
The attendant uncertainty of life dating back to the military era led to the emergence of
ethnic militia groups all over the country, whose activities constitute a threat to security
of lives and property. In the face of repressive military rule which peaked during
infamous Abacha dictatorial years, a number of ethnic militant groups emerged to take
their fate into their own hands. Vanguards of this new form of resistance to constituted
authority were the Ogoni and the Andoni peoples of Rivers State (led by the late
environmentalist, Ken Saro Wiwa) who are demanding for autonomy after years of
official environmental degradation and social deprivation of their communities. Their
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) triggered the ill wind of change
and ‘the fever caught on’.
Many other groups have since emerged under different aegis demanding their ethnic
rights. In the Southwest, there is the O’dua Peoples Congress (OPC) founded by Dr.
Frederick Fasehun (in August 1994) as a non-violent pan-Yoruba organization seeking to
protect the interest of the Yoruba race (National Concord, 1999). Holding sway in the
North is the Arewa Peoples Congress, acting as an antithesis against the activities of the
OPC. The Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the
Bakassi Boys, and the Igbo Peoples Congress; some couched under the umbrella of
Ohaneze, are in the Southeast agitating for Igbo nationality cause. In a seeming effort not
to be outdone in this rat race for ethnic identity, are the Ijaw Youth Movement, and the
Egbesu among others, defending the minority rights in the oil rich South-South.
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One feature common to all these groups, notwithstanding the furor generated by their
activities, is that they all have base appeal. Even the most ardent critics of the groups
will testify to this appeal manifested in the tacit support given to them by the government
at the state level. While the State Governors have not come out openly to ban these
groups, some state Houses of Assembly, have duly recognized them in their states of
operations. In Anambra State for example, the state legislative body “has provided
guidelines for their [Bakassi Boys] operations” (National Interest, 2001:3), while former
Governor Mbadinuju co-opted them as the state vigilante group on public payroll.
One major problem with these militia groups is the threat they pose to the Federal
Government which does not recognize them, and actually outlawed them. Explaining the
rationale for declaring the groups’ activities illegal, the then Minister for Police Affairs,
Major-General Jemibewon (rtd.), cited arbitrariness of the outfits’ (especially OPC)
activities as the major reason (The Comet, 2000). His tirade however has no meaning for
the states which count on the militant groups for the protection of lives and property in
the face of police inertia.
Another discomfort surrounding these groups and which constitute an obstacle to
effective law enforcement is their modus operandi, which threatens the nascent
democracy in Nigeria. The militia groups have usurped the role of the regular police in
contravention of 1999 constitutional provisions (The Constitution, 1999: Section 220).
Related to this outrage is the ‘jungle justice’ approach which, aside from usurping
judicial role, has led to the loss of many innocent lives and property in flagrant disregard
for the fundamental human rights, including rights to fair hearing.
In spite of these problems, we should not loose sight of the benefits inherent in the
militant activities of the ethnic ‘armies’. Their violent struggle based on the principle of
justice, equity and fair play, attempts to inject sanity through the eradication of official-
sanctioned fraud, crime, corruption and other vices. It is obvious that there is no love lost
between them and the criminal kingpins and armed robbers in the society. Commenting
in one of the national dailies, (Punch, March 2001), an Islamic scholar, Adewunmi,
indicated that “it is incontestable that they have raised awareness in certain quarters and
generated controversies in public discourse” (p.5).
More importantly, the groups (through their activities, which are largely out of police
control) serve as pointer to the inefficiency of the nation’s security apparatus. Thus,
some organized and recognized groups such as the pan-Yoruba organization (Afenifere),
and its Igbo counterpart (Ohaneze Ndigbo), regard them as the only hope for the security
of the common man in a society where people have lost confidence in the government
and its policing apparatus.
Overview
Apart from MASSOB which is a political organization seeking self determination
for the Igbo race, and the Area Boys made up of miscreants (with no identifiable
ideology) looking for a means of survival, all the other groups namely, the OPC, the
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Bakassi Boys and the Egbesu Boys have base appeal. A case study is the Onitsha town
residents who, in their reaction to the Police clampdown on ethic militias, and in
supporting the Bakassi Boys, appealed to Governor Mbadinuju not to disband the outfit
in the interest of peace and security in Anambra State. This base appeal is manifest in the
tacit support given to them by the government at the State level where the legislative
organ has duly recognized them. In Anambra State, for example, the legislative body
provided guidelines for the operations of the Bakassi Boys, while the governor has co-
opted them as the state vigilante groups.
Moreover, many prominent individuals have at one time or the other expressed their
support for the localized vigilante groups within limited and controlled areas of
operation. Examples include Sunday Mbang, the prelate of the Methodist Church
worldwide, who expressed his unflinching support for OPC’s activities if limited to
getting rid of hoodlums in the society (Tell, August 7, 2000: 33). In the light of such
support, Chief Abraham Adesanya, leader of the pan-Yoruba organization has declared
that “no amount of falsehood, propaganda and blackmail against the OPC would succeed
or suppress the group in its bid to rid Yorubaland of criminals. OPC will live forever”
(Ibid).
The ethnic, sectional or clan warlords obviously evince an intention to challenge not only
the legitimacy, but also the efficacy of the government and its state security machinery to
protect its citizens. This phenomenon stems from the seeming nonchalance of the corrupt
Federal Government in decisively confronting certain explosive situations that threaten
the very fabric of the nation-state. The myriad of problems include armed robbery
menace, official corruption, rampant political assassinations, police inertia, hunger, rising
unemployment, galloping inflation, and general insecurity of lives and property.
The Way Out
A critical appraisal of breakdown of law and order and the subsequent resort of the
people to armed struggle points to the disenchantment of the people with the leadership
and governance of the country. Armed struggle by the people is a direct response to the
sadism and cynicism that characterized over two decades of failed leadership. Citizens
who grew up in an environment of state-sponsored violence, in which government
deployed covert and overt state violence as a ready tool for political discourse and crises
management, would naturally operate under a logic which justifies raw power and
violence as the panacea to all problems.
Secondly, people’s recourse to violence is symptomatic indication of lack of trust in
government, and loss of confidence in the regular police to provide adequate security for
lives and property in the society. The decline in the quality and effectiveness of the
Nigerian Police has degenerated into the failure of the government apparatus to maintain
law and order and sustain the right environment for justice in the society.
In the light of this situation, I make some suggestions which would hopefully go a long
way toward fostering enduring peace and harmony in the polity and guarantee cordial
47AFRICAN JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY AND JUSTICE STUDIES,
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relationship between the government and the governed, as well as ensure peaceful co-
existence among the people.
In the first place, the Government should understand that underlying the activities of
these local vigilante groups is a genuine agitation for a change in the system that has for
long sustained oppression and perpetual domination by some sections of the country. The
clampdown or operation flush-out order issued by the presidency on the various militia
groups spread across the country is ill-advised and should be rescinded. The Federal
Government should therefore embrace dialogue and set out clear operational guidelines
regulating the conduct of such groups to legally permissible limits in apprehending
criminals.
Moreover, the indigenous ways employed by these groups in identifying criminals in the
society should be explored by the government for possible infusion into the failed
policing and crime control system. This can be beneficial and helpful as it would assist
the police in getting a grip on combating crime and other vices. A little compromise here
and there should not portend weakness on the side of government.
Following an armed robbery attack on the former Chief Justice of the federation (Justice
Fatai Williams), Bola Tinubu, the Governor of Lagos State contemplated mobilizing the
vilified O’dua Peoples’ Congress to combat the activities of criminals which has recently
been on the increase in Lagos State (The Post Express, June 14, 2000). This strong
consideration for the use of the OPC in Lagos State was inspired by the seeming success
recorded by the dreaded Bakassi Boys in Abia and Anambra States during the same
period. Moreover, Tinubu’s administration is also turning the ‘Area boys’ (the social
miscreants on Lagos streets) to ‘good boys’ through skill acquisition options so that they
will no longer prey on unsuspecting innocent citizens of Lagos for daily survival (The
Guardian, August 31, 2000). However, Lagos residents and motorists would tell you that
Tinubu merely converted the miscreants from social dynamites to licensed ticking time
bombs. The Federal government should take a cue and improve on Tinubu’s stop-gap
measure to truly uplift the long suffering masses.
The Punch (2005) alleges that the former IG, Tafa Balogun, colluded with governors and
the ruling Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) to rig the 2003 general elections. The same
IG is fingered in the botched abduction of Governor Chris Ngige on July 10, 2003 which
was facilitated by a detachment of police, led by the late Assistant Inspector-General of
Police, Raphael Ige. The reason why Ige was only retired without immediate formal
criminal prosecution has become clear following revelations that the IG paid him N15
million to do his dirty job. Furthermore, the November 10, 2004, mayhem where the
federal police provided protection for the criminals who torched Anambra state buildings
and properties, is disgusting to say the least. The new IG must immediately divest the
police from engaging in future acts of hooliganism if the law enforcement standard must
be restored.
It is only in Nigeria that a faltering presidency will employ the police to destabilize and
intimidate opponents. Recent self admission of ballot tampering (albeit in connivance
with the PDP government) by the “Tsunami” of Anambra state politics (Chris Ubah),
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who was the architect of the treasonable botched kidnap of a state governor, is an
opportunity for Ehindero to withdraw all police protection, and prosecute him like the
criminal he is. The withdrawal of police protection from a “democratically elected”
governor by the president immediately following the failed kidnap attempt manifests the
federal government duplicity in the act. The fact that the president is a common inlaw to
the mastermind of the perfidy did not help matters in any way.
Ehindero should act to correct the havoc wrecked by the police in Anambra state under
the watchful eyes of his corrupt predecessor. He should ask the president to take a stand
in Anambra crises, or admit complicity since the federal police were used in the
destabilizing acts including the burning of government offices in the state. The Aso Rock
(presidential palace) executives can no longer feign ignorance.
The present police administration looks willing to execute series of fundamental
restructuring and reorganization in the force, which hopefully would launch the Nigerian
Police Force on the positive side of history. To re-invent a new image for the police, the
new acting IG Mr. Sunday Ehindero has on his first press conference on assuming office
on January 18, 2005, unfolded a six-point program for the development of the Nigeria
police force. He needs to emphasize merit as his cardinal objective in order to encourage
productivity thereby confronting the misnomers that have constituted obstacles to
effective policing.
Additionally, much still needs to be done towards changing the public perception of the
nation’s law enforcement agency. Mere window dressing will not suffice at this point
where the police image and morale is at its lowest ebb. Concerted efforts at drastic
reformation of the Nigerian Police will help it earn a more positive image in the society.
Corruption gave the Nigeria Police Force a poor image in the Nigerian society. Some
argue that every society gets what it deserves, and the Nigeria police corruption is a
reflection of the social malaise that bestrides the Nigerian society. The new top cop
needs to match his words with action and declare total war against police graft as a
starting point in the professionalization of the force. Since controlling police corruption
will make it much easier to deal with the hydra-headed monster (crime) engulfing the
society as a whole, the new police Czar should make corruption reduction a major
cardinal point of his tenure.
Combining order maintenance with prosecutorial responsibility amounts to over
burdening the police. To make the police more effective, it should hands-off criminal
prosecution and defer to another government agency like the Director of Public
Prosecutions (DPP). Fear of prosecution by an independent agency will also reinforce
discipline and make it easier to control police corruption and excesses.
Furthermore, an immediate revision of the Nigerian police pay scale is needed as a first
step toward discipline. In all developed societies, the salary of a police officer is above
that of ordinary citizen with equivalent education. A decent pay is a worthwhile
investment that will encourage restraint to acceptance of bribes to augment the meager
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