MASPERO AFTER MUBARAK - WHAT HAS CHANGED AT THE EGYPTIAN STATE TELEVISION?
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UNIVERSITEIT GENT
FACULTEIT POLITIEKE EN SOCIALE WETENSCHAPPEN
MASPERO AFTER MUBARAK
WHAT HAS CHANGED AT THE EGYPTIAN STATE TELEVISION?
Wetenschappelijk artikel
Aantal woorden: 8657
Laurens Bielen
MASTERPROEF MANAMA CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT
PROMOTOR: Prof. Dr. CHRISTOPHER PARKER
COMMISSARIS: Prof. Dr. SAMI ZEMNI
ACADEMIEJAAR 2012 – 2013Deze pagina is niet beschikbaar omdat ze persoonsgegevens bevat. Universiteitsbibliotheek Gent, 2021. This page is not available because it contains personal information. Ghent University, Library, 2021.
Laurens Bielen
Maspero after Mubarak
Abstract (EN)
This article examines the changes at the Egyptian state television since the ouster of Mubarak
on 11 February 2011. Even today, the state television is still one of the most important media
outlets in Egypt, despite of the recent evolution to private satellite television and the new
media. The changes are sought, by means of literature research and qualitative interviews, at
the informal stage of culture and climate, since only there those subtle shifts can be
discovered.
First, the history of state television in Egypt is outlined, showing that Maspero has always
played an important role. Notwithstanding several changes, all those in power considered the
state television of the utmost importance. Next, we can see the image of the protesters change
from thugs under Mubarak's rule, to patriotic revolutionaries a few days later. The star part,
however, is played by the military, that has now become the saviour of the motherland. Soon,
the protesters lose any standing, and they become once more the thugs that are trying to
destroy Egypt.
The parliamentary elections bring other changes to light: while they were the most free
elections in recent history, the Freedom and Justice party received a disproportionate share of
attention on air. In the previous elections, they had been all but ignored. In this period, with
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces as leaders of the country, the state TV was there to
praise them and prove their innocence. After Morsi was elected president, a short period of
confusion and power-struggle followed. Soon, however, Maspero became Morsi's pall-bearer.
The research presented in this article shows there are next to no changes at the state
television in this period. Apart from the fact that Maspero simply adapts to the new centres of
power, the most important change is the increase in internal contestation and dissidence.Laurens Bielen
Abstract (NL)
Dit artikel onderzoekt de veranderingen die de Egyptische staatstelevisie ondergaan heeft
sinds de val van Moebarak op 11 februari 2011. Ondanks de recente evoluties naar private
satelliettelevisie en de zogenaamde nieuwe media, blijft de staatstelevisie een van de
belangrijkste mediakanalen in Egypte. De veranderingen worden op het informele niveau
gezocht, via literatuurstudie en kwalitatieve interviews, aangezien enkel daar de subtiele
verschuivingen qua attitudes opgemerkt kunnen worden.
Eerst wordt een korte geschiedenis geschetst van de staatstelevisie in Egypte, die aantoont
dat voor Maspero steeds een belangrijke rol weggelegd was. Ondanks verschillende
veranderingen blijven de opeenvolgende machthebbers de staatstelevisie een groot belang
toedichten. Vervolgens zien we na het aftreden van Moebarak de status van de betoger
veranderen van bandeloos tuig naar vaderlandslievende revolutionairen. De glansrol is
echter weggelegd voor het leger, dat de redder des vaderlands geworden is. Al snel verliezen
de betogers elk krediet, en verworden ze opnieuw tot tuig dat de ondergang van Egypte
probeert te bewerkstelligen. Hoewel de parlementsverkiezingen van 2011 de meest vrije
verkiezingen in de geschiedenis waren, zijn er ook daar verschillende verschuivingen te
merken: de Freedom and Justice-partij krijgt nu disproportioneel veel aandacht, terwijl de
Moslimbroeders bij de vorige verkiezingen nauwelijks in beeld kwamen. In heel de periode
dat de Supreme Council of the Armed Forces de opperste leiding van het land had, was de
staatstelevisie er voor hen om hun te loven en hun onschuld aan te tonen. De verkiezing van
Morsi tot nieuwe president geeft een korte periode van verwarring en machtsstrijd. Al snel
wordt Maspero echter de slippendrager van Morsi.
Het onderzoek dat in dit artikel voorgesteld wordt, toont dus aan dat er nauwelijks
veranderingen te bemerken zijn over deze periode. Hoewel Maspero zich aanpast aan wie er
de macht heeft, is de voornaamste verandering dat de interne contestatie en dissidentie
toegenomen is.Maspero after Mubarak
Introduction
On 9 October 2011, thousands marched to the television building Maspero in reaction to
recent events. The protesters – who were mainly Christians – decried the state media's
'incitement of sectarian violence.' Soon, they were answered with brute force by the military
(“Cairo clashes leave 24 dead after Coptic church protest,” 2011). The state TV reported that
protesters were attacking the army, and called on its viewers to go out and defend the army
(MENA, 2011; M. Nader,1 personal communication, October 1, 2012). This resulted in mobs
of armed civilians attacking Christians (Bushra, 2011). In these events, 27 Coptic-Christian
protesters were killed (Trew, 2012).
This was arguably the most iconic, but far from the only protest directed at the state
television: around the 25th of January 2012, Maspero saw almost daily protests for weeks
(Trew, 2012). Moreover, right after Mubarak stepped down, protesters went to Maspero to
demand the resignation of the Minister of Information because of his role in the television
reporting during the previous days (M. Nader, personal communication, October 1, 2012).
Events like these show the importance of the state television in Egypt. The emphasis on the
so-called 'new media' and their role in the events of the last couple of years in the region and
around the world, both in academics and in popular media, threatens to deflect our attention
from the more traditional medium that is terrestrial television. While social networking sites
like Facebook and Twitter, blogs, and online news websites certainly played an important
role, their reach is still limited in Egypt. 2 Television is much more widely accessible, with an
estimated 12.8 million households with a television set (Allam, 2010), which amounts to
circa 75 percent of all households, using the figures of the 2006 Central Agency for
Mobilization and Statistics census (Egypt State Information Service, 2006). Adel Iskandar
(2011) gives a higher figure with 95% of households having access to terrestrial television.
1 Mona Nader is head of the media department at the Cairo Insitute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS).
2 The percentage of Internet users in Egypt is still below 10% of the population, according to the ITU
(International Telecommunication Union, 2010. p. 202), while the CIA World Factbook puts their number
just above 20 million, which is around 25% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). Most of these people live in
urban areas: the number of people in urban areas with broadband access is 6 times that of those in rural
areas, and a similar trend is visible if we consider all types of internet access (International
Telecommunication Union, 2010. pp. 18-19).
1Laurens Bielen
Thus, television is – and has been since its establishment – extremely important as a means of
mass communications, because of its wide spread coupled with the high levels of illiteracy. 3
This means that even today newspapers and other written publications remain somewhat
elitist, while radio and television are the news-source for the masses.
As a consequence of the importance of TV, the state television network is still one of the most
precious media outlets to the government. One protester at Maspero described its power as
follows: “Maspero is one of the most powerful places in Egypt. It broadcasts straight into
everyone’s homes; it can control what the nation thinks.” (Trew, 2012).
While the number of people watching private (satellite) channels is rising, the number of
people watching the state television is still much bigger (VOMENA, 2012). Compared to
95% of households with access to terrestrial television, only 60% of the Egyptian households
have access to satellite television (Iskandar, 2011).
At the end of Mubarak's term, observers didn't notice any fundamental change in television
news since the Sadat era. This article examines if there have been any changes since then, and
to what extent things are different. It is mainly concerned with changes of climate and culture,
since the legal framework with respect to the state television has not seen important change.
After the so-called Arab Spring, a lot of the scholarly research on the Middle East and North
Africa concerns itself with the case of democratisation. In much of the existing, classical
literature on media and democracy, media is described as the 'Fourth Power' or 'Fourth Estate'
(Sparks, 1995). Now however, some doubt the democratising powers of the media. Lee
Becker (2007) wrote an excellent essay exploring the relation between media and democracy,
challenging the common conceptions of the relation between independent media and a
democratic society. Earlier, he wrote an article on this topic with Patrick McConnell
(McConnell & Becker, 2002), echoing the same sentiments and outlining the available
research on the subject. Similarly, Chin-Chuan Lee (2001) sketched some of the problems
with the view on the media vis-a-vis democracy in Asia, but his more general remarks are of
3 Egypt has one of the lowest literacy rates of the Arab region: even though the percentage of literate adults
has risen from 44,4 in 1986 to 72,7 in 2009 (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2011), only in Morocco and
Yemen there are more illiterate adults (Mellor, 2005. p. 20). The latest census (Egypt State Information
Service, 2006) shows that 29% of the population is illiterate.
2Maspero after Mubarak
universal cogency. However, the 'Watchdog' function of the media is still widely heralded.
While the three concepts – the 'Fourth Power', the 'Fourth Estate' and the 'Watchdog' – reflect
a different outlook on the press (as Sparks (1995) elaborated in his article), one thing doesn't
change: the press is viewed as a fundamental prerequisite of a functioning democracy in most
of the literature. The debate on the democratising effects of the media in Egypt or elsewhere is
not within the scope of this article, but, combined with other research, the research presented
herein could provide a factual basis for the debate.
This research can also be an asset for further research in the tradition of Jürgen Habermas, as
the state media play an important role in the shaping of the 'public sphere' in Egypt. Research
on the public sphere in the region tends to ignore the 'classic' mass media (terrestrial
television, radio...), but those media still reach the biggest part of the population and have thus
a much bigger power than the 'new media'. Research as showcased in 'New Media in the
Muslim World: The Emerging Public Sphere' (Eickelman & Anderson, 2000) could possibly
benefit from a more complete view of the media and its functions and roles. It would be
interesting to see if the changes at the Egyptian state television are reflected in changes to the
configuration of the public sphere, as Khamis (2011) sees the public sphere in Egypt during
and after the revolution as locus of the contest between the government and its political
challengers, both using the media to win over the public.
In general, this article tries to add to the research on the interactions between politics and
media, that are still lacking in the region as compared to the Western world (Khamis, 2011).
Especially in this time of change in the Arab world, research like this can prove an important
asset to contribute to a wider understanding of the region and the processes that shape it.
It can also serve as a starting point for research into the power-structures that have shaped the
country in this period, as this power manifests itself more often than not on the informal stage.
This article examines the changes in climate and culture of the state media at Maspero. The
time-frame of this research is between the two symbolic dates of 11th February, 2011 – the day
of Mubarak's ouster – and 8th October, 2012 – the end of Morsi's so-called '100 days'. This last
day is symbolic because of Morsi's promises during his campaign to have accomplished a
wide array of tasks before the end of these 100 first days. The exact date is contested by
Morsi's entourage, probably because he managed to deliver on very few of his promises.
3Laurens Bielen This time-frame is roughly divided in two periods, the first with the SCAF as the supreme power in Egypt, the second with Mohamed Morsi as the first democratically elected president. The first section of this article concerns itself briefly with questions of methodology, combined with a few technical remarks. In a second chapter, the history of television in Egypt is sketched by means of an introduction, from the beginning in 1960 to the end of Mubarak's rule on 11 February, 2011. The next sections contains the actual research, outlining the changes in attitude and sentiments at the state television under the SCAF rule, firstly, and under the rule of Morsi, secondly. 4
Maspero after Mubarak
Methodology
The idea that John Fiske (1987) presented – news is knowledge, and knowledge is power;
therefore news is power – is still very current: as stated in the introduction, mass media are
generally viewed as being fundamental to a functioning democracy. Christopher Sparks
(1995. p. 56) developed a model that goes beyond the most common models of mass media as
a 'Fourth Estate', 'Fourth Power' or 'Watchdog'. His model provides researchers with a more
flexible approach to the mass media. As to the state media, Sparks described the pull factors
of the political powers to shape the state media 4 to their liking – those factors ranging from
outright censorship to a certain climate or culture. That pressure can only be mitigated by an
equal pressure by the 'powerless': journalists, media professionals and ordinary citizens.
This model is to be preferred, as it leaves room for contrasts and struggles internal to the state
media, as well as it opens our eyes to external influences on the media. The use of this model
draws the attention to internal dynamics, change, and fluidity – which are the focal point of
this research – while avoiding the pitfalls of determinism and an approach that considers the
subject as static.
The above is reflected in Dina Matar's (2012) warning that, in the Arab world, the state and its
interests are not always fixed or coherent. According to her, this is a consequence of the
meaning of the Arab word for state, dawla ( ) دول ة, the etymology of which points to its
circularity and flux. Thus, rather than searching for the one and only official position, this
research will focus on the informal realm of practices and attitudes.
These ideas are coupled with Korany's (2010) paradigm of change. He sees two types of
change: on the one side the sudden 'big bang'-type of change, such as wars, revolutions and
other milestone events, and on the other the slow change, i.e. cumulative processes of an
evolutionary nature, such as an evolution of ideas or the impact of things like demographics.
While the events between 25th January and 11th February 2011 can be considered a milestone
event, the following months were followed by smaller events and changes of a more
evolutionary nature.
4 Sparks seems to use 'state media' to describe any type of media that has ties to the state. He does not
differentiate between state media or public-service broadcasters.
5Laurens Bielen
The emphasis of the research presented herein is on the sentiments and practices, rather than
on the legislative or codified. By its nature, regulations and official stances are always slow to
reflect change, and are not able to show internal differences or dissent. The attention to the
informal is thus necessary to incorporate the ideas of Korany, Matar, and Sparks.
This study is situated in what Christian Fuchs (2009) calls critical academic social science
(p. 11). Fuchs makes a useful division of the media, based on a Marxian view. Fuchs (2009)
defines the three stages in the media realm as follows:
(1) [The production sphere:] The organisation of the journalistic production of content
that is generated and stored with the help of media tools. (2) [The circulation sphere:]
the distribution of content with the help of transmission technologies, so that (3)
recipients consume cultural content. [the consumption]” (p. 12).
This article explores part of the media system of Egypt, by focusing on the 'production sphere'
of the state television, as this is the sphere were loyalties and red lines have their influence. In
private media these changes would be visible both in the production sphere (governments
impeding news gathering) and the circulation sphere (post facto censorship). The nature of
state media implies that the circulation sphere is as good as without censorship or the like, so
that these changes would mainly be apparent in the production sphere.
The research conducted herein can thus be incorporated in future research of the media
ecology in Egypt.
This paper contains empirical research, and combines literature review with qualitative
interviews to paint its picture. Information was gathered from scholarly research, newspaper
and magazine articles, opinion pieces, blogs, NGO reports and interviews with media
professionals and activists.
Remarks
Acknowledging that it is a contested expression, this article tries to avoid using the word
'revolution' in a conceptual way. In some cases it is used to reflect the wording used by others,
in other to designate the period between the 25 th of January and 12th of February 2011. This is
in line with how this period is usually described in Egypt. The discussion about the
6Maspero after Mubarak
revolutionary nature of these events has been held in several scholarly articles and opinion
pages in newspapers, and it would lead us too far to repeat this long debate here.
The transliteration of Arabic names in this article follows the spelling used by the persons
themselves, if available. The consequence of this is a certain degree of inconsistency in
transliteration of some Arabic letters, but it facilitates the readability and recognition of those
names. The spelling used herein is also shared with most publications, be they scholarly or
journalistic, which makes it easier to find more information about the persons and events
described herein. The references have not been transliterated, so as to make it easier to find
the works referred at.
7Laurens Bielen 8
Maspero after Mubarak
Egyptian State Television: A Concise History
This chapter gives an overview of the history of the Egyptian state television, starting with its
introduction in 1960. The events leading to the ouster of Mubarak get some extra attention in
the second part of this chapter.
The first three presidents
Television was introduced in Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1960 (Allam, 2010; I. Saleh,
2003. p. 67). From the beginning of his term, Nasser understood the potential of television as
a means to reach the people and forge an Egyptian nation (H. Amin, 2012; Peterson, 2011; I.
Saleh, 2003. p. 67). Television was seen by Nasser and his acolytes as “a means of
disseminating public information and educational materials and of creating citizens” (Abu-
Lughod, 2005. p. x). It became a second “weapon wielded by the Nasser regime”, the
expression Laura James (2006. p. 177) used to describe the 'Sawt al-Arab' ('Voice of the
Arabs') radio station that broadcast mainly nationalist songs and announcements. As a
consequence of this concept of television, TV fell under the responsibility of the Ministry of
Culture and National Guidance (H. Amin, 2012). The goal of creating an educated and
informed people with a national pride in Nasser's Egypt, meant that television had to be under
strict government control (Allam, 2010; H. Amin, 2012).
Egypt started broadcasting with three channels, the third of which, that aired predominantly
American and British programs, was scrapped following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war and
the changing diplomatic relations that resulted from it (H. Amin, 2012). On 13 August 1970,
TV was brought under the umbrella of the Ministry of Information, which established the
Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) (H. Amin, 2012). The ERTU gained complete
control over television through different laws, and as a consequence the margin of freedom
and the quality of the broadcasts diminished: news broadcasts became “protocol news with
neither credibility nor competence.” (I. Saleh, 2003. p. 67). Protocol was paramount to
journalistic standards (R. A. Abdulla, 2010. p. 62).
9Laurens Bielen
Sadat's Infitah-policy5 of the 1970s was also visible on television: more Western programs
were broadcast. (H. Amin, 2012; I. Saleh, 2003. p. 67). In the same period, Egypt switched to
colour television (H. Amin, 2012).
The end of the Sadat era saw the evolution of the state TV into a “Broadcasting Network” (I.
Saleh, 2003. p. 68): the Sadat administration wanted a more diverse and liberal media
landscape, but wanted to stay in control at the same time (I. Saleh, 2003. p. 68)
A clear sign of television's popularity was the sky-rocketing amount of television sets. In the
mid-1970s, there were an estimated half a million television sets, but by 1988 that number had
risen to 4 million (Mostyn, 2002).
During Mubarak's presidency, the way the state television broadcast was being decentralised.
The two national channels were supplemented in 1985 by a third, that covered only Cairo (H.
Amin, 2012). By 1995, the number of channels had increased to eight, with almost every
region having its own dedicated channel (Allam, 2010). Also in the 1990s, Egypt ventured
into satellite broadcasting by establishing Nile TV, a channel aimed at expatriates living in
Egypt, and promoting tourism (H. Amin, 2012). Channel 1 is today also being broadcast via
the NileSat6 satellite (Allam, 2010).
Nation-building and education remained two of the main tasks of the state television
throughout the years. This is demonstrated by research such as that of Lila Abu-Lughod in
Dramas of Nationhood (Abu-Lughod, 2005) and 'Television and the Virtues of Education'
(Abu-Lughod, 1998), and by Farag Elkamel's research on health education (Elkamel, 1995).
Egypt also has a very high rate of schools that use TV for educational purposes (International
Telecommunication Union, 2010. p. 34).
Even though the original Nasserist education and nation-building discourse on television was
being challenged since the 1990s (Abu-Lughod, 2005. p. x), television was still considered
one of the key institutions for “the production of national culture” at the turn of the
5 Infitah (انفتاح, 'openness') is the name of Sadat's policy to attract more private investment. This policy was
accompanied by the replacement of the USSR by the United States as Egypt's main ally.
6 NileSat 101, the first Egyptian television satellite, was launched in 1998, and was conceived in the same
'development' context as the terrestrial channels. It can carry more than 80 different channels (Sakr, 1999).
10Maspero after Mubarak
millennium (Sakr, 2001. p. 7).
Saleh argues that there was no improvement in the quality of the broadcasts: “[The Arab
media] follow the flock of protocol news and political propaganda.” (I. Saleh, 2003. p. 112).
Also the technical quality saw next to no improvement, as Mahmoud Sultan echoed in Ray
Weisenborn's book: the news-items are long, slow and indirect; there have been no
fundamental changes since the 1960s (Weisenborn, 1992. p. 9).
Road to the 25th of January and the overthrow of Mubarak
The events of the 25th of January 2011, that led eventually to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak,
have a long prehistory. Determining the inception or the causes of these events will lead us far
outside the scope of this research. Therefore, only a concise sketch of the situation, with
concern to the state television, will be provided in this section.
State and police were in a heightened state of readiness because of the upcoming
parliamentary elections in 2010. At the same time, strife was brewing over who would
succeed Hosni Mubarak: his son, or maybe someone from the army or intelligence services
(Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2010. pp. 131-132).
2010 saw countless transgressions of human rights law, and the government's refusal to
initiate reforms heightened the discontent (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2010.
pp. 132-151). Coupled with the farcical elections at the end of 2010, this ruined the reputation
and legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of more people than ever before (“Egypt’s election:
Another charade,” 2010; “Violations marred 2010 parliamentary elections, says watchdog,”
2011; The Independent Coalition for Elections' Observation, The Independent Coalition for
Elections' Observation Calls Upon the President to Dissolve the Parliament [Press Release],
in: Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), 2010. pp. 85-87; مركز القاهرة لدراسات حقوق
2011 ,)النسان.
Coverage of these elections by the state television was one-sided: Channel 1 dedicated 44% of
its election coverage to the ruling National Democratic Party, and only 2% of that coverage
was negative. This contrasts starkly with the Muslim Brothers, to whom Channel 1 only
11Laurens Bielen devoted 1.6% of its time, with only 4% of that time depicting the Muslim Brothers favourably (2011 ,مركز القاهرة لدراسات حقوق النسان. p. 42). During the revolution, the state TV kept showing support for the Mubarak regime up to the last moment. This included showing live footage from cameras heedfully aimed at the calm and empty Nile banks, and later – when the protests could no longer be denied – reporters and hosts of the state television turned to blackguarding the protesters. At the same time, the state media claimed that foreigners with hidden agendas were instigating the protests (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2011a). It should be noted that not all journalists at Maspero agreed with this. One of the state television's senior reporters, Shahira Amin, resigned in protest (Iskandar, 2012a; “Egypt journalist resigns from state TV in protest,” 2011). Commenting on the advent of satellite TV, Rasha Abdulla (2010) states that “the days of 'concealing' news from their people were over.” (p. 67). Thanks to satellites, news could reach the public unhindered and without government interference from anywhere in the world. The dissemination of news and ideas is nowadays even easier, with Internet and social networking. Be that as it may, on 28 January 2011, Channel 1 did not show any of the police violence, and largely ignored the protests for days to follow, instead broadcasting carefully framed vistas of the Nile banks were everything was peace and quiet. Those Egyptians with access to satellite television or the internet could indeed easily see through the state media propaganda and non-news, thanks to the pan-Arab news networks and citizen journalism via the social media websites, which led to a credibility crisis for Maspero (Khamis, 2011). The television landscape in Egypt now consists of commercial type broadcasting and state broadcasting only. The state television never developed into public-service broadcasting. State television stems from a certain mistrust: television is deemed too important to leave outside of direct governmental control (Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision (Canada), 2001). By the same token, private broadcasting is only allowed via satellite, while the possession of satellite dishes has long been forbidden by law. It is safe to say all three presidents agreed with Fiske's (1987) idea that news is power. 12
Maspero after Mubarak
From Tantawi to Morsi
SCAF and the revolution: honeymoon gone bad?
On the 11th of February, 2011, all state media aired an announcement from the presidency:
then-Vice President Omar Suleiman tells the nation that Mubarak stepped down. This
broadcast signalled a significant change in tone for the state media. While state TV was
previously blackguarding the protesters, and ignoring events, now they began praising those
same youths it had called thugs only hours earlier.
It was on this day that the military began framing itself as the true 'protectors of the
revolution' (عسكر كاذبون,7 personal communication, October 21, 2012). SCAF had decided they
were better off without Mubarak, and that it was best to acknowledge and praise the
revolution in order to win over the general public and safeguard the interests of the military
and its higher echelons. The state media played an important part in the creation of this image
by its uncritical stance vis-a-vis the military and its praise of the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF).
In March, for example, Channel 2 aired a talk show with two young hosts, that was in fact a
relentless exaltation of the 'revolution.' Every word on the revolutionaries and the revolution
was one of laudation. The song 'Sound of Freedom' ( – صوت الحريةSout Al Horiya) by Hany
Adel was mentioned at length as being an “absolutely wonderful” song by both hosts and
guests. (“2011 ”, )ايامناThe music video that goes along with the song was recorded on Tahrir
square, and uses pictures taken during the protests. It reinvents nationalist poetry from the
October War of 1976, that uses imagery that compares the blood shed for the country to the
spring that brings life. The chorus repeats the same sentence over and over again: “In every
street of my country, the sound of freedom is calling me.” (Adel, H. (Songwriter &
Performer), Hawary, H. E., Mostafa, S. (Performers) and Ismail, A. (Producer). (2011). Sout
7 Askar Kazeboon is a campaign that took alternative media to the people. They held screenings of amateur
footage that exposed the army as liars in different neighbourhoods, and even one at Maspero itself.
They preferred not to appear with their personal name.
13Laurens Bielen Al Horiya ( [ )ص وت الحري ةmusic video], Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=- HcZAJRcOtY) The change of tone and content that accompanied the ouster of Mubarak, was not planned or directed from above. One of the key points is that Maspero is a big institution, with important internal dynamics (M. Nader, personal communication, October 3, 2012; S. Shukrallah, 8 personal communication, October 7, 2012). These dynamics erupted a few days after Mubarak's ouster, when members of the ERTU protested vehemently against Abdel Latif al- Manawy's conduct during the revolution. Al-Manawy was Head of the Egyptian News Sector of the ERTU. During the protest, al-Manawy had to be rescued by the military (ahmedlo5. (2011, February 13). 13022011080.mp4 [video file]. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8C4APRUKYSo). Thus, when Mubarak was gone, people who opposed him received – or took – more 'space' at the state television (S. Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). Two other dynamics at play in this period are the following: one, praising the revolution and its propagators was a way of containing the effects of the revolution (S. Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012) as long as the praise remained superficial; and, two, people are opportunists (S. Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). These opportunists saw the revolutionaries as the new strongmen, who had to be treated favourably: after all, the revolutionaries had managed to ouster Mubarak, and had successfully demanded the resignation of the Minister of Information, Anas El-Fiky. However, soon the interests of the protesters and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces began to drift apart. The first sign was on 26 February, when the army first used violence to disperse protesters (“Protesters say Egypt military used force to disperse them,” 2011). On 9 March, the army forcibly evicted everyone from Tahrir square, with reports of torture emerging soon (Iskandar, 2012a). It became clear that Maspero now fully supported the SCAF. The numerous demonstrations that were critical of the SCAF rule almost never made the news, and none of the accusations that protesters made against the SCAF were aired (Iskandar, 2012b). One of the biggest cases being ignored on state television was the “virginity tests” that were conducted on March 9 by 8 Salma Shukrallah is an activist, journalist for Ahram Online, and guest contributor for Jadaliyya. 14
Maspero after Mubarak
the army.9 A poignant example of state media censorship happened on May 10, when the first
female presidential hopeful criticised the SCAF in an interview on the state television: the
head of the ERTU had the interview taken off the air (Iskandar, 2012a).
From 'revolutionaries' to 'thugs'
This gap between protesters on the one side, and the SCAF on the other, only widened over
the following weeks, in the run-up to the constitutional referendum of 19 March. The SCAF
wanted everyone to vote in favour, while the revolutionaries tried to persuade voters to reject
the reforms. According to Mona Nader, this was the decisive rupture between SCAF and the
revolutionaries (M. Nader, personal communication, October 3, 2012). This resulted in
another shift of tone at Maspero. The predominant conservative attitude coupled with a dose
of opportunism meant that the revolutionaries were viewed less favourably. This general
stance comes from the view that “everything that is mainstreamed as good, is good” (S.
Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). By this time, the 'revolution' had been
accepted by this conservative stream, but the process had altered what this revolution
encompassed. The same protesters that toppled the Mubarak regime were now no longer
viewed as revolutionaries: these protesters were no longer protesting against Mubarak or his
allies, but against the new transitional government (عس كر ك اذبون, personal communication,
October 21, 2012). Now, they were considered people that wanted to destroy the country (S.
Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). This twist was necessary, because the
army – in their own view – “saved the revolution”, and the army was intrinsically good 10 (S.
Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). Thus, the revolution had to be good.
Now, however, the army was taking action against protesters. It follows from the previous that
these protesters couldn't be revolutionaries.
9 Girls and women that were arrested at protests had to undergo a “virginity test,” so that the army could
allegedly prove that they were not sexually assaulted by them, later on. Only one of the women, Samira
Ibrahim, filed a formal complaint. The army tried to cover up this abuse. (Human Rights Watch. (9
november 2011). Egypt: Military 'Virginity Test' Investigation a Sham. Retrieved from:
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/09/egypt-military-virginity-test-investigation-sham)
The state media failed to report on the incident (Iskandar, 2012a).
10 This is not only because they successfully depicted themselves as 'saviours of the revolution', but also
because of the long-standing image of the army as the protectors and heroes of Egypt, especially after the
1973 war with Israel.
15Laurens Bielen
Askar Kazeboon (personal communication, October 21, 2012) explains it this way:
It was normal to hear people say: “These are not the revolutionaries of January 25th,
these are thugs.” In this context, the January 25 revolutionaries are good, the military is
good: they ushered in a new era, [while] those in the square are thugs trying to destroy
Egypt.
In short, when the protesters and the military drifted further and further apart, Maspero
attached itself to the military.
It is important to stress that this position was not institutionalised, as Salma Shukrallah
(Personal communication, October 7, 2012) correctly assesses. Rather, it was a general feeling
and outlook, created and strengthened by the SCAF and its allies. Others put it more bluntly:
Issandr Al-Amrani asserted that “the most important of the state-controlled media, the
television channels that seek to influence the worldview of millions of Egyptians, are still
outrageous propaganda outlets” (Al-Amrani, 2011).
That the protesters were now generally considered thugs at Maspero became painfully clear
on 9 October 2011, when – as briefly described in the introduction – a mainly Christian
protest against sectarian incitement of the state media turned into a violent battle with the
army and armed civilians. Commenting on the protest on live television, Channel 1 host
Rasha Magdy called upon the viewers to come down to Maspero and help the army, that was
supposedly being attacked by violent protesters (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
(CIHRS), 2011; Ibrahim, 2012). The army downplayed its role in these events, and absolved
itself of any responsibility for the deaths and the violence in a press conference, aired without
any accompanying critical remarks on the state television.
Later on, the army denied the use of violence in two other protests, in the first of which 40
protesters were killed by police forces (Iskandar, 2012b). The SCAF used the state media to
spread its image of innocence: Nile TV aired the full press conference in which the SCAF
absolved itself of any responsibility by showing edited footage of the events (Iskandar,
2012a). The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies published a report
(Hadid, 2011) that lists the baseless accusations made by the state television at the protesters,
16Maspero after Mubarak
who were allegedly shooting at the army, killing several.
The state media's uncritical coverage was attacked on several private channels.
The changes in the media approach of the SCAF is also clearly exhibited in its reinstatement
of the Ministry of Information. In February, the SCAF abolished the Ministry under enormous
pressure of the protesters and various rights organisations (Committee to Protect Journalists,
2011b). A few months later, in July, the SCAF reversed its decision, and swore in Osama
Heikal as Minister of Information. The Ministry had always been considered one of the key
obstacles to press freedom.
The trend was continued, when in September the SCAF announced that the Emergency Law
would be in effect again. This was combined with a general deteriorating climate for the
media, and attracted international attention and condemnation from i.a. the Committee to
Protect Journalists (2011c).
The 2011 parliamentary elections
The postponed parliamentary elections that were held in November were one of the most free
elections in Egypt in decades. State media did their best to promote and invigorate this image
in every way they could (S. Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). The
elections were this free because there were no clear favourites (S. Shukrallah, personal
communication, October 7, 2012), but also – and more importantly – because the SCAF didn't
have a 'preferred candidate' (M. Nader, personal communication, October 3, 2012).
One of the most positive aspects was the educational programming in the run-up to the
elections, according to the CIHRS (2011). The state channels aired programmes on how to
vote, and strongly urged voters not to sell their votes.
Nevertheless, the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) (2011) pointed to small
irregularities that show a preference of Channel 2 for the Muslim Brotherhood: pre-election
polls gave the Muslim Brotherhood party the biggest share of the votes at 40%. According to
the CIHRS these practices should be condemned as they can influence voter behaviour and
attract more votes to parties that appear to be winning. According to a CIHRS study (مرك ز
17Laurens Bielen 2012 ,القاهرة لدراسات حقوق النسان. pp. 109-117), the Freedom and Justice party also received the majority of the airtime dedicated to the elections: both terrestrial channels devoted double the time to the FJP compared to the party that received the next most attention. Throughout this period, the state television was singing the praise of the SCAF and the army for enabling the elections and safeguarding the country (R. Abdulla, 2011; Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 2011. p. 8; M. Nader, personal communication, October 3, 2012). While people were demonstrating against the regime, the state television aired pictures of soldiers assisting voters. Rasha Abdulla (2011) also noted that the only voices heard on the state television news were voices of praise for the SCAF. In the talk shows the same pattern was visible, but to a lesser degree. Abdulla (2011. p. 8) also pointed at a clear anti-revolutionary reaction from the news anchor after a report about an election boycott by revolutionaries: the anchor said in his concluding remarks that the elections were the only option for Egypt on its way to democracy. Although the state media parroted the SCAF statements about its commitment to the revolution and its non-violence for months, it is important to iterate that there was a certain degree of internal dissent with the (non-institutionalised) position Maspero took. Several journalists and presenters were “demoted, fired, or have [had] charges brought against them” (Iskandar, 2012a;b). Earlier that year, Hafez el-Mirazi, a member of the Board of the Egyptian State Television had already resigned in protest to the SCAF's control over the media (Iskandar, 2012a). In November, Nile TV presenter Mona El-Shayeb went on air to plead for public support of her organisation that tried to 'purify' the state media (Iskandar, 2012a; loversofegypt. (2011, November 22). [ رد قن اة الني ل للخب ار عل ى انتق ادات التليفزي ون المص رىYoutube clip], Retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZVsYA5Doebo.) In the segment, she admitted that the state TV was biased, and that change is necessary: “The [state] television needs to return to the people, it needs to talk to the people and with the tongue of the people.” She stressed that the state television had a history of 30 years of service to the state, and that – as a consequence – it is impossible to chance the ingrained sentiments and practices in a short time. 18
Maspero after Mubarak
These are the people that Christopher Sparks (1995) describes as the powerless. They
constitute a pull factor on the media, counteracting the influence of the establishment.
In January in the lead-up to the one year anniversary of the protests of the 25th, the state
television covered the protests in much the same way it covered the Maspero protests of
October (M. Nader, personal communication, October 3, 2012). After a period of fairly
balanced reporting, protesters took to the streets protesting the biased state media once more.
Broadcasts from the state television generally praised the SCAF, while blackguarding the
protesters (S. Shukrallah, personal communication, October 7, 2012). Journalist, activist and
writer of the famous blog 3arabawy, Hossam el-Hamalawy was very clear in January on the
matter of change at the state media under the SCAF (VOMENA, 2012):
When it comes to the state-run press, nothing has changed. Nothing! Like you feel that
Mubarak is still around, except [you have to] take out the word 'Mubarak' and put in
[its] stead the words 'field marshal Tantawi'.
He emphasised that the state media behaved in the same way as under Mubarak. The
television was extolling the virtues of the military and the SCAF, and aired every
announcement from the SCAF without the slightest critical approach.
Maspero – which became known to more and more people as “a major symbol of oppression,
and the tool of anti-revolutionary propaganda” (عسكر كاذبون, personal communication, October
21, 2012) – became a target for protests: “The state media turn people against us,” reasoned
the activists, “so we need to control the media.”
Controlling the state media is too difficult a task for protesters, but they established some
projects that had a significant impact. A lot of activists noticed that the military talked through
the media to the people, and was telling lies. Some of them tried to find a way to expose these
lies: they founded 'Askar Kazeboon' (' – عسكر ك اذبونThe military are liars'), a campaign that
took alternative media to the people. They held screenings of amateur footage that exposed
the army as liars in different neighbourhoods, and even one at Maspero itself. Major news
outlets regularly use footage shot by reporters of the affiliated independent media organisation
Mosireen.
19Laurens Bielen After the so-called Port Said Massacre in which fans of the Al-Masry football team stormed the field and attacked Al-Ahly fans – the Ultras Ahlawy who played an important role in almost every protest – and team members, leading to more than 70 deaths and hundreds injured, a sports presenter at the state television condemned the authorities for its conduct (Iskandar, 2012a; freechristianvoice. (2012, February 2). لول م ره م ذيع ف ى التليفزيون المص رى يه اجم ر [ ادارة مصYoutube video]. Retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=7fPmVuZcmRM). For minutes, the presenter lashed out at the security forces and defended the protesters at Maspero and elsewhere. During protests the following days, another journalists of the state media, Nile TV correspondent Mahmoud Al-Azaly, gave a long and detailed report of how the security forces attacked the protesters (Iskandar, 2012a; Ahmed Mostafa. (2012, February 4). "س جل ي ا تاري خ يس قط يس قط حكم العس كر "وش هد ش اهد م ن اهله ا. Retrieved from: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpxwC41Ze7Q). In the segment, he is very vocal about the use of live ammunition on protesters, which the SCAF denied and the state media had always repeated. Mahmoud Al-Azaly11 had himself been shot with pellets (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012). Although he was hit in the eye, it is not clear if he was targeted. Another episode in the same period was the with the advent of the so-called NGO-trial. In an unprecedented media-campaign of which the state television was an important part, NGOs were discredited as foreign agents, arrested and brought to trial (Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), 2011). 11 The article of the CPJ wrongly states his name as 'Mahmoud al-Ghazali'. 20
Maspero after Mubarak
New president; new media?
In his campaign, Mohamed Morsi promised that “no one will touch media freedoms” (Aboul
Enein, 2012), but this promise did not hold.
With the inauguration of the new president, a power-struggle erupted between newly elected
Mohamed Morsi and the SCAF (El Zein, 2012; Kirkpatrick & El Sheikh, 2012). Kirkpatrick
and El Sheikh quoted state television producer Taghrid Wafi comparing this period to the
weeks after the downfall of Mubarak, when nobody knew who was in power. While criticism
of the military seemed possible, everyone in the state media soon believed that the real leaders
of the country were still the generals (S. Amin, 2012).
The general view was that criticism of the President would become increasingly difficult and
dangerous (H. Saleh, 2012). Soon after his inauguration, Morsi had the editors of several
state-led newspapers fired and replaced (Abrams, 2012). Later, he strengthened his position
vis-a-vis the SCAF by sacking the top of the military.
While Morsi had promised to abolish the Ministry of Information, he soon appointed his
fellow party member Salah Abdel-Maqsoud as the new Minister of Information (Aboul Enein,
2012).
Nevertheless, Shahira Amin – who quit the state television earlier – opined that the situation
at the state television had improved under Morsi: she saw no directives from above, and
reckoned that there was a greater degree of freedom of expression (Khalil, 2012). In personal
correspondence some time later, however, Amin retracted that statement, saying that there had
been no change at the state media (S. Amin, personal communication, November 8, 2012).
In August, the SCAF was overhauled by Morsi: the two top officials, Hussein Tantawi and
Sami Annan, were 'promoted' to presidential advisers. Other SCAF members retired or were
appointed at other government positions. The new president revoked decisions made by the
SCAF, and re-appropriated several powers that the SCAF transferred from the presidency to
themselves. It is not clear if this constitutes a fundamental change in the power structure, or if
this only means that the military will continue to control the country from the sidelines as it
21Laurens Bielen
did under the previous presidents (Salem, 2012; Sallam, 2012). Emad Al-Din Hussein (,حسين
2012) pointed in the same direction in his newspaper column, emphasising the strong historic
ties between the military and the media, even long before 25 January. In the same sense,
Hesham Sallam considers it impossible that the state television would air these decisions
without approval of the “relevant wielders of power inside the military establishment”
(Sallam, 2012).
By September, Morsi had fully asserted his authority over the state media (Hendawi, 2012).
The state media developed a “personality cult, portraying Morsi as something of a superman,”
and an interview on the state television turned into a monologue only interrupted with flattery
of Morsi. Coupled with what has been described in the previous paragraph, this should
probably be seen as Morsi taking the forefront, while the military retreated backstage, while
retaining most of its power.
All the issues described above make observers say that Morsi is no different than Mubarak
(Hendawi, 2012). Newspaper commentator Wael Kandil (2012 , )قن ديلsees Morsi travelling
the same road that every president since the 1952 coup has taken, shaping the state media to
serve top-ranking officials. Famous novelist Alaa Al-Aswany also compared Morsi to
Mubarak: “President Morsi preserved Mubarak's corrupt media using them for his [own]
benefit” (2012 ,)الس واني. This view is reflected in Muhammad Shuman's article (,ش وما
2012) that stated that, rather than changing the law, the Muslim Brotherhood inherited them
gladly. Ahmed Aboul Enein (2012) echoes these statements in his own article.
What next?
Askar Kazeboon is very clear in its evaluation of the performance of the state media under
Morsi's rule: ‘Things are getting worse.’ (Personal communication, October 21, 2012)
With concern to the future of Maspero, Ramy Aly (2011) pointed at the importance of the
transformation of the state television to a Public Service Broadcaster.
22Maspero after Mubarak
All respondents point to the public-service broadcasting model as an ideal. In that model, the
key values are universality, diversity and independence (Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision
(Canada), 2001). They all indicate that these values are missing from the state television as it
is now. The basic mandate of the public-service broadcasting fits with the goals of the
Egyptian state television, i.e. to inform, educate, and entertain. However, there are countless
issues with the way this mandate is carried out, as demonstrated in this paper. If Maspero
wants its television channels to evolve into PBS-type channels, there is much work to do.
However, apart from some dissidents and activists, there appears to be no one trying to
effectuate this.
Rasha Abdulla (2010) is correct in saying that it is by now very difficult to hide the truth from
the public (p. 83), in part because of a phenomenon that Salma Shukrallah calls the
“Lebanonisation of the [Egyptian] media” (Personal communication, October 7, 2012): via
satellite, a plethora of new and older television channels catering to every political preference
became available, especially after Mubarak's ouster. A lot of these networks are connected to
the old Mubarak regime, while others are founded by businessmen and are more liberal. Some
are wary of this trend: Hisham Kassem, former publisher of Al-Masry Al-Youm, decried the
emergence of all these channels led by businessmen, saying that those channels only serve the
interests of those businessmen: “With these big media owners, now, we will wish for state
media at some point” (Mansour & Herrera, 2012). Still, this had as a result that the state
television could no longer lie as openly as it used to do (S. Shukrallah, personal
communication, October 7, 2012). In this sense, Salma Shukrallah – contrary to the Askar
Kazeboon campaign – sees some improvement in the performance of the state television,
compared to what was still possible in January 2011.
This sentiment is not shared by Ahmed Aboul Enein, journalist at the Daily News Egypt. He
sees a gloomy future, with Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood using the same techniques
employed by Mubarak in controlling the media (Aboul Enein, 2012).
Rasha Abdulla (2011. p. 11) stated correctly that the Egyptian State Television “needs to
realize that it is there to serve all sectors of the people of Egypt.” This is a sentiment shared
with Ramy Aly (2011) who characterises the current state television as the public relations
channel of the state. Also within Maspero these feelings are present. In this article, the
23Laurens Bielen example of Mona El-Shayeb is quoted, who poetically declared that the “[state] television needs to return to the people, it needs to talk to the people, with the tongue of the people.” 24
Maspero after Mubarak
Conclusion
The end of Morsi's 100-day period on October 8 is a fitting symbolic date to conclude the
time-frame of this research, albeit much less symbolic than the date chosen as the starting
point. It appears from the research presented above that the changes that happened at the state
television in Egypt during this period were less than symbolic, and merely superficial.
Applying the ideas of Korany on change to this case, shows us that big and sudden changes
on one level do not always correspond to the same type of change on another level. The
change that happened in the period from January 25 to February 12, 2011 had only a limited
influence on the state media, while the events had a much bigger impact on other 'stages' of
power, and national and international relations. Nevertheless, the months that followed saw
several minor events that constituted a “slow change” - the result of cumulative processes.
This slow change, however, was nothing more than piffling and outwardly. The state
television as a whole never fundamentally changed its attitude towards those in power or the
people. Whenever the power balance shifted, the loyalties of Maspero shifted in the same
manner.
When the SCAF took over from Mubarak, the state television immediately realised that they
were the new centre of power. This assessment was of course an easy one, seeing the
historical political and economical power of the military. The result of this was an almost
unequivocal support of the SCAF in all its decisions. With the parliamentary elections later
that year, Maspero discovered that the Muslim Brotherhood had probably become the most
powerful political faction. As a result, they received by far the most – and almost solely
positive – airtime. While the election of Morsi as the new president heralded a short period of
confusion and power-struggle, soon Morsi and his Freedom and Justice party emerged as the
new big centre of power, while the military retreated to the back-stage. The state television
was quick to adopt, and treated Morsi the same way it had treated Mubarak before him.
All this time, the state television was little more than the propaganda outlet for the current
rulers.
Another area of change at the state television is how Maspero depicted the protesters. During
the days of the revolution, the protesters were outlaws with foreign agendas trying to destroy
25Laurens Bielen the country. Then, they became patriotic heroes for a short time, but they soon became thugs and outlaws, again. The state television reflects here the point of view of the ruling powers. In Korany's terminology, the first change of attitude – from zero to hero – is the consequence of a big change, while the second change – from hero back to zero, again – is more of an evolutionary nature. As showed in this article, the view of the SCAF and Maspero on the protesters changed slowly with each demonstration. If one change can be considered really important, it is the louder voice of dissent and discontent inside Maspero, compared with the level of internal discord under the previous regime. This proves that Dina Matar's assessment of the state in the Arab world, being in constant flux and with internal differences, is equally valid when it comes to the state media. After the 25th of January, the differences between the propaganda-based news of the state television, the coverage from the other networks, and the reality was exacerbated. This led to more presenters and hosts voicing their disagreement, be that on air or by quitting the network. Thus it has been apparent form a methodological point of view that Christopher Sparks's (1995) model of the mass media, as outlined in the beginning of this article, is more easily applied, and paints a more precise picture of the state of the media than other models. This whole article proves how important it is to have an eye for internal dynamics and change. The different actors Spark defined are clearly distinguishable in the case of the Egyptian state media: the SCAF – and later Morsi and his government – are pressuring the state media in one direction, while activists and NGOs try to counter that; internal, there are journalists opposing the 'official' view. This results in internal dynamics and flux at the state television, as demonstrated in this article. 26
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