Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
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Moscow, July, 2012
valdaiclub.com
Military Reform:
Toward the New Look
of the Russian Army
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical Report
The authors of the report:
Mikhail Barabanov,
Editor-in-Chief of Moscow Defense Brief
Konstantin Makienko,
Deputy Director of the Center for
Analysis of Strategies and Technologies;
member of the Expert Council under the
Russian State Duma Defense Committee
Ruslan Pukhov,
Director of the Center for Analysis of
Strategies and Technologies; member
of the Public Council under the Russian
Defense Ministry
Russian military reform was
discussed at the conference of
the Defense and Security section
of the Valdai Discussion Club
titled “Modernization of Russia’s
Armed Forces and Cooperation
in International Security” which
was held on May 25—27, 2011
in Moscow.
Contents
3 0. Introduction
5 1. Prerequisites for the Military
Reform
9 2. Military-Political Context of
Reform: Risks and Threats to
Russia’s Military Security
12 3. Demographic and Financial
Resources
15 4. Strategic Objectives of the
Serdyukov-Makarov Reform
25 5. Dynamics of Conscription
and Enlistment
29 6. Rearming the Army and the Navy
32 7. Interim Results of the Reform
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
0. Introduction
In October 2008, Russian Defense Minister by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
Anatoly Serdyukov announced the launch of of the Russian Empire Count Sergei Witte:
a new stage of military reform, aimed at tran- “In Russia, you need to enact reforms quickly;
sitioning the Russian Armed Forces to a new otherwise they mostly do not work out and are
look. This rapid and intensive military reform inhibited.”
has turned out to be the most radical transfor-
It should also be noted that the top politi-
mation of the country’s military since the crea-
tion of the Red Army in 1918.1 The Defense
cal leadership fully supports the Serdyukov-
Makarov military reform. It is this support
Ministry has embarked on an active and vig-
that has played a significant role in stabilizing
orous campaign of reforms, most of which
the reform, given the intense criticism by the
were completed on an organizational level by
military and the “expert community” of many
December 1, 2009. However, the reform pro-
aspects of the changes. This political support
cess is still continuing on many fronts.
has resulted in consistent increas-
es in spending on the country’s
defense. Moreover, these increas-
In an unprecedentedly short period for es have been forthcoming not only
peacetime, the Russian Armed Forces in periods of economic growth,
but also during the acute phase of
have been given a new look that is the 2008–2009 economic crisis.
radically different from the traditional
form of the Red, Soviet and Russian The importance and the scale
of transformations were noted
armies in Vladimir Putin’s report, pub-
lished on the threshold of the
The changes affected all the main elements of presidential elections: “We have adopted and
Russia’s Armed Forces – strength, command are implementing unprecedented develop-
and control, organization, and officer train- ment programs for our armed forces and for
ing. It is not only the radical nature but also the modernisation of Russia’s defense indus-
the speed of the reforms that is astonishing. try. All in all, we will allocate something like
In fact, in an unprecedentedly short period for 23 trillion rubles for these purposes over the
peacetime, the Russian Armed Forces under- next decade. Frankly speaking, there have
went a restructuring that was radically differ- been plenty of discussions regarding the size
ent from the traditional form of the Red, Soviet and timeliness of such sizable allocations. I
and Russian armies. Whether by intuition or am convinced that they fully correspond to the
consciously, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyu- country’s potential and resources. And, most
kov and Chief of General Staff of the Armed important, we cannot put off the goal of creat-
Forces Nikolai Makarov in this respect seem ing modern armed forces and of comprehen-
to be following the principle once formulated sively strengthening our defensive potential.”2
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 3
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
It is too early to gauge the final outcome of the is of key importance. Success in personnel
reform process. Although the organizational preparation will mean that the Russian Armed
transformations have to a large extent already Forces can become Russia’s most efficient
been made, two of the most time-consuming public institution, against the backdrop of a
aspects of the reforms – strength acquisition generally rather inefficient and corrupt Rus-
and the training of new, professional and sian bureaucracy. Failure will be tantamount
adequately motivated personnel (both officers to the failure of the entire military reform
and contract soldiers), and rearmament – are program overall.
far from complete.
1 Some believe that the most radical transformation took
The results of the reforms in these two areas place before and during World War II.
will not be visible before 2012–2015. It needs 2 Vladimir Putin`s article “Being strong: National security
to be clearly understood that it is the prepara- guarantees for Russia” //Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February
tion of the new officer and new soldier that 20, 2012
4 Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
1. Prerequisites for the Military
Reform
1.1. The Russian Armed Forces before the overall strength, while the structure of the
Reform in 2008 officer personnel was well below standard.
Instead of a “pyramid,” in which junior offic-
On the eve of the radical changes, widely ers made up the majority of the personnel,
referred to as “giving the armed forces a there was an “egg” shape, with almost as many
new look”, the Russian Army was in fact still lieutenant colonels as there were captains, and
holding on to the main features of its Soviet even more majors.
predecessor. However, compared to the Soviet
Army, it had deteriorated substantially in 1.1.3. A low proportion of stand-by combat-
almost all the basic parameters – the quality ready units, less than 13% of the total num-
of combat training and personnel, motivation, ber of units. In the Army, this share reached
modern equipment, or even simply in terms 17%, in the Air Force it was no more than
of new weapons and military hardware. The 7% (and none at all in the Anti-Aircraft Mis-
main weaknesses of the Russian Army in the sile Troops) and in the Navy it was 70%.
period before the reforms were: Only the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF)
and the Airborne Forces were
100% ready for combat opera-
tions. A period of one year was
On the eve of the radical changes needed to achieve full com-
the Russian Army had deteriorated bat readiness and deployment
of the Army, while the vast
substantially in almost all the basic majority of armed conflicts of
parameters the past 20 years have been
characterized by volatility and
lack of a clearly defined period
of threat.
1.1.1. Disproportionate echelons of command.
While the total number of personnel in the 1.1.4. In the period from 1992 to 2008, i.e.
Armed Forces was 1.35 million, there were over 16 years, virtually no significant pur-
52,000 command-and-control personnel. At chases of weapons and military equipment
the same time, the actual strength of combat- were made for general-purpose forces. As a
ready forces, as shown by the experience of the result, at the outset of the reforms, the Army
two Chechen wars, was no more than 100,000. was equipped with obsolete and outdated
Consequently, there was one command-and- weapons and military equipment, much of
control professional for every two combat- which was in out-of-commission status. The
ready soldiers and officers. situation was particularly dire in one of the
most hi-tech services of the Armed Forces,
1.1.2. A disproportionately large proportion the Air Force, where up to 55% of the total
of officers and warrant officers – 50% of the equipment was out of commission.
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 5
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Staffing of the armed forces of the Russian Federation
until 2008
STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN FUNCTIONAL WEAPONS
ARMED FORCES UNTIL 2008. AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
UNITS OF PERMANENT
COMBAT READINESS
FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL
WEAPONS WEAPONS
AND MILITARY AND MILITARY
EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT
Army Formations and units 17% 75-85% 100% 85-90%
Aviation units 7% 100%
45-50% 50-55%
Air Force Air defense units 0% 100%
PERIOD
Navy Ships and patrol boats 70% 75-80% OF THREAT 100% 75-80%
UP TO ONE
Strategic YEAR
Missile Forces Missile regiments 100% 100% 100% 100%
Airborne
Forces Formations and units 100% 85% 100% 85%
Size of the Armed Forces
1,35 MIL 4,20 MIL
in peacetime in wartime
Source: Russian Defense Ministry
1.2. Military, Political and Technical (due to the collapse of one of them) is believed
Prerequisites for the Reform to have reduced the probability of large-scale
war, preparations for which had always been
The essential features of the Soviet Army were the main task of the Soviet Army. Even if we
retained for 15 years after the collapse of the assume that the elimination of deep ideologi-
Soviet Union, but the Russian Armed Forces cal contradictions and Russia’s desire to build
were in a qualitatively new military-political, the same type of Western economic (market
technological and resource (especially demo- economy) and political system (open pol-
graphic and financial) environment, which yarchy, more commonly referred to today as
naturally required them to adapt to a new “democracy”) do not mean the end of military
context. Among the most significant changes and political rivalry, it is clear that Moscow
that triggered the transformations are the fol- does not have sufficient resources to continue
lowing: competing in the conventional field.
1.2.1. A radical change in the global military Containment of NATO, if it is still relevant,
and political situation. The end of the ideo- can only be done with a nuclear deterrent. On
logical confrontation between the two systems the other hand, all the real evidence shows
6 Moscow, JuLY, 2012
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
that since 1979, the Soviet, and subsequently “elite” military units, combined into a single
Russian, Army has been perpetually involved real-time “combat information network” that
in local, counter-guerilla and counter-terror- gives them access to unprecedentedly high
ism wars, and has also conducted numer- levels of reconnaissance, situational data and
ous peacekeeping operations. It is clear that target designation, and imparts to these com-
preparations for this type of conflict have far bat units an unheard-of capacity for coordina-
less stringent requirements in terms of army tion. Network-centric military operations have
strength and mobilization capability, but at a number of features that distinguish them
the same time call for a significant increase in qualitatively from the nature of war under the
professionalism and combat readiness. “deep-battle” theory which prevailed during
the Second World War and for
several decades thereafter. These
special features include:
Containment of NATO can only be done
with a nuclear deterrent 1.2.2.1. The development of
command, control, communi-
cations, computer, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance
1.2.2. The evolution of forms and methods of (C4ISR) systems, as well as firepower lead-
warfare. The Russian military hold that the ing to an increase in the importance of the
theory of network-centric warfare, which has a actions and the combat effectiveness of rela-
profound theoretical basis and has had practi- tively small groups of “combat units.” Units
cal confirmation, dominates modern Western of even low tactical value are dispersed, which
(primarily American) military thinking. requires a good knowledge of the enemy, as
well as knowledge and understanding of the
The “network” concept presupposes that the intentions of one’s own higher command.
traditional linear, centralized and hierarchical Combat operations are conducted with the
principle of social systems (“center – periph- highest degree of autonomy and independence
ery,” “trunk – branches”), which is character- of units, with increased initiative of command
istic of an industrial society, will be replaced among them.
with self-organizing, nonlinear and fundamen-
tally non-structuralized systems suitable for a 1.2.2.2. Combat operations are carried out
modern information society. It is assumed that very rapidly, and are distinctive in their rapid
in such “nonlinear” systems, there is no “core,” and constant maneuvering, including “verti-
i.e. no clearly defined “center,” since every cal” maneuvering.
cell of such a set may, under certain circum-
stances, assume the function of the “center.” 1.2.2.3. The massing of forces and resources
Consequently, modern military organization and fires, is no longer a decisive factor in mili-
is conceived as a totality of highly professional tary superiority. Furthermore, such massing
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 7
Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
could actually have an adverse effect, since it demographic dynamics, have impacted on
makes it easier to find targets for destruction. the traditional Russian military hierarchy
There will be a tendency for the prevalence of of different services and combat arms. First
smaller, highly mobile and agile forces. of all, achieving the capability to conduct
network-centric war presupposes a radical
1.2.2.4. Military operations are designed to not modernization of command, control, com-
only defeat the enemy physically, but also to munications, computer, intelligence, surveil-
crush their morale, and not just of the troops lance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), particu-
but also of the people and the government. larly at the tactical level, an area where the
Factors such as the depth of support for the war Soviet Army typically lagged behind. On the
among the general population play an increas- other hand, the demographic crisis and the
ingly important role and, accordingly, so does declining quality of conscripts mean that
understanding and using culturally specific the Russian Army will no longer be able to
features of the enemy and his political system, rely on its usual trump card of numerous
including through exposure via the media. motorized rifle and tank forces. Perhaps for
the first time in its military his-
tory, the Russian Army cannot
count on a guaranteed numeri-
The evolution of the external environment cal superiority over the enemy,
and the deterioration of the demographic and therefore needs to raise its
technological level. Accordingly,
situation make it absolutely imperative to hi-tech tools of “stand-off war-
transform a mass mobilization army into fare,” such as aircraft and pre-
one that is more compact and professional cision weapons, are becoming
increasingly important. It goes
without saying that maintaining
the strategic balance, by defini-
1.2.2.5. The distinction between “civilian” and tion, requires the preservation of the pri-
“military” segments of society is disappearing. macy of all three components of the Strategic
The aim of a military campaign is to impact Nuclear Forces (SNF).
not only the enemy army, but also its society,
understood in terms of its cultural as well as In addition, the active efforts of the U.S.
its physical aspects. This trend makes it neces- to create new and effective means of high-
sary to conduct joint “civilian-military” opera- precision conventional attack make it neces-
tions, rather than purely military ones. sary to strengthen the Aerospace Defense
Forces. In general, both the evolution of the
1.2.3. Changes in the contribution of the external environment and the deterioration of
services and combat arms of the Armed the demographic situation make it absolutely
Forces in achieving the ultimate goal of com- imperative to transform a mass mobilization
bat operations. The military, political and army into one that is more compact and pro-
doctrinal evolution, as well as unfavorable fessional.
8 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
2. Military-Political Context
of Reform: Risks and Threats
to Russia’s Military Security
Any discussion of military reform will inevita- stan does not come under attack.) On the
bly involve constructing a hierarchy of military other hand, a conflict with NATO, which seems
risks and threats. This should proceed from unlikely for now, could compromise the lives of
the fact that the priorities publicly announced most of Russia’s population and the very exist-
in a variety of doctrinal documents may differ ence of the Russian Federation as a state. If the
significantly from the true hierarchy of threats main criterion is probability of armed conflicts
which lies at the base of real military prepa- with Russian involvement, the following hierar-
rations. For example, there is no mention in chy can be defined:
official documents of a possible military threat
from the China, while the actual military organ-
izational development clearly cannot ignore
such a threat. However, non-governmental 2.1. Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Space
observers may be freer to express their views
on the priorities of military security. In building 2.1.1. The entire Belavezha Accords system
a hierarchy of military priorities for Russia, we of state and territorial structure, which took
should distinguish the probability of an armed shape as a result of the 1991 national disaster
conflict and the scale of threat that this conflict (the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991), is
poses for the vital interests of the country. For illegitimate, random, unstable and therefore
example, the most probable scenario for today fraught with conflict. The entire post-Soviet
is the emergence in the medium term of con- Eurasian space is an area with a complex
flicts in Central Asia, which may affect Russia’s combination of integration, separatist and
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) irredentist tendencies. The system has been in
allies, but it will not pose a threat to the vital a state of permanent crisis for almost all of the
interests of Russia itself (at least while Kazakh- 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 9Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
and it is safe to say that in future it is doomed will inevitably worsen in the case of withdraw-
to more or less conflict-ridden transforma- al of Western coalition troops from the coun-
tion. Specific forms of this transformation can try, which will more than likely be followed by
range from short-term revivals of currently a return to the Taliban rule. Most likely, the
frozen conflicts to the collapse of some of the authoritarian but weak Central Asian regimes
post-Soviet states. In this case, any conflict will not independently provide effective resist-
in the post-Soviet space is highly likely, if ance to a highly motivated and experienced
not certain, to lead to Russia’s intervention, Taliban force, and Russian intervention in one
including military intervention. After all, Rus- form or another will become all but inevita-
sia is committed to ensuring the safety of the ble, turning into an absolute certainty should
CSTO, as well as South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Kazakhstan come under attack.
2.1.3. It is not a hypothetical, but
a very real conflict in the North
The entire Belavezha Accords system Caucasus that persists within the
of state and territorial structure is territory of Russia. The ethnic
illegitimate, random, unstable and separatist rebellion in Chechnya at
the turn of 2002–2003 was trans-
therefore fraught with conflict
formed into a pan-Caucasian Salafi
underground, which is waging a
subversive and terrorist “insurgen-
2.1.2. Today, the most likely threat is a dra- cy war.” The scale of military operations (up to
matic aggravation of the situation in Central 300 militants and a similar number of military
Asia. The fundamental cause of weakness of and law enforcement officers are killed each
the states in the region is, in essence, their year) is equivalent to a low-intensity conflict, and
artificial nature: the current national territo- the spatial scale of the sabotage and zone affected
rial demarcation did not stem from a long by terrorism to that of a regional conflict.
historical evolution, but was the result of the
discretionary decisions of the Bolshevik lead- 2.1.4. Russia is committed to ensuring the
ership in Moscow. Moreover, the proneness security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which
to conflict in Central Asia is both endogenous it has recognized as independent states and
and can be encouraged from outside. The whose political sovereignty is challenged by
sources of internal conflict can be clan and Georgia. Although today the resumption of the
regional rivalries (as has already happened Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian
in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and partly in conflict seems unlikely, there is no doubt that
the Fergana Valley in Uzbekistan), national the idea of revenge will continue to be central
and ethnic divisions (Kyrgyzstan; Uzbek-Tajik in Georgian political and military planning for
tensions in Uzbekistan) and social tensions. decades to come, and these conflicts will be
External threats emanating from Afghanistan revived at the slightest weakening of Russia.
10 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
2.2. Other Threats which, in view of the real balance of power
between China and Russia, may, of course,
2.2.1. A “Falklands scenario” for the Kuril only be achieved through the nuclear deter-
Islands. Japan is persisting in its open ter- rent. Accordingly, the need to preserve and
ritorial claims against Russia, and has all increase the effectiveness of the Strategic
the necessary military and technical tools for Nuclear Forces is dictated not only by the
occupying the disputed Kuril Islands. Even imperatives of maintaining strategic stability
the stagnant Japanese economy and the insta- in relation to the U.S. and NATO, but also the
bility of its government could be catalysts need to contain China.
2.2.3. “External” conflicts near
Russia’s borders pose a genu-
People’s Republic of China containment ine threat to Russian security –
above all instability in the Mid-
is becoming an ever more urgent task,
dle East, and the situation in
which, in view of the real balance of power Iran and the Democratic People’s
between China and Russia, may only be Republic of Korea.
achieved through the nuclear deterrent
2.2.4. Finally, the NATO opera-
tion in Yugoslavia, the United
States’ and its allies’ invasion in
for hostile ambitions, just as it happened in Iraq, the French-British-Italian intervention
Argentina in 1982. In this context, the priori- in the civil war in Libya, as well as continu-
ties of Russia’s military planning should be the ing territorial claims of some NATO countries
defense of the Kuril Islands, a counter-attack against Russia and its ally Belarus are keeping
to recapture the islands in the case of Japa- the task of containing NATO a priority. This
nese occupation, and in the broader sense, containment requires, above all, maintain-
general containment of Japan, including using ing the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent,
the nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, the size of especially in the context of the U.S. missile
Japan’s economy (second to third largest in defense program. However, a direct military
the world), the continued development of its conflict between Russia and NATO in the fore-
military technological capabilities make this seeable future seems extremely unlikely. The
task quite difficult. main trigger for such a conflict could be West-
ern attempts to intervene in Russia’s relations
2.2.2. Given the rapid growth of the eco- with other former Soviet republics; however,
nomic, technological and military power of as the experience of August 2008 has shown,
the People’s Republic of China, its contain- NATO takes quite a cautious and restrained
ment is becoming an ever more urgent task, approach in these situations.
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 11Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
3. Demographic and Financial
Resources
3.1. Demography It is thought that 700,000 men reach induc-
tion age in Russia each year, but with defer-
One of the main factors that will determine ments and exemptions this figure is reduced
the nature of Russia’s military organizational to 550,000. Worse still, some demographers
development in the short and medium term are predicting that in the coming years Russia
is the demographic crisis. This factor is likely is expected to enter a “demographic valley” –
to be even more important than the country’s the consequence of a sharp decline in the
financial capabilities. Demography to a great birth rate during the national disaster (col-
extent defines the parameters of conscription, lapse of the Soviet Union) in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The number
of conscripts during this period
is predicted to fall to 300,000
Hopes of achieving the announced army per year. However, the main
strength of one million is nothing more limiting factor is not even the
than a pipe dream number of conscripts, but their
quality. Above all, this is about
the health of the young men
called up for military service.
and, therefore, the ratio of conscripts to con- The medical health of conscripts is at an all-
tract soldiers in the Armed Forces. Ultimately, time low and is declining still further. While
demographic limitations will be the decisive at the end of 2007 the percentage of suitable
factor in determining the actual size of the recruits was 70.4%, by the end of 2009 it
army. In all probability, hopes of achieving the was already down to 68.4%. This suitability
announced army strength of one million are percentage has a clear inverse relationship
nothing more than a pipe dream. with the level of urbanization and income in
12 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Common medical conditions
resulting in Russian citizens
being exempted
from the draft in 2009
Musculoskeletal
disorders
19,7%
Mental disorders
13,4%
Digestive
disorders Other
10,5% disorder
s38,8%
Circulatory
disorders
8,9%
Nervous
disorders
8,7%
Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
different regions across Russia. The lowest competitiveness of the broader Russian civic
suitability percentage for recruits at the end identity against Islamic religious or ethnic
of 2009 was observed in the Siberian (65.2%) identity.
and Moscow (66.9%) Military Districts, and
the highest was in the North Caucasian
(72.6%) and the Far Eastern (72.2%) Military
Districts. 3.2. Financial and Economic Resources
Another important indicator of the quality of Spending on national defense has been deter-
conscripts is the level of civic loyalty among mined for 2011–2013.
recruits from the North Caucasus region,
especially those from Dagestan. Apart from The schedule (p.14) clearly shows that the next
the fact that soldiers from the North Cauca- two years will be a time of intensive growth
sus are the principal instigators of bullying in military spending, which will increase in
and crime in the Army, there are serious 2012 by 9.1%, and in 2013 by 26.8%. Growth
doubts about their loyalty to Russian nation- in military spending is expected not only in
al interests. Nevertheless, the Caucasus is absolute terms, but also as a percentage of the
where the most physically fit, best-trained GDP – from 3.1% in 2011 to nearly 3.4% in
and motivated recruits come from. Obvi- 2013. If these plans are realized, Russia will
ously, the resolution of this contradiction be the third or fourth largest military spender
cannot be found at the level of the Armed in the world, behind only the United States,
Forces alone. This perspective covers issues China, and possibly the UK. Significantly,
that are fundamental to Russia’s future, the trend toward increased military spend-
such as the modernization of the Caucasian ing goes against the trend of decline in most
republics, increasing the attractiveness of of the developed countries, but is in line with
the pan-Russian national project and the the general flow of the mainstream that can be
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 13Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Schedule of budget
allocations under the
heading “National Defense”,
2011-2013
bln rub
2098,6
1655,7
1517,1
2011 2012 2013
Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
sifying their combat training will
require increasing the percentage
The planned military spending formula share of the GDP spent on the mil-
can be defined as the maximum possible itary to 4% or even higher. This is
spending, taking into account the the maximum permissible level
of military spending – anything
economic potential of Russia, and the higher would have a detrimental
minimum necessary to reconstruct an effect on Russia’s economy. Even
effective military machine a prolonged period of 4% military
spending is highly undesirable in
a country that requires a radi-
cal overhaul of its infrastructure,
observed in countries with emerging markets, healthcare and education. Nevertheless, that is
such as China, India, and to a lesser extent, the minimum level of funding needed to carry
Brazil. out the military reform and the moderniza-
tion of the Armed Forces. Thus, the planned
Obviously, this places quite a high burden on military spending formula can be defined as
the relatively small and weak Russian economy. the maximum possible spending, taking into
We can assume that after 2013, implement- account the economic potential of Russia, and
ing all the commitments to raising wages for the minimum necessary to reconstruct an effec-
servicemen, re-equipping the Army and inten- tive military machine.
14 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
4. Strategic Objectives of the
Serdyukov-Makarov Reform
In general, as has already been stated, the 220,000). Dissolution of the warrant officer
ultimate goal of the reforms is to create mod- corps.
ern, well-trained Armed Forces equipped • Forming a brand new command and con-
with the latest weapons and military equip- trol system for the Armed Forces. Instead of
ment. six Military Districts, establishing four inter-
service United Strategic Commands, while
Specific areas of ongoing reform as of October retaining several combat arms – the Stra-
2008 are: tegic Missile Forces, the Aerospace Defense
• Reducing the strength of the Russian Armed Forces, and the Airborne Forces – under
Forces from 1.35 million in 2007 to 1 million central command.
in 2012. • Transitioning the Army to brigade organiza-
• Eliminating reduced-strength combined tion and abolishing the divisional, corps and
units in the Army and the conversion of all army levels.
combined units to Permanent Readiness • Reorganizing the Air Force and Air Defense;
Forces, while reducing the number of units abolishing armies, corps, divisions and air
and combined units in the Armed Forces, as regiments and transitioning to a system of
well as military bases. In other words, it is air bases and aerospace defense brigades.
the de facto renunciation of a mass mobili- • Centralizing the personnel training system
zation army in favor of a more professional through the transformation of 65 military
and combat-ready outfit. educational institutions into 10 “system-
• Changing the personnel structure to the wide” military universities.
normal “pyramid” structure. Reducing the • Significantly reducing the Central Admin-
number of officers from 335,000 to 150,000 istrative Staff and the military command
(this threshold was subsequently raised to and control authority of the Defense Minis-
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 15Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Goals and objectives
of Armed Forces reforms
The purpose of the reforms is to create mobile
and well-trained armed forces equipped with modern
equipment and weapons
Priorities
1 Re-deployment of all formations and units
for permanent combat readiness, 100% staffing
for a state of war
2 Re-equipment of the Armed Forces with
modern armaments, military and special
equipment to meet modern requirements
3 Revision of program statutory documents
for instruction, training and conduct of military
operations of the Armed Forces, as well
as planning and guidance documents to ensure
the vital functions of troops and forces
4 Training of new officers and non-commissioned
officers, compiling of new training programs,
creation of a modern network of military schools
5 Ensuring decent military pay, fulfillment
of permanent and service housing requirements
and resolution of complex social security
problems
Source: Russian Defense Ministry
• Significantly intensifying combat
The goal of the reforms is to create training, radically increasing the
number of exercises at all levels –
modern, well-trained Armed Forces from the individual and tactical
equipped with the latest weapons and level to the annual carrying out of
military equipment exercises on a strategic scale.
• Adopting a new State Arma-
ment Program for the period
2011–2020, in the course of
try, as well as support and service support which forces would be almost completely
units from 51,300 to 13,400 personnel in rearmed with new and 70% modern weap-
total. ons and military equipment.
• Outsourcing logistic support and material • Significantly increasing pay and allowances
welfare to civilian contract organizations. for members of the military and resolving
16 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Changing the number of staff at the Central Office
of the Russian Defense Ministry and supply
and security units
CENTRAL OFFICE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF SUPPLY AND SERVICE TOTAL
OF THE RUSSIAN THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE UNITS OF THE CENTRAL (NUMBER
DEFENSE MINISTRY MINISTRY OFFICE OF THE RUSSIAN OF UNITS)
DEFENSE MINISTRY
Before reforms
10 523 11 290 29 500 51 313
Staffing
reduced,
After reforms functions
10 523 transferred 2 912 13 435
to the central Staffing
office reduced
by 75%
Source: Russian Defense Ministry
the housing problem with the aim of vastly the start of the reforms), but this figure has
raising the prestige of military service. already been reached by 2012. The officer
corps was originally planned at 150,000
Let us look at some of these areas, primarily personnel (from 335,000 officer positions
related to structural changes in the Russian in 2008), and then the bar was raised to
Armed Forces. 220,000. Nevertheless, the actual reduction
in the number of officers was less: 40,000
out of these 355,000 officer positions were
in fact vacant and eliminated before the end
4.1. R
educing the Strength of the Armed of 2009. In addition, by the end of 2008,
Forces, Including Reduction of the 26,700 officers had reached the age limit for
Number of Officers military service and were subject to compul-
sory dismissal on age grounds, and in 2009,
One of the most obvious, though certainly a further 9,100 officers were due to reach the
not the most important, manifestations of age limit. As of 2008, there were 7,500 offic-
the reforms is a marked reduction in the ers commissioned for two years after gradu-
strength of the Armed Forces, including the ation from civilian colleges: they should also
officer corps. It was previously planned to have been dismissed at the end of their terms
bring the number down to one million per- of service, and from now on, such profession-
sonnel by 2016 (down from 1.35 million at als will no longer be recruited.
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 17Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
The ratio of military rank
categories in the structure
of the armed forces
until 2008
Generals 1 107
0,3%
Colonels 25 665
7,2%
Lieutenant colonels 87 637
24,7%
Majors 99 550
28,1%
Captains 90 411
25,4%
Senior lieutenants,
lieutenants 50 975
14,3%
Source: Russian Defense Ministry
number of lieutenants and senior
One of the most obvious manifestations lieutenants should increase from
of the reforms is a marked reduction 50,000 to 62,000. In 2009, the
warrant officer corps was all but
in the strength of the Armed Forces, eliminated, their numbers falling
including the officer corps. In parallel from 142,000 to 118,700. At the
the organization and establishment same time, up to 20,000 warrant
officers, who were in command
of the Army is being restructured positions, were commissioned as
in terms of job categories officers, and the rest were dis-
missed or switched to non-com-
missioned officer roles.
In parallel with the downsizing of the army,
its organization and establishment is being
restructured in terms of job categories, from
the pre-reform “egg-shaped” structure, dom- 4.2. Establishing Unified Strategic
inated by colonels and lieutenant-colonels, Commands
who outnumbered junior officers, into the
standard “pyramid” structure. As of Septem- The most significant administrative and
ber 1, 2008, there were 1,107 generals and organizational reform was the abolition of the
admirals in the Russian Armed Forces; by “traditional” Military Districts in 2010. The
2012, this number was reduced to 610. The six “old” Military Districts have been replaced
number of colonels is being reduced to 7,700; by four new “large” Military Districts and
majors are down to 25,000, and captains are the corresponding four Joint Strategic Com-
down from 90,000 to 42,000. In contrast, the mands (JSC).
18 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
Changes to the military administrative division of Russia
Before reform 1. Moscow Military District
2. Leningrad Military
2 District
1 3. Volga-Urals Military
6 District
3
4. Northern Caucasus
4 5 Military District
5. Siberian Military District
6. Far Eastern Military
District
After reform 1. Western Military District
2. Central Military District
1 3. Southern Military
District
4 4. Eastern Military District
2
3
Source: Russian Defense Ministry
trict (South JSC, commanded
Under the new model, service commands from Rostov-on-Don) and
includes the Black Sea Fleet. The
and combat-arm commands are actually Volga-Urals Military District and
transformed into appropriate combat-arm the western part of the Siberian
headquarters, while retaining all the Military District were reincorpo-
rated into the Central Military
basic functions in organizational
District (Center JSC, command-
development, strength acquisition, ed from Yekaterinburg). The
and combat training, but losing direct remaining part of the Siberian
operational control of them Military District and the former
Far Eastern Military District are
being merged to form the East-
ern Military District (East JSC,
The Western Military District (West JSC, commanded from Khabarovsk), which also
commanded from St. Petersburg) was formed includes the Pacific Fleet.
from the old Moscow and Leningrad Mili-
tary Districts and is made up of forces from These four commands correspond to the major
the two former Military Districts, as well as strategic areas that the modern Russian mili-
the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The former tary thought considers to be the main areas
North-Caucasian Military District is being of potential threat and potential theaters of
transformed into the Southern Military Dis- military operations (West, South, East), while
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 19Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
the Center JSC will apparently play the role of 4.3. Reorganizing the Army
“continental reserve.”
The basic philosophy of the reorganization of
The idea of establishing JSCs is based on the Army is to renounce the traditional Russian
the formation of unified, joint, integrated and Soviet model of a mass mobilization army
and different-service force groupings in the (that is, one mostly composed of combined
independent strategic sectors (theaters of units which are subject to full deployment only
operations). The composition of these force upon mobilization) and to transit to a fully
groupings under a unified command should manned army based on units in a permanent
include all the forces of the Army, the Air- state of combat-readiness in peacetime. The
borne Forces, the Air Force, Air Defense and Soviet Army of the 1980s had four catego-
the Navy that are stationed on the territory ries of armored and motorized rifle divisions,
of a JSC. Forming a system of coordination depending on their peacetime manning levels.
between different-service forces and materiel Moreover, only around 50 out of 200 or so
in modern warfare requires that permanent divisions were deemed Grade A, meaning they
joint command-and-control agencies should had 100% manning levels and were ready for
immediate commitment to bat-
tle. The remaining 150 divisions
(at Grades B, C and D) required
partial or full manning with mobi-
All the new look combined units must be
lized reservists and a long lead
fully manned and constitute permanently time for wartime deployment. In
combat-ready forces addition, there were also reserve
divisions that were completely
“scaled down” in terms of their
strength (after 1989, they were
be created at the operational and strategic analogous to division- or brigade-level weap-
levels, as well as the establishment of perma- ons and equipment storage bases). This com-
nent different-service joint forces at the same bination of permanently combat-ready units
levels. The new JSCs are designed to reflect and ones that required additional mobilization
precisely these requirements. (“scaled down” to varying degrees) remained
in force in Russia until 2009. Consequently,
Under the new model, service commands and all the reduced-strength units were subject to
combat-arm commands are actually trans- disbandment during the reforms. All the new
formed into appropriate combat-arm head- look combined units must be fully manned and
quarters, while retaining all the basic func- constitute permanently combat-ready forces.
tions in organizational development, strength
acquisition, and combat training, but losing An essential part of the reforms is to convert
direct operational control of them. the Army to brigade structure and three-level
20 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
The approximate composition of the Army’s units of
permanent combat readiness in new Russian military
districts as of the beginning of 2011 (excluding training
and reserve units)
WESTERN CENTRAL SOUTHERN EASTERN FOREIGN TOTAL
Army headquarters
2 2 2 4 10
Tank brigades
2 1 1 4
Motorized infantry
brigades
6 7 8 8 29
Intelligence brigades
2 2
Covering brigades
1 1
Air assault brigades
1 2 3
Machine gun
and artillery division
1 1
Military bases
(motorized rifle brigades)
4 4
Special forces brigades
2 1 2 2 7
Missile brigades
3 2 1 2 8
Artillery brigades
3 1 2 3 9
Rocket artillery brigades
1 1 1 1 4
Anti-aircraft missile
brigades
3 1 2 3 9
Engineering brigades
2 2
Source: Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies
command and control organization: military 2009–2010, these arrangements for the for-
district – operational command – brigade. mation of Operational Commands were not
Instead of the existing divisions and com- implemented, and in the end it was decided
bined-arms armies (and army corps), bri- to retain command-and-control headquarters
gades based on the original reform concept of the armies.
were meant to unite under the Operational
Commands. The plan was to assemble eight During 2009, 23 divisions were disbanded,
Operational Commands using the available and 40 deployed brigades and brigade-level
nine combined-arms armies. However, in military bases were established to replace
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 21Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
the old divisions and brigades: a total of four ment. By 2015, it is planned to reorganize the
armored brigades, 35 motorized rifle brigades current brigades into three different types:
and one protective cover brigade (in essence, heavy, medium and light motorized rifle bri-
a fortified area). Only two division-level units gades. The heavy brigade should be the main
were retained: the 18th Machine-Gun and permanently combat-ready combined unit of
Artillery Division in the Southern Kurils (reor- the Army and will be equipped with tracked
ganized into a brigade in 2011) and the 201st vehicles. The medium (mobile) brigade must
Military Base in Tajikistan (reorganized into a be fully equipped with wheeled armored vehi-
brigade in late 2010). Out of the 35 motorized cles and serve as a rapid response unit. The
rifle brigades, 10 were brigades that existed light brigade must be highly mobile and move
before 2008, 21 were formed as brigades on around in light armored vehicles.
the basis of motorized rifle divisions, and
another four were deployed from storage Experimental testing of the heavy, medium
bases. In 2010, plans were announced for the and light brigades began in 2010. The results
formation of an additional six motorized rifle will influence the second phase of reorganiza-
brigades, as well as at least one engineers and tion of all the brigades. A new type of brigade
one anti-aircraft missile brigade. is the reconnaissance brigade, the first of
which (the 100th) was formed in
late 2009 in Mozdok.
The combined Air Force and Air Defense The main reserve component of
of Russia have undergone radical the Army is the existing stor-
organizational changes and been age and maintenance facilities
subjected to severe cutbacks for weapons and military equip-
ment, which are warehouses
where sets of equipment are
stored. In 2009, more than 60
All the new brigades are in a full state of per- storage bases were established, most of which
manent combat readiness. In this way, the were brigade-level, including 15 combined-
number of permanently combat-ready units arms brigades (one armored and 14 motorized
nominally increased from 13% to 100% in the rifle). At the same time, military educational
space of one year. The actual manning levels of institutions and district training centers are
brigades range from 95% to 100%, with 100% the new look mobilization centers.
reserves of military equipment and other types
of materiel.
By the end of 2009, a total of 85 brigades had 4.4. Reorganizing the Air Force,
been established. In addition to the afore- Air Defense and Navy
mentioned 40 combined-arms brigades, they
include nine missile, nine artillery, four rocket The combined Air Force and Air Defense of
artillery and nine air defense missile brigades, Russia have also undergone radical organiza-
one engineers’ brigade, as well as signal, elec- tional changes and been subjected to severe
tronic warfare, and other types of brigades. cutbacks. The basis for the radical restructur-
Seven special forces brigades are under special ing of the Russian Air Force was the abolition
provision, and a reconnaissance brigade was of the Soviet regimental structure of air units
established as an experimental unit in Mozdok that had existed since 1938. Instead of the air
in the North Caucasus. regiment, the new basic unit of the Air Force
is the air base, which includes a command
It should be noted that the reorganization at element, between one and seven air squad-
the brigade level was split into two stages. At rons, an airfield maintenance battalion and
the first stage, for the most part completed signal elements.
by December 1, 2009, the new brigades were
formed with compromise staffing levels on the The idea is to integrate all air and ground ele-
basis of available weapons and military equip- ments under a single airbase command. This
22 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
structure has long been in place in the Belaru- and corps were disbanded and replaced by 13
sian Air Force, from where, according to some, aerospace defense brigades, combining air-
it was borrowed. bases of fighter aviation, air defense missile
regiments and radio electronic engineering
The 2009-type air bases are divided into three regiments. These 13 brigades were divided
categories: 1st (equivalent to the former air between the Operational-Strategic Command
division), 2nd (equivalent to the former air of Aerospace Defense and the four Air Force
regiment), and 3rd (equivalent to a detached and Air Defense Commands.
There were no radical organi-
zational changes to the Russian
There were no radical organizational Navy in 2009–2010, but a num-
changes to the Russian Navy, but ber of steps were taken to sim-
a number of steps were taken to simplify plify its organization and reduce
the number of units. The over-
its organization and reduce the number
all plan is to reduce them by
of units half, from 240 to 123 units. Joint
Commands of the Submarine
Forces have been established in
squadron). At the first stage, by the end of the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The greatest
2009, 52 air bases were established in Russia, reduction was in the Navy’s Marine Corps:
replacing the 72 air regiments, 14 air bases the only Marine Division (the Pacific 55th)
and 12 detached air squadrons and detach- was reorganized into a brigade, the 77th Bri-
ments formerly existing in the Air Force and gade stationed in the Caspian Sea was dis-
Air Defense Forces. The total number of units banded, and the remaining four brigades in
and combined units in the Air Force and Air the Marine Corps were reorganized into regi-
Defense Forces has been reduced from 340 ments. Reforms of the basic structures of the
to 180. Navy were only launched in late 2011.
Looking ahead, by 2012, there will be only
10 air bases (including two naval air bases).
Each airbase (all will be the 1st category) will 4.5. Establishing Aerospace Defense
include two to three airfields, making a total Forces
of 27 airbase airfields (possibly excluding the
army aviation). The next important step in reforming the Air
Force and Air Defense was the formation on
The Russian Air Force’s Air Defense Forces December 1, 2011, of a new component ser-
have undergone a major reorganization as vice of the Russian Armed Forces, the Aero-
well. In 2009, all the old air defense divisions space Defense Forces (ASD), representing the
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 23Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
ernization of technical equip-
Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces did ment. In this way, purchases of
silo-based and mobile Topol-M
not undergo any major changes during intercontinental ballistic missiles
the early stages of the military reform have been ongoing since 1997,
and maintained their existing structure, and 2010 saw the deployment of
the RS-24 Yars mobile ballistic
although they did experience some missile, a MIRVed version of the
reductions at the command level Topol-M. Work is underway to
develop new types of missiles and
warheads.
fusion of the Space Forces, Antimissile and
Air Defense Forces from the former Air Force
and Air Defense. Accordingly, the ASD forces
are now comprised of the Space Command 4.7. Reforming Military Education Systems
and the Air and Missile Defense Command. In
actual fact, this organization essentially looks The military education system is undergoing
like a return to the Soviet Air Defense Forces major changes in terms of greater centraliza-
as a separate service of the Armed Forces. tion and reduction, which is closely related to
the downsizing of the officer corps. In 2008,
there were 65 military institutions of higher
learning (15 military academies, four military
4.6. Strategic Missile Forces universities, 46 military schools and military
institutes). As part of the Armed Forces of
Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces did not Russia, 10 “system-wide” schools are being
undergo any major changes during the early created in 2012: three military training and
stages of the military reform and maintained research centers, six military academies and
their existing structure (missile army – missile one military university. The new “system-
division – missile regiment), although they did wide” schools will meet the challenges of
experience some reductions at the command officer training, and also conduct research.
level. The SMF strength is mainly determined All currently available teaching staff will be
by the relevant international agreements with concentrated in these schools. The military
the U.S., especially the New START Treaty, schools and military institutions that existed
signed in Prague in 2010. At the same time, in 2008 are being transformed into branches
the Strategic Missile Forces (and, in general, of these centers. At a later date, it will be deter-
the Strategic Nuclear Forces, including the mined which of the existing higher educa-
air and naval components) are a significant tional establishments will be phased out. The
priority for government weapons procurement new centers will be established on a territorial
programs, thus allowing for the planned mod- basis rather than on the service principle.
24 Moscow, JuLY, 2012Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
5. Dynamics of Conscription
and Enlistment
Approaches to how the army should be In the first phase, in 2008–2010, the Defense
manned have varied considerably over the Ministry was leaning toward a rejection of the
last three years, and, as far as one can tell, policy of increasing the number of contract
these approaches are based on three main soldiers in the Armed Forces, at least in the
factors: the assessment of the efforts of the Army, and was in favor of a transition from the
previous leadership of the Defense Ministry contract system that had already been adapted
to implement the Federal Targeted Program to staffing some units and combined units of
to convert the army to contract-based enlist- the Army to a mixed system where conscripts
ment, the availability of financial resources were “returned” to the forces. Later on, in ear-
(which in turn depends on the economic situ- ly 2011, this trend was reversed. The military,
ation in the country and the priorities of the having received the appropriate political sup-
top political leadership), and demographic port and resource allocation guarantees from
constraints. the President and the Government, announced
plans to increase the number of
new contract personnel.
Russia’s military and political Russia’s military and political
leadership have differed in their views leadership have previously dif-
on the place of contract service in the fered in their views on the place
strength acquisition system and of contract service in the strength
acquisition system and the pos-
the possibility of a full transition sibility of a full transition to
to manning by contract manning by contract. During his
tenure as President, Boris Yelt-
Valdai Discussion Club
Analytical report 25Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army
sin made repeated demagogic declarations Assault Division, followed by a number of oth-
concerning a future transition to full contract er permanently combat ready combined units,
manning of the Russian Armed Forces. The primarily detached motorized rifle brigades.
contract system of military service was devel-
oped quite extensively during this period, At the same time, since conscription service
although it was hampered by economic con- was still considered to be the most appro-
straints. priate way to train reserves for Russia, the
plan was to retain conscription but with a
This trend was dominant under the new Pres- subsequent reduction in the term of service.
ident, Vladimir Putin. In November 2001, Ultimately, the term of service under con-
President Putin endorsed the proposed gov- scription was to be limited to a period of
ernment program (Mikhail Kasyanov was six months in training units. After finishing
Prime Minister at the time) of a gradual tran- training, soldiers could either sign a contract
sition of the Armed Forces to a contract-based or become reservists, joining the Trained
strength acquisition system by 2010. Reserve. During the transition period, the
enlistment-based manning lev-
els in the army and navy should
still be at least 30–50%.
The Federal Targeted Program
of Transition to the Contract Basis, It is fair to say that, on the whole,
the Federal Targeted Program
which was implemented in 2004–2007, of Transition to the Contract
was a failure Basis, which was implemented
in 2004–2007, was a failure.
Given the program’s stated goal
of bringing the number of con-
The first step toward implementing this con- tract personnel in the Armed Forces up to
cept was the development of the Federal Tar- 400,000, the actual number of contract per-
geted Program to transfer the Army to a sonnel at the beginning of 2009 was about
contract basis, implemented in 2004–2007, 190,000 and, more to the point, the quality
which was conceived as a program of transi- of the contract contingent was at rock bot-
tion. During this time, a legal framework was tom.
to be established, financial issues resolved,
and organizational issues worked through for This was partly due to the fact that any
each component of the armed forces under the attempt to change over to a professional army
new staffing conditions: one combined unit in requires the presence of a professional corps
each service was to be converted to contract- of recruiters, which Russia has never had.
based enlistment. The Russian Armed Forces’ The lack of professional recruiters is easily
first contract unit was the 76th Pskov Airborne explained by the historical lack of a volunteer
26 Moscow, JuLY, 2012You can also read
