Lord of the Nile: Master's Essay - Explaining how the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has affected Ethiopian Foreign Relations
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Master’s Essay
Lord of the Nile:
Explaining how the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam has affected Ethiopian
Foreign Relations
Author: Joseph Lindqvist
Supervisor: Emil Uddhammar
Subject: International Affairs
Period: Spring 2021
Course Code: 5SK30EJoseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
Abstract
The aim of this essay is to examine how the foreign relationships of Ethiopia has developed as
a result of the construction and filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam between 2011
and 2021. This essay therefore asks: How has Ethiopia’s foreign relations with the EU, Egypt,
Sudan and China changed, have those relationships become more conflictual or cooperative,
and how could potential changes be explained using a constructivist perspective?
Constructivism is used as a means of explaining changes in the statements, positions and
policies of these countries through concepts such as “norms” and “identities”. It additionally
utilizes concepts from other studies such as “Hydro-hegemony”, “Benefit Sharing” and
“Ethiopian renaissance”. It uses the BAR-scale from Wolf et al. (2003) to determine the
different stages of Ethiopia’s relationships.
The study concludes that Ethiopia’s relationship with the EU and China have progressed
positively as a result of the GERD, and they have now started considering Ethiopia a more
equitable partner for further cooperation. The relationship with Egypt and Sudan initially
improved, with new Ethiopian norms of cooperation and equitable utilization becoming
mainstay. However, Ethiopia’s unilateral action during recent events broke these norms, and
has turned the relations conflictual once again.
Keywords: Constructivism, Hydro-Hegemony, Nile River, Grand Ethiopian Renaissance
Dam, GERD, East Africa, China, Ethiopia.
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Table of Contents
Abstract 2
1. Introduction 4
1.1. Aim and Research Questions 6
2. Theoretical Framework 7
2.1. Constructivism 7
2.2. Previous studies 9
2.2.1. Zeitoun & Warner – Construction of hydro-hegemonies 9
2.2.2. Gubena – Ethiopian Renaissance 10
2.2.3. Tawfik – Benefit Sharing and the GERD 10
3. Research design 11
3.1 BAR Water event intensity scale 12
3.2. Limitations 13
3.3. Material 14
4. Background 15
4.1. Previous Nile River Agreements 15
4.2. Current Context of the GERD 16
4.3. Financing the GERD 18
4.4. China in Africa 18
4.4.1 China in Ethiopia 19
4.5. EU in Ethiopia 20
5. Analysis 20
5.1. Development of Ethiopia’s relationship with Sudan 20
5.1.1. Analysis 23
5.2. Development of Ethiopia’s relationship with Egypt 25
5.2.1. Analysis 28
5.3. Development of Ethiopia’s relationship with China 30
5.3.1. Analysis 32
5.4. Development of Ethiopia’s relationship with EU 33
5.4.1. Analysis 34
6. Conclusions 35
Bibliography 38
Primary Material 38
Secondary Material 43
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1. Introduction
One of the more difficult foreign policy issues is how to best make use of resources shared
between multiple countries or actors. These commonly includes rivers, which provide benefits
for those utilizing them, but this utilization can also cause hard for other actors along the
river. It is common that one or several countries view themselves as the “owner” of the river.
Conflicts can therefore occur due to the different projects countries introduce on what they
perceive as “their” river. The Nile river in Africa is a clear example of this. Egypt has taken a
prominent role in regards to the Nile river due to several colonial agreements and historical
precedents; the Nile river is in many ways seen as a part of Egypt’s identity. This is further
exacerbated by the country’s high dependence on the Nile river for water, power and
agriculture. 85% of Egypt’s freshwater supplies originates from the Nile River, most of which
goes into the country’s agriculture (AQUASTAT 2016 pp. 4-5, 8). it is therefore not
surprising that when Ethiopia announced a large dam project on the Nile river in 2010, the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam or “GERD” for short, that it would cause conflict between
Ethiopia, Egypt and several other Nile river basin countries.
Ethiopia, on the other hand, is set to gain a lot from this project. The dam will produce 6000
megawatts of electricity, aiding in solving Ethiopia’s electricity shortage and providing power
to the many Ethiopians currently lacking it. The project could also turn Ethiopia into a major
energy exporter, leading to further cooperation, infrastructural connections and development
opportunities with countries such as Djibouti, Uganda, Sudan, South Sudan and Kenya. The
country could therefore become a development juggernaut and take on a stronger regional
leadership position (Than 2011; Mutahi 2020).
The GERD can be seen in the context of several greater infrastructural and manufacturing
investments, aiding the country in its economic ascent. For many Ethiopians, the dam is a
symbol of Ethiopia’s growth from a poor third world country into something greater, which
can be seen in the use of the word “renaissance” in its name, meaning rebirth (Matsangou
2018).
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(Picture: Mutahi 2020)
However, the conflicts with neighboring countries cannot be ignored. Egypt and Sudan are
especially affected, with both countries being afraid of reduced waterflow as a result of the
dam. Egypt has cited colonial agreements which claim their historical rights to the Nile water.
These would give Egypt the right to inspect and veto projects that would or could affect their
access to Nile river water negatively. Ethiopia has proceeded with the project regardless,
which has led to animosity between the two. In later years, the two countries have engaged in
further debates regarding how exactly the dam should be constructed and how its benefits
should be distributed. Other countries affected by the projects include other Nile River Basin
countries such as Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi, though less directly affected
compared to Egypt or Sudan. Larger states such as the US, the EU and China also have their
own interests in the region. Environmental groups and larger organizations such as the UN or
the World Bank have additional interests in and questions about the potential environmental
and economic impacts of the dam (Than 2011; Mutahi 2020).
This project therefore has the potential to re-shape Ethiopian foreign relations as we know it.
In this essay I aim to explain and interpret how and why this has occurred. These relationships
are ultimately shaped by the identity of the actors at hand and how actors have come to
understand their relationships to the other parties. A simple way of determining how
relationships have developed is to look at whether they have become more cooperative or
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more conflictual. This study will make use of the BAR-scale made by Wolf et al. (2003) to
map out the development of relations between being conflictual and being cooperative by
placing river-related events on a scale from cooperative to conflictual. To determine the
reason for these developments, the essay will make use of a constructivist analysis, which aids
in understanding the norms and identities behind the relations as well as how the different
actors construct reality in different ways, looking at the role of human consciousness in
politics. Constructivist methods will then be used to help explain why this change has
occurred.
Ethiopia’s relationship with Egypt and Sudan are picked as they could be directly affected by
the project. Other countries in the Nile Rivers basin such as South Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania
and Kenya would not be as directly affected by the project and have not been as heavily
invested into the debate regarding the dam. They are therefore not included. Ethiopia’s
relationship with China is included as they are a major outside influence on the region in
terms of infrastructural investments and has longer relations with Ethiopia (Millar 2020).
Lastly, it would be interesting to examine Ethiopia’s relation to western states as the country
has actively rejected western aid for the GERD (Ighobor & Bafana 2014 pp. 6-7). The EU is
chosen here as it has been involved in the Nile river negotiations. The relevancy of this essay
in the broader research context comes from investigating the developing hegemonial structure
in East Africa, but also the role of both infrastructure projects as well as the role of norms and
identities in shaping foreign relations.
1.1. Aim and Research Questions
The aim of this essay is to investigate whether the foreign relationships of Ethiopia has
developed to become more conflictual or cooperative as a result of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam project and how this can be explained. This will be done through a
constructivist analysis.
• How has the construction and filling of the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam from 2011 to
2021 affected Ethiopia’s foreign relationships with the countries of China, Egypt, Sudan
and the EU, if at all?
• Have Ethiopia’s foreign relationships with China, Egypt, Sudan and the EU changed to
become more conflictual or more cooperative?
• How can changes, or lack thereof, in Ethiopia’s foreign relationships be explained from a
constructivist perspective?
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2. Theoretical Framework
This section maps out a framework for constructivist theories as it applies to the topic at hand.
It also discusses a handful of previous studies which relate to the subject and which contain
useful concepts and perspectives.
A couple of different theories could be applied to try and explain why changes in international
relations occur. Realist theories explain it through changes in the balance of power between
states, liberalist theories can explain it through the role of international institutions and
treaties, and Marxist theories can explain it through changes in the material and economic
relations between countries. All these theories could touch upon different aspects of the
conflict. I have in this study however opted for constructivist methods, since the relationships
have clearly changed despite no material changes occurring as a result of the dam yet. What
has been occurring is a conflict of words, of discourses and of norms. Egypt, Sudan and
Ethiopia represent different identities, with different norms and values, and constructivism
can help explain why changes occur when their interests collide. Is in explaining how these
non-material factors influence real changes that constructivist methods are applicable.
2.1. Constructivism
The constructivist theory of international relations discusses the relationship between ideas,
knowledge, culture and politics. Rather than focusing on material factors, it discusses how the
ideas we apply shape politics and what role human consciousness and social factors play in
interpreting the world. Ideas, concepts, norms, values, power relations and structures are not
said to exist naturally but are “intersubjective meanings” held between a group of actors. They
are thus dependent on human agreement of their existence and interpretation through
preexisting structures such as rules or language. These in turn socially construct the actor’s
identities and knowledge, which in turn helps shape their interests and with whom they
cooperate. Constructivism can also look at the role of speech, argumentation and persuasion
in forming and reforming understandings and social facts. The main benefit of constructivism
as a method lie in the analysis and interpretation of these intersubjective meanings
(Finnemore & Sikkink 2001 pp. 393-394, 402-403; Conker 2014 pp. 52-53).
Adler (2013) notes that constructivism can be notably useful for explaining change in
international relations through changes in the collective meaning and understanding of reality
through learning, as it was used to explain the large change that was the end of the Cold war. I
will similarly attempt to explain changes in international relations, so these methods are
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therefore appropriate to use in this study. Constructivism can also give us insight into the role
of power in the form of dominant narratives or hegemonical structures which shape the social
world. This is known as discursive power. This is different from the material factors looked at
by traditional approaches such as realism or liberalism. As we are looking at a conflict
between larger regional powers looking for hegemony, with various colonial narratives at
play, this is a very relevant perspective to utilize (Adler 2013 pp. 123-125; Conker 2014 pp.
41-42).
The concept of “norms” describes the social agreement of what is considered appropriate
behavior. Norms in turn shape how different nations apply their national interest on the
international arena. Norms and ideas can additionally substitute power through normative and
discursive power, bringing influence to otherwise powerless actors. Norms are
institutionalized by decision-makers, shape their behavior and identities and become objective
reality which shape their behavior (Conker 2014 p. 41).
The concept of “identity” describes who the actor is. According to constructivism, the identity
is socially constructed by actors through repeated interactions. How they treat and are treated
by other actors shape how they view themselves and the other actor. On the international
arena this can in turn shape things such as the national interests of the state (ibid. pp. 39-40).
An identity can describe a type of state, such as democracy, theocracy or superpower, the
relative role of a state in a relationship, such as ally, rival or enemy, or even the national
ideology of a state. These identities can be multiple and sometimes contradictory (Klotz &
Lynch 2007 pp. 69-79). Which actors are interpreted to be legitimate or powerful are not
necessarily related to reality but rather how they have been socially constructed by other
actors (Adler 2013 pp. 126-127; Finnemore & Sikkink 2001 pp. 398-400). As norms and
identities shape how states interact with each other, I will in this study be interested in seeing
which norms and identities have been at play in this conflict, and how these have been shaped
by repeated interactions.
One common feature of hydropolitics is “securitization”, to frame water or a water project as
a national security issue by identifying and/or constructing existential threats, in order to
invalidate criticisms and to legitimize certain strategies. This does not need to be an objective
threat, but something that becomes a security issue once an actor deems it so. Securitization
has a close relationship with hydropolitics due to the developmental and environmental
implications of water projects and its relationship with access to food, water and power
(Conker 2014 pp. 45-48).
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Constructivist theories will be used to explain and identify which norms and identities are at
play when looking at the relationship between Ethiopia and Egypt, Sudan, China or the EU.
Other concepts such as securitization or hegemony will also be used when applicable. These
concepts in turn shape how the actors understand their relation to the other party and can be
used to explain how and why changes have occurred in their relations.
2.2. Previous studies
2.2.1. Zeitoun & Warner – Construction of hydro-hegemonies
Zeitoun & Warner (2006) discusses the concept of “hydro-hegemony” presents an analytical
framework for using it. This framework examines the power relations between riparian
nations and which strategies they use in order to construct hegemonies and counter-
hegemonies. The article defines hegemony as “when one social class exerts power over others
beyond that accounted for by coercion or law, it may be described as hegemonic”. “Hydro-
hegemony” is then the ability to exert this power in the area of hydropolitics. The hydro-
hegemony can be both be in a more positive “leadership” position and a more negative
“dominative” position (Zeitoun & Warner 2006 pp. 436-438). Water relations can be further
categorized into cooperative and competitive, and the control over the water can be either
shared or contested (ibid. pp. 443-444).
Zeitoun & Warner goes on to detail strategies for creating and maintaining hydro-hegemonies.
These include “water resource capture”, which refers to unilateral projects which take control
of water resources and affect the quality or flow of water. Another strategy is containment,
where the hegemon tries to influence weaker partners into compliance. Cooperative strategies,
on the other hand, invite weaker parties to share the benefits of the water. Treaties can be
utilized here to enforce the status quo in the hegemons favor and leave out otherwise relevant
participants (ibid. pp. 444-448).
The hydro-hegemon can also utilize a few constructivist containment strategies. This includes
the aforementioned concept of “secularization”. ”Knowledge construction” refers to creating
potentially false understandings or knowledge in order to steer negotiations. A “sanctioned
discourse” is a normative delimitation for “allowed” discourse on a topic. These strategies can
allow hegemons to emphasize certain aspects of a conflict while minimizing others, allowing
them to control the narrative. Additional strategies include international coercion, economic
resources, military or covert actions and taking advantage of geographic position (ibid. pp.
446, 449-450). Lastly, states under hydro-hegemony might attempt to set up a counter-
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hegemony through the use of agenda setting strategies, desecuritization and alternative
hegemonies (ibid p. 454).
The concept of “hydro-hegemony” is relevant to this study as it informs us how different
actors construct and secularize water conflicts and relations in their favor.
2.2.2. Gubena – Ethiopian Renaissance
Gubena (2019) analyzes the foreign policy of the People’s Revolutionary Democratic Party
from 2002 to 2018, during which the party was in power in Ethiopia. Gubena’s study also
utilizes a constructivist perspective and argues for the role of certain key ideas in shaping
Ethiopian foreign policy. This includes ideas about exceptionalism, power and maintenance of
the status quo. Gubena concludes that the foreign policy presented by the People’s
Revolutionary Democratic Party envisions Ethiopia as a regional hegemon, destined to bring
maintenance to the region. The party popularized the concept of an “Ethiopian renaissance”,
with the term appearing in the names of various businesses and the GERD (Gubena 2019 p. 5-
6, 53).
The GERD represents a step towards Ethiopia becoming a regional hegemon according to
Gubena, by making other countries reliant on it for electricity and by taking power and
influence away from Egypt (ibid. pp. 33-34). Gubena’s study gives us insight into how the
Ethiopian identity has been shaped by its foreign policy and vice versa, and role of the GERD
in relation to both. What I additionally aim to do in this study is to view this identity and the
dam project in relation to other actors and look at how it has affected Ethiopia’s relationships
with them.
2.2.3. Tawfik – Benefit Sharing and the GERD
Tawfik (2016) looks at the specific case of the GERD and how it has transformed
hydropolitical relations in the Nile river basin. This is analyzed from a benefit-sharing
perspective, which looks at potential benefits and losses the project can bring to the actors
involved and their relationships (Tawfik 2016 pp. 574-577). Tawfik notes that while the dam
has noticeable political, economic and environmental benefit for Ethiopia, it comes at a short
term financial and political price. Sudan stands to gain more from the project compared to
Egypt due to sedimentation reduction, improved irrigation and proximity of energy exports,
which might affect its stance on the dam. However, there are still negative effects on
Sudanese fishing, water quality and agriculture. For Egypt, the effects are more negative,
especially during filling years where it would significantly affect its access to water and
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electricity through hydropower. It is therefore in Egypt’s interests to fill the dam slowly to
make impacts less dramatic in the short term. In the long term, the project might increase
Egypt’s water supply through reduced evaporation due to more water being stored at colder
temperatures upstream (ibid. pp. 577-580).
The article concludes that while the project has moved away from confrontation towards
coordination, it has yet to reach a benefit-sharing stage where all countries can jointly reap the
benefits of the dam. This is in part due to lack of impact assessments and Ethiopia’s unilateral
approach to the dams construction. The delayed impact studies would assess the dam midway
through its construction rather than studying means of reducing these impacts and maximizing
benefits. Tawfik’s article sees Ethiopia and Sudan integrating their approaches but Egypt’s
strong stance and political sensitivity on the issue might affect further cooperation between all
three parties (ibid. pp. 583, 587-588). While this study explains how relations in the basin
changed between 2010 and 2016, this essay will additionally go into the “why” of why this
change is occurring the way it is and additionally look at developments after 2016. Tawfik’s
study can serve as a point of comparison and a source of information for this paper.
3. Research design
In this section, I will map out how the aforementioned theory will be applied on the material
gathered. It will also introduce the conflictual-cooperative scale, discuss various limitations
with the study and present the material used.
Using constructivist methods, this study will attempt to capture intersubjective meanings in
the form of norms and identities. Actors will attempt to frame situations in certain way in
foreign policy debates with other countries in order to shape the discourse. This reflects both
how they view themselves, how they view other actors and which goals they are trying to
reach. This in turn shapes the identities actors take in the debate. The language used by the
actors can help clue us in on how actors view their relation to the other party, and whether the
relationship has grown more cooperative or conflictual (Klotz & Lynch 2007 pp. 51-55, 101).
In this study I will therefore look at statements, texts and actions by the actors involved and
analyze which intersubjective meanings, in the form of norms and identities, are at play when
making them. Articulations of people in leadership positions will be seen as representative of
an actor as a whole as it otherwise difficult to account for the wide range of opinions within a
state. This is in large part why identities can be contradictory, as they can represent inner
11Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
turmoil within a country. These statements and positions then have to be considered in the
context of past agreements, statements and the conflict at hand to see how the relationships
between actors have developed over time and whether they have grown more cooperative or
conflictual. This method is chosen as it is a simple means of operationalizing the development
of relations as it utilizes the direct statements and opinions from them. It also utilizes easily
collectable material. The background section will cover past events and will help later in the
analysis to explain how and why certain actors create certain intersubjective meanings
(Finnemore & Sikkink 2001 pp. 394-395).
The concepts discussed in the “previous studies” section such as Zeitoun & Warners (2006).
concept of hydro-hegemony, Gubena’s (2019) idea of an “Ethiopian Renaissance” and
Tawfiks (2016) concept of benefit sharing will also provide a basis analysis and discussion of
the material. These generally help us in the explanation of why changes in the relationship
have occurred like they have.
3.1 BAR Water event intensity scale
Wolf et al. (2003) presents a BAR (Basins At Risk) water event intensity scale as you can see
below, detailing different stages of the relation between river basin countries. Wolf’s reason
for creating the scale was to ease the categorization of water-related events around the globe,
to widen analysis to include cooperative events in addition to conflictual, and to determine the
river basins with the greatest political risk in the near future (ibid pp. 30-31). Table 1 shows
the scale:
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Table 1. BAR event intensity Scale (Wolf et al. 2003 p. 34).
BAR Scale BAR event description
-7 Formal declaration of war; extensive war acts causing deaths, dislocation or high strategic costs
-6 Extensive military acts
-5 Small scale military acts
-4 Political-military hostile actions
-3 Diplomatic-economic hostile actions
-2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction
-1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction
0 Neutral or non-significant acts for the inter-nation situation
1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions – mild verbal support
2 Official verbal support of goals, values or regime
3 Cultural or scientific agreement or support (non-strategic)
4 Non-military economic, technological or industrial agreement
5 Military economic or strategic support
6 International Freshwater Treaty; major strategic alliance (regional or international)
7 Voluntary unification into one nation
A higher negative value represents more conflictual relations whereas a higher positive value
represents more cooperative relations. This scale is a modified version of an inter-state event
scale with water-related events added (ibid p. 33). This scale is therefore applicable both on
countries directly involved in the Nile River Basin such as Sudan and Egypt but also other
inter-state relations such as those with China and the EU. The BAR-scale will be used in this
essay means of determining the development of relative state of relations between the
countries in question and whether they have become more cooperative or conflictual. It also
helps us determine what exactly we mean by “cooperative” or “conflictual” events.
3.2. Limitations
The essay will consider the period from the start of the construction of the dam in 2011 to the
current year of 2021. This period is sufficiently long that we would be able to note differences
in relationships. A longer period could have been picked to include relations prior to the
construction but this would be outside of the scope of this essay. The analysis will be
composed of four bilateral content analyzes, analyzing the foreign relations of Ethiopia with
Egypt, Sudan, China and EU. These were picked to capture different aspects of Ethiopian
foreign policy, including its relation to the east, west and the most notable regional powers.
These are also some of the most involved parties in the debate. Countries such as the US,
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Russia and other Nile basin countries such as Uganda or Burundi could have been looked at,
but these are generally less involved than the actors chosen, which would make finding
material more difficult and would be outside of the scope of this essay. The essay also will not
look at South Sudan as it seceded from Sudan in 2011 since it is a different political entity
with a separate foreign policy from Sudan.
This essay will not look at how the material relations between the actors have changed but
rather the way actors view their relation to each other in the context of international relations.
Changes in material relations might be viewed as a symbol of a change in relations but is not
the unit of analysis in and of itself. I cannot therefore make any conclusions about objective
reality but rather reality as interpreted by the actors. The essay will also not attempt to assess
the impacts or benefits of the dam. Lastly, I will engage in interpretation in this essay, one has
to mindful of my own role as researcher and acknowledge that results are based on my own
interpretation of what is considered relevant, important or intentional (Klotz & Lynch 2007
pp. 106-107).
3.3. Material
The material in this study consists of public statements, agreements, actions, communications
and expressions made in regards to the other parties from Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, the EU and
China during the time period of 2010 to 2021. The language contained within will be studied
to discern identities, norms and other intersubjective meanings. The main focus will be on
written information. The goal here becomes to gather a wide variety of sources to be able to
effectively triangulate the material and come to better conclusions (Klotz & Lynch 2007 pp.
19-20).
Since the study is primarily interested in the relations between state actors it is not
problematic to utilize primarily state sources for statements. What we mostly need to be
mindful of is the potential misrepresentation of actors statements by other actors (ibid. p. 49).
One prominent source is the website Sudan Tribune, which is run by international journalists
covering Sudanese and other regional news. It has a notable archive of old articles covering
the back and forth debate regarding the dam with both Sudan and Egypt, featuring many
public statements from politicians. Articles regarding China’s involvement in Ethiopia are
mainly taken from the website of the Chinese embassy to Ethiopia, since this represents
China’s views on its relationship with Ethiopia. EU statements are taken from EU websites
and documents. These are generally complemented with newspaper articles such as the BBC
14Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
and Egypt independent and other papers containing statements and information. All of these
sources generally cover similar types of information in the form of statements and opinions
from country leaders as represented through articles.
4. Background
This section will look at the history of the relationships prior to 2010. This will provide a
useful framework for later analysis. It also contains a brief summary of the development of
the dam, before looking into specific actor perspectives in the following analysis section.
4.1. Previous Nile River Agreements
The original 1929 Nile River agreement came into fruition during a shortage of cotton
following the second world war. This put a lot of pressure on the British-controlled Egypt and
Sudan to increase productivity along the Nile river. A commission was formed in 1920 to
effectively diverge the water between the two countries. This resulted in two new dams and a
storage facility in Sudan, as well as an agreement to evenly split deviations from the rivers
natural flow between the two countries. Egypt saw this as threat to their sovereignty as in the
event of their independence, the river control measures would be upstream and outside of
their control. After Egypt’s independence in 1922, a new commission was formed which
eventually led to the new Nile River agreement in 1929 (Lumumba 2007 p. 12). This
agreement would put 92% of the Nile river’s total waterflow in Egyptian hands and give them
full control during the dry summer season, while Sudan got 8% of the waterflow. It
additionally gave Egypt the right to monitor upstream projects and also undertake its own
projects without consent from other riparian countries. Lastly, the agreement gave Egypt the
right to veto any projects on the Nile River which would affect the quantity or quantity of
water in Egypt. The basis for this heavy control from Egypt was said to be its “Natural and
Historical rights” over the Nile river. This agreement most importantly only extended to
countries which were under British administration at the time, such as Sudan, Kenya,
Tanzania and Uganda. It therefore did not include the independent Ethiopia (ibid. pp. 14-15;
United Nations 1963 pp. 100-107). This is significant as a majority of the total freshwater
supplies flowing into Egypt originates in the Ethiopian portion of the Nile (AQUASTAT
2016 p. 4).
After Sudan became independent in 1956, the new government wanted to renegotiate the old
Nile River agreement in the context of the general water needs of Sudan becoming better
15Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
known and Egypt enacting a new dam in Aswan which would hurt Sudanese farmlands. This
resulted in a new agreement which increased Sudan’s share of the water to 22%, leaving 66%
in Egyptian hands and the remainder as a margin for evaporation. Any surplus or lack of
water from these estimates was to be divided evenly (Abdalla 1971 pp. 336-337; FAO 1997).
Nile River negotiations after this agreement were shaped by asymmetric power relations with
Egypt taking a hegemonic position, as it was the state with the greatest ability to control and
utilize the river resources through the Aswan Dam and various irrigation projects, while it
also had the greatest overall economic power in the Nile River Basin. This has allowed Egypt
to control the debate on Nile waters through setting the agenda and framing discourses around
its “historic rights” to the waters and framing the access to water as a “national security
issue”. On the other end, countries such as Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia have been
characterized by instability, lack of infrastructure, underdevelopment and internal conflicts.
These factors have historically weakened their position relative to Egypt in this debate. This
has changed since the 1990s as these countries have become increasingly stable and caught up
to Egypt in terms of development thanks from increased financing from China and other
international donors. This has led to increased regional integration, including the “Nile River
Basin Initiative” in 1999, which has acted as forum for Nile development and management
(International Crisis Group 2020).
This increased development has led to increased bargaining power for these upstream
countries relative to Egypt. This has in particular been shown in Ethiopia, who unilaterally
started various hydropower projects along the river during the mid-2000s, sponsored by the
World Bank and China. Ethiopia also took a clear stance against previous agreements in 2007
with a new river agreement which promoted “equal utilization” of water resources among
upstream countries, ignoring Egypt and Sudan previous agreements. An additional agreement
was signed in May of 2010 between Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania, which was
widely criticized by Egypt and Sudan (Cascão 2009 pp. 247-256). Sudan and Egypt chose to
freeze their participation in the Nile River Basin Initiative until 2015 in response to this
(Sudan Tribune 2015). Egypt dismissed the agreement as “not binding” and claimed the 1929
and 1957 agreements were still valid (Sudan Tribune 2010a; BBC 2010).
4.2. Current Context of the GERD
The construction of the GERD was announced at the start of 2011, with construction
beginning in April the same year. The announcement was met with worries from international
16Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
observers due to previous dam projects often being flawed and often being seen as land grabs
from the Ethiopian government. The original timeframe set 2015 as the completion year
(Than 2011). Despite Ethiopia insisting that the project was for the benefit of all neighboring
countries, the project was criticized by Egypt who requested to conduct environmental and
technical studies on the dam to assess its impact on the country, a request which Ethiopia
rejected (Ezega 2011). In 2015, Sudanese, Egyptian and Ethiopian leaders signed a
declaration of principles with a commitment to cooperation and peaceful resolutions to the
conflict (Moyo 2015). The conflict reignited in 2019 as the dam neared completion and
debates regarding the speed of its filling started between Egypt Sudan and Ethiopia (Mutahi
2020).
The first fillings of the dam beginning in July of 2020 and are still ongoing as of May 2021.
The dam is placed close to the Sudanese border, on the Blue Nile, which makes up the
majority of the Nile rivers total waterflow. This in turn makes the filling of the dam highly
influential for Egypt, who takes 85% of its freshwater resources from the Nile river. This
project could also affect Egypt’s own damns on the Nile River, therefore reducing Egypt’s
electricity production. To prevent all too large impacts on itself and Sudan, Egypt have
suggested a slower timeframe for filling the dam, which would take between 12 and 21 years.
However, Ethiopia wants to fill the dam in 6 years to reap the benefits of the dam quicker.
Ethiopia wants the 6000 megawatts of electricity the dam will be capable of producing as
quickly as possible. This would allow Ethiopia to almost double their own energy capacity
and export energy to the rest of east Africa. These exports would both make Ethiopia an
estimated 1 billion US dollars per year and allow them to build relations with neighboring
countries. The dam would additionally help regulate rainfall and prevent flooding in the
country. Sudan and Egypt could also stand to gain from the project, from reducing
sedimentation, reducing evaporation, increased energy imports and steadier waterflows.
Ethiopia is doing significant work with the aid of the World Bank and China to improve its
energy infrastructure to accommodate the increased energy exports (Kumagai 2016; Tesfa
2013).
Internally, the dam has great significance to the Ethiopian identity and national mood, serving
as a unifying element for Ethiopia’s wide array of ethnic groups. Most Ethiopians support the
dam and view it as a means out of poverty through electricity. They also think it is their
national right to construct it. Since the dam is largely sponsored by internal donations, it has
been seen as a way of showcasing Ethiopia’s self-sufficiency relative to international donors.
17Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
Most Ethiopians also minimize the environmental concerns from NGOs. The Ethiopian
Government considers the dam a matter of national sovereignty and is therefore very private
in regards to the exact construction and plans (Veilleux 2013 pp. 8-9; Yihdego et al. 2017 p.
12).
4.3. Financing the GERD
The total cost of the GERD was estimated at 4.8 billion US dollars. Meles Zenawi, the former
Prime minister of Ethiopia, wanted to reduce the country’s reliance foreign donor money,
such as the donations received from the World Bank for previous projects. This is why a
significant portion of the dam was crowdfunded, with money coming in from taxes, bonds
and donations from Ethiopian citizens. Government employees were forced to give up a
months’ worth of salary to fund the dam. In 2014 financial consultants estimated that 450
million had been raised through these methods out of the 1 billion dollar fundraising goal. The
goal is to eventually make back the money through energy exports and to use the fundraising
campaign to inspire investors and stimulate the private sector. This would also ensure
financial independence from western development aid in the future. However, many lenders
were reluctant to sponsor the dam due to the lack of concrete electrical export agreements
with neighboring countries (Yihdego et al. 2017 p. 12; Ighobor & Bafana 2014 pp. 6-7).
The GERDs main contractor is the Italian Firm “Webuild” (formally known as “Salini
Impregilo”). China has not been directly involved in the construction or financing of the dam
itself but has rather provided funding and contracting for the electrical systems, turbines and
power lines worth 1.8 billion US dollars. China has also loaned Ethiopia 1.2 billion US
dollars to build the transmission lines going from Addis Ababa to the Dam (Miller 2020).
4.4. China in Africa
Cooperation between China and Africa had started during the Cold war as a means of aligning
themselves separately from the major superpowers at the time. Chinese investment into Africa
has grown substantially since the start of the century, in part due to the “Forum on China-
Africa Cooperation” and the “Belt and Road Initiative”, which has led to China investing
Billions of US dollars into Africa. This has mostly come in the form of infrastructure
investments and aid through Chinese banks and companies, which has opened new doors for
African countries in terms of development and trade relations. China is also the world’s most
prominent provider of construction, which has complemented the infrastructure deficit seen in
many African countries and formed basis for new trade relations. This has included many
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projects within the energy sector, especially hydropower projects, something China
specializes in due to its many rivers. These have been met with significant environmental
concerns from international observers, stemming from lacking standards and problematic
resettling processes. These hydropower projects have been financed primarily through local
national resources, which has in turn made China more dependent on African natural
resources over time (Foster et al. 2009).
4.4.1 China in Ethiopia
Following the end of the Cold War, Ethiopia’s leftist leadership found itself under
considerable political pressure from western countries and sought to counterbalance this by
reaching out to China in order to build a relationship. Following a controversial election in
2005, western countries distanced itself from the ruling party and Ethiopia’s new main trading
partner became China, who was able to aid Ethiopia thanks to its economic and diplomatic
experiences. China has showed particular interest in Ethiopia for the sake of investments and
building relationships in Africa, electing to pick the country as one of China’s main trading
hubs on the continent, despite not being particularly commercially interesting. Ethiopia’s
strong diplomatic situation in Africa as a whole allows it to serve as a foothold for China into
the rest of Africa, which is likely one of Chinas motivations for their close partnership. The
interest has also been reciprocal in Ethiopia. The previous Ethiopian prime minister Meles
Zenawi was said to be a big fan and ally of China (Matseke 2021).
Strains in the relationship arise from the fact that the trade relationship is unbalanced in
China’s favor, that Chinese investment in Ethiopia has not resulted in capacity building and
increased “know-how” and that Chinese infrastructure projects amplify existing differences
between developed and undeveloped regions. Opposition parties also accused the previous
Meles regime of intending to copy China’s one-party rule. On the whole though, Ethiopians
have been very positive towards their relationship with China (Adem 2012 pp. 152-155).
China has had particular involvement in the hydroelectric industry in the Nile River Basin and
has prior to the GERD sponsored several other dam projects on the Nile River, in Sudan,
Uganda and Ethiopia. Chinas involvement in Africa could therefore have aided in shifting the
hydropolitical balance of power towards upstream countries. This has also given Ethiopia and
other countries a new choice of donors in the form of Chinese banks, which unlike
multilateral institutions do not require adherence to environmental, governance or human
rights criteria for their sponsoring. Chinese support has also generally been quicker and more
affordable than previously available contracts from western donors (Cascão 2009 pp. 260-
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262). The majority of Chinese infrastructure investments in Ethiopia is in ICT, Hydropower,
Construction and in energy sectors (Foster et al 2009 pp. 27-28).
Ethiopia has loaned heavily from China, with 12 billion US dollars being loaned between
2000 and 2019, growing in later years. Loans from China make up roughly 60 per cent of
Ethiopia’s total external debt. Ethiopia hopes to be able to use the Belt and Road initiative as
a forum to pay off its massive debt (Maini & Lingala 2019).
4.5. EU in Ethiopia
Development aid is one of the main forms of cooperation with African countries for the EU. It
has traditionally been plagued with issues of fragmentation, low coherence and outdated
systems. Before the end of the Cold War this aid was mostly strategic, but after it has mostly
been concerned with reducing poverty and improving governance (Hackenesch 2011 pp. 7-9).
Ethiopia has been the largest recipient in Africa of EU aid. This is in part due the poverty of
the country but also due to its commitment to developing out of said poverty, which increases
the chance of donor money going to the correct causes. Ethiopia also has a very effective
bureaucracy.. However, outside of this the economic cooperation between Ethiopia and the
EU has historically been limited. Ethiopia was selected as a recipient of labor coordination aid
in 2007, but this was held back by fragmentation, lack of political will and the incompatibility
of European and Ethiopian systems. Some concerns have additionally stemmed from the
limited democratic system, especially following the election in 2005 and the crackdown on
political opponents from the ruling party. These developments has collided with donor ideals
of “ownership”. Following the 2005 election, relations have generally deteriorated which has
allowed China the political space to step in as a substitute aid provider (ibid. pp. 14-18).
5. Analysis
This part is divided into four sections, one for each foreign relationship being examined. Each
part begins with a summary of the development of the actors relationship with Ethiopia during
the 10-year period in terms of Nile river hydropolitics. This is then followed by an analysis of
each relationship using constructivist perspectives and concepts.
5.1. Development of Ethiopia’s relationship with Sudan
Following the announcement of the GERD in 2011, Sudan was similarly to Egypt initially
concerned about the availability of water for itself, as well as having safety concerns in the
20Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
event the dam bursts. Sudanese representatives argued against the project and called upon
international donors to block its funding (Sudan Tribune 2012a). During the debate for the
2010 agreement, Sudan had demanded a guarantee of an exact share of the river waters, with
their delegate claiming that the upstream countries are in lesser demand of the waters relative
to Sudan and Egypt, because of their greater perspiration (BBC 2010; Sudan Tribune 2010a;
Yihdego et al. 2017 p. 13).
Ethiopian high-ranking officials repeatedly emphasized the joint benefits of the dam, such as
reduction of sedimentation, reduced evaporation, better navigation and regulation of water, as
well as an increased power supply in the Nile river basin as a whole (Sudan Tribune 2011a).
They also repeatedly claimed their right to execute development projects on the Nile River
and mostly ignored Egyptian or Sudanese claims that the 1959 or 1929 agreements were still
valid (Sudan Tribune 2011c).
In May of 2011, a spokesperson from the Ethiopian foreign ministry spoke positively about
Sudan’s willingness to cooperate on Nile river issues. They described relations as “cordial”.
During that same month, the Sudanese minister of foreign affairs spoke positively about the
prospect of an Ethiopian dam on the Nile, citing many of the aforementioned benefits for
Sudan (Sudan Tribune 2011a).
In July of 2011, the Sudanese ambassador to Ethiopia expressed direct support for the project,
citing their historic ties and cooperation between the two countries. Further cooperation was
also encouraged by the Ethiopian president (Sudan Tribune 2011b). Later that year, Sudan,
Egypt and Ethiopia agreed to set up a tripartite committee which was to look into potential
problems stemming from the dam project, drawing upon expertise from international experts.
Sudan and Egypt agreed to a coordinated approach to these deliberations, but Sudan would
generally play an intermediate third party role (Salman 2016 p. 519). The president of Sudan,
Omar al-Bashir, expressed interest in joint cooperation and coordination with Ethiopia on the
areas of hydropower and development (Sudan Tribune 2011c). In 2012 the tripartite
committee visited the dam site (Yihdego 2017 pp. 11-12). The international experts concluded
in June 2013 in a report that the project would not affect downstream countries severely and
gave a few recommendations, a conclusion which Sudan accepted. Sudan additionally offered
to send experts and to deliberate further with Ethiopia on how to best implement the
recommendations (Sudan Tribune 2013).
21Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
In March of 2012, the Sudanese President expressed direct support for the project during the
inauguration of a new Ethiopian ambassador. The new ambassador responded by emphasizing
the growing of greater historical and cultural bonds between the two nations (Sudan Tribune
2012a). This was realized later that year when Sudan became connected the Ethiopian power
grid, to facilitate energy exports from the dam (Salman 2016 p. 518). Sudan’s Ambassador to
Ethiopia emphasized in 2013 that the Sudanese support of the dam is not political but comes
from a belief that the dam is of benefit to everyone involved, claiming that “We are not
playing a political role” (Sudan Tribune 2013). During the following year, the Sudanese
president would keep emphasizing the value of the dam for the purposes of regional
integration through energy exports (Sudan Tribune 2014a).
During 2014 Sudan made various approaches towards Ethiopia and away from Egypt
politically. The Sudanese foreign minister criticized Egypt’s stance in the debate, claiming
that Egyptian media and officials are needlessly inflaming the situation. He instead
emphasized Sudan’s possible role mediator in the conflict. Later that year, Ethiopia and Sudan
agreed to open border crossings, trade committees (Sudan Tribune 2014b) and joint military
exercises (Sudan Tribune 2014c). Sudan distancing itself from Egypt is said to stem from
feelings that Egyptian Nile river policy is overly nationalistic and focused on securing its own
resources more than cooperation. This has been coupled with frustration from Egyptian
expectations that Sudan will always follow the Egyptian stance on Nile river issues. This can
in turn explain Sudan’s movement away from Egypt and towards Ethiopia while ascertaining
its own national interests (Tawfik 2019 pp. 668-669).
In 2015, the tripartite committee came to an agreement regarding the project with a
declaration of principles document. This document outlined principles of cooperation, dispute
settlement, regional integration, utilization of Nile River resources, as well as mechanisms of
communication and cooperation in regards to the GERD. The Sudanese president was quoted
as saying: ”by signing this agreement, we confirm our commitment to pursue further detailed
agreements that organize relations among the Nile Basin countries” (Moyo 2015). The
impact studies faced further disagreements and delays until they were eventually carried out
(Salman 2016 pp. 522-523).
After a few relatively quiet years, the debates regarding the GERD started once again in 2019
once the dam neared completion, resulting in debates regarding the operation and filling of the
dam. Ethiopia’s new prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, claimed that “no force” could stop
Ethiopia from building and filling its dam. After a failed initial negotiation about the filling,
22Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
Egypt requested the US and the World Bank to help mediate the conflict. This mediation
resulted in the three countries agreeing to continue working towards a solution. South Africa
and the African Union also served as mediators at later stages. In January of 2020, the three
states came to a preliminary agreement about the filling of the dam but failed to reach a final
conclusion during the following spring. These deliberations were mostly centered on Egypt
and Ethiopia, but Sudan was still involved (Mutahi 2020).
Sudan’s Prime minister suggested a joint management of the dam, which Ethiopia rejected.
While Sudan remained significantly more positive towards the project compared to Egypt, it
nevertheless feared that the filling would disrupt its own energy sources and water resources.
Sudan’s neutral position also resulted in Egypt trying to gain favors by solving old border
disputes in Sudan’s favor. Internally, Sudan has been divided between people directly affected
by the loss of water resources and people believing that the gain in hydropower will mitigate
the losses, or that the losses are not significant enough to hurt Sudan (Michaelson 2020).
In July of 2020, Sudan noticed lowered water levels around their dams, indicating that
Ethiopia had started filling the GERD, despite the fact that a final agreement had not yet been
reached and that deliberations were still ongoing. Ethiopia initially denied these claims, but it
would soon become evident reality. Sudan stated in response that it is against any form of
unilateral measures by any party (Egypt Independent 2020; Abdelhadi 2020). In February of
2021, this position was reiterated when the Water Resource Minister called the unilateral
filling a “threat to national security” which “threaten the lives of half the population in
central Sudan, as well as irrigation water for agricultural projects and power generation
from [Sudan’s] Roseires Dam”. The conflict has recently been further intensified by border
disputes and Ethiopia’s ongoing Tigray conflict (Al Jazeera 2021). are set to resume but there
are disagreements regarding mediators and their roles. Further talks during the spring of 2021
resulted in no new common ground (Egypt Independent 2021a). Ethiopia has maintained that
a second filling will occur in July (Derso 2021).
5.1.1. Analysis
In terms of the BAR-scale, Sudan’s relationship with Ethiopia has moved from a neutral 0
position prior to the dam, to a -1 (Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction)
from the initial reaction in 2011. It later moved to +2 (Official Verbal Support of Regime and
Values) when Sudan realized the value of the dam later that year. The relationship did not
develop to “scientific or cultural support” at +3 but definitely developed closer after this
23Joseph Lindqvist 2021-05-28
point. After the filling debate in 2019 the relationship has dropped to a -2, displaying hostility
in interactions due to Ethiopia’s unilateral actions.
Most of the early debate around the dam has been framed in terms of joint benefits and
regional cooperation by Ethiopia. This was contrasted by Ethiopia’s unilateral approach to the
dams construction, which caused the early friction between itself and Sudan. However, once
aforementioned norms were more established, Sudan began to understood Ethiopia as a
partner in cooperation. This can in large part be seen in the developments during 2014, during
which Ethiopia and Sudan integrated in more areas in addition to just hydropower. Egypt’s
position appears significantly less reasonable and more inflammatory to the debate when
under this norm of cooperation, which can help explain Sudan’s distancing from Egypt. This
can be related to Zeitoun & Warners (2006) concept of “Sanctioned Discourses” in
hydropolitics, in which norms enforce a certain discourse about a hydro-hegemonic situation
which emphasize the positive aspects of it (in this case the potential for benefit-sharing and
energy exports) and de-emphasizing the negative aspects of it (in this case the potential
negative side effects on the project for Egypt and Sudan). The declaration of principles in
2015 and the 2010 treaty could also be said to be forms of “containment strategies”, because
they created increased leverage and institutionalization of the status quo for Ethiopia. Egypt
and Sudan were notably left out of the 2010 agreement which limited their influence (Zeitoun
& Warner 2006 pp. 447-448).
Tawfik’s (2016) paper notes that the benefit-sharing aspect of the dam has not been realized
in part due to the lack of early impact assessments, which meant the countries took notably
different approaches to the dam. This can be seen in Sudan’s initial uncertainty stemming
from Ethiopia’s unilateral movements and lack of communication regarding the project. Only
when the benefits became clear to Sudan did they start wholeheartedly supporting the project.
The lack of impact assessments led to the late discovery of many unforeseen downsides for
Sudan. These, coupled with the unilateral dam filling from Ethiopia, has made Sudan once
again uncertain about the project. This collides with the norms of regional cooperation and
benefit-sharing and has resulted in Sudan moving towards the Egyptian position of framing
the conflict more in terms of its “national security” in 2021.
On the other end, there is a distinct commitment to self-determination and the norm of
national sovereignty from Ethiopia, as well as a desire to become a regional hegemon in line
with Gubena’s (2019) line of thinking. Ethiopia must simultaneously move unilaterally to
seize regional influence away from Egypt through the hydro-hegemonic strategies discussed
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