Looking for a Jurisdiction for Somali Pirates
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2, April–June 2011 Looking for a Jurisdiction for Somali Pirates DANIELE ARCHIBUGI AND MARINA CHIARUGI The reluctance to punish hostes humani generis (enemies of human- kind). On 27 April 2010 the United Nations However, the crime of piracy has been Security Council adopted the last of a sleeping for so long that also the pro- rather long series of Resolutions devoted cedures to punish it have become rusty. to dealing with a problem that inter- Most of the piracy at sea experienced national relations theory did not expect before the resurgence in the Gulf of to reappear in the twenty-first century: Aden was, and still is, localised. In Asia the resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of and West Africa, pirates exercise vicious Aden. While previous Resolutions urged robberies that are much less disturbing states to act effectively against piracy, this for world politics. The pirates in the Gulf new one is devoted to addressing a more of Aden have dramatically changed this specific issue that has also faced unpre- perspective: harboured in a failed state pared good-willing states and their that is not able to control its coasts and navies: what do to with the pirates once patrol its territorial waters, Somali pirates they are arrested? The Security Council is have become much more audacious. well aware that many suspected pirates They have managed to hijack some of have been arrested by various national the world’s largest ships, kidnap crews navies and then released without facing and secure millions of American dollars any trial. How is it possible? For how in ransom, most of which is used to long will it last? And, more importantly, finance further criminal activities. And, what can be done about it? last but not least, for several months if not Whoever has a smattering of inter- years, if eventually caught red-handed by national law is perfectly aware that the one of the several navies that are now law of piracy at sea already provides patrolling the Gulf, rather than facing a willing states with a fully equipped trial and long years in prison, the hos- toolkit.1 The age in which states exercised tages have been gently escorted offshore their rivalry by using privateers against by their capturers. the vessels of competing powers has long It is true that the rate of bloody crime gone. For several decades, if not centu- has been contained and that the number ries, the act of piracy at sea has returned of hostages that have been killed is so far to being just a private crime. It can there- very small, but it is also true that one of fore be expected that each state able to the most important maritime routes of the arrest a suspected pirate would place him world is no longer safe. Ship-owners are on trial.2 The law against piracy at sea increasingly asking governments to take developed in a very linear way, giving firm action. Insurance companies are states the opportunity to exercise being forced to update their premiums universal jurisdiction upon individuals and deal with specialised firms able to suspected of being ‘Blackbeard’s col- carry out negotiations with the pirates leagues’ and unanimously considered that have taken possession of the ships. # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011 Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA 231
The data collected by the International ered to be a Thai fishing trawler seized by Maritime Bureau (IMB)—a non- pirates. The navy ship Tabar returned fire, governmental organisation funded by sinking the trawler and killing the sus- ship-owners—show that the risk of being pected pirates as well as the fifteen kid- attacked by a skiff waving the Jolly Roger napped fishermen who were on board. is much greater, in fact almost double, The second episode occurred on 6 May than the probability of incurring any 2010, when Russian forces were engaged other kind of maritime accident. The in a military operation aimed at freeing statistics speak for themselves: actual or the oil tanker Moscow University. The attempted attacks have been 239 in 2006, eleven kidnappers were fired upon by 263 in 2007, 293 in 2008 and 406 in 2009.3 the Russians, which provoked the killing Moreover, it is estimated that about half of one of them and the release of the of the actual attacks are not reported tanker. The military head of the operation because of the burden and slowness con- concluded that there were no trial oppor- nected to successive investigations.4 tunities in Russia and the ten surviving Navies of Western states have been the pirates were ‘released’ 300 miles off the protagonists of several fast-track arrest- coast without water, food and any navi- and-release episodes. The reason why gation device. According to the declara- suspected pirates have been released is tions of a Russian high-ranking defence that a very old crime in a new age has ministry official, the pirates did not have found states and the other damaged any possibility of safely reaching the players unprepared. Western states are, coast. The end of this episode is, however, in fact, those that have the maritime disputed: some journalists suggested that forces to patrol the Gulf of Aden and the official version could be an attempt to have the greatest interest in returning to hide the killing of all of the pirates during safe commercial navigation. But Western the rescue operation. It is difficult to states also have to satisfy sophisticated know what actually happened; neverthe- systems of legal guarantees, a demanding less, it is a serious violation of human public opinion and a large number of rights to use excessive force to free a attentive human rights organisations. It hijacked ship and, above all, to leave is certainly not easy for them to deal pirates in the high sea to their own for- satisfactorily with suspects arrested in tune. the middle of the sea. In some cases Should the behaviour of the Russian they have preferred to wash their hands navy be considered the implementation of the matter and return the pirates to the of a new anti-piracy doctrine? In fact, coast. some months before, Russian President Medvedev declared, half in jest, that since norms on what to do with captured Tough clashes and gentle pirates are still unclear, it would be better returning to our forefathers’ methods, arrests in the high sea which presumably includes hanging Other navies have been less gentle than them from their vessels’ masts. There is this. Although many of the high seas no official register for these ‘quick and confrontations with suspected pirate ves- dirty’ encounters of military ships with sels are likely to be unreported, two suspected pirates in high sea since episodes involving the Indian and the nobody cares to report them. But it is Russian navies, respectively, are instruc- quite clear that each navy can act using tive. The first involved the Indian navy its own discretion. approaching a suspected vessel in Western navies are much gentler with November 2008 which was later discov- pirates—so gentle in fact that often they 232 D a n i e l e Ar c h i b u g i a n d M a r i n a C h i a r u g i The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011
have escorted suspected pirates to shore. detention of suspected pirates can make For example, the NATO Operation some difference. It is therefore logical that Ocean Shield does not have any com- the ‘international community’—this bar- mon legal framework to arrest pirates, or oque name that designates the common any mechanism to transfer them to a interest of a large number of governments third party for trial. If a NATO vessel and of the multinational business sec- seizes suspect pirates, the question tor—has been busy trying to find solu- regards only the national state of the tions. seizing warship. Yet it is self-evident that powerful states cannot send their expensive mar- A forgotten legal framework itime forces to patrol the Gulf of Aden in order to restore safe sea routes and, when and a new global context they eventually manage to capture sus- Is there any middle ground between the pected pirates, just release them. If navies indiscriminate killing of suspected will limit themselves to having a preven- pirates and their gentle escort to the tive role, and not also a repressive role, coast? What are the legal instruments they will have a never ending job. Navies that states can use? Both the 1958 Geneva certainly have had a tremendous impact Convention on the Law of the Sea and in terms of increasing security in the Gulf. the 1982 United Nations Convention on This security has to deal with two oppos- the Law of the Sea (hereinafter ing trends: on the one hand, there is the UNCLOS) authorise states to try sus- increasing number of pirates and the pected pirates. Moreover, the norms on improved quality of their equipment as universal jurisdiction have become part a consequence of the ransoms paid; on of international customary law, allowing the other hand, there is the greater deter- states that did not ratified these Conven- rence exercised by navies and by new on- tions to prosecute pirates, collecting even board forms of protection, which make it the gratitude of the international com- more difficult to seize a ship. munity. Therefore, any state has an Attempted attacks have in fact almost uncontroversial power to seize any ship doubled, while the successful ones have suspected of being used by pirates, arrest not. It can be argued, as expected, that the its crew and bring them to its territory number of pirates has increased as a for trial in its courts. The 1988 Conven- consequence of the ransoms paid, but to tion on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts seize a ship has become more difficult. On Against the Safety of Maritime Naviga- the basis of the IMB’s statistics, in 2008 tion (hereinafter the SUA Convention) successful attacks have been 38 per cent goes even further since member states of the attempted ones, while in 2009 the have a precise duty to adopt all the percentage has decreased to 22 per cent. national laws necessary to assure the During the first months of 2010, the total prosecution of any act of violence in number of attacks seemed to be decreas- the high sea.7 Without the need to evoke ing for the first time, while there was a the controversial notion of universal shift of the areas of massive attacks south- jurisdiction, the SUA Convention asks ward from the Gulf of Aden to the Indian states to prosecute or extradite the sus- Ocean.5 pects, either because the ship has its The number of pirates directly in- nationality (flag state), the crime has volved with piracy at sea is limited and occurred in its territorial waters (territor- most estimates converge in thinking they ial state), or because the suspects are its are in the range of 1,000–2,000.6 If this is citizens (state of active nationality). The the actual number, the arrest, trial and SUA Convention makes it clear that L o o k i n g fo r a J u r i s d i c t i o n fo r S o m a l i P i r a t e s 233 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2
whenever there is a pirate, there must be Yet the arrest, transfer and prospective at least one competent national court to prosecution of these pirates are just part try him—at least as far as states party to of the story. When the kidnapped crews the Convention are concerned.8 are not clearly associated with the nation- In the case of Somalia, the UN Security ality of a powerful Western state, there is Council has further broadened the no eager agent that makes a serious powers of the states patrolling the area, attempt to capture them and release the removing the limit of territorial waters for hostages through force. And so for sev- the hot pursuit of suspected pirate ves- eral years ships have continued to be sels. With Resolutions 1816 and 1851, the hijacked, crews to be kidnapped, ransoms Security Council has allowed states even to be paid and captured pirates to be to enter into Somali territory, although released. Only a few apprehended Somali subject to the additional consent of the pirates are suffering the consequences of Transitional Federal Government. By all their actions. The wind is changing, how- means, it seems that life should have ever, and some states have become eager become more difficult for pirates and to use their courts. Significant examples easier for those willing to prosecute include the following: them. So far, however, navies have sel- dom decided to exercise such powers. In April 2010, American prosecutors charged There has been a surprising reluctance eleven alleged pirates that, probably by mis- of Western powers to use legal methods take, made a ridiculous attempt to hijack two to judge pirates. Costs, an unclear code of warships of the United States Navy. In May 2010, a Yemeni tribunal sentenced to death six conduct, onerous guarantees imposed by pirates that killed two people during the human rights and refugees law or a seizure of an oil tanker, condemning six simple lack of interest have all contribu- others to ten years’ imprisonment. In June ted for several years to leaving the crime 2010, a Dutch Court condemned five pirates without punishment. There are, however, who hijacked a Dutch vessel to five years’ a few exceptions that are more revealing imprisonment. than the norm. States have been willing to use a mus- Why have so few pirates been at the cular approach when their own nationals bar, and most of those who have only in are victims of hijacking. Typical cases very recent months? Although the rea- include the seizure of French yacht Le sons are more political than legal, the Ponant and of the American cargo ship available legal framework is also some- Maersk Alabama: in both cases, the re- how unsatisfactory. First of all, many spective national navies arrested the countries still lack an internal set of rules pirates and put them into the hands of for prosecuting individuals suspected of their national courts. From the juridical piracy; even if international norms are viewpoint, they have been following the quite clear, the lack of appropriate in- criteria of the flag state and, more impor- ternal laws is a hampering factor. Second, tantly, passive nationality jurisdiction. there are legal and logistical difficulties in Perhaps more relevant has been the polit- transporting defendants, evidence and ical viewpoint: France and the United witnesses to courts that are often thou- States have been able to please their sands of miles away: the costs associated public opinion by showing that the na- with a fair trial are too onerous. Third, tional government was able to protect its while the advantage of seizing and trying citizens abroad. In both cases, presidents a group of pirates will be collective, the Nicholas Sarkozy and Barack Obama economic costs and the political risks have personally greeted the kidnapped would be paid for by the capturing nation citizens when they arrived home. only. 234 D a n i e l e Ar c h i b u g i a n d M a r i n a C h i a r u g i The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011
It would be certainly cheaper to try the More recently, a similar agreement has suspected pirates in the region, but here been signed with the Republic of the Western states have to struggle against Seychelles. The Seychelles was quick to their own norms and policies protecting change its criminal code to allow jurisdic- human rights: suspects cannot be trans- tion over piracy, and the first trial was ferred to countries that practice torture concluded on 26 July 2010, in which and where fair trials are not guaranteed. eleven pirates were sentenced to ten More generally, the non-refoulement prin- years in prison. Under this premise, it is ciple forbids returning an individual to a not surprising that Mauritius and Tanza- territory where there is the risk of being nia also have announced their willing- persecuted or abused.9 In other words, ness to prosecute pirates. Western states are able to seize the pirates The fact that a Western ship arrests the because they have efficient military capa- pirates and that they are then transferred city and political muscle to get them, but to countries in the region may create they are also more reluctant to bring the some procedural problems with the suspects home to trial because they have regional country’s internal legislation. to face more disadvantages than advan- To prevent this, the Security Council has tages. invited patrolling states to make use of the practice of ship-riders agreements—a Searching new judicial very common and fruitful practice in the fight against drug trafficking, which enti- instruments tles a law enforcement officer to make an This has led to search for other, cheaper arrest under the laws of his or her state and more effective solutions. Many states when the officer is on a foreign vessel, have found it convenient to sign bilateral avoiding criminals being allowed to take agreements with states in the region to advantage of shared waters for illegal assure all the procedural needs of the activities. Ship-riders possess the author- trial. The United Kingdom, the United ity to assess piracy incidents, decide the States, the European Union and Denmark best way to proceed with the capture, and have all signed Memoranda of Under- secure the evidence needed by the courts standing with Kenya for the transfer of of their state. captured pirates to its jails for being tried Still, Western states should continue to in front of African judges. In November be worried about the fortune of the sus- 2009, 111 pirates were waiting for trial pects they deliver since the prisoners’ after having been handed over to Kenya, human rights can be violated. The Ken- 74 of which on the basis of the provisions yan judicial system and its prisons are far of the Memorandum of Understanding from being best practice examples. Even (MOU) with the EU. The willingness of if the treaties signed by Western states states in the region to try and jail sus- and the Resolutions of the Security Coun- pected pirates is also related to negotia- cil put a great emphasis on fair trial and tions. For example, the Kenyan the protection of human rights, there is government announced in April 2010 its more than one reason to doubt that these intention to no longer accept pirates for targets will be achieved. There is the risk trial because of its overburdened judicial that the transfer of prisoners may repli- system. However, the resources made cate the notorious ‘extraordinary rendi- available by the international community tions’ not just for suspected terrorists, but increased and two months later a new also for suspected pirates. high-security courtroom in Mombasa was opened for piracy as well as for other crimes. L o o k i n g fo r a J u r i s d i c t i o n fo r S o m a l i P i r a t e s 235 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2
Achieved results and possible to benefit from the renewing of peniten- actions tiary institutes. The simple presence of the UNODC After more than three years of multina- international staff at local jails represents tional naval operations, the more inter- a strong deterrent against possible esting achievements of the international abuses against prisoners. But will this community in the realm of a fair system concern and supervision be sustainable of pirate prosecution came from the Con- in the long run, when the attention of the tact Group on Piracy off the Coast of international community will be lower? Somalia (CGPCS) and the United Nations To use tribunals and prisons of states in Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). the region is not necessarily sustainable CGPCS is an informal group initiated by in the long term: the judicial and deten- the United States in January 2009, tion facilities cannot stand the pressure endorsed by UN Security Council Reso- of sustaining all the trials, and the gov- lution 1851 and currently composed of 45 ernments have already said that prison- countries and seven international organ- ers will be accepted on a case-by-case isations. It was principally conceived to basis. coordinate political, legal and military What else can be done? A wealth of efforts against piracy and to ensure that proposals have been made,10 and perhaps pirates are brought to justice. It manages this is the most clear expression that the a trust fund mainly aimed toward enhan- international community does not yet cing the prosecution capacities of states in have a clear idea of how and where to the region, but also toward promoting the act. The most comprehensive and author- diffusion of anti-piracy messages in the itative stance has come from the Secre- Somali local media. tary-General who, at the request of the UNODC aims to coordinate inter- Security Council, has released a specific national efforts against organised crime, report.11 and has implemented a large programme Seven different options are offered in for judicial capacity building in Eastern the Secretary-General’s report for prose- Africa States. In particular, it focuses its cuting and imprisoning pirates. First of attention on: the review of remand cases all, it is significant to look at what the that has led to a reduction in the number report does not include. While academics of prisoners; the training of prosecutors discussed the possibility of resorting to and police forces; the provision of the International Criminal Court, 12 the defence lawyers; mechanisms for the Secretary-General’s report does not availability of evidence; and, above all, endorse this proposal. This seems reason- the improvement of conditions in pris- able since in a short period it may gen- ons. A major concern is that prisons erate a high number of trials associated satisfy the basic necessities of inmates, with piracy, thereby risking a serious including water, medical care, limited blockage in ICC activities. Nor it would overcrowding, sewerage capacity, and be dignified assigning competences over blankets and mattresses. The commit- piracy—an international crime, but still a ments of UNODC are directed not only form of robbery at sea—to an institution towards Kenya and the Seychelles, but created to judge the most heinous crimes also towards the pirates’ territorial state; of our age. Beyond the obvious conse- the organisation is also sponsoring the quence of trivialising a tribunal aimed construction of two new prisons in Punt- to judge ‘the most serious crimes of inter- land and Somaliland, which should meet national concern’, the deterrence factor international standards. Hopefully, not may be weak and transferring prisoners just pirates but all prisoners will be able to other courts will not contribute to 236 D a n i e l e Ar c h i b u g i a n d M a r i n a C h i a r u g i The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011
improving local capacity building in legal courts and will not require long forensic proceedings. examination of the assaulted merchant The Secretary-General’s report pro- ships. In fact, one of the reasons why poses the return to international tribu- ship-owners are often reluctant to report nals, which could either follow the successful, and even more unsuccessful, model of the ad-hoc tribunals instituted assaults is to avoid delays associated with by the Security Council more than fifteen the collection of legal evidence. The insti- years ago for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, tution of an exclusion zone will make life or the mixed tribunals adopted for Sierra more difficult for suspected criminals and Leone, Cambodia and Timor East. These easier for merchant ships. Nevertheless, options would reduce drastically any evidence-collecting remains a difficult perplexity about the fairness of prisoner task in a field where the tools for crime treatment during and after the trial. After are easily hidden in the abyss by merely all, there has been a proliferation of inter- throwing it overboard. national and hybrid criminal courts.13 Nevertheless, as pointed out by both the Council of Europe’s and the Secretary- Prospects General’s reports, such an alternative After some years of uncertainty, the inter- obviously implies costs that states are national community now has a full menu not necessarily willing to bear and it for choice since, at the request of the 1918 may take too long to be instituted to Resolution of the Security Council, the represent an effective deterrence. More- Secretary-General has delivered a report over, there is the danger that an inter- with various options for prosecuting and national tribunal will divert resources imprisoning suspected pirates in the Gulf from official development aid and will of Aden. Already the fact that the Secur- not contribute to improving the judicial ity Council leaves open so many options apparatus of the states in the region. shows that there is not yet a clear strategy Alternatively, the Secretary-General’s on the methods that should be used to report explores the possibility of making repress piracy in the region. There should a greater use of local and regional facil- be more options than either releasing the ities, either by creating a regional tribunal suspects or sinking their ships, and the or by enhancing the judicial capabilities Secretary-General provides states with of the states in the region. All these the opportunity to choose how to act. options could imply the more or less The economic interests associated with intense participation of the United navigation in the area, the periodic com- Nations and of other states. plaints of the business community and Others have suggested the institution the high costs involved in maintaining a of an ‘exclusion zone’—a sea area where fleet of military ships in the Gulf are all vessels equipped with particular items factors that should induce governments like ladders, grappling hooks, weapons to pick at least some of the options sug- or even a manifestly insufficient store of gested by the Secretary-General. Never- food and water are presumed to be pira- theless, the proper way to sort the tical vessels, inverting the burden of the problem once and forever, of course, proof.14 These instruments (known also would not be to repress crime in high as ‘equipment articles’) have been repeat- sea, but to recreate a Somali state able to edly used in the struggle against slave control its coasts, preventing expeditions trade in past centuries and against drug to hijack ships. Since it is more than smuggling in recent times. Such a propo- twenty years since the Somali question sal will have the advantage of making it was listed on the agenda of global gov- easier to collect the evidence needed in ernance, there is little hope that it can be L o o k i n g fo r a J u r i s d i c t i o n fo r S o m a l i P i r a t e s 237 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2
fixed with the resources and the political oceans surrounding Somalia. Piracy willingness that the international com- remains a problem that can be actually munity has so far been willing to use. solved only onshore, rebuilding the insti- In addition, the second-best solution— tutions able to administer justice and so- namely the integration of prevention with cial policies in the Somali territory. The repressive measures—has been incred- second best solution of jailing pirates may ibly slow. In particular, there has been be just a short-term palliative. widespread reluctance to develop legal methods in spite of a well developed international law framework that will Notes allow for it. It is difficult to explain this 1 For an historical and legal overview on the since Somali pirates have neither political law of piracy, see M. Bahar, ‘Attaining protection nor serve the vested interests optimal deterrence at sea: a legal and of any power. Perhaps the reluctance strategic theory for naval anti-piracy which for so many months has left cap- operations’, Vanderbilt Journal of Trans- tured pirates either shot dead or free is national Law, vol. 1, 2007, pp. 32–121; due to the unwillingness to introduce D. Guyldfoyle, ‘Counter-piracy law enfor- extraterritorial courts that can deal with cement and human rights’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 19, the crimes recognised by international 2010, pp. 142–63; M. Halberstam, ‘Terror- law. ism on the high seas: the Achille Lauro Crimes committed by Somali pirates piracy and the IMO Convention on Mar- are much less vicious than the war crimes itime Safety’, America Journal of Inter- and crimes against humanity committed national Law, vol. 82, no. 2, 1988, pp. 272– in Africa and elsewhere. Governments 311; E. Kontorovich, ‘A Guantanamo on sponsoring ad hoc courts will have the sea: the difficulties of prosecuting increasing difficulty in explaining why pirates and terrorists’, California Law they devote so much attention to trying Review, vol. 98, 2010, pp. 243–61; A. J. pirates and so little to repressing war Roach, ‘Agora: piracy prosecutions’, Amer- criminals. Governments may be accused ica Journal of International Law, vol. 104, of using the sword of law to strike the 2010, pp. 243–61; J. E. Thompson, Mercen- aries, Pirates and Sovereigns, Princeton, NJ, petty rather than the egregious criminal. Princeton University Press, 1994. If this is the case, it is likely that none of 2 No need to use gender neutral language in the Secretary-General’s options will be this case since all Somali pirates appre- implemented. hended so far are men. The few exceptions Even if the landscape is changing and to the rule are to be found either in the there is an increase in the willingness to legendary Anne Bonny and Mary Read or exert justice, we can be sure that the men in the few reported women pirates of our at the bar are not yet the ‘big fishes’ age active in the Chinese and Nigerian among Somali pirates. Piracy in the Gulf seas. of Aden started as an individual act of 3 See the annual reports of the International desperation, but it is transforming fast Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the Inter- into organised crime. The lords of piracy national Chamber of Commerce: Piracy remain peacefully at home and can count and Armed Robbery Against Ships, January– December 2008, London, International on an almost ten million population basin Chamber of Commerce, January 2009; of manpower, impatient to find a way to Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, escape from the most anguished poverty. January–December 2009, London, Inter- Under these premises, even if the judicial national Chamber of Commerce, January repression mechanisms worked properly 2010. All can be requested on the IMB and quickly, the plague of piracy would Piracy Reporting Centre website: http:// hardly disappear from the seas and www.icc.ccs.org 238 D a n i e l e Ar c h i b u g i a n d M a r i n a C h i a r u g i The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011
4 See the report of the Political Affairs Com- see D. Guilfoyle, ‘Counter piracy law mittee of the Parliamentary Assembly of enforcement and human rights’, Inter- the Council of Europe to Resolution 1722: national and Comparative Law Quarterly, B. Keles, Piracy: A Crime and a Challenge for vol. 59, 2010, p. 152. Democracies, doc. 12193, 1 April 2010, 10 See the report of the Committee on Legal available on the Assembly website: Affairs and Human Rights of the http://www.assembly.coe.int Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 5 See International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of Europe to Recommendation 1913: of the International Chamber of Com- S. Holovaty, The Necessity to Take Addi- merce, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against tional International Legal Steps to Deal with Ships, 1 January–30 June 2010, London, Sea Piracy, doc. 12194, 6 April 2010, avail- International Chamber of Commerce, able on the Assembly website: http:// July 2010, available at: http://www.icc. www.assembly.coe.int ccs.org 11 United Nations Secretary-General, Report 6 See, among others, R. Middleton, Piracy in of the Secretary-General on Possible Options Somalia: Threatening Global Trade, Feeding to Further the Aim of Prosecuting ( . . .), doc. Local Wars, Chatham House Briefing n. S/2010/394, New York, United Nations, Paper, October 2008, available at: http:// 26 July 2010. www.chatamhouse.org.uk 12 See E. Andersen, B. Brookman-Hawe and 7 SUA Convention, Article 6, available on P. Goff, Suppressing Maritime Piracy: the website of the International Maritime Exploring the Options in International Law, Organization: http://www.imo.org Workshop Report, October 2009, p. 4 and 8 While Somalia did not ratify the Conven- ff., available at the American Society of tion, all other states in the region are International Law website: http:// bound to its provisions. www.asil.org 9 Under international law, non-refoulement 13 See the census of the Project on Inter- precludes states from returning a person national Courts and Tribunals of the to a territory where his life or freedom New York University at: http:// would be threatened or where he might www.pict-pcti.org/index.html be tortured or face persecution (see Article 14 See E. Kontorovich, Equipment Articles for 33, 1951 Refugee Convention). The prin- the Prosecution of Maritime Piracy, Discus- ciple is, however, subject to various excep- sion Paper prepared for One Earth Future tions and, while it is commonly Foundation, available on the website of the considered a customary principle, its nat- Foundation: http://www.oneearthfuture. ure of peremptory norm is not universally org accepted. On its relationships with piracy, L o o k i n g fo r a J u r i s d i c t i o n fo r S o m a l i P i r a t e s 239 # The Authors 2011. The Political Quarterly # The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2011 The Political Quarterly, Vol. 82, No. 2
You can also read