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NO. 29 APRIL 2021 Introduction Libya’s Flawed Unity Government A Semblance of Compromise Obscures Old and New Rifts Wolfram Lacher The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) under Abdelhamid Dabeiba in March 2021 was a breakthrough in efforts to overcome Libya’s political division. But the settlement’s flaws are already starting to show. So far, political actors have merely agreed to compete for access to state funds within a unified government. Dis- tributive struggles could soon test the government’s cohesion. Meanwhile, substan- tive disagreements are being shoved aside; in particular, the government is trying to ignore the challenges in the security sector. Unless progress is made towards elections that are planned for December 2021, tensions between profiteers and opponents of the government risk provoking a new political crisis. But even the elections them- selves harbour potential for renewed conflict. In February 2021, United Nations (UN) media- Tripoli from April 2019 to June 2020 tion efforts met with unexpected success deepened societal rifts. The GNU’s forma- when the UN-led Libyan Political Dialogue tion also confounded expectations because Forum (LPDF) selected a three-member the convergence between political repre- Presidency Council and a prime minister. sentatives in the LPDF was not matched by Even more surprising was Prime Minister that between the actual parties to the con- Dabeiba’s success in winning his govern- flict. The armed groups that fought each ment the endorsement of the House of Rep- other in the most recent war remain affili- resentatives (HoR), which is the Libyan legis- ated with opposing military command struc- lative body that was elected in 2014. This tures and continue to host foreign forces endorsement has given Libya its first unified and mercenaries to deter their adversaries. government since August 2014. According Another surprise was the role of Russia, to the LPDF roadmap, the GNU’s term ends Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with elections that are planned for 24 De- in consenting to the formation of the GNU, cember 2021 even though there is not yet which they could plausibly have sought any legal basis for their implementation. to prevent. After all, a unity government This breakthrough was unforeseen not could seek to expel these states’ forces or only because the country’s political division mercenaries from Libya. But no such for- had hardened in recent years, but also eign obstruction occurred; in fact, Egypt because the civil war over the capital of and Turkey supported the process, even
though they had been on opposing sides together politicians who mostly have only
in Libya for years. weak ties to forces on the ground. Half of
The negotiating framework emanated the 75 representatives chosen by the UN to
from the Berlin Process that Germany and be LPDF participants are members of one of
the UN launched in autumn 2019 to broker the two competing legislative bodies – the
an understanding between the foreign HoR and the High State Council. Over the
powers involved in Libya. But the Berlin past few years, these bodies have become
Process was not the reason why the media- infamous for defending their privileges and
tion efforts were able to gather momentum. obstructing progress. In most cases, their con-
Instead, two factors were key. First, in spring stituencies have long stopped seeing these
2020, Turkey’s military intervention in sup- parliamentarians as representing their in-
port of the Tripoli government – and in terests. Egypt, which exerts great influence
violation of the Berlin declaration of Janu- over HoR Speaker Agila Saleh, ensured that
ary 2020 – ended the war in Tripoli and the LPDF included numerous supporters of
created a balance of power. Khalifa Haftar, Saleh and that the HoR would need to ap-
leader of the Libyan Arab Armed Forces prove LPDF decisions in order for them to
(LAAF), could no longer hope for military become binding. In addition to the parlia-
victory. The ceasefire agreement signed mentarians, the LPDF includes proxies of
under UN auspices in October 2020 merely individual political figures and, to a lesser
formalized the prevailing stalemate. Sec- extent, military actors, as well as civil
ond, from January 2020 onwards, the war- society representatives.
ring parties deprived each other of access By contrast, Haftar’s forces and western
to oil revenues, causing growing financial Libyan armed groups are weakly represented
difficulties for both sides. Russian attempts in the LPDF, as are the concerns of the con-
to negotiate the resumption of oil produc- flicts’ victims – internally displaced per-
tion in summer 2020 prompted the US to sons, the war-disabled, and relatives of
intensify its own mediation efforts on the those killed in the conflicts. Indeed, LPDF
matter. For Libya’s politicians, forming a delegates came to focus primarily on select-
unity government became the only way to ing members of the Presidency Council as
once again unlock access to oil revenues. well as the prime minister.
Parliamentarians played an even stronger
role in forming the cabinet. The HoR’s en-
The Logic of Unification dorsement of the GNU was a key condition
for transcending the state of institutional
The UN-led process that produced the GNU division. To gain this endorsement, Dabeiba
was selective with regard to its participants allowed small groups or even individual
and the questions it tackled. This facilitated parliamentarians to name their own minis-
the GNU’s formation, but also limited its ters. During negotiations, many members
prospects for success. of the HoR openly demanded what they
The LPDF, which the UN first convened claimed was a fair share in government
in November 2020, is one of the UN’s three posts for their cities, tribes or regions.
negotiating forums intended to resolve Dabeiba fully submitted to such demands
conflict in Libya. The others are the Libyan and thereby arrived at a government of 35
Economic Dialogue and the Joint Military ministers whose selection occurred on the
Commission, the latter of which yielded the basis of clientelist ties, and who have few
October 2020 ceasefire agreement and has common political interests. Several have
also been tasked with negotiating the uni- already been subject to administrative rep-
fication of Libyan military command struc- rimands or judicial investigations for abuse
tures. of office, embezzlement and other charges.
Government formation through the The GNU therefore does not rely on a
LPDF, and subsequently the HoR, brought coalition of well-identifiable political blocs.
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
2Libya has few well-organized political these funds serve to build patronage net-
forces, and they largely ended up empty works, or simply personal enrichment.
handed in the process of government for- This logic dominated the GNU’s formation
mation – among them Haftar’s power mainly because the UN-led process depended
structure in eastern Libya and the Justice on the lure of state wealth as the primary
and Construction Party, which is affiliated driver behind the LPDF.
with the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead,
the government includes representatives
of dozens of different clientelist networks. Persistent Military Realities
To date, the UN-led process has only
required these networks to agree that they To enable negotiations on the redistribution
will compete for access to state funds with- of access to state funds, political actors cir-
in a single government. But exactly who cumvented core issues and key players in
gets what largely remains to be negotiated. the conflict. These include the continued
Ministerial posts are only one aspect of this existence of opposing military forces and
equation. Many other official positions can the grievances – particularly impunity for
or must be reshuffled, and budgets are to war crimes – of groups from which the
be divided. Dabeiba still requires the HoR’s conflicting parties recruit.
approval for the GNU budget, and in ex- The armed groups on both sides of the
change for their confirmation thereof, par- most recent war were only marginally in-
liamentarians are trying to push through volved in the political process. Haftar sub-
their choices for deputy ministers. As soon mitted to the process because his foreign
as the budget has passed, competition over backing dwindled in the wake of his defeat
the control of funds will unfold within the in Tripoli, and because he was exposed to
government. In addition, members of both Egyptian pressure. Likewise, his opponents
the HoR and GNU are trying to agree on in western Libya were also more or less
new appointments to top positions, such as excluded from the formation of the govern-
those of the Central Bank governor and the ment, because they lacked the necessary
head of the Audit Bureau, for which they weight after fragmenting into rival factions
also intend to ensure proportional repre- subsequent to the war. But neither side
sentation of the regions. In sum, the new has a strong stake in the GNU, nor do they
political settlement has yet to produce effectively submit to its authority.
winners and losers. As a result, the GNU’s So far, the GNU has refrained from
opponents will organize with time. Already, claiming leadership in the security sector.
resentment is on the rise among the many According to the LPDF, the Presidency
political and military actors to whom Council has the power to appoint the top
Dabeiba had promised posts, so far without echelons of the military and thereby to
keeping his promises. reunify command structures. But it has yet
The logic of proportional representation to do so. In fact, it remains unclear whether
on the basis of regional or local origin had Haftar even recognizes the Presidency
implicitly shaped previous governments Council’s role as the supreme commander
as well. But the current process has openly of the armed forces. For his part, Dabeiba
established it as its dominant principle. has not named a defence minister because
The composition of the Presidency Council no candidate gained the acceptance of both
reflects this logic, as it will consist of one Haftar and his adversaries. Dabeiba’s inte-
representative each for western, eastern rior minister, like most of his predecessors,
and southern Libya. The blatant demands stands for a policy of allowing rival armed
for a proportional share of government po- groups to operate under the interior minis-
sitions are transparent attempts to receive try umbrella and benefit from its funds.
access to state funds. They rely on a tacit Dabeiba himself has extensive contacts
understanding between political actors that among armed groups in Tripoli, Misrata
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
3and Zawiya, which have so far enjoyed doing so would collide with its approach
greater leeway during his tenure than of appeasing factions across political divides
under the previous interior minister, Fathi by offering them access to state funds. Fi-
Bashagha. nally, Haftar’s power structure remains the
As for the task of placing the competing single biggest obstacle to the establishment
military command structures under a uni- of national security institutions.
fied leadership, the GNU has merely de- Even if the GNU continues to ignore the
ferred to the Joint Military Commission. thorny issues in the security sector, it will
Consisting of two sets of five officers soon see itself confronted with the realities
appointed respectively by Haftar and the of the military landscape. In Tripoli, armed
GNU’s predecessor government in Tripoli, groups exert great influence within state
the Joint Military Commission has confined institutions – a state of affairs that has
itself to working out the details of the cease- fuelled anger among forces in other cities
fire and its monitoring mechanism. It lacks and regions, and provoked open conflict in
the political weight to negotiate a reunifica- the capital in 2018. As in previous govern-
tion of the army. The five officers appointed ments, the Tripoli militias are pushing to
by Tripoli enjoy little trust among the armed place allies in senior positions, which is
groups that form the bulk of western Libyan already driving growing tensions in the
forces. The role of the five officers appointed capital. In the east and centre of the coun-
by Haftar is primarily to simulate the ex- try, the GNU will only be able to operate
istence of a formal military hierarchy, with Haftar’s approval. Government repre-
whereby actual decision-making authority sentatives will have to strike arrangements
lies with the warlord’s inner circle of close with Haftar’s forces; for the latter, this
relatives. means opportunities to siphon off funds
Haftar’s effective submission to a unified and fill positions with allies. Above all,
military command is as equally unlikely as recurrent acts of violence by armed groups
the possibility that his adversaries accept will soon show just how limited the new
a leading role for him or his sons. The core government’s sway is over militias that
LAAF units are inextricably intertwined nominally act as state security forces.
with both his claim to overall power and
the economic predation of his relatives. As
long as Haftar’s power structure stands, he Economic Opportunities?
will only permit a notional integration into
a national military, in order to gain access Instead of tackling the problems in the
to funds. He urgently needs such access security sector, Dabeiba emphasizes that
given his increasing financial difficulties, he intends to jump-start the economy and
his tarnished standing following the Tripoli restore basic public services like the supply
defeat and his limited influence on the of power, cash and fuel. In doing so, he
government formation. But with the per- responds to pressing concerns among the
sistence of Haftar’s forces, the threat he population. The economy and financial
poses to his enemies in western Libya also sector have severely suffered during years
endures and thereby necessitates their of institutional division. Underinvestment,
dependence on local militias and Turkish corruption and war damage have taken a
protection as security guarantees. toll on public infrastructure. Inflation and
In sum, the GNU is unlikely to make the decline of public services have impov-
progress towards unifying command struc- erished large swathes of the middle class.
tures, tightening control over armed groups But Dabeiba’s focus on the economy is
or dissolving militias. Armed actors are in- also a political calculation. It fits well into
sufficiently integrated into the political pro- the political class’s current tendency of
cess. The government itself avoids tackling ignoring fractious substantive issues in
the challenges in the security sector since favour of focusing on splitting the spoils.
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
4Dabeiba also hopes to gain political capital cur that his cousin Ali is the eminence grise
from an economic upturn, whether appar- behind the prime minister. Since 2011,
ent or real – political capital that could Ali Dabeiba has built a patronage network
allow him to hold on to power longer than among armed groups in Misrata and Tripoli
anticipated. This likely explains his early to protect his interests. His son Ibrahim is
moves to increase public salaries by 20 per- the prime minister’s closest adviser, even
cent and pay a basic pension as well as accompanying him to meetings with for-
child and spouse allowances. eign heads of state. Other advisers are also
Dabeiba’s intention to resume major longstanding confidants, some of whom he
public investment projects for the first time worked with at LIDCO and to whom he is
since the 2014 political divide also likely related by marriage. In addition, the minis-
hides ulterior motives. By awarding con- ters for transport and construction, as well
tracts, Dabeiba could seek to gain the good- as the state minister for prime minister
will of foreign governments with the aim of affairs also have close ties to the Dabeiba
securing his power. There are also justified network. Using his official powers, Dabeiba
fears that cronies associated with Dabeiba will seek to place allies in top positions at
would use investment projects to siphon state-owned enterprises.
off profits through commissions or other The Dabeiba network’s interests are there-
methods. After all, Dabeiba represents a fore ambivalent. On the one hand, visible
network that is notorious for doing just economic and social amelioration would
that. serve to secure Dabeiba’s hold on power.
During the final years of the Qadhafi On the other hand, cronyism and corrup-
era, Dabeiba headed the state-owned Libyan tion obstruct such progress – even more
Investment and Development Holding Com- so as the proponents of rival networks in
pany (LIDCO). This company partnered with the government will also strive for self-
foreign contractors to implement construc- enrichment.
tion projects worth billions of dollars that Competing interest groups within the
were awarded by the Organisation for the GNU are only one obstacle to reforms.
Development of Administrative Centers Corruption is rampant across all levels of
(ODAC). Until 2011, the head of this state the public sector. Curbing it would require
institution was Ali Dabeiba, a cousin and restoring the authority of the courts and
brother-in-law of the current prime minis- at least an embryonic state monopoly on
ter as well as a current member of the LPDF. violence. In addition, key institutions such
While at the helm of ODAC, Ali Dabeiba as the Audit Bureau and the Central Bank
amassed immense wealth that can only be remain divided, and the prime minister has
explained by massive corruption, leading no remit over them. Rival networks could
to suspicions that have caused Libyan and use such institutions as levers to veto con-
British authorities to open fraud investiga- tracts and other budget allocations.
tions. Abdelhamid Dabeiba’s ostentatious Dabeiba has found a powerful ally in
prosperity is also difficult to reconcile with Central Bank Governor al-Siddiq al-Kabir,
his job as an executive at a state-owned who is keen to maintain good relations
company. Moreover, in recent years, the with the government to secure his position,
prime minister paid millions to lobbying and also has longstanding ties to the
firms in the US and France to raise his Dabeiba network. Over the past year, Kabir
political profile, partly using LIDCO funds came under strong pressure from Dabeiba’s
for this purpose. It seems likely that predecessor Faiez al-Serraj as well as the
Dabeiba’s political ambitions are also a chairman of the National Oil Corporation
quest to amass even greater wealth. Mustafa Sanalla, both of whom sought to
With Dabeiba, an entire network of oust him. But with the advent of the GNU,
interests has come to power. Well-informed that pressure has faded, which hasn’t
observers in Dabeiba’s native Misrata con- helped to advance reforms. Kabir is now
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
5less cooperative on efforts to reunify the Cen- But for Haftar, whose foreign backers
tral Bank, as doing so would dilute his power do not acknowledge their role, the Russian
over the institution. A key unresolved issue mercenaries are vital. To a lesser extent,
concerns the 70 billion dinars (13 billion the same can be said for his Syrian and
euros) in public debt accumulated by the Sudanese fighters. In the absence of an
parallel eastern authorities since 2015. Only alternative foreign security umbrella, a Rus-
reunification of the Central Bank would sian withdrawal would threaten Haftar’s
permit a concerted effort to restore trust influence in southern and central Libya,
in the dinar, improve the availability of and could even provoke the collapse of his
cash and tackle the discrepancy between power structure. As with other core issues
the official and parallel exchange rate. in the conflict, there is therefore little
chance for progress on the matter so long
as Haftar remains an indispensable, albeit
The Foreign Military Presence difficult, partner for his foreign sponsors.
Neither the UAE nor Egypt will want the
The contrast between the semblance of withdrawal of mercenaries to lead to Haf-
compromise and the facts on the ground tar’s sudden demise and the eruption of
is starkest in the continuing presence of conflicts in eastern Libya.
foreign forces and mercenaries that back Even beyond the mercenary dilemma,
the parties to the most recent civil war. conflicting foreign interests will compound
According to the ceasefire agreement of the centrifugal forces within the govern-
23 October 2020, all foreign forces were ment. States that were on opposing sides
to leave Libya within three months. Six in the recent war are now trying to woo in-
months after the ceasefire agreement was dividual figures in the GNU. So far, Prime
signed, no such withdrawal is in sight. In Minister Dabeiba has sought to maintain
fact, Turkey and Russia are continuing to ambivalence in relations with these states.
reinforce their presence. Turkish military But as they push for the government to
flights to al-Wutiya Airbase continue, as position itself more clearly, they could exac-
does the building of fortifications in central erbate tensions within the GNU – such as
Libya by mercenaries of the Wagner Group, between Dabeiba and the Presidency Coun-
whose activities the Russian government cil, both of whom claim the right to repre-
denies but actually controls. Another key sent Libya internationally.
actor is the UAE, which has financed and
equipped at least parts of the contingents of
Russian, Syrian and Sudanese mercenaries The Coming Crisis
bolstering Haftar.
Turkish and Russian footprints are solidi- On paper, the GNU’s role is to prepare the
fying because both continue to serve as country for the parliamentary and presi-
security guarantors for the conflicting par- dential elections planned for 24 December
ties. These groups fear that their foreign 2021, to usher in Libya’s first unified and
backers’ departures would alter the balance democratic government since 2014. In
of power, provoking renewed fighting. The reality, the GNU’s formation has created
Syrian mercenaries that Turkey has deployed a vested interest in the new status quo.
in Libya are largely irrelevant to the balance Dabeiba’s grand plans for public invest-
of forces, but the formal Turkish military ments and decentralization leave little
presence is crucial. Turkish officials con- doubt that he aims to stay on beyond 2021,
sistently argue that the ceasefire agreement just as the clientelist networks in his gov-
does not affect their official presence, but ernment will also seek to hold on to power
more recently, they have started signalling for as long as possible. This is all the more
that Turkey is ready to withdraw the Syrians the case as an LPDF decision prevents GNU
if Haftar’s mercenaries leave the country too. members from running in the elections.
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
6The conflict of interest is most glaring in fierce persecution. Presidential elections
the House of Representatives, whose mem- harbour particular potential for conflict,
bers have just placed their candidates in since the victory of any candidate affiliated
ministerial positions – and should now with a party to the conflict would pose an
prepare these ministers’ exits by adopting a existential threat to that party’s adversaries.
constitutional and legal framework for the But even in the absence of large-scale esca-
elections. To block such votes, parliamen- lation, the risk that political forces could
tarians interested in the survival of the challenge, reject and even fight the results
Dabeiba government could exploit the con- would be high.
tinuing dispute over the HoR’s presidency
and meeting venue, as well as over the pos-
sibility of holding a constitutional referen- Conclusions
dum.
A plausible scenario therefore is that The stated aim of the UN-led process is to
progress towards the elections could remain tackle a root cause of the conflict by en-
elusive, meaning that the Dabeiba govern- suring fairer and more transparent manage-
ment could hold on to power beyond 24 ment of state wealth. In reality, however,
December 2021. This situation would be the GNU’s formation has prepared the
bound to trigger a new political crisis even grounds for intensified looting of the state.
if the government blames the HoR for the This, in essence, is what competing net-
delay. Many actors have only accepted the works have agreed to under the cover of
new government due to its limited man- regional and local proportionalism, and to
date. Extending it would call the GNU’s that effect, they have circumvented most
legitimacy into question. The ranks of the substantive issues in the conflict. The ap-
government’s opponents, which are set pointment of a prime minister whose name
to grow with the upcoming distributive is synonymous with Qadhafi-era corruption
struggles, could then swell dramatically. epitomizes this understanding. As a basis
Renewed political division would be a real for a reunified Libya, this settlement could
possibility. have wide-ranging consequences and shape
In view of the significant obstacles to the political system even after the next
elections, domestic and foreign pressure elections. More immediately concerning is
currently focuses on making sure that the the fact that this settlement creates the con-
elections take place – but not on creating ditions for renewed conflict, even if the
the conditions for free and fair elections. imbalances and losers it produces will take
For the UN as for Libyan political forces, time to surface.
the elections have become an end in them- Current European attitudes towards the
selves. There is little discussion whether GNU will not encourage it to temper these
they will help to resolve conflict. Nonethe- tendencies. Europeans are relieved that
less, the minimum conditions for successful they can present the GNU’s formation as
elections are lacking. By reunifying military a success of their diplomacy. They also
command structures, the GNU was sup- display a keen interest in the deals Dabeiba
posed to mitigate the risk that armed groups dangles in front of them. Official European
could manipulate electoral results or refuse policy in support of the elections notwith-
to recognize them. But by now, it has standing, some diplomats exhibit a growing
become clear that little progress is likely preference for the stability they hope
to be made in the security sector. Dabeiba could bring. This is problematic,
If the elections happen, they are bound since Dabeiba’s continuation beyond De-
to be accompanied by violence and irregu- cember 2021 would be very likely to pro-
larities in several cities and regions. The voke a new political crisis. It is important
situation is most problematic in areas con- to encourage progress towards elections,
trolled by Haftar, where dissidents face even if they will bring serious risks under
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
7the current conditions. But the elections
should not be seen as a mere box-ticking
exercise. Europeans should not only focus
on ensuring the passage of a legal frame-
work for the elections. Their attention
should shift to the conditions in which the
elections will take place, and the actors
that could prevent the subsequent peaceful
transfer of power.
© Stiftung Wissenschaft
und Politik, 2021
All rights reserved
This Comment reflects
the author’s views.
The online version of
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SWP
Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik
German Institute for
International and
Security Affairs
Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4
10719 Berlin
Telephone +49 30 880 07-0
Fax +49 30 880 07-100
www.swp-berlin.org
swp@swp-berlin.org
ISSN (Print) 1861-1761
ISSN (Online) 2747-5107
doi: 10.18449/2021C29
(Updated English version of
SWP-Aktuell 34/2021)
Dr. Wolfram Lacher is a Senior Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.
SWP Comment 29
April 2021
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