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Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts:
A Case from Brazil
La política del conocimiento en los conflictos ambientales: un caso de Brasil
Aline R. B. Pereiraa, b, Wolfram Laubea
Abstract Resumen
Following large environmental conflicts and disasters, eco- Tras grandes conflictos y desastres ambientales, los proyectos
nomic endeavors -particular large-scale investments in mi- económicos, en particular las inversiones a gran escala en minería
ning or hydropower- are nowadays subjected to rigorous o energía hidroeléctrica, están hoy en día sujetos a leyes y regla-
environmental law and regulations. The application of rules mentos ambientales rigurosos. La aplicación de las normas y regla-
and regulations takes place in environmental administration mentos tiene lugar en la administración pública y en los tribunales
and courts and includes environmental impact assessments e incluye evaluaciones de impacto ambiental (EIAs), procesos de
(EIAs), licensing processes and litigation in court. Within concesión de licencias y litigios en los tribunales. En este contexto,
these contexts, decision making is supposed to be based se supone que la toma de decisiones se basa en un razonamiento ra-
on rational reasoning and purportedly impartial scientific cional y supuestamente en conocimientos científicos e imparciales.
knowledge and information. Thus, citizens’ rights in resou- Así, los derechos de los ciudadanos en los conflictos ambientales y
rce conflicts and the effective enforcement of these rights la aplicación efectiva de estos derechos en procesos de contestación
in administrative, judicial, and political contestation become administrativa, judicial y política dependen en gran medida del co-
highly dependent on knowledge and information and the nocimiento, de la información y de las formas en que se producen,
ways it is produced, interpreted, and valued in the interac- interpretan y valoran en la interacción entre las personas afectadas
tion between people affected and investors, lays and experts, y los inversores, los expertos y no expertos, los burócratas, los profe-
bureaucrats, legal practitioners and citizens. Political con- sionales del derecho y los ciudadanos. La discusión política se con-
testation becomes a seemingly technical dispute. This pa- vierte en una disputa aparentemente técnica. El presente texto se
per bases on a qualitative study of the conflicts surrounding basa en un estudio cualitativo de los conflictos en torno al estableci-
the establishment of the large-scale iron-ore mining project miento del proyecto minero a gran escala Minas-Río, en Conceição
Minas-Rio, in Conceição do Mato Dentro, Minas Gerais, do Mato Dentro, Minas Gerais, Brasil, realizado en 2014-2015.
Brazil, conducted in 2014-2015. It describes the problematic Se describe la naturaleza problemática de la producción de infor-
nature of the production of information and knowledge in a mación y conocimiento en un contexto político-económico dado y
given political-economic context and the contestations su- las disputas en torno a la validez de los resultados aparentemente
rrounding the validity of apparently scientific results as they científicos que surgieron en el proceso de concesión de licencias
emerged alongside the environmental licensing process. En- ambientales. Los estudios ambientales y sus evaluaciones técnicas
vironmental studies and their technical evaluations are based se basan en supuestos cuestionables y a menudo carecen de datos
on questionable assumptions and often lack accurate baseli- de referencia precisos. La falta de recursos públicos para la investi-
ne data. The deficiency of public resources for independent gación independiente hace que las agencias ambientales dependan
investigation makes the environmental agencies dependent de los servicios y de la información proporcionada por las compa-
on services and information provided by mining companies. ñías mineras. Aparte de esta forma de colaboración, la prioriza-
Apart from this form of collaboration, the prioritization of ción de conocimientos supuestamente científicos y “expertos”, las
allegedly scientific “expert” knowledge, career trajectories of trayectorias profesionales del personal de las agencias y la presión
agencies’ personnel, and pressure by pro-mining politicians de políticos que favorecen la minería conducen a la adopción arbi-
lead to the uncritical adoption of data, information and traria de datos, información y conocimientos proporcionados por
knowledge provided by the company and/or the consultan- las mineras y/o las empresas consultoras empleadas por ellas. Al
cy firms employed by them. At the same time, information mismo tiempo, la información proveída por las personas afectadas
given by the people affected and environmentalists becomes y los ambientalistas queda al margen. De esta manera, los derechos
sidelined. Thereby, environmental and citizen rights, as the ambientales y de los ciudadanos, así como los derechos a la infor-
rights to information concerning the environment and to mación sobre el medio ambiente y a la participación en los procesos
participation in licensing processes, guaranteed in the Bra- de concesión de licencias, garantizados en la Constitución y la le-
zilian constitution and environmental legislation, become gislación ambiental brasileñas, se vuelven ineficaces.
ineffective.
Keywords: knowledge politics; right to information; en- Palabras clave: política del conocimiento; derecho a la in-
vironmental impact statements; large scale mining; informa- formación; declaración de impacto ambiental; minería a gran esca-
tion management. la; gestión de información.
a
Center for Development Research, University of Bonn. Bonn, Germany. ORCID Pereira, A.R.B.: 0000-0002-0550-6073;
ORCID Laube, W.: 0000-0002-6798-7968
b
Corresponding author: alinerbpereira@daad-alumni.de
Received: May 4, 2018. Aceptación: November 9, 2018
Gestión y Ambiente 21(supl. 2), 30-46, 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
Introduction between 2006 and 2015, within the environmental
The global scramble for natural resources, combi- licensing process2. In Brazil the environmental li-
ned with the depletion of older and more consolida- censing process is still the main instrument govern-
ted ore deposits, has been pushing mining frontiers ments have implemented to enforce environmental
to the deep countryside of Brazil1, affecting commu- legal frameworks, to monitor and control activities
nities not yet fully part of global markets and com- that actually or potentially pollute and degrade the
modity chains. A good example for this dynamic is environment and to ensure the rights of affected
the open pit mine of the Minas-Rio iron ore mining citizens (Ribeiro, 2015, p. 10). As a result, this ad-
project, located in Conceição do Mato Dentro, Al- ministrative process ends up as the single “barrier”,
vorada de Minas and Dom Joaquim (Minas Gerais). which hampers or (at least) delays the uncontrolled
The case is paradigmatic to the recent advancement advancement of extractive industries in the country3.
of extractive industries in the country after 2000, Among these typically violated rights, in this paper
during the boom of commodities, and raised consi- we focus on the right to information, perceived as
derable public and scientific attention (Milanez and one of the most violated rights in environmental li-
Santos, 2018; PoEMAS, 2015, p. 80; Zhouri, 2014). censing processes (Bermann, 2014, p. 98).
Imposing environmental costs and other “externa- The right to information is a pre-requirement to
lities” of large-scale economic activities over local guarantee other rights in conflicts sparked by large
communities (Martinez-Alier, 2001, p. 159) often scale mining activities. Closely related to the right
fosters the emergence of resistance movements and to participate in public decision-making, good qua-
conflicts. In conflict scenarios typically related to lity information is also essential for good governan-
extractive industries, previous researchers strongly ce and forms the basis of legal claims. As enshrined
report rights violations (Ferreira, 2015; Pereira et in Brazilian constitutional and infra-constitutional
al., 2013; Zhouri, 2014) such as eliminating or con- legislation, the right to trustworthy environmental
siderably limiting communities’ access to land and information is not only a right of all citizens, but
water, not to mention other social impacts, inter alia also a duty of the State through its Environmen-
sudden population influx, rising cost of housing and tal Authorities4. Law 6938/1981 establishes in its
living, or an increase in criminality (Hilson, 2002). article 4, item V, that the National Environmental
These researches are certainly relevant to identify Policy will aim at “[…] the dissemination of envi-
patterns of rights’ violations in similar contexts. No- ronmental data and information and the formation
netheless, academic discussion could benefit of more of public awareness of the need to preserve environ-
systematic analysis in order to understand how the- mental quality and ecological balance”. The same
se right violations occur within existing institutions, law further determines in its article 9 that the ins-
or in which manners that do not strictly fall under truments of the National Environmental Policy in-
the category of ‘rights violations’ certain actors and clude “the guarantee of provision of environmental
groups are deprived from the means to satisfy their
needs. On this background, the research underlying
this study set out to understand the contestations
2 The discussion presented in this paper relates to a broader
over the Minas-Rio iron ore mining project as it investigation in Aline R. B. Pereira’s PhD research, an in-depth
unfolded in the administrative and legal realms qualitative study of the Minas-Rio iron ore mining project and
the conflict it sparked in the countryside of Minas Gerais, Brazil.
1 The ore deposits were there before. But as these areas 3 In spite of its many faults, some of which described in this
often lacked the necessary infrastructure for its exploitation paper, the environmental licensing process is still an indispen-
(transport, energy sources, etc.), they were not considered sable requirement with which mining (and other industries)
economically viable until the first decade of 2000, when the have to cope.
Chinese demand for natural resources has triggered a com- 4 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil (1988), arti-
modities’ boom (according to Milanez, 2017, a commodities cle 5, XIV and XXXIII, article 225 §1º IV and VI. Law 6938, arti-
bubble). As the deposits located closer to more established cle 9, XI, and article 4, V, (Presidência da República do Brasil,
mining areas and richer in the desired minerals are depleted, 1981); Law 10650, especially article 2 (Presidência da Repúbli-
the mining frontier moves further to more remote areas. ca do Brasil, 2003).
31A. R. B. Pereira, W. Laube
information, which obliges the Public Power to pro- decision-making processes. This will be followed by
duce them when they do not exist” (item XI). an overview of data collection methods. The Mi-
The application of rules and regulations takes nas-Rio case will then be introduced, with emphasis
place in environmental administration and courts in the epistemological, social, and political-econo-
and includes environmental impact statements mic problematics of the production, valuation and
(EISs), licensing processes and litigation in court, contestation of knowledge. The paper concludes
which can evolve when the former processes beco- by discussing the empirical findings in theoretical
me contentious. Within this context, decision-ma- perspective, trying to map out possible strategies
king is supposed to be based on rational reasoning that could reduce the emptying of citizen rights in
and purportedly impartial scientific knowledge and legal and administrative procedures that involve the
information. Thus, citizens’ rights in resource con- extractive industry.
flicts and the effective enforcement of these rights
in administrative, judicial, and political contestation
become highly dependent on knowledge and infor- Knowledge politics in environmental
mation. Political contestations become seemingly conflicts
technical disputes. In theses cases, the ways infor- Anthropologists and sociologist have theori-
mation is produced, interpreted, and valued in the zed law as a dynamic process involving informal
interaction between people affected and investors, interactions and uncertainties that cannot be fully
lays and experts, bureaucrats, legal practitioners and controlled by legislation (Moore, 1978), or as social
citizens become crucial not only for the citizen right practices influenced not only by codified rules, but
to information, but also to the citizens’ general abili- also by a range of less explored contextual factors
ty to realize their full rights in socio-environmental and social behavior (Bourdieu, 1987; Edelman et
conflicts. al., 2010).
Administrative decision-making is said to be The case presented here illustrates that disputes
largely based on supposedly impartial data, infor- to define what information counts and what is the
mation, and knowledge generated within the ‘mo- law that prevails are intermingled in fields in which
dern’ scientific epistemology. Along the research, actors with very different resources fight to defi-
though, it became clear that this was not always ne the extent of communities’ and environmental
the case. Thus, deepening the critical scrutiny of rights, as well as companies and government’s du-
these underpinning assumptions and epistemolo- ties. These actors include legal professionals, but also
gies, processes of knowledge production, as well as many others (councilors, affected families, technical
questioning which (forms of ) data, information and staff in charge of environmental analysis, represen-
knowledge were considered valid and credible –and tatives of the mining company) who appropriate the
were, thus, acknowledged in decision-making fora– language of rights according to their interests and
became necessary. capacities. The case provides an interesting arena to
These questions are not straightforward, but they study how different processes and events influence
form a major field of contestation. Thus, in order the law that concretely prevails.
to understand how the right to information is li- However, what is directly addressed in this paper
mited in practice, this paper describes and analyzes is not litigation and the adjudication of mining con-
the processes surrounding knowledge production, flicts. It is not the conflict about which law, rule or
valuation and contestation, and the way the outco- regulation actually counts, or how to interpret it, or
me of these processes impacts the environmental whether or not it should be implemented or igno-
licensing process and the environmental and citizen red. The focus here lies on the right to information,
rights it is meant to protect. or yet on a step that precedes it: the definition, pro-
This paper starts with a short review of the duction and valuation of knowledge and the politics
theoretical debate regarding the problematic role of knowledge that go along with the legal and admi-
of experts and (scientific) knowledge in public nistrative procedures. The inherent indeterminacy
32 Gest. Ambient. 21(supl. 2) 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
of law is exacerbated by the fact that many envi- integration of such kinds of knowledge is important
ronmental and societal conflicts, together with po- in environmental management contexts (Raymond
litical disputes, are framed in technical terms and et al., 2010). In general, the integration of different
adjudication actually depends on (the mostly) scien- types of knowledge and expertise is meant to im-
tific assessment of the problems at hand. However, prove communication and participatory decision-
this delegation of evaluative and decision-making making in deliberative and democratic processes, as
competencies to the scientists, technicians, and (so- it enhances “interactive knowledge” (Lindblom and
called) experts, does not automatically result in ob- Cohen, 1979) and “communicative rationality” (Ha-
jective decision- and consensus-making. bermas, 1984) by integrating all participating actors,
As Epstein (1996, p. 16) observed with respec- expert and lay, and their types of knowledge.
ted to public controversies with regard to the HIV/ While this is not really put into practice, habitual
Aids epidemic: “Increasingly, science is the resour- problems of presentation exist. Even seemingly, ob-
ce called on to promote consensus, and experts are jective empirical findings, for instance observations
brought in to ‘settle’ political and social controver- of pollution by affected people in environmental
sies. Yet this ‘scientization of politics’ simultaneously conflicts, are ignored in decision-making fora, if
brings about a ‘politicization of science’[…].” they are not presented in scientific and/or compa-
As experts and scientists can determine the tible ways. The tendency to sideline non-scientific
outcome of controversies that greatly touch upon ways of conceptualizing reality and generating and
the vested interested of conflicting factions, the- presenting knowledge has been widely discussed
se factions invest considerably in influencing the and problematized (e.g.: Long, 1992; Wynne, 1996).
outcome of the data, information, and knowledge Apart from the type of knowledge, legal require-
generation process per se. As Leach and co-authors ments and public decisions detailing which actual
verse it, “we can see this tendency for social and data and information should be provided –and thus
political disputes to become technical disputes, becomes relevant in the decision-making process–
and for conflicts around resources to be expressed is also crucial. As can be seen from the empirical
in terms of conflicts around knowledge” (Leach et material below, the lack of resources and expertise
al., 2007, p. 17). on the side of environmental agencies, the lack of
These “conflicts around knowledge”, as we will legal requirements to gather sufficient baseline so-
see below, evolve at different scales and levels. They cioeconomic data, and the lack of a sufficient legal
can lead to attempts to influence different aspects definition of people affected by a project in existing
of the knowledge definition (what is valid and re- laws can lead to the omission of important data and
levant), knowledge generation (basic assumptions, information from the knowledge generation pro-
which data is gathered, who gathers data), and the cess5. A fact corroborated in other studies on EIAs
valuation of knowledge (which knowledge beco- in Brazil (e.g.: Duarte et al., 2017, p. 276, Fonseca,
mes a valid and credible resource in the decision- 2017, p. 92).
making process).
Generating Data and
Defining Epistemology, Information to Producing Knowledge
be Relevant, and Forms of Presentation Once the type and format of data, information
Public controversies and political conflicts usua- and knowledge to be generated is agreed upon,
lly rely on modern, technical data, information and the collection and production of knowledge starts.
knowledge that is held to be relevant and credible. Again this process is not necessarily straight-
Other sources of information and knowledge, such forward. Knowledge production largely depends on
as local (environmental) knowledge, individual expe-
riences –let alone spiritual interpretations– are fre-
5 As detailed in Pereira (2019), this lack of legal definition can
quently declared to be difficult to integrate or even be partially explained by the procedural character of environ-
irrelevant and obsolete (Petts, 2006), although the mental law in face of the complexity of ecological relations.
33A. R. B. Pereira, W. Laube
the availability of expertise and resources as well as credibility impeached by other scientists. This of-
the incentives provided for the production of par- ten results in “politics of counterexpertise” (Fischer
ticular results. While experts are supposed to be 2000, p. 94) that leave the decision-making bodies
knowledgeable, resourceful, honest and impartial with a large degree of digression, having to decide
brokers in controversies (Limoges 1993, p. 418), this which findings and results to prioritize, declare valid
ideal is often far from reality. In the environmental and credible. In a situation where political pressu-
licensing process, large amounts of varied kinds of re on environmental agencies to issue permits for
data need to be collected, compiled, analyzed and economically interesting investments is high –as
interpreted. This usually exceeds the capacities of for instance under the extractivist regimes in Minas
local affected people, but also of public environ- Gerais, or Brazil per se– critical scientific expertise,
mental authorities, who lack the personnel, trans- often produced on behalf of local communities and/
port, equipment, laboratory facilities and funding to or activists, easily becomes sidelined.
carry out complex studies. Therefore, EISs are usua- The dynamics and processes described above
lly outsourced and carried out by hired independent show how not only legal decisions are highly depen-
experts or consultants. While the later are supposed dent on contextual factors such as social practices,
to produce impartial, objective knowledge, their re- economic interests and political influences, but also
sults are often tainted by the stance of the organi- supposedly technical risk-benefit analyses and EISs
zation employing them. Frequently, working for the are prone to subjective and interest-driven interfe-
same employers or companies leads to dependencies rence that can, as will be shown in the empirical part
that can inspire loyalties and predispositions resul- below, result in the emptying of citizen rights.
ting in favorable reports (Fischer, 2000, pp. 99-101).
This is especially problematic if the contract for the
EIS is issued by the company applying for the licen- Methods
se, and the environmental agency lacks the means to This paper bases on an in-depth qualitative re-
independently scrutinize the results presented, as in search that was conducted by the first author in Bra-
the Minas-Rio case. zil between 2014 and 2015. The researcher studied
the ways in which environmental, economic, and
Valuation of Knowledge political citizen rights are upheld or become emp-
The question on which data, information and tied in the framework of large mining investments
forms of knowledge are decided to be relevant, ac- in the country’s extractivist economy. Being a trai-
curate and credible is closely related to the decisions ned lawyer, but having worked with social scientists
prior to the knowledge production process, because before, a qualitative research methodology paying
in the first step certain type of inputs for the deci- special attention to legal and social practices su-
sion-making process are already ruled out. However, rrounding the environmental licensing process of
even with regard to types of data, information and the Minas-Rio project was employed.
knowledge regarded as relevant, questions of validity Data collection encompassed 28 in-depth, semi-
and credibility can arise. Research on scientific deci- structured interviews with key informants purpo-
sion support in environmental decision-making has sefully selected according to their expertise with
long pointed to “scientific indeterminacy” (Fischer, regard to the case studied. The case was selected
2000, p. 94) as a major point of concern. In many ca- considering its paradigmatic character among re-
ses, existing scientific findings have been scientifica- cent mining projects in Minas Gerais, data avai-
lly contested and alternative scientific analysis of the lability and the possibility of access to data and
same phenomena provided. So, on the one hand, the informants. The first interviews, mapping out the
accuracy and relevance of techno-scientific results conflict history and dynamics, were carried out with
can be questioned from a lay and local knowledge people that had been engaged in the legal procedu-
perspective. On the other hand, scientific results and res and public contestations surrounding the mining
opinions are often critically scrutinized and their investment since 2007. This included inhabitants of
34 Gest. Ambient. 21(supl. 2) 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
Conceição do Mato Dentro, members of affected Furthermore, the researcher collected and
families, environmental and social activists, muni- evaluated the extensive documentation of the
cipal authorities, state and municipal environmen- environmental licensing process in the SUPRAM-
tal authorities’ representatives, technical staff of the Jequitinhonha archives. This process took six weeks,
Minas Gerais environmental agency (including le- and also provided opportunities to build rapport, to
gal experts), and public prosecutors involved in the observe the daily routines and the internal and ex-
conflict. In a second phase, paying closer attention ternal interactions of those working for the technical
to the environmental licensing process in particu- branch of the environmental agency (SUPRAM-
lar, persons specialized in elaborating EISs, lawyers Jequitinhonha) implementing the licensing process.
specialized in mining and environmental law, and During the research, because of the contested and
lawyers working for affected communities were conflictive nature of the mining investment, it was
interviewed. Depending on the informant’s back- sometimes difficult to gain access to observation
ground, the interview’s focus was on the history of spaces and build rapport with informants from di-
the case, how the conflict between mining company verging groups. In the discordant context surroun-
and community unfolded, and on the Minas-Rio ding the Minas-Rio, social relations are worn and
environmental licensing process, or on general as- mistrust is looming. But in the end, different actors
pects of environmental licensing processes of mi- involved in the process (i.e. affected communities,
ning activities in the state of Minas Gerais. local authorities from Conceição do Mato Dentro
Environmental licensing processes in Minas ge- and environmentalists, environmental authorities
rais unfold in two main spaces or subdivisions of from Diamantina, lawyers and prosecutors) agreed
the environmental agency: a technical and admi- to participate in the research. Especially represen-
nistrative branch that verifies the studies presented tatives of local communities and activists expressed
by the mining company (known as Regional Envi- their interest in a better understanding of the pro-
ronmental Superintendence, the SUPRAM), and a cedures of the environmental agency and the dyna-
deliberative council, the Collegiate Regional Unity mics of the environmental licensing process, which
(URC), that comes together in public sessions in is less simplistic than usual suspicions of corruption.
order to discuss and vote for the Environmental li- Having gained access and rapport with the diffe-
censing processes in Minas gerais unfold environ- rent actors involved in the conflicts and negotiations
mental permits. In these public deliberative sessions surrounding the Minas-Rio project enabled the re-
only the environmental councilors (representatives searcher to gather the required information to be
of public power and civil society) can vote, but diffe- able to present the empirical findings below. During
rent actors can attend and use around two minutes research, because of the conflict and the potential
to voice their claims. risks involved for outspoken respondents, they were
Interviews were supplemented with observa- promised confidentiality. Therefore, name, age, gen-
tions of public sessions of URC-Jequitinhonha der, location and particular office of interviewees,
during 2014 and 2015 in Diamantina (where the especially from the environmental authorities, will
environmental authority responsible for the Mi- not be mentioned in the following. All interviews
nas-Rio project is located) and in Conceição do were held in Portuguese and transcribed and trans-
Mato Dentro6. lated into English by the first author.
6 A total of 18 public meetings involved sessions organized by
affected families without the presence of the mining compa-
ny, one meeting organized by the affected families with the
mining company, mediated by the local prosecutor, meetings company, environmental councilors and prosecutor (without
organized by municipal authorities with the mining company affected communities members or representatives), and for-
and with attendance of affected families, meetings organized mal sessions organized by the state environmental authorities
by municipal authorities because of affected families’ pres- to deliberate the environmental permit, the URC-Jequitin-
sure (without the presence of the mining company), meetings honha sessions (with massive attendance of affected families,
organized by state environmental authorities with the mining mining company representatives and workers).
35A. R. B. Pereira, W. Laube
Mining Advancement Conceição do much of the information on which the licensing is
Mato Dentro, Minas Gerais based was wrong and/or incomplete. Furthermore,
The Minas-Rio iron ore mining project consists it is claimed that during the licensing process the
of an open-pit mine and a processing plant in three company acted non-transparently and deceitfu-
municipalities of Minas Gerais: Conceição do Mato lly. Promises of the company to mitigate problems
Dentro, Alvorada de Minas and Dom Joaquim (a and compensate local communities were not kept
total area of around 3880 hectares of land). It also as the environmental licensing process advanced8.
entails a pipeline of 525 km length, which is cros- The company, for instance, failed to sufficiently
sing 32 municipalities in the states of Minas Ge- develop the infrastructure and social conditions
rais and Rio de Janeiro to transport iron ore pulp of Conceição do Mato Dentro before it recruited
to the shore, and a port in Açu in Rio de Janeiro a huge contingent of workers to start building the
State, which was built to export the extracted iron mine. Like in other mining areas, the onset of lar-
ore. The investment initially anticipated was 3 bi- ge-scale mining did not only lead to conflicts over
llion US dollars, but the cost had already risen to 8,8 land, water and environmental externalities, but a
billion dollars by 2013 (Miller and Kiernan, 2013). large in-migration of mine workers, business people
After licensing, the mine was to produce 26,6 mi- and fortune seekers, which led to hiking prices for
llions of tons of iron ore per year (Prates, 2014, p. housing and other urban services as well as increa-
11). The establishment and operation of the mine ses in criminality and prostitution. This corresponds
comes at considerable social and environmental with local inhabitant’s perceptions that the city is
costs. Among these, the significant water demand of now less safe than before the mining project (Bec-
the mine and especially the pipeline exerting huge ker and Pereira, 2011; Zhouri, 2014; Pereira et al.,
pressure on local water resources has been singled 2013 specifically about Conceição do Mato Den-
out as one of the main problems by affected families tro; and Zhouri, 2010; Zucarelli, 2006; Bebbington,
and environmentalists (Becker, 2009, p. 340; Bec- 2010, 2009; Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 2890; Hil-
ker and Pereira, 2011; Pereira et al., 2013). Local son, 2002, in general).
communities have started to question the expansion While the living conditions in Conceição do Mato
of mining in the region from the onset. They tried Dentro worsened, promises such as local economic
pushing state authorities and the mining company development and an increase in the employment
to give more complete accounts of the possible ran- of locals did not materialize. Company’s failure to
ge of impacts in the region. meet promises and frustrated local expectations led
Because of its potentially large impact the project to the deterioration of the relationship between lo-
would have to undergo, under Brazilian laws, an en- cal communities and the mining company throug-
vironmental licensing process with the elaboration hout the environmental licensing process. Mistrust,
of an EIS and divided in three phases, each of which hostility and opposition dominated public debates,
resulting in a different environmental permit (pre- and also found expression in the ways information
liminary permit, installation permit and operation and knowledge was defined, produced and privile-
permit7) and start the application process around ged within the licensing process.
2006. But despite considerable political pressu- The public sessions that were part of the environ-
re and investments, iron ore extraction has been mental licensing process became a place of confron-
only allowed more than eight years later, in 2014 tation, where local inhabitants, local researchers, and
(when the operation permit was issued). However, environmentalists, fought what they saw as inaccep-
environmentalist and affected people maintain that table rights violations and flaws in the knowledge
and information politics. They demanded for addi-
7 The environmental licensing of the Minas-Rio, though, had
tional environmental studies and, with the help of
four phases, the Installation permit stage being divided in ins-
tallation permit I and installation permit II. The fragmentation 8 Local dwellers have already started to complain about im-
has also been heavily criticized by researchers and activists pacts during the mining infrastructure building stage, around
(see Becker and Pereira, 2011). 2009, before extraction begun.
36 Gest. Ambient. 21(supl. 2) 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
engaged researchers, even produced their own te- permit10 before the initial purchase of land by in-
chnical reports. In the following, examples of these vestors, this is not the case in the context of mining.
processes will be provided. One of his colleagues described the consequences
as follows:
Defining Knowledge and Information Now it is very hard to define [the affected families],
Needs in the Minas-Rio Case it is very hard. Imagine how to define that in an area
In Brazil the information and knowledge that where there was no previous diagnosis! There wasn’t
is relevant in environmental licensing processes is a previous diagnosis there, how to delimitate it now?
largely defined by law. Scientific bio-physical docu- My understanding is that if you have affected, impac-
mentation and reasoning has precedence over local ted the economic and social life of a person, she is an
forms of knowing and representing knowledge and affected person. And she must be compensated. […]
information. Furthermore, crucial data that would Isn’t it an impact that the mining company is causing?
help to determine the impact of the mining requi- […]. (Interview with state environmental agency te-
rements and the people potentially affected is not chnical staff, Diamantina, 22 May 2015).
demanded for, at least before the onset of project ac-
tivities. As an officer from the environmental agency Interviews highlighted the differences between
explained: the mining and the energy sector (hydroelectric
In the environmental licensing, the State doesn’t de- plants). Whereas companies building dams are for-
mand that the company evaluates the socioeconomic bidden to intervene in anyway on the ground (e.g.,
impacts, the State doesn’t demand and the company buying land) before the environmental permits have
also doesn’t do it. And people are there, in-between. been issued, in the mining sector the practice is not
If you would arrive there and say ‘let’s se, how many forbidden; on the contrary, it is widespread and, in
families are there? –There are 150. – How many are in the Minas-Rio case, accounts for many of the con-
a vulnerability situation? – 50. Well, these vulnerable flicts over land that have been unfolding to present
ones need a differentiated treatment, a differentiated days (Diversus, 2014a). As a private EIA-consultant
resettlement program.’ There isn’t such a thing! The- explained:
re is no law to protect these people nowadays. […] In the mining sector, the companies even hide that
[But], for you to damage the [protected] Atlantic fo- they are arriving in the region in order to buy lands to
rest you have to make an inventory, and for you to take certain ends. They end up buying [land] and genera-
the people out of the place you don’t need one! Have ting impacts long before they have the [environmen-
you ever seen something like this? But […] there is tal] permit. In the energy sector, for instance, this is
a whole legislation that classifies what is the vegeta- something that used to be tolerated, and that today it
tion in medium stage, what is an advanced vegetation, is not. You cannot arrive and buy land before the preli-
you have... extractification of the forest, under forest, I minary permit. It is not tolerated because... in the case
don’t know what. It is easier to take a family out of the of rural workers, sharecroppers, partners, they end up
place than to damage a part of the Atlantic rainforest. being impacted even before the project starts. [...] So,
(Interview with state environmental agency technical there are some companies in the State [Minas Gerais]
staff, Diamantina, 22 May 2015)9. in the mining sector, that do not even inform that they
are coming to the region. They arrive, they introduce
Another respondent also argued that while in
third parties to buy the land, these third parties buy
other investment areas, such as the energy sector,
all the land, those who used to live there have already
the company must obtain at least the preliminary
been impacted, left the land, and this generates... ge-
9 The legal requirement of information about the physi- nerates huge environmental problems. […] [In the
cal; biological and socioeconomic environment (Resolução
CONAMA 001/86) is further specified in Normative Delibera- 10 First environmental permit in the three-stages licensing
tions (DN) in Minas Gerais regarding certain ecosystems, but process that is done for projects that are regarded as poten-
such a norm regarding socioeconomic aspects is absent. tially more degrading/pollutant.
37A. R. B. Pereira, W. Laube
energy sector] The company only buys [land] after the decision-making process. Especially because this
installation permit. (Interview with former technical lack of baseline information was to be ameliorated
staff of the environmental authority, now expert wor- by information presented by the mining company.
king in EIS elaboration. Belo Horizonte, 18 May 2015 As a technical staff member of the environmental
(see also: Santos, 2014). authority remembers:
We, the state, we haven’t been there [in Conceição do
The impossibility and failure to gather most cru-
Mato Dentro] before the project, the state hasn’t been
cial socioeconomic data is paralleled by confron-
there. The state doesn’t know who the people are. The
tations about the type of bio-physical information
State didn’t have a picture of the situation before. All
that needs to be taken into consideration. While
that is produced, all the information that is produced,
conflicts about the quantity and quality of water
is brought to us by the company, this is the system,
resources and the pollution of water by the Minas-
do you understand? […] Indeed, I believe this should
Rio project are discussed in hydrological terms, lo-
change, this relation between company, state, I belie-
cal inhabitants find it difficult to insert their own
ve this should be maybe reverted. I believe the state
experiences and observations into the environ-
has to assume its role more… impartially. […]” (In-
mental licensing process. The failure to take local
terviews with an environmental agency technical staff,
knowledge onboard has led to bitter conflicts. One
Diamantina, 22 May, 2015 and 1 June, 2015)
example of knowledge conflicts happened during
the 85ª Meeting of the URC-Jequitinhonha, on Since the state did not have a databank with the
September 18th 2014. Being enraged by the bureau- relevant socioeconomic or environmental data of the
cratic processes and by a language that seemed to investment area, nearly all information on which the
conceal water quality problems caused by the mine, environmental authorities could rely on to reach a
local inhabitants presented a large number of dead decision had been provided by the mining company
fish and bottles of turbid water to the councilors. or the consultants the mining company hired. Re-
They explained they had collected the water and sources for field visits (cars, fuel, drivers, accommo-
the dead fish downstream of the tailings dam of the dation costs) were also scarce. Thus, environmental
Minas-Rio project some weeks before, when all fish authority’s staff had very restricted opportunities
suddenly appeared floating dead. While technical to verify in loco the information presented in the
investigations were inconclusive and technicians EIS in case of doubt. Many times, the transport for
were not able to determine the actual cause of the field visits, as reported by interviewees and observed
fish dying, the locals continued to be convinced that by the researcher, had been provided by the mining
the tailings dam upstream polluted their water. Any company.
scientific investigation was futile since the dead fish Indeed, neither public environmental authorities
and the turbid water were speaking for themselves. nor local communities have the necessary infras-
In a nutshell, a legal ill-definition of investment tructure and capacity to collect and process the lar-
procedures and baseline data need in the mining sec- ge amounts of data needed in such impact analysis.
tor (especially regarding its socioeconomic aspects), But also the experts hired to produce the EIS have
as well as conflicting views about which information delivered insufficient information regarding impor-
should be integrated into the decision-making pro- tant aspects of the case. A practice that is common
cess earmarked the environmental licensing process in the Brazilian environmental studies consultancy
of the Minas-Rio project from the onset. market. As a consultant explained:
[The environmental agency] lacks of important crite-
Generating (incomplete) Data and ria in the analysis of the studies. This has been gene-
Producing (contested) Knowledge rating other problems, […], leading to the dropping
in the Minas-Rio Case quality of the results. So sometimes [in the environ-
The lack of basic information on the side of the mental consultancy market] you find people who make
state authorities remained a central obstacle to the [an environmental study] very cheap, in an unfeasible
38 Gest. Ambient. 21(supl. 2) 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
time. […] [F]or [instance in] an EIS/RIMA [Envi- Gesta 2017; Justiça Global, 2017; Prates, 2017; Ro-
ronmental Impact Statement and Environmental Im- drigues, 2018).
pact Report] you need to evaluate hydrological cycles, While the lack of infrastructure of the environ-
[but] there are some methods of diagnosis that certain mental agencies surely weakens the range of moni-
companies do not accept to do, and other do”. […] toring activities by the state, further difficulties arise
This has been generating many documents of doubt- from the fact that technical staff at the environmen-
ful technical quality… which ends up misleading the tal agency (engineers, geologists, economists, legal
entrepreneurs. Which has also been resulting in new staff ) criticizing the studies presented by the mining
problems. (Interview with former technical staff of the company’s consultants are sometimes intimidated
environmental authority, now expert working in EIS by their superiors:
elaboration. Belo Horizonte, 18 May 2015). They [our superiors] threatened us [...]. [T]he former
technical director at the time used to say ‘you know, it
Asked about the response of the environmental is because if they make it [the licensing process] too
agency in such cases the same respondent continued difficult, you end up transferring these employees to
to explain: places that are not very nice...’. (Interview with state
The environmental agency today does not even realize environmental agency technical staff, Diamantina, 22
it. The environmental agency is extremely overburde- May 2015)
ned, with a very small workforce and expertise, becau-
se it does not pay well, do you understand? Because In general, and especially as the process dragged
it doesn’t pay well there is a very high turnover. A lot on, superiors in the environmental agency and state-
of people with very little experience… they have not level politicians seemed to be more concerned with
been trained, they have not been oriented, they have accelerating the licensing process than producing
not been trained, they arrive there and have a lot of additional (scientific) evidence. Referring to the
paper thrown on them […]. So the guys do not even need to comply with demands by their superiors,
notice basic flaws that resonate throughout the pro- another respondent explained that he had to cede to
cess”. (Interview with former technical staff of the what seemed to have become the dominant concern
environmental authority, now expert working in EIS in the environmental agency:
elaboration. Belo Horizonte, 18 May 2015). Is the institutional position? Even if it goes against my
personal position, against what I believe? If this is the
As result, the EIS of the Minas-Rio, for instance, case… I will defend the institutional position. […] I
has underestimated the number of affected families always make it clear. I cannot agree, but if I am here as
(declared to be less than 100). Only the families a civil servant, then I will defend the institutional poli-
who lived in the area where the open pit and other cy. But the state must give me elements to defend this
structures of the project would be installed were position”. (Interview with state environmental agency
considered “affected”. After consistent contestation technical staff, Diamantina, 22 May 2015 and 1 June
by local communities new studies found out that 2015).
even within the operational area some families had
been overlooked (Diversus, 2011, 2012, 2014b). In- Weak capacities and lacking political will on the
habitants living in the surroundings of the project, side of the environmental agency, on the one hand,
who are certainly affected by the mining project in and flawed reports provided by the mining company
various ways (e.g. water problems, soil vibration, and its consultants, on the other, made alternative
dust, noise, etc.) have been disregarded (Ferreira, routes of knowledge and information generation
2015; Prates, 2014; Tôrres, 2014; Vieira, 2015). The necessary. Independent researchers and communi-
failure to account for the indirectly affected people ties started gathering their own evidence, and the
is one of the reasons why the project is still met environmental agency –giving in to public criti-
with a high degree of opposition (Ação Francisca- cism– asked for an additional report by a second
na de Ecologia e Solidariedade, 2017; Gesta, 2016; independent consultancy called Diversus. However,
39A. R. B. Pereira, W. Laube
this additional and alternative information was ous- Technical staff from the environmental authority
ted in the process of selecting information sources has reported what they considered an excess of po-
that were considered relevant for the decision. litical pressure over them in order to suppress infor-
mation that could hinder or delay permit’s emission
Validating Knowledge and in informal talks at SUPRAM-Jequitinhonha (Dia-
Information in the Minas-Rio Case mantina, MG), as well as in recorded interviews:
In the Minas-Rio case, the definition of relevant When I reported things that went against what the
information and knowledge as well as the produc- company wanted, they [superiors of this environmen-
tion of data and information was compromised. tal expert] changed the technical expertise. This also
This was partially due to legal and institutional happened in another mining project now [not only in
weaknesses that undermined the knowledge gene- the Minas-Rio]. I wrote an expertise, and afterwards
ration process, but also resulted from political pres- they took out everything that could somehow be
sure to streamline and short cut licensing processes. contrary to the interests of the company. I obviously
Politicians saw the need to move the process in fa- didn’t sign this expertise. There is no autonomy. In the
vor of the acclaimed investment. Furthermore, the environmental authority, whoever worked on the Mi-
politically dominant view that the licensing process nas-Rio project had no independence working in this
should be fastened greatly affected the decisions on process. The political pressure to just let the project
which data, information and knowledge was finally pass was huge. They [superiors of this environmental
defined to be relevant, credible, and to be taken in expert] even told us [the technical staff ]: ‘This project
consideration in the decision making process. will pass. You better put in conditionalities, because it
In the environmental agency, existing reports will pass’. And that is what we had in the end. An en-
were, according to interviewees, actually tempered vironmental permit with more than two hundred con-
in order to omit information that could be detri- ditionalities, can it be feasible? If there are more than
mental to the investors. Asked about inconsistencies two hundred measures that the project has to fulfill so
in the environmental licensing file, a member of the that it can be installed, how can something like that be
feasible?” (Interview with state environmental agency
technical staff exclaimed:
technical staff. Minas Gerais, 22 May 2015).
“There are so many documents that were taken out of
there [the environmental licensing process file]! […] This information was frequently repeated in
She [the highest officer at SUPRAM-Jequitinhonha] informal talks during archival research and in in-
said that she had removed these documents from the terviews. Officers soon learned that they were not
file. That whenever she would find this kind of do- supposed to question the information presented by
cuments there again, she would remove them again”. the mining company too much and that they were
(Interview with state environmental agency technical meant to facilitate the quick licensing of the Minas-
staff, Diamantina, 22 May 2015) Rio project.
The need to speed up the licensing process beca-
Furthermore, critical questions within the envi- me also clear when alternative information, partially
ronmental agency were actively suppressed by supe- asked for by the environmental agency itself, was
riors. As the officers went on to confide: regarded as irrelevant for the final decision-making
For example, when I requested more information, process, preceding the deliberation on the operation
or concluded that the studies were insufficient, then permit. For example, in a public deliberative session
the secretary [State Secretary for the Environment] at the environmental council (URC-Jequitinhon-
came here to tell me that this was not the case [that ha), in Diamantina, Minas Gerais, in September
more information was not needed], that I should just 29th 2014, concerns of local inhabitants, who re-
leave everything as it was.” (Interview with state en- quested issues of water scarcity, vibration damaging
vironmental agency technical staff, Diamantina, 22 houses, and uncertainty about resettlement process
May 2015) to be discussed before the license was to be issued,
40 Gest. Ambient. 21(supl. 2) 2018Knowledge Politics in Environmental Conflicts: A Case from Brazil
were brushed aside. In the same meeting, the en- been decided upon. But he by no means acknowled-
vironmental consultancy report by Diversus which ged that the dubious quality of the EIS initially pre-
had been carried out on URC-Jequitinhonha's re- sented by the mining company –which made several
quest and had recently been submitted was com- complementary studies necessary– was itself a main
pletely ignored. The report was held from the reason for the ‘delay’ of the process –not to mention
environmental councilors responsible for the licen- that it caused community insecurity and enhanced
sing. Thus this important (alternative) information the opposition to the project.
–though scientifically grounded– was ignored in the Given the flaws in the definition and demand
decision-making. for information, problems in data and information
The fact that alternative information is often production, and a rigorous process of elimination of
ignored in environmental licensing processes is no potentially relevant knowledge and data calling the
novelty in Brazil. An environmental councilor re- investment in question, it does not surprise that all
ferring to his experience from other licensing pro- environmental permits were finally granted.
cesses concluded that it would be more reasonable
to decelerate the process, allow time for a better Discussion: Politics of Knowledge in the
analysis of the studies and for more community Environmental Licensing Process for the
participation, so that the environmental councilors Minas-Rio Project
could vote in a more reliable manner11. In this con-
The state of Minas Gerais and Brazil have, in
text, another environmental councilor has asked the
theory, a democratic model of environmental pro-
Minas Gerais State Secretary of Environment and
tection, a model in which strong technical eva-
Sustainable Development, who was present at the
luation by environmental experts (in the case here
meeting, why the State of Minas Gerais found it so
presented, at SUPRAM) is enriched by social con-
urgent to decide on the permit on that day, instead
trol and participation (in an environmental coun-
of pausing the licensing process in order to allow the
cil, as the URC-Jequitinhonha). However, both
environmental councilors to have access to the com-
technical assessment and social control depend on
plementary studies about the socioeconomic im-
available information. As has been discussed abo-
pacts of the project and, at least, understand better
ve, evidence-based decision-making often leads to
the unresolved matters before deliberating12. In face
politics of knowledge and politization of science.
of this question, the State Secretary of Environment
Knowledge politics affect the basic assumptions,
and Sustainable Development declared:
demand for information, and epistemological di-
I have had the opportunity to accompany the develop- gression as to which form of knowledge to privilege.
ment of this process for more than six years, therefore, In the Minas-Rio case, legal requirements for the
I do not know to which extent you understand that it environmental licensing in the mining sector omit-
is accelerated, and to which extent I understand that ted important baseline information and allowed for
the time to decide the issue is long overdue. […] I be- investor engagement (e.g. buying land) prior to the
lieve that the State of Minas Gerais cannot afford the knowledge generation and decision-making process.
luxury of such an inefficiency in not judging this case, Local knowledge about water pollution, presented
this or any other.”13 in situ in the form of dead fish and dirty water, did
not meet the required benchmarks of knowledge
Note that the Secretary of Environment of Minas
deemed relevant. As the licensing process dragged
Gerais did not hesitate to highlight as inefficiency
on, the knowledge and data production also beca-
(of the State) that the operation permit had not yet
me problematic. Lack of resources as well as poor
staff capacities severely curtail the ability of the en-
11 Minutes of the 86ª URC-JEQ meeting, lines 714-719. vironmental agency to generate a sound knowled-
12 Minutes of the 86ª URC-JEQ meeting, lines 724-725 and ge basis for an informed decision-making process.
747-750. In the case discussed, the information presented in
13 Minutes of the 86ª URC-JEQ meeting, lines 728-736. the studies provided by the mining company was
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