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Consultation Draft
Public
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL SERVICES BOARD
and
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE SUPERVISORS
[Consultation Draft]
ISSUES IN REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
MICROTAKĀFUL (ISLAMIC MICROINSURANCE)
22 JUNE 2015Consultation Draft
Public
ABBREVIATIONS .....................................................................................................................iii
A. INTRODUCTION OF THE RESEARCH PAPER ................................................................ 1
I. Background of the joint work between IFSB and IAIS.......................................................... 1
II. Objective of the Research Paper ............................................................................................. 2
B. ABOUT MICROTAKĀFUL ................................................................................................. 2
I. Models / Types of Microtakāful ............................................................................................... 4
(a) Wakālah....................................................................................................................................... 4
(b) Wakālah-Muḍārabah ................................................................................................................. 5
(c) Wakālah-Waqf ............................................................................................................................ 5
(d) Cooperative................................................................................................................................. 5
(e) Mutuals ........................................................................................................................................ 6
(f) Sharing of Surplus ..................................................................................................................... 6
II. Differences between Takāful and Microtakāful...................................................................... 7
(a) Type of Microtakāful Providers (MPs)..................................................................................... 7
(b) Type of Participants ................................................................................................................... 9
(c) Product Features and Contribution ....................................................................................... 10
(d) Distribution Channels .............................................................................................................. 10
(e) Consumer Education ............................................................................................................... 11
(f) Operations................................................................................................................................. 12
III. Differences between Microtakāful and Microinsurance .................................................. 12
IV. Survey Findings on Industry & Regulatory Practices of Microtakāful .......................... 13
C. SUPERVISORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MICROTAKĀFUL ................14
I. Corporate Governance ............................................................................................................ 14
(a) Interests, Roles and Responsibilities of External Microtakāful Stakeholders ................. 14
(b) Interests, Roles and Responsibilities of Internal Microtakāful Stakeholders .................. 18
(c) Application of IAIS’ Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) ....................................................... 25
II. Financial & Prudential Regulation.......................................................................................... 26
(a) Sharī`ah -compliance requirements ...................................................................................... 26
(b) Requirement on Separation of Funds ................................................................................... 27
(c) Solvency and Capital Adequacy Framework ....................................................................... 27
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(d) Risk Management Framework ............................................................................................... 28
(e) Investment Framework............................................................................................................ 29
(f) Underwriting Requirements .................................................................................................... 30
(g) Application of IAIS’ Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) ....................................................... 30
III. Transparency, Reporting and Market Conduct ................................................................ 31
(a) Customer education and awareness .................................................................................... 31
(b) Consumer protection ............................................................................................................... 32
(c) Consumer recourse and complaints ..................................................................................... 32
(d) Reporting to RSAs ................................................................................................................... 33
(e) Application of IAIS’ Insurance Core Principles .................................................................... 34
IV. Supervisory Review Process .............................................................................................. 34
(a) Licensing requirements ........................................................................................................... 34
(b) Application of IAIS’ Insurance Core Principles (ICPs) ....................................................... 35
D. PROPOSAL FOR FUTURE WORK...................................................................................36
E. APPENDIX ........................................................................................................................37
F. DEFINITIONS ....................................................................................................................39
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ABBREVIATIONS
AML/CFT Anti-money Laundering, Combating the Financing of Terrorism
BOD Board of Directors
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CRF Cooperative Risk Fund
ECAI External Credit Assessment Institution
FISC Financial Inclusion Subcommittee
IAIS International Association of Insurance Supervisors
ICP Insurance Core Principles
IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board
JWG Joint Working Group
MCCO Mutuals, Cooperatives and other Community-based Organisations
MP Microtakāful Provider
MRF Microtakāful Risk Fund
PRF Participants’ Risk Fund
RSA Regulatory and Supervisory Authorities
RTO ReTakāful Operator
SB Sharī`ah Board
SHF Shareholders’ Fund
TC Technical Committee
TO Takāful Operator
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A. INTRODUCTION OF THE RESEARCH PAPER
I. Background of the joint work between IFSB and IAIS
1. The IFSB, in its inaugural Seminar on Regulation of Takāful held in Jordan on 10-11 January
2005, adopted several recommendations in which one of them is for the IFSB to play “an active and
complementary role to that of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) by issuing
prudential and supervisory standards for Takāful that would safeguard the interests of the consumers and
the soundness and the stability of the financial system as a whole” (IFSB & IAIS, 2006).
2. Pursuant to that, a joint working group (JWG) was established by the IFSB and IAIS in 2005 to
produce an Issues Paper on the applicability of the existing IAIS Core Principles (ICPs) on Takāful sector
and the regulatory and supervisory standards to be developed by the IFSB on Takāful. This JWG
prepared the paper titled “Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Takāful (Islamic Insurance)”, which
was issued in August 2006, providing a background to Takāful as well as an analysis of the applications
of ICPs to the Takāful industry.
3. In this paper, four major themes were outlined to address the regulatory and supervisory issues
within the Takāful industry:
(a) Corporate Governance
(b) Financial and Prudential Regulation
(c) Transparency, Reporting and Market Conduct
(d) Supervisory Review Process
4. Based on these themes, the IFSB has in subsequent years produced the following standards and
guidelines:
(a) IFSB – 8: Guiding Principles on Governance for Takāful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings
[December 2009]
(b) IFSB – 11: Standard on Solvency Requirements for Takāful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings
[December 2010]
(c) GN – 5: Guidance Note on the Recognition of Ratings by External Credit Assessment Institutions
(ECAIs) on Takāful and Retakāful Undertakings [March 2011]
(d) IFSB – 14: Standard on Risk Management for Takāful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings
[December 2013]
5. In July 2013, the IFSB participated in the IAIS Financial Inclusion Subcommittee (FISC) meeting
held in Manila, Philippines 1. A proposition was made during this meeting for a second joint-initiative to be
conducted between the IAIS and the IFSB, similar to the first Issues Paper in 2006. Following this, both
organisations came to an understanding to prepare a paper focusing on regulatory issues prevailing in
the Microtakāful sector and its role in enhancing financial inclusion. It was also agreed that a JWG –
comprising members from both organisations – would work on this project.
1
The IAIS has since 2006 worked on its “access agenda” by way of the IAIS-Microinsurance Network Joint Working
Group and the Access to Insurance Initiative. Three papers on Microinsurance have since been developed: (a)
Issues in Regulation and Supervision of Microinsurance, June 2007, (b) Issues Paper on the Regulation and
Supervision of Mutuals, Cooperatives and other Community-based Organisations in increasing access to Insurance
Markets, October 2010, and (c) Application Paper on Regulation and Supervision Supporting Inclusive Insurance
Markets, October 2012.
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6. Recognising the issues that the Takāful sector’s regulatory and supervisory authorities (RSAs)
face in relation to enhancing and strengthening the role of Microtakāful institutions, the Technical
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Committee (TC) of the IFSB, in its 32 meeting in Basel, Switzerland recommended to the IFSB Council
th
to approve preparation of a research paper in this area. Consequently the Council of the IFSB, in its 24
meeting in Brunei in March 2014 approved the development of a research paper on Microtakāful to be
part of IFSB 2014 Workplan.
II. Objective of the Research Paper
7. Taking into consideration the fact that there is currently lack of studies on the operations of
Microtakāful sector and associated regulatory issues, the objectives of the joint initiative are:
(a) to identify the current practices and models used for offering Microtakāful products, and the
challenges and potential issues arising from Microtakāful transactions;
(b) to review the current regulatory framework for the Microtakāful sector in various jurisdictions and
suggest initiatives to strengthen the framework and thus enhance financial inclusion through the
Takāful sector; and
(c) to provide guidance to the RSAs in putting in an enabling environment for the overall
development and growth of the Microtakāful sector
B. ABOUT MICROTAKĀFUL
8. A research conducted in 2010 suggests that in Muslims populated countries such as Indonesia
(207 million), Pakistan (160 million), India (151 million) and Bangladesh (132 million) where they were
classified under the World Bank as lower-middle and low-income countries, insurance penetration is low
due to the contradiction of insurance principles with Sharī`ah principles (Erlbeck, 2010).
9. Microtakāful is widely known in the industry as Takāful for the low-income population. In the
general Takāful terms, low-income means the section of population that is customarily not eligible and not
invited to participate in any of the Takāful plans of any Takāful Operator. This group’s ineligibility is
attributed to their inability to meet the basic financial and underwriting requirements set forth by Takāful
regulation, for reasons relating to medical history, hazardous occupation, irregular income, insurable
interest and various other considerations that fall within the purview of prudential regulation of exclusive
finance. An important cause is the unavailability of suitable insurance products that fit the needs of this
specific group of customers in combination with their lack of awareness and understanding of the
usefulness of insurance to manage the risks in their private and professional lives. Another contributing
factor is the lack of expertise and will of Takāful operators to make the investment needed to reach these
markets.
10. With the financial industry’s focus shifting towards inclusive finance, major initiatives have been
undertaken worldwide to take up the responsibility to include this low-income population into the financial
system, to ensure that they are as privileged as the high-income population. The industry sees the need
for this low-income group to be allowed to participate in various products and plans offered by the banks,
insurance/Takāful companies as well as any other facilities offered by these financial institutions. The
condition of this segment of society makes it more vulnerable towards financial losses therefore there is a
great need for it to have some sort of financial protection. Microinsurance/Microtakāful is therefore an
important tool to protect it from financial losses, and help it break the cycle of poverty.
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11. From the perspective of the Takāful industry, more Takāful Operators have started shifting their
focus to include the low-income segment via Microtakāful products. In 2014, under the Malaysian
Government Bantuan Rakyat 1 Malaysia (“BR1M”) or 1 Malaysia Public Relief programme, an initiative to
help low income earners lessen their financial burden has done exactly that. This initiative has brought all
of the Takāful operators operating in Malaysia together to provide i-BR1M scheme to earners of below
2
USD 1119 and USD 839 monthly household income (Takaful Ikhlas, 2014) .
12. Various definitions of “Microtakāful” have been established to categorize this group of low-income
participants. Some jurisdictions categorise them based on the minimum annual income, some categorise
them based on product features, some categorise them based on location of the potential participants,
others may categorise them based on distribution channels.
13. While in certain jurisdiction Microtakāful products are focused on low-income, in some other
jurisdictions, Microtakāful products are targeted at not only low-income, but rather low-income Muslims.
In research paper, it was cited that “Microtakāful is a concept developed for deprived people in Muslim
countries” (Gor, 2013). In Africa, Microtakāful is defined by Takāful Insurance of Africa as “A mechanism
to provide Sharī`ah -based protection to the blue-collared, under-privileged individuals at an affordable
cost” (Takaful Insurance of Africa, 2012). Whilst there are various other definitions for Microtakāful that
can be cited in numerous academic papers, the objective nevertheless remain the same, that is to include
certain section of the population to be part of the financial system in which under normal circumstances
are excluded.
14. For the purpose of this paper, Microtakāful shall be defined to be consistent with the definition of
Takāful as provided in the IFSB – 8 (IFSB, 2009), taking into account the core principles embedded in
the concept of mutual assistance:
“Microtakāful is the Islamic counterpart of microinsurance 3, and exists in both Family and General forms.
It is a joint-guarantee initiative, whereby a group of participants agree among themselves to support one
another jointly for the losses arising from specified risks, under the core principles of Tabarru’ (donation),
TaÑāwun (mutual assistance) and Prohibition of Ribā (usury). Microtakāful is generally offered to low-
income and under-privileged segment of the population (which is usually
excluded from the general Takāful terms and conditions) by various entities which are regulated and
supervised by regulatory and supervisory authorities of Takāful /insurance or any other competent
regulatory and supervisory authority under the national laws of any jurisdiction”.
15. Given the evolving nature of Microtakāful, the definition shall be subject to periodic review for
appropriateness as the Microtakāful industry grows and matures.
16. While the distinction between Microtakāful and Takāful is made based on the inclusivity and
exclusivity of the financial system, it is worthy to reiterate that conceptually, Microtakāful does not differ
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i - BR1M is a one (1) Takaful plan that provided protection to recipients BR1M categories of households / families. i -
BR1M aims to ease the burden of the recipient and/or recipient’s families in the event of his or her death (accidental
and non-accidental) or accidental total permanent disability. i - BR1M contribution is borne entirely by the
Government of Malaysia. Furthermore, i - BR1M is managed by Takaful operator consortium.
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The IAIS has defined “microinsurance” as insurance that is accessed by low-income populations, provided by a
variety of different entities, but run in accordance with generally accepted insurance practices (which include the ICPs)
(IAIS 2012). The IAIS also uses the term “inclusive insurance” as all insurance products that are aimed at the
excluded or underserved insurance market. In practice the term “microinsurance” is often used interchangeably.
Where the term microinsurance is used in this paper it is considered to mean inclusive insurance.
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from Takāful. It is a subset of Takāful. It exists under the premise that microinsurance does not meet the
basic principles of Sharī`ah, where elements of Riba (usury), Maysir (gambling) and Gharar (uncertainty)
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are prohibited . However, due to the exclusivity nature of Takāful products, the specific regulation of
Microtakāful has not been given much attention by the regulatory and supervisory authorities despite the
new development in promoting inclusive finance in the financial industry. This might be due to the mere
fact that little experience or empirical data is available for prudential regulation to take place effectively
without dampening the growth for inclusiveness.
17. Sections B.I. – B.III. of this paper aim to provide basic background information on the types of
Microtakāful models that are currently being used in the industry, key differentiating elements between
Takāful and Microtakāful, as well as differences between Microtakāful and microinsurance. Section B.IV.
psl will highlight the survey findings of the survey conducted by both the IFSB and the IAIS for the
purpose of this paper.
18. The next Section C shall consequently draw upon the various Microtakāful (and in some
scenarios, microinsurance) issues and challenges that have also been observed in the Takāful /insurance
industry from regulatory perspective. This section shall divide the issues on regulation of Microtakāful
into four different segments which are (i) Corporate Governance, (ii) Financial and Prudential Regulation,
(iii) Transparency, Reporting and Market Conduct, and finally (iv) Supervisory Review Process. In
addition, where appropriate, practical examples faced by some of the RSAs that have initiated regulations
on Microtakāful / microinsurance will be provided to give insights on the various approaches that have
been proven to be successful or unsuccessful in regulating Microtakāful.
I. Models / Types of Microtakāful
19. In following the due process of research paper development, the JWG undertook a survey 6 to
attain an understanding on the various models used to develop Microtakāful products. While two models,
Wakālah and Cooperative, proved to be popularly used by the survey respondents, this paper provides
various other Microtakāful models that are known to be used in certain jurisdictions that did not respond
to the survey.
(a) Wakālah
20. Under a Wakālah model, the Microtakāful Provider (MP) and the participants form a principal-
agent relationship whereby the MP acts strictly as a Wakil (agent) on behalf of the participants, to
manage the risks and also to manage the investment of the contributions. In return for the service
rendered by the MP as Wakil, the MP receives a management fee, called a Wakālah fee, which is usually
a percentage of the contributions paid. The Wakālah fee must be pre-agreed and expressly stated in the
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The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) published “Issues in Regulation and Supervision of
Microinsurance” in June 2007, entailing definition of microinsurance and the issues and challenges in regulating the
sector.
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IFSB – 8: Guiding Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings states that the concept of
Takaful is significantly defined by Tabarru’ commitment, Ta’awun and Prohibition of Riba (usury).
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Two sets of Survey Questionnaire (Set A for Market Players and Set B for Supervisory Authorities) were sent to the
IFSB’s and the IAIS’ member countries, for a survey duration between 10 July 2014 – 15 August 2014. A total of 25
institutions responded in which 10 indicated their non-participation due to the absence of Microtakāful in their
respective jurisdiction. The remaining 15 participating respondents were made up of six regulatory authorities and
nine Microtakāful providers. The low participation rate was believed to be contributed by the fact that Microtakāful is
still not popular in many jurisdictions of the IFSB’s and IAIS’ member countries, as compared to its conventional
counterpart, microinsurance.
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Microtakāful contract. For the MP, the Wakālah fee is intended to cover the total sum of: (a) management
expenses and (b) a margin of operational profit to the MP. In this respect, an MP will be profitable if the
Wakālah fee it receives is greater than the management expenses incurred. It does not directly share in
the risk borne by the Microtakāful Risk Fund (MRF) or any of its investment profit or surplus/deficit.
21. In addition, the Wakālah model may permit the MP to receive part of its remuneration as Wakil in
the form of a performance-related fee. A performance-related fee, as agreed in the Microtakāful contract,
is typically related to the underwriting result of the MRF. The underwriting result arising in the MRF, after
payment of the Wakālah fee, including any performance-related element, and after crediting any
investment income, is attributable to the participants collectively.
(b) Wakālah-Muḍārabah
22. In a Wakālah-Muḍārabah model, as commonly practiced, the MP acts both as a Wakil as well as
a Muḍārib (entrepreneur) to the participants: typically as Wakil to manage the underwriting activities of the
MRF, and as Muḍārib to manage its investment activities, though the exact relationship and basis of
remuneration in respect of these activities will be specified in the Microtakāful contract. The MP receives
a Wakālah fee, which is usually a percentage of the contributions paid, as described above, and may
(where the contract permits it) receive a performance fee based on the underwriting result. In addition,
the MP is remunerated by a predetermined percentage share in the investment profit.
23. Some RSAs permit extension of the Muḍārabah element of the model to cover also the
underwriting results of Microtakāful operations. 7
24. As with the Wakālah model, the residue in the MRF after payment of all contractual obligations
including profit shares due to the MP is attributable to the participants collectively.
(c) Wakālah-Waqf
25. Under a Wakālah-Waqf model, the MP’s shareholders and potentially also Microtakāful
participants contribute seed money to the establishment of the Waqf MRF. In addition to acting as a
Waqif (trustee) to the Waqf MRF, the MP also undertakes the role of a WakÊl to manage the underwriting
activities. The Wakālah fee must be pre-agreed and expressly stated in the Microtakāful contract.
26. The residue in the MRF after payment of all contractual obligations including profit shares due to
the MRF is attributable to the Waqf fund.
(d) Cooperative
27. In a Cooperative model, the MP’s shareholders and the participants establish a Cooperative
MRF. All management expenses and acquisition costs are paid out of the Cooperative MRF. There is
however a difference between the Saudi Cooperative Model and Sudan Cooperative Model. In the
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Many scholars disagree with the MP taking any percentage of an underwriting surplus under a Muḍārabah contract,
on the ground that an underwriting surplus is not a profit, though some consider that a performance fee may be
permitted. In any event, none of the respondents to our survey claimed to be using a pure Muḍārabah model.
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former, the MP ’applies the Wakālah contract to its Takāful scheme hence entitles itself to a Wakālah fee.
It also takes a share of underwriting surplus from the Cooperative MRF. In contrary to the former, the
latter does not allow the sharing of surplus between the MP and the participants, rather all surplus
belongs to the participants. Furthermore the latter applies the Muḍārabah contract to its Takāful operation
hence it would be remunerated via a predetermined share of investment income for being a Muḍārib.
Another important feature of this model is that the participants have their own representatives appointed
by them in the BOD.
(e) Mutuals
28. Usually, the Mutual model is a not for profit model applied by the MP. In this model, the MP’s
shareholders who are also participants establish a Mutual MRF. Participants of a Mutual model
automatically become owners of the Mutual MRF at the inception of participation. Participants jointly
contribute to the MRF which is used to serve claims of member participants. Similar with Cooperative
model, all management expenses and acquisition costs are paid out of the Mutual MRF. Participants
comprise the general assembly of the MP, which is responsible for appointing the BOD. Also, participants
may either receive a share of surplus or reduction in future contribution if surplus is retained.
(f) Sharing of Surplus
29. Surplus sharing is an element of Takāful which to date is still deliberated at length by the Takāful
industry. Well known for its unique payback feature to the participants, many industry players still use this
surplus sharing mechanism as an enticement feature to attract the general public to participate in Takāful
plans. This is especially obvious in General Takāful products which are renewable annually. It is usually
at the end of the certificate term that any surplus generated from the PRF will be shared between the
participants and the shareholders of the TOs. As envisaged in IFSB – 8, surplus generated from the
underwriting funds will usually be shared at a pre-agreed percentage between the shareholders and the
participants. The portion for participants will either be distributed to the participants themselves or be
retained in the PRF to build up the reserves to strengthen the fund for solvency purposes (IFSB, 2009).
30. Although the issue with regards to surplus sharing remains to be the responsibility of each
Sharī`ah Board of each respective jurisdiction and likely to remain also an issue for MPs, it is not this
feature that creates concern with the MPs and its stakeholders. The real predicament is on whether
surplus should be distributed to the participants or should it ideally be required to remain in the MRF. In a
sector where the obligation to honor claims is much higher than the need to make profit out of product
offerings, the need to ensure sufficiency of MRF creates greater burden on the MPs. This makes it even
more crucial for solvency of MRF to be observed. To achieve this, some MPs argue that the most
appropriate mechanism is to retain surplus in the MRF. The objectives of surplus retention must be
disclosed to participants to ensure transparency is observed especially in practices where there are no
participants’ representation in corporate governance of the MPs.
31. However, whether this approach is feasible or practical remains to be an open question that
needs to be answered by the MPs and its RSAs. There needs to be proper judgment on whether it is
more viable to retain surplus in the MRF (to build capital strength of the fund) or to distribute surplus to
the Microtakāful participants (in an attempt to increase their interests in products that have a payback
feature). An alternative that has been found to be practiced in certain jurisdictions is to direct the surplus
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to the general welfare of the low income group or to enhance the benefits of the product. This practice
provides the low income group a general sense of gaining something back through the enhanced benefits
and better welfare. Another suggestion provided by a research mentioned that it would be more
appropriate for surplus to be ploughed back as TabarruÑ for additional coverage on personal accident
cover since the amount of surplus generated from the small contribution of Microtakāful participants do
not normally count as a form of savings for this low-income population. It would benefit them more if
extended coverage is provided (Mokhtar, Sulaiman, & Ismail, 2012).
32. An example of surplus distribution being done is the declaration of surplus by Takāful Insurance
of Africa (TIA) in Kenya whereby all its policyholders, including the Microtakāful participants received a
total of USD120,000 for the financial year ending December 2012 (Chao-Blasto, 2014). TIA believes that
“Surplus distribution is the beauty of Takāful and a testimony to Sharī`ah compliance, fairness and equity
of the process” (Takaful Insurance of Africa, 2013).
II. Differences between Takāful and Microtakāful
33. Given the conceptual similarities between Takāful and Microtakāful as explained in paragraph 14,
the following shall illustrate the differences between these two prior to exemplifying the necessity to
change the current regulatory framework of the Takāful industry for regulation of Microtakāful.
(a) Type of Microtakāful Providers (MPs)
34. Takāful exists in a highly regulated financial environment whereby the Takāful Operators (TOs)
are required to be licensed prior to being allowed to offer Takāful products to the industry. Among the
key requirements to be fulfilled include the need to be Sharī`ah compliant in their operational model, to
meet minimum capital requirements, to have in place a governance framework that addresses the
interests of all key stakeholders, to have in place a Sharī`ah governance framework to ascertain Sharī`ah
compliance at all times as well as to have in place investment and risk management framework for
prudential management of the funds overseen and managed by the TOs, i.e. Shareholders Fund (SHF)
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and Participants’ Risk Fund (PRF) . The current regulations on these TOs are pertinent since they are
profit-oriented and competition is stiff between the various TOs. RSAs are responsible for prudential
and/or market conduct supervision to protect the interests of the Takāful participants and might consider
that the profits generated by the TOs are not achieved at the expense of the Takāful participants.
35. Microtakāful on the other hand exists in an environment which to date is yet to be strictly
regulated in many jurisdictions. With the worldwide financial system opening its door to financial
inclusion, many RSAs in various jurisdictions remain elusive when it comes to regulating the MPs. This
elusive approach has led to the existence of MPs that may or may not be licensed by the Takāful
/insurance RSAs to offer Microtakāful products to the participants. Some of these MPs hence may not
fulfill the regulatory and supervisory requirements of normal TOs. Three types of MPs have been
identified to provide Microtakāful products to the participants (“MPs” shall henceforth be referred to
institutions offering Microtakāful products, including the licensed TOs).
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IFSB-8: Guiding Principles on Governance for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertakings recommends six guiding
principles as reference for establishment of a TO’s governance framework. IFSB-11: Standard on Solvency
Requirements for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) provides seven key features to be followed in constructing a solvency
structure for TOs. IFSB-14: Standard on Risk Management for Takaful (Islamic Insurance) Undertaking provides key
elements in constructing a risk management framework for TOs.
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(i) The first type of MP is the TOs themselves. These are formal institutions which are regulated by
the RSAs of Takāful /insurance in their own jurisdictions. Governed by Takāful regulations, these
licensed TOs create products which are specifically targeted at the low-income population. Although
some of these products may or may not follow the same guideline of the normal Takāful products, they
nevertheless go through a thorough product development process required by the RSAs using a
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proportional approach . Although some TOs do not specifically term their products as ‘products for the
low-income’ or Microtakāful products, several TOs have started this initiative when plans with as low as
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USD 3.00 in annual contribution started to be offered to rural population . Many TOs in the industry have
since taken up the challenge to provide Microtakāful products to the low-income population by modifying
their underwriting requirements through the creation of simple and easily comprehensible products.
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These are done with the conscious mindset to uphold the Maqasid of Sharī`ah within the population
(Vejzagic & Smolo, 2015).
Example: Prime Islami Life Insurance Ltd in Bangladesh launched several products (Monthly Small-
Savings Assurance Plan, Prime Islami Deposit Pension Scheme and Kalyan-Bima Two Payments
Deposit Pension Scheme) for the poor people of Bangladesh since 2001. These products were created
for agricultural and factory workers, small traders and housewives, as well as self-employed workers.
These are groups of people who are not able to make huge annual contribution but are able to contribute
US$2 monthly (ICMIF Takaful, 2014).
(ii) The second type of MP consists of the institutions regulated by formal entities other than RSAs of
Takāful /insurance, under laws other than Takāful /insurance law in their jurisdictions. These are formal
institutions which may or may not exist to generate profits. Their main source of income does not come
from insurance/Takāful activities. They may or may not be licensed, but nevertheless they are regulated.
These organisations range from Zakat collectors, Sadaqah collectors, and many other types of charity-
driven institutions or associations which main reason of existence is to provide for the low-income and the
poor. These MPs may also be government agencies which work together with TOs to come up with
Microtakāful products, or may also be microfinance institutions (MFIs) which provide loans to low-income
population, and the Microtakāful products that they offer are just side products which are bundled
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together to cover the loans provided by these MFIs . Products coming from these formal entities are
usually driven by state or national initiatives to promote financial inclusion. Contributions from this second
type of MPs may come from the participants themselves, from Zakat or Sadaqah funds, from donations,
or even national budget to provide Microtakāful protection for the low-income section of the population.
The regulations that govern their activities may not be as stringent as the regulations imposed by RSAs of
TOs.
9
The IAIS’ Application Paper on Regulation and Supervision supporting Inclusive Insurance Markets (October 2012)
provides guidance on proportionte approaches to be used for inclusive finance. The proportional principle works two
ways: for low risk activities, simpler and less burdensome guidelines are used. For complex and riskier activities,
more sophisticated methods and techniques will be used.
10
Syarikat Takaful Malaysia has since its incorporation in year 1984 offered inexpensive funeral expenses group
plans to the poor. This initiative is followed by Etiqa Takaful Bhd, also in Malaysia when the organisation started in
year 1993. These products are also made available to rural population. Amana Takaful of Sri Lanka, has since 1998
been providing coverage to the cottage industry and to self-employed individuals in Sri Lanka, with a focus on people
running small businesses.
11
Maqasid of Shariah means the objectives of Shariah. Under Islamic Jurisprudence, the main five objectives of
Shariah to protect the interest of mankind are (1) Protection of Al-Din (Religion), (2) Protection of Al-Nafs (Life), (3)
Protection of Nasl (Lineage & Family), (4) Protection of Al-‘Aql (Intellect or Mind) and (5) Protection of Al-Mal
(Property)
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In Sri Lanka, this practice is widespread due to the absence of the licensing requirement on MPs.
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Example: An example of government-driven initiative is the Microtakāful scheme launched together with
the Farmers Welfare Federation of Malaysia (an NGO). The product which was developed by Takāful
Ikhlas in 2007, was funded by the Malaysian government with contributions as low as US$6.00 per
annum. It provides immediate death benefit of US$140.00 covering 100,000 members (Mokhtar,
Sulaiman, & Ismail, 2012).
(iii) The third type of MP is the unregistered and unregulated institutions. These are informal entities
that are unregulated by RSAs of Takāful /insurance law, or any other formal entities under laws other than
Takāful /insurance laws. These MPs may be informal groups or community associations that are created
to provide Microtakāful coverage to their own members. Some of these guaranteed benefits include
funeral expenses benefits, or simple death or total permanent disablement benefits. The participants of
these MPs are not protected under any type of legal settings.
(iv) Example: In Malaysia, especially in rural areas, members of the community often establish a
Funeral Expenses fund where contributions are collected from members of the village at an amount as
minimal as USD1,40 per annum. These are unregistered groups where contributions are paid to and
collected based on good faith by the collectors appointed by the village’s mosque.
(b) Type of Participants
36. Takāful participants are regular income earners. Most often than not, they are average and
above average income earners. Although different jurisdictions may define ‘basic infrastructure’
differently from one another, most of the Takāful participants live in areas with basic infrastructure
including roads, market, water and electricity. Their socioeconomic conditions allow them to have easy
access to common financial products offered by the Takāful industry. Takāful participants are also more
exposed to various financial products offered by financial institutions hence making information
asymmetry less of an issue for them. They are also very much aware of the importance of Takāful
products through the various campaigns done by the TOs in these areas that are easily accessible by
intermediaries of TOs.
37. Microtakāful participants are on the other hand irregular or low-income earners. Many
Microtakāful participants do not enjoy basic amenities. They have less exposure to financial products
simply because of the lack of campaign done by financial institutions in the areas that they live in due to
the lack of basic infrastructure. Under the general financial terms, they may not have access to financial
services due to their socioeconomic conditions which may include residing in the areas which are
unreachable by the common means of communication and transportation due to lack of development. In
general Takāful terms, Microtakāful participants are commonly the group of people who do not fulfill the
financial and underwriting requirements due to their inability to meet the basic health and financial
requirements as stipulated by the TOs’ underwriting and financial requirements. It has been observed
that the profile of Microtakāful clientele would mostly coincide with the profile of microfinance participants.
This however, may extend to include people who do not necessarily need a loan but are low-income and
possess insurable risks.
38. Example: Amana Takāful Insurance 13 works together with Muslim Aid Sri Lanka to implement
Islamic microinsurance in Sri Lanka through its scheme named Micro Insurance Navodaya (Navodaya
means ‘dawn of a new era’). Among the targeted groups are garment manufacturing companies to
promote Microtakāful to factory workers who fall under the low-income bracket and is able to pay only
USD0.22 a month. Amana Takāful Insurance also targets workers of tea estates.
13
https://www.takaful.lk/
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(c) Product Features and Contribution
39. Takāful products generally come with various kinds of product features, from simple to
complicated. Simple product features are products which require minimum explanation and minimum
prerequisite knowledge on the part of the participants prior to participating in the plan. Two examples of
simple products features are death and total permanent disablement benefits whereby the MP does not
require extensive and comprehensive explanation in enabling the participant to understand the product.
The terms and conditions for participation are also easy to comprehend since the exclusions are minimal.
Complicated products features on the other hands require certain prerequisite knowledge on the part of
the participants and thorough explanation on the part of the MP. A good example is the hospital and
surgical plan for participants. The participants need to be able to comprehend the types of hospitalization
and surgical procedures that are covered under the plan, as well as the limit that they are able to claim
under the plan. This requires time and efforts on the part of the MP, with appropriate follow-up
clarification for better understanding of the participants, especially in understanding the terms, conditions
and exclusions that come with such product features. Sophisticated products are made available for
Takāful participants since they are generally easily reachable by Takāful intermediaries through common
means of communication and transportation. With these variations in product features, the contribution
amount required of these products will reflect its simplicity or sophistication, which does not pose
economic constraints to those who can afford these products.
40. Microtakāful products on the other hand are in practice generally simple and easy to understand.
Its simplicity is pertinent in reaching out to participants residing in areas that may not be easily accessible
by normal means of communication and transportation by the MPs. Simplicity is also key consideration in
product design given the economic capability of participants to obtain such coverage at an affordable
contribution. It is also worthy to mention that simple product features translates to simple claims
procedures and verification, which is key operational requirement of a successful Microtakāful initiative.
41. Example: Credit Microtakāful plan was introduced by Takmin (Takāful Mikro Indonesia) in year
2006, a joint partnership between Takāful Indonesia and Peramu, an NGO. Takmin works together with
cooperative bodies that act like MFIs in the island of Java to provide loans to start up business or to help
expand the current business. These MFIs provide Grameen style microfinance for women from poor
families in which 25 – 30 women provide mutual help to each other with the financing provided based on
Qard Hassan (Mokhtar, Sulaiman, & Ismail, 2012).
(d) Distribution Channels
42. Takāful products are known to have complex and costly distribution channels. Given the range
of products from simplest to the most sophisticated ones, TOs need various channels that are able to
meet the requirements of different categories of participants. The most common ones are individual
agents, corporate agents and brokers. These distribution channels survive based on the various layers of
the agency and brokerage commission structure. The pricing of Takāful products is hence dependent on
the type of distribution channel used to distribute the products to the participants. The more complex the
product channel is, the higher the transaction costs will be manifested in the contribution paid by the
normal participants who expect better services to be provided by these intermediaries.
43. Microtakāful products on the other hand are simple yet challenging to distribute to the
participants due to the demographic characteristics of the participants. The need to remain simple yet
affordable make distribution taxing since majority of the participants may reside in areas that are
unreachable by normal means of communication and transportation. Low cost distribution is essential to
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a successful Microtakāful development. Some of the popular distribution channels that have been
identified in the industry include the use of mobile phones. The transactions (exchange of aqad and
payment of contribution) take place via deduction of mobile phone credits and an exchange of simplified
contract wordings which are comprehensible based on the simplicity of the terms and conditions of the
Microtakāful products. Some MPs have indicated that they appoint small grocery stores or pawn shops to
be the distribution channels since these are frequently visited by Microtakāful participants. There are also
instances where distribution channels are provided by government or associations providing social
welfare initiatives which are tied up together with the MP’s products. With these simple and non-complex
distribution channels where there are not many agency layers to share commissions, the transaction
costs for distribution of Microtakāful products are easily driven down. It is also shown that trust plays an
important role in the use of certain type of distribution channel. Where products are distributed via local
mosques, religious groups or trade union, the participation rate seems to be higher. Another channel that
is slowly paving its way through Microtakāful participants is through MFIs. With product bundling being
one of the mechanisms to distribute Microtakāful products, Microtakāful products are automatically
attached with the products of the MFIs.
44. Example: Takmin (Takāful Micro Indonesia) works together with an NGO, Peramu in
empowering the poor in Indonesia through Microtakāful products. Peramu works closely with Baytul Maal
Wat Tanwil Cooperative in various small districts in Indonesia to distribute Microtakāful products in Bogor,
Indonesia (Haryadi, 2006).
(e) Consumer Education
45. Takāful objectives and values are widely understood by the middle income earners which lead
the purchasing power among the Muslim consumers. The high level of awareness among the middle
income earners can be attributed to the development of Islamic finance as well governments’ direct
involvement in supporting the conducive atmosphere and enabling environment for growth of the Takāful
industry. This is especially true for countries such as Malaysia, Pakistan and Nigeria whereby the RSAs
have issued various guidelines and frameworks particularly for Takāful market players.
46. Microtakāful objectives and values are not known or understood by the target market itself. This
is due to the low level of education and financial literacy it has, which makes it incognizant towards the
risks that may cause it further suffering and financial losses. More often than not, potential Microtakāful
participants see no value in paying contribution for future benefits that may or may not be paid to them.
This phenomenon has led to weak demand for Microtakāful products. Lack of awareness and
understanding of Microtakāful has also opened doors to deliberate misseling of Microtakāful products by
irresponsible agents which further damages the reputation of Microtakāful. Some studies have suggested
that awareness programs could be conducted by mosques, MuÎallas, and Zakat institutions as they are
within the reach of the aforementioned target market.
47. Example: The collaboration between Amana Takaful and Muslim Aid has contributed immensely
to the development of Microtakāful and Takāful understanding amongst the low income segment in Sri
Lanka. Muslim Aid specialises in providing Shari’ah compliant microfinance services to the financially
under privileged making it the best platform for dissemination such information. Dissemination of
information is done through regular meetings and awareness programs which coincide payment of
microfinancing dates which gave the aforementioned institutions to interact with the low income earners
directly. This has boosted the demand for Microtakāful in Sri Lanka (Lanka Business News, 2010).
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(f) Operations
48. Takāful operators operations are usually lengthy due to the complex structure that they adopt. In
certain countries, potential participants would have to go through agents in order for them to participate in
a Takāful scheme. Usually it would take a few days for the applications to be processed and approved by
the TOs. Claims management also goes through the same length process. Although TOs are required to
ensure that claims management are conducted amicable, they have a set of process and procedures that
they have to follow in order for them to pay the claims made by participants or their beneficiaries. This
lengthy process is to prevent fraudulent claims or payment of invalid claims that may affect their funds.
49. Microtakāful operators operations are less complicated to that of TOs. Subscription of
Microtakāful schemes are made simple and within reach of potential Microtakāful participants.
Furthermore, just like the TOs, MPs are required to ensure claims processing and payments are done
promptly without unnecessary delays. However, MPs claims management process is usually simple while
still having proper mechanism to control fraud in place. In practice, some MPs transfer their processing
and approval of applications, and claims process to its non-governmental organization or government
agency partners.
50. Example: In Malaysia, Etiqa Takaful and Angkatan Koperasi Kebangsaan Malaysia (a
government agency) launched Tabarru’ Koperasi scheme whereby it covers death and total permanent
disability up to 80 years old. This scheme is only open to the members of the cooperative only, and also
members of cooperatives that are over seen by Angkatan Koperasi Kebangsaan Malaysia (Angkatan).
The contribution for this scheme is as low as USD 1.30 to as high as USD 6.80 per year which pays a
death benefit as high as USD 5159.00. Operations for this particular schemes has been simplified in the
sense that all management of scheme such as applications and claims are done by participating
cooperatives for their members (ICMIF, 2014).
III. Differences between Microtakāful and Microinsurance
51. The differences between Microtakāful and microinsurance are similar with the differences
between Takāful and insurance. The non-existence of the elements of Riba, Maysir and Gharar in
Takāful as explained in IFSB – 8 in the product features and contractual relationship between the MPs
and its participants (IFSB, 2009). This makes Microtakāful products more appealing to the section of
population who are conscious about the religious implication of their participation in financial services
offered by various types of financial institutions. In Pakistan for example, 96% of the populations are
Muslims. They believe that the principles set forth in the conventional insurance mechanism are against
their faith and belief. On the contrary, they accept that the principles in Microtakāful promote cooperation
among the members of the community and are able to serve the people better (Khan, 2013).
52. The Core Principles of Takāful as outlined in Paragraph 14 of the IFSB – 8 is equally applicable
14
for Microtakāful .
14
The three principles cited in IFSB – 8 are Tabarru’ Commitment (Tabarru’ commitment is a type of Islamic financial
transaction that is fundamental to Takaful schemes. It is the amount contributed by each Takaful participant to fulfil
obligations of mutual help and to pay claims submitted by eligible claimants), Ta’awun (The concept of Ta’awun, or
mutual assistance, is another core principle to the operation of Takāful, with participants agreeing to compensate
each other mutually for the losses arising from specified risks. As Takāful has often been perceived as a form of
cooperative or mutual insurance, the initial objective is not to gain profit but to assist one another mutually, under the
principle of Ta’awun) as well as Prohibition of Riba (Conventional insurance business involves the element of Riba.
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IV. Survey Findings on Industry & Regulatory Practices of Microtakāful
53. In an effort to understand the Microtakāful sector better, the IFSB and the IAIS undertook a
survey on Microtakāful in the third quarter of 2014. This section provides an analysis made out of the
responses received from the survey result bearing in mind that the number of responses received may
not be sufficient to form any concrete conclusion as to the nature of the Microtakāful industry. It however
serves as guidance for the development of the remaining part of this paper.
54. When the survey was sent out, it was intended to target institutions providing Microtakāful
products. While the survey was sent to 64 institutions/RSAs, only 25 respondents provided feedback. A
concrete reason which contributed to the low response was the non-offerings of Microtakāful products
where 10 out of the 25 respondents stated ‘non-offerings’ as their main reasons for not participating in the
survey.
55. Based on the limited information provided by 15 participating respondents, the survey result gave
an indication that while Microtakāful is still not as widespread as the normal Takāful products, a few
institutions have already taken the steps to provide coverage to the low income population via low-
contribution and simple products, most commonly death, total permanent disablement and credit Takāful .
Although the infrastructure for Microtakāful administration is not fully in place for many of these 15
institutions, steps have been taken to ensure simplified products and simplified claims administration
provide ease of transactions for participants.
56. From regulatory perspective, the survey result indicates that there is currently no specific
regulation on Microtakāful in place. Where the MPs are non-TOs, there may not be a specific regulation
to oversee their operational framework. Where MPs are TOs, they may be required to adhere to existing
regulations and guidelines of the normal TOs. These include the requirements on licensing, requirements
on appointing intermediaries, solvency requirements as well as the separation of the MRF and the
Shareholders’ Fund.
57. In preserving the interests of participants, MPs are required to have similar governance
framework, in which the key organs to preserve interest of stakeholders are Board of Directors, Sharī`ah
Board as well as Senior Management. In circumstances where conflict arises, three RSAs indicated that
the similar rectification mechanism that is already in place for the normal TOs will be used on the MPs.
58. While the findings do provide certain insight on what is currently going on in the industry, the
amount of information acquired through this survey exercise may not be indicative of what the majority of
the MPs are currently doing or not doing Nevertheless, it could provide an avenue to highlight all the
potential areas requiring attention of the regulators of MPs.
59. To quote a paragraph from IAIS’ paper on Issues in Regulation and Supervision of
Microinsurance (June 2007), ‘Regulators and supervisors in emerging market jurisdictions have little
experience or empirical data to support their role in creating an ‘inclusive’ insurance market that works
effectively for the upper as well as the lower income segments, with the latter being the focus of
microinsurance, this lack of data exemplifies the fact that the RSAs of MPs may be encountering similar
Hence, it is important that investments in both the Takāful funds and the shareholders’ funds are Riba-free types of
investment).
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