Iran's Warfighting Capabilities: Roots, Roles and Evolution - DISCUSSION PAPER - TRT World Research Centre
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DISCUSSION PAPER
Iran’s Warfighting
Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Merve Akın
DISCUSSION PAPER
Iran’s Warfighting
Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Merve Akın
Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
© TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
WRITTEN BY
Merve Akın
PUBLISHER
TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE
June 2020
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The opinions expressed in this discussion paper represent the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the TRT World Research Centre.
4Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Introduction
T
his discussion paper focuses sent its first military satellite into the orbit recent-
on Iran's military capabilities. ly. The United States (US) criticised this action,
Although Iran's armament stating that this development showed that Iran’s
is restricted by international space program is “neither peaceful nor civilian”
sanctions and and arms em- (U.S. Department of State, 2020). US Secretary
bargoes, the country has still of State Mike Pompeo found Iran's launch in-
managed to develop its military capabilities to consistent with UN Security Council Resolution
the extent that has raised concerns regionally. 2231 which refrains Tehran to develop ballistic
These concerns are understandable, particular- missiles designed to carry a nuclear payload.
ly when one considering that Iran has the larg- These developments raise eyebrows and sharp
est ballistic missile force in the Middle East. discussions concerning Iran's real intentions
and capabilities.
While Iran claims that its military operations are
defensive, they are far from being considered On the other hand, Iran's latest military blun-
as such by other states. As Iran's conventional ders, which caused significant civilian loss,
military capabilities are not sufficiently strong to raised questions about the lack of professional-
pose significant threats against its adversaries, ism of the Iranian army. On 8 January 2020, the
the same cannot be said for Tehran’s unconven- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) shot
tional means of fighting via the use of proxies, down Ukrainian aeroplane, killing everyone on
terror networks, and militias. board, on the day Iranian strikes targeted US
bases in Iraq. The most recent accident affect-
One of the biggest concerns of Iran's neighbours ed the Iran Naval Forces in the Gulf of Oman on
is the expansion of such militias or proxies, 11 May and led to the death of 19 Iranian sailors.
which are operating on behalf of Iran's author- These incidents reveal the existence of a gap
ity and for its national interests. Another signif- between Iran's claims and existent capacity and
icant issue in the region is Iran's feverish efforts add nuances and caveats to the discussion of
to boost its ballistic missile capabilities. Iran also Iran’s military might.
Iranian Ballistic Missile Ranges
UKRAINE RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN
FRANCE MONGOLIA
ROMANIA
GREECE TURKEY TURKMENISTAN
Tehran CHINA
SYRIA
IRAQ AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
LIBYA EGYPT PAKISTAN
SAUDI
System (Max Range) ARABIA
INDIA
Shahab 1 (300 km)
Fateh-110 (300-500 km)
Shahab 2 SRBM (500 km) YEMEN
Zolfaghar SRBM (700 km)
Qiam-1 SRBM (750 km)
Shahab 3/Emad-1/ SOMALIA
Seijil MRBMs (2000 km)
Source: US Defence Intelligence Agency
5Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Iran’s Security Environment
Despite changes affecting security paradigms in the gether with new technologies. The aggressive policies
post Cold war era, military security is still considered pursued by the United States in the Middle East, with a
as the most significant asset for nation-states to defend vast number of US military bases and troops stationed
their national interests and territorial integrity, and de- there, constituted a double edge sword. On the one
ter military aggression. It includes states’ defence and hand, the US presence in the region provides securi-
deterrence capabilities, the capacity of the regular ty for US allies. On the other hand, it poses threats in
army, nuclear power and so on. However, the nature the eyes of non-US allies, such as Iran. The continuous
of conventional warfare is also evolving with the rise antagonism between Iran and its adversaries, such as
of unconventional fighting strategies and asymmetric the Gulf States, accelerated the arms race in the region.
capabilities not only by states but also by non-state Iran’s past military experiences vis-à-vis its regional ri-
armed actors. Therefore, all new developments pushed vals provided a significant incentive for Tehran to en-
countries to invest more in their defence industries to- hance its defence capabilities.
The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) was one of the longest offensive. Tehran managed to absorb the aggression
and bloodiest wars of the 20th century that reached and launched a counter-offensive. However, after eight
unprecedented peaks of violence with more than a years, the war ended without a conclusive victory for
million casualties (Karsh, 1989). It was a catastrophic either side. It resulted in more than a million casualties
chapter for Iran, as the Khomeini regime was mostly following the use of chemical weapons and bombings
occupied with revolution and state formation at that of many cities.
time. When Iraq started the war, the Iranian military
was not prepared to deal with the threat since the new The war caused a big impact on Tehran’s military doc-
regime eliminated ‘some 10,000 senior officers’ and re- trine, threat perception, and defence policies. Numer-
duced conscription levels by September 1980 (Chubin, ous lessons were drawn from the involvement of formal
1986, p. 310). The Khomeini regime disregarded the and informal military organisations, which constituted
Shah's military, called Artesh, and saw them as royalist the backbone of Iran's military structure (such as IRGC
and pro-Western (ibid.). The IRGC named as Pasdaran and Shia armed forces in Iraq, i.e. Badr corps). Iran re-
(or Sepah in Persian) was established as a force loyal to alised its weakness in conventional military power and
the Supreme Leader in 1979. Without experience and focused on the development of ballistic missiles. It also
discipline, the Iranian military was in a very disadvan- further developed its unconventional military strategy
tageous position. through proxies, insurgencies, and guerrilla attacks.
All these approaches were synthesised and adopted
During the war, Iran's already limited conventional formally after the war. Since then, Iran has been imple-
military power was heavily degraded during the Iraqi menting this approach with only minor revisions.
Iran's Military Doctrine and Defence Policies
The focal point of Iran's military doctrine is its alleged However, in the mid-1990s, Tehran altered its security
animosity towards the United States. At the same time, perception and started to move away from its earlier
Tehran has to deal with various constraints on its mili- doctrine. This shift took place following the defeat of
tary and economy in a complex security environment Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War and the sanc-
(Ward, 2005, p. 559). In the early 1990s, Tehran pursued tions against Iraq that followed. What also affected
an ideology-oriented defensive strategy codified in Iran’s position was the general instability in the region
1992, aiming at the preservation of national independ- due to the tensions between Israel and Lebanon, the
ence, territorial integrity of the Islamic regime and the hostile relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Sub-
purported protection of Muslims and other ‘oppressed’ sequently, Iran shifted its strategy towards 'deterrence'
nations across the world (ibid., p. 560). by assuming a more practical perspective considering
national interests.
6Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
The Deterrence Strategy
Deterrence is one of the core elements of Iran's mili- According to Ajili & Rouhi (2019, p. 142), there are five
tary doctrine, which refers to military actions that aim key operational pillars of this strategy: ‘fixed and mobile
to increase rival's risks and costs while decreasing its air defence; artillery and ballistic missiles; electronic
constraints to avoid any possible conventional military and cyber warfare; limited use of airpower; and naval
conflict. Tehran's declared goal is to deter the United combat’. Some of these tactics date back to the military
States, which is depicted as the principal enemy, as experiences during the Iran-Iraq war, such as naval
well as other US allies in the region. For this purpose, combat, which is based on anti-ship cruise missiles as
Iran has relied on this strategy and tried to enhance its cost-effective tools (ibid.). Anti-ship cruise missiles are
relations with the neighbours, while at the same time crucial tools for Iran to deter enemy naval forces in the
weakening US influence in the region (Ward, 2005). Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The geopoliti-
However, boosting relations with neighbouring coun- cal position of the Strait of Hormuz for oil trade, where
tries is not an easy task for Tehran, since US-allied more than 20% of world’s oil moves through, has always
countries border Iran. Similarly, it shares borders with been used by Iran to threaten its adversaries (RFERL,
NATO-member countries, such as Turkey. In 2010, it 2020). Iranian leaders (Euronews, 2011) and military
was announced that a radar station belonging to the officials (Asriran, 2019) threaten countries to close the
NATO missile defence system would be built in Malat- strait to international shipping. Several confrontations
ya, Turkey (CNN, 2012). Iran considered such a plan as between Iranian vessels and foreign-flagged tankers
a direct security threat. took place in 2019.
Major ports around the Strait of Hormuz
A strategic passage where a third of the world's oil traffic passes
IRAQ
Basra
Um Qasr IRAN
KUWAIT Shuwaikh
Mubarak Khark
Al-Kabeer
Shuaiba
Bouchehr
Gulf
Industrial port Bandar Abbas
of King Fahd BAHRAIN
Mina Salman
Ras Tanura
Ras Laffan
SAUDI King Abdulaziz QATAR 5
ARABIA 4 6
Doha
3 7 Strait Chabahar
Hamad 2 of Hormuz
1
Muscat
Regime 1 Zayed UAE
2 Khalifa
Close to Iran 3 Jebel Ali
4 Rashid
Close to Saudi Arabia 5 Khalid
6 Khar Fakkan OMAN
Major Ports
7 Fujairah
Source: AFP bureaus
7Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
'Mosaic Defence' and 'Forward Defence'
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the egy, which aims to wage "an endless defence and long-
removal of its archenemy in its western borders, Iran term warfare on land, air and sea" (Ward, 2005, p. 573).
began to change its military strategy to a more multi-di-
mensional strategy. In 2005, in addition to naval and Following the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran shifted its strat-
air-defence capabilities, IRGC institutionalised Iran's egy to a more offensive military doctrine along with
unconventional warfare strategy and asymmetric oper- defensive/deterrent approach through the adoption of
ations through the doctrine of 'mosaic defence' (Yossef, hybrid warfare (Yossef, 2019). This new doctrine was
2019). Tehran has formalised the extent of military oper- called 'forward defence', which focuses on Iran's offen-
ations through the mobilisation of large militia units to sive against enemies beyond the country’s borders to
engage in attrition warfare against an occupying army prevent them from fomenting internal conflicts (Vatan-
(ibid.). The IRGC adopted a framework of security strat ka, 2017). It has four main pillars: proxy fighting, drone
strikes, naval guerrilla warfare and cyber attacks.
Timeline of Iran's Recent Attacks,
Military Incidents, and Operations
14 September 2019 without human casualties. At the same day, IRGC shot down
the Ukrainian passenger jet, killing all 176 people on board. The
Iran-backed Houthis' drone strikes hit two key oil installations
military announced that the jet was accidentally hit by a human
of Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, in the city of
error (Fassihi, 2020).
Abqaiq and Khurais (Hubbard et al., 2019). Washington blamed
Tehran for the attacks while Iran denied responsibility.
22 April 2020
27 December 2019 Iran launched the country's first military satellite, Nour-1, into
the orbit by the operation of IRGC's Aerospace Division (Press
Iran-backed Iraqi militia, Kataeb Hezbollah launched a rocket
TV, 2020). US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that Iran's
attack that killed one American contractor and wounded several
missile launch violates UNSC Resolution 2231 (Reuters, 2020).
others in Kirkuk, Iraq (DW, 2019).
8 January 2020 10 May 2020
Iran navy's missile hit own vessel, Konarak, during a training
Iran fired 22 missiles to hit US military bases in Iraq as a
exercise in the Gulf of Oman, killing 19 Iranian sailors (Tasnim
retaliatory attack for Maj. General Qassem Soleimani's
News, 2020).
assassination by the United States (Rubin, 2020). The majority
of rockets targeted Al-Anbar airbase, damaged infrastructure
A Dual Military Structure: Artesh and IRGC
The idea to create different military units was derived forces and intelligence units operating in different re-
from the Khomeini regime's fear of a military coup by gions. On the other hand, this bifurcation is believed to
Shah's army, Artesh. However, the Iranian authorities be as one of the critical vulnerabilities of Iran's armed
did not abolish Artesh with the establishment of the forces since it poses an obstacle in the transformation
IRGC. Instead, it weakened the power and status of the of basic strengths of the military personnel into an ef-
forc-es. Both structures have their ground, naval, air fective combat power (Ward, 2009, p. 301).
8Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Iran's Regular Army: Artesh
The foundation of Artesh goes back to the mid-1920s military officers, including senior soldiers. After the first
when Reza Shah Khan initiated to create a modern years of the Iran-Iraq War, Artesh began to function as
army after the First World War. The army had significant a less powerful army from its previous status. For in-
capabilities by 1979 (Kaussler, 2011). As an old US ally, stance, Iran’s Navy (IRIN) and IRGC Navy (IRGC-N) had
pre-revolutionary Iran relied on Washington's support overlapping responsibilities in the Persian Gulf, the Cas-
to advance the capacity of Artesh. The US supported pian Sea and the Gulf of Oman for a long time. Howev-
Shah's army to hinder Soviet expansion, and contain er, their operational areas and strategic missions were
Russia's influence into the region (Russell, 2011). Iran redefined in 2007 by giving the IRGC-N sole authority
has even bought F-14 fighter jets from America, which in protecting the Persian Gulf (Himes, 2011). For the
were the most capable combat aircraft in the US arsenal regular army, the Iranian leadership has tasked IRIN to
in those years (ibid.). engage outside of the Gulf and projecting Iranian influ-
ence (ibid.).
Nevertheless, Artesh was depleted by the Khomeini
regime in 1979, through the purging of thousands of
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
Khomeini established the IRGC following the Revolu- The IRGC operates differently from the regular army
tion in 1979. His aim was to create a paramilitary force as they carry out asymmetric warfare and terror oper-
that protects the regime and defends the Iranian revo- ations via the Quds Force and Shia militias in the re-
lution from internal and external threats. After the Iran- gion. Despite its relatively small number, IRGC has been
Iraq war, the role of the corps was formalised as the training, arming and funding the vast network of Shia
'preeminent service' (Ward, 2009, p. 302). Even though proxy groups to carry out unconventional operations
the IRGC was tasked to defend Iran's national security across the region.
similar to Artesh, its fundamental mission made the
forces a different military unit from the regular army.
The corps has been charged with safeguarding Iran's
theocratic system and Iran's clerical elites (Ostovar,
2016). Therefore, the IRGC has unique relations with
the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, velayat-e faqih, who
must be protected by the corps. Hence, IRGC became
a very influential actor in politics, economy and so-
cio-cultural structures.
The IRGC embodies conventional forces, such as
ground, naval, aerospace and intelligence, as the reg-
ular army. However, it also consists of two extra units:
Basij and the Quds Force. The former acts as Iran's
paramilitary reserve force whereas the latter is tasked
with conducting unconventional military operations
across the Middle East. According to the US Defence
Intelligence Agency report, the total number of active
military personnel is 610,000; reaching up to more
than 1,000,000 Basij reserves which are added during
the time of conflicts (US Defence Intelligence Agency, (Kerim Gulbetekin - Anadolu Agency)
2019).
9Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Iran’s Conventional Military Capability
Today, Iran is still managing to improve its convention- and European powers, or even Russia's and China's
al military capacity. For this purpose, Iran has been military hardware (ibid.). Additionally, Iran's military ex-
striving to develop the indigenous military industry for penditure is much lower when compared to its neigh-
a long time. When the West imposed an arms embar- bours' military spending and arms sales, particularly
go and economic sanctions on Iran, Tehran turned his GCC countries (Cordesman, 2015).
face to the East for importing advanced weapons and
artillery. In this respect, Russia, China and North Korea Tehran's core military capabilities can be divided into
were key countries in supporting Iran's development of different areas, as follows:
ballistic missiles and providing traditional armaments. • Ballistic Missiles
• Anti Access / Area Denial
Despite Tehran's superiority in ballistic missile capacity, • Unconventional Warfare
Iranian military power is said to be qualitatively inferior • Expeditionary Operations
to its Gulf neighbours, which have modern American • Cyberspace
and Western weapon systems (Russell, 2011). Iran's • Intelligence Services
weapons that are domestically produced are far from • Space Launch Program
competing with the armaments of the United States
Military expenditure by Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE,
1992-2018
100
80
(constant 2017 US$ billion)
Military expenditure
60
40
20
0
95
00
05
10
18
15
19
20
20
20
20
20
Iran Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
Note: Data is unavailable for the UAE for 1994-1996 and 2015-2018 and Qatar for 1994-2001 and 2011-2018
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Apr. 2019
10Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Ballistic Missiles
The ballistic missile Iranian Ballistic Missiles
arsenals are con-
Sejjil (Ashura) MRBM
sidered a key pillar
Emad-1 MRBM
of Iran's strategic
Shahab 3 MRBM
deterrence strat-
egy. Even though
Qiam-1 SRBM
Iran's economy has
Shahab 2 SRBM
Shahab 1 SRBM
Zolfaghar SRBM
been restricted by
Fateh-110 SRBM (and variants)
the international
sanctions and an
arms embargo, the
regime started in-
vesting heavily in
developing ballistic
missiles and cruise
missiles. The expe-
System
rience during the
Iraq-Iran war had a Maximum At least Up to Up to
Range (km) 300-500 300 500 700 2,000
large bearing in this 750 2,000 2,000
decision because Source: US Defence Intelligence Agency
Iran was able to
retaliate Iraqi missile strikes on Iranian cities by using missiles in different types and capacities (Rezaei, 2019).
SCUD missiles (Elleman & Fitzpatrick, 2018). The rockets include close-range ballistic missiles (CR-
BMs), short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), and medi-
Despite the regime's rhetoric regarding self-reliance, um-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which can hit tar-
Iran got military assistance from China and North Ko- gets around the region as far as 2,000 kilometres from
rea to develop its ballistic missiles programme (Olson, Iran's borders. Some of these missiles are produced by
2016). China was a very influential actor in this regard, Iran’s industry, such as Shahab-3, Ghadr 110 and its al-
as Iran bought anti-ship cruise missiles and several mis- ternative forms, Emad, Shahab-4, Shahab-5, Shahab-6,
sile systems from Beijing. China's contribution to Iran's Sejjil, Ashoura, Fajr and Qiam-1.
missile program was very significant (ibid.). Today, Chi-
na is the biggest trading partner of Iran. Beijing imports Tehran has tested some of these weapons in several
oil from Tehran, whereas exporting arms to the latter. conflicts, such as in Syria and Iraq. In October 2017 and
26% of Iran’s imports come from China valued to $13.12 2018, IRGC targeted ISIS in Syria by SRBMs in retalia-
billion by 2017 (Trading Economics, 2017). 17% of these tion for terrorist attacks in Iran (Fars News Agency, 2017;
imports include machinery, nuclear reactors and boil- 2018). Iran has also used the same missiles for targeting
ers (ibid.). Despite the oil trade being constrained due Kurdish militants in Iraq in September 2018, damaging
to the US sanctions, the two countries maintain military the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) headquar-
trade. According to SIPRI arms transfers database, the ters (Wahab, 2018).
trend indicator value (TIV) of arms exports from China
to Iran between 2000-2019 is estimated to be around Today, Iran has the largest missile force in the region,
$807 million (SIPRI, 2020). according to the US Defence Intelligence Agency. How-
ever, this capacity is considered ineffective in obtaining
Iran has adopted a key deterrent strategy by using mis- intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and intermedi-
siles as a long-rage strike capability due to the lack of ate-range systems, which are threatening for the United
modern air force. Iran’s investment of domestic man- States and regional countries (Elleman & Fitzpatrick,
ufacturing of ballistic missiles has increased in recent 2018). Nevertheless, Iran's missile power is regarded as
years to compensate for its limited air force assets. alarming since the regime support its unconventional
Through collaboration with North Korea, China and forces across the Middle East through those missiles in-
Russia, Iran became able to produce its own ballistic directly (Olson, 2016).
11Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Anti Access /Area Denial Strategy
Iran's Anti Access / Area Denial strategy (A2/AD) aims craft (FAC), fast inshore attack craft (FIAC), naval mines,
to avert an enemy from infiltrating or operating in areas submarines, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs), anti-ship
where are essential to the country's security and sover- ballistic missiles (ASBMs) and air defence systems
eignty. This strategy mainly relies on Iran's naval forces (Haghshenass, 2008; Gunzinger & Chris, 2011). Tehran
in the critical passage for the world's oil supply, the Per- has enhanced a maritime guerrilla-warfare strategy to
sian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Due to the lack of ef- utilise the vulnerabilities of conventional naval forces
fective naval forces, Iran carries out asymmetric tactics, depending on large vessels. Iran operates coastal de-
such as small boat attacks, to saturate a ship's defences. fence cruise missiles (CDCMs) along its southern coast
Iran's A2AD capabilities consist of the ship and shore- that it can launch against the military ship as far as 300
launched anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), fast attack kilometres away.
Unconventional Warfare
Unconventional warfare is a significant pillar of Iran's While Iran has been trying to improve the capability
military doctrine along with asymmetric war-fighting of ballistic missiles and conventional military build-up,
capabilities. Unconventional warfare includes: con- it also continues to expand its relations with militant
ducting guerrilla activities with hit-and-run tactics, groups in the region. Using proxies provides Iran with a
terrorist attacks, supporting insurgencies, proxies or 'plausible deniability' that Tehran does not take respon-
militias against their governments or invading powers. sibility for military operations conducted by those non-
Tehran has been supporting non-state armed actors state armed groups (Ward, 2005, p. 574). Nevertheless,
since 1979 to counter its adversaries. Iran's collaboration relying on these groups has severely increased in the
with Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia groups was established in post-US occupation of Iraq to subvert US influence and
the early 1980s to compensate for Tehran's strategic iso- promote Iran's security agenda in Iraq. Following the
lation due to the lack of powerful conventional allies in a Arab uprisings in 2011, they have become more crucial
hostile region (Behravesh, 2020). for Iran's power projection in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and
other countries.
Iran's proxies are critical assets for Tehran to extend its
footprint in the region. Other countries consider the Tehran's economic support to the proxies is a well-
influence of proxies as meddling in the affairs of sover- known fact. However, there is no official data or statisti-
eign states (Ostovar, 2016, p. 6). While the country uses cal information about the extent of Iran’s financial sup-
ballistic missiles to deter its rivals, it uses these proxies port to these groups and how much money is allocated
to directly retaliate against its foes (Ostovar, 2018). Since to them from its defence budget. Nevertheless, in 2016,
its formation in 1982, Lebanese Hezbollah organised Lebanese Hezbollah confessed that Iran provides full
numerous terrorist attacks and plots against the United financial support and armaments, which correspond
States and Israel on behalf of Tehran (Katzman, 2017). to $100 and $200 million annually as per US estimates
(Ostovar, 2018).
Expeditionary Operations
Iran's expeditionary warfare capabilities include small- eign militias. In Syria, Iran has carried out operations to
scale conventional forces that comprise ground forces, keep the Assad regime in power against the opposition.
and airlifted troops and UAV operators to support allied In 2016, a small number of Artesh's ground forces were
states in larger conflicts. The most visible example for stationed in Syria, which was their first deployment in
Iran's expeditionary operations is its involvement in external borders since the Iran-Iraq War (Bucala, 2017).
the Syrian Civil War in 2011 that started Tehran's inten- Moreover, Iran deployed conventional ground forces to
sive intervention in regional conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Iraq in early 2014. IRGC-QF backed Iraqi Shia groups,
Yemen. The critical military activities in this field have such as Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation Forces)
been conducted by the IRGC-QF, which combines tra- and boosted their military capacity.
ditional Iranian forces and large numbers of Shia for-
12Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Cyberspace Capabilities
Iran has nascent offensive cyberspace capabilities vis- natural resource companies, and telecommunications
à-vis advanced technology of the United States, Russia firms. In a couple of years, Tehran increased its capacity
and China. The regime generally uses cyberspace oper- in carrying out destructive cyber attacks against the ad-
ations for ensuring internal security and imposing state versaries. Following malware attack against an Iranian
ideology upon the population. Tehran's over-seas cyber oil facility in 2012, Tehran attacked Saudi Aramco and
attacks intend to harass and intimate opponents mostly Qatari RasGas oil companies by using malware created
through proxies. irreparable damage in thousands of computers (ibid.).
Iranian hackers also targeted major US banks, and the
Iran's recognition of cyberspace development as a stra- US Stock Exchange by organising a distributed denial
tegic priority mainly came out of in the wake of the 2010 of service (DDoS) campaign in 2012-2013 (ibid.). During
Stuxnet cyber attack on Iran's nuclear centrifuges (Rug- the Israel-Gaza conflict in 2014, Iranian cyber actors
ge, 2018). Tehran began to get technical support from launched DDoS attacks against the Israel Defence Forc-
Russia and China and rapidly improved its cyber capa- es infrastructure (Kaplan, 2014). In 2016, Saudi Arabia
bilities by conducting censorship activities, destructive became the target of Iranian cyber operation with a
attacks, espionage campaigns against military and more detrimental malware attacking civil aviation au-
government data, and internal information controls. In thority, labour ministry, and central bank (Chan, 2016).
the espionage category, the state periodically targets
aerospace companies, defence contractors, energy and
Intelligence Operations
Iran's intelligence has multiple structures composed es. The former is accountable to the President, whereas
of 16 organisations charged with foreign intelligence, the latter answers solely to the Supreme Leader. This
counterintelligence, and international monitoring and dual structure mostly creates tensions between two
security missions (Bahmani, 2014). These institutions bodies due to their overlapping interests. The MOIS
include the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), has been operating to ensure Iran's domestic security
and subcomponents of the IRGC and Artesh. Iran's In- and lead counterterrorism missions since 1984. On the
telligence Coordination Council, directing by the MOIS, other hand, the IRGC Intelligence Organisation (IRGC-
is responsible for coordinating and deconflicting the IO) is the leading military intelligence service, which is
operations of the intelligence organisations. The MOIS capable of all-source collection, analysis and investiga-
and the IRGC are its most powerful intelligence servic- tions since its inception in 2009.
Space Program
Tehran has an ambitious space launch program to en- Iranian Space Agency launched its first domestically
hance Iran's regional status and gain international repu- produced satellite, Omid from Safir-2 rocket, into the
tation (Hildreth, 2012). The United States and European low Earth orbit in 2009 as a data-processing satellite
powers keep a watchful eye on Iran's efforts in devel- for research and telecommunication purposes. Tehran
oping ballistic missiles since these missiles use similar had also launched Rasad-1 imaging satellite in 2011 and
technology to advance space program. Their claim and Fajr satellite-carrying GPS in 2015. On 9 February 2020,
foremost concern are that Iran uses space launch pro- Iran launched another communication satellite, Zafar-1
gram to conceal real intentions for the construction of through Simorgh rocket from Imam Khomeini Space
ICBMs. However, Iranian military capacity and econom- Centre. However, the satellite did not reach the required
ic potential are far from building ICBMs, and Tehran is speed for being put in the orbit (Graham, 2020). More
said to dedicate itself to improve space capabilities not recently, Iran successfully launched its first military sat-
for simply covering ICBM initiatives. ellite, Noor, into the orbit on 22 April 2020.
13Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
Conclusion: Whither Military Power?
In 40 years, Iran has increased its military capability Iran also seems to be very ambitious to expand its
even when it was restrained at times by international sphere of influence in Afghanistan after the Trump
sanctions and arms embargoes. After the United States administration decided to reduce the troops. These
left the Nuclear Deal, tensions between Washington developments might incite Iran to increase further its
and Tehran reached their peak, and particularly fol- asymmetric warfare strategies.
lowing the killing of Maj. General Qassem Soleimani.
Consequently, Tehran announced that it would aban- Trump’s election for a second term would probably
don the nuclear limits of the deal gradually. This devel- inhibit any US-Iran rapprochement. While Tehran is
opment fueled an old discussion that Iran is moving already reeling under sanctions and embargoes, the
towards becoming a nuclear power. Tehran proved its country will likely continue its cooperation with Russia
determination with the initiatives to develop ballistic and China in order to develop its military capabilities.
missiles. The IRGC’s launch of country’s first military On the other hand, Iran’s recent military accidents have
satellite shows Iran’s resolve to be a military power to be dented its bellicose rhetoric. In any case, the trajectory
reckoned with in the region. of Iran’s military power will remain a hot topic of discus-
sion for years to come.
(Fatemah Bahrami - Anadolu Agency)
14Iran’s Warfighting Capabilities:
Roots, Roles and Evolution
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