Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies - UK ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
BRIEFING PAPER
Number 9184, 25 March 2021
Integrated Review 2021:
emerging defence By Claire Mills
technologies
Contents:
1. Background – The Integrated
Operating Concept 2025
2. Cyber
3. Artificial intelligence and
autonomous systems
4. Directed energy weapons
5. Space
www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | papers@parliament.uk | @commonslibrary2 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
Contents
Summary 3
1. Background – The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 4
2. Cyber 7
2.1 National Cyber Force 9
2.2 The Integrated Review – a full spectrum approach 10
3. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems 12
3.1 Incorporation of AI into defence programmes 13
Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) programmes 15
3.2 New Centre for Artificial Intelligence 16
4. Directed energy weapons 18
5. Space 20
5.1 A new integrated approach 21
A new civil/military space strategy 21
Joint Space Command 22
Cover page image copyright: MOD-cyber security by MOD Defence Imagery. Licensed
under OGL (Open Government) / image cropped.3 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
Summary
In September 2020 the MOD launched its Integrated Operating Concept, (IOC) a new
strategic vision for defence which recognises that the world has entered an “era of
persistent competition” and that the character of warfare has changed.
The overriding messages of the IOC, namely multi-domain integration and persistent
engagement, subsequently underpin the thinking behind, and the conclusions of, the
Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper, which were both published in
March 2021.
As part of this new approach, embracing new and emerging technologies is seen as a
priority. The MOD intends to invest £6.6 billion over the next four years in defence
research and development with specific focus given to emerging technologies in artificial
intelligence, AI-enabled autonomous systems, cyber, space and directed energy weapons.
Higher risk research and innovation is recognised as essential for modernisation.
Both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper also acknowledge,
however, that embracing new “sunrise” technologies should not come entirely at the
expense of more traditional warfighting capabilities.
Among other proposals:
• A new National Cyber Force has been established. A new cyber security strategy will
be published in 2021 that will retain the UK’s competitive edge in this sphere and
establish the UK as a responsible, democratic, cyber power.
• Artificial intelligence is a key enabler of military capability, across the whole of
defence. AI has been incorporated into several key programmes, including the Future
Combat Air System, and is the focus of several innovative funding programmes
through the Defence and Security Accelerator. An AI defence strategy will be
published in 2021 and a new Centre for Artificial Intelligence will be established.
• Over the next decade, the MOD will invest £1.4 billion in space-related capabilities. A
new Space Command will be established in 2021, along with a new National Space
Operations Centre and a new Space Academy. An integrated space strategy will also
be published in 2021 which will bring military and civilian space policy together for the
first time.4 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
1. Background – The Integrated Operating
Concept 2025
“Some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet
their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for
sunrise”,
Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, September 2020
In September 2020 the MOD launched its Integrated Operating
We have to move
Concept, (IOC) a new strategic vision for defence that recognises that
beyond ‘jointery’ –
the world has entered an “era of persistent competition” and that the integration is now
character of warfare has changed. needed at every
The overriding message of the IOC is that to retain strategic advantage: level.
• integration across all operational domains 1 MOD, Introducing the
Integrated Operating
• integration across government Concept, September
• international engagement and partnership with allies 2020
• a more assertive posture
• achieving information advantage,
are all priorities going forward.
These assumptions subsequently underpin the thinking behind, and the
conclusions of, the Integrated Review and the Defence Command
Paper, which were both published in March 2021.
Box 1: Relevant documents
• HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, 16 March 2021
• Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP411, 22 March 2021
• Ministry of Defence, Introducing the Integrated Operating Concept, September 2020
1
Land, air, sea, space and cyber5 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
One of the consequences of this new approach is the need to embrace “Capability in the
new and emerging technologies, particularly in cyber and artificial future will be less
intelligence. defined by numbers
of people and
In November 2020 the Prime Minister announced some of the first platforms than by
expected defence outcomes of the Integrated Review. He announced an information-centric
increase in defence spending of £24.1 billion over the next four years technologies,
against the 2020/21 budget, 2 £1.5 billion of which will be channelled automation and a
into research and development. In total the MOD plans to invest at least culture of
£6.6 billion over the next four years in military R&D. 3 innovation and
experimentation”.
He also announced that capabilities will be upgraded “across the
board”, with specific focus given to emerging technologies such as Defence in a
artificial intelligence, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and directed Competitive Age, para
energy weapons. Higher risk research and innovation is recognised as 7.4
essential for modernisation. Setting out his agenda, the Prime Minister
stated:
We will need to act speedily to remove or reduce less relevant
capabilities. This will allow our new investment to be focused on
the technologies that will revolutionise warfare, forging our
military assets into a single network designed to overcome the
enemy […] New advances will surmount the old limits of
logistics... 4
The focus on emerging technologies in the Integrated Review and
defence command paper builds on initiatives that, in some cases, were
launched before the last SDSR in 2015. As the Defence Command Paper
notes:
Our renewed focus on R&D sets a new approach to ensure we use
our investment strategically. It is vital that we seize the
opportunities for innovation –focusing on game-changing
technologies -and protect those technologies that will provide us
with a decisive edge. This will enable us to ensure that the UK
continues to have competitive, innovative and world-class defence
to accelerate the transformation of our armed forces and sustain
our strategic advantage. 5
Both the Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper also
acknowledge, however, that embracing new “sunrise” technologies
should not come entirely at the expense of more traditional warfighting
capabilities.
In his foreword, Defence Secretary Ben Wallace states:
In Defence it is always tempting to use the shield of sentimentality
to protect previously battle-winning but now outdated
capabilities. Such sentimentality, when coupled with over-
ambition and under-resourcing, leads to even harder
consequences down the line. It risks the lives of our people, who
are truly our finest asset […]
2
The defence budget in 2024/25 will, therefore, be £6.4 billion higher compared to
2020/21.
3
Global Britain in a Competitive Age, p.73
4
HC Deb 19 November 2020, c488
5
MOD, Defence in a Competitive Age, para 3.86 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
It would similarly endanger our people if we simply wielded a
sword of cuts, slicing away the battle-proven on the promise of
novelty, without regard for what is left behind. Old capabilities are
not necessarily redundant, just as new technologies are not
always relevant. Those of us in government charged to protect
and defend have a duty to enter new domains, as well as
continuing investment in the traditional ones, but always adapting
to the threat.
Technological advancements have, however, been outlined as one of
the reasons for reducing the size of the Army. In his Statement to the
House on 22 March 2021 the Defence Secretary stated:
The Army’s increased deployability and technological advantage
will mean that greater effect can be delivered by fewer people. I
have therefore taken the decision to reduce the size of the Army
from today’s current strength of 76,500 trained personnel to
72,500 by 2025. 6
Box 2: Further reading
• HM Government, Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, CP410, March 2021
• UK Army to be reduced to 72,500, House of Commons Library Insight, 23 March 2021
• Defence Command Paper 2021: equipment cuts, House of Commons Library (forthcoming)
6
HC Deb 22 March 2021, c6387 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
2. Cyber
Cyber has been on the MOD’s agenda for over a decade. The military’s
approach consists of several interconnected and overlapping strands Defensive cyber
which are both defensive and offensive in nature. They are also closely operations (DCO):
interlinked with the Government’s wider cybersecurity strategy. 7 Active and passive
measures to preserve
In 2013 the MOD formed the Joint Forces Cyber Group, 8 which consists the ability to use
of a number of units to proactively and reactively defend MOD cyberspace.
networks against cyber-attack and to develop the capability for
offensive cyber-attacks. 9 Part of that group is a new cyber reserve unit, Offensive cyber
which would see reservists working alongside regular forces to protect operations (OCO):
critical computer networks and safeguard vital data. The MOD has Activities that project
actively recruited reservists with specialist IT skills. The MOD has resisted power to achieve
answering detailed questions on the Joint Forces Cyber Group as “their military objectives in, or
disclosure would, or would be likely to prejudice the capability, through, cyberspace.
effectiveness or security of the Armed Forces.” 10 MOD, Cyber Primer, 2016
In 2013 the MOD also announced the Defence Cyber Protection
Partnership, bringing together Government and the UK’s leading
defence and security companies to address cyber security issues in the
defence supply chain.
The 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) committed £1.9
billion over five years to “transform significantly the UK’s cyber
security.” It also made clear that defending cyber space is part of the
armed forces’ core missions. 11 In 2016 the National Cyber Security
Centre (NCSC) was established, as part of GCHQ, to provide leadership
on this issue. The Government also published a new five-year National
Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (NCSS).
In 2015 the Army’s 77th Brigade was formed, specialising in information
management, including in the cyber domain.
Over the last few years, the MOD has been establishing a £40 million
Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), based at MOD Corsham. The
2016 NCSS explains that the new centre will use defensive cyber
capabilities to protect the MOD’s cyberspace and deal with new threats.
The CSOC will work with the National Cyber Security Centre to
“confront the MOD’s cyber security challenges and contribute to wider
national cyber security.” 12
7
The 2010 National Security Strategy identified hostile attacks on UK cyber space by
other states and large scale cybercrime as a ‘tier one’ threat to national security. In
response, the Government established the National Cyber Security Programme
(NCSP), to help meet the objectives of the strategy, and in November 2011,
published the UK’s first Cyber Security Strategy.
8
This was originally known as the Defence Cyber Operations Group and was referred
to as such in the Defence Committee’s 2012 report on cyber-security.
9
It comprises Joint Cyber Units at Cheltenham and Corsham, the Joint Cyber Unit
(Reserve) and Information Assurance Units.
10
PQ26326, 11 February 2016
11
Cyber defence is also part of NATO’s core task of collective defence and the Alliance
has clearly signalled a cyber-attack could trigger an Article 5 response. NATO
defined cyber as an operational domain at its 2016 Warsaw summit.
12
National Cyber Security strategy, para 5.3.108 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
£22 million is also being invested in the creation of a series of British
Army Cyber Operations Centres across the UK. The intention is to
exploit AI, in combination with military analysts to provide 24/7
information and threat analysis. In June 2020, 13th Signal Regiment was
created as the first dedicated “cyber” regiment, which will provide the
basis of the centres, and headquartered at Blandford. The centres will
also work closely with existing Army capabilities such as 77th Brigade.
Operational capability is expected in the early 2020s.
Both the 2015 SDSR and the NCSS also committed to providing the
armed forces with advanced offensive cyber capabilities. One unit of the “We are building a
Joint Forces Cyber Group is based at GCHQ as part of a new National dedicated capability to
counterattack in
Offensive Cyber Programme.
cyberspace as part of
The Government has been reluctant to be drawn into revealing too our full-spectrum
much information about its offensive cyber skills. In 2016 Michael capability.”
Fallon, the then Defence Secretary, gave a speech on cyber defence at
RUSI, and said that offensive Cyber is now being integrated into military Earl Howe, 12 January
2017
planning alongside the full range of military effects. 13
The 2016 NCSS sets out the Government’s ambition to make the UK “a
world leader in offensive cyber capability”, stating:
we will ensure that we have at our disposal appropriate offensive
cyber capabilities that can be deployed at a time and place of our
choosing, for both deterrence and operational purposes, in
accordance with national and international law. 14
Specifically, the Government will:
1. invest in our NOCP – the partnership between the Ministry
of Defence and GCHQ that is harnessing the skills and
talents of both organisations to deliver the tools,
techniques and tradecraft required;
2. develop our ability to use offensive cyber tools; and
3. develop the ability of our Armed Forces to deploy offensive
cyber capabilities as an integrated part of operations,
thereby enhancing the overall impact we can achieve
through military action
Ongoing investment in cyber capabilities was subsequently reflected in
the 2018 Modernising Defence Programme. In the Autumn Budget
2018, the Treasury allocated an additional £1 billion to the defence
budget over the next two years, intended to boost the UK’s cyber
capabilities and support the Dreadnought programme. 15 Further
funding was also allocated to the MOD in the 2019 Spending Round.
HM Treasury made an additional £300 million available to the MOD in
2019/20 for priority capability programmes, followed by an additional
13
Defence Secretary’s speech at the RUSI cyber symposium, Ministry of Defence, 21
October 2016. I n2016 the UK was also the first country to offer its national
offensive cyber-capabilities to the NATO alliance (HC Deb 16 July 2016 c25)
14
Para 6.5.2
15
The programme to replace the ballistic missile submarines that provide the platform
for the UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent. The MOD later revealed that £400 million of
the extra money would be invested in Dreadnought.9 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
£1.2 billion for capabilities in 2020/21. In October 2019 the MOD
stated:
This additional funding will enable our world-class Armed Forces
to begin to modernise and meet the intensifying threats and risks
we now face, including prioritising investment in key capabilities
such as shipbuilding, offensive cyber and the nuclear deterrent.
We will decide on the allocation of this funding as part of our
normal financial planning and budgeting process. 16
In early 2018, a Defence Cyber School also opened at the Defence
Academy at Shrivenham, intended to be “a centre of excellence for
cyber training and exercise across the Ministry of Defence and wider
Government, addressing specialist skills and wider education.” 17 The
MOD has also developed a bespoke test to identify military personnel
with an aptitude for cyber work which is being rolled out in the
military’s technical training programmes. 18 In its 2020 report, the Armed
Forces Pay Review Body acknowledged the issues with recruitment and
retention of cyber specialists, among other new technologies. The board
concluded:
In combination with the future skill requirements of Cyber, AI,
space and robotics MOD will face a major challenge unless they
change their traditional approach to Terms and Conditions of
Service […]
We think that MOD should think outside the box of the existing
pay and career structure and give serious consideration to the use
of a bespoke pay spine for this critical group: we look forward to
considering proposals in the future. 19
2.1 National Cyber Force
As part of its early work on the integrated review, in November 2020
the Prime Minister confirmed the creation of a National Cyber Force
(NCF).
Building on the success of the MOD/GCHQ joint National Offensive
Cyber Programme, the NCF brings together personnel from the MOD,
GCHQ, MI6 and DSTL to conduct cyber operations, under one unified
command. It remains separate from, and will operate alongside, the
National Cyber Security Centre. The MOD provides most of the funding.
Director of GCHQ, Jeremy Fleming, commented:
Today the National Cyber Force builds out from that position of
defensive strength. It brings together intelligence and defence
capabilities to transform the UK’s ability to contest adversaries in
cyber space, to protect the country, its people and our way of life.
Working in close partnership with law enforcement and
international partners, the National Cyber Force operates in a
16
PQ290758, Armed Forces: Finance, 1 October 2019
17
National cyber security strategy, November 2016, para 7.1.9
18
Defence Secretary’s speech at the RUSI cyber symposium, Ministry of Defence, 21
October 2016
19
Xviii and para 6.710 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
legal, ethical and proportionate way to help defend the nation
and counter the full range of national security threats. 20
General Sir Patrick Sanders of Strategic Command said:
What distinguishes the NCF, and I believe passionately is its
greatest strength, lies in the partnership between Strategic
Command, GCHQ and SIS, blending our strengths and cultures to
create this operationally distinct force. It is a natural step after
decades of cooperation and means we are growing a potent
national capability to deter our adversaries, defend our forces on
operations and protect our digital homeland. 21
The MOD has confirmed that the NCF is currently “training and
recruiting at scale”, as well as “investing in the research and
development required to establish and maintain world leading cyber
capabilities”. 22 According to the BBC “the ambition is to grow the force
to about 3,000 in the next decade”. 23 At present the Government
estimates that MOD cyber experts comprise almost half of the NCF’s
cyber specialists. 24 The Defence Command Paper confirmed:
We are investing in a new dedicated career pathway for Defence
cyberspace specialists. This will include a new employment model
to manage, develop and reward our cyberspace talent and
expansion of our Defence Cyber School so we have the right skills
in the right teams at the right time. We will enhance our
understanding of the domain, through experimentation,
education, collective training and by drawing on expertise from
our allies, industry and academia. 25
Prior to the publication of the Integrated Review the Prime Minister also
announced that a new Headquarters for the NCF would be established
in the North of England. 26
A number of commentators considered the announcement on the NCF
to be a long time coming and welcomed the step forward.
2.2 The Integrated Review – a full spectrum
approach
The Integrated Review places cyber at the centre of the UK’s national
security. It commits to a “new, full spectrum approach to the UK’s cyber
capability” in order to “cement our competitive edge and keep ahead
of our enemies”. 27 It notes that the UK is the “ third most powerful
cyber nation in the world, ranking top in defence, intelligence, norms
and offensive capabilities”. As such, the review commits to establishing
20
Ministry of Defence press release, “National Cyber Force transforms country’s cyber
capabilities to protect UK”, 19 November 2020
21
Ibid
22
Ministry of Defence press release, “National Cyber Force transforms country’s cyber
capabilities to protect UK”, 19 November 2020
23
“UK’s National Cyber Force comes out of the shadows”, BBC News, 20 November
2020
24
Downing Street press release, 14 March 2021
25
Ministry of Defence, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP411, para 7.13
26
GCHQ already has an outpost in Manchester.
27
Downing Street press release, 14 March 202111 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
the UK as “a responsible and democratic cyber power, able to protect
and promote our interests in, and through cyberspace”. 28
A new cyber strategy will be published in 2021 that will focus on
greater investment in education, partnerships with academia and
industry and integration between the civilian sector and defence and
the intelligence services.
At the heart of the full spectrum approach will be the NCF and its HQ in
Northern England, which will form part of a new “cyber corridor”
across the region that will create and sustain thousands of jobs.
Box 3: Suggested reading
• “What the integrated reviews means for the UK’s cyber strategy”, RUSI Commentary, 23 March
2021
• Ministry of Defence, Cyber primer
• “Why the UK’s National Cyber Force is an important step forward”, International Institute for
Strategic Studies Blog, November 2020
• “On the offensive: the UK’s new cyber force”, RUSI Commentary, 23 November 2020
28
HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.3512 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
3. Artificial intelligence and
autonomous systems
“Historians will be the judges, but it is plausible that by 2050 (or
perhaps before), automation and artificial intelligence will have altered
not just the character, but the very nature of war”.
MOD, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Global Strategic Trends,
6th edition
The 2018 Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) identified artificial
intelligence and autonomous systems as a significant way in which the What do AI and
character of warfare is changing. The MDP thus called for “a more autonomy mean?
coordinated approach to work on “families” of technology (for
example: artificial intelligence and machine learning; nanotechnology; Artificial Intelligence
Theories and techniques
man-machine teaming) in order to “exploit opportunities for developed to allow
modernisation aggressively and accept higher risk in pursuing novel computer systems to
ideas, driving operational advantage and overall affordability”. 29 perform tasks normally
requiring human or
The aim was to use existing engines for innovation such as DSTL’s biological intelligence.
Autonomy Programme, the Defence Innovation Fund and the Defence
and Security Accelerator (DASA), which were launched in 2016 as part Autonomy
of the Defence Innovation Initiative, to work with industry to identify The characteristic of a
system using AI to
and develop “innovative solutions to our most pressing challenges”. 30
determine its own course
The MDP also signalled the MOD’s intention to go further and launch a of action by making its
range of new “Spearhead” innovation programmes, to “exploit cutting- own decisions.
edge technologies [such as AI] at speed”. It established a Defence
Transformation Fund to finance innovative military capability, ring Autonomous Systems
A system containing AI-
fencing £160M of the MOD’s budget in 2019/20 for such purposes.
based components that
In September 2019 the MOD’s Defence Innovation Directorate went on allow it to exhibit
autonomy.
to publish its Defence Innovation Priorities, in tandem with the broader
Defence Technology Framework (DTF). The DTF identified AI as part of (Defence Science and
one “family” of technologies that “will be critical to drive innovation Technology Laboratory,
and radical transformation across a range of Defence activities, from October 2020)
optimising the performance of military equipment, to reducing its cost,
to enabling new or enhanced military effects”. 31
The DTF also identified areas where there is the most potential for
transformational change using these families of technology, including:
• Space
• Platforms
• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
• Logistics and support
29
Mobilising, Modernising and Transforming Defence, December 2018, p.22
30
The 2015 SDSR set out the MOD’s approach to innovation in defence and security,
including the creation of the Innovation Fund, worth £800 million over 10 years, and
the defence and security accelerator (DASA). SDSR 2015, Factsheet 12
31
MOD, Defence Technology Framework, September 2019, p.1013 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
• Enhanced cyber and electronic warfare
• Next generation weapons systems
• Resilient communications
• Human enhancement
• Next generation command and control (C2)
In October 2020 the MOD published its Science and Technology
strategy, in which it confirmed that a Defence Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomy Unit had been established which would work on a strategy
“to help the department adopt these technologies at pace”. The
Integrated Review confirmed that an AI defence strategy would be
published in 2021 (see below).
3.1 Incorporation of AI into defence
programmes
As the Defence Technology Framework, Science and Technology
strategy and the 2021 Defence Command Paper all identify, AI is an The UK does not
emerging technology to be exploited through other programmes and possess armed
areas of capability to deliver greater military effect across all operational autonomous aircraft
domains. It is, in effect, viewed as an “enabler” of military capability. systems and it has no
intention to develop
Indeed, the DTF considered that AI, along with machine learning and them.
data science “are expected to enable radical transformation across
almost every area of Defence activity”, but in particular are “critical MOD, JDP0-30.2,
enabling technologies for autonomous systems, intelligence analysis and Unmanned aircraft
computer network defence”. 32 systems, 2017
The Government has been clear, however, that the UK does not possess
lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or what are sometimes
referred to as “killer robots”, and that it has no intention of developing,
procuring or operating them. MOD guidance states:
The UK does not possess armed autonomous aircraft systems and
it has no intention to develop them. The UK Government’s policy
is clear that the operation of UK weapons will always be under
human control as an absolute guarantee of human oversight,
authority and accountability. Whilst weapon systems may operate
in automatic modes there is always a person involved in setting
appropriate parameters. 33
This policy has been reiterated by Ministers on a number of occasions. 34
In 2013 Alistair Burt, then Parliamentary under Secretary of State at the
Foreign Office, also set out the UK’s position on international efforts to
define, and potentially ban, the development of such technologies:
The UK has unilaterally decided to put in place a restrictive policy
whereby we have no plans at present to develop lethal
autonomous robotics, but we do not intend to formalise that in a
national moratorium. We believe that any system, regardless of its
32
MOD, Defence Technology Framework, September 2019, p.17
33
MOD, Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30.2, Unmanned aircraft systems, August 2017,
para.4.18
34
Government policy is laid out in HL364, 11 July 2017; HL3864, 13 December 2016;
PQ33942, 21 April 2016;14 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
level of autonomy, should only ever be developed or used in
accordance with international humanitarian law. We think the
Geneva conventions and additional protocols provide a sufficiently
robust framework to regulate the development and use of these
weapon systems […]
We cannot develop systems that would breach international
humanitarian law, which is why we are not engaged in the
development of such systems and why we believe that the
existing systems of international law should prevent their
development. 35
There are, however, significant differences of opinion on the definition
of lethal autonomous weapons system, and the approach to their
regulation. 36
Equipment Plan programmes
Several of the programmes within the MOD’s current Equipment Plan
either have a significant AI element, or are programmes to procure AI-
enabled, non-lethal, autonomous systems. The following is a snapshot
of some of the bigger programmes:
• Maritime Mine Countermeasures programme (MMCM) – a joint
programme, acknowledged in the Defence Command Paper,
between the UK and France to develop a prototype autonomous
system for the detection and neutralisation of sea mines and
underwater IEDs. It will be a “system of systems” incorporating
several integrated assets, including unmanned surface and
underwater vessels, C2 and neutralisation systems. The intention is
to deliver a fully autonomous end-to-end mine countermeasures
capability by 2030. The MMCM is part of the Royal Navy’s broader
mine countermeasures and hydrographic capability (MHC)
programme.
• The Route Survey and Tasking Analysis (RSTA) programme, which is
also part of the MHC project. The RSTA will deliver an automated
capability, using AI-enabled submersibles, to detect and render
harmless underwater mines in UK waters by 2022.
• Future Combat Air System (Team Tempest)- The Government’s
ambition is to develop a new combat air system for the mid-2030s,
which will utilise AI. The Defence Command Paper describes it thus:
FCAS will deliver an innovative mix of crewed, uncrewed
and autonomous platforms including swarming drones.
This will deliver an advanced combat air system capable of
fighting in the most hostile environments. 37
The Government and industry have pledged £2 billion over the next
four years in the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative.
35
HC Deb 17 June 2013, c734
36
This lack of international consensus was addressed by the Lords Select Committee
on Artificial Intelligence in a 2018 report on the UK’s AI capabilities. A number of
commentators have criticised the UK’s approach, suggesting that its definition of
LAWS sets the bar too high. See for example: reports from Human Rights Watch,
August 2018 and Article 36, April 2016.
37
Defence in a competitive age, para 7.4215 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
Team Tempest, an “innovative Government-industry partnership”
has been created to deliver on that ambition. 38
• F-35 Lightning - the F-35 incorporates elements of AI, largely
through the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) which is
an onboard diagnostic system. Future hardware and software
upgrades are expected to significantly exploit AI.
In the 2019 Equipment Plan the MOD states that current Army
Command programmes also include:
Utilising the Defence Transformation Fund to deliver innovative
capabilities in accelerated timelines including: Unmanned Air
Systems, robotic platoon vehicles, development and trailing of
autonomous systems to revolutionise logistic support and to
deliver information manoeuvre. 39
Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA)
programmes
Looking to the future, projects are also funded by DASA either through
themed competitions or open calls for innovation. The Defence “Artificial
Command Paper identified DASA challenges and funding as key to Intelligence (AI) and
AI-enabled
maximising “the 'pull through' of R&D investment into cutting-edge
autonomous
equipment”. 40 capabilities will be
A number of AI-related competitions are underway, including: essential to defence
modernisation”.
• An autonomous underwater capability for the Royal Navy
• A project on Behavioural analytics Defence in a
Competitive Age,
• International Space Pitch Day, which is a joint UK-US initiative p.42
• The second phase of a programme examining Autonomy in
challenging environments.
The most high profile programme to date, however, is the Intelligent
Ship – Next Generation project. In June 2019 DASA launched a project
aimed at revolutionising the way warships make decisions and process
intelligence and data with the use of AI. The warship has been identified
as a prototype demonstrator. The potential for utilisation across other
domains from 2040 onwards is a longer-term objective of the project.
According to DASA the project is based on:
a future vision where elements of automation, autonomy,
machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) are closely
integrated and teamed with human decision makers. It is
expected that this will ensure timely, more informed and
trusted decision making and planning, within complex,
cluttered, contested and congested operating and data
environments (henceforth referred to as the future operating
environment). 41
38
See also RAF press release, 25 January 2021 for information on a contract to design
and manufacture a prototype uncrewed fighter aircraft for the RAF’s Lightweight
Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) project. The aircraft would embrace
manned-unmanned teaming and would not be a fully autonomous lethal weapon
system.
39
MOD, Defence Equipment Plan 2019, February 2020, p.34
40
Defence in a Competitive Age, para.7.6
41
MOD, Competition document: intelligent ship – the next generation, July 201916 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
In January 2020 DASA awarded 9 Phase 1 contracts, collectively worth
£1 million. In June 2020 DASA launched Phase 2 of the Intelligent Ship
project. Building on phase 1 projects, the specific aim of this second
phase is to examine human-machine interfacing. There is £3m of
funding available across this phase and in January 2021 nine 16-month
contracts were awarded. 42
3.2 New Centre for Artificial Intelligence
In his November 2020 statement, the Prime Minister announced the
creation of a new Centre for Artificial Intelligence. Little further detail
was provided at the time, leaving many to question where it would fit
within Government, including with the existing Office for Artificial
Intelligence, and what role it would have vis-à-vis the MOD’s existing AI
capacity. Primarily:
• The recently established Defence Artificial Intelligence and
Autonomy Unit
• DSTL’s AI Lab which was formed in 2018
• Strategic Command’s JHub
• The Royal Navy’s centre of excellence in data science and AI,
codenamed Project NELSON.
Professor Trevor Taylor at RUSI called the new centre “a vision, in search
of a role”. 43
Several analysts have suggested that it may have a similar role to, and
potentially work with, the US’ Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. Indeed,
in September 2020 the JAIC hosted the first meeting of its new AI
Partnership for Defense, involving13 allied partner nations, including the
UK.
The Defence Command Paper stated that the new Centre for AI will be
at the heart of the Department’s investment in defence AI “serving as
the nucleus to accelerate the development and exploitation of these
critical technologies from the battlespace to the back office”. 44
It also confirmed that the MOD is working in partnership with industry
and academia to develop a framework for the ethical development and
use of AI and autonomy in defence. The UK is also working with
international partners to develop international legal, ethical and
regulatory norms and standards.
Box 4: Suggested reading
• The artificial intelligence battlespace, RUSI Commentary, March 2021
• Unpacking the UK’s newly announced Centre on Artificial Intelligence, RUSI Commentary,
December 2020
42
“UK DASA awards nine projects under phase 2 of Intelligent Ship competition”,
Government Computing, 13 January 2021
43
Trevor Taylor, RUSI Commentary, March 2021
44
Defence in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.4217 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
• Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Biscuit book: Building blocks for artificial
intelligence and autonomy, October 2020
• Ministry of Defence, Joint Concept Note 1/18, Human-Machine Teaming
• House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: ready, willing and able?,
HL 100, Session 2017-19
• Chatham House Research Paper, Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare, January 2017
Application of AI in other countries’ defence policies
• US Congressional Research Service, Artificial intelligence and national security, November 2020
• US Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence
Strategy, February 2019
• Coordinating artificial intelligence: six lessons from the US, RUSI Commentary, August 2020
• European Defence Agency, Artificial intelligence: joint quest for future applications, August 2020
• French Ministry of Defence, Report of the AI task force, September 201918 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
4. Directed energy weapons
Laser and radio frequency technologies have been steadily developed
since the 1960s and 1970s, but it is only in the last few decades that
their serious application in a battlefield context, as directed energy
weapons, has been considered. Most of the active research on directed
energy weapons has taken place in the US and former Soviet Union,
now Russia, largely in part due to the prominent role they played in the
US’ Strategic Defence Initiative concept in the 1980s. However,
countries like China and Israel have also invested considerable resources
in the research and development of laser weapon technologies. 45
In 2002 the MOD set out its position on the development of Directed
Energy Weapons (DEW):
The importance of utilising technology to create battle winning
forces is a key theme of the Strategic Defence Review. Directed
Energy Technology offers a potentially significant military
enhancement to our forces but it is just one area of technology
development currently being assessed.
This assessment is taking place within the boundaries laid down
by conventions and international law.
The MOD investigate Directed Energy Weapons in order to
identify potential technologies that may meet joint capability
requirements. Details of programmes are classified… 46
Research on laser and radio frequency DEW has been ongoing within
the MOD’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), 47 but it
is only in the last few years that the UK has moved beyond the realms of
research and taken steps to demonstrate and develop a viable DEW
capability, leading some commentators to accuse the MOD of “playing
catch-up”. 48 In 2017 an MBDA-led consortium known as UK Dragonfire
was awarded a £30 million contract to demonstrate the potential of
Laser Directed Energy Weapons. The MOD said “The goal of the
programme is to demonstrate a standalone laser directed energy
weapon system that is capable of acquiring, tracking and engaging
aerial and surface targets at various ranges and in different weather
conditions”. 49 The programme culminated in a technology
demonstrator in 2019.
That same year the MOD also announced that it was seeking to develop
three new demonstrators to explore the potential of laser and radio
frequency DEW and accelerate their introduction into service, as part of
the MOD’s Novel Weapons Programme (NWP) which was formally
45
A timeline of major milestones of DEW in a military context was published by Army
Technology in August 2020.
46
HC Deb 26 February 2002, c1145W
47
In 2018 DSTL also established a Future Kinetic Effects and Weapons Systems
Programme which would examine directed energy weapons, among other things.
48
See for example, Andrew Chuter, “UK shoots for new laser weapons against drones,
missiles”, Defense News, 9 July 2019
49
MOD press release, March 201719 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
established in 2018/19. 50 The MOD acknowledged at the time that
“directed energy technologies and systems are now reaching maturity”
and that it had “appointed a Senior Responsible Owner and established
a Novel Weapons team to specifically investigate the military utility of
Directed Energy Weapons”. 51
£130 million was to be subsequently invested in this package of
demonstrator projects which would integrate mature technology into
existing platforms, including:
• a high energy laser weapon on-board a ship for air and surface
defence applications,
• a high energy laser weapon on a land vehicle for ground-based air
defence applications including countering unmanned air systems
and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems,
• a high-power radio frequency weapon on a land vehicle for
countering unmanned air systems and counter mobility
applications. 52
These capabilities would then be placed into the “hands of the user”
through significant trials, so as to allow them “to better understand the
effects that can be achieved, how they can use Directed Energy
Weapons and how to operate them alongside other elements of UK
armed forces”. 53 The new systems are expected to be trialled in 2023
and are expected to reach the frontline within ten years. A new joint
programme office has been established to run the programme.
The Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper confirmed the
MOD’s investment in these ”next generation capabilities” and the
intention to develop future “Test and Evaluate (T&E) capability” for
novel weapons, alongside AI and space-based systems, as part of the
T&E Futures programme.
Box 5: Suggested reading
• Emerging military technologies: background and issues, US Congressional Research Service,
November 2020
• Directed energy weapons: a case study in acquisition innovation, Defence IQ, October 2019
50
Ministry of Defence, Defence Equipment Plan 2019. The aim of the NWP is to
accelerate the introduction of Directed Energy Weapons into all services within 10
years.
51
PQ167182, Weapons, 5 September 2018
52
Tenders Electronic Daily, Prior Information Notice 2019/S 132-323391, July 2019
53
ibid20 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
5. Space
Space has been used for military purposes for decades, albeit limited to
the deployment of non-offensive military systems such as
communications, imagery, positioning and navigation and surveillance
satellites. Several countries, including UK have developed a “The threat from
comprehensive space-based military architecture to facilitate military adversaries in this
activities on the ground. As such, it is generally accepted that the rapidly maturing
militarisation of space has long been a reality, but not the domain is real and it is
weaponisation of space. 54 here now. If we fail to
understand how to
However, space is becoming an increasingly contested environment. operate successfully in
Protecting the UK’s space-based assets, both civilian and military, has the Space Domain
become a priority; 55 while space is increasingly viewed as a military through integrated
domain in its own right. In the last few years there has been operations, we lose
considerable investment by states, including Russia and China, in our battle-winning
capabilities that potentially threaten the use of space by the UK and its edge”.
allies. 56
Air Vice-Marshal Harv
In 2018 RAF Air Command assumed command and control of UK Smyth, Director Space,
military space operations to defend the UK’s interests in space; while February 2021
the MOD announced that the number of personnel working in the UK
defence space sector would be increased to over 600 personnel by
2023. 57 In March 2018 the RAF launched its first ever satellite, the
Carbonite II, to deliver high-quality imagery and full-motion colour video
from space. 58
In summer 2018 the MOD was also expected to publish its first defence
space strategy to address the threats and opportunities that face the UK
in this domain. In May 2018 the Department published the “headlines”
of its intended strategy, which set out a vision of securing “freedom of
action in space” that fully exploited “its military and civil potential”.
That document acknowledged the synergies between the civilian and
54
Space is part of the global commons and the concept of territorial sovereignty does
not apply in space (Outer Space Treaty 1967). UK space capabilities are also
inherently dual-use in nature given that the same environment, largely the same
technology and often the same infrastructure is used to meet both military and civil
operations. As such there is an increasing interdependence between the military,
civil and commercial space sectors.
55
The strategic importance of space and the national security implications of
protecting the UK’s space-based assets was acknowledged in the UK’s first ever
National Space Policy, published in 2015.
56
In particular counter-space technologies such as anti-satellite weapons. See for
example: Current and future trends in Chinese counterspace capabilities, French
Institute of International Relations, November 2020 and Russia’s behaviour risks
weaponizing outer space, Chatham House Expert Commentary, 27 July 2020. In
2019 Russia and China also signed a deal on joint lunar exploration and on 11
March 2021 announced that they had expanded that agreement to establish a joint
lunar research station either on the surface of the moon, or in its orbit.
57
From a baseline of 500 personnel (MOD press release, 21 May 2018)
58
The programme was also intended to help the MOD and the RAF understand the
potential operational and cost benefits that could be offered in the future by a
constellation of small satellites.21 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
military sectors and the need to work across Government, the private
sector and with international partners. 59
However, the full strategy subsequently never materialised. 60 In January
2020 the MOD stated:
The Defence Space Strategy has developed significantly. We are
currently reviewing the right timing for publication and how best
to align it with the emerging National Space Strategy. The
Ministry of Defence is firmly committed to a number of space
programmes, and we are assessing our space capabilities,
coherence and requirements. 61
5.1 A new integrated approach
The Integrated Review and the Defence Command Paper set out the
UK’s ambition to be “a meaningful player in space” by 2030. “There is a national
ambition to gain
In this timeframe the aim is to have “the ability to monitor, protect and and maintain a
defend our interests in and through space, using a mixture of sovereign competitive edge in
capabilities and burden-sharing partnerships with our allies”. 62 space”.
Recognising that there will be “considerable risks to strategic stability”
General Sir Gordon
if competition in space is not managed and regulated effectively, the Messenger, Vice Chief
Government is also committed to leading international efforts to of the Defence Staff
“develop norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in
space”. 63
Over the next decade, the MOD will invest around £5 billion on
recapitalising and enhancing its satellite communication capabilities,
through the delivery of the Skynet 6 programme and a further £1.4
billion on space-related capabilities. Specifically, a new Space Command
will be established (see below) along with a new National Space
Operations Centre, a new UK-built intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) satellite constellation and a new Space Academy,
to develop the skills and training of defence space personnel. 64
A new civil/military space strategy
The Integrated Review also announced that the UK will adopt a new
integrated space strategy in 2021, that will bring together military and
civilian space policy for the first time. 65
Through this strategy the UK will support the growth of the UK’s
commercial space sector and develop a commercial launch capability
59
The MOD already has links with the multinational Combined Space Operations
(CSpO) initiative, which improves cooperation amongst the Five Eyes community,
plus France and Germany. It also works closely with US and NATO allies.
60
Despite several indications from the Government that its publication was
forthcoming: PQ176122, 11 October 2018; PQ202301, 19 December 2018;
PQ249251, 7 May 2019; PQ276172, 16 July 2019
61
PQ3707, Defence, 20 January 2020
62
HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age, CP403, p.58
63
Ibid, p.57
64
MOD, Defence in a Competitive Age, para 7.16
65
The long-awaited defence space strategy will therefore be merged with the
forthcoming civil space strategy.22 Integrated Review 2021: emerging defence technologies
from the UK by 2022. The Sutherland Space Hub in Scotland secured
planning permission in August 2020. 66
The UK will also increase international collaboration in its space
activities. The UK will continue its participation in the EU’s Copernicus
Earth observation programme and will deepen cooperation with NATO
and the Combined Space Operations initiative, a partnership of seven
nations working together to address threats and shared interests in
space.
Joint Space Command
In November 2020, and as part of the first outcomes of the Integrated
Review, the Prime Minister announced that a new Joint Space
Command would be established. “The threat from
Space Command will be based at RAF High Wycombe and staffed 67 adversaries in this
from all three Services, the civil service and key members of the rapidly maturing
domain is real and it is
commercial space sector. It will bring together the functions of space
here now. If we fail to
operations, space workforce generation and space equipment
understand how to
capability. Strategic Command will continue to lead on the development operate successfully in
of joint enabling capabilities across all military domains, including cyber the Space Domain
and space. In the space domain such capabilities include satellite through integrated
communications, position, navigation and timing as well as intelligence operations, we lose our
surveillance and reconnaissance. battle-winning edge”.
In February 2021 Air Commodore Paul Godfrey was announced as the Air Vice-Marshal Harv
new Commander, United Kingdom Space Command. Smyth, Director Space,
February 2021
The new National Space Council 68 will provide strategic policy direction,
through the recently formed Space Directorate within the MOD. Space
Command will also work with the UK Space Agency, where necessary,
to “deliver joint national space capability”. 69
Box 6: Suggested reading
• Failure to lift off: the UK’s space launch ambitions, RUSI Commentary, 24 February 2021
• Future of the UK space industry: debate pack, House of Commons Library, 3 February 2021
• Defence Secretary’s speech at the Defence Space Conference, November 2020
• Space as an operational domain: what next for NATO?, RUSI Newsbrief, October 2020
• Dr Bleddyn Bowen, A familiar frontier: British defence strategy and spacepower, RAF Air and
Space Power Review, Summer 2019
66
Due to the cost, historically the UK has relied on allies and third-party capabilities,
such as the US, India and the European Space Agency to deliver UK satellites into
orbit. Background on the development of space ports in the UK is available in House
of Commons Library Insight: When will UK spaceports be ready for lift off?, April
2019. It was also discussed at length in two recent debates on the UK space
industry: House of Lords, UK space industry, 4 March 2021 and House of Commons,
Future of the UK space industry, 4 February 2021.
67
Which is already home to the National Air and Space Operations Centre [NASOC]).
68
The 2019 Queen’s Speech outlined the Government’s intention to establish a
National Space Council and to launch a new National Space Strategy. The terms of
reference of the new Council are “to consider issues concerning prosperity,
diplomacy and national security in, through and from Space, as part of coordinating
overall Government policy”. The Defence Secretary is a member of the Council.
69
RAF press release, 1 February 202123 Commons Library Briefing, 25 March 2021
• Ministry of Defence, JDP 0-30 UK air and space doctrine, March 2018
• Ministry of Defence, Towards a Defence Space Strategy, 2018About the Library
The House of Commons Library research service provides MPs and their staff
with the impartial briefing and evidence base they need to do their work in
scrutinising Government, proposing legislation, and supporting constituents.
As well as providing MPs with a confidential service we publish open briefing
papers, which are available on the Parliament website.
Every effort is made to ensure that the information contained in these publicly
available research briefings is correct at the time of publication. Readers should
be aware however that briefings are not necessarily updated or otherwise
amended to reflect subsequent changes.
If you have any comments on our briefings please email papers@parliament.uk.
Authors are available to discuss the content of this briefing only with Members
and their staff.
If you have any general questions about the work of the House of Commons
you can email hcenquiries@parliament.uk.
Disclaimer
This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their
parliamentary duties. It is a general briefing only and should not be relied on as
a substitute for specific advice. The House of Commons or the author(s) shall
not be liable for any errors or omissions, or for any loss or damage of any kind
arising from its use, and may remove, vary or amend any information at any
time without prior notice.
The House of Commons accepts no responsibility for any references or links to,
BRIEFING PAPER or the content of, information maintained by third parties. This information is
Number 9184
provided subject to the conditions of the Open Parliament Licence.
25 March 2021You can also read
