Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress - Updated August 25, 2021
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Hypersonic Weapons:
Background and Issues for Congress
Updated August 25, 2021
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
R45811
SUMMARY
R45811
Hypersonic Weapons:
August 25, 2021
Background and Issues for Congress
Kelley M. Sayler
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— Analyst in Advanced
maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional Technology and Global
prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States Security
has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched
from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are
powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these
weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics,
on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S.
military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.
Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and
Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic
systems. This is due, in part, to the advances in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a
number of hypersonic weapons programs and have likely fielded operational hypersonic glide vehicles—
potentially armed with nuclear warheads. Most U.S. hypersonic weapons, in contrast to those in Russia and
China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely
require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and
Russian systems.
The Pentagon’s FY2022 budget request for hypersonic research is $3.8 billion—up from $3.2 billion in the
FY2021 request. The Missile Defense Agency additionally requested $247.9 million for hypersonic defense. At
present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons,
suggesting that it may not have approved either mission requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans.
Indeed, as Principal Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is
instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets.
As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions
about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and
arms control. Potential questions include the following:
What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-
effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint
operational doctrine and concepts?
Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress
evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests
for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an
acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile
defense options both necessary and technologically feasible?
How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability?
Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new
multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building
activities?
Congressional Research ServiceHypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1
Background.................................................................................................................... 2
United States ............................................................................................................ 4
Programs ............................................................................................................ 4
Infrastructure..................................................................................................... 10
Russia.................................................................................................................... 12
Programs .......................................................................................................... 12
Infrastructure..................................................................................................... 14
China..................................................................................................................... 14
Programs .......................................................................................................... 15
Infrastructure..................................................................................................... 16
Issues for Congress ....................................................................................................... 18
Mission Requirements .............................................................................................. 18
Funding and Management Considerations ................................................................... 18
Strategic Stability .................................................................................................... 20
Arms Control.......................................................................................................... 21
Figures
Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles .......... 3
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard............................................................................. 13
Figure 3. Lingyun-1 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Prototype................................................... 16
Tables
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding.......................................... 9
Table A-1. DOD Hypersonic Ground Test Facilities............................................................ 22
Table A-2. DOD Open-Air Ranges................................................................................... 23
Table A-3. DOD Mobile Assets ....................................................................................... 23
Table A-4. NASA Research-Related Facilities ................................................................... 24
Table A-5. Department of Energy Research-Related Facilities .............................................. 24
Table A-6. Industry/Academic Research-Related Facilities .................................................. 24
Appendixes
Appendix. U.S. Hypersonic Testing Infrastructure.............................................................. 22
Contacts
Author Information ....................................................................................................... 25
Congressional Research ServiceHypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Introduction
The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its
conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) program since the early 2000s. 1 In recent years, it has
focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and
intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been
relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in
pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part,
to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the
United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates
that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide
vehicles and likely fielded an operational capability.
Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic
stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USD[R&E]) Michael Griffin has testified to Congress
that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a
corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”2 Although the John
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-
232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a
priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational
system before 2023. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in
Russia and China, are not being designed for use with a nuclear warhead. 3 As a result, U.S.
hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging
to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.
In addition to accelerating development of hypersonic weapons, Section 247 of the FY2019
NDAA required that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, produce a classified assessment of U.S. and adversary hypersonic weapons
programs, to include the following elements:
(1) An evaluation of spending by the United States and adversaries on such technology.
(2) An evaluation of the quantity and quality of research on such technology.
(3) An evaluation of the test infrastructure and workforce supporting such technology.
(4) An assessment of the technological progress of the United States and adversaries on
such technology.
(5) Descriptions of timelines for operational deployment of such technology.
1 For details, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles:
Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
2 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “T estimony of Michael Griffin,” Hearing on New
T echnologies to Meet Emerging T hreats, April 18, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/18-
40_04-18-18.pdf.
3
Until recently, the United States was not believed to be considering the development of nuclear-armed hypersonic
weapons; however, a since-revoked Air Force solicitation sought ideas for a “thermal protection system that can
support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges.” Senior defense officials responded to news reports of the revocation,
stating that DOD “remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics.” See Steve T rimble, “USAF Errantly
Reveals Research on ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” Aviation Week, August 18, 2020,
https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/missile-defense-weapons/usaf-errantly-reveals-research-icbm-range-
hypersonic-glide.
Congressional Research Service 1Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
(6) An assessment of the intent or willingness of adversaries to use such technology.4
This report was delivered to Congress in July 2019. Similarly, Section 1689 of the FY2019
NDAA requires the Director of the Missile Defense Agency to produce a report on “how
hypersonic missile defense can be accelerated to meet emerging hypersonic threats.”5 The
findings of these reports could hold implications for congressional authorizations, appropriations,
and oversight.
The following report reviews the hypersonic weapons programs in the United States, Russia, and
China, providing information on the programs and infrastructure in each nation, based on
unclassified sources. It also provides a brief summary of the state of global hypersonic weapons
research development. It concludes with a discussion of the issues that Congress might address as
it considers DOD’s funding requests for U.S. hypersonic technology programs.
Background
Several countries are developing hypersonic weapons, which fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 (five
times the speed of sound). 6 There are two primary categories of hypersonic weapons:
Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) are launched from a rocket before gliding to a
target. 7
Hypersonic cruise missiles are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines, or
“scramjets,” after acquiring their target.
Unlike ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons do not follow a ballistic trajectory and can
maneuver en route to their destination. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, hypersonic weapons
could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not
preferred.”8 Conventional hypersonic weapons use only kinetic energy—energy derived from
motion—to destroy unhardened targets or, potentially, underground facilities. 9
Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability,
and low altitude of flight. 10 For example, terrestrial-based radar cannot detect hypersonic
weapons until late in the weapon’s flight. 11 Figure 1 depicts the differences in terrestrial-based
radar detection timelines for ballistic missiles versus hypersonic glide vehicles.
4
P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, T itle II, §247.
5
P.L. 115-232, Section 2, Division A, T itle XVI, §1689.
6At a minimum, the United States, Russia, China, Australia, India, France, Germany, and Japan are developing
hypersonic weapons technology. See Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread
of a New Class of Weapons, RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2137.html; and
Mike Yeo, “Japan unveils its hypersonic weapons plans,” Defense News, March 14, 2020.
7
When HGVs are mated with their rocket booster, the resulting weapon system is often referred to as a hypersonic
boost-glide weapon.
8 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, “T estimony of John E. Hyten,” Hearing on United States
Strategic Command and United States Northern Command, February 26, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Hyten_02-26-19.pdf.
9
Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons, p. 13.
10 See Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-
2019-Missile-Defense-Review/T he%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
11 Richard H. Speier et al., Hypersonic Missile Proliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons.
Congressional Research Service 2Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles
Source: CRS image based on an image in “Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming,” The
Economist, April 6, 2019, https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-
faster-than-mach-5-are-coming.
This delayed detection compresses the timeline for decisionmakers assessing their response
options and for a defensive system to intercept the attacking weapon—potentially permitting only
a single intercept attempt. 12
Furthermore, U.S. defense officials have stated that both terrestrial- and current space-based
sensor architectures are insufficient to detect and track hypersonic weapons, w ith former
USD(R&E) Griffin noting that “hypersonic targets are 10 to 20 times dimmer than what the U.S.
normally tracks by satellites in geostationary orbit.”13 Some analysts have suggested that space-
based sensor layers—integrated with tracking and fire-control systems to direct high-performance
interceptors or directed energy weapons—could theoretically present viable options for defending
against hypersonic weapons in the future. 14 Indeed, the 2019 Missile Defense Review notes that
“such sensors take advantage of the large area viewable from space for improved tracking and
potentially targeting of advanced threats, including HGVs and hypersonic cruise missiles. ”15
Other analysts have questioned the affordability, technological feasibility, and/or utility of wide-
area hypersonic weapons defense.16 As physicist and nuclear expert James Acton explains, “point-
defense systems, and particularly [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)], could very
plausibly be adapted to deal with hypersonic missiles. The disadvantage of those systems is that
they can only defend small areas. To defend the whole of the continental United States, you
12
Bradley Perrett et al., “U.S. Navy sees Chinese HGV as part of Wider T hreat,” Aviation Week, January 27, 2014.
13
David Vergun, “DOD Scaling Up Effort to Develop Hypersonics,” DoD News, December 13, 2018,
https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1712954/dod-scaling-up-effort-to-develop-hypersonics/; see also
“T estimony of Michael Griffin”; and “T estimony of John E. Hyten.”
14 “T estimony of Michael Griffin”; and “T estimony of John E. Hyten.”
15
Department of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review, p. XVI, https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/
11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/T he%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
16See James M. Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2, 2018,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/04/02/hypersonic-weapons-explainer-pub-75957; and Margot van Loon,
“Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer.”
Congressional Research Service 3Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress would need an unaffordable number of THAAD batteries.”17 In addition, some analysts have argued that the United States’ current command and control architecture would be incapable of “processing data quickly enough to respond to and neutralize an incoming hypersonic threat.”18 (For additional information on hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler and Stephen M. McCall.) United States The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs. 19 Those who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors’ anti-access/area denial strategies. 20 In recognition of this, the 2018 National Defense Strategy identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies “[ensuring the United States] will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.”21 Similarly, the House Armed Services Committee’s bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come. 22 Programs Unlike programs in China and Russia, U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, according to one expert, “a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 times less accurate [than a conventionally-armed glider]” due to nuclear blast effects. 23 According to open-source reporting, the United States is conducting research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) on a number of offensive hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology programs, including the following (see Table 1): 17 Acton, “Hypersonic Weapons Explainer.” 18 Margot van Loon, “Hypersonic Weapons: A Primer” in Defense Technology Program Brief: Hypersonic Weapons, American Foreign Policy Council, May 17, 2019. Some analysts have suggested that future command and control systems may require autonomous functionality to manage the speed and unpredictability of hyp ersonic weapons. See John L. Dolan, Richard K. Gallagher, and David L. Mann, “Hypersonic Weapons Are Literally Unstoppable (As in America Can’t Stop T hem),” Real Clear Defense, April 23, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/04/ 23/hypersonic_weapons__a_threat_to_national_security_114358.html. 19 For a full history of U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, see CRS Report R41464, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf. 20 Roger Zakheim and T om Karako, “China’s Hypersonic Missile Advances and U.S. Def ense Responses,” Remarks at the Hudson Institute, March 19, 2019. See also Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 580. 21 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of T he United States of America,” p. 3, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 22 House Armed Services Committee, Future of Defense Task Force Report 2020, September 2020, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/2/6/26129500 -d208-47ba-a9f7- 25a8f82828b0/424EB2008281A3C79BA8C7EA71890AE9.future-of-defense-task-force-report.pdf. 23James M. Acton, “China’s Advanced Weapons,” T estimony to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 23, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/02/23/china-s-advanced-weapons-pub-68095. Congressional Research Service 4
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
U.S. Navy—Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS);
U.S. Army—Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW);
U.S. Air Force—AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW,
pronounced “arrow”);
U.S. Air Force—Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM);
DARPA—Tactical Boost Glide (TBG);
DARPA—Operational Fires (OpFires); and
DARPA—Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC, pronounced
“hawk”).
These programs are intended to produce operational prototypes, as there are currently no
programs of record for hypersonic weapons. 24
U.S. Navy
In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a
common glide vehicle for use across the services. 25 The common glide vehicle is being adapted
from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully
tested in 2011 and 2017. 26 Once development is complete, “Sandia National Laboratories, the
designer of the original concept, then will build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems
are being developed separately.”27
The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with
a booster system to create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army.
According to the Navy’s FY2022 budget documents, the Navy intends to conduct testing in
support of CPS’s deployment on Zumwalt-class destroyers by FY2025 and Virginia-class
submarines by FY2028. 28 Although Navy officials have previously noted plans to achieve
“limited operating capability” on Ohio-class submarines as early as 202529 and to eventually field
hypersonic weapons on Burke-class destroyers, such plans are not reflected in FY2022 budget
24Steve T rimble, “New Long-T erm Pentagon Plan Boosts Hypersonics, But Only Prototypes,” Aviation Week, March
15, 2019, https://aviationweek.com/defense/new-long-term-pentagon-plan-boosts-hypersonics-only-prototypes.
25
T he services coordinate efforts on a Common Hypersonic Glide Body Board of Directors with rotating chairmanship.
Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Ramps Up Funding For Laser Shield, Hypersonic Sword,” Breaking Defense,
February 28, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/02/army-ramps-up-funding-for-laser-shield-hypersonic-sword/.
26 Steve T rimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week, October 11, 2018, http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-
production-line; and Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Warhead Is Key T o Joint Hypersonics,” Breaking Defense,
August 22, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/08/army-warhead-is-key-to-joint-hypersonics/.
27
Steve T rimble and Guy Norris, “Sandia’s Swerve Could Lead to First -gen Hypersonic Production Line,” Aviation
Week, October 11, 2018, http://aviationweek.com/air-dominance/sandia-s-swerve-could-lead-first-gen-hypersonic-
production-line.
28
Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research,
Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 1466,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/RDT EN_BA4_Book.pdf .
29
Department of the Navy, “Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2021 Budget,” February 10, 2020,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/21pres/Highlights_book.pdf; and Megan Eckstein, “Navy Says
Hypersonic Weapons Coming to Subs in 5 Years,” USNI News, November 17, 2020, https://news.usni.org/2020/11/17/
navy-says-hypersonic-weapons-coming-to-subs-in-5-years.
Congressional Research Service 5Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress documents. 30 The Navy is requesting $1.4 billion for CPS RDT&E in FY2022—an increase of $366 million over the FY2021 request and $607 million over the FY2021 appropriation. 31 U.S. Army The Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with the Navy’s booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over 1,725 miles and “provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets.”32 The Army is requesting $301 million in RDT&E for the program in FY2022—$500 million under the FY2021 request and $531 million under the FY2021 appropriation. 33 It plans to conduct flight tests for LRHW in FY2022 and FY2023, field an experimental prototype in FY2023, and transition to a program of record in the fourth quarter of FY2024. 34 U.S. Air Force The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA’s Tactical Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000 miles. 35 Despite testing delays due to technical challenges, ARRW successfully completed a “captive carry” test flight in June 2019; its first free-flight test failed in April 2021. 36 The Air Force has requested $238 million for ARRW RDT&E in FY2022—$144 million under the 30 David B. Larter, “All US Navy destroyers will get hypersonic missiles, says T rump’s national security adviser,” Defense News, October 21, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/10/21/all-us-navy-destroyers-will-get- hypersonic-missiles-trumps-national-security-advisor-says/. 31 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Navy Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p . 1466, https://www.secnav.navy.mil/fmc/fmb/Documents/22pres/RDT EN_BA4_Book.pdf . 32 Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Discloses Hypersonic LRHW Range Of 1,725 Miles; Watch Out China,” Breaking Defense, May, 12 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/army-discloses-hypersonic-lrhw-range-of-1725-miles- watch-out-china/; and https://breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-sets-2023-hypersonic-flight-test-strategic-cannon- advances/ Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_202 2_PB.pdf. 33 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, p. 639, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_202 2_PB.pdf. 34 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Army Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, Budget Activity 4, https://www.asafm.army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2022/Base%20Budget/rdte/RDT E_BA_4_FY_202 2_PB.pdf. 35 ARRW is expected to be launched initially from the B-52H strategic bomber. T homas Newdick, “Air Force Says New Hypersonic Missile Will Hit T argets 1,000 Miles Away In Under 12 Minutes,” The Drive, October 13, 2020, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37045/air-force-says-new-hypersonic-missile-will-hit-targets-1000-miles- away-in-under-12-minutes. 36Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force’s Hypersonic ARRW Missile Fails First Flight T est,” Military.com , April 6, 2021, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2021/04/06/air-forces-hypersonic-arrw-missile-fails-first-flight-test.html#:~:text= In%20June%202019%2C%20the%20service,early%202020s%2C%20the%20release%20states. Congressional Research Service 6
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress FY2021 request and $148 million under the FY2021 appropriation. 37 In addition, the Air Force has requested $161 million in FY2022 for the procurement of an estimated 12 ARRW missiles. 38 In February 2020, the Air Force announced that it had cancelled its second hypersonic weapon program, the Hypersonic Conventional Strike Weapon (HCSW), which had been expected to use the common glide vehicle and booster system, due to budget pressures that forced it to choose between ARRW and HCSW. 39 Then-Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper explained that ARRW was selected because it was more advanced and gave the Air Force additional options. “[ARRW] is smaller; we can carry twice as many on the B-52, and it’s possible it could be on the F-15,” he explained. 40 A senior Air Force official has since noted that a B-52 could potentially carry four ARRWs. 41 Finally, in FY2022, the Air Force launched the Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM) program to develop a hypersonic cruise missile that integrates Air Force and DARPA technologies. Some reports indicate that HACM is intended to be launched from both bombers and fighter aircraft, with a senior Air Force official noting that a B-52 could potentially carry 20 HACMs or more. 42 According to the Air Force, “the ability to execute HACM development is contingent upon fully funded and successful predecessor capability development efforts.”43 The Air Force requested $200 million for HACM in FY2022. 44 The Air Force is also seeking information from industry on the Expendable Hypersonic Air- Breathing Multi-Mission Demonstrator Program, alternatively known as Project Mayhem. According to Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White, “Project Mayhem is to look at the next step in what the opportunity space allows relative to hypersonic cruise missile systems ” and is intended to be capable of flying “significantly longer ranges than what we’re doing today.”45 37Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDT E_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20- %20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. 38 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Missile Procurement, Volume I, p. 19, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/PROCUREMENT _/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20- %203020%20-%20Missile%20Proc.pdf?ver=GIEj1YH2GS-elMys1wLm1A%3d%3d. 39 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force kills one of its hypersonic weapons programs,” Defense News, February 10, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/smr/federal-budget/2020/02/10/the-air-force-just-canceled-one-of-its-hypersonic- weapons-programs/. 40 John A. T irpak, “Roper: T he ARRW Hypersonic Missile Better Option for USAF,” Air Force Magazine, March 2, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/arrw-beat-hcsw-because-its-smaller-better-for-usaf/. T irpak additionally notes that “the F-15 could accelerate the ARRW to Mach 3 before launch, potentially reducing the size of the booster needed to get the weapon to hypersonic speed.” 41 John A. T irpak, “Air Force Will T ry Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine, June 3, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. 42 John A. T irpak, “Air Force Will T ry Again to Launch ARRW Hypersonic Missile in July,” Air Force Magazine, June 3, 2021, https://www.airforcemag.com/air-force-july-launch-arrw-hypersonic-missile/. 43 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Re search, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 148, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDT E_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20- %20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. 44 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Air Force Justification Book of Research, Development, T est and Evaluation, Volume II, p. 139, https://www.saffm.hq.af.mil/Portals/84/documents/FY22/RDT E_/FY22%20DAF%20J-Book%20-%203600%20- %20AF%20RDT %20and%20E%20Vol%20II.pdf?ver=KpJJbVq68o32dSvkjuv_Iw%3d%3d. 45 Mike White, Remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Hypersonic Strike and Defense: A Congressional Research Service 7
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress Mayhem is reported to be larger than ARRW and capable of carrying multiple payloads for different mission sets. 46 DARPA DARPA, in partnership with the Air Force, continues to test Tactical Boost Glide, a wedge-shaped hypersonic glide vehicle capable of Mach 7+ flight that “aims to develop and demonstrate technologies to enable future air-launched, tactical-range hypersonic boost glide systems.”47 TBG will “also consider traceability, compatibility, and integration with the Navy Vertical Launch System” and is planned to transition to both the Air Force and the Navy. DARPA has requested $50 million for TBG in FY2022—$67 million under the FY2021 request and $32 million under the FY2021 appropriation. 48 DARPA’s Operational Fires reportedly seeks to leverage TBG technologies to develop a ground- launched system that will enable “advanced tactical weapons to penetrate modern enemy air defenses and rapidly and precisely engage critical time sensitive targets.” DARPA has requested $45 million for OpFires in FY2022—$5 million over the FY2021 request and $3 million under the FY2022 appropriation. 49 In the longer term, DARPA, with Air Force support, is continuing work on the Hypersonic Air- breathing Weapon Concept, which “seeks to develop and demonstrate critical technologies to enable an effective and affordable air-launched hypersonic cruise missile.”50 Principal Director for Hypersonics Mike White has stated that such a missile would be smaller than DOD’s hypersonic glide vehicles and could therefore launch from a wider range of platforms. Principal Director White has additionally noted that HAWC and other hypersonic cruise missiles could integrate seekers more easily than hypersonic glide vehicles. 51 DARPA requested $10 million to develop HAWC in FY2022—$10 million under the FY2021 request and $21 million under the FY2021 appropriation. 52 Conversation with Mike White,” June 10, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hypersonic-strike-and-defense- conversation-mike-white. 46See, for example, Rachel S. Cohen, “Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile Becomes High -Priority USAF Project,” Air Force Magazine, October 13, 2020, https://www.airforcemag.com/hypersonic-attack-cruise-missile-becomes- highpriority-usaf-project/. 47 “T actical Boost Glide (T BG) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/program/tactical-boost-glide; and Guy Norris, “U.S. Air Force Plans Road Map to Operational Hypersonics,” Aviation Week, July 27, 2017, https://aviationweek.com/defense/us-air-force-plans-road-map-operational-hypersonics. 48 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 158, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. 49 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 159, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. 50 “Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) Program Information,” DARPA, https://www.darpa.mil/ program/hypersonic-air-breathing-weapon-concept. 51 “Department of Defense Press Briefing on Hypersonics,” March 2, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/ T ranscripts/T ranscript/Article/2101062/department-of-defense-press-briefing-on-hypersonics/. 52 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 161, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justificatio n/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. Congressional Research Service 8
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
Table 1. Summary of U.S. Hypersonic Weapons RDT&E Funding
FY2021 Request FY2021 Enacted PB2022
Title ($ in millions) ($ in millions) ($ in millions) Schedule
Conventional 1,008 767 1,374 Platform
Prompt Strike (CPS) deployment in
FY2025 and FY2028
Long-Range 801 832 301 Prototype
Hypersonic deployment in
Weapon (LRHW) FY2023
AGM-183 Air- 382 386 238 Early operational
Launched Rapid capability in FY2022
Response Weapon
(ARRW)
Hypersonic Attack 0 0 200 Complete critical
Cruise Missile design review in
(HACM) FY2023
Tactical Boost Glide 117 82 50 Continue tests in
(TBG) FY2022
Operational Fires 40 48 45 Complete critical
(OpFires) design review in
FY2022
Hypersonic Air- 20 31 10 Complete final
breathing Weapon program review in
Concept (HAWC) FY2022
Source: Program information taken from U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and DARPA FY202 2 Justification Books,
available at https://comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materials/.
Hypersonic Missile Defenses 53
DOD is also investing in counter-hypersonic weapons capabilities, although former USD(R&E)
Michael Griffin has stated that the United States will not have a defensive capability against
hypersonic weapons until the mid-2020s, at the earliest. 54 In September 2018, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA)—which in 2017 established a Hypersonic Defense Program pursuant to Section
1687 of the FY2017 NDAA (P.L. 114-840)—commissioned 21 white papers to explore
hypersonic missile defense options, including interceptor missiles, hypervelocity projectiles, laser
guns, and electronic attack systems.55 In January 2020, MDA issued a draft request for prototype
proposals for a Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapons System interceptor. This
effort is intended to “reduce interceptor key technology and integration risks, anchor modeling
and simulation in areas of large uncertainty, and to increase the interceptor technology readiness
levels (TRL) to level 5” (validating components in a relevant environment). 56 MDA has also
53
For additional information about hypersonic missile defense, see CRS In Focus IF11623, Hypersonic Missile
Defense: Issues for Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler, Stephen M. McCall, and Quintin A. Reed.
54 “Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin at NDIA Hypersonics
Senior Executive Series,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 13, 2018, https://dod.defense.gov/News/T ranscripts/
T ranscript-View/Article/1713396/media-availability-with-deputy-secretary-shanahan-and-under-secretary-of-defens/.
55 P.L. 114-840, Section 2, Division A, T itle XVI, §1687; and Hudson and T rimble, “T op U.S. Hypersonic Weapon
Program”; Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” p. 21.
56 Missile Defense Agency, “Draft Request for Prototype Proposal: Hypersonic Defense Regional Glide Phase Weapon
Congressional Research Service 9Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress awarded four companies—Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Leidos, and L3Harris—with $20 million contracts to design prototype space-based (low-Earth orbit) sensors by October 31, 2020. 57 Such sensors could theoretically extend the range at which incoming missiles could be detected and tracked—a critical requirement for hypersonic missile defense, according to then- USD(R&E) Griffin. 58 MDA requested $248 million for hypersonic defense in FY2022—up from its $207 million FY2021 request and down from the $273 million FY2021 appropriation. 59 In addition, DARPA is working on a program called Glide Breaker, which “will develop critical component technology to support a lightweight vehicle designed for precise engagement of hypersonic threats at very long range.”60 DARPA requested $7 million for Glide Breaker in FY2022, matching the $7 million appropriation in FY2021. 61 Infrastructure According to a study mandated by the FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 112- 239) and conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), 62 the United States had 48 critical hypersonic test facilities and mobile assets in 2014 needed for the maturation of hypersonic technologies for defense systems development through 2030.63 These specialized facilities, which simulate the unique conditions experienced in hypersonic flight (e.g., speed, pressure, heating), 64 included 10 DOD hypersonic ground test facilities, 11 DOD open-air ranges, 11 DOD mobile assets, 9 NASA facilities, 2 Department of Energy (DOE) facilities, and 5 industry or academic facilities. 65 In its 2014 evaluation of U.S. hypersonic test and evaluation infrastructure, IDA noted that “no current U.S. facility can provide full-scale, time-dependent, System,” January 30, 2020, p. 8. T RL measures a technology’s level of maturity; T RL 5 requires validation in a relevant environment. For information about specific T RLs, see T roy Carter, “The 9 T echnology Readiness Levels of the DOD,” T echLink, https://techlinkcenter.org/technology-readiness-level-dod/. 57 Sandra Erwin, “Missile Defense Agency selects four companies to develop space sensors,” Space News, October 30, 2019, https://spacenews.com/missile-defense-agency-selects-four-companies-to-develop-space-sensors/. Experts disagree on the cost and technological feasibility of space-based missile defense. 58 Media Availability With Deputy Secretary Shanahan and Under Secretary of Defense Griffin.” 59Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Missile Defense Agency, Defense -Wide Justification Book 2a of 5, p. 569, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD T E_Vol2_MDA_RDT E_PB22_Justification_Book.pdf. 60 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 164. 61 Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Budget Estimates, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense-Wide Justification Book 1 of 5, p. 160, https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2022/budget_justification/pdfs/03_RDT _and_E/RD T E_Vol1_DARPA_MasterJustificationBook_PB_2022.pdf. 62 P.L. 112-239, Section 2, Division A, T itle X, §1071. 63 A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office states that there are “26 DOD, DOE, NASA, and private U.S. wind tunnel facilities capable of supporting hypersonic research.” Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 15, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-378. 64 T hese conditions additionally require the development of specialized materials such as metals and ceramics. 65 T his list is taken directly from a 2014 Institute for Defense Analysis report and, therefore, may not be current. See (U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure to Effectively and Efficiently Mature Hypersonic Technologies for Defense Systems Development: Summary Analysis and Assessment, Institute for Defense Analyses, September 2014. Permission to use this material has been granted by the Office of Science and T echnology Policy. Congressional Research Service 10
Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
coupled aerodynamic and thermal-loading environments for flight durations necessary to evaluate
these characteristics above Mach 8.”
Since the 2014 study report was published, there have been a number of changes in U.S.
hypersonic test infrastructure. For example, the University of Notre Dame has opened a Mach 6
hypersonic wind tunnel and at least one hypersonic testing facility has been inactivated.
Development of Mach 8 and Mach 10 wind tunnels at Purdue University and the University of
Notre Dame, respectively, is ongoing. 66 In addition, the University of Arizona modified one of its
wind tunnels to enable Mach 5 testing, while Texas A&M University—in partnership with Army
Futures Command—is constructing a kilometer-long Mach 10 wind tunnel. 67 (For a partial list of
U.S. hypersonic test assets and their capabilities, see the Appendix.) The United States also uses
the Royal Australian Air Force Woomera Test Range in Australia and the Andøya Rocket Range
in Norway for flight testing. 68 In January 2019, the Navy announced plans to reactivate its Launch
Test Complex at China Lake, CA to improve air launch and underwater testing capabilities for the
conventional prompt strike program. 69 According to an assessment conducted by the Government
Accountability Office, DOD has dedicated approximately $1 billion to hypersonic facility
modernization from FY2015 to FY2024. 70
In April 2020, DOD’s Office of Inspector General announced that it would be evaluating current
ground test and evaluation facilities to determine if the capability and capacity would be
sufficient to execute DOD’s planned test schedule. 71 Similarly, Section 222 of the FY2021 NDAA
(P.L. 116-283) requires the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, in
consultation with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, to submit to the congressional
defense committees “an assessment of the sufficiency of the testing capabilities and infrastructure
used for fielding hypersonic weapons, and a description of any investments in testing capabilities
and infrastructure that may be required to support in-flight and ground-based testing for such
weapons.”
In addition, in March 2020, DOD announced that it had established a “hypersonic war room” to
assess the U.S. industrial base for hypersonic weapons and identify “critical nodes” in the supply
66Oriana Pawlyk, “Air Force Expanding Hypersonic T echnology T esting at T wo I ndiana Universities,” Military.com,
April 23, 2019, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2019/04/23/air-force-expanding-hypersonic-technology-testing-
two-indiana-universities.html.
67
University of Arizona, “Mach 5 Quiet Ludwieg T ube,” https://transition.arizona.edu/facilities/qlt5?_ga=
2.62515882.768526379.1582843192-983632914.1582843192; and Ashley T ressel, “Army to open hypersonic testing
facility at T exas A&M,” Inside Defense, October 13, 2019, https://insidedefense.com/daily-news/army-open-
hypersonic-testing-facility-texas-am. Additional universities such as the University of Maryland, the California
Institute of T echnology, the Georgia Institute of T echnology, the Air Force Academy, the University of T ennessee, and
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University also maintain experimental hypersonic facilities or conduct
hypersonic research.
68
(U//FOUO) Paul F. Piscopo et al., (U) Study on the Ability of the U.S. Test and Evaluation Infrastructure.
69
“Update: US Navy to develop China Lake to support CPS weapon testing,” Jane’s (subscription required), February
12, 2019, https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_1644858-JMR.
70 Government Accountability Office, Hypersonic Weapons: DOD Should Clarify Roles and Responsibilities to Ensure
Coordination across Development Efforts, GAO-21-378, March 22, 2021, p. 27, https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-21-
378.
71 See Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, “Memorandum for Distribution: Evaluation of the Ground
T est and Evaluation Infrastructure Supporting Hypersonic Capabilities (Project No. D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000),”
April 13, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Apr/14/2002280826/-1/-1/1/D2020-DEV0SN-0106.000.PDF.
Congressional Research Service 11Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
chain. 72 DOD has also amended its “5000 series” acquisition policy in order to enhance supply
chain resiliency and reduce sustainment costs. 73
Russia
Although Russia has conducted research on hypersonic weapons technology since the 1980s, it
accelerated its efforts in response to U.S. missile defense deployments in both the United States
and Europe, and in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in
2001. 74 Detailing Russia’s concerns, President Putin stated that “the US is permitting constant,
uncontrolled growth of the number of anti-ballistic missiles, improving their quality, and creating
new missile launching areas. If we do not do something, eventually this will result in the
complete devaluation of Russia’s nuclear potential. Meaning that all of our missiles could simply
be intercepted.”75 Russia thus seeks hypersonic weapons, which can maneuver as they approach
their targets, as an assured means of penetrating U.S. missile defenses and restoring its sense of
strategic stability. 76
Programs
Russia is pursuing two hypersonic weapons programs—the Avangard and the 3M22 Tsirkon (or
Zircon)—and has reportedly fielded the Kinzhal (“Dagger”), a maneuvering air-launched ballistic
missile. 77
Avangard (Figure 2) is a hypersonic glide vehicle launched from an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM), giving it “effectively ‘unlimited’ range.”78 Reports indicate that Avangard is
currently deployed on the SS-19 Stiletto ICBM, though Russia plans to eventually launch the
vehicle from the Sarmat ICBM. Sarmat is still in development, although it is scheduled to be
deployed by the end of 2022. 79 Avangard features onboard countermeasures and will reportedly
72 Aaron Mehta, “Pentagon launches hypersonic industrial base study,” Defense News, March 3, 2020,
https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2020/03/02/pentagon-launches-hypersonic-industrial-base-study/.
73
C. T odd Lopez, “Rewrite of Acquisition Regulation Helps U.S. Build Hypersonic Arsenal More Quickly,” DOD
News, October 30, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2400205/rewrite-of-acquisition-
regulation-helps-us-build-hypersonic-arsenal-more-quickly/.
74United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs, Hypersonic Weapons: A Challenge and Opportunity for Strategic
Arms Control, February 2019, https://www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/hypersonic-weapons-a-challenge-
and-opportunity-for-strategic-arms-control/.
75
Vladimir Putin, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/
president/news/56957.
76 In this instance, “strategic stability” refers to a “bilateral nuclear relationship of mutual vulnerability.” See T ong
Zhao, “Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic T echnology and the Security
Dilemma,” Carnegie-T singhua Center for Global Policy, July 23, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/07/23/
conventional-challenges-to-strategic-stability-chinese-perceptions-of-hypersonic-technology-and-security-dilemma-
pub-76894.
77
Although the Kinzhal is a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile rather than a hypersonic glide vehicle or
hypersonic cruise missile, it is often included in reporting of Russia’s hypersonic weapons program. For this reason —
and because it poses defensive challenges that are similar to other hypersonic weapons—it is included here for
reference.
78
Steve T rimble, “A Hypersonic Sputnik?,” Aviation Week, January 14-27, 2019, p. 20.
79
Nicholas Fiorenza, “Putin outlines development of Russia’s nuclear triad,” Jane’s Defence Weekly (subscription
required), April 22, 2021, https://customer.janes.com/DefenceWeekly/Display/FG_3953700-JDW. Sarmat could
reportedly accommodate at least three Avangard vehicles. See Malcolm Claus, “Russia unveils new strategic delivery
systems,” Jane’s (subscription required), https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
Congressional Research Service 12Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress
carry a nuclear warhead. It was successfully tested twice in 2016 and once in December 2018,
reportedly reaching speeds of Mach 20; however, an October 2017 test resulted in failure.
Russian news sources claim that Avangard entered into combat duty in December 2019. 80
Figure 2. Artist Rendering of Avangard
Source: https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/FG_899127-JIR.
In addition to Avangard, Russia is developing Tsirkon, a ship-launched hypersonic cruise missile
capable of traveling at speeds of between Mach 6 and Mach 8. Tsirkon is reportedly capable of
striking both ground and naval targets. According to Russian news sources, Tsirkon has a range of
between approximately 250 and 600 miles and can be fired from the vertical launch systems
mounted on cruisers Admiral Nakhimov and Pyotr Veliky, Project 20380 corvettes, Project 22350
frigates, and Project 885 Yasen-class submarines, among other platforms.81 These sources assert
that Tsirkon was successfully launched from a Project 22350 frigate in January and October
2020. 82 U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the missile will become operational in 2023. 83
In addition, Russia has reportedly fielded Kinzhal, a maneuvering air-launched ballistic missile
modified from the Iskander missile. According to U.S. intelligence reports, Kinzhal was
successfully test fired from a modified MiG-31 fighter (NATO code name: Foxhound) in July
2018—striking a target at a distance of approximately 500 miles—and may now be ready for
combat. 84 Russia plans to deploy the missile on both the MiG-31 and the Su-34 long-range strike
80
“First regiment of Avangard hypersonic missile systems goes on combat duty in Russia,” TASS, December 27, 2019,
https://tass.com/defense/1104297.
81 “Russia makes over 10 test launches of T sirkon seaborne hypersonic missile,” TASS, December 21, 2018,
http://tass.com/defense/1037426. See also Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power
Aspirations, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017, p. 79, https://www.dia.mil/portals/27/documents/news/
military%20power%20publications/russia%20military%20power%20report%202017.pdf.
82
“T ASS: Russia Conducts First Ship-Based Hypersonic Missile T est,” Reuters, February 27, 2020,
https://www.voanews.com/europe/tass-russia-conducts-first-ship-based-hypersonic-missile-test; and Associated Press,
“Russia reports successful test launch of hypersonic missile,” October 7, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/vladimir-
putin-archive-russia-20688205e30f19a8d76fcd77cb9d45a4.
83
Amanda Macias, “Russia again successfully tests ship-based hypersonic missile—which will likely be ready for
combat by 2022,” CNBC, December 20, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/12/20/russia-tests-hypersonic-missile-that-
could-be-ready-for-war-by-2022.html; and “Russian Navy to accept latest T sirkon hypersonic missile for service in
2023—source,” TASS, March 20, 2019, http://tass.com/defense/1049572.
84Amanda Macias, “Russia’s new hypersonic missile, which can be launched from warplanes, will likely be ready for
combat by 2020,” CNBC, July 13, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/russia-new-hypersonic-missile-likely-
ready-for-war-by-2020.html.
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