Gordon Brown and Hard-Headed Internationalism
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Area: Europe - ARI 129/2007
Date: 10/12/2007
Gordon Brown and Hard-Headed
Internationalism
David Mathieson ∗
Theme: Gordon Brown is about to complete his first semester as British Prime Minister and it is
now possible to assess some of the changes which he has made to foreign policy. Some of Brown’s
intentions have been revealed by his response to questions –from the Reform treaty of the
European Union (EU) to Darfur– which demanded immediate action. But he has also sought to
reformulate some of the principles which will guide British foreign policy in the longer term. This
new vision, which combines multilateralism with interventionism, he describes as ‘hard headed
internationalism’.
Summary: Gordon Brown has adopted a lower profile on the international stage than his
predecessor Tony Blair. The dominant foreign policy questions during his first six months have
focussed on Europe and the US. The latest episode in Britain’s perennially difficult relationship
with the European Union (EU) concerns the ratification process of the Reform Treaty. Brown is
attempting to avoid at all costs the referendum being demanded by the opposition Conservative
Party and by powerful sections of the media. Brown has reasserted the pre-eminence of the
transatlantic relationship as Britain’s most important bilateral tie but has hinted that an emerging
multi-polar world will require changes of strategy. His doctrine of hard-headed realism attempts to
predict some of those changes by arguing for reformed multinational institutions whilst insisting
that intervention (with force on occasion) will be more necessary than ever in a globalised world.
Analysis: Since Gordon Brown became Prime Minister in June 2007 there has been a marked
change of tempo and tone if not of direction in British foreign policy. Whereas his predecessor
Tony Blair revelled in a global role, Brown is a more reluctant traveller –or as one Government
insider once put it ‘Gordon does not do abroad’–.1 Brown’s reticence to seek out opportunities on
the international stage, or become over-engaged in foreign policy, has been one of the most notable
contrasts with Blair over the last six months. On the eve of Brown’s first major foreign policy
speech as Prime Minister. the Financial Times commented that he ‘must be looking forward to [it]
like a trip to the dentist. He does not seem to have much taste for Abroad –especially Europe–’.2
Given that foreign policy –in particular Iraq and the Lebanon– led to his predecessor Tony Blair’s
forced, premature departure from Downing Street, Brown’s more reserved approach to
international affairs is perhaps understandable. But beyond giving foreign policy a lower profile in
the overall Government message, what has changed in the content and what are the new directions
being mapped out by the Brown administration?
∗
Senior Analyst, Global Trends Unit, BBVA
1
Quoted in the Spectator, 3/XI/2007.
2
Financial Times, 12/XI/2007.
1Area: Europe - ARI 129/2007
Date: 10/12/2007
When Gordon Brown became Prime Minister little was known about his views on foreign policy.
He was the most powerful member of the Blair Government after the Prime Minister but whilst he
had a veto, if not control, over extensive areas of domestic policy, his expressed views on foreign
policy were seldom if ever at variance with the Government line.
As a consequence, since becoming Premier, Brown has been forced to tread a fine line between
continuity and change. Bound by collective, cabinet responsibility and political expediency he has
had to defend the record of the Labour Government of which he was such a prominent member
over the previous decade. Yet he has also sought to nuance some elements of policy, notably on
Iraq and the transatlantic relationship, in an attempt to assuage critics of the existing policies inside
and outside the Labour Party.
Brown sent out an early message to the anti-war lobby by bringing John Denham (who had
resigned from Blair’s Government in April 2003) into the cabinet and appointing Mark Malloch-
Brown, assistant Secretary General at the UN and another Iraq critic, as a minister in the Foreign
Office. Perhaps the more important if subtle message of his initial appointments was that Brown
intended to maintain firm control over foreign policy choices. Rejecting behind-the-scenes claims
from more senior and experienced members of the Government, he placed young and relatively
inexperienced ministers in the key foreign policy posts: David Miliband (41) became Foreign
Secretary and Douglas Alexander (37) became Secretary for the Department for International
Development.
Two issues in particular have dominated Brown’s first six months in office. First, and most
importantly in terms of domestic politics, the EU Reform Treaty to replace the failed Constitution
and the process of ratification. Secondly, the future British presence in Iraq and Afghanistan and a
possible recalibration of the transatlantic relationship with the US. Finally, Brown has begun to
develop a distinct, overarching framework for his foreign policy, described as ‘hard-headed
internationalism’. This attempts to reconcile a new emphasis on multilateralism and reformed
multilateral institutions with an interventionism driven by shared interests and values.3
Consistent with the image of a generally robust approach, Brown has adopted a particularly tough
European policy described by his closest political adviser as ‘hard-headed pro-Europeanism’.4
Since becoming Prime Minister, Brown has retained his coolness towards the EU and consolidated
the reputation he acquired as Chancellor for being impatient with the EU machinery and some of
his European counterparts.5 Although Brown has a reasonably warm relationship with other new
leaders in Europe –notably Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy– he still appears to be uninterested
or ambivalent about the EU. In a recent major speech on foreign policy he mentioned Britain’s
membership of the EU and the Commonwealth in the same sentence and implied (intentionally or
not) an equivalence between the two organisations. There were only three other direct references to
the EU in the entire speech –two in passing and one urging more reform–.
Brown’s lukewarm attitude to the EU has, however, be understood as a political response to what
is, in the UK, a highly divisive issue. The opposition Conservative party is dominated by a strong
anti-EU wing which constantly charges the Labour government of ‘betraying Britain’s interests in
Brussels’. A key attack point has been the reform process. At the Lisbon summit in June 2007 the
outgoing Prime Minister Blair negotiated four ‘red lines’ or sections of the Treaty which would not
apply to Britain concerning justice and home affairs, defence and foreign policy, social security
and a fundamental rights charter. On the basis of this Brown has argued that the new Reform
Treaty as it relates to Britain is materially different to the Constitutional Treaty.
3
Rt Hon Gordon Brown Speech at the Mansion House, 12/XI/2007.
4
Rt Hon Ed Balls MP quoted in the Financial Times, 16/V/2007.
5
According to one British MEP his appearances at ECOFIN meetings left some of his European colleagues with the
impression that he had only stayed long enough to lecture them about the failings of their dirigiste, protectionist policies
before he left to brief the press.
2Area: Europe - ARI 129/2007
Date: 10/12/2007
The point is significant. In its General Election manifesto of 2005 the Labour Party pledged a
referendum on the Constitution before ratification. Brown now argues that that pledge does not
now apply to the new Reform Treaty. The opposition Conservative Party and powerful sections of
the press –from the populist Sun to the cerebral Economist– argue that the Government is duty
bound to hold the referendum and will be breaking an election pledge if it does not do so.
Frustrated by politicians around Europe who have publicly emphasised the similarities between the
Constitution and the Reform Treaty, Brown has repeatedly had to emphasise the differences, in
particular as they relate to Britain:
‘Why is this treaty different? It is different because it is not a constitutional treaty; it is an
amending treaty. Why is it different? It is different because we won a protocol in the charter of
rights, we got an opt-in on justice and home affairs, we got an emergency brake on social security,
and we have exempted the security issues’.6
The debate is important for two reasons. First, if the Conservatives do force a referendum most
analysts expect a ‘no’ vote. This would paralyse the ratification process and the EU. Secondly, a
quarter of all Conservative MP’s have signed a parliamentary petition (known as an Early Day
Motion) calling for a referendum in the UK before or after ratification by Parliament. If a post
ratification referendum rejected the Treaty Britain would be obliged to renegotiate her terms of
membership –or withdraw from the EU altogether–. The Conservative leadership refuses to
comment on whether it would be bound by this demand from its own Backbenchers but the stakes
are clearly very high both for Britain –and for the rest of Europe–.
In the context of the British debate Brown’s ‘tough love’ approach to Europe is understandable but
it does bring to the fore the question of why he is in this position and why Europe continues to be
such a neuralgic issue in British public life. It is all the more odd because in many important
respects the British vision of Europe has prevailed: the single market, the Lisbon agenda and
enlargement to name but three notable victories.
These are all responses to global challenges but Brown still appears to be frustrated by the
reluctance of some European leaders to recognise the nature of the problems and has no patience
with those who would construct ‘fortress Europe’. He put the point plainly in a speech shortly
before becoming Prime Minister when he spoke of the English Channel as a highway to the world
and said ‘whenever the choice has been between protectionism and the open seas, Britain has
chosen the open seas... to be global rather than insular or protectionist’.7 Brown’s Europe Minister
has reiterated the Government’s view that ‘the real challenge for Europe is to show in real, day to
day terms, how it is helping people adapt to the challenges of globalisation’ and has published a
position paper called Global Europe: Meeting Economic and Security Challenges.8
Yet it is not always clear that Brown sees the EU as an essential link into this globalised world.
Despite being elected to put ‘Britain at the heart of Europe’ over a decade ago, the Labour
Government has never made any sustained, consistent attempt to convince an admittedly sceptical
British electorate of the merits of the EU. Gordon Brown has been one of the most reticent to make
the case and over the next few months he might, as Prime Minister, face the consequences of that
failure to change public attitudes.
In dealing with the transatlantic relationship Brown has been on much firmer ground. Comments
over the summer by a couple of ministers suggesting that Brown might be about to distance
himself from the US were intended only for domestic consumption.9 In reality they were designed
6
Gordon Brown, House of Commons debates, 17/X/2007.
7
Rt Hon Gordon Brown, speech at the Mansion House, 22/VI/2006.
8
Jim Murphy MP, speech to the Centre for European Reform, 12/VII/2007.
9
Speech by the Rt Hon Douglas Alexander, 12/VII/2007, and comments by Lord Mark Malloch-Brown.
3Area: Europe - ARI 129/2007
Date: 10/12/2007
to create an impression which distanced Brown from Tony Blair, not from Washington. One of
Brown’s first overseas trips was to President Bush in the White House. It was widely remarked that
the personal chemistry between the two leaders was not as it had been with Blair (Brown looked
less than comfortable at being whizzed 360 degrees by Bush in the Presidential golf cart) but there
were no policy rifts. This was confirmed by Brown when he said in a recent speech that ‘It is no
secret that I am a lifelong admirer of America. I have no truck with anti-Americanism in Britain or
elsewhere in Europe…’ (incidentally, it is impossible to imagine Brown repeating the first sentence
but substituting the word ‘Europe’ for ‘America’).10 The Foreign Secretary recently confirmed that
‘the US is the single most important bilateral relationship’.11
It is true that under Brown, Britain is scaling down its contingent to the Iraq coalition force, but
this was happening anyway. In 2003 Britain contributed 35,000 to the invasion force. That number
has dropped to 3,000 and Brown has announced that another 1,000 troops ‘will be home by
Christmas’. Foreign Secretary Miliband has conceded that the post war reconstruction ‘could have
been done better’, although this sentiment is now widely expressed in the US too and was behind
the sweeping congressional gains made by the Democrats last November. Miliband insisted,
however, that a Brown-led Government would have taken Britain to war in 2003.12
Britain is also robustly supporting firmer action against the failure of Iran to comply with the
nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty and the terms of three UN Security Council resolutions. Whilst
the former Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, described military action against Iran as ‘inconceivable’,
Brown now says that ‘nothing should be ruled out’.13 He has, however, emphasised that sanctions
are ‘bearing some success’ and will be desperate to find a diplomatic solution for both security and
domestic political reasons. He knows that if there is a US or Israeli strike on Iran he will be
presented with an uncomfortable dilemma. He would probably approve a strike but this would
further alienate that part of the electorate (and his own party) which became disenchanted with
Tony Blair over Iraq. In the less likely scenario that he condemned a strike he would be written off
as permanently unreliable by important allies.
The UK-US relationship remains as strong as ever. Beneath that, however, subtle differences are
emerging which may become important partly depending on the outcome of the presidential
elections in November 2008. If the incoming President resists tendencies towards either continued
unilateralism or a new isolationism there may be a coincidence with the new foreign policy tenets
being sketched out by Brown.
Brown has argued that foreign policy will increasingly be played out in a context shaped by ‘six
new global forces unique to our generation’:
(1) Instability and uncertainty arising from failed or rogue states.
(2) The spread of terrorism.
(3) The global shift in economic power arising from the flows of capital and sourcing so that ‘the
new frontier is that there is no frontier’.
(4) Climate change.
(5) World-wide migration of people and pandemics.
(6) Technology-driven networking so that ‘it is possible for the first time in human history to
contemplate and create a global society that empowers people’.
From this, Brown drew three conclusions. First, that ‘the old distinction’ between an ‘over there’
and an ‘over here’ was no longer relevant in terms of important issues such as terrorism, migration
or environmental degradation.
10
Mansión House speech.
11
Rt Hon David Miliband, speech to RIIA, 19/VII/2007.
12
The Independent, 14/XI/2007.
13
Statement, 12/XI2007.
4Area: Europe - ARI 129/2007
Date: 10/12/2007
Secondly, that technological change is providing a gateway to information and connecting people
so that ‘it is possible in this century, for the first time in human history, to contemplate a global
society that empowers people everywhere’. The logic of this is that individuals will be empowered
to form groups and networks out-with the traditional units of the state. And a global society implies
global citizens. Whilst the concept can be traced back to the writings of Tom Paine the reality
would be a very radical prospect indeed. This may be the import of what Brown is saying but raises
some big questions: what kind of rights will these global citizens enjoy? More to the point, how
will global citizens be able to enforce their rights and who will help them? The logic of his
argument has the potential to open up a whole new chapter in international relations.
Thirdly, Brown concludes that if this process of integration is to be successfully managed then it
will require stronger and better international institutions, rules and networks. The International
Monetary Fund and World Bank have both promised to reform their structures (the former has
pledged that the next Managing Director will not necessarily be European) and a Brown
premiership will be pressing them as a matter of urgency. But it is reform of the UN Security
Council which would be the greatest prize in order to make it ‘more credible and more effective’.14
Brown evidently believes that sustained unilateralism by any country is bound to fail, and probably
sooner rather than later, in an increasingly multi-polar world. David Miliband has already warned,
implicitly, of a decline in US supremacy, commenting recently that ‘within 20 years, political,
economic and military power may be more geographically dispersed than it has been… since the
19th century’.15 This could be interpreted as a Soto voce warning to the US that it should contribute
to shape this process of reforming multilateral institutions whilst it has the power to do so. But
what if it does not? It is not difficult to anticipate tensions arising between Brown’s loyal
Atlanticism and his muscular multilateralism. If the prevailing mood in Washington over the next
eight years is to continue to dismiss the international community as ‘irrelevant’ or simply
unreliable it is not clear how Brown will react.
On specific issues in his first six months as Prime Minister Brown has already offered some
examples of how he thinks global problems might be tackled. At variance with Washington, and
some in Europe, he is highly focussed on climate change. He is introducing legislation which will
make Britain the first country in the world with a legal framework to cut CO2 emissions. He has
also called for a strengthened role for the UN and World Bank in environmental protection and
wants to help developing countries ‘leapfrog’ the dirty energy phase. Africa is another priority. He
has attempted to draw world attention to individual regions (with Sarkozy he promoted the latest
initiative in Darfur) and has developed plans to universalise education on the continent to improve
economic growth. This emphasis on economic support as a means of alleviating global tensions is
a constant in Brown’s worldview: he is an active supporter of more free trade in the Doha round
and has formulated an ‘economic road map’ for Palestine as a precursor to peace in the Middle
East.
Despite Brown’s lower personal profile on the world stage, there is no indication that he wants to
diminish Britain’s presence. On the contrary, on issues such as climate change, trade and Africa he
is at the forefront of those pushing for reform. His policy of interventionism is largely a
continuation of that developed under Blair, but the new emphasis on multilateralism could give this
greater scope in the future.
David Mathieson
Senior Analyst, Global Trends Unit, BBVA
14
Rt Hon Gordon Brown, speech.
15
David Miliband, New Statesman, 23/VII/2007.
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