Future Directions of US-Saudi Relations under Biden - Unit for Political Studies Situation Assessement | 11 March 2021
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Situation Assessement | 11 March 2021 Future Directions of US-Saudi Relations under Biden Unit for Political Studies
Future Directions of US-Saudi Relations under Biden Series: Situation Assessement 11 March 2021 Unit for Political Studies The Unit for Political Studies is the Center’s department dedicated to the study of the region’s most pressing current affairs. An integral and vital part of the ACRPS’ activities, it offers academically rigorous analysis on issues that are relevant and useful to the public, academics and policy-makers of the Arab region and beyond. The Unit for Political Studie draws on the collaborative efforts of a number of scholars based within and outside the ACRPS. It produces three of the Center’s publication series: Assessment Report, Policy Analysis, and Case Analysis reports. . Copyright © 2021 Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. All Rights Reserved. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies is an independent research institute and think tank for the study of history and social sciences, with particular emphasis on the applied social sciences. The Center’s paramount concern is the advancement of Arab societies and states, their cooperation with one another and issues concerning the Arab nation in general. To that end, it seeks to examine and diagnose the situation in the Arab world - states and communities- to analyze social, economic and cultural policies and to provide political analysis, from an Arab perspective. The Center publishes in both Arabic and English in order to make its work accessible to both Arab and non- Arab researchers. The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies Al-Tarfa Street, Wadi Al Banat Al-Dayaen, Qatar PO Box 10277, Doha +974 4035 4111 www.dohainstitute.org
Table of Contents The General Framework for Relations between the Two Countries . . . . . . . . . . 1 Resetting Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Balancing Values and Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Realist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Rights Based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Future Directions of US-Saudi Relations under Biden
US President Joe Biden’s decision to publish the US intelligence report on the murder of the Saudi
dissident journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, at his consulate in Istanbul in 2018, hints at a new direction
for US-Saudi relations.(1) The US State Department has imposed sanctions on 76 Saudi officials ‒
including those involved in the Khashoggi killing and others ‒ for threatening Saudi dissidents
abroad, including visa restrictions.(2) The Treasury Department also imposed additional penalties on
some of them. The Biden administration’s decision allowing the report to be published indicates a
shift in the approach to dealing with Saudi Arabia since taking over from the Trump administration.
Trump rejected a congressional resolution in 2019 requiring his administration to publish the report
under the Magnitsky Act, which authorizes the United States to impose sanctions on foreign officials
for serious human rights violations.(3) The current US administration has made clear its intention to
reset relations between the two countries. The debate in the US focuses on whether these relations
are sustainable or whether they require a complete overhaul as well as the balance between values
and interests in US foreign policy.
The General Framework for Relations between the Two Countries
Since 1945, US-Saudi relations have been based on what has been inaccurately dubbed the oil-
for-security formula. There were geostrategic considerations (for example, the Cold War and later
Nasserism, post-revolution Iran, Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990). This did not prevent
shocks in the relationship: The Saudi/Arab oil embargo on Western countries that supported the
Israeli aggression of 1967 and 1973, the aftermath of 9/11, disagreements regarding the response to
the Arab Spring revolutions, and the nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015.
But the relationship significantly warmed under the Trump presidency, with his indifference to
the nature of the ruling Arab regimes and his emphasis on US economic interests, following his
participation in the Riyadh 2017 summit. It was further strengthened by Trump’s stance against
the nuclear agreement with Iran, and then his administration’s withdrawal from it in 2018. Saudi
Arabia doubled its investments in the United States and its purchases of American weapons, which
had a major role in increasing White House support for the war in Yemen, despite the opposition of
Congress. Despite Khashoggi’s assassination in October 2018, the former US president refused to
review the relationship with Saudi Arabia, and even vetoed the Summer 2019 Congressional decision
to impose an embargo on the sale of offensive weapons to Riyadh.(4)
1 “Declassified Report on Saudi Role in killing of Jamal Khashoggi,” CNN, February 26, 2021, at: https://cnn.it/3bBc3A0.
2 Antony J. Blinken, “Accountability for the Murder of Jamal Khashoggi,” U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/2ODqvyi.
3 Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Defies Congressional Deadline on Khashoggi Report,” The New York Times, February 8, 2019, at: https://nyti.
ms/38tBam5.
4 Merrit Kennedy, “Trump Vetoes Bills Intended to Block Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia,” National Public Radio, July 25, 2019, at: https://n.pr/2OjvyE8.
1Situation Assessement | 11 March 2021
Resetting Relations
During the Trump era, Saudi Arabia fell into the trap of reducing the relationship with the United
States to the president and the small circle surrounding him, leading to discontent in the circles
of American institutions, with unprecedented criticism from the two main parties. Joe Biden, who
was the Democratic Party’s candidate at that time, had pledged to “reset” the relationship with
the kingdom and hold it accountable for the war in Yemen, killing Khashoggi, and its human rights
record if he was elected.(5) In early February, Biden announced his decision to end US support for
offensive operations in the war in Yemen, including related arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and
the UAE, and announced his administration’s endeavour to find a diplomatic solution to the 6-year
conflict that has spawned humanitarian and strategic catastrophe.(6) The Biden administration
previously announced a suspension and review of arms deals for the two Gulf countries approved
by the Trump administration. However, Biden’s decision regarding the US role in the Yemen war
included two main exceptions: protecting Saudi Arabia from “missile attacks, drone strikes, and
other threats from factions armed by Iran in several countries,” stressing that his administration will
continue “to support and help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity and
its people.” The second exception is for terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, which the United
States will continue to target in order to protect its domestic security, US interests in the region and
the interests of its allies and partners.(7) So, there are still foundations for partnership and issues on
which countries meet.
On 16 February, the White House spokeswoman, Jane Sacchi, announced that the United States
would “re-evaluate” the relationship with Saudi Arabia, and that one of the expressions of that is
for the president to speak with his counterpart, King Salman.(8) On the 25th of the same month,
that is, one day before the publication of the CIA report, Biden spoke with Saudi King, Salman bin
Abdulaziz. It was noteworthy in the White House statement that it described the relationship with
the Kingdom as a “long-term partnership,” not an alliance. At the same time, it was evident that
the White House was keen to set the foundations of the new relationship in efforts to reset it. The
conversation centred on regional security, including renewed diplomatic efforts led by the UN and
the US to end the war in Yemen, and the commitment of the US to assist Saudi Arabia in defending
its territories from attacks from groups allied with Iran. He also stressed the president’s satisfaction
with the decision to release some Saudi activists who hold US citizenship and activist Loujain Al-
Hathloul, stressing the importance of universal human rights and the rule of law.(9)
5 Joseph R. & Biden, Jr., “Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump,” Foreign Affairs, March/ April 2020, at:
https://fam.ag/38urxUg.
6 “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, February 4, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3euq0Bl
7 Ibid.
8 Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor Dr Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, The
White House, February 26, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3tcxUn0.
9 “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud of Saudi Arabia,” The White House, February 25, 2021, at:
https://bit.ly/3bCh23j.
2Future Directions of US-Saudi Relations under Biden
Balancing Values and Interests
Like previous US administrations, the Biden administration is fighting two conflicting approaches
as it seeks to reset the relationship with Saudi Arabia. The first calls for political realism to preserve
US regional and international interests and calls for preserving the US-Saudi alliance. The second
is concerned with rights and calls for adherence to the values (such as human rights) that the US
embodies. Hence, it prompts an evaluation of the US-Saudi relationship on this basis.
The Realist Approach
Supporters of this approach argue that Saudi Arabia’s strategic position in the Middle East, its huge
wealth, oil resources, and its position in the global energy market are all factors necessitating the
strategic alliance with it. Based on this approach, the United States and Saudi Arabia have a set of
common interests. These include preserving the stability of the oil market, combating terrorism
and extremism, especially as the Saudi government has promoted what the US deems to be a more
moderate Islam and more open societal values, as well as confronting Iran and containing its regional
influence. They also suggest that Saudi Arabia can contribute to regional stability, pushing for peace
between the Palestinians and the Israelis, returning Iran to the nuclear negotiating table, and ending
the Yemen war.(10)
Proponents of this trend warn against being deceived by the United States’ independence from
the reliance on oil imports, as the current largest global oil producer. They stress the importance of
the same foundations, as Saudi Arabia remains the largest exporter of oil in the world, with great
influence over price stability, as the largest exporter of oil to China, the main US competitor, arguing
that any vacuum in the region will lead to profound geostrategic shifts. China and Russia will try to
fill this potential vacuum, evidenced by both the Russian role in Syria and the increasing Chinese
influence in Iran.(11) They add that global leadership requires strong partnerships in every region,
regardless of the presence or absence of shared values. They say that Saudi Arabia is an ideal ally, as
it has great financial potential and is not dependent on US aid, unlike other countries in the region,
such as Jordan and Egypt, for example. It is also able to pay for US arms and military protection.(12)
The Rights Based Approach
Supporters of this approach argue that Saudi Arabia’s interests often conflict with those of the United
States, just as the two systems of values rarely coincide. Especially in the field of human rights, and
that the Saudis - instead of contributing to the push for US priorities in the Middle East region -
10 Jeffrey Fields, “Why Repressive Saudi Arabia Remains a US ally,” The Conversation, March 4, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3qzr75q.
11 Elise Labott, “Can Biden Finally Put the Middle East in Check and Pivot Already?” Foreign Policy, March 2, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3euE8uy.
12 Luck
3Situation Assessement | 11 March 2021
have often worked to complicate the situation and impede those priorities. They stress that Saudi
policies, especially in recent years, have strengthened Iran’s influence rather than reducing it, such
as the blockade of Qatar, for example. Moreover, the military campaign it launched in Yemen in 2015
did not defeat Iran’s Houthis allies, but rather caused a humanitarian catastrophe and entrenched
Iranian influence, just as Saudi Arabia failed to counter Iranian influence in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.(13)
They argue that the United States no longer needs Saudi oil and that that Riyadh no longer trusts
Washington to ensure its security, despite the fact that it spends billions of dollars annually on US
weapons. They also believe that even if Saudi Arabia remains important to US interests in the region,
this matter should not immunize it from criticism, especially regarding human rights violations.
They conclude that the current US-Saudi alliance has become a costly burden for the United States.(14)
Conclusion
The Biden administration is aware of all these nuances and is seeking to achieve a kind of balance
between the values it claims to represent and US interests in the region. Hence, it allowed the
publication of the US intelligence report on the assassination of Khashoggi, and imposed marginal
sanctions, to a large extent, on several Saudi officials, without including those the report found directly
responsible for the crime, under the pretext that the US does not punish the leaders of countries that
it has diplomatic relations with it.(15) Accordingly, the Biden administration is attempting to reset the
relationship with Saudi Arabia, not dismantle it.(16) In other words, the US continues to advance its
geostrategic interests even if the Biden administration attaches greater importance to democracy
and human rights.
13 Aaron David Miller & Richard Sokolsky, “Saudi Arabia is a Partner, not an Ally. Let’s Stop the Charade,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2021, at:
https://wapo.st/2PNPpf3.
14 Ibid.
15 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki, The White House, March 2, 2021, at: https://bit.ly/3rOZs1T.
16 Nabih Bulos, “Biden Response to Report on Khashoggi killing Angers both Saudi Arabia and its Critics,” The Lose Angeles Times, March 2, 2021, at:
https://lat.ms/2OFWlKX.
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