Drivers of narratives undermining democracy and Transatlantic cooperation in the Central European information space in 2021 - Democracy & Resilience
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Drivers of narratives undermining democracy and Transatlantic cooperation in the Central European information space in 2021 Democracy & Resilience Narratives travelling the information space www.globsec.org
Authors:
Dominika Hajdu, Policy Director
Contents
Katarína Klingová, Senior Research Fellow
Centre for Democracy & Resilience Summary 4
Domestic drivers 4
Foreign drivers 6
This analysis is part of a series of analyses called “Narratives travelling the information space” within Cross-cutting drivers 9
a project led by GLOBSEC and funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. National Endowment for Democracy
and GLOBSEC assume no responsibility for the facts and opinions expressed in this report or their subsequent use. Recommendations 11
Narratives travelling the information space
|3Summary Domestic drivers
According to multiple reputable between most post-communist
State and media Capital found this strategy often to seep into the public space - the
assessments of the state of countries and Austria point to translates into the generation of overall virality of posts mentioning
democracy throughout the stark differences in democracy
capture
narratives that uncritically promote #Polexit has increased nearly tenfold
world, democracy is undergoing resilience. Russia or China, or, on the contrary, since 2017, confirming a growing
The (successful) attempts of state
a period of decline.1 While capture in some CEE countries criticise the European Union. That presence of this discourse in public
GLOBSEC Trends 2021, which
the COVID-19 pandemic and have largely contributed to the said, fringe outlets, which often discussions.
measured trends and shifts in
restrictive measures related to it spread of narratives undermining disseminate anti-democratic or
public attitudes in 10 Central
have, undoubtedly, contributed democracy and Transatlantic pro-autocratic narratives in other EU “The ruling coalition led by
European countries, also found
to the deficit, democratic unity. The governments, which countries, have struggled to develop the Law and Justice party has
widespread distrust in public
backsliding and dissatisfaction have succeeded in filling crucial a substantial audience in Hungary – openly criticised the European
institutions, dissatisfaction with their typical role rather has been
with democratic governance democratic institutions with loyalists Union and its institutions, which
how national governments assumed by mainstream outlets.
extend beyond lockdowns and are now capable of controlling the has fuelled anti-European
are managing the COVID-19
closings. Rising polarisation, narrative consumed by the majority groups in Poland and related
pandemic and knowledge gaps population about anyone who dares “Overall, Hungarians’ positive debate.”11
populist motivated policy
regarding the meaning behind to criticise their undemocratic moves. views on Russia and China,
decisions targeted towards
democracy. The results come as This is the case of Poland3, where the as well as their distrust of the
quick political victories and A study by the Austrian Society
an intensive smear campaign is capture of the public broadcaster is United States, could most likely
the proliferation of information for European Politics, meanwhile,
waged across the region against coupled with judicial reform enabling originate from a top-down pro-
manipulation have all eroded Kremlin, pro-Beijing campaign
concluded12 that the COVID-19
liberal democratic principles and removal or appointment of judges on
societal interpersonal trust vaccination issue, though to a lesser
policies. political grounds4, Hungary5, where that has been waged by the
in public institutions. This extent in Austria than other countries
independent media are getting Hungarian ruling party.”9
public confidence is, notably, To better understand in the region, was used by key
scarce due to government-initiated
an essential ingredient that these patterns, GLOBSEC, measures, or Slovenia, which is
government officials in the country
otherwise safeguards democratic in cooperation with nine following a similar playbook.6 Populism to lampoon the EU for its capability
organisations from the region, deficit during the crisis. This take was
processes and the delegated Hungary7 has declined from 25th to
explored how narratives Poland’s distinct historical ties also promoted by an official Sputnik
powers of government. 92nd in the World Press Freedom with Russia, including widespread V vaccine Twitter account to spread
undermining democracy and/or
Data from the Economist Index between 2009 and 20218, awareness of Kremlin influence narratives and posts supporting the
cohesion travel the information
Democracy Index reveals indicative of the impact of state operations and potent historical growing interest of Austrians to get
space in 10 countries – Austria, capture of key mainstream media
that many younger European memories of Soviet occupation, have the Russian jab.13
Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, outlets on democratic decline and
democracies, which have rendered their relationship a special
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, public opinion. Around 500 media
only enjoyed EU and NATO case. The Polish public broadcasting
Romania and Slovakia. Case outlets are now concentrated service, for example, has refrained
membership for 15-18 years,
studies on specific countries under the umbrella of the Central from peddling narratives directly
are slightly more vulnerable to
were conducted by researchers European Press and Media supporting autocratic regimes. As
these currents. Across most Foundation (KESMA), which, under
from respective organisations. the Kosciuszko Institute’s case study
former post-communist states2, the government’s influence, tends to
This report, however, provides confirms10, however, partial media
widespread dissatisfaction with frame issues in a carefully targeted
an overarching assessment of control has enabled narratives
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
how democracy works is fuelled way. An analysis from Political criticising and undermining the EU
similarities and central patterns
by ever-present corruption and
concerning the Central European
education systems still playing
landscape vis-à-vis actors and
catch-up from communist era 3 https://rsf.org/en/poland
messages weakening democracy 4 https://www.dw.com/en/eu-fines-poland-1-million-per-day-over-judicial-reforms/a-59635269
restrictions on critical thinking. 5 https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/The%20threat%20that%20does%20not%20exist%20(for%20some)%20-%20Russia%20and%20China.pdf
and unity in the transatlantic 6 https://rsf.org/en/slovenia
While there are exceptions, 7 Case study by Political Capital:
space. 8
https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/The%20threat%20that%20does%20not%20exist%20(for%20some)%20-%20Russia%20and%20China.pdf
https://govdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/h3f86901f?country=HUN & indicator=32416 & viz=line_chart & years=2001,2021
such as Estonia, comparisons 9 Case study by Political Capital:
https://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/The%20threat%20that%20does%20not%20exist%20(for%20some)%20-%20Russia%20and%20China.pdf
10 Case study by Kosciuszko Institute: https://ik.org.pl/publikacje/czy-polexit-to-operacja-infromacyjna/
11 Ibid.
12 Case study by Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE):
1 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, Freedom House Indexes, World Press Freedom Index, etc. https://www.globsec.org/publications/austria-and-the-eus-joint-covid-19-vaccine-strategy/
2 https://www.globsec.org/publications/voices-of-central-and-eastern-europe/ 13 Case study by Austrian Society for European Politics (ÖGfE):
https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Austria-and-the-EU%E2%80%99s-joint-COVID-19-vaccine-strategy.pdf
4| |5“Although Chancellor Kurz
always emphasised that
“The spread of disinformation
on social media seems to
Lack of awareness
in public
Foreign drivers
his criticism [of vaccine have launched a process of
procurement] did not refer to “normalisation” of false and administration
the EU’s vaccine strategy and malign content by having
Large foreign owned Total visits to different language Much of this news proliferates on
versions of Sputnik news websites, Facebook. But the potential reach
to Commission President von various narratives and
In countries with satisfactory press
outlets
freedom, like Slovakia, harmful according to Similarweb23, stands as of Sputnik News on the social media
der Leyen, this was the way it conspiracy theories spread
narratives may often be the product Sputnik News, a Russian-owned follows: giant remains low in Latvia and
was perceived publicly by many by official representatives
of other factors including ignorance news agency infamous for spreading Lithuania – in these two countries it
in Austria. In February 2021, influencing policy decisions. This
on the part of key officials. One disinformation, remains a prominent garners a follower base, respectively,
only 37% of Austrians said in might mean that narratives such Outlet
Total visits
GLOBSEC analysis examining the voice aimed at, among other goals, in Jan-March 2021 of 750 and 3,600 users. The affiliate in
an ÖGfE survey that the joint as ROEXIT or the anti-European
purchase of Sputnik V vaccines weakening the democratic West21. Czechia (and Slovakia by extension),
vaccine procurement had been Union attacks could gain Czech version 7.685 million
in Slovakia, for example, unveiled The outlet currently operates online, meanwhile, recorded average
a good decision, whereas 42% traction…”17
minimal awareness that Kremlin among languages from Central
Latvian version 4.760 million weekly interactions of 83,500 visits
answered that it would have
hybrid warfare could, if taken to the Europe, in Czech, Latvian (and Polish version 3.521 million
in 2021 and the one in Moldova (and
been better if each member
Slovakia, for its part, has seen extreme, ignite a government crisis Russian for the minority), Lithuanian Romania by extension) 72,400. The
country had ordered vaccines German version (SNA) 3.214 million
various domestic actors, including and change in government. (and Russian for the minority), Polish charts below illustrate that despite an
on its own.”14
far-right18 and anti-system political and Romanian (intended for the
Romanian/Moldovan
1.126 million extensive campaign labelling Sputnik
GLOBSEC’s Vulnerability Index, version
figures , seek to obstruct Western
19
Romanian-speaking part of Moldova). News and Russia Today as sources of
which assessed the resilience of Lithuanian version 0.1497 million
cooperation and challenge the Considering that the Czech version Kremlin information manipulation, the
Right-wing nationalism geopolitical orientation of the
public administrations in eight
also reaches the Slovak audience and press agencies continue to serve as
countries, further demonstrated20
country. Recent negotiations that the German version includes an The Czech website has garnered important tools of influence in some
Despite their exclusion from that officials throughout the region
between Slovakia and the US over Austrian section, Sputnik News boasts a particularly robust audience, countries of the region and could still
government coalitions, political were unaware of the fact that
the Defence Cooperation Agreement the potential to reach 7/10 societies with 32% of its traffic coming from enjoy even further growth in their
parties close to the far- or extreme- actors may seek to intentionally
to be signed by both countries, for studied by this project. Estonia, where Slovakia. And, interestingly, 13% of popularity.
right have been able to wield erode democracy. The absence of
example, were met by protests, an situational awareness and a one- the site was shut down following Polish Sputnik views can be traced to
significant influence on debates
intensive disinformation campaign track-mind perception of threats pressure from Tallinn, marks an Germany and 57% of visits on Latvian
concerning democracy and Western
and demands that a referendum be can mean that the good intentions exception.22 Sputnik to Russia.
alliances - Romania and Slovakia
held over whether this cooperation of various public institutions and
are notable examples. In Romania,
should go forward. Attempts to officials comes to be exploited by
despite generally broad support Sputnik Polska Sputnik Lietuva: Baltijos naujienos Sputnik Moldova-România Sputnik Česká republika SNA
weaken cooperation between foreign propaganda that targets
for NATO and EU, the right-wing
Slovakia and one of its most both the societies of the autocratic
nationalist AUR15 party has proven 300k
important allied security guarantors, countries themselves and audiences
effective in disseminating narratives
in fact, play directly into the hands on the other side of the world.
combining traditionalism and 250k
of Kremlin influence operations,
nationalism that undermine both
considering the heightened tensions
organisations. The tropes primarily 200k
between Ukraine, NATO and Russia.
gain traction on social media where
they are diffused to hundreds of 150k
thousands of users.16 They include
assertions that Romania exerts little 100k
influence in Brussels and suffers
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
from an infection of “faulty foreign 50.0k
ideas” (i.e. neo-Marxist and politically
correct beliefs) that threaten 0.00
traditions.
Week of Jan 01 Week of Apr 01 Week of Jul 01 Week of Oct 01
14 Source of the data: https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20210217_OTS0020/oegfe-schmidt-die-corona-pandemie-hinterlaesst-ihre-spuren-im-eu-meinungsbild; Total weekly interactions of posts published between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021. Source: CrowdTangle
Austrian case study: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Austria-and-the-EU%E2%80%99s-joint-COVID-19-vaccine-strategy.pdf
15 AUR = Alianţa pentru Unirea Românilor
16 Case study by Funky Citizens:
https://www.globsec.org/publications/anti-western-narratives-in-romania/
17 Ibid. 21 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sputnik-news-russian-government-owned-controlled-nato-accuses-kremlin-propaganda-machine-disinformation-syria-brexit-refugee-
18 https://www.facebook.com/100044386691134/posts/519670146189204 crisis-a7574721.html
19 https://www.facebook.com/harabinstefan/videos/634587377768083/ 22 https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-news-agency-sputnik-closes-estonia-operations-after-employees-quit/30355321.html
20 www.vulnerabilityindex.org 23 https://www.similarweb.com/
6| |7Name Total Reactions Comments Shares
“Cases of blatant disinformation purchase turned south, however, consume information from Russian-
are rare. BB.lv, more often, pro-Kremlin outlets lambasted what originating and Kremlin-controlled
Sputnik Polska 684.7K 517.6K 83.1K 84.0K presents one-sided information, they deemed an alleged targeted outlets that spread disinformation
omits relevant stories, and uses disinformation campaign waged and pro-Kremlin propaganda.
Sputnik Lietuva: Baltijos naujienos 140.9K 97.2K 30.1K 13.7K contrasting framing of Russia against the Russian vaccine . 32
Moscow’s actions, significantly,
and the West… Furthermore, The official accounts of Sputnik challenge the geopolitical orientation
Sputnik Moldova-România 3.64M 2.77M 360.4K 515.6K
BB.lv often republishes V further unjustifiably accused the and/or democratic processes of
Sputnik Česká republika 4.57M 3.32M 683.8K 561.6K content from Russia-based Slovak Drug Agency of sabotage the Baltics. It is imperative that
Kremlin-controlled “media”. and a deliberate disinformation more balanced (and unbiased)
SNA 2.05M 1.41M 400.7K 239.2K The Kremlin’s propaganda campaign.33 These claims were information, consequently, reach
perspective on the EU and US subsequently disseminated by these communities who otherwise
Total interactions of posts published between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021 per Facebook page. Source: CrowdTangle
and its version of domestic Twitter accounts with characteristics would only engage each other via
events in Russia, consequently, of inauthentic activity, according to inter-linked Facebook pages, online
Name Total Growth % Growth
are both promulgated to Latvian the TruthNest application34. While the communities or local media outlets.
readers.”30 languages and countries of origin
Minority groups, however, are not
Sputnik Polska 22.7K +9.5K +72.53%
of the accounts varied, significant
only cynically used by the Kremlin
Sputnik Lietuva: Baltijos naujienos 3.7K +539 +17.14% numbers of them employed Spanish
and Beijing. Hungary’s Orbán
The artificial peddling and were based in Latin America.
government, for its part, has
Sputnik Moldova-România 28.5K +10.6K +59.29% By that time, many countries in
of narratives Latin America had purchased or
increasingly sought to lean on
Sputnik Česká republika 138.2K +34.8K +33.71% Hungarian minorities living in
The COVID-19 pandemic mobilised were in the process of negotiating
neighbouring countries to influence
SNA 217.6K -2.5K -1.129% governments to produce vaccines the procurement of Russian shots.
the results of local elections,36
and secure purchase deals sooner The accounts generally sought to
enhance the sphere of influence of
Growth of followers per page between January 1, 2021 and December 31, 2021. Source: CrowdTangle
than the competition. This process, label Russia a victim even as they
Budapest and enlarge the electoral
notably, went hand in hand with an disseminated false and misleading
base for Hungarian elections. Some
information assisted by additional
The turn to smaller narratives peddled, tracks closely to Moves by the Latvian government 27 intensive Russian disinformation
accounts with bot-like features.
Hungarian public institutions and
that adopted by Sputnik News.25 to block Baltnews, meanwhile, have campaign and propaganda aimed political figures frequently amplify
foreign-affiliated at the promotion of its own Sputnik
raised public awareness about the narratives of the Kremlin and
outlets outlet28. A case study from Latvia, V vaccine.31 As the GLOBSEC Exploitation of Beijing, affirmed in an analysis of
“These examples represent
only a handful of the many however, points to an outlet Baltijas case study on Slovakia notes, minority groups the Hungarian information space.
In countries exhibiting greater
articles published by Russian- Balss (BB.lv), which, according to Moscow’s propaganda machinery This malign content percolates far
awareness of Kremlin direct There are numerous national
controlled media outlets in the author Martins Hirss, manages and social media accounts and wide in the region through the
influence or where state minority groups across CE region –
the Baltics that collectively, to frame content in a manner established exclusively to promote reposting of information published
administrations regularly impose borders have indeed evolved and
by weaving together a web of favourable to Russia and less so to Sputnik V vaccine have sought by Hungarian public institutions and
restrictions on Russia-owned state shifted for centuries. These societal
twisted and false stories, aim the West. The website was owned to undermine trust in vaccines officials.
media (e.g. the Baltics), smaller groups, especially in small countries,
to sow distrust towards NATO by the wife of a former member developed by Western companies
outlets that harbour either indirect or could be vulnerable to (malign)
allies that market arms to the of the Russian Parliament and and persuade policymakers
previous links to Moscow are used to influence operations attempting
Lithuanian Armed Forces and Putin’s United Russia party until 2019, worldwide to purchase their jab
shape public opinion. The EESC case to foster social polarisation, sow
government. The articles are its current ownership is unknown. Its instead.
study for Lithuania underscored that confusion and/or undermine the
not particularly sophisticated… readership base, nonetheless, makes The procurement of Sputnik
Baltnews, an outlet indirectly owned authority of government. Vigilance
[but] it is important to recognise it the most popular Kremlin-aligned V vaccine doses by Slovakia and
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
by Russia Today24 and operating in all towards such threat is especially
that the simplicity of a lie can online news source in the country.29 friendly declarations by various
three Baltic countries, employs any present in the Baltics, with relatively
and every opportunity to undermine make it persuasive to people Slovak political figures were later
large Russian minority groups.
NATO unity and perceptions about already disinclined towards picked up by information operations
Such societal groups, as shown
its strategic importance to members. doublechecking facts”.26 targeting both Russian and
in Estonian analysis35, then often
This approach, including the international audiences. When the
24 https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/miriamelder/a-network-of-russian-language-news-sites-is-secretly-owned 30 Ibid.
25 Case study by EESC: https://www.eesc.lt/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/In-the-Kremlins-crosshairs-Lithuania-and-trust-in-NATO-ver2.pdf 31 Similar behaviour was not observed among other vaccine producers.
26 Ibid. 32 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/west-criticizes-russian-coronavirus-vaccine-cant-accept-russia-primacy/
27 https://eng.lsm.lv/article/society/society/access-to-kremlin-mouthpiece-portal-blocked-according-to-eu-sanctions-rules.a326744/ 33 Case study by GLOBSEC: https://www.globsec.org/publications/sputnik-v-not-just-a-vaccine/
28 https://medium.com/dfrlab/baltnews-latvias-audience-size-decreased-after-domain-suspension-d636018f8a06 34 https://www.truthnest.com/
29 Case study By Martins Hirss: https://www.globsec.org/publications/kremlin-aligned-media-in-latvia-kingdom-of-crooked-mirrors/ 35 Case study by Dmitri Teperik, ICDS: https://www.globsec.org/publications/disinformation-networks-of-pro-kremlin-proxies-in-estonia-in-the-russian-speaking-community/
36 https://www.vulnerabilityindex.org/src/files/Globsec_VulnerabilityIndex_online.pdf
8| |9Cross-cutting drivers The case of Estonia on how
Russia’s use of COVID restrictions
“This story is an example of how
easily content travels through
the national “values and traditions” is
one of the key and most dangerous
and vaccination to further weaken Facebook communities and drivers of polarisation across Europe.
the Russian minority’s trust43 is yet among different countries.”44 This narrative has been used to
Use of well-established party. Despite no indication of systematically works towards having
another example underlining the justify anti-abortion laws in Poland,
a rise in asylum applications in the more Muslims and Africans in the
and emerging extent to which polarising issues anti-media and anti-NGO laws in
country38, migration was deployed EU”.40 There is also a general pattern of
polarising issues to spread fear in the party’s election
and a range of actors, both domestic Hungary and anti-LGBTI measures
anti-democratic and disinformation
and foreign, are involved in these and attacks almost across the entire
spots - a “Refugees welcome” “The hoaxes that resonated content appealing to groups
An examination of Bulgarian and processes. region, including Slovakia48, Bulgaria49
sign, alongside others, elevated most with the public were those already predisposed to this type
Czech elections held in 2021 shed or Latvia50.
the Brussels dictate and security conforming to long standing
light on the repeated campaign
frames. According to pre-elections
Facebook groups of information. A Czech article, for
stereotypes, such as the one example, purported a conspiracy
reappearance of topics that had
polls conducted by PSSI, our Czech that the EU is trying to destroy
and active individuals theory concerning revelations from
already proven polarising and
a source of information manipulation,
partner, and the sociological agency us through migration.”41 within them the Pandora Papers about Andrej
STEM, 51% of Czechs believed Babis being an alleged operation
alongside new wedge issues that
the claim that the liberal Pirates The case studies from nearly all
were trialled for the same purpose. orchestrated by globalists like George
Party, the target of numerous The climate crisis (and the EU Green countries demonstrated that many
The topic of migration is one of Soros. The article, according to the
disinformation campaigns, “wants Deal) is an important issue that will of the narratives undermining
these. The issue gained resonance Czech case study, was ultimately
to start handing out apartments and be widely utilised by Eurosceptic and democracy and Western cooperation
during the 2015 EU crisis and has shared into groups with nationalistic,
other support so that more people populist voices to further sow distrust are gaining traction on Facebook
remained on the agenda ever since37, pro-Russian, anti-vax and anti-EU
from Muslim and African countries in the EU and Western unity. It has groups. Specific articles are often
occupying a prominent place in the themes.45 Similar observations
could come to Czechia”. And 39 already been featured in election shared multiple times and re-shared
2021 elections and the campaign were discerned from the Bulgarian
half further believed that the “EU campaigns in both Bulgaria and in other groups. This “success”
of ANO, the former governing election campaign during which
Czechia. on Facebook is undergirded by
pro-Russian, anti-NATO, anti-EU,
dedicated individuals, often retirees
religious and ultra-conservative
with abundant enough free time
groups shared conspiracy theories
to post an average 12-14 posts per
linked to COVID-19 measures and
day, trolls who share content into
vaccinations.46
multiple groups at once or people
just enthusiastically engaged in their
Use of the concept of
favourite groups with their online
peers. The ICDS analysis for Estonia
“traditional values”
identified a group of 14 individuals
Fears of the unknown, nostalgia,
particularly active in producing,
personal frustrations and insecurities
sharing and engaging with content
from a fast-developing world shared
in Russian-language groups. The
among many (not only) Central
Latvian case study, meanwhile, points
Europeans are an easy target to
to the impact that one individual
exploit.47 The far-right nationalists,
engendered by sharing an article,
populists, the Kremlin, pro-Kremlin
which deployed negative frames
actors and the church and religious
about the US, on three different
authorities alike have been utilising
Russian-speaking groups in Latvia.
these feelings to establish their
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
The story subsequently travelled into
role of the beacons and restorers
other groups of Russian speakers in
of stability and tradition. The false
Estonia and Russia.
assumption of the open, inclusive
Election campaign spot from ANO, 202142, claims on the boards include Lower pensions, Make Brussels decide, Abolish cars, Punish the successful, etc.
society being in a direct contrast of
37 2017 campaign: http://www.old.pssi.cz/download/docs/500_parlamentni-volby-2017-analyza.pdf; 43 Case study by ICDS: https://www.globsec.org/publications/disinformation-networks-of-pro-kremlin-proxies-in-estonia-in-the-russian-speaking-community/
https://www.median.eu/cs/?page_id=2542; 2018 campaign: https://www.e15.cz/volby/prezidentske-volby-2018/stop-imigrantum-a-drahosovi-zemanova-kampan-odstartovala-na- 44 Case study by Martins Hirss: https://www.globsec.org/publications/kremlin-aligned-media-in-latvia-kingdom-of-crooked-mirrors/
billboardech-1342348 45 Case study by PSSI (in Czech): https://www.pssi.cz/download//docs/9485_pssi-perspectives-15.pdf
38 Applications for asylum, since 2014, have remained constant between 1,000 and 2,000: 46 Case study by CSD: https://csd.bg/events/event/disinformation-narratives-in-the-november-2021-bulgarian-elections-campaign-key-actors-and-amplifie/
https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/statisticke-zpravy-o-mezinarodni-ochrane-za-jednotlive-mesice-v-roce-2020.aspx 47 More about these atttitudes can be found in GLOBSEC polling from 2020: https://www.globsec.org/publications/voices-of-central-and-eastern-europe/
39 https://www.stem.cz/velka-cast-obcanu-uverila-predvolebnim-utokum-na-konspiracnich-serverech-ukazuje-novy-pruzkum/#more-6896 (in Czech) 48 https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2014-06-10/slovak-republic-marriage-defined-as-between-one-man-and-one-woman/
40 Ibid. 49 https://www.euractiv.com/section/non-discrimination/news/foreign-ambassadors-slam-attack-on-lgbtq-centre-in-bulgaria/
41 https://www.stem.cz/velka-cast-obcanu-uverila-predvolebnim-utokum-na-konspiracnich-serverech-ukazuje-novy-pruzkum/#more-6896 50 https://www.euronews.com/2021/04/30/gay-latvian-man-dies-after-homophobic-attack-campaigners-say
42 https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/zahranici/babis-podle-listu-dennik-n-vyuziva-v-kampani-neexistujici-pr/r~f123ac84228b11eca824ac1f6b220ee8/
10 | | 11Recommendations Recommendations
z Improving z Transparent z Independence of z Better integration z Better presence of z Limiting the reach
situational ownership public broadcaster of minorities with Western media of harmful content
awareness of civil of the media more information in in the region
Public broadcasters are One of the key factors
servants an important source of their languages undergirding the success
Growing media distrust Rising democratic
hampers the ability of information throughout backsliding and the of far-right and nationalist
Low situational Language and ethnic
the press to fulfil its the CE region and are state capture of public groups in the CE region
awareness often minority groups are often
democratic watchdog generally perceived as institutions, including relates to their large-scale
stemming from a one- exploited by various
role. At the same time, among the most trusted public broadcasters, presence and virality on
track-mind perception problematic actors to
many outlets are merely media sources in many provide an opportunity social media. This feat
of security threats and pursue their interests. The
pieces of propaganda countries.51 The state- for officials to manipulate is made possible by two
understanding of the general lack of information
machines that promote capture and politicisation, public opinion and linked patterns. Posts
security environment, and news in minority
information operations however, is leaving its undermine the ability of generating anger, namely,
a lack of developed languages emboldens
and peddle hyper-partisan mark and could serve as citizens to make decisions attract more engagement
structures enabling this nefarious action.
issues (e.g. the opaque a vehicle for undermining based on objective from users55, and
horizontal and vertical The Baltic countries, that
media ownership of democracy, witness the information. Information algorithms recommend
exchange of information said, have exhibited good
Baltijas Balss in Latvia). case of Hungary. The not coloured by the content based on user
and inadequate practices in ensuring the
Democratic governments, depoliticisation and government’s political engagement. These two
monitoring capacities are availability of prominent
therefore, would be professionalisation of agenda is, in such an observations bolster
common features across media content in multiple
prudent to ensure public broadcasters, environment, difficult the spread of content
countries in the region languages.52 To further
complete transparency of by contrast, could to ascertain, especially generating animosity and
including Bulgaria and enrich the information
media ownership. Among increase media trust when combined with hate56 and risks users
Slovakia. Satisfactory space and provide
other benefits, these and help stave off anti- government attempts to getting mired in a spiral of
situational awareness, equal opportunities for
moves could contribute democratic narratives from gain control of private extremist content57. EU and
importantly, can be the all citizens, including
to increased trust and permeating far and wide. media outlets too. Though civil society alike should
cornerstone of resilience minority access, there
better identification of the an increasing number of advocate and work with
building, effective whole- is a need to additionally
potential misuse of outlets information spaces in the big tech on establishing
of-government policies support minority language
for influence operations. CE region display these clear rules and algorithm
and strategic foresight. versions of smaller and
tendencies, a positive transparency to ensure
More resources should, more thematic media
indicator concerns the that they not primarily
therefore, be invested outlets too.
emergence of foreign promote detrimental
in the peer-to-peer
media (re-)establishing content. Factual
exchange of information
offices in the region and information and quality
and trainings to cultivate
offering information in journalism based on clearly
important interpersonal,
local languages. Examples defined trustworthiness
regional and international
that should be expanded indicators rather should
contacts and strengthen
on include Deutsche Welle be more prominently
resilience.
restarting their reporting featured. While these
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
in Hungarian53 and Radio moves will likely impact
Free Europe/Radio Liberty big tech’s revenue stream,
reporting in 27 languages the current toll afflicted on
and 23 countries including democracy is considerably
Hungary and Bulgaria.54 greater.
52 https://www.delfi.lt/
53 https://www.dw.com/en/dw-magyar-deutsche-welle-launches-program-in-old-new-broadcast-language-hungarian/a-57358854
54 https://pressroom.rferl.org/rferl-language-services
55 https://cordis.europa.eu/article/id/430608-trending-science-social-media-making-us-angrier-study-reveals
56 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-020-00550-7
51 In Czechia and Slovakia, for example: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf 57 https://www.nytimes.com/column/rabbit-hole
12 | | 13Recommendations Recommendations
z Lifelong digital skills z Community-building z Open z Open z Pro-active
learning targeted to initiatives communication communication communication
various social and for the elderly of public security about hybrid threats about new
age groups threats and defence posed by Russia challenges
The case studies
uncovered that key of democratic and China
Understanding how social The monitoring of both
media platforms and new amplifiers of information principles Czech and Bulgarian
Significant segments of
technologies work and manipulation in some elections demonstrated
With democracies and political leadership and
grasping relevant pointers communities often include that the measures to
democratic principles society in CE remain
can prove especially elderly individuals of tackle the climate crisis
challenged on multiple ignorant about Russian
difficult for various social retirement age who spend is becoming yet another
fronts, it is paramount and even more Chinese
groups including older their free time sharing tool to undermine the
that public officials influence operations. For
generations. Those content on social media. EU and its policies. The
openly communicate example, a total of 46% of
vulnerable can fall down The formation of worldly authorities thus must build
about these problems respondents in CE have
the rabbit hole of social connections is important resilience proactively
and defend democratic “never heard of” and/or
media platforms and for the psychological and communicate about
principles. In September “did not know” who the
(unintentionally) amplify well-being of the old issues that will most
2021, representatives of Chinese president was in
malign content and aged. And a lack of digital probably guide decision-
the Lithuanian Defence the GLOBSEC Trends 2021
become online trolls. skills, combined with and policy-making in the
Ministry warned public survey.60 People in the
Continued education the absence of contact next decade – be it the
officials and citizens not to region also generally hold
programmes focused on with the offline world, climate crisis, role of AI,
use Chinese-made phones very limited knowledge
developing the digital can easily trap these demographic changes or
due to cybersecurity and about current events in
skills of different societal individuals in spirals of others.
censorship risks.58 The Russia and China including
groups based on the disinformation content.
Latvian government, for human rights violations.
sources they consume Community-building
its part, continuously This ignorance poses
and forums they use initiatives, consequently,
publicly discredits a significant vulnerability
for communication are, should be supported for
Kremlin-operated exploited by both actors.
therefore, necessary to senior citizens.
outlets, including Sputnik The domestic policies
help address the problem. and foreign activities,
News and Baltnews,
thereby contributing to including malign influence
their low readership in operations, of Moscow and
the country.59 Related Beijing need to become
communication on part of public debate in
security threats and Central Europe. A shift
the pitfalls of using the in this direction would
products and services also contribute to more
of particular private extensive reporting on
the matter by mainstream
Narratives travelling the information space
Narratives travelling the information space
companies should be
foundational to building media outlets. Responding
societal resilience against to this deficit will entail
malign influence. raising awareness about
already ongoing malign
activities in the region and
sharing experiences on
preventing and countering
these operations.
58 https://www.dw.com/en/lithuania-cybersecurity-agency-warns-against-chinese-made-phones/a-59266470
59 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-prosecution-of-baltnews-and-sputnik-latvia-is-merely-russophobia 60 https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GLOBSEC-Trends-2021_final.pdf
14 | | 15 ajnorská 100/B
V +421 2 3213 7800
831 04 Bratislava info@globsec.org
Slovak Republic www.globsec.org
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