DEMOCRATIC OFFENSE DISINFORMATION - AGAINST @apolyakova @AmbDanFried #russia #china #EU #US #disinformation - Atlantic Council
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DEMOCRATIC
OFFENSE
535
AGAINST
DISINFORMATION 154
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Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
CONTENTS ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Executive Summary........................................ 2 Dr. Alina Polyakova is the President and Chief
Defense Against Disinformation: Executive Officer of the Center for European
A Mixed Report Card ..................................... 3 Policy Analysis (CEPA). She serves on the
A Burgeoning Sector of Disinformation board of the Free Russia Foundation and the
Institute of Modern Russia and is professor of
Research Groups.............................................. 7 European studies at the Johns Hopkins School
Stop the Whack-a-Mole Approach: of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Dr.
Get on the Offense ......................................... 10 Polyakova was the founding director for global
Cyber Options ................................................. 11 democracy and emerging technology at the
Sanctions (and Other Financial) Tools........ 15 Brookings Institution.
‘The Truth Shall Set You Free’: Ambassador Daniel Fried is Ambassador Daniel
Support for Free Media................................... 17 Fried is the Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow
Recommendations........................................... 20 at the Atlantic Council. Ambassador Fried
Conclusion......................................................... 25 served as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe
and as NSC Senior Director under President Bill
Endnotes............................................................ 26
Clinton and President George W. Bush, and as
Ambassador to Poland. He most recently served
in government as State Department Coordinator
for Sanctions under President Barack Obama.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This three-part series on how democracies can
defend against and get ahead of disinformation
would not have been possible without help ABOUT CEPA
from many colleagues in the United States The Center for European Analysis (CEPA)
and Europe. This paper, and the ones before is a non-partisan think-tank dedicated to
it, would not have become a reality without strengthening the transatlantic relationship.
Geysha González, who remained committed to Headquartered in Washington, D.C. and led by
the work since the first paper was published seasoned transatlanticists and young leaders
in 2018. We also received valuable feedback from both sides of the Atlantic, CEPA brings
and support from colleagues at the Atlantic an innovative approach to the policy arena.
Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and Our cutting-edge analysis and timely debates
the Center for European Policy Analysis. Many galvanize communities of influence while
others from the public, private, and nonprofit investing in the next generation of leaders to
sectors across the Atlantic lent their expertise understand and address present and future
in the review process. Alexander Wirth of the challenges to transatlantic values and principles.
Center for European Policy Analysis stepped in
at just the right moment to move this project
forward. The authors also thank the Delegation
of the European Union to the United States for
its generous support without which this report
would not have been possible. This report is
part of CEPA’s Digital Innovation Initiative,
which receives generous support from Craig
Newmark Philanthropies.
All opinions are those of the author(s) and do
not necessarily represent the position or views
of the institutions they represent or the Center
for European Policy Analysis.
Cover: Assets from freepik.com were used.
2
Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
The intentional use of misleading its efforts globally. Moreover, Russia is
information to influence societies, or no longer the sole threat in the foreign
disinformation, presents a serious threat influence game. The Chinese Communist
to the integrity of democratic systems. Party (CCP) has far greater resources
Authoritarian states regularly use it to than Russia and a long track record of
exploit democracies’ open information information manipulation and aggressive
systems, presenting a significant intervention in Taiwan and Hong Kong.
national security threat that demands a With the Covid-19 pandemic, China
purposeful and concerted response. This entered the global disinformation space,
paper is the third in a series of papers targeting Europe, NATO, and the United
that deals with how democracies can States, working from the Kremlin’s
build resilience against disinformation. playbook. There is now growing evidence
The first installment, Democratic that Russia and China are working
Defense Against Disinformation,1 together to amplify anti-democratic
and its follow-up, Democratic Defense narratives.4
Against Disinformation 2.0,2
unpacked the challenge of foreign-origin Democracies have aimed to identify,
disinformation and suggested practical expose, and build greater public
steps to deal with it, including actions by awareness of state-sponsored
governments, social media companies, disinformation with the goal of building
and civil society. The core argument was up greater long-term resilience to
that defense against disinformation has information influence operations.5 But
to be rooted in democratic principles and the adversaries adapt and evolve their
values: transparency, accountability, and strategies and tactics to circumvent
respect for freedom of expression. We exposure and attribution. Companies,
must not become them to fight them. researchers, and governments are
playing whack-a-mole — responding
While domestic-origin disinformation to each disinformation campaign as it
is a more widespread (and growing) arises while trying (and failing) to keep
challenge, the tools to deal with foreign up with new threats. To get ahead of
state-sponsored disinformation are foreign disinformation, democracies must
broader. The Russian government was the develop a proactive strategy to prevent
first mover and innovator in exploiting state-sponsored information operations
the digital information environment to in the first place.6 That means getting off
carry out influence operations against our back foot and getting on the offensive.
democracies, targeting the United States, This paper, written principally for the
Europe, and countries beyond.3 United States but hopefully applicable
in adapted form to other countries, is
But while Russian interference in the a road map for how countries can get
2016 U.S. elections awoke Americans ahead of foreign disinformation. The
and Europeans to the threat of new U.S. administration should lead the
disinformation, the response has not democratic community in this effort.
deterred the Kremlin, which has extended
1
Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
Executive Summary the fast-evolving threat and the slow
implementation of efforts to manage it.
The United States and other democratic We, therefore, recommend
countries have made progress supplementing defense with offense. Our
defending against foreign and domestic recommendations are designed for the
disinformation. Unevenly, but steadily, a United States; some may be adaptable by
structure for democratic defense against European governments and the European
disinformation is emerging, consistent Union (EU) as well. Offense does not mean
with the principles of transparency, spreading disinformation (that would not
accountability, and respect for freedom of be consistent with democratic values and
expression. It includes: democracies aren’t good at it anyway). It
• a growing network of disinformation does mean building up:
detectors (led by civil society • Cyber tools to identify and disrupt
sometimes informed by government foreign disinformation operations. The
agencies); U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)
• social media companies (responsive has already launched this option — the
to public and legislative pressure) U.S. military terms it “hunt, surveil,
that constrict disinformation on their expose and disable.” It has the appeal
platforms; of immediacy and directness, but at
its harder-edged end it has drawbacks.
• an informed media that exposes The “disable” option needs to be
disinformation; and, potentially at a implemented with care.
next stage,
• Sanctions (and other financial) tools
• a regulatory framework that seeks to against disinformation actors and their
filter out inauthentic and deceptive sources of funding, and development
behavior. of contingent retaliatory sanctions
as a deterrent. Use of the sanctions
While defensive measures cannot tool requires persistence to apply
block all disinformation, they can limit well and its impact will be moderate
disinformation as more people learn rather than decisive. It will be more
to filter it out on their own (“social effective if carried out in parallel by the
resilience”). United States, the EU, and the United
Kingdom.
But defense is working against a moving
target. Purveyors of disinformation have • Support for free media in the broad
grown more sophisticated and their tactics sense, including journalists, activists,
continue to advance. The line between and independent investigators, can
domestic and foreign disinformation be the most effective tool of counter-
has blurred, with Russian agents using disinformation. It is asymmetric
local actors as proxies to carry out — it does not directly counter
disinformation operations. “Deepfakes” are disinformation — but plays to the
progressing beyond the ability to detect greatest strengths of free societies
such content in real time. China and other dealing with authoritarian adversaries:
foreign players (Iran, for example) have also the inherent attraction, over the long
entered the disinformation game. run, of truth. This was a key lesson
of the Cold War, when 20th century
Defensive tactics based on democratic values
methods, e.g., support for independent
can mitigate the impact of disinformation,
radio broadcasting at Radio Free
but there remains a mismatch between
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), proved
2
Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
effective in reaching societies inside the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc. Today,
Defense Against
updated technologies, including direct, Disinformation: A
although unofficial, support for activist
journalists working both inside and
Mixed Report Card
outside Russia (and China) may become
a 21st century equivalent. China’s The good news
media and internet landscape is more Emerging whole-of-society counter-
restrictive than Russia’s but options disinformation activities: Transatlantic
exist there as well. These activities can democracies — governments, researchers,
be slow to yield measurable results and the private sector/social media
but can have strategic impact over companies — have generally moved
time, if applied with creativity and beyond denying the disinformation
determination. challenge (or describing disinformation
The United States and, to some degree, in awestruck terms as insurmountable) to
the EU, NATO, and some European testing solutions.
national governments, are already • EU’s actions:
applying versions of these tools, but often
haphazardly, without integrating them ʑ 2015: The European External
into a policy framework and with only Action Service (EEAS) established
spotty coordination. For the first two levels the EastStratCom Task Force
of tools, governments will have the lead; to identify and raise awareness
for the third, civil society groups will be around Russian disinformation
critical and, in some cases, leading actors. campaigns against EU member
states. Initially deeply underfunded
with few staff members, the task
While defensive measures force finally received significant EU
budget support and expanded to 16
cannot block all disinformation, members by 2020. The EUvsDisinfo
they can limit disinformation database now holds almost 10,000
examples of disinformation.8 But
as more people learn to filter it the future of the taskforce remains
uncertain as it is not a permanent
out on their own unit and relies on staff seconded
from EU member states.
The new U.S. administration under ʑ 2018: The European Commission
President-elect Joseph R. Biden Jr. is likely developed an Action Plan Against
to be more committed to developing a Disinformation9 and concluded
strategic response to disinformation, and a voluntary Code of Practice
be more effective generally, in crafting on Disinformation with major
and implementing policies. U.S. President social media companies, which
Donald J. Trump’s mixed signals with lays out policy norms to restrict
respect to Russian disinformation, attacks disinformation. The enlisted
on free media, and distracting fights with companies, initially including
European allies prevented a coordinated Facebook, Google, Twitter, and
response and set the United States back7. Mozilla, now joined by Microsoft
Recovering from these setbacks will not be and TikTok,10 have been providing
easy, but the new Biden administration will monthly reports to the European
have a roadmap for what to do. Commission. The results appear
3
Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
France’s President Emmanuel Macron gestures as he speaks to the press after a plenary session at
the Bellevue centre in Biarritz, France August 25, 2019. Ludovic Marin/Pool via REUTERS.
mixed in terms of the detail of data Services Act (DSA) — to be finalized
provided, independent verification, at the end of 2020. The former
and lack of standard terminology will likely lay out next steps on
and report structure.11 the Code of Practice and may help
turn currently voluntary measures
ʑ 2019: In preparation for the into regulation. The DSA, on the
EU parliamentary elections in other hand, takes an expansive
May 2019, the EU established a view of digital regulatory policy,
Rapid Alert System to facilitate including the likely establishment
information sharing, expose of an independent body to regulate
disinformation in real time, and everything from data use to rules
coordinate with other multilateral of the road around emerging
efforts by the G-7 and NATO. technologies and e-commerce.
Critics have noted that the system
has yet to issue an alert, but EU • Notable actions by European national
officials assert that the system is governments:
working.
ʑ Sweden: Most European
ʑ 2020: The EU is integrating lessons governments have established
learned from previous efforts into counter-disinformation teams
two broader policy initiatives — to coordinate governmental
the European Democracy Action efforts to identify and respond to
Plan (EDAP) and the Digital disinformation operations, but
4Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
Sweden has long been ahead in blow to the Macron government’s
identifying the threat, analyzing counter-disinformation policy.
its societal vulnerabilities,
committing significant resources, ʑ United Kingdom: Following the
and developing a strategic plan. poisoning of former Russian
The Counter Information Influence spy Sergei Skripal by Russia’s
Section at the Swedish Civil military intelligence service,
Contingencies Agency (MSB) leads the GRU, in Salisbury in 2018,
the effort and a newly expanded the UK government developed a
Psychological Defense Agency is whole-of-government approach
in the process of being established to responding to disinformation
by 2022.12 The agency has trained attacks. The effort is led by the
more than 14,000 Swedish Department for Digital, Culture,
public servants in the subject of Media and Sport (DCMS) which
information influence since 2016. coordinates efforts to expose
foreign disinformation, alert the
ʑ France: In 2018, French President public, and assess appropriate
Emmanuel Macron launched the responses through a counter-
Paris Call for Trust and Security in disinformation cell that engages
Cyberspace that seeks to establish intelligence agencies, tech experts,
international cyber norms. It has, the Foreign Office, as well as
as of this writing, attracted backing other government agencies.
from 78 governments, civil society The UK’s broadcast regulator,
groups, and a number of major Ofcom, is involved in an ongoing
European and U.S. corporations investigation of China Global
(including Facebook, Google, and Television Network (CGTN) for its
Microsoft).13 Notably, Amazon, broadcasting of illegally obtained
Apple, and Twitter have not joined “confessions.”15
the Paris Call. And while the
United States opted out of it, its • Multilateral institutions’ actions:
platform provides a valuable space
ʑ NATO: The NATO Strategic
for multi-stakeholder discussions.
Communications Center of
France’s domestic initiatives to Excellence in Riga,16 established in
regulate disinformation through 2014, and the European Center of
content moderation have been Excellence on Countering Hybrid
far less successful. In June 2020, Threats in Helsinki17 (the Helsinki
a French court struck down as Hybrid CoE, established in 2017,
unconstitutional a hate speech law that works with both the EU and
passed by Parliament and supported NATO) are active in identifying
by Macron’s government.14 The so- disinformation among other hybrid
called Avia Law would have forced threats and sharing best practices
social media platforms to take for countering them. Both have
down content reported by users added Chinese disinformation to
as hateful within 24 hours or face their areas of responsibility. Their
fines of up to €1.25 million ($1.46 focus is primarily on research
million) among other stringent and coordination, however, and
provisions. The French court’s neither has the power to affect and
ruling saw the law as infringing on mandate policy.
free speech. The ruling was a major
5Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
ʑ G7: In 2018, the G7 established the Europe and elsewhere to carry out
Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) counter-disinformation research
at Canada’s initiative. The RRM and develop monitoring tools.
aims to coordinate information
sharing and respond to “malign and ʑ The U.S. Cyber Command
evolving threats to G7 democracies” (USCYBERCOM) has gained
and grew out of the Charlevoix prominence through its
Commitment on Defending actions targeting purveyors of
Democracies from Foreign Threats.18 disinformation and a new proactive
posture that USCYBERCOM calls
ʑ United Nations: In the wake “persistent engagement” as part
of disinformation campaigns of the Department of Defense’s
around the Covid-19 “infodemic,” “defend forward” framework.21
the United Nations launched
an initiative called Verified to ʑ The U.S. Congress has been
counter the spread of misleading considering legislation that
information on the public health would constrict the space for
crisis. It relies on individuals to disinformation. The 2017 Honest
sign up as volunteers to receive Ads Act would mandate social
verified content and share in their media platforms to keep a public
communities and social media. database identifying purchase of
This “crowdsourcing” approach is paid political ads while preventing
a public-private partnership and foreign entities from purchasing
takes on a novel approach that online political ads (as is the case
relies on private citizens to be with non-digital ads). While the bill
trusted community messengers.19 has stalled in Congress, companies
Though its sustainability remains have de facto implemented its
in question, the program had main provisions through their
recruited 10,000 volunteers own policies. The 2019 Digital
worldwide as of July 2020.20 Citizenship and Media Literacy
The U.N. and the World Health Act would allocate $20 million
Organization (WHO) have in funding for media and digital
also partnered with Facebook, literacy education in U.S. public
WhatsApp, and other messaging schools. This bill has also not
services and telecom operators to passed Congress.
deliver accurate information about
• Notable private sector actions:
the pandemic.
ʑ Coordination among companies:
• U.S. actions:
Social media companies and
ʑ The U.S. government’s Global others are implementing counter-
Engagement Center (GEC, housed disinformation policies regarding
at the State Department) has a issue and other political ads, taking
mandate to counter state-sponsored down coordinated inauthentic
disinformation, adding to its behavior, labeling misleading
original mandate to counter terrorist information and state-sponsored
and Islamist propaganda. With media outlets, working more
significant congressional funding closely with civil society groups
of $64.3 million and an additional concerned about disinformation,
$138 million requested for 2021, and generally engaging more with
the GEC has provided funding to researchers and governments.
independent research groups in
6Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
ʑ Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, aimed at reducing disinformation with
LinkedIn, Pinterest, Reddit, respect to the 2020 U.S. elections.25
Verizon Media, and the Wikimedia
Foundation joined Google,
Facebook, Twitter, and Microsoft A Burgeoning Sector
to coordinate with the U.S. of Disinformation
intelligence community to identify
disinformation campaigns.22 This led
Research Groups
to several takedowns of coordinated What was once a niche specialty has
inauthentic behavior, including evolved into a burgeoning field of research,
the removal of a network linked to in both the nonprofit and private sectors.
the Kremlin-connected troll farm Early responders from frontline states,
Internet Research Agency (IRA) such as the Baltic Elves and Ukraine’s
from Facebook.23 StopFake, are now part of a large global
• Twitter, once seen as the most network of universities, think tanks,
problematic of the platforms given nonprofit research groups, consultancies,
the extent of the IRA’s activities and and independent media organizations.26
the ease of access, is now an industry Governments and foundations have
leader in setting the policy agenda. The increased funding for counter-
company has banned: disinformation efforts, while companies
ʑ advertising by all state-controlled and political campaigns now recognize
media, including RT and Sputnik24 the need to understand the threat and
and respond. Groups long devoted to counter-
disinformation are developing ties with
ʑ all political advertising. other civil society groups new to the
topic, including U.S. domestic civil right
It has extended and refined policies, groups (e.g., the Congressional Black
including: Caucus Foundation and the Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights)
ʑ labeling state-controlled media and
which have discovered that Russian-origin
key government accounts, initially
disinformation is linked to U.S. right-wing
from the United States, the UK,
extremist groups and others with a bigoted
Russia, France, and China;
policy agenda (e.g., restricting minority
ʑ a framework for labelling and voting rights).27 The ability to monitor,
removing manipulated or synthetic identify, and expose disinformation
media and misleading information operations is rapidly improving as
intended to undermine public information sharing between these groups
confidence in an election; and grows.
ʑ a policy framework for limiting
coordinated harmful activity, which A whole-of-society
has reduced the reach of such response is still in
content. nascent stages
Twitter continues to be the only social The abovementioned efforts constitute
media company to publish a full an emerging structure for democratic
archive of the information operations defense against disinformation: a
it has removed, including all the tweets growing network of disinformation
and related media. In October 2020, detectors (led by civil society sometimes
Twitter announced additional policies informed by government agencies), social
7Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
media companies (responsive to public They set up shell media and social
and legislative pressure) constricting media companies, attempted to
disinformation on their platforms, convince unsuspecting individuals to
informed media alert to disinformation “rent out” their social media accounts
campaigns and exposing them, and a and contracted local journalists
careful regulatory framework (reflecting to publish misleading content.28
a developing set of international norms) Such tactics obfuscate detection by
targeted less at content control and more blending in with domestic voices and
at filtering out inauthentic and deceptive taking away a telltale sign of foreign
behavior. interference: the use of foreign-based
accounts whose location gives away
Defensive measures cannot filter out all their true identity.
disinformation. No doubt, some individuals
will believe even exposed falsehoods if they As China has entered the disinformation
tend to confirm preexisting biases. But at game, its approach has not simply copied
their best, defensive measures can limit the Kremlin’s playbook. Rather, Beijing is
disinformation as societies slowly learn to deploying a more far-reaching and deeply
filter it. embedded set of tools to sway public
opinion in democratic societies, using
The bad news the full scope of China’s economic and
political power. China’s “sharp power”
Defensive efforts are still at an early stage, strategy, documented by the National
sometimes in sketch form only, and often Endowment for Democracy, aims to
merely attempting whack-a-mole against penetrate the political and information
an evolving threat. environments in target countries.29
With China’s mishandling of the early
A rapidly evolving threat: Disinformation stages of the Covid-19 pandemic facing
campaigns have grown more sophisticated. international criticism, Beijing has
For instance: stepped up its information influence
• The production of increasingly operations aimed at Western democracies,
credible disinformation content using highlighting shortcomings in their
artificial intelligence (e.g., “deepfakes” public health systems, promoting its own
or “synthetic media”) is rapidly efforts to provide medical and personal
progressing far beyond the ability to protective equipment, and attempting to
detect such content in real time. curb international political contacts with
Taiwan.
• Foreign state-sponsored disinformation
operations, no longer restricted to the
frontline states of Central and Eastern
Policy responses
Europe in the case of Russia or Taiwan woefully lag
and Hong Kong in the case of China, In the meantime, policy steps taken by key
pose a global threat. players remain uneven.
• The line between domestic and foreign • Notwithstanding constructive
disinformation has blurred. Working steps, social media companies have
through local proxies, disinformation inconsistent approaches to the challenge
purveyors are able to hide the true of disinformation. For example, Twitter
source of online content. In Ukraine, bans political ads while other social
Africa, and Latin America, Russian media platforms do not. In another
agents used local actors as proxies to inconsistency, when confronted in
carry out disinformation operations. May 2019 with a deceptively altered
8Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey is seen testifying remotely via videoconference as U.S. Senator Chris Coons
(D-DE) listens during a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing titled, «Breaking the News: Censorship,
Suppression, and the 2020 Election,? on Facebook and Twitter’s content moderation practices, on
Capitol Hill in Washington, U.S., November 17, 2020. REUTERS/Hannah McKay/Pool.
video of Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the • Implementation of the EU’s
U.S. House of Representatives, YouTube policy framework for combating
removed the video, Facebook de- disinformation remains spotty.
ranked it, and Twitter let it stand.30 European critics have characterized
Inconsistent standards can be exploited the EU’s Rapid Alert System (RAS) on
by purveyors of disinformation, who disinformation as being neither rapid
can tailor their tactics to exploit the nor alert nor a system; that may be
gaps and opportunities. unfair, but the RAS does seem off to a
slow start.
Social media companies have concentrated
on takedowns of inauthentic content. • The United States still lags the EU
That is a good (and publicly visible) step (and many EU member states). While
but does not address deeper issues of the United States has sometimes acted
content distribution (e.g., micro-targeting), with strength against purveyors of
algorithmic bias toward extremes, and lack disinformation, e.g., by indicting IRA-
of transparency. The EU’s own evaluation connected individuals,31 U.S. policy
of the first year of implementation of its is inconsistent. The U.S. government
Code of Practice concludes that social media has no equivalent to the European
companies have not provided independent Commission’s Action Plan Against
researchers with data sufficient for them to Disinformation and no corresponding
make independent evaluations of progress Code of Practice on Disinformation,
against disinformation. and there remains no one in the
9Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
U.S. government in overall charge of Some can raise the costs and may
disinformation policy; this may reflect change the incentive/risk calculus for
the baleful U.S. domestic politics and governments contemplating disinformation
Trump’s mixed or worse messages campaigns and perhaps establish a
on the problem of Russian-origin measure of deterrence. Others can
disinformation. weaken technical capabilities to conduct
disinformation operations and thus
• Aside from funding the State serve as tactical supplements for defense
Department’s Global Engagement against disinformation. Still other forms
Center, congressional work on of offense can challenge regimes that
countering disinformation has slowed, use disinformation in strategic ways:
with even the Honest Ads Act stalled. Vladimir Putin’s regime in Russia seems
to use disinformation to weaken its
• Longer-term tools to encourage public
democratic adversaries by attacking their
sophistication about disinformation and
social cohesion; democratic countries can
thus social resistance to it are being
answer this through support for free media
developed in some European countries
inside Russia, China, and other purveyors
(e.g., Finland and Sweden), but barely
of disinformation, working nationally or
beginning in the United States.
together.
• A lack of coordination between
Care and caution are still required. The
Europe and the United States on
principle of remaining true to democratic
policy responses to disinformation
values holds as much for offensive as
has produced two different tracks:
for defensive options. We must not
Europe focuses on identifying and
become them to fight them. Democracies
exposing disinformation, while the
should not attempt their own version of
United States investigates, names, and
disinformation. Doing so would undermine
shames, though inconsistently. Neither
the values that democracies seek to defend,
has sought to develop a regulatory
creating a moral equivalence (one that
framework to increase authenticity and
would bolster the cynical arguments of
integrity in the social media space.
Russian propagandists about democracy
A combination of defensive tactics based being mere fraud). Besides, if the history of
on democratic values can be effective in at the Cold War is any guide, democracies are
mitigating the impact of disinformation in no good at disinformation.
the short term. But the fast-evolving threat
Democratic countries have options.
and the slow implementation of policies,
Democratic offense against disinformation
practices, and long-term social antibodies (so
can draw on three levels of tools:
to speak) to manage it are still mismatched
in favor of disinformation; defense needs to • Cyber tools to identify and disrupt
be supplemented with offense. disinformation operations. This
option is already in use and has the
Stop the Whack-a- appeal of immediacy and directness.
It is essential but at its harder-edged
Mole Approach: Get end has drawbacks, e.g., the risk of
on the Offense escalation.
Democracies also need to go on offense: • Sanctions (and other financial) tools
to take the fight more directly to the against disinformation actors and their
purveyors of disinformation and the sources of funding, and development
regimes that sponsor and direct them. of contingent retaliatory sanctions as
Effective offense can take many forms. a deterrent. Use of the sanctions tool
10Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
requires persistence to apply well and
its impact will be moderate rather than Democracies should not
decisive. attempt their own version
• Support for free media in the broad of disinformation.
sense, including journalists, activists,
and independent investigators. With
respect to Russia, this could include IRA, the St. Petersburg troll farm which had
those operating both inside and outside long been identified as a major source of
the country. This option can be slow to Russian disinformation targeting the United
yield measurable results but can have States.34 This information, probably leaked
strategic impact over time, if applied by USCYBERCOM itself, remains the United
with creativity and determination. States’ most notable publicly reported
counter-disinformation offensive operation.
The United States and to some degree the USCYBERCOM appears to be continuing
EU, NATO, and some European national such efforts, including reportedly against a
governments are applying versions of criminal Russian botnet.35
these three levels of tools, but often
haphazardly, without integration into a Cyber offensive operations (rightly)
policy framework and with only spotty remain classified, but Gen. Paul Nakasone,
coordination. For the first two levels of simultaneously director of the National
tools, governments will have the lead; Security Agency (NSA) and commander of
for the third, civil society groups will be USCYBERCOM, has outlined the basics of
critical and, in some cases, leading actors. the strategy publicly.36
USCYBERCOM has offered a set of
Cyber Options offensive actions meant to disrupt and
disable the internet infrastructure behind
The Department of Defense’s Cyber major disinformation operations. The
Strategy summary issued in September concepts reflect intelligence capabilities,
2018 stated that the United States would such as reconnaissance, gaining deep
“defend forward” and “persistently access and adversary awareness. Nakasone’s
contest” malicious cyber activity, with statements37 and people familiar with the
specific reference to Russia and China, program see options for actions on four
and emphasized Russian disinformation levels: “hunt, surveil, expose, and disable.”
operations as a particular challenge.32
The National Security Presidential • Hunt includes actively seeking out
Memorandum, NSPM-13, issued around adversarial activities and entities before
that time, reportedly gave new authorities an attack takes place.
to the U.S. military, with USCYBERCOM • Surveil includes probing foreign
in the lead, to engage in certain cyber disinformation systems to identify
offensive actions below a certain bad actors and the details of related
threshold.33 software, malware, and viruses used in
While the new cyber strategy covers far disinformation and related operations.
more than the disinformation challenge, • Expose includes the release on
what the policy could mean with respect to a selective basis of the details of
offensive counter-disinformation operations disinformation operations, including
became clear when The Washington Post personnel, methods, and specific
reported that around the time of the 2018 campaigns. This information could be
U.S. mid-term elections, USCYBERCOM provided to internet service providers
had attacked and temporarily disabled the (ISPs), social media companies, and
11Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
friendly third countries. Exposure seems to exist. Recognizing that much
could also include conveying such of the policy and operations is classified,
information to the media or to civil we offer the following assessment and
society groups that follow and combat recommendations with respect to the
disinformation, either directly or reported cyber tools:
through third parties, to out bad actors
and expose networks and operational Deploy the “hunt” and “surveillance” tools.
habits. Exposure will have different Use of the U.S. government’s cyber capacity
outcomes depending on the actor: to gain intelligence on state-sponsored
whereas Russia simply denies any disinformation operations, technical
accusations, regardless of the evidence details, and actors appears valuable. The
presented, China has, in the past, leads for such actions might have been
responded by reducing its attacks on placed elsewhere, e.g., in the intelligence
U.S. companies. community rather than in the military, but
it is important that they exist and are being
• Disable could include disrupting employed.
the infrastructure used to wage
disinformation operations through Expose (with tactical forethought) foreign
a variety of means (e.g., redirecting disinformation operations, especially to
command and control of adversary friendly governments, ISPs, social media
malware, degrading the infrastructure companies that are active and responsible
of prime Russian disinformation in countering disinformation, and civil
sites, and other means to target or society activists. In some cases, it may be
compromise systems). This was the advisable to filter such information so it
level of attack reportedly chosen reaches some (e.g., foreign civil society
against the IRA. activists) through third parties rather than
the U.S. government. USCYBERCOM or the
Under NSPM-13, as reported, NSA may not always be best placed to do
USCYBERCOM (with additional input liaison work with non-U.S. (and even some
from policy agencies) has a degree of U.S. non-U.S. government) partners, so a
latitude regarding which targets to choose. smooth interagency process for providing
Reportedly, the threshold for targeting relevant information to outside groups
Russian government entities, e.g., the GRU will be important. The NATO Strategic
cyber units responsible for the hacking Communications Center of Excellence
operations against the Democratic National in Riga and the Helsinki Hybrid CoE,
Committee’s computer system in 2016, especially by linking up with civil society
is higher than that for nominally non- activists, should organize themselves to act
Russian government bodies such as the IRA as early warning centers.
or proxies of the Russian government or
Kremlin. If accurate, this would be a wise Providing U.S., European, and other media
distinction to make, especially with respect with general information about Russian
to disabling operations. (and Chinese) disinformation operations —
exposing operational details, individual bad
Russian actors, and Russian organizations
Opportunities and and their foreign collaborators — seems
cautionary notes like sound policy. The IRA is now widely
known and the GRU’s cyber units are
The general appeal of applying cyber becoming so, but these are unlikely to
offense options to go after foreign be the only Russian entities engaged in
disinformation targets is clear, more or less disinformation and related activities. The
on the grounds of “they have it coming,” exposure of new names and organizations
and the capacity for effective action can limit future disinformation operations.
12Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
A subset of exposure can include reaching know that the U.S. government was aware
out directly to individuals engaged in of their activities and identities. That
disinformation (as USCYBERCOM is operation received broad support from
reported to have done with respect to those who follow disinformation because
employees of the IRA). According to the target was notorious, unofficial (though
various reports, many of these individuals a tool of the Kremlin), and had a long track
are ordinary, tech-savvy Russians not fully record of disinformation, including in the
aware of the impact or nature of their own United States.
activities. Letting them know that their
identities are known, that they can be It will be important to maintain this
exposed, and that sanctions (e.g., bans on relatively high bar for such operations
visas to the United States and Europe and/ going forward: targets chosen for active
or asset freezes) can be applied may have a disabling operations should be nefarious
deterrent effect. (i.e., major and not peripheral players in
disinformation, whether publicly known
Such operations must be carried out with or not). A high degree of confidence on
care. Decisions about when and how much attribution is key — while the Kremlin (or
to reveal about certain individuals associated Beijing) will likely deny any involvement
with disinformation, especially third- in information influence operations even
country enablers of Russian disinformation when presented with undeniable facts, that
operations (either witting or “useful idiots”), attempt at plausible deniability should not
should be considered on an interagency prevent our ability and intent to act.
basis, incorporating input from regional
experts from the State Department about While not familiar with the details of the
how to make best use of such revelations, classified NSPM-13, we recommend that
especially those involving third-country senior U.S. government interagency sign
nationals. In some cases, revelations about off be required for any cyber disabling
Russian disinformation operations can be operation against any foreign target. Using
provided discreetly, in small batches, to cyber means to go after Russian or other
credible media. In other cases, it might be countries’ assets carries risks of escalation
more effective to prepare bespoke counter- and retaliation beyond the disinformation
disinformation campaigns intended to blunt realm, potentially into targeting civilian
or preempt specific Russian campaigns. infrastructure more generally. This is not
Such decisions, and preparation for such an argument for inaction, but for care and
campaigns, should likewise be made with discipline.
strong interagency input.
Get organized. USCYBERCOM may be the
U.S. intelligence agencies are increasingly lead element of the U.S. government’s cyber
cooperating with both social media action, including counter-disinformation,
platforms and researchers to flag suspicious but it should not be responsible for
operations. A September 2020 takedown strategic decision making, including
of a (relatively small) IRA operation was an with respect to counter-disinformation.
example of successful cooperation between According to many in the U.S. government,
the U.S. government, platforms, and the interagency structure for counter-
researchers.38 disinformation remains weak, with lines
of authority unclear. This is especially true
Be judicious about disabling and disrupting with respect to Russia, for reasons related
disinformation targets. Few shed tears to Trump’s own benign views about Putin
over reports that in 2018 USCYBERCOM and resistance to accepting the facts about
temporarily shut down the IRA and let Kremlin disinformation operations during
some of the individuals working there the 2016 elections and those ongoing.
13Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
Ft Meade, MD - U.S. Cyber Command is employing a new virtual training platform, the Persistent
Cyber Training Environment, during Cyber Flag 20-2. Over a period of two weeks, Cyber Flag 20-2 will
host more than 500 personnel worldwide, spanning nine different time zones and 17 cyber teams.
Credit: U.S. Cyber Command photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Jon Dasbach.
No private cyber “disabling” action. disinformation targets, risk triggering
Involvement of civil society in countering unwanted cycles of escalation and should
disinformation — offense as well as not be part of the menu of offensive tools.
defense — can be critical. Civil society
and research groups, e.g., Bellingcat, Cyber offense is an essential, not decisive,
the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic tool in the counter-disinformation tool kit.
Research Lab, the Stanford Internet The tools of cyber offense, already in play,
Observatory, EU DisinfoLab, and private are apt to be useful to limit the threat and
companies such as Graphika have played thus worth pursuing. But we also suspect
a key role in defense against Russian that their effectiveness will be at the
disinformation by uncovering campaigns margins. This is often as good as it gets, but
and exposing methods. They are already we should not expect that cyber offense
significant actors helping to surveil and against disinformation will prove decisive.
expose Russian disinformation operations. We have entered a shadow world of move
As noted above, we recommend robust and countermove in the cyber realm and
(and hopefully real-time) exchange its disinformation subset. USCYBERCOM’s
of information. Disabling operations and other U.S. government cyber tools
initiated by private cyber actors, however, are useful but, as they themselves would
even directed against non-official state acknowledge, incomplete.
14Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
Sanctions (and Other Ukraine-related sanctions authorities, but
by that time Prigozhin was publicly known
Financial) Tools to be a supporter of the IRA. EO 13757 was
more usable than its 2015 predecessor, EO
Sanctions have been used since the end 13694, which it amended, but still provided
of the Obama administration against a high bar to sanctions against malicious
Russian purveyors of disinformation, cyber actors engaged in disinformation
though not with a focus commensurate operations.
with the threat. Headroom remains for
additional action using existing authorities The Trump administration has had its
and options exist for other forms of own challenges addressing Russian
financial pressure against purveyors of disinformation directed against the
disinformation. By sanctions, we mean United States (not least due to Trump’s
exercise of the Treasury Department’s reluctance to acknowledge its existence).
authorities under the International Nevertheless, in September 2018, the
Emergency Economic Powers Act Trump administration issued EO 13848
(IEPPA), which essentially allow the U.S. providing broader authority for the
government to freeze the assets of a foreign U.S. government to impose sanctions
person — physical or legal — within the against those interfering in a U.S. election
United States and to cut off that person (EO 13848’s preamble explicitly notes
from use of and access to the U.S. dollar. “covert distribution of propaganda and
Because of the extent of the dollar’s use disinformation” as part of the national
in global finance, being placed under full security threat that the EO seeks to
Treasury blocking sanctions means that address).41 One year later, the Trump
the sanctioned person is effectively cut off administration imposed its first sanctions
from the global financial system. using this EO: it designated the IRA as a
whole, six of its employees (four of whom
A slow start for sanctions options. Aware had been previously designated under
of Russian disinformation operations EOs 13694 and 13757), and identified some
during the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Prigozhin-owned companies and property,
the Obama administration issued such as luxury aircraft and a yacht.42
Executive Order 13757 on December 28,
2016 (well after the elections) and used To escalate pressure on purveyors of
it to impose full blocking sanctions on disinformation, we recommend the
Russian targets which had engaged in following:
malicious activities against the United
States, including election interference. • Intensify the use of existing sanctions
These targets included three small authorities after the 2020 election
Russian cyber companies, four Russian cycle. EO 13848 should be deployed
individuals, the Russian intelligence as post-election analysis reveals the
service (FSB), and the GRU.39 These latter extent of disinformation operations.
targets are prominent, but unlikely to Potential targets should include
suffer much due to sanctions. Around individuals engaged in disinformation
the same time, the U.S. government also operations, organizations that generate
imposed full blocking sanctions on Yevgeny disinformation (the IRA is probably not
Prigozhin, nicknamed “Putin’s chef,” who the only such Russian outfit), and their
has functioned as a conduit for funding funding sources. Any financial dealings
aggressive Russian operations in Ukraine, with already-sanctioned individuals
Syria, and (more recently) Africa.40 The and organizations would provide
Obama administration designated (i.e., grounds for derivative sanctions against
sanctioned) Prigozhin using separate such persons. So, collaborators, agents,
funders, and business partners of
15Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
disinformation operators or operations, DETER and DASKA mandate strong
whether Russian, U.S., or third-country financial and other sanctions should
nationals, would be subject to being the administration determine that
sanctioned. Discretion, especially when election interference has taken place.
contemplating third-country or U.S. DETER mandates sanctions on major
individuals, is wise; sanctioning on Russian state banks and energy
auto pilot would not be. The net result companies (potentially including
of a such a Russia-focused sanctions Gazprom), new sovereign debt, and
program, if applied rigorously (at the Russian oligarchs. DASKA (in the
level of the current Iran sanctions version approved in December 2019
program, for example), could be by the Senate Foreign Relations
to expose and isolate the Russian Committee) includes sanctions on
disinformation apparatus. individuals with corrupt ties to Putin,
their family members who benefit
To implement such a program, resources at from such dealings and persons who
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control facilitate such ties; investments in
(OFAC), which administers financial Russian LNG projects outside Russia;
sanctions, would need to be increased new sovereign debt; and financial
to allow for targeting research. The institutions that support election
intelligence community and USCYBERCOM interference.
could also furnish OFAC with potential
targets, as could the State Department, In general, DASKA’s sanctions provisions
drawing on its contacts with civil seem more practical than DETER’s.
society groups that monitor the Russian DETER’s full blocking sanctions against
disinformation network. major Russian state banks risk financial
blowback and its full blocking sanctions
• Develop new sanctions authorities. against Russian energy companies could
Pending legislation, including the disrupt world energy flows and expose
Defending Elections from Threats by European customers. The sanctions
Establishing Redlines Act [DETER, authorities should be refined if and as
introduced by U.S. Sens. Marco Rubio the bills advance.
(R-FL) and Chris Van Hollen (D-
MD)]; and the Defending American • Establish powerful but contingency
Security Against Kremlin Aggression sanctions to deter future Russian and
Act [DASKA, introduced by U.S. Sen. Chinese election interference. This is a
Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and Robert sound approach (and a better practice
Menendez (D-NJ)] include provisions than imposing sanctions for past
for escalating sanctions and other malicious behavior). But while election
economic pressure in response interference, the target of these bills,
to interference in the 2020 U.S. can include disinformation, it is a
elections.43 DETER explicitly includes far bigger and broader category of
disinformation in its definition of malicious action than disinformation.
election interference. DASKA, in its Strong sanctions can be imposed
current iteration, does not. Instead, it for the first time only once, and
focuses more on the administration to establish deterrence, the bar for
of elections, though its definition action should either be placed high or
could include certain forms of with some flexibility to impose some
disinformation, e.g., if it impeded sanctions in response to disinformation
voting rights. New versions of these and more in response to additional,
acts are likely to be introduced in the aggressive election interference, such as
next session of Congress, which starts attacks on election infrastructure.
in January 2021.
16Democratic Offense Against Disinformation
• Apply additional tools of financial Cyber offense and sanctions can put
statecraft. Sanctions are not the only pressure on disinformation networks
options in the offensive arsenal against and may provide a measure of deterrence
disinformation. Putin’s ruling elite against election interference that includes
and their supporters are known to disinformation. Support for free media,
keep their personal wealth hidden in if sustained, can be a strategic tool that
offshore accounts. Those who attack the challenges the brittleness, and exposes the
democratic West appear to have more corruption and brutality of the Russian and
confidence in it and its financial system Chinese systems that use disinformation
than that of their own country. Working in aggression abroad and to sustain
with the UK and the EU, the United themselves at home. Disinformation is
States should develop and implement a weapon of authoritarians; support for
authorities to restrict hidden Russian freedom of information is part of the
wealth flowing anonymously to high- arsenal of democracy. We have options,
end real estate (in London, Miami, but they must be curated to each country’s
New York, and other locations) and media landscape.
through anonymous limited liability
companies (LLCs) into the United Russia’s media landscape. One of Putin’s
States. For reasons of good financial first steps as he imposed authoritarian
practice and anti-corruption, the United governance on Russia was to seize control
States, together with key allies (the UK, of independent television networks,
especially), should develop and enforce forcing some of its leaders out of the
standards of transparency. The United country. 44 State-owned/Kremlin-controlled
States and key allies could, however, media, both television and radio, dominate
prioritize identifying and exposing broadcasting and have for many years.
the funds and money flows of key The last remaining independent television
players in the Kremlin disinformation network — Dozhd (rain in Russian) — is
world and respond asymmetrically under pressure from Russian authorities
to disinformation campaigns by but has not yet been shut down. Some
constricting Putin and his cronies’ independent (or semi-independent) radio
financial freedom. Financial forensics stations, such as Ekho Moskvy (Echo of
can also reveal proxy networks and Moscow in Russian), continue to function,
infrastructure preparations for future also under pressure. Print journalism has
influence campaigns, which can greater latitude for free expression, e.g.,
enhance preemptive measure to disable Moskovskiy Komsomolets and especially
such networks before an attack is Novaya Gazeta (recalling to some extent
carried out. the Soviet practice of allowing some
publications somewhat greater editorial
latitude in an effort to limit disaffection).
‘The Truth Shall Set
You Free’: Support for The internet in Russia, however,
remains a space of contested freedom,
Free Media with independent journalists and civil
society struggling with state attempts to
Support for free media — in this case exert control and massive state trolling
for the purpose of fighting Russian and operations. Using social media platforms
Chinese disinformation with support for (YouTube is currently popular), a new
true information — may sound naïve. It generation of Russians is creating a
shouldn’t. In fact, of the offensive options proliferating community of pointed,
we regard it as having the greatest long- independent, and investigative online
term potential against disinformation. journalism. For example, Roman
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