Dauphin County Reporter - THE ADVANCE SHEET
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ADVANCE SHEET Pages 478-509
THE
Dauphin County Reporter (USPS 810-200)
A WEEKLY JOURNAL
CONTAINING THE DECISIONS RENDERED IN THE
12th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
No. 5547, Vol. 122 March 31, 2006 No. 139
Entered as Second Class Matter, February 16, 1898, at the Post Office at Harrisburg, Pa.,
under the Act of Congress of March 31, 1879
Commonwealth v. Taylor 478
Bar Association Page Inside Back CoverTHE ESTATE OF KYLE K. DIETRICH a/k/a
DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTER KYLE KEVIN DIETRICH, late of Halifax
Edited and Published Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (died
by the
March 3, 2006). Executrix: Corrine Dietrich, 18
DAUPHIN COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION Maple Avenue, Halifax, PA 17032. Attorney:
213 North Front Street Earl Richard Etzweiler, Esq., 105 North Front
Harrisburg, PA 17101-1493 Street, Harrisburg, PA 17101. Phone (717) 234-
(717) 232-7536
____________ 5600. m31-a14
DONALD MORGAN
Executive Director
JOYCE TAMBOLAS
Administrative Assistant ESTATE OF WILLIAM COOPER a/k/a
BRIDGETTE L. HILBISH WILLIAM G. COOPER, late of Middle Paxton
Office Assistant
___________ Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania.
Printed by Executrix: Jeannette Marie Weller, 3511 Fishing
KURZENKNABE PRESS Creek Valley Road, Harrisburg, PA 17112.
1424 Herr St., Harrisburg, PA 17103 Attorney: Theresa L. Shade, Esq., Wix, Wenger
& Weider, 4705 Duke Street, Harrisburg, PA
THE DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTER (USPS
810-200) is published weekly by the Dauphin 17109-3099. m31-a14
County Bar Association, 213 North Front Street,
Harrisburg, PA 17101. Periodical postage paid at
Harrisburg, PA. POSTMASTER: Send address
changes to THE DAUPHIN COUNTY
SECOND PUBLICATION
REPORTER, 213 North Front Street, Harrisburg,
PA 17101.
ESTATE OF CATHERINE E. ALLEMAN,
TERMS
late of the City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County,
For NON-MEMBERS of the
Dauphin County Bar Association: Pennsylvania. Executrix: Patricia L. Lietman, 57
Bound Volume 120 ________________$125.00 Walsh Road, Halifax, PA 17032. Attorney: David
Advance Sheets, Volume 121 ________$ 90.00 H. Stone, Esq., Stone LaFaver & Shekletski, 414
For MEMBERS of the Bridge Street, P.O. Box E, New Cumberland, PA
Dauphin County Bar Association: 17070. m24-a7
Bound Volume 120 ________________$ 90.00
Advance Sheets, Volume 121 ________$ 75.00
Advertisements must be received before 12
o’clock noon on Tuesday of each week at the office
of the Dauphin County Reporter, 213 North Front ESTATE OF SYBLE D. HUMMER, late of
Street, Harrisburg, PA 17101. Lower Paxton Township, Dauphin County, Penn-
Telephone (717) 232-7536 sylvania. Executrix: Alyce E. Taylor, 4511 Goose
Valley Road, Dauphin, PA 17112-2172. Attorney:
Estate Notices Melanie Walz Scaringi, Esq., Scaringi &
Scaringi, P.C., 2000 Linglestown Road, Suite
DECEDENTS ESTATES 103, Harrisburg, PA 17110. m24-a7
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that letters
testamentary or of administration have been
granted in the following estates. All persons
indebted to the estate are required to make
payment, and those having claims or demands to ESTATE OF VICTORIA BOZIC, late of
present the same without delay to the administra- Susquehanna Township, Dauphin County,
tors or executors or their attorneys named below. Pennsylvania (died January 29, 2006). Co-
FIRST PUBLICATION Executors: Anthony Covic, 9803 Abbey Road,
North Royalton, OH 44133 and Ljerka Jelovic,
ESTATE OF ALLEN A. DODD, late of the 6055 Locklie Drive, Highland Heights, OH
City of Harrisburg, Dauphin County, Pennsyl- 44143. Attorney: David C. Miller, Jr., Esq., 1100
vania. Executor: William A. Dodd, 2815 Parrish Spring Garden Drive, Suite A, Middletown, PA
Street, Philadelphia, PA 19130. Attorney: James 17057. Phone (717) 939-9806. m24-a7
H. Rowland, Jr., Esq., 812 N. 17th Street,
Harrisburg, PA 17103. m31-a14ESTATE OF LUCILLE W. FARLING a/k/a
SECOND PUBLICATION LUCILLE R. FARLING, late of the Borough of
Hummelstown, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania
Estate Notices (died February 24, 2006). Executor: Michael K.
Farling, 870 Fairhaven Road, Hummelstown, PA
17036. Attorney: Jean D. Seibert, Esq., Wion,
ESTATE OF ROLAND H. RADER, late of Zulli & Seibert, 109 Locust Street, Harrisburg,
Middletown Borough, Dauphin County, Penn- PA 17101. m17-m31
sylvania (died January 23, 2006). Executor:
Jeffrey P. Tessier. Attorney: Marielle F. Hazen,
Esq., 2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 202,
Harrisburg, PA 17110. m24-a7 ESTATE OF GEORGE CHARNEY, JR., late
of Lower Paxton Township, Dauphin County,
Pennsylvania (died February 21, 2006).
Executrix: Kathleen A. LoPiccolo, 4300 Fritchey
ESTATE OF DAVID E. NIMAL, late of Street, Harrisburg, PA 17109. Attorney: L. Rex
Williamstown Borough, Dauphin County, Bickley, Esq., 114 South Street, Harrisburg, PA
Pennsylvania (died March 13, 2006). Executrix: 17101. m17-m31
Lauren E. Nimal, 312 Walnut Street, Apt. B,
Lemoyne, PA 17043-1646. Attorney: Steve C.
Nicholas, Esq., Nicholas Law Offices PC, 2215
ESTATE OF GERALD R. LUPP a/k/a
Forest Hills Drive, Suite 37, Harrisburg, PA
GERALD LUPP, late of Harrisburg, Dauphin
17112-1099. m24-a7
County, Pennsylvania (died January 24, 2006).
Administrator / Attorney: Bruce J. Warshawsky,
Esq., Cunningham & Chernicoff, P.C., 2320
North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110.
ESTATE OF ESTHER H. BOGAR, late of m17-m31
Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (died January 28,
2006). Co-Executors: Jerry H. Bogar, 1090
Cardinal Drive, Harrisburg, PA 17111 and Sally
Bogar Hedstrom, 403 Columbus Avenue, ESTATE OF HAZEL S. YOUCH, late of
Frederick, MD 21701. Attorney: Elyse E. Rogers, South Hanover Township, Dauphin County,
Esq., Keefer Wood Allen & Rahal LLP, Suite Pennsylvania. Executor: Daniel F. Youch, 1042
301, 415 Fallowfield Road, Camp Hill, PA Fitzgerald Street, Salinas, CA 93906. Attorney:
17011. m24-a7 Charles J. DeHart, III, Esq., Caldwell & Kearns,
13 East Main Street, Hummelstown, PA 17036.
m17-m31
ESTATE OF PHYLLIS L. RAY, late of
Marysville, Perry County, Pennsylvania (died
ESTATE OF MARGARET L. HARTRANFT,
August 30, 2005). Executor: Mark T. Fesler, 15
late of the Borough of Middletown, Dauphin
Cold Springs Road, Marysville, PA 17053.
County, Pennsylvania (died February 21, 2006).
m24-a7
Executor: Larry A. Hartman, 29 Almond Drive,
Hershey, PA 17033. Attorney: Stanley A. Smith,
Esq., Rhoads & Sinon LLP, One S. Market
Square, P.O. Box 1146, Harrisburg, PA 17108-
THIRD PUBLICATION
1146. m17-m31
ESTATE OF SANDRA A. MCRAE a/k/a
SANDRA A. ROBBINS, late of Lower Swatara
Township, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. ESTATE OF WILLIAM MCCULLOUGH, late
Executor: A. Michael McRae. Attorney: Michael of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania (died February
C. McBratnie, Esq., Fox Rothschild, LLP, 760 18, 2006). Executor: Brian C. Napper, 4239
Constitution Drive, Suite 104, P.O. Box 673, Beaufort Hunt Drive, Harrisburg, PA. Attorney:
Exton, PA 19341-0673. m17-m31 Carl G. Wass, Esq., Caldwell & Kearns, 3631
North Front Street, Harrisburg, PA 17110-1533.
m17-m31478 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Given the present factual and procedural posture of this case, we now
direct the Court Administrator to follow Dauph.R.C.P. 1915.3(3) and
assign this case to a Custody Conference Officer.
ORDER
AND NOW, January 18, 2006, the Dauphin County Court
Administrator is directed to assign the pending Complaint in Custody to
a Custody Conference Officer.
_______o_______
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Crimes and criminal procedure — Jury view — Evidence — Co-defendant’s redact-
ed confession — Hearsay — Sufficiency of evidence — Weight of evidence —
Transcript.
Defendant and his Co-Defendant were both sentenced to life impris-
onment after being convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and
other serious crimes in connection with a drug-related killing. He then
raised six issues in his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal.
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Opinion. C.P., Dau. Co., No. 2430 CR 2003.
1. Absent an abuse of discretion, the denial of a request for a jury view will not be over-
turned. Commonwealth v. McNeal, 545 Pa. 42, 679 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. 1996).
2. Those portions of a statement made by an out-of-court declarant which are not incul-
patory, such as statements that another person was not guilty of the crime, are not declara-
tions against penal interest and are not admissible under the hearsay rule exception.
Commonwealth v. Brickle, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. 1984).
3. Whether or not testimony should be read to the jury “rests within the discretion of the
trial court.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663, 677 (2003).
4. The standard for the sufficiency of evidence is whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences favor-
able to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to find every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Palette, 531 Pa. 384, 613 A.2d 548, 549
(1992).
5. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court. A new trial should be awarded when a jury’s verdict is so con-
trary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice ... the evidence must be so tenuous,
vague and uncertain that the verdict shock’s the conscience of the court ... Commonwealth
v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).
6. If the grounds asserted in the post-sentence motion do not require a transcript,
neither the briefs nor hearing nor argument on the post-sentence motion shall be delayed
for transcript preparation. Pa.R.Cr.P. 720(B)(2)(c).478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 479
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Francis T. Chardo, for the Commonwealth
Justine J. McShane, for Defendant
CLARK, J., January 19, 2006 –
BACKGROUND
This matter stems from the somewhat infamous “Italian Lake
Murder” case. In the early morning hours of November 1, 2000, in a
beautiful urban park located in the historic uptown section of the City of
Harrisburg, a brutal, gunshot murder occurred. The victim of that slay-
ing was a local young woman, Ms. Hayde Freytes (hereinafter referred
to as either the Victim or Cachi, her nickname), who was shot to death,
with gunshot wounds in both her head and hand. Although the law
enforcement authorities instantly launched a vigorous investigation to
determine who perpetrated this vicious crime, they were unable to accu-
mulate enough evidence to bring a successful prosecution for this
heinous murder until several years after the event.
However, through the dedication and efforts of the Dauphin County
District Attorney and his staff, together with local and state law
enforcement authorities, especially the Harrisburg City Police
Department, all working in conjunction with the Second Dauphin
County Investigative Grand Jury, the case was finally developed to a
sufficient level for charges to be filed against the perpetrators. This
writing is in response to the appeal filed by one of the convicted mur-
derers in this case.
The Commonwealth charged the above-listed Defendant, Glenn D.
Taylor (Defendant Taylor), along with his Co-Defendant, Mwandishi G.
Mitchell (Defendant Mitchell), with the murder of Ms. Freytes, and also
with several other very serious crimes associated with that criminal
episode. After a rather lengthy jury trial, both Defendants were convict-
ed and sentenced to life imprisonment. Post-Trial Motions were filed
and denied, and a direct appeal to the Superior Court was filed.1 This
Opinion is being submitted to the Superior Court for its consideration in
determining that appeal.
1. Very similar separate direct appeals have been filed by both Defendants, Mr. Taylor
and Mr. Mitchell; however, we are addressing the specific appeal issues raised by
Defendant Taylor in this Opinion. The appeal of Defendant Mitchell raises many of the
same or similar issues as are raised by Mr. Taylor and addressed herein, however we nev-
ertheless find it appropriate to issue a separate full Opinion with regard to Defendant
Mitchell’s appeal issues so that there is no confusion regarding the basis for our rulings
regarding his (Mitchell’s) case.480 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
The Victim was a heroin-addicted prostitute in the Harrisburg area
who bought drugs from Defendant Mitchell, and also sold drugs to help
support her drug habit. Defendant Mitchell worked for Defendant Taylor
who was his (Mitchell’s) supplier of the drugs. Defendant Mitchell sold
drugs directly, and had other persons selling drugs for him. The Victim
was one of those “other persons” that sold drugs for Defendant Mitchell.
Defendant Taylor also supplied drugs to other people, including Mr.
Samuel Taggert. Mr. Taggert witnessed the Victim steal drugs from
Defendant Mitchell. Defendant Mitchell had given the Victim drugs to
sell for him (Mitchell) on a consignment basis, sometimes referred to as
“fronting” drugs. However, rather than selling the drugs and returning
the proceeds to Mitchell, she (Victim) absconded with the drugs and
refused to pay Defendant Mitchell for them.
Defendant Mitchell was angry with the Victim for absconding with
his drugs. Aside from stealing his drugs (which really belonged to
Defendant Taylor), word on the street had reached Mr. Mitchell that the
Victim was calling him (Mitchell) a “pussy” and that she refused to
repay him. Mr. Taggert witnessed Defendant Mitchell offer a Fifty
Dollar bounty for anyone who would assault the Victim. Mr. Taggert
also witnessed Defendant Mitchell attempt to personally assault the
Victim until a crowd gathered and he stopped his assault.
Approximately two weeks before the murder, Defendant Mitchell
went to the home of the Victim’s friend, Ms. Luisa Andujar, to find the
Victim. The Victim was hiding upstairs and Ms. Andujar did not permit
Defendant Mitchell to enter her home. After he left, the Victim, obvious-
ly scared and crying, confided to Ms. Andujar that if she (Victim) did not
repay Defendant Mitchell for the heroin she had stolen by October 31,
2000, he would kill her.
Ms. Dena Russell claimed to be the Victim’s best friend and also
claimed she and the Victim would “hang out” together in the Allison Hill
neighborhood of Harrisburg. Ms. Russell stated that they would get high
together on drugs, prostitute themselves, and rob people to get money to
buy more drugs. She stated that the Victim had stolen drugs from many
other people besides the Defendants.
Ms. Rosemarie (Rose) Shroy was also a drug-addicted prostitute who
lived in the Harrisburg area and knew the Victim from “the streets.” In
the fateful early morning hours of the murder, at or about 1:00 A. M.,
the Defendants found Ms. Shroy attempting to prostitute herself on the
corner of Third and Reily Streets in Harrisburg. The Defendants were478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 481
Commonwealth v. Taylor
driving in Defendant Taylor’s blue station wagon. Defendant Mitchell
was the driver, Defendant Taylor was the front-seat passenger, and in
the back seat were Ms. Linda Williams (Defendant Taylor’s girlfriend)
and Mr. Hafeese Nelson (Defendant Taylor’s son). Mr. Nelson was also
allegedly involved in Defendant Taylor’s drug operation.
The Defendants asked Ms. Shroy if she wanted to “party” and tempt-
ed her with drugs and money to join them. Ms. Shroy entered the vehi-
cle on the right-rear passenger side. The Defendants then asked Ms.
Shroy to take them to the Victim because they wanted another girl to
party with. Ms. Shroy, not perceiving any sinister intent at that time, told
them that the Victim could probably be found near the Sun Ray Cafe at
the corner of Third and Seneca Streets in Harrisburg.
The Defendants indeed found the Victim attempting to prostitute her-
self at that very street corner. The Victim could not immediately identi-
fy Defendant Mitchell because he had a black, hooded sweatshirt pulled
up which obscured his face. Ms. Shroy called to the Victim and, after
seeing her friend (Ms. Shroy), the Victim decided to enter the vehicle.
Defendant Taylor insisted that the Victim sit up front in-between himself
and Defendant Mitchell. The Victim entered the front of the vehicle fol-
lowed by Defendant Taylor. It was only after she was trapped in the mid-
dle of the front seat of the vehicle that she recognized Defendant
Mitchell. She gasped and Defendant Mitchell looked at her and said,
“that’s right bitch.” Defendant Mitchell then struck her with the back of
his hand and pulled a gun on her.
Defendant Mitchell then gave the gun to Defendant Taylor and he
(Mitchell) began driving to Italian Lake. The Defendants punched the
Victim and Defendant Taylor stuffed a sock or rag down her throat and
restrained her. When they reached Italian Lake at or about Third Street,
Defendant Taylor dragged the Victim out of the car. Defendant Mitchell
said, “I can take this” and took the gun and grabbed the Victim by the
throat. Both Defendants then dragged the Victim into the Italian Lake
park.
Mr. Nelson asked the Defendants, “what should I do with her?” refer-
ring to Ms. Shroy. At that point, Ms. Shroy, fearing for her own life,
opened the right rear door of the vehicle door and fled. As she was flee-
ing, she heard three gunshots.
Mr. Joseph Dudick lived at 260 Edward Street in Harrisburg, which is
located across the street from Italian Lake, and his bedroom window
faced the park. He was awoken sometime after 1:30 by a noise that482 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
sounded like the crack of a gunshot and by voices coming from the park.
A few minutes later, after possibly falling back asleep, he heard another
noise which also sounded like the crack of a gunshot. At this point, Mr.
Dudick arose from his bed and looked out his window. He could not see
anything (he later determined that a tree was blocking his view of the
park) but he nevertheless decided to call the police.
Mr. Dudick returned to bed and less than five minutes later heard the
sounds of a vehicle. He looked outside and saw a vehicle which he
described as either a station wagon or a small SUV parked across the
street by the park. He then saw a man run up out of the park, get in the
vehicle, and speed away. Mr. Dudick only saw the man’s silhouette but
indicated that he was similar in shape and size to Defendant Taylor.
Mr. Joseph Krauss was a private security guard who drove a certain
route to check on different buildings and ensure they were secure at
night. Part of Mr. Krauss’ regular security patrol route allegedly took
him along Edward Street, past Italian Lake, and past Third Street. Mr.
Krauss claims that he drove past Italian Lake and saw the Victim and an
unidentified black male standing on Edward Street near Italian Lake.
His log sheet for the inspection of the building down the block that he
had recently checked (located at Front and Edward Streets) stated the
time was 1:50 A.M. when he was at that premises. However, Mr.
Krauss’ log sheet had been inexplicably altered with white-out. Further,
Mr. Krauss admitted to seeing the Victim’s picture in a local newspaper
prior to picking her face out of a photo array shown to him by the
Harrisburg Police.
The police investigators were not able to find any physical evidence
to connect the Defendants to these crimes. Furthermore, Dr. Neil A.
Hoffman, the Defendant’s expert witness pathologist, testified that, in
his (Hoffman’s) opinion, the description of the alleged beating of the
Victim while in the station-wagon did not match the autopsy photo-
graphic evidence. Dr. Wayne K. Ross, pathologist for the
Commonwealth, testified that the gunshot to the Victim’s head may have
masked previous trauma, and therefore her beating injuries were not
specifically noticeable.
Defendant Mitchell made incriminating statements to two inmates
while he was in Dauphin County Prison. Both Mr. Nathaniel Holmes
and Mr. Alexis Morales testified that Defendant Mitchell admitted that
the Victim owed him money for drugs. Defendant Mitchell told Mr.
Holmes to tell his (Holmes’) cousin, Ms. Kenae Navorro, to stay in New478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 483
Commonwealth v. Taylor
York so she could not testify against him (Mitchell). Mr. Morales stated
that while Defendant Mitchell was discussing his (Mitchell’s) murder
charge, Defendant Mitchell said he (Mitchell) could “get away with it”
because the Commonwealth had no evidence against him.
Defendant Taylor also made incriminating statements while he was
incarcerated. Mr. Daniel Chacon testified that Defendant Taylor stated
that the Victim was shot in the head and in the hand. Defendant Taylor
also told Mr. Chacon that the Victim had stolen heroin from him
(Taylor). Mr. Keith Penrose Johnson, in his testimony before the
Investigating Grand Jury, stated that Defendant Taylor admitted to com-
mitting a murder and that he (Taylor) shot his victim in the head and in
the hand.
Ms. Cynthia Williams testified that she attended a Halloween Party
with Defendant Taylor on the night of the murder. However, she also
stated that she left the party at 11:00 P.M., three hours before the mur-
der. Ms. Linda Williams (who was allegedly Defendant Taylor’s girl-
friend, and also present in the vehicle on the night of the murder) testi-
fied that she was at the Halloween party until 1:00 A.M. with Defendant
Taylor, and that she spent the night with Mr. Taylor. However, Linda
Williams’ testimony before the Investigating Grand Jury stated that she
did not know where Defendant Taylor was on the night of the murder.
Although there were numerous other witnesses at trial, we believe
that the foregoing synopsis provides an accurate portrait of the main
events and witnesses in this case, and sets the stage for our further dis-
cussion of the matters which Defendant Taylor asserts entitle him to
relief. We note that all the evidence, both physical and testimonial, has
been preserved in the Record.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The criminal charges against Defendant Taylor were brought on April
4, 2003. Formal arraignment occurred on August 6, 2003. Defendant
Taylor, together with his Co-Defendant Mitchell, were jointly tried
before a jury, with this Court as the presiding trial judge, from December
6th through 15th, 2004. At the conclusion of the trial, Defendant Taylor
and his Co-Defendant, Mr. Mitchell, were convicted of Second Degree
Murder, Kidnapping, Criminal Conspiracy to commit Kidnapping,
Unlawful Restraint, Criminal Conspiracy to commit Unlawful Restraint,
and Carrying a Firearm Without a License. Defendant Taylor was imme-
diately sentenced on December 15, 2004, after the verdict, and at his484 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
(Taylor’s) specific request, and after a full counseled colloquy, on the
record, concerning his pre-sentencing rights, including his right to the
preparation of a Pre-Sentence Report. This Court specifically conclud-
ed, after said colloquy, that Defendant Taylor made a knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary decision to forego his pre-sentencing rights, as afore-
said, and we proceeded at that time to impose sentences upon him for his
crimes.
Defendant Taylor filed a Post-Sentencing Motion on January 10,
2005. After a thorough review by this Court of its notes and the record
of the case, that Motion was denied on April 21, 2005. A timely appeal
to the Superior Court followed. Pursuant to this Court’s 1925(b) Order,
a Statement of Matters Complained Of on appeal was filed by Defendant
Taylor on June 8, 2005.
ISSUES
The following issues were raised in the Defendant’s Statement of
Matters Complained Of on appeal:
1. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S PRETRIAL MOTION
IN LIMINE TO CONDUCT A JURY VIEW OF THE
CRIME SCENE AT ITALIAN LAKE.
2. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ONLY
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A REDACTED
STATEMENT GIVEN BY MWANDISHI MITCHELL
WHICH WAS MADE TO DETECTIVE DONALD
HEFFNER.
3. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING THE TESTIMONY OF ROSEMARIE SHROY
TO BE READ BACK TO THE JURY.
4. WHEN THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT OF
GUILTY [ON THE CHARGES] THE VERDICT WAS
SO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AS TO
SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE AND TO
MAKE THE AWARD OF A NEW TRIAL IMPERA-
TIVE, SO THAT RIGHT MAY BE GIVEN ANOTH-
ER OPPORTUNITY TO PREVAIL.
5. THE JURY’S VERDICT, EVEN WHEN VIEWED IN
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VER-478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 485
Commonwealth v. Taylor
DICT WINNER, AND EVEN WITH THE BENEFIT
OF ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE
DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI-
CIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY.
6. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RELYING
UPON THE DAUPHIN COUNTY COURT’S PRIOR
RULING IN COMMONWEALTH V. BORDNER, 121
Dauph. 211 (Dauph. Co. 2002) WHEN IT DENIED
UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL’S REQUEST FOR A
TRANSCRIPTION OF THE NOTES OF TESTIMO-
NY IN ORDER TO AID THE DEFENDANT IN PRO-
MULGATING HIS POST-SENTENCING
MOTIONS.
Due to our need to address issues of the Sufficiency of the Evidence
during our discussion of the Weight of the Evidence, we will address the
issue of the Sufficiency of the Evidence (Issue #5) prior to addressing
the issue of Weight of the Evidence (Issue #4).
DISCUSSION
1. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED THE DEFENDANT’S PRETRIAL MOTION
IN LIMINE TO CONDUCT A JURY VIEW OF THE
CRIME SCENE AT ITALIAN LAKE.
The Defendant claims “it was imperative for the jury to view the Lake
in order for the jury to discern the physical layout of the [crime] scene.”
(Brief in Support of Matters Complained Of on Appeal, P. 5). Rule 643
of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure states, “the trial judge
may in the judge’s discretion order a view by a jury.” Pa.R.Cr.P. 643(A).
“Absent an abuse of discretion, the denial of a request for a jury view
will not be overturned.” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 545 Pa. 42, 679
A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. 1996).
We did not believe that a jury view was necessary in the case at bar.
There were ample and lengthy full-color videos of the entire Italian Lake
area displayed to the jury on very good video equipment, and there were
other exhibits as well for the jury to understand all the necessary and rel-
evant physical characteristics of the entire murder scene and adjacent
areas. It is our firm belief that all of these additional forms of demon-
strative evidence were more than sufficient to assist the jury to properly
assess what actually happened on the night of the murder.486 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Although the Defendant claims that a jury view would help the jury
understand the physical layout of the crime scene, he does not specifi-
cally explain why or how the physical layout is relevant to his case. For
example, the exact topography may have been relevant if the Defendant
was alleging that an eyewitness’ view of the crime was obscured.
However, in the case at bar, no eyewitness saw the actual commission of
the crime. We also note that the topography may have changed as the
trial was held four years after the crime occurred.
Finally, we have no reason to believe that the jury was confused or
was unable to understand the physical facts and/or spatial aspects of the
case due to a lack of a jury view. Therefore, to avoid the tremendous bur-
den, apparent waste of time, and unnecessary expense of transporting
the jury to and from the crime scene, we denied the Defendant’s Motion,
since such a trip would have added little, if anything, to the well-pre-
pared and numerous exhibits which accurately depicted all the relevant
areas associated with the murder.
2. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ONLY
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE A REDACTED
STATEMENT GIVEN BY MWANDISHI MITCHELL
WHICH WAS MADE TO DETECTIVE DONALD
HEFFNER.
At trial, Defendant Taylor introduced the following statement made
by Defendant Mitchell to Detective Donald Heffner of the Harrisburg
Police Department during a stationhouse interview:
Q: Had Cachi ever ripped anyone else that you know of?
A: I don’t know.
Q. Did you tell the other guy that Cachi ripped you off?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you tell the other guy about?
A: I told him the money was going to be $100.00 short
because she ran off.
Q: What did the other guy say about that?
A: The other guy said that I was supposed to be watch-
ing her and that was supposed to come out of my
money.478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 487
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Q: Was the other guy mad?
A: Not to me.
Q: Did the other guy ever mention it again?
A: No.
Q: Did the other guy take it out of your money?
A: Yes.
Notes of Testimony p. 783 lines 3-19.
The above statement had been redacted, prior to trial, to substitute “the
other guy” for the name Glenn Taylor, the Defendant. On appeal,
Defendant Taylor claims that this statement should not have been redact-
ed as it tended to negate Defendant Taylor’s motive to kill the Victim.
Defendant Taylor contends that this is because the statement showed that
Defendant Taylor never actually lost any money because he was reim-
bursed for his loss out of Defendant Mitchell’s share. Defendant Taylor
also asserts that the statement also tended to show that he (Taylor) was
not angry because he never mentioned the incident again.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123; 88 S.Ct. 1620 (1968), the
United States Supreme Court ruled that a defendant’s constitutional
rights are violated when his non-testifying co-defendant’s confession,
which implicates the defendant, is introduced at their joint trial.
Consistent with the holding in Bruton, we ordered Defendant Mitchell’s
statements redacted to protect Defendant Taylor from being implicated
by a statement which he (Taylor) could not contest unless he gave up his
right to remain silent, an obvious Bruton violation, and reversible error.
We note that Defendant Mitchell’s statement does contain inculpato-
ry information. First of all, it states that Defendant Taylor knew that the
Victim stole his (Taylor’s) drugs. Further, it shows that Defendant Taylor
was angry with the Victim. When asked if Defendant Taylor was mad,
Defendant Mitchell replied, “not to me.” This strongly implies that
Defendant Taylor was indeed upset, but his anger was directed towards
someone other than Defendant Mitchell (presumably the Victim.)
Defendant Taylor claims that since the rule in Bruton was meant to
protect the non-confessing defendant (such as Taylor), he should be
allowed to waive this protection if he feels it is to his benefit to have the
testimony admitted. However, we still did not allow Defendant
Mitchell’s un-redacted statement to be read to the jury, since it was inad-
missible hearsay.488 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
The general rule is that any out of court statement introduced for the
truth of the matter asserted therein is hearsay. Pa.R.E. 801. However,
Defendant Mitchell’s redacted statement was allowed into evidence
because it fell into the hearsay exception of being a statement against
penal interest. Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3).
A statement against penal interest is a statement made by an unavail-
able declarant that, “so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant’s position
would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.”
Pa.R.E. 804(b) (3). The Rule also states, “In a criminal case, a statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness
of the statement.” Id. Therefore, the only statements that were admis-
sible were statements that were trustworthy and tended to inculpate
Defendant Mitchell.
We first note that Defendant Mitchell was unavailable to testify
because he invoked his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.
We further note that his statement was reliable because it was made to a
police officer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that a state-
ment against penal interest is trustworthy if it was “made to reliable per-
sons of authority or those having adverse interests to the Declarant.”
Commonwealth v. Bracero, 515 Pa 355, 528 A.2d 936, 938 (Pa. 1987).
However, not all of Defendant Mitchell’s statement was against his
(Mitchell’s) penal interest. Although Defendant Mitchell’s statement
contained portions that inculpated him (Mitchell), it also contained por-
tions that solely exculpated Defendant Taylor. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has ruled, “Those portions of a statement made by an
out-of-court declarant which are not inculpatory, such as statements that
another person was not guilty of the crime, are not declarations against
penal interest and are not admissible under the hearsay rule exception.”
Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 505 Pa. 442, 480 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. 1984).
Whether or not Defendant Taylor had a monetary loss from the
Victim’s actions or whether he (Taylor) was angry had no bearing on
Defendant Mitchell’s penal interest. Therefore, to allow the jury to hear
Defendant Mitchell’s un-redacted statements about Defendant Taylor
would be to allow inadmissible hearsay.
The Defendant claims that he is entitled under Constitutional Due
Process to have a statement admitted if it is exculpatory. He cites to
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038 (1973) for this
proposition.478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 489
Commonwealth v. Taylor
In Chambers, Mr. Chambers was charged with murdering a police-
man during a riot. Gable McDonald subsequently confessed to the
shooting but then repudiated his confession. The Mississippi trial court
precluded Mr. Chambers from attempting to impeach Mr. McDonald by
cross-examination and from calling three witnesses to testify that Mr.
McDonald made confessions to them. The trial court prohibited the three
witnesses on the grounds that their testimony of Mr. McDonald’s con-
fessions constituted hearsay.
The United States Supreme Court ruled that Mr. Chambers’ Due
Process rights were violated because the Mississippi trial court refused
to allow reliable evidence of Mr. McDonald’s confessions. The Court
noted that the confessions were against Mr. McDonald’s penal interest.
Further, these statements were reliable because Mr. McDonald stood to
gain nothing from making these confessions, they were made sponta-
neously to close acquaintances, they were made to three separate people
at three separate times, and he (McDonald) was available to testify.
The difference between Chambers (and the Pennsylvania cases based
on Chambers) and the case at bar is that the evidence at issue in
Chambers was both exculpatory for the defendant and inculpatory for
the declarant. In other words, Mr. McDonald’s confessions were not
only inculpatory to himself, but were exculpatory for Mr. Chambers. In
the case at bar, the testimony that Defendant Taylor incurred no mone-
tary shortfall and/or that Defendant Taylor was not angry, was in no way
inculpatory to Defendant Mitchell. Therefore, those statements of
Defendant Mitchell were not reliable and could not be admitted at trial
even if they were exculpatory to Defendant Taylor.
Defendant Taylor further claims that the complete statement should
have been admitted as a statement of a co-conspirator under the
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(25). However, this Rule of
Evidence says that statements of co-conspirators are only admitted, “if
the statement is offered against a party,” and was made, “by a co-con-
spirator . . . during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Pa.R.E. 803 (25) (E). (Emphasis supplied)
At trial, this statement was offered against the Commonwealth, not
against the co-conspirator of a party. Further, this statement was made to
a police officer during a stationhouse interview and therefore was made
to the detriment of the conspiracy and not in furtherance of it. Finally,
the crime occurred on November 1, 2000, but the interview occurred on
April 17, 2003, over two years later. Clearly, the conspiracy had ended490 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
long before the interview took place. Therefore, we do not believe that
Pa.R.E 803(25) mandates the admission of Defendant Mitchell’s un-
redacted statement.
3. YOUR HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ALLOW-
ING TESTIMONY OF ROSEMARIE SHROY TO BE
READ BACK TO THE JURY.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in the seminal case of
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 576 Pa. 23, 838 A.2d 663 (2003), ruled that
whether or not testimony should be read to the jury “rests within the dis-
cretion of the trial court.” Id. at 677. Further, “the reading of the testi-
mony does not implicate reversible error, provided that it does not place
undue emphasis on one witness’ testimony.” Id.
In the case at bar, at the specific request of the jury, the reading of the
testimony of Ms. Shroy occurred, on the record (it was transcribed by a
second court reporter during read-back), and it was read back in its
entirety, including both direct and cross-examination. The utmost care
was taken to not place any undue emphasis on any part of that testimo-
ny.
Finally, extensive instructions were given to the jurors. We made sure
to emphasize to the jurors that the reading of the testimony was not to
supersede their own memory of the trial testimony. We allowed the tes-
timony to be read back only as an aid to their recollection. These were
all requirements listed in Johnson, 838 A.2d 677-78. For these reasons,
we believe reading back Ms. Shroy’s testimony was not an error, and
indeed followed the exact protocol established by our Supreme Court for
such circumstances, as set forth in Johnson.
Defendant Taylor attempts to make a distinction between Johnson and
the case at bar because the testimony in Johnson involved a witness who
established motive and not a witness who actually established guilt. We
feel this is not a relevant distinction, indeed, it appears to us that it is a
distinction without a difference, and is a misreading of Johnson.
In Johnson, Mr. Johnson was found guilty of murdering Louis Combs
in a territorial dispute between groups involved in the sale of illicit
drugs. Ms. Nicole Ramsey was permitted to testify about Defendant
Johnson’s drug selling activities. While generally, evidence of other
crimes is inadmissible to establish a defendant’s character (Pa.R.E. 404
(b) (1)), Ramsey’s testimony was permitted for the limited exception of
establishing motive (Pa.R.E. 404(b) (2)). Further, the trial judge gave the
jury an instruction that they should only consider Johnson’s drug activ-
ity for the limited purpose of motive.478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 491
Commonwealth v. Taylor
During deliberations, at the request of the jury, the judge permitted
Ramsey’s testimony to be read back to the jury. However, the judge did
not repeat his earlier instruction that evidence of prior crimes could not
be used to evaluate Johnson’s character. Johnson appealed and claimed
reading the testimony back to the jury was error and it was also error to
not read back the instruction.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, denied these claims and
stated that the trial court was permitted to read back the testimony of Ms.
Ramsey and the court did not have to repeat the instruction because the
jury was presumed to have followed the earlier instruction. The Court
stated, “Further, the jury previously received a detailed instruction from
the court that the evidence regarding Johnson’s drug involvement was
admitted solely for the purpose of establishing motive, see supra, which
instruction the jury is presumed to have followed.” Johnson, 838 A.2d
at 678.
Defendant Taylor misreads the holding in Johnson to rule that the
only testimony that can be read back to a jury is testimony that establish-
es motive (but not guilt). It is obvious that the only reason the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed the issue of motive was because
the content of Ramsey’s testimony required a limiting instruction. In the
case at bar, Ms. Rose Shroy’s testimony was not evidence of prior
crimes but, rather, was evidence of the crime itself. Her testimony did
not need a limiting instruction. The fact that Ms. Shroy’s testimony was
not admitted for the purpose of motive has no bearing on whether her
testimony could be read back to the jury. Since we followed all the
guidelines established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Johnson,
we likewise believe that it was proper to allow the reading back of the
testimony of Ms. Rose Shroy.
5. THE JURY’S VERDICT, EVEN WHEN VIEWED IN
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE VER-
DICT WINNER, AND EVEN WITH THE BENEFIT
OF ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE
DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFI-
CIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A
VERDICT OF GUILTY.
The bedrock standard for the Sufficiency of Evidence is:
Whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable inferences
favorable to the Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence to492 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
. . . The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
means of wholly circumstantial evidence. . . . Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire trial record must be
evaluated and all evidence actually received must be consid-
ered. . . . Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the cred-
ibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is
free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 613 A.2d 548, 549 (1992).
Furthermore,
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a ques-
tion of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime
charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to support the
verdict is in contradiction to the physical facts, in contraven-
tion to human experience and the laws of nature, then the evi-
dence is insufficient as a matter of law.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52
(2000).
Thus we look, as a matter of law, to see if every element of each crime
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Defendant was convicted of
Second Degree Murder, Kidnapping, Criminal Conspiracy to commit
Kidnapping, Unlawful Restraint, Criminal Conspiracy to commit
Unlawful Restraint, and Carrying a Firearm Without a License.
According to the laws of our Commonwealth, these crimes have the fol-
lowing elements:
SECOND DEGREE MURDER: a criminal homicide
constitutes murder of the second degree when it is com-
mitted while [the] defendant was engaged as a principal
or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2502.
KIDNAPPING: A person is guilty of kidnapping if he
unlawfully removes another a substantial distance under
the circumstances from the place where he is found, or if
he unlawfully confines another for a substantial period in
a place of isolation, with any of the following intentions:478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 493
Commonwealth v. Taylor
(2) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight there-
after. (3) To inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the vic-
tim or another.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2901(a)(2) and (3).
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT: A person commits an
offense [of unlawful restraint] if he knowingly: (1)
restrains another unlawfully in circumstances exposing
him to risk of serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §2902(a)(1).
CONSPIRACY: A person is guilty of conspiracy with
another person or persons to commit a crime if with the
intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1)
agrees with such other person or persons that they or one
or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes
such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such
crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons
in the planning or commission of such crime or of an
attempt or solicitation to commit such crime. . . .
(e) OVERT ACT. – No person may be convicted of con-
spiracy to commit a crime unless an overt act in pursuant
of such conspiracy is alleged and proved to have been
done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §903 (a) (1), (2), and (e).
CARRYING FIREARM WITHOUT A LICENSE: . . .
any person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any
person who carries a firearm concealed on or about his
person, except in his place of abode or fixed place of
business, without a valid and lawfully issued license
under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §6106 (a) (1).
To convict a defendant of Second Degree Murder, it must be proven
that the victim was killed during the commission of one of a series of
named felonies. The named felonies, as used in the murder statute, are
further defined as follows:
“Perpetration Of A Felony: The act of the defendant in
engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or
attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual
intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or
kidnapping.”494 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
In the case at bar, the felony upon which the murder could be based is
kidnapping (which could be found with or without a conspiracy). To
convict a defendant of kidnapping, it must be proven that a defendant
removed the victim a substantial distance from the place where she was
found in order to inflict bodily injury upon her. To be guilty of conspir-
acy to commit kidnapping, a defendant must have conspired with his co-
defendant to kidnap a victim and one or both of them must have com-
mitted an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
In the case at bar, there is no question that there was sufficient evi-
dence, if believed by the jury, to convict Defendant Taylor of all of these
crimes. We will now review trial testimony offered by the
Commonwealth at trial to support the verdict of the jury. We again note
that when deciding a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we must
view all the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth.
Ms. Rose Shroy was an eyewitness to the entire incident save the
actual firing of the gunshots. Ms. Shroy testified that while she was in
the vehicle with the Defendants, they asked her (Shroy) where the
Victim was located (N.T. 129). A jury could rule that this is evidence that
the Defendant and Co-Defendant had a conspiracy to find the Victim
and harm her. The overt act occurred when they actually completed the
crime by picking the victim up, driving her against her will to Italian
Lake, and killing her.
The kidnapping charge is clear from Ms. Shroy’s testimony. She saw
Defendant Taylor (who was the front-seat passenger) pick up the Victim
in his (Taylor’s) vehicle (N.T. 132), assault her (Victim) (N.T. 133),
drive with her to Italian Lake (N.T. 133), assist Defendant Mitchell in
dragging her by the throat and at gun point into the park (N.T. 134), and
shortly thereafter Ms. Shroy heard gunshots (N.T. 137). A jury could
certainly find from those facts that Defendant Taylor kidnapped and then
killed the Victim.
The same evidence to support the kidnapping charge could also be
used to support a charge of unlawful restraint and conspiracy to commit
unlawful restraint. Defendant Taylor and Co-Defendant Mitchell were
actively looking for the Victim. When they found her, they unlawfully
restrained her by taking her prisoner and assaulting her in the front seat
of the Defendant’s vehicle. Further, while Co-Defendant Mitchell drove
the vehicle, Ms. Shroy testified that Defendant Taylor physically
restrained the Victim by holding her hands and stuffing a sock or a rag
in her mouth (N.T. 135).478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 495
Commonwealth v. Taylor
Finally, with regard to the charge of carrying a firearm without a
license, Ms. Rose Shroy testified that during the course of the ride in the
vehicle with the Victim, both Defendants possessed the handgun, at one
point or another (N.T. 133). At trial, the Commonwealth admitted
Exhibits #34 and #35 which were self-authenticating documents that
reflected that neither Defendant Taylor nor Co-Defendant Mitchell pos-
sessed a valid license to carry a firearm or a valid sportsman’s firearms
permit (N.T. 507).
Ms. Shroy’s testimony, by itself, would be sufficient to convict
Defendant Taylor, if believed by the jury. In addition, testimony of other
witnesses established that Defendant Taylor had a motive for killing the
Victim because she failed to pay a drug debt and was allegedly shooting
off her mouth on the streets concerning the fact that she “beat”
Defendant Mitchell, who was one of Defendant Taylor’s main drug traf-
fickers, out of his drugs and money. It was abundantly clear from the
trial testimony that those stolen drugs and the money which they repre-
sent, were ultimately the property of Defendant Taylor; and, therefore, it
is not at all difficult to imagine that should a drug trafficker get a repu-
tation as being “easy” or a “pussy” with regard to those persons who
owe him money for drugs, then that drug dealer will likely suffer simi-
lar losses in the future. Obviously, in the drug trade that sort of street
reputation is unacceptable.
Mr. Samuel Taggert testified that he was involved in selling heroin
with Defendant Taylor and Co-Defendant Mitchell (N.T. 278-79). Mr.
Taggert testified that Defendant Taylor supplied Defendant Mitchell
with heroin and Defendant Mitchell would sell it for Defendant Taylor
(N.T. 280). Mr. Taggert also testified that Defendant Mitchell gave hero-
in to the Victim to sell for him (Mitchell) but the Victim left without sell-
ing the drugs to anyone or paying Defendant Mitchell for them (N.T.
283-84). Thus, Mr. Taggert established a motive for Defendant Taylor to
murder the Victim because she stole drugs that he (Taylor) had given on
consignment to Defendant Mitchell.
Mr. Daniel Chacon was in prison with Defendant Taylor. Mr. Chacon
testified that the Defendant told him (Chacon) that the Victim was shot
in the head and in the hand (N.T. 409, 416). Mr. Chacon also testified
that Defendant Taylor admitted that the Victim stole four bundles of
heroin from him (Taylor) (N.T. 415).
Mr. Keith Penrose Johnson was Defendant Taylor’s cellmate. At
trial, Mr. Johnson claimed he could not recall Mr. Taylor making496 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
incriminating statements. However, Mr. Johnson’s prior testimony
before the Investigating Grand Jury revealed that Defendant Taylor
admitted to committing a murder (N.T. 359) and that he (Taylor) shot
the victim in the head and in the hand (N.T. 359).
There is more than sufficient evidence to lawfully convict the
Defendant of murdering the Victim. Ms. Rose Shroy was an eyewitness
to practically the entire incident. Mr. Samuel Taggert established a
motive for Defendant Taylor’s malice toward the Victim. Finally, Mr.
Daniel Chacon and Mr. Keith Penrose Johnson substantiated the
Defendant’s guilt, through the very words spoken by Defendant Taylor.
4. WHEN THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT OF
GUILTY [ON THE CHARGES] THE VERDICT WAS
SO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AS TO
SHOCK ONE’S SENSE OF JUSTICE AND TO
MAKE THE AWARD OF A NEW TRIAL IMPERA-
TIVE, SO THAT RIGHT MAY BE GIVEN ANOTH-
ER OPPORTUNITY TO PREVAIL.
With regard to the claim of the Weight of the Evidence the equally
well-established standards are:
A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict
is contrary to the weight of the evidence, concedes that
there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus,
the trial court is under no obligation to view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. An alle-
gation that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A
new trial should not be granted because of a mere con-
flict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A trial
judge must do more than reassess the credibility of the
witnesses and allege that he would not have assented to
the verdict if he were a juror. Trial judges, in reviewing a
claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evi-
dence, do not sit as the thirteenth juror.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52
(2000).
A new trial should be awarded when a jury’s verdict is
so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of478 (2006)] DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS 497
Commonwealth v. Taylor
justice . . . the evidence must be so tenuous, vague and
uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the
court. . . . The question the trial court should have been
answering, in the sound exercise of its discretion, was
whether notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are
so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or give
them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).
We will now review each of Defendant Taylor’s contentions and ana-
lyze what the evidence at trial revealed. We will then weigh all the tes-
timony and decide if the weight of the evidence should favor Defendant
Taylor.
Defendant Taylor claims that it was improper for this Court to allow
the verdict to stand on the testimony of Ms. Rose Shroy because alleged
inconsistencies in her testimony should have been given extra-weight to
cast doubt on and invalidate her entire testimony.
It does not surprise the Court that the Defendant wishes to impeach
the testimony of Ms. Shroy. Defendant Taylor’s main prayer for relief
appears to be directed at obtaining a new trial. However, if the
Defendant were ever afforded that appellate relief, it is very unlikely that
the Commonwealth would be able to prevail at any such proceeding,
since its star witness, Ms. Shroy, would be unavailable to testify at any
retrial of the case.2 We do not find, however, that the alleged inconsis-
tencies in her statements were so overwhelming as to merit the invalida-
tion of her entire testimony. Indeed, this Court had a full opportunity to
observe the testimony of Ms. Shroy at trial, just as did the jury. On bal-
ance, we found the testimony of Ms. Shroy to be very convincing and
entitled to great weight by the jury, should they have found likewise –
which, by virtue of their verdict, they did as well.
For example, Defendant Taylor points out that Ms. Shroy incorrectly
identified the clothing of the Victim on the night of the murder. Ms.
Shroy had stated in her Preliminary Hearing testimony that the Victim
was wearing a summer dress, but the Victim was actually wearing dark
jeans at the time of her death (N.T. 61). We find that merely because Ms.
Shroy initially and incorrectly identified the Victim’s clothing does not
cause our conscience to be shocked. Ms. Shroy stated that the Victim
2. This Court takes Judicial Notice of the obituary of Ms. Rosemarie Shroy, published
in the Patriot News, which indicated that she died of cancer on August 3, 2005.498 DAUPHIN COUNTY REPORTS [122 Dauph.
Commonwealth v. Taylor
“lived” in that particular dress and that is why Ms. Shroy thought she
(Victim) was wearing it that night (N.T. 218). The strong inference from
Ms. Shroy’s statement about the Victim “living in that dress” was that
whenever she (Victim) was out on the town prostituting herself to buy
drugs, she would likely be wearing that dress. It should be remembered,
that according to Ms. Shroy’s testimony about when the Defendants final-
ly located the Victim in the early morning hours of the date of the murder,
she (Victim) was, in fact, attempting to prostitute herself to buy drugs. That
could have easily caused Ms. Shroy to believe that she (Victim) was wear-
ing her usual dress that evening. We find that it was proper to let the jury
decide how much weight to give Ms. Shroy’s testimony on that issue.
As a matter of law, with regard to sufficiency of the evidence, Ms.
Shroy’s testimony was allowed to stand because, although her testimo-
ny was contrary to a physical fact, what the Victim was wearing was not
an element of any of the criminal charges. The fact that Ms. Shroy was
mistaken only goes to the weight the jury should give her testimony.
Defendant Taylor also tries to emphasize Ms. Shroy’s allegedly erro-
neous testimony with regard to the beating that the Victim sustained in
Defendant Taylor’s vehicle while en route to Italian Lake. Ms. Shroy’s
Preliminary Hearing testimony described a brutal beating to the Victim’s
face and even at trial she stated that the Victim was beaten such that the
Victim was bleeding (N.T. 188). Ms. Shroy stated in her Preliminary
Hearing testimony that the Victim’s lip was split (N.T. 189) and her eye
was swollen (N.T. 190). The Defendant’s forensic pathologist, Dr. Neil
A. Hoffman, testified that his analysis of the autopsy photographs
revealed no visible trauma to the Victim’s face [aside from the massive
gunshot wound] (N.T. 584-86). He also disagreed with the
Commonwealth’s forensic pathologist, Dr. Wayne K. Ross, who opined
that the gunshot wound may have masked other trauma to the Victim’s
face (N.T. 588) (N.T. Dr. Ross 12-13).
Again, we do not believe that the weight of the evidence mandates
that this Court dismiss Ms. Shroy’s testimony. Ms. Shroy admitted that
she was sitting in the back seat and assumed the punches were to the
Victim’s face (N.T. 187). “I just remember punches and screaming”
(N.T. 181). Also, the jury was free to believe the Commonwealth’s
pathologist over the Defendant’s pathologist. We feel that it was appro-
priate for the jury to decide how much weight to give that portion of Ms.
Shroy’s testimony.
We further note that with regard to the sufficiency of evidence,
whether Ms. Shroy overstated the beating sustained by the Victim didYou can also read
