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COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
COVID-19 Crisis
Through a Migration Lens
Migration and Development Brief 32
April 2020
iMigration and Development Brief reports an update on migration and remit- tance flows as well as salient policy developments in the area of international migration and development. The Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNO- MAD) is a global hub of knowledge and policy expertise on migration and development. It aims to create and synthesize multidisciplinary knowledge and evidence; generate a menu of policy options for migration policy mak- ers; and provide technical assistance and capacity building for pilot projects, evaluation of policies, and data collection. KNOMAD is supported by a multi-donor trust fund established by the World Bank. The European Commission, and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Interna- tionale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH commissioned by and on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) are the contributors to the trust fund. The views expressed in this paper do not represent the views of the World Bank or the sponsoring organizations. All queries should be addressed to KNOMAD@worldbank.org. KNOMAD working papers, policy briefs, and a host of other resources on migration are available at www.KNOMAD.org.
COVID-19 CRISIS THROUGH A MIGRATION LENS Migration and Development Brief 32 April 2020 Migration and Remittances Team Social Protection and Jobs World Bank
Migration and Development Brief 32
© 2020 International Bank for Reconstruction and Attribution—Please cite the work as follows: Dilip Ratha,
Development/The World Bank. Supriyo De, Eung Ju Kim, Sonia Plaza, Ganesh Seshan, and
Nadege Desiree Yameogo. 2020. “Migration and Develop-
ment Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens.”
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ivCOVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Contents
Summary............................................................................................... viiii
Acknowledgements.................................................................................. xi
1. Viewing the COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens..............................1
1.1 Impacts on Employment of Foreign Workers and Their Earnings.....................3
1.2 Impacts on Internal Migration..................................................................5
1.3 Remittance Flows to Decline in 2020......................................................... 6
1.4 Slower Progress in Reducing Remittance Costs and other
Migration-related Development Goals...........................................................9
1.5 Policy Responses Should Be Inclusive of Migrants and Their Remittances........10
2. Regional Trends in Migration and Remittance Flows.........................16
2.1 East Asia and the Pacific.......................................................................16
2.2 Europe and Central Asia........................................................ . ..............19
2.3 Latin America and the Caribbean................................................... . .......21
2.4 Middle East and North Africa.............................................................. . .23
2.5 South Asia..........................................................................................25
2.6 Sub-Saharan Africa....................................................................... ......27
Appendix:
Data Notes and Methodologies for Forecasting Remittances and FDI........ ....30
A.1 Estimation of Remittance Flows for 2019............................................. . ...30
A.2 Methodology for Forecasting Remittances for 2020...................................30
A.3 Data on Remittances, Gross Domestic Product, Remittance Prices,
Refugees, and Other Variables....................................................................30
A.4 Caveats.............................................................................................31
A.5 Methodology for Forecasting Foreign Direct Investment..............................31
References.......................................................................................... . ...33
Endnotes ...............................................................................................35
List of Figures
Figure 1.1 Three Phases of the Spanish Flu, 1918–19.........................................3
Figure 1.2 Migrant Workers Are More Vulnerable to Risks of
Unemployment During an Economic Crisis......................................................5
vMigration and Development Brief 32 vi
COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Figure 1.3 Event Study: Remittances to the Philippines Increased
During the Bird Flu, but Decreased During the Global Financial Crisis....................6
Figure 1.4 Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries
Expected to Decline in 2020..........................................................................7
Figure 1.5 Remittance Costs Remain High.......................................... . . . ..........9
Figure 2.1 Top Remittance Recipients in the East Asia and Pacific Region, 2019.....16
Figure 2.2 Remittance Fees to the Philippines Are Among the Lowest
in the East Asia and Pacific Region...............................................................17
Figure 2.3 Remittance Inflows to Europe and Central Asia
Remained Strong in 2019...................................................................... . . . ..18
Figure 2.4 Russia Continued to Be the Least Expensive Country
from Which to Send Money.........................................................................20
Figure 2.5 Remittances Represent a Large Share of
Foreign Income in Latin America..................................................................21
Figure 2.6 Cost of Sending Money to Latin American
and the Caribbean, 2018 and 2019..............................................................22
Figure 2.7 Remittance Inflows to the Middle East and North Africa in 2019...........23
Figure 2.8 Sending $200 within the Middle East and North Africa
Is Less Expensive Than Sending $200 from Outside the Region........................ 24
Figure 2.9 Top Remittance Recipients in South Asia in 2019.............................. 25
Figure 2.10 Remittance Costs in South Asia Vary Widely between
the Highest- and Lowest-Cost Corridors...................................................... 26
Figure 2.11 Top Remittance Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2019................ 27
Figure 2.12 Remittance Costs in Sub-Saharan Africa Vary Considerably.............. 28
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Comparison of COVID-19 with Other Pandemics and
the Global Financial Crisis.............................................................................2
Table 1.2 Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low-
and Middle-Income Regions.........................................................................8
Table 1.3 Possible World Bank Interventions Addressing COVID-19’s
Effects on Migration and Remittances.......................................................... 13
Table A.1 Panel Data Regression Estimates for Remittances............................. 30
Table A.2 Panel Data Regression Estimates of Foreign Direct
Investment to Low- and Middle-Income Countries.......................................... 32
List of Boxes
Box 1 Access to Health Care For Migrant Workers........................................... 11
viiMigration and Development Brief 32
Summary
The economic crisis induced by COVID-19 have contributed to spreading the epidemic.
could be long, deep, and pervasive when Governments need to address the challenges
viewed through a migration lens. Lockdowns, facing internal migrants by including them in
travel bans, and social distancing have brought health services and cash transfer and other
global economic activities to a near standstill. social programs, and protecting them from
Host countries face additional challenges in discrimination.
many sectors, such as health and agriculture,
that depend on the availability of migrant Migration flows are likely to fall, but the stock
workers. Migrants face the risk of contagion of international migrants may not decrease im-
and also the possible loss of employment, mediately, since migrants cannot return to their
wages, and health insurance coverage. This countries due to travel bans and disruption to
Migration and Development Brief provides transportation services. Migrant workers tend
a prognosis of how these events might affect to be vulnerable to the loss of employment and
global trends in international economic migra- wages during an economic crisis in their host
tion and remittances in 2020 and 2021. country, more so than native-born workers.
Lockdowns in labor camps and dormitories
Considering that migrants tend to be concen- can also increase the risk of contagion among
trated in urban economic centers (cities), and migrant workers. Many migrants have been
are vulnerable to infection by the coronavirus, stranded due to the suspension of transport
there is a need to include migrants in efforts to services. Some host countries have granted
fight the coronavirus. Migrant remittances pro- visa extensions and temporary amnesty to mi-
vide an economic lifeline to poor households in grant workers, and some have suspended the
many countries; a reduction in remittance flows involuntary return of migrants.
could increase poverty and reduce households’
access to much-needed health services. The In 2020, remittance flows to low- and mid-
crisis could exacerbate xenophobic, discrimi- dle-income countries are expected to drop
natory treatment of migrants, which calls for by around 20 percent to $445 billion, from
greater vigilance against such practices. $554 billion in 2019. In the midst of this sharp
decline, the relative importance of remittance
This Brief is largely focused on international flows as a source of external financing for low-
migrants, but governments should not ignore and middle-income countries is expected to
the plight of internal migrants. The magnitude rise. This is because foreign direct investment is
of internal migration is about two-and-a-half expected to decline by even more, due to travel
times that of international migration. Lock- bans, disruption of international trade, and
downs, loss of employment, and social distanc- wealth effects of declines in the stock prices of
ing prompted a chaotic and painful process multinational companies. This Brief estimates
of mass return for internal migrants in India that it could fall by more than 35 percent.
and many countries in Latin America. Thus, Private portfolio flows through stock and bond
the COVID-19 containment measures might markets could fall by over 80 percent.
viiiCOVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
The global average cost of remittances de- So far, government policy responses to the
clined to 6.8 percent in the first quarter of COVID-19 crisis have largely excluded mi-
2020, from 6.9 percent a year previous. This re- grants and their families back home. But there
mains far above the Sustainable Development is a strong case for including migrants in the
Goal target of 3 percent. Remittance service near-term health strategies of all countries,
providers have been affected by lockdowns, given the externalities associated with the
shorter business hours, and social distancing. health status of an entire population in the face
This has increased the relative importance of of a highly contagious pandemic. Also, govern-
electronic transfers, since some cash-based ments would do well to consider short-, medi-
services and remittance operators have been um-, and long-term interventions to support: (i)
closed or impacted negatively by the crisis. Al- stranded migrants; (ii) the remittance infra-
though the use of digital payment instruments structure; (iii) loss of subsistence income for
for sending remittances is increasing, poorer families back home; and (iv) access to health,
and irregular migrants often lack access to on- housing, education, and jobs for migrant work-
line services. They require the origination and ers in host/transit countries and their families
distribution of funds through banks, payment back home. The pandemic has also highlighted
cards, or mobile money. Online transactions the global shortage of health professionals
(like cash-based services) require remittance and an urgent need for global cooperation and
service providers to exercise vigilance against long-term investments in medical training.
fraud and financial crime, to comply with
anti-money laundering and countering the
financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations.
However, such due diligence has become diffi-
cult amid staff shortages.
ixMigration and Development Brief 32 x
COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Acknowledgements
This Brief was prepared by Dilip Ratha, Su- Oya Pinar Ardic Alper, Eldira Dashi, Harish
priyo De, Eung Ju Kim, Ganesh Seshan, and Natarajan, Roberta Gatti, Mattias K. A. Lund-
Nadege Desiree Yameogo of the Migration berg, Martin Rama, Hans Timmer, and Albert
and Remittances Team, Jobs Group, Social G. Zeufack for helpful comments and inputs.
Protection and Jobs Global Practice; and Sonia Thanks to Immaculate Nafula Machasio and
Plaza of the Finance, Competitiveness, and Maja Vezmar for research assistance, Fayre
Innovation Global Practice. Thanks to Michal Makeig for editing, and Rebecca Ong for com-
Rutkowski, Ian Walker, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, munications support.
xiMigration and Development Brief 32 1
COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
1. Viewing COVID-19 Crisis Through a
Migration Lens: Remittance Flows are
Expected to Decline by 20 Percent in 2020
The economic crisis induced by COVID-19 is The exception is the so-called Spanish flu of
deeper and more pervasive than any other pan- 1918–20, which was global. It infected around
demic-induced crisis since the 1900s. Table 1.1 500 million people (one-third of the world pop-
briefly compares a few well-documented crises. ulation at the time) and resulted in 17–50 mil-
Most pandemics have affected a few countries lion deaths between March 1918 and March
and a small share of the world population. 1920, in three recurrent phases
Table 1.1 Comparison of Covid-19 with Other Pandemics and the Global
Financial Crisis
Cases Average
Case as % of change in
Cases as
Cases % of world
Deaths Fatality
Most Affected Countries
population GDP growth
(thousands) (thousands) Rate of most in the most
Population
(%) affected affected
countries countries
China, India, Indonesia,
SPANISH FLU 17,400– 2.7%– Russia, United States of
500,000 ~25% ~28% 0.8%
(1918–20)* 50,000 10% America (global pandemic
impacting many countries)
Canada; China; Hong
SARS
8 Negligible 0.7 9.56% Kong SAR, China; 0.01% 3.1%
(2002-2004)
Singapore
H1N1
Australia, China, Mexico,
(Swine Flu) 762,630* 11% 284 0.04% 0.06% -2.5%
Thailand, United States
(2009–10)**
Islamic Republic of Iran,
MERS Jordan, Republic of Korea,
2.5 Negligible 0.8 34.38% 0.001% -3.7%
(2012) Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates
Ebola Guinea, Liberia,
28.7 Negligible 11 39.52% 0.16% -8.6%
(2014–16) Sierra Leone
France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, United States
COVID-19
2,019 .03% 119 5.92% (global pandemic 0.22% -8.7%
(2019–20)
impacting 210
countries)***
High-income
Memo: global
Countries of all countries:
financial crisis
income levels -3.7%;
(2008–2009)
LMICs: +-3.3%
Sources: KNOMAD website; WDI, CBC, and WHO estimates; Johns Hopkins website; Lancet; IMF 2020; UN Population data; Maddison
Historical Statistics.
Note: The average share of deaths and changes in GDP growth attributed to Spanish flu is listed for only India, Indonesia, and the United
States, countries for which GDP data are available. GDP = gross domestic product; LMICs = low- and middle-income countries; MERS =
Middle East respiratory syndrome; SARS = severe acute respiratory syndrome.
*WHO and CDC estimates of cases. The number of Spanish flu cases is from https://ourworldindata.org/spanish-flu-largest-influen-
za-pandemic-in-history; case percentages of population are broad approximations, and period economic data are from the Maddison
Historical Statistics.
**The H1N1 swine flu outbreak occurred in the midst of the 2008–09 global financial crisis, thereby making it difficult to determine the real
economic effects of the pandemic.
***Top five countries by case number as of April 13, 2020. 2
COVID-19 is now a global pandemic impacting 213 countries, areas or territories per the World Health Organization.Migration and Development Brief 32
(figure 1.1). If that pattern were to be repeat- 1.1 Impacts On Employment Of
ed, the COVID-19 crisis could last longer than Foreign Workers And Their Earnings
currently projected by many governments, with
several recurrences over the next 24 months. These measures have brought global economic
activities to a near standstill. Such simultane-
Fast-spreading contagion, high case fatality ous suspension of activities in all parts of the
rates, inadequate medical facilities, and a lack world is unprecedented in history. Worldwide,
of vaccine cure (so far) have prompted societ- many businesses, especially small and medi-
ies to lock down, reduced business hours and um enterprises and informal businesses, have
practice social distancing. A response to the closed. According to the International Mon-
coronavirus outbreak in China in December etary Fund (IMF), the world economy is ex-
2019 was the imposition of a ban on interna- pected to contract by 3 percent in 2020 in the
tional travel and quarantines for international baseline scenario, a change of nearly 6 percent
arrivals. Subsequently, most countries have compared with 2019. Advanced economies are
imposed a ban on the arrival of not only for- projected to decline by 6.1 percent and emerg-
eigners but also of returning nationals. ing market and developing economies by
1.0–2.2 percent in 2020. Also, there is substan-
tial risk of continued economic recession well
into 2021. The worst case scenario anticipates
Figure 1.1 Three Phases of the Spanish Flu, 1918–19
(Deaths per 1000 persons, United Kingdom)
25
20
15
10
5
0
8
8
8
8
8
8
9
9
9
8
9
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
91
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
un
ct
ep
ug
ov
ul
ar
an
eb
ec
pr
-O
-J
-M
-J
-N
-S
-D
-A
-J
-A
-F
29
29
29
29
29
28
29
29
31
30
29
Source: Data are based on Taubenberger and Morens (2006: 15).
3COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
even lower growth (IMF 2020).1 According to The crisis has greatly increased the demand for
the latest regional economic updates published health care services, and a global competition
by the World Bank, real economic growth could has already begun with many developed coun-
fall to -0.5 percent in the East Asia and Pacific tries announcing incentives to recruit doctors
region, 4.4 percent in Europe and Central Asia, and nurses from abroad. There is a global
-4.6 percent in Latin America and the Caribbe- need to train more health professionals and
an (LAC), 1.8 percent in the Middle East and provide recognition of skills in host countries in
North Africa (MENA), -2.8 percent in South the long term.
Asia, and -5.1 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa
(Arezki et al. 2020; Calderon et al. 2020; World Migrant workers tend to be particularly vulner-
Bank 2020a–d). able, more than native-born workers, to losses
of employment and wages during an economic
When viewed through a migration lens, the crisis in their host country. During the global
economic crisis induced by COVID-19 could be financial crisis, the average unemployment
even longer, deeper, and more pervasive than rate for foreign-born workers in the EU-28
these estimates imply. In host countries, the countries rose from 11.1 percent in 2007 to
COVID-19 crisis has created additional chal- 16.4 percent in 2009, significantly higher than
lenges in sectors that depend on the availabili- the increase among native-born workers. Even
ty of migrant workers. The crisis has dispropor- a decade later, in 2018, the unemployment
tionately impacted food and hospitality, retail rate remained high for foreign-born workers,
and wholesale, tourism and transport, and while it had fallen below the pre-crisis rate for
manufacturing. As the farming season begins native-born workers. The unemployment rate
in many countries, there are emerging signs of for foreign-born workers is especially high in
labor shortages in the agriculture sector of in- Italy and Spain, which have been hit hard by
dustrial countries that rely on migrant workers. the coronavirus.
Given the seasonality of agriculture, worker
shortages have given rise to concerns about Migration flows are likely to fall, but the stock
food security later in the year. of international migrants may not decrease
immediately. In 2019, there were around 272
The crisis has presented a challenge for the million international migrants (including 26
cross-sectoral mobility of workers, which could million refugees). Under normal circumstances,
be particularly hard for lower-skilled migrant migrants losing jobs would consider return-
workers, especially informal and undocument- ing home. However, that has become nearly
ed workers. During the global financial crisis impossible because of travel bans and the sus-
in 2009, many migrant workers moved from pension of transportation services. As a result,
construction to agriculture and retail. Such the rate of voluntary return migration is likely
intersectoral movement may be difficult at this to fall, except in the case of a few cross-border
time because the sectors that need more work- migration corridors in the South (such as Ven-
ers—such as health and information technolo- ezuela–Colombia, Nepal–India, Zimbabwe–
gy—require specific skills and prior training. South Africa, Myanmar–Thailand).2 In other
words, more people will stay on in their host
country than is typical.
4Migration and Development Brief 32
Figure 1.2 Migrant Workers Are More Vulnerable to Risks of Unemployment During
an Economic Crisis
Unemployment rate (%), EU-28,
during global financial crisis 2008-2009 Native Born
Foreign Born
16.4
12.3
11.1 11.1
7.3
6.9
2007 2009 2018
Source: Eurostat data.
Note: EU = European Union.
In the long term, income gaps between coun- those from international migrants, serve as a
tries constitute the most important driver of lifeline and insurance for families left behind.
migration pressure. The average per capita
income in high-income countries was 54 times The COVID-19 outbreak has placed many in-
that in low-income countries, according to the ternal migrant workers in dire conditions, many
World Bank (2019). The present crisis will not losing their (mostly informal) jobs and unable
lower the income gap sufficiently to reduce to return home due to disruption to public
migration pressures. On the contrary, income transport services and movement restrictions.
inequality between the low-skilled and high- This is the reality for most migrant workers,
skilled is likely to increase due to the crisis. especially those working in the informal sector
and living in overcrowded slums.
1.2 Impacts on Internal Migration
Lockdowns, travel bans, and social distancing
The number of internal migrants is about measures in response to the crisis have dispro-
two-and-a-half times that of international portionately affected internal migrant work-
migrants. China and India each have over ers, who found themselves stranded, unable
100 million internal migrants. For the poorer to return either to their places of work or their
sections of the population, especially from un- communities of origin. Without adequate
der-developed rural areas, migration to urban access to housing, basic water and sanitation,
economic centers provides an escape from health facilities, or social safety nets to help
poverty and unemployment. Remittances from them survive such restrictions, these migrants
these migrants, typically smaller amounts than have become even more vulnerable to conta-
5COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
gion risks. If discrimination and xenophobic basic provisions to provide shelter to stranded
attitudes affected migrants before, the current migrants in cities and districts of destination,
crisis has exacerbated such social tensions. transit, and origin. Some countries are provid-
The crisis has created a chaotic and painful ing cash support to affected and vulnerable
process of mass return for internal migrants in groups with a specific allocation for internal
India and many countries in Latin America. As migrants and returned migrant workers (World
a result, the COVID-19 containment measures Food Program 2020).
might even have contributed to spreading the
epidemic. The loss of jobs and livelihood has 1.3 Remittance Flows to Decline in 2020
also ruptured an important lifeline to rural
households in many countries. The persistence of the stock of international
migrants over an economic cycle or a crisis is
Governments need to address the challenges an important factor in the persistence or resil-
facing internal migrants by including them in ience of remittances. Not only do new migrants
programs that provide health services and send money home but also those migrants who
cash transfer and other social programs, and arrived a long time ago. Indeed, migrants new
by protecting them from discrimination. Some and old increase the amounts they send home
governments are already providing some as- during times of crisis and hardship in their
sistance to these vulnerable groups who are at country of origin, a phenomenon noted in the
risk of spreading the virus. For instance, in In- literature as the countercyclicality of remittanc-
dia, the government has now set up camps with es. Remittances (as a share of GDP) tend to be
Figure 1.3 Event Study: Remittances to the Philippines Increased During the Bird Flu,
but Decreased During the Global Financial Crisis
Percent change (y-o-y, 3-month moving average)
Bird Flu (Nov. 2003)
30 Financial Crisis (Sep. 2008)
25
20
15
10
5
0
-4 -2 0 2 4
Time (month)
Data Source: World Bank–KNOMAD remittance inflows dataset.
Note: t = 0 November 2003 and September 2008. It represents the month at which the outbreak reported.
6Migration and Development Brief 32
largest in poor countries (8.9 percent in 2019), South Asia turned out to be larger than expect-
small island developing states (7.7 percent), ed in the second half of 2019.
and those in fragile and conflict-affected
situations (9.2 percent).3 During a crisis in the In 2020, remittance flows to LMICs are expect-
host country, however, remittances can decline. ed to decline by around 20 percent, marking
For instance, during the global financial crisis, the sharpest decline in recent history (table
remittance flows to low- and middle-income 1.2 and figure 1.4). This is not so much due to
countries (LMICs) declined by 5 percent in a decline in the stock of international mi-
2009. Similarly, the event study in figure 1.3 grants, but largely due to a fall in wages and
shows the countercyclical increase in remit- the employment of migrant workers in host
tance flows to the Philippines during the bird flu nations due to COVID-19 (see appendix for
pandemic in November 2003, and a procycli- the methodology behind this projection). The
cal decline in response to the global financial decline in remittance flows is expected to be
crisis starting in September 2008. sharpest in Europe and Central Asia, South
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. These region-
In 2019, remittance flows to LMICs became al patterns are affected by COVID-19 and
larger than foreign direct investment (FDI), also a fall in the price of oil, which affects the
an important milestone for monitoring re- economies of Russia and the Gulf Cooperation
source flows to these countries. Recent data Council (GCC) countries in particular. Russia
reveal that in 2019, remittance flows to LMICs is the most important source of remittances
reached $554 billion, slightly higher than our to Central Asia; outbound remittances from
earlier projection ($551 billion) published in Russia, as expressed in U.S. dollars, would also
October 2019.4 Remittance flows to LAC and be impacted by the weakening of the ruble
Figure 1.4 Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-Income Countries Expected to
Decline in 2020
($ billion)
900
FDI
700
500 Remittances
300
100 ODA
Portfolio debt
and equity flows
-100
90
96
f
92
94
18
14
16
00
98
06
08
10
12
02
04
20
19
19
19
19
20
20
20
20
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Sources: World Bank staff estimates, World Development Indicators, and IMF Balance of Payments statistics.
Note: See appendix A in World Bank (2017) for data and forecast methods. FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = official development assistance.
7COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
against the dollar. Such valuation effects would tion of international trade, and wealth effects
also be felt in outbound remittance flows from of declines in the stock prices of multinational
Europe through the weakening of the euro companies; private portfolio flows through
against the U.S. dollar.5 Outbound remittances stock and bond markets may decline by about
from the GCC countries would be impacted 80 percent.6
by the recession induced by the coronavirus as
well as a fall in oil prices. Remittance flows to Medium-term downside risks dominate the re-
South Asia, East Asia, and the MENA countries mittance outlook for 2021. The recovery from
would be impacted as well (see section 2 for the crisis is likely to be prolonged and arduous.
regional trends). Global and regional growth in 2021 is likely to
remain subdued. Given these global trends,
Despite the decline, however, remittance flows remittances to LMICs are expected to grow at
are expected to become even more important about 5.6 percent in 2021 to $460 billion, well
as a source of external financing for LMICs below the 2017 level of $487 billion and far
(figure 1.4). In 2020, FDI is expected to decline from the recent records of 2019 (table 1.2).
by over 35 percent due to travel bans, disrup-
Table 1.2 Estimates and Projections of Remittance Flows to Low- and Middle-
Income Regions
Region 2009 2016 2017 2018 2019e 2020f 2021f
($ billion)
Low and Middle Income 307 446 487 531 554 445 470
East Asia and Pacific 80 128 134 143 147 128 138
Europe and Central Asia 36 46 55 61 65 47 49
Latin America and the Caribbean 55 73 81 89 96 77 82
Middle-East and North Africa 33 51 57 58 59 47 48
South Asia 75 111 118 132 140 109 115
Sub-Saharan Africa 29 39 42 48 48 37 38
World 437 597 643 694 714 572 602
(Growth rate, percent)
Low and Middle Income -5.0 -1.5 9.1 9.0 4.4 -19.7 5.6
East Asia and Pacific -4.8 -0.5 5.1 6.8 2.6 -13.0 7.5
Europe and Central Asia -14.7 -0.3 20 10.9 6.6 -27.5 5.0
Latin America and the Caribbean -11.3 7.4 11 9.9 7.4 -19.3 5.9
Middle-East and North Africa -6.2 -1.2 12.1 1.4 2.6 -19.6 1.6
South Asia 4.5 -5.9 6.2 12.1 6.1 -22.1 5.8
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.2 -8.3 9.3 13.7 -0.5 -23.1 4.0
World -5.1 -0.9 7.7 8.0 2.8 -19.9 5.2
Source: World Bank–KNOMAD.
Note: See appendix A in World Bank (2017) for data and forecast methods. Projections for 2020 and 2021 are based on methods described in the
appendix to this Brief. e = estimate; f = forecast.
8Migration and Development Brief 32
1.4 Slower Progress in Reducing Remit- and government policies in receiving countries.
tance Costs and other Migration-relat- According to the Remittance Prices Worldwide
ed Development Goals database, the average cost of sending $200 to
LMICs was 6.8 percent in the first quarter (Q1)
The World Bank closely monitors three Sustain- of 2020, slightly below the cost one year earlier
able Development Goal (SDG) indicators for (figure 1.5).8 The global average cost of remit-
which it is a custodian: increasing the volume tances declined from 6.9 percent in 2019 Q1 to
of remittances as a percentage of gross do- 6.8 percent in 2020 Q1. This is still more than
mestic product (GDP) (SDG indicator 17.3.2), double the SDG target (10.c) of 3 percent by
reducing remittance costs (SDG indicator 2030.9 Sub-Saharan Africa continued to have
10.c.1), and reducing recruitment costs paid the highest average cost, at about 9 percent.
by migrant workers (SDG indicator 10.7.1).7 Remittance costs across many African corri-
Progress on all three indicators is projected to dors and small islands in the Pacific remained
slow in 2020, although initial data shows that above 10 percent. Intraregional migrants in
remittance costs through digital channels are Sub-Saharan Africa comprised over two-thirds
decreasing. of all international migration from the region.
Yet intraregional remittance costs are very high
Remittance costs remained above the SDG in the region (figure 2.12 in section 2).
target and may increase due to disruptions to
remittance services, though there are counter- Brick-and-mortar remittance service provid-
vailing forces such as the growing use of digital ers (RSPs) have been affected by lockdowns,
services, increased competition for business, reduced business hours, and social distancing.
Figure 1.5 Remittance Costs Remain High
(Percent)
Q1 2019
10 9.25
Q1 2020
8.90
8
7.21
7.13
6.94
6.79 6.67 6.76 7.00
6.48
6.20
6 5.97
5.04 4.95
4
2
0
Global SAR LAC ECA EAP MENA SSA
Average
Sources: World Bank Remittance Prices Worldwide database.
Note: Red dotted line represents the Sustainable Development Goal 10 target of 3 percent. EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia;
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
9COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
There is less disruption and perhaps a relative tries have announced incentives or relaxed visa
increase in remittances sent via digital pay- restrictions to recruit health professionals from
ment instruments. However, poor and irregular foreign countries.
migrants have lower or no access to digital
payment instruments—such as bank accounts, In general, most countries use residency crite-
payment cards, or mobile wallets—to fund or ria to determine whether foreigners are entitled
disburse remittance transactions. Many poor to public health care services (box 1). So far,
households in LMICs also lack access to trans- government policy responses have mostly
action accounts to receive remittances. Online excluded migrants. There is a strong argument
transactions also require RSPs to be able to for including migrants in the near-term health
remotely collect and verify identity documents strategies of all countries, recognizing the
and exercise additional vigilance against positive externalities associated with health, or
higher risks of fraud and financial crime, to conversely, the negative externalities associat-
comply with anti-money laundering and coun- ed with pandemics.
tering of financing of terrorism (AML/CFT)
regulations.10 However, such due diligence has Table 1.3 summarizes short-, medium-, and
become difficult amid staff shortages.11 The long-term interventions that could be consid-
disruption of formal remittance services and ered by the World Bank Group. Specifically,
a lack of access to banking or online services operational interventions could be considered
may shift remittances to informal channels. to support: (i) stranded migrants; (ii) access to
health care, housing, education, and jobs for
Some RSPs have temporarily waived the fees migrant workers in host/transit countries and
for sending money home, but such waivers are their families back home; and (iii) remittance
not sustainable. To encourage RSPs to facil- infrastructure.
itate remittance inflows, some governments
(notably that of Pakistan) have announced tax Keeping remittances flowing
incentives equivalent to the remittance fees
waived. The World Bank has initiated a weekly sur-
vey of remittance costs in several important
1.5 Policy Responses Should Be Inclu- corridors to assess the effects of the COVID-19
sive of Migrants and Their Remittances crisis on the remittances sector. Initial find-
ings show that authorities in many sending
Lockdowns and travel bans directly affect the and receiving countries observed a decline
employment and wages of foreign workers. in remittance flows and expect this trend to
Lockdowns in labor camps and dormitories can continue. RSPs are not classified as essential
increase the risk of contagion among migrant services. As such, their services have been
workers. Many migrants have been stranded interrupted or their working hours reduced.
due to the suspension of transport services. The use of digital channels for sending money
Lockdowns have also closed the offices of is increasing due to the closure of brick-and-
RSPs, some of whom are also grappling with mortar services.12 Meanwhile, a large percent-
employees who have fallen sick, thus affecting age of migrant workers and their families back
the flow of remittances. home are unbanked or under-banked, and are
facing challenges in meeting the due diligence
To address shortages of workers in agriculture requirements of digital channels. In the short
and health sectors, some countries have grant- run, the services that remain available are in
ed visas to attract agricultural workers, even general priced lower than those that preced-
chartering flights to bring them in. Many coun- ed the COVID-19 measures, according to
10Migration and Development Brief 32
Box 1. A Comparison of National Health services for migrants tend to be asso-
ciated with higher costs to varying degrees.
Policies Regarding Migrant Workers’
In Qatar, migrants seeking to obtain a health
Access to Health Care
card that grants access to a subsidized public
health system pay only a slightly higher fee
According to the forthcoming Migration and
than do GCC nationals.15 In Malaysia, foreign-
the Law Database, economic migrants13 enjoy
ers using the public health system are charged
full access to public health care in 80 out of a
significantly higher fees than are citizens.
total of 132 sampled countries, provided that
general requirements for participation in the
In response to the COVID-19 crisis, several
respective scheme are fulfilled.14 Another 40
host countries have temporarily introduced
countries allow migrants access to health care
new policies or relaxed requirements to facil-
conditionally, while 12 countries (most of which
itate migrant workers’ access to health care
are located in South Asia and the Middle East
protection. Examples include the following:
a North Africa regions) completely exclude
migrants from their health care systems.
• The Portuguese government announced
that all immigrants with pending res-
Many countries use residency to determine
idence applications will be treated as
whether foreigners are entitled to public health
permanent residents until July 1, 2020,
care services. The national laws and regu-
due to COVID-19. This measure will allow
lations of Portugal and Dominican Republic
migrants access to public social security
link health entitlements to the residency status
system, including health care.
rather than nationality of a person. In Croatia,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, the United States
• The Malaysian Ministry of Health an-
of America, and Singapore, a person needs to
nounced that foreigners will be exempted
obtain permanent residency status first in order
from registration, examination, treatment,
to enjoy health care protection on par with cit-
and hospitalization fees related to the
izens. Under Turkish laws and regulations, for-
treatment of COVID-19.
eigners may benefit from general health insur-
ance schemes provided that they have resided
• The UK government announced that no
in Turkey more than a year. Other national laws
charges will be made in the diagnosis or
delegate the role of protecting migrants’ health
treatment of COVID-19 for all people,
to employers. In the United Arab Emirates and
regardless of their residency/immigration
Kuwait, employers are required to cover the
status.
costs of health insurance for migrant workers
or face penalties for noncompliance.
• The Qatari government is providing free
health care to migrant workers affected by
Access to health care for economic migrants
the COVID-19 virus in the Doha Industrial
can be restricted to emergency life-saving care
Area.
or infectious disease prevention. Economic mi-
grants in Kazakhstan have the right to receive
Source: Migration and the Law Database, World Bank (2020).
free medical care only for acute diseases that
are dangerous to others. The list of such dis-
eases is determined and updated by a regula-
tory health authority.
11COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
data collected in 2020 Q1.16 Some RSPs have
removed their fees and have been using social
media to raise awareness of digital payment
instruments (where applicable).
It would be important for RSPs and authorities
to work together to mitigate the effects of the
crisis and encourage the adoption of digital
payments, greater use of regulated channels,
and wider availability of cost-efficient services.
In the meantime, the World Bank will continue
to monitor and report on the availability of
remittance services worldwide, and work with
stakeholders to improve the transparency and
efficiency of the remittances market toward
a reduction of the still high cost of remitting
money internationally, guided by the CPSS-
World Bank General Principles for Internation-
al Remittances (CPSS-WB 2007). The World
Bank has issued a call to action to support the
remittances sector (see table 1.3).
12Migration and Development Brief 32
Table 1.3 Possible World Bank Interventions Addressing COVID-19’s Effects on Migration and Remittances
Supporting access to social
Supporting remittance
Supporting stranded migrants services for migrants and their
infrastructure
families
SHORT TERM
• Evacuation of stranded migrants. • Set up grants to improve access • Remittance service providers
to basic health services, education, (RSPs) have been facing store
• Granting temporary protected
and housing for host and migrant closures and disruption of
status to foreign nationals with
communities. remittance services.
expired visas.
• Extend cash transfer programs to • Support could be provided to RSPs
• Health awareness campaigns and
support internal and international to be declared as essential services.
provision of treatment to migrants.
migrants, especially those who have
• Incentives (such as subsidies) could
• Identifying options to serve lost their jobs in host cities/countries.
be offered to RSPs to reduce the cost
stranded migrants (including
• Support social services and provide of remittance services. For example,
internal and international migrants,
cash transfers to families left behind. RSPs could claim a tax credit for
informal workers, and those without
waiving remittance fees paid by
proper documentation). • Facilitate the provision of remote
remitters.
mentoring and medical advice by
• Supporting informal businesses
diaspora doctors, and the temporary • Certain AML/CFT requirements
that are likely to employ migrants,
return of such professionals. could be temporarily simplified to
conditional on keeping migrants on
incentivize online and mobile money
the payroll. • Include migrants in programs that
transfers, following a risk-based
provide a temporary moratorium
approach.
on debt service in countries of origin
(including loans taken out for paying • Public authorities would do well to
recruitment costs) and rent payments identify, remove, or mitigate factors
in host countries. that prevent customers or providers
from leveraging digital payment
instruments for remittances.
Supporting access to social
Supporting remittance
Supporting stranded migrants services for migrants and their
infrastructure
families
MEDIUM TERM
• Revisit insurance regulations that • Support countries in improving
may constrain migrants from buying data on migration and remittances.
medical insurance for families back
• Support efforts to reduce
home.
remittance costs.
• Make medical insurance benefits
• Facilitate emerging remittance
offered by host countries portable to
models using digital means.
origin countries.
• Achieve universal financial access
• Expand origin countries’ social-
in receiving and sending countries.
welfare schemes to migrants abroad
(i.e., to address unemployment spells). • Enhance domestic retail payment
systems and grant RSPs access.
• Facilitate the recognition of skills
of migrants and refugees in host • Promote interoperability.
countries to help with the shortage
of skills. • Enhance AML/CFT compliance
and use of digital ID solutions.
• Support cross-border payment
solutions for remittances.
13COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
Supporting access to social
Supporting remittance
Supporting stranded migrants services for migrants and their
infrastructure
families
LONG TERM
• Support safe and regular • Set up twinning arrangements to • Support efforts to reduce
migration programs. train more doctors and nurses in remittance costs.
low- and middle-income countries in
• Support national strategies (on
collaboration with medical schools in
a demand basis) to increase the
high-income countries.
share of regular migrants in the total
migrant population in host countries. • Support efforts to reduce
recruitment costs.
• Establish universal health programs
that include migrants irrespective of
their legal status.
14Migration and Development Brief 32 15
COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
2. Regional Trends in Migration and
Remittance Flows
The outlook for remittances for 2020 remains tries such as those in the Pacific Islands could
as uncertain as the impact of COVID-19 on see households at risk as remittance incomes
global growth and may depend to a large decline over this period (World Bank 2020a). A
extent on the measures taken to restrain the recovery of 7.5 percent growth for the region is
spread of the disease. In the past, remittances anticipated in 2021.
have been countercyclical during times of di-
saster in the recipient economy. This time, how- Remittances to the Philippines rose by 4 per-
ever, the pandemic has affected all countries, cent in 2019, to reach $35.2 billion, up from
and the economic fallout is likely to vary due to the 3 percent growth seen in 2018 (figure 2.1).
country-specific characteristics. Year-on-year growth in remittances for Janu-
ary 2020 was 6.6 percent but this likely reflects
2.1 East Asia and the Pacific a period prior to widespread COVID-19 mea-
sures being adopted in host countries. Remit-
Remittance trends. Remittance flows to the tances to Indonesia returned to a single-digit
East Asia and Pacific region grew by 2.6 annual growth of 4 percent in 2019 after expe-
percent in 2019, about 4.3 percentage points riencing double-digit growth in 2018, the latter
lower than the growth rate in 2018. In 2020, due to an expansion in remittance flows from
remittance flows are expected to decline by the Middle East (particularly Saudi Arabia).
13 percent due to the impact of COVID-19. By contrast, remittances from the Middle East
The slowdown is expected to be driven by shrunk in 2019 while growth remained in the
declining inflows from the United States, the double digits from Asia, particularly in Hong
largest source of remittances to the East Asia Kong SAR, China; and Taiwan, China.
and Pacific region, and from Hong Kong SAR, Remittance costs. The average cost of send-
China. Several remittance-dependent coun- ing $200 in remittances to the East Asia and
Figure 2.1 Top Remittance Recipients in the East Asia and Pacific Region, 2019
($ billion, 2019) (Percentage of GDP, 2019)
37.6
68.4
35.2
16.2
14.3
10.9
9.9 9.7
17.0 6.5 6.1 5.9
11.7 5.0
7.1
2.8 1.7 1.6 0.6 0.3
.
am
a
a
s
lu
oa
Ca Sts
m
sia
M dia
lia
ji
s
sia
s
Ph hina
ar
ilip ti
ji
nd
M nd
di
ne
ng
Fi
ne
Fi
va
a
na
go
nm
am
ay
ne
bo
es etn
rib
bo
sla
pi
la
.
pi
To
Tu
ed
et
C
al
on
ai
do
S
m
ilip
ya
Ki
m
lI
Vi
Vi
M
,F
Th
Ca
al
In
Ph
ia
sh
ar
on
M
Sources: World Bank staff estimates, World Development Indicators, and
icr
IMF Balance of Payments statistics. Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 16
MMigration and Development Brief 32
Figure 2.2 Remittance Fees to the Philippines Are Among the Lowest in the East Asia
and Pacific Region
(Percent)
30
Fourth Quarter 2018
Fourth Quarter 2019 25.1
25
5 highest-cost corridors
21.0
20
17.0
15 14.0 14.2
13.4 12.9 13.0
11.8
5 lowest-cost corridors 11.0
10
5.1
5 4.1 3.2
3.2 2.6 3.4 2.8
2.9
2.2 2.2
0
pi s to
m
sia
a
s
a
a
s
u
ar
ne
ne
di
in
in
at
na
nm
ne
s
Ch
Ch
bo
nu
pi
pi
ilip te
ne
et
do
ya
ilip
ilip
Ph ira
m
Va
Vi
to
to
M
Ca
In
Em
Ph
Ph
to
to
nd
a
to
to
ric
to
to
o
nd
lia
la
ab
Af
tt
sia
e
ai
nd
ra
la
or
or
Ar
ai
Th
h
ay
st
ai
ap
ap
la
w
ut
d
Au
Th
al
ai
Ku
So
ite
ng
ng
M
Th
Un
Si
Si
Sources: Remittance Prices Worldwide database, World Bank. Average cost of sending $200.
Pacific region dropped to 7.13 percent in 2020 was expected to fall amid travel bans imposed
Q1, compared with 7.21 percent in 2019 Q1. by the GCC.17 As of April 30, 2020, 1677
The five lowest-cost corridors in the region av- overseas Filipino workers had tested positive
eraged 2.6 percent while the five highest-cost for COVID-19, of which 451 had recovered
corridors averaged 15.4 percent as of 2019 and 201 had died. Only workers barred from
Q4. Money transfer costs from Thailand to travelling to China were entitled to a subsidy
neighboring countries in Southeast Asia were of 10,000 pesos (about $198), which had not
among the highest, averaging 12.1 percent in been extended to those affected by travel
the last quarter of 2019. bans, particularly in Qatar and Kuwait.
Migration trends. The Philippine government’s Over 60,000 migrant workers from Myanmar,
efforts to halt the spread of the coronavirus Cambodia, and the Lao People’s Democratic
by banning travel to several countries—in- Republic fled Thailand, defying requests by
cluding Taiwan, China; Macau; Hong Kong officials to remain in the country to help con-
SAR, China; and South Korea—was short tain the virus and raising fears of cross-border
lived amid resistance from overseas Filipino infections. Elsewhere, Singapore, which ap-
workers concerned about potential job losses peared to have early success in containing the
if they were unable to travel back to their host coronavirus among its residents, was seeing
countries after home visits. The government a new surge in cases from a previously over-
announced that new deployment to these looked source. Over three-quarters of these
countries and mainland China would be scaled new cases were related to low-skilled migrant
down while deployment to the GCC countries workers housed in dormitories. There were
17COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens
more than 200,000 migrant workers from the arrest and deportation of undocumented
Asia residing in a total of 43 dormitories in migrants in order to facilitate their testing and
the country. treatment for the coronavirus.
A lockdown in Malaysia was causing hardship Throughout the East Asia and Pacific region,
for foreign workers, particular daily casual migrant workers were left out of financial
workers. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign support from host governments to counter the
Affairs (MOFA) indicated that it had sent more economic fallout from containing the coronavi-
than 3,000 aid packages to its citizens in Ma- rus pandemic, and were at times being told to
laysia and was preparing an additional 3,000 simply return home–though many were unable
more.18 Malaysia is the main destination for to travel due to travel bans or flight cancella-
Indonesian workers, hosting half of Indonesia’s tions. A recent survey of migrant workers in
estimated 3.7 million workers abroad in 2019.19 New South Wales, Australia, found that half
had lost their jobs and one-fifth had seen
Undocumented migrant workers in host their work hours reduced while none would
Southeast Asian countries risked detention be eligible for government assistance. A plan
and deportation by visiting health centers to to pay employers A$1,500 (around US$950)
be checked or treated for the coronavirus. The every two weeks per employee did not extend
Ministry of Labor in Taiwan, China, planned to to those employing temporary migrant workers
inspect the documentation of migrant caregiv- (except New Zealanders). While the Singa-
ers. A civic group called for granting amnesty porean government waived the monthly levy
to the estimated 50,000 undocumented work- of S$750 (about US$530) for foreign workers
ers in the economy, citing these workers’ fear of required of employers and committed to pro-
coming forward to report COVID-19 symp- viding the latter a rebate, contract workers did
toms. In Malaysia, civic groups similarly called not expect to receive any financial support.
on the government to impose a moratorium on
Figure 2.3 Remittance Inflows to Europe and Central Asia Remained Strong in 2019
($ billion, 2019e) (Percentage of GDP, 2019e)
15.8
29.2 28.2
25.4
10.6
7.2 16.2 15.6
14.2
4.2 4.2 11.4 10.5 10.2
2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.1 9.5
an
e
Ro ia
ia
f
an
a
an
ia
o
ne
a
va
ia
ia
a
Ta lic
vo
lic
Ta ria
Uz ic o
vin
in
vin
gr
ni
ss
an
rg
rg
en
ist
st
ist
b
do
ai
ub
so
a
ra
ba
ne
Ru
pu
o
go
eo
lg
m
go
ki
kr
ul
jik
m
jik
Uk
Ko
ol
ep
e
Al
be
Bu
te
ep
U
Ar
Re
G
G
ze
ze
M
zR
on
,R
er
er
yz
M
rg
H
H
ia
rg
rb
Ky
d
d
Ky
an
an
Se
ia
ia
sn
sn
Bo
Bo
Sources: World Bank staff estimates, World Development Indicators, and IMF Balance of Payments statistics.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; 2019e = estimated for 2019.
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