Concept Note, Switzerland's Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 2020
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Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy,
South Sudan, 2017 – 2020
1. Context
1.1. Root causes of conflict in South Sudan
The general failure by the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) to ensure security and rule of
law, the cultural responsibilities of youth to protect their community, the shifting of social norms regulating
violence, and the high proliferation of modern weapons have all been behind drastically increasing levels of
conflict in South Sudan, particularly among pastoralists. One of the most significant factors has been the ma-
nipulation of identity and ethnicity by politicians as a means of increasing support in elections and as a means
of mobilization within the context of political contests. As traditional rules of engagement and ethics of warfare
no longer apply, the political contestation has turned violent. A major consequence has been an acceptance of
civilians as legitimate targets of war and a polarization of local communities along ethnic lines, which led to
grave violations of international humanitarian law and human rights.
After the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in early 2005, a policy of State engage-
ment was pursued by donors, operating in what they regarded as a post-war reconstruction scenario. Howev-
er, despite the CPA the situation was closer to a „suspended war‟ during which local conflicts erupted fre-
quently. This led to a serious underestimation of the residual and often complex triggers of violence. In many
respects problems identified in 2005 are still existent; for example, youth alienation and specific tensions
around water and land have been exacerbated by poor progress over reintegration of demobilised soldiers
and the enormous return of populations from Khartoum and abroad since 2005. Modest progress achieved
until 2013 was annihilated by the recent civil war.
1.2. The December, 2013 events and the beginning of the armed conflict
Fighting started in the capital, Juba, on the evening of 15 December, 2013 initially among members of the
Presidential Guard. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) split between forces loyal to the Government
and forces loyal to former Vice-President Riek Machar. After forces loyal to Mr. Machar were defeated, Gov-
ernment forces entered neighbourhoods primarily populated by civilians of Nuer origin and began targeting
Nuer men. Thousands fled their homes and neighbourhoods were left emptied and often destroyed by security
forces.
The targeting of Nuer civilians in Juba in December 2013 led to mobilization of Nuer support for Riek Machar’s
Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-i.O.). Importantly though, the unity is based
mainly on the perceived threat against the Nuer, not on the leadership skills of Machar or the desire to support
any particular political agenda. The people who were fighting on behalf of the opposition preferred to fight in
parallel to the military structures. At a later stage during the conflict Shilluk and Equatorian groups joined the
i.O.-movement.
Subsequently neighbouring states and regional actors have been pulled into the conflict too. The government
of Sudan in Khartoum has long been suspected of capitalizing on any internal armed conflict in South Sudan
to undermine national unity and lead to the collapse of the country. To date, the only way for South Sudan to
export crude oil is through the pipeline that goes to Port Sudan in the North. Uganda has openly supported the
GRSS, including the deployment of Ugandan troops in the immediate aftermath of the December 2013 out-
break of fighting. Kenya has strong economic ties to South Sudan in the banking and commercial sector. Ethi-
opian Prime Minister, Haile Mariam Desalegn, has played a direct role in repeated attempts to negotiate a
peace agreement between the parties to the conflict. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
has been the main actor leading the peace process. It has remained involved in the peace talks despite hav-
ing been effectively blown off by both the major parties to the conflict multiple times in the past 20 months.
The other main international actor, which finds itself mired in the conflict, is the UN Mission to South Sudan
(UNMISS). It was originally mandated in 2011 to support South Sudan in consolidating the peace and help
with security sector reforms and state building, albeit with a Chapter VII mandate in civilian protection. The UN
Security Council changed its mandate in the aftermath of renewed conflict, with civilian protection as its prima-
ry mandate (and the “Protection of Civilian” sites as its major headache).
1.3. A dire humanitarian situation
The armed conflict that started in mid-December 2013 in South Sudan has had wide-ranging economic, social
and political consequences. Despite the signing of a Peace Agreement in August 2015, localised conflicts
have persisted, and even grew in geographical scope. Estimates by the UN Office for the Coordination of Hu-
manitarian Affairs (OCHA) suggest that as a result of the armed conflict more than 2.3 million people compris-
ing nearly 20 percent of the total population of South Sudan have fled their homes. This includes about 1.7
million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and about 0.7 million refugees hosted by neighbouring countries.
An estimated 180’000 IDPs are hosted in UN Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites while 90 percent of the IDPs
remain outside the PoC sites.2 The levels of hunger and malnutrition in the country have been acute and widespread with the latest Integrat- ed Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) highlighting that an estimated 2.8 million people or 23 percent of the population are at risk of facing acute food and nutrition insecurity between January-March 2016. The ma- jority of the population at risk (57 percent) is concentrated in the former states of Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile, with Unity remaining the most affected. Latest figures show, however, that the nutritional situation in Bahr el Ghazal has considerably deteriorated in recent months. All parties to the armed conflict have committed grave violations of IHL and HR, including targeted ethnic vio- lence and deliberate sexual and gender-based violence.The South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2016 has requested US$ 1.3 billion for 114 humanitarian partners to respond to the most life-threatening needs of 5.1 million people out of an estimated 6.1 million persons identified in need of protection and assis- tance in South Sudan. 1.4. An economy in shambles The decline in oil production by almost half and the sharp drop in international oil prices caused large short- falls in foreign exchange receipts and government revenue. The country is experiencing an economic crisis with a sharp decline in national income and high inflation, which approached 300 percent in June, 2016. Moreover, the value of the South Sudanese pound has dropped by close to 90 percent since the exchange rate liberalization in December 2015. If macroeconomic policies do not change, the economic situation will deteriorate further, resulting in more humanitarian suffering and potentially threatening the still-fragile peace process. The deficit in 2016/17 could top US$ 1.1 billion or 25 percent of GDP. The government must raise non-oil revenue and cut expenditures, particularly in the payroll, current operations, travel, and investment. Moreover, there is a need to strengthen expenditure controls, budget preparation, and to limit arrears accumu- lation. These measures could reduce the fiscal gap to about US $300 million. Further fiscal adjustment be- yond these measures would make it impossible for the government to meet its obligations, including expenses related to the peace agreement, suggesting a need to cover this remaining gap from external sources (i.e. donors). 1.5. The Peace Agreement signed in August, 2015 The peace agreement signed in August 2015 has registered progress with the formation on 29 April, 2016 of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), comprising all signatory parties. The Agreement out- lines a comprehensive plan to end the fighting, frame a post-conflict transition, and begin the tasks of reconcil- iation and reform. The months since signing have given a taste of just how challenging implementation is likely to be all along; the parties have manufactured delays, sought to renegotiate aspects of the agreement, and continued fighting in some parts of the country. Implementation has been slow. The fighting that started anew in Juba on 8 July, 2016 led to the disintegration of the TGoNU. AU and IGAD have adhered to the principle of setting up a third party protection force, which has been endorsed by the UN Security Council on 12 August 2016. Although the situation in Juba has calmed down the situation in the country remains very tense. The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission and its Chairperson, former President of Botswana Festus Mogae, have begun to fill the void, pushing the parties toward uneven progress. Success will require a sus- tained mix of support and pressure, that, when appropriately coordinated, brought the parties to an agreement in August, 2015. The notion of an inclusive, multi-stakeholder process is a major point of contention, among parties and external actors alike. While some partners and many South Sudanese citizens saw the value of a multi-stakeholder process including civil society organizations, women’s representatives, religious leaders, and eminent South Sudanese, the warring parties resisted, rejecting participation or trying to use an expanded table to stack the process with their own supporters. Even when information is readily available, bringing the voices of those affected by conflict into the peace process also demands political space where they can open- ly debate developments. Such space was at risk during the conflict, as media outlets were subject to threats and closure, journalists faced reprisals, and when even prominent members of the ruling party were afraid to voice their opinions. Inclusivity remains a challenge as implementation proceeds. 2. Switzerland’s foreign policy objectives in South Sudan For Switzerland, South Sudan has been an important country programme since it gained independence in 2011. The focus of the Swiss engagement remains humanitarian, supported by activities in the field of human security and limited development cooperation. Significant Swiss diplomatic engagement in mediation and hu- man security dates back to the late 1990ies. Switzerland took an active part in the negotiations and implemen- tation of the CPA in 2005, which served as the basis for the referendum on independence in South Sudan in 2011. Bilateral trade is relatively modest. A few companies based in Switzerland are active in the commodities sector in South Sudan (e.g. Nespresso). Switzerland recognised the new state of South Sudan along with the rest of the international community in 2011. Since 2012, South Sudan has maintained a multilaterally accredited permanent mission in Geneva, which is also bilaterally accredited as its Embassy to Switzerland. Switzerland's interests in South Sudan are represented by its Embassy in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). Since 2006, Switzerland has maintained a Coopera- tion Office in the capital Juba. To date the two Governments have not concluded any bilateral agreement. Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 2020
3 While a framework agreement had been envisaged earlier on, the intention did not materialise due to the state of civil war prevailing in South Sudan since December, 2013. 3. Results achieved, 2013 – 2016 The Cooperation Strategy 2013 – 2016 was based on the assumption that the Government of the Republic of South Sudan, controlled by the SPLM, was legitimate, and willing and capable to lead a nation- and state- building process. Moreover, it was assumed that South Sudan had the necessary resources (oil and agricul- ture), which the Government was willing to engage so as to overcome the need for international humanitarian assistance. After 15 December 2013, both were proven wrong; a new, devastating cycle of violence and de- struction was triggered, the social, economic and political consequences of which cannot yet be fully assessed. Also, the Swiss Cooperation Office in Juba – as is the case for offices in other fragile contexts, particularly where it does not count amongst the 10 biggest donors – has constantly been struggling with the generation of evidence that would provide for clear attribution of results, or signs of meaningful contribution. In other words, statements are not very robust, but they certainly were the best one could do under the circumstances. Bearing this in mind, some tracers can be identified. Food Security and Livelihoods: resilience, in terms of promoting agricultural production beyond subsistence, has been persistently pursued since 2013, and even earlier. There exists evidence that Switzerland has ena- bled multilateral and other international actors to introduce an element of sustainability and self-sustenance of producers, which protected livelihoods and markets at times at which the objective was not considered a prior- ity in view of the emergency. Investment in coordination, sharing of lessons learned, and good practices has paid off, and generated positive effects. Through support in particular to WFP and ICRC, Switzerland has substantially contributed to life-saving efforts for South Sudan’s most vulnerable population. Basic Social Services: the more appropriate title may be meanwhile: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH), Aweil +. While it can be argued that Switzerland did not significantly influence the national health equation and practice, it did make a strong and visible mark on improving WASH services delivery in Northern Bahr el Ghazal (NBeG) to more than 100’000 people, and – with MEDAIR - in the Jussuf Batil refugee camp, Maban. The state-building hypothesis in NBeG had to be abandoned after December, 2013, but the reorientation to- wards community mobilisation and hygiene bears the promise of leaving sustainable results behind after the upcoming closure of the project, in March, 2017. Coupled with the shift of the context from post-conflict to conflict the phasing-out of the direct action was decided. Human Security and Protection: Swiss engagement in this domain has been led by the assumption that the strengthening of institutions would lead to greater stability in the new country. The formation of Councils of Traditional Authority Leaders (COTAL) and the Constitution-making process were supported. These engage- ments were severely undermined by the events of December, 2013. The legitimacy of actors controlled by the existing Government to influence Swiss supported initiatives became questionable. However, the assumption about traditional authorities potentially being a major driver of societal change towards conflict transformation and inclusion remains valid. Furthermore, Switzerland can draw on a wide network of contacts, long-standing experience and a good reputation working with traditional authorities. Support to church-led peace building processes was designed in an exemplary way, focusing on the needs and adopting the pace of the partners. This is an area in which Switzerland proved that it can do well. Protection has become another area in which Switzerland provides critical support as regards solid evidence- based analyses and advocacy and the building of effective coalitions towards policy influencing, particularly in the context of the dialogue and – sometimes – debate between UNMISS and the protection community. The above builds upon strong partnerships with the Protection Cluster and the NGO Forum. 4. Lessons learnt and conclusions 4.1. Switzerland’s specificity in the donor landscape While Switzerland is not among the top contributors within the international community with regard to financial means, it is nonetheless perceived as a credible actor. Switzerland was acknowledgedly able in recent years to come forward with context-specific, partner-oriented cutting-edge responses to identified needs: e.g., as regards the security of NGO actors (and thus an effective humanitarian delivery), horticultural production (and thus food security in peri-urban areas), or multistakeholder peacebuilding (supporting the SSCC, enhancing the voice of customary authorities). To capitalise on this, Switzerland needs to ensure that it upholds a thor- ough awareness of the context in South Sudan. It is crucial that any engagement be preceded by conflict- sensitive analysis of the context and of the potential impact of intervening. Given the complexity of the crisis in South Sudan, “how” we do things is as important as “what” we do. To be able to adjust to significant changes in the midst of a protracted crisis, it is important that planning and programming remain flexible and pragmatic. Given the varying contexts in South Sudan - in terms of e.g. con- flict intensity, economic resources, ethnicity - it is evident that no “one solution fits all” can be applied. Conse- quently, Switzerland needs to develop targeted approaches combining emergency aid with the strengthening Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 2020
4
and capacitation of actors, systems and institutions. This is valid as regards food security, agricultural produc-
tion and markets, as much as it is with respect to conflict sensitivity, non-violent conflict transformation and
peace/nation-building.
4.2. Principles of Engagement
The meaningfulness and effectiveness of the Swiss engagement in South Sudan depends on its commit-
ment to a Whole of Government Approach. This complementarity of available instruments is perceived
as a comparative advantage of Switzerland.
The comprehensive application of conflict-sensitive programme management (CSPM) will guide the entire
Cooperation Strategy.
In whatever we do, individually and as a team, we support transparency and accountability.
Commitment to gender equity guides our programming.
We promote self-sufficiency, dignity and the freedom of choice for communities / individuals.
Technical assistance is to be embedded in the promotion of community cohesion so as to enhance resili-
ence. The focus is to be on community-managed basic services and equipment.
We should invest more actively in appropriately designed, patient and solidly rooted reconciliation and
healing processes, rather than in attempts at quick fixes. It means to promote local peace-building dia-
logue, support social cohesion and inclusion, foster inclusive and participatory governance, and reward
peace at the local level.
Institutional and behavioural change is a process that calls for qualitative indicators of effectiveness and
adaptive, iterative planning. We must concentrate on what Switzerland tends to be better at than others:
responsiveness to locally identified needs, the patient accompaniment of locally owned processes, the
promotion of promising alternative approaches and a critical dialogue, and the support of holistic multi-
stakeholder endeavours. This requires that we need to be ready to embrace carefully assessed risks,
where other donors stop because of their internal rules and procedures.
5. Priorities
Basic WASH services as a domain of intervention will be discontinued after March, 2017, i.e. after the orderly
closing of the SDC project in Aweil, NBeG. This will free humanitarian resources and enhance focus towards
greater effectiveness on two domains: Food Security & Livelihoods, as well as Protection and Human Rights.
Peace- & Nationbuilding will be established as a specific domain drawing both from HSD and SDC funding,
focusing on dialogue and institutional reform towards inclusive and accountable governance, hinging upon
and reinforcing FSL and Protection initiatives. In all domains, supported endeavours shall aim at fostering
local non-violent means of transforming conflict and mitigating violence typically triggered by a fierce competi-
tion around resources. Gender discrimination and the prevention / mitigation of sexual and gender-based vio-
lence (SGBV) are approached as priority concerns in the frame of a strategy that aims at responding to the
needs and aspirations of the most vulnerable.
5.1. Rationale, theory of change
Where elites and officials are accustomed to putting their own interests before the public good, and where
formal institutions are de facto not - yet - perceptible for citizens, local community-owned mechanisms of gov-
ernance have a better prospect to bind society together and counter predatory behaviour as well as violence.
Through fostering organizations and initiatives that empower those within the South Sudanese polity who
commit and act towards a peaceful, just and prosperous South Sudan in a way that caters to the needs of the
most vulnerable for the benefit of all, Switzerland will contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding
towards building a South Sudanese nation that provides livelihood for all. While doing so, Switzerland’s poli-
cies and interventions are systematically informed by conflict analysis and implemented according to conflict-
sensitivity principles and standards.
5.2. Expected Outcomes
Domains of Outcome statements
Intervention
Food Security and The most vulnerable have access to life-saving food.
Livelihoods Producers have become self-sufficient and are capable of placing surpluses on
local markets.
Protection of Civil- Protection needs of civilians - as identified by them - have been met.
ians, promotion of Communities have been empowered and capacitated so as to create a safer envi-
Human rights ronment for themselves.
Peace and Na- South Sudanese promoters of peace have developed and maintained spaces for
tionbuilding dialogue and conflict transformation that respond to citizens’ need for peaceful co-
existence and social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountability.
Viable and equitable options towards nationbuilding have been spelt out by South
Sudanese and transformed into proposed constitutional and legal norms.
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20205
6. Managing the strategy and implementing the programme
The strategy aims at balancing direct support with multi-bilateral contributions, the latter being understood as
both burden sharing and entry points for joint ventures. Direct support shall go to selected partners capable of
generating good practices and approaches that may inform Switzerland’s policy dialogue and influencing.
Particular attention shall be given to Switzerland contributing to an overall strengthening of accountable and
responsive institutions, serving the most vulnerable. Humanitarian interventions incorporate the overarching
goal of enabling affected populations to create a safe environment, ensuring their survival and strengthening
communities’ resilience to violent conflict.
While the results framework (RF) and proposed outcomes address a scenario based on the country consoli-
dating peace and following a path towards sustained and inclusive socio-economic development, domains of
intervention have been assessed as robust against crisis and renewed conflict. In case of a generalised con-
flict:
FSL would focus on safeguarding conditions for resilience while contributing to life-saving food distri-
bution in the midst of a food security crisis.
Protection of Civilians would address immediate needs of the most vulnerable victims and displaced
persons.
Peace- and Nationbuilding would aim at fostering spaces and voices for peace.
At the time of writing, the programme may be described as being at crossroads: elements of the RF remain
implementable while the probability of being forced to at least temporarily resort to the above fall-back has
increased significantly. Under any circumstances, supported endeavours must be designed so as to foster
resilience and capacity to engage on a development path once possible again.
The indicative budget amounts to CHF 80 million, for the period, 2017 to 2020 (95% from SDC, 5% from HSD);
a large share will be funded through SDC, Humanitarian Aid (~CHF 18 m. per year). The South Cooperation
contribution level will depend on general discussions regarding budget, and the evolution of the context in
South Sudan. See Annex 3 for further details.
The current setup of the Cooperation Office in Juba will be kept. A presence in South Sudan is crucial with a
view to monitoring the evolution of the context and maintaining a close relationship with partners. This should
permit swift programme adaptation if and when necessary. In view of the above, operational cost (CHF 2.3 m.
/ year, or approx. 12% of the total budget) is assessed as acceptable. However, a relocation of the office for
security reasons cannot be ruled out, triggered by deteriorating security conditions or disruptions in supplies in
Juba (namely fuel). Without a permanent presence in Juba, the SDC-portfolio would become almost exclu-
sively humanitarian in nature. Bilateral partnerships would largely be reoriented towards multilateral agencies.
HSD might then no longer be in a position to carry on with the implementation of its entire programme.
7. Steering the implementation of the strategy
As South Sudan is currently in a highly fragile condition, permanent adaptation to context will be the main
principle of engagement for Switzerland – agility in fragility. Outlined scenarios (see Annex 1 and 3) constitute
a central element for steering the strategy’s implementation.
A WOGA-steering committee will meet annually to analyse the context and the relevance of the strategy and
discuss potential adaptations to the portfolio. Based on defined triggers indicating major changes in the con-
text, revisions of the results framework – which builds upon a scenario of slow but steady recovery - shall be
undertaken.
Annual Reports will provide an overview on progress made, address challenges and suggest necessary pro-
grammatic corrective measures.
Annexes:
1. Scenarios
2. DRAFT Results framework
3. Tentative budget allocation
4. Protokoll Frühnotiz Kooperationsstrategie Südsudan (DirKo, 02.05.16)
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 2020Annex 1 – Scenario overview and related triggers
A – “Straight to hell and B – “A long walk to peace” C – “A dream gone sour”
back” *
Par-
ties
start
to
im-
ple-
The unyielding attitude of the The provisions of the ARCISS ment the ARCISS in order to get
warring parties leaves the AR- are being implemented, includ- access to donor support but re-
CISS maculation and even ing critical elements such as form efforts remain at the surface.
escalates the conflict through reconciliation, local governance During presidential elections the
the establishment of 28 states. and transitional justice. Civil ethnic and personal rivalries erupt
Description Together with a further fraction- society positioned itself strongly even stronger than ever before
alization of militias security as key actor in peace and rec- and lead to a total collapse of
deteriorates and causes interna- onciliation while a new political basic law and order. Donors sus-
tional actors to relocate. A major elite emerged that was serious pend aid programmes, and the
event unexpectedly changes about promoting local govern- international community abandons
conflict dynamics and creates ance. This recovery benefitted attempts at mediation and re-
tangible pressure, leading to the from positive economic devel- establishing peace. South Suda-
formation of a new government. opments and external actors nese diaspora and churches re-
Humanitarian and development refraining from instigating re- main the only actors trying to
actors return and the economy newed clashes along past launch a peace process.
slowly recovers. cleavages through their tradi-
tional proxies.
Switzerland evacuated its inter- Switzerland engaged in humani- Switzerland had been supporting
national staff to Addis Ababa tarian aid and linked up subsist- civil society for democratic change
from where it continued its multi- ence producers to local markets, and peace, human rights and food
bilateral humanitarian aid pro- supported non-state actors security before it had to close its
gramme, support to non-state engaged in human rights, Office. From then on, it sponsored
Implications for CH stakeholders engaged in peace- peacebuilding and mediation, as South Sudanese stakeholders
building and mediation, and the well as in the constitutional endeavouring to stop this new war.
identification and development process. It is considered to In 2020 Swiss assistance was
of constitutional federal options select South Sudan as a priority discontinued, except modest
towards fair and equitable power country for a development pro- humanitarian contributions to
and resources sharing. gramme from 2021 onwards. multilateral actors.
Transitional Gov-
ernment
In place, but not functional In place, functional Not functional, not in place
(functioning / not
functioning)
Power sharing: Free
and fair elections/ Even if it is in place it is not
In place, functional Not functional, not in place
Politics
Inclusive, equitable functional
constitutional reform
Reconciliation and
Not addressed or superficial only Implementation under way Not relevant
justice
Emergence of new
political elite (selec-
Not in sight Emerging Not in sight
tion of person-
nel/election)
Political space Volatile / Shrinking Opening Minimal / not existing
Monopoly of vio-
lence with (legiti-
Security
mate) State (con-
Fragmentation remains,
flicts; RMG strength; Monopoly Stabilized, increasing Low, increasing fragmentation
increases
ext armed forces
(LRA, SDN RMGs,
Uganda)
Government (Oil)
Low or appropriated by conflict Stable, increasing part goes to Little/no revenues, appropriated by
Economy
revenue
parties the budget conflict parties
PFM
(budget, debt, risk Weak, not improving Slowly improving Weak, deteriorating
of sovereign default)
* According to Switzerland’s analysis South Sudan is currently in Scenario A.
Triggers for the relocation of the SCO
1. Security in Juba doesn’t allow to leave compound
2. Access to fuel not possible, office work has to stopAnnex 2 – DRAFT Results Framework
Introductory note on the Results Framework
National reference document: in the absence of, e.g., a national poverty reduction strategy, the reference used here is he Interim Cooperation Framework
(ICF), 2016-2017, of the United Nations Country Team in South Sudan: Recovery, Resilience and Reaching the Most Vulnerable. Subject to positive enough de-
velopments, the ICF would flow into a UNDAF (UN Development Assistance Framework combined with a Government strategy)
Scenario of reference for the Results Framework: so as to remain compatible with the logic of the Results Framework (and its reference to a national plan)
and the nature of the ICF, which postulates a transition towards peace and stability, proposed outcomes and accompanying items refer to a context in which the
State has not ultimately and totally failed. Statements thus are robust subject to the Swiss Cooperation Office remaining operational and partners’ programmes
implementable. That is, proposed outcomes may be achieved – at least to a certain extent – despite a further downward trend as described in two of the three
scenarios in Annex 1, until tipping towards chaos.
Regular monitoring of the “fields of observation” shall - if necessary - permit identifying the point of time at which the results framework (as well as the ICF)
would become unachievable. In such a case, it is proposed that an alternative results framework be produced, the format of which would have to be designed so
as to provide proper reference and guidance in a situation of ultimate state failure, widespread insecurity and humanitarian emergency. The follow-up reference
frame to the ICF will also lead to a review of the results framework.3
Domain of intervention : Food Security and Livelihoods
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes (segregated by, a) multilateral (2) Contribution of Swiss Programme (3) Outcomes at Country level
contributions, b) geographically specific projects supported
by CH). Baselines to be collected
Outcome statement 1: The most vulnerable population has Switzerland supports multilateral and international partners’ UN ICF Outcome 1: More Resilient Communities
access to life saving food emergency food assistance to support the vulnerable population
to bridge periods of food shortage. Indicator 1.1: % of targeted communities using 11 coping strategies
By 2020, 100% of people being classified in IPC phase 4 or below. Coping Strategy Index (CSI), disaggregated by sex of
and 5 in 2016 have safe and equal access to food aid Risk: household head. Baseline (2014): (rCSI): 50% of targeted communi-
(SPR WFP / ICRC reports) (disaggregated by sex of head - Extortion and illicit taxes ties use more than 11 coping strategies. Target (2017): 100 % of
household when and where feasible and available) - Hostile behaviour of Government services targeted communities reduce the number of coping strategies to 11
- Insecurity and logistical constraints hindering humanitarian or below (out of a score of 56) Indicator 1.2: Number of targeted
access communities have increased assets over the baseline. Baseline
- Funding gaps (mainly as regards multilateral organizations) (2014): None of targeted communities have average of 2.4 functional
assets. Target (2017): 250 communities have community assets
over the baseline average of 2.4 functional assets
Outcome statement 2: Producers have become self- Switzerland supports multilateral, international and national UN ICF Outcome 4: Local Economy Invigorated
sufficient and are capable of placing surpluses on local partners to increase the capacity of households to feed them-
markets selves and to boost income generation. Indicator 4.1: Number of value chain enabling strategies in agricul-
ture, livestock and fisheries. Baseline (2015): 4 strategies
• By 2020, food distribution has decreased to 0% due to a Risks: Target (2017): 4 additional strategies
constantly declining trend in humanitarian food distribution - General insecurity, erratic rains and flooding; pests and Indicator 4.2: Number of Cooperatives and Micro Small and Medi-
needs (WFP/ICRC) diseases disrupting agricultural production um sized Enterprises in place for production and marketing of pro-
By 2020, the cereal deficit has decreased by xx% (to be - Non-functional markets due to micro and macro-economic duce. Baseline (2015): 70. Target (2017): 60 new cooperatives and
defined), due to an increased production (FAO/WFP Crop instability MSMEs formed
and Food Security Assessments and Reports)
By 2020, the food basket cost has reached the average
2014 value due to a positive trend in the inflow of goods in
local markets (WFP marketing bulletins)
(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)
Emergency Food Assistance (GFD, food for asset / work etc. M4P)
Livelihood Recovery and Resilience Building (crop improvement, food diversification, access to markets, M4P, value chain etc.)
Public Private Development Partnership (Input providers, Nespresso, etc.)
Partners: Multilateral partners (e.g. WFP, ICRC, FAO), INGOs (e.g. Acted, Caritas Belgium, Care, Mercy Corps), NNGOs (e.g. Caritas Juba, DMI) and others (e.g. FSL-Cluster, Nespresso)
The strategy aims at balancing direct support with multi-bilateral contributions, the latter are understood as both burden sharing and entry points for joint ventures. Direct support shall go to select-
ed partners capable of generating good practices and approaches that may inform Switzerland’s policy dialogue and influencing. Gender discrimination and the prevention / mitigation of SGBV are
approached as priority concerns in the frame of a strategy that aims at responding to the needs and aspirations of the most vulnerable.
(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)
Food Security and Livelihood, 2017 - 2020: 35.0 million; 44% of total funding
(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20204
Team of DDoC or DoC and 2 NPO
Cash: partnerships developed and maintained that produce and demonstrate good practices with respect to promoting and strengthening livelihoods.
Cash: evidence and lessons learnt produced that feed into policy dialogue / influencing forwards delivering according to the needs of the most vulnerable.
Multi-bilateral contributions: evidence and good practices generated and fed into planning and steering of the multilateral humanitarian effort. Effective humanitarian delivery supported through
secondments with the potential of positive systemic / policy influence.
Target financial figures reached.
Means of verification. Annual report stocktaking and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution make a positive difference; if yes, how?
If not: corrective measures to be identified).
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20205
Domain of intervention : Protection of Civilians, promotion of Human Rights
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes (segregated by, a) multilat- (2) Contribution of Swiss Programme (3) Outcomes at Country level
eral contributions, b) geographically specific projects
supported by CH). Baselines to be collected.
Outcome statement 1: Protection needs of civilians – as Switzerland supports its partners in responding to the immediate UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened
identified by them - have been met. and long-term protection needs of civilians,, including encourag-
ing safe, voluntary and informed returns, as well as provision of Indicator 3.1: Number of targeted governance and security
Reach and Protection Cluster surveys (samples) show a solid and evidence based analysis and advocacy, based on reforms are implemented
positive satisfaction trend civilian needs, aimed at policy influencing and promoting good Baseline (2015): The constitution review process, legislative,
By 2020, all IDPs have voluntarily returned and/or settled practices among all actors. military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace
Percentage of respondents who report increased personal agreement
safety and security, disaggregated by sex Risks Target (2017): 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law
Number of women and girls, men and boys subjected to institutions’ Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted.
physical, sexual or psychological violence having received - Government becomes highly repressive towards NGO activities Indicator 3.2: Percent of respondents who report increased
support in psychosocial, medical and/or legal aid - escalation in the security situation causing more displacements personal safety and security disaggregated by gender.
- lack of willingness by communities to share information Baseline:(2015): 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) re-
- donor fatigue, hence shortfalls in funding affecting projects spondents with confidence in peace, safety and security Target
(2017): 50% (48% men and 52% women)
Indicator 3.3: Percent of transitional governance mechanisms
with CSO/media participation. Target (2017): 80%
Outcome statement 2: Communities have been empow- Switzerland invests in community-based approaches, through
ered and capacitated so as to create a safer environment support to peacebuilding activities, promotion of human rights,
for themselves. non-violent conflict mitigation options, capacity building of com-
munities, with a special focus on gender equity and SGBV:
Policy dialogue and influencing (Heads of Mission, caucus
From 2017 onwards, steady decline in violent local con- and common statements / demarches)
flicts (protection cluster and implementing partners) UN Human Rights Council; Swiss positions
2020: no death casualties Partnerships with Civil Society, like-minded International
South Sudanese women, girls, men and boys enjoy free- Organisations, Protection Cluster, HCT
dom of movement Risks:
Percentage of respondents who report increased personal -TGNU completely collapses, hence escalation of violence
safety and security, disaggregated by sex - low capacities of NGOs and high turnover of staff
2017 onwards: increase in community driven peace initia- - lack of cooperation by targeted communities
tives, including by women - communities lose trust and confidence in each other
(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)
- Support direct physical protection of civilians at risk of facing physical violence to ensure safety of civilians and prevent loss of lives
- Advocacy and effective coordination of aid activities through the protection cluster, the South Sudan NGO Forum and OCHA to ensure effective response
- Facilitate safe and unhindered access through support to ICRC and UNHAS, OCHA, UNMISS and other stakeholders and if need be engage with parties to the conflict to respect the IHL
- Support information gathering and sharing and establishing mechanisms through which all stakeholders can access information. Use produced evidence and analysis for policy influencing
- Build local capacities and enhancing nonviolent local protection mechanisms to minimize local conflicts and collectively involve all stakeholders in ensuring their own safety
-Support sexual and gender based violence prevention and response, in particular access to support services and - where and when possible - access to justice
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20206
(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)
Resources: SDC Budget, 2017-2020: CHF 25 million; 31%
Responsible: Team of DOC or DDoC +1 NPO
All SDC implementing partners (NP, IOM, DRC, Protection Cluster, NGO Forum, ICRC, OCHA, HCT, G6+)
(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme)
Responsible: DOC or DDoC + 1NPO
Programmes supported by Switzerland are acknowledged as good / best practice.
Through providing support to key protection actors, Switzerland can influence collective donor practice and policy towards principled and rights-based protection.
Local community-based and managed non-violent conflict transformation spreads as a basis and precondition for regional and national peacebuilding.
Means of verification. Annual report stocktaking and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution make a positive difference; if yes,
how? If not: corrective measures to be identified.)
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20207
Domain of intervention: Peace- and Nationbuilding
(1) Swiss portfolio outcomes. (2) Contribution of Swiss Programme (3) Outcomes at Country level
Baselines partly to be established.
Outcome statement 1: South Sudanese promoters of peace Switzerland supports South Sudanese stakeholders to develop UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened
have developed and maintained spaces for dialogue and and maintain spaces for dialogue and conflict transformation
conflict transformation that respond to citizens’ need for that respond to citizens’ need for peaceful coexistence and Indicator 3.2: Percent of respondents who report increased
peaceful coexistence and social cohesion, governance and social cohesion, governance and truth, justice and accountabil- personal safety and security disaggregated by gender
truth, justice and accountability. ity. Baseline:(2015): 28.1% (male 27.1% and female 29.5%) re-
spondents with confidence in peace, safety and security
Indicators: Target (2017): 50% (48% men and 52% women)
From 2017 onwards, HRW, Amnesty International and Risks:
other surveys show positive trends with regard to - space for dialogue is shrinking due to political polarization and Indicator 3.3: Percent of transitional governance mechanisms
peace and governance targeted violence or political pressure with CSO/media participation. Baseline (2015): 0. Target (2017):
By 2017 and onwards spaces for dialogue set up by - efforts to deal with the past are blocked by elite interests 80%
churches and/or civil society have been developed, - buy-in and capacity by South Sudanese could be lacking
can be maintained and are gaining recognition - support by the international community at large to keep spaces
By 2020 spaces for dialogue help making the voices of open could diminish
diverse interest groups heard by political decision
makers at the central, state and local level
Outcome statement 2: viable and equitable options towards Switzerland supports the processes to implement the peace UN ICF Outcome 3: Peace and Governance Strengthened
nationbuilding have been spelt out by South Sudanese and agreement with a view to pursue a constitutional review process Indicator 3.1: Number of targeted governance and security
transformed into proposed constitutional and legal norms. and enable free and fair elections at the end of the transitional reforms are implemented
period and continued nationbuilding beyond this point. Baseline (2015): The constitution review process, legislative,
Indicators military and civil service reforms agreed as part of the peace
by 2017 a constitutional reform project has been de- + the peace agreement provides a clear roadmap and structure agreement
signed, integrating an informed analysis of federal op- for the reform process Target (2017): 16 civil service institutions reformed, 3 rule of law
tions and institutions’ Acts reviewed, permanent constitution drafted.
By 2018/19 a new permanent constitution based on Risks:
inputs from diverse South Sudanese interest groups is - possible lack of buy-in from national elites to the peace agree- UN ICF Outcome 5 - Cross Cutting: Improvement of the
in place ment could block progress Status of Women and Youth
By 2018/19 free and fair elections are held - elections, if held at all, could legitimize status quo and hamper
By 2018/19 the new permanent constitution and elec- necessary reforms Indicator 5.1: % of women in parliament; % of women in cabinet
tions provide a basis for governance, justice and secu- - social cohesion is deteriorating, hindering progress in na- ministerial positions. Baseline (2015): 26.5%; 10%. Target:
rity reforms strengthening social cohesion and na- tionbuilding (2017) 30% women and 15% youths according to the prevision
tionbuilding of the Peace agreement
(4) Lines of intervention (Swiss Programme)
For Outcome 1:
Support to church-led peace and reconciliation initiatives involving grassroots communities as well as elites.
Support to civil society dialogue initiatives aimed at including interests of I. A. communities, youth, women and others into public political discussions on peaceful coexistence and social cohe-
sion, governance and truth, justice and accountability.
Support to dialogue initiatives aimed at including traditional authorities into discussions on governance and conflict transformation/mitigation.
For Outcome 2:
Support to institutions leading the implementation of the peace agreement to promote constitutional reform processes.
Support to South Sudanese actors, such as think tanks and civil society interest groups, to provide input into the implementation process.
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 20208
(5) Resources, partnerships (Swiss Programme)
Peace- & Nation-Building, 5-15% of budget, i.e. 4 to 12 million
Strategy: strengthen local and national moral leaders’ voice, supporting the spaces they create and the processes they lead; foster efforts towards righting the wrongs (dealing with the past), rebuild
broken trust (building towards peace and reconciliation), self-organization (including customary authorities), link the high-level political dialogue with initiatives on the ground and move forward in devel-
oping a common vision and nation.
Partners: Rift Valley Institute, South Sudan Council of Churches, SSYPADO - Youth Leaders' Roundtables, JMEC, Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility (CSRF)
(6) Management/performance results, including indicators (Swiss Programme), see chapter 6 of CS
Team: 1 Human Security Advisor, DoC/DDoC – 1 NPO
Inclusiveness: evidence of Switzerland significantly contributing to bringing all legitimate stakeholders on board
Policy influencing: documentation of Swiss supported initiatives that contribute to rooting the peace and reconciliation process in South Sudan, with and for the South Sudanese people
Thematic and methodological support / expertise: Switzerland provides the right expertise at the right moment
Means of verification. Annual report stocktaking (partners’ and donors’ assessment) and self-evaluation; systematic review of documentation produced by partners (question: did the Swiss Contribution
make a positive difference; if yes, how? If not: corrective measures to be identified).
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 2020Annex 3 – Tentative budget allocation CS South Sudan
Indicative financial planning 2017-20:
Strategy 2017-2020 (planned Mio. CHF)
Domains of intervention % of % of
SDC HSD Total %
total total
1. Food Security and Livelihood 35.0 44% 35.0 44%
2. Protection / Human Rights 25.0 31% 25.0 31%
3. Peace and Nationbuilding 8.0 10% 4.0 5% 12.0 15%
Other 8.0 10% 8.0 10%
Total* 76.0 95% 4.0 5% 80.0 100%
* Office management costs from the Global Credit are not included
Disbursements 2013-16:
Disbursements 2013-2015
Planned 2016 (Mio. CHF) Estimated Strategy 2013-16 (Mio. CHF)
(Mio. CHF)
Domains of intervention
% of % of
SDC HSD Total SDC HSD Total SDC HSD Total %
total total
1. Food Security and Livelihood 14.4 14.4 5.5 5.5 19.9 25% 19.9 25%
2. Basic Services in WASH 9.7 9.7 2.7 2.7 12.4 16% 12.4 16%
3. Protection / Human Security 18.5 3.9 22.4 6.8 1.4 8.2 25.3 32% 5.3 7% 30.6 39%
Other 7.5 7.5 2.1 2.1 9.6 12% 9.6 12%
Office management 4.6 4.6 1.8 1.8 6.4 8% 6.4 8%
Total 54.8 3.9 58.7 18.9 1.4 20.3 73.7 93% 5.3 7% 79.0 100%10
Portfolio-Management in function of scenarios:
A – “Straight to hell and back” * B – “A long walk to peace” C – “A dream gone sour”
Description
Domains:
Food Security & Strategische Strategische Strategische
Livelihoods Domains: Arbeitsfelder: Domains: Arbeitsfelder: Domains: Arbeitsfelder:
Protection 2017-18 2019-20 2017-18 2019-20 2017-18 2019-20 2017-18 2019-20 2017-18 2019-20* 2017-18 2019-20*
Peace- and
Nationbuilding
Strategische
Arbeitsfelder:
Nothilfe (HA)
Wiederaufbau,
Nexus (HA/RZ)
Human Security
(HSD)
* According to Switzerland’s analysis South Sudan is currently in Scenario A.
Concept Note, Switzerland’s Cooperation Strategy, South Sudan, 2017 – 2020Annex 4 – Protokoll Frühnotiz Kooperationsstrategie Südsudan
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