CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISKS AND THE AFRICAN UNION - United ...
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
SIPRI Policy Brief
May 2020
CLIMATE-RELATED SUMMARY
w There has been considerable
SECURITY RISKS AND attention on the conventional
climate mitigation and
THE AFRICAN UNION adaptation debate in Africa,
including the prominent efforts
of the African Group of
vane aminga and florian krampe* Negotiators on Climate Change
in global climate forums.
However, there is little
understanding of how the
African Union (AU) is
discussing and responding to
INTRODUCTION characteristic of these risks
the security implications of
stresses the need for a regional
Africa is responsible for a mere climate change.
approach, which makes This Policy Brief outlines key
4 per cent of global carbon dioxide intergovernmental organizations strengths of the AU’s response,
emissions, yet is disproportionately (IGOs) including the African such as a rapidly evolving
vulnerable to the impacts of a Union (AU)—but also the United discourse around climate
changing climate.1 In addition, over Nations and regional economic security and efforts to improve
half of the states in sub-Saharan communities (RECs)—crucial for collaboration and coordination
Africa are among those most identifying, assessing, responding to among different parts of the
affected by the double burden of and ultimately mitigating climate- institution. But also, key
climate exposure and political related security risks. weaknesses in the discourse
fragility. 2 The continent is grappling There has been considerable around AU policy responses,
with multiple climate-related attention on the conventional
such as the lack of tangible
security risks such as forced climate mitigation and adaptation
policy operationalization as
migration and displacement, well as financial
debate in Africa, including unpreparedness and limited
livelihood insecurity, food and the prominent efforts of the
water insecurity, rising levels of member state accountability.
African Group of Negotiators on The Policy Brief makes
intercommunal conflict between Climate Change in global climate recommendations highlighting
pastoralists and farmers, protracted forums.4 However, there is little entry points for advancing the
cross-border resource conflicts understanding and response to
and unsustainable resource climate-related security risks
and Food and Agriculture Organization of
exploitation. 3 The transnational the United Nations (FAO) et al., 2019 The State within the AU, such as:
of Food Security and Nutrition in the World: (a) develop and institutionalize
1 Ritchie, H., ‘Global inequalities in CO2 Safeguarding Against Economic Slowdowns and coordinated responses to
emissions’, Our World in Data, 16 Oct. 2018. Downturns (FAO: Rome, 2019). See also African
climate-related security risks;
See also the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Union (AU), ‘9th African Union High-Level
Initiative. Retreat on the Promotion of Peace, Security
(b) develop strong climate
2 United States Agency for International and Stability “Strengthening African Union’s security leadership within the
Development (USAID), The Intersection of conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts”’, African Union; and (c) change
Global Fragility and Climate Risks (USAID: 25–26 Oct. 2018. the narrative to focus on shared
Washington, DC, Sep. 2018). 4 African Group of Negotiators, ‘Home’.
3 United Nations High Commissioner for
problems and therefore shared
See e.g. Damptey P. T. M. and Zakieldeen S.,
solutions—multilateralism
Refugees (UNHCR), Global Trends: Forced ‘African Group of Negotiators (AGN)’, eds
Displacement in 2018 (UNHCR: Geneva, 2019); Bueno Rubial, M. and Siegele, L., Negotiating rather than nationalism.
Kishi, R. et al., Year in Review 2019 (Armed Climate Change Adaptation (Springer: 2020);
Conflict Location & Event Data Project: 2020); and Scholtz, W. ‘The promotion of regional
* This work is funded by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs as part of SIPRI’s Climate
Change and Security Project.2 sipri policy brief
understanding of how the AU is CURRENT DISCOURSE AND
discussing the security implications RESPONSES
of climate change and how it is
responding to climate-related The AU’s current discourse around
security risks. For this reason, climate-related security risks is
SIPRI has published a Background vibrant and dynamic. Across the
Paper that maps 16 AU policy organization, 16 frameworks relate
frameworks (formulations of to climate-related security risks
policies in treaties and similar in key policy areas such as food
agreed-upon frameworks) related security, peace and security, human
to climate-related security risks. security, and energy security and
In the Background Paper and in natural resource use crises. The
this Policy Brief, the term ‘climate- AU has widely recognized climate-
related security risks’ encompasses related security risks (on the
a diverse and wide array of impacts assembly level and on the executive/
and risks emerging from climate administrative level within the
change and how they undermine African Union Commission (AUC)
the security of different referent and its different departments). 6
objects—human and state security. In fact, the AU is one of very few
The Background Paper finds that regional IGOs that recognizes
the AU is increasingly recognizing and discusses climate-related
different security risks associated security risks explicitly within its
with climate change, and the AU’s peace and security architecture.7
discourse is rapidly developing The Background Paper’s mapping
towards more integrated responses and initial analysis offers four key
to climate-related security risks. findings, suggesting strengths
The mapping depicts that there are and weaknesses in the AU’s policy
areas of success and also areas that response. The key strengths
need strengthening. 5 identified are the AU’s rapidly
This Policy Brief emerges from evolving climate security discourse,
the Background Paper and outlines and improving collaboration and
the strengths and weaknesses in coordination. In contrast, the lack of
the discourse around AU policy tangible policy operationalization,
responses. In financial unpreparedness and
AU among few regional IGOs that addition, it makes limited member state accountability
are identified to constrain the AU’s
recognize climate-related security risks recommendations
climate security work.
within its peace and security architecture highlighting entry
points for advancing
the understanding and response
to climate-related security risks
within the AU and also with other
6 Aminga (note 5).
actors such as the UN and RECs. 7 Krampe, F. and Mobjörk, M., ‘Responding
to climate-related security risks: Reviewing
regional organizations in Asia and Africa’,
Current Climate Change Reports, vol. 4, no. 4
environmental security and Africa’s common (Oct. 2018), pp. 330–37; Dellmuth, L. M. et al.,
position on climate change’, African Human ‘Intergovernmental organizations and climate
Rights Law Journal, vol. 10, no. 1 (2010), security: Advancing the research agenda’,
pp. 1–25. WIREs Climate Change, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018),
5 Aminga, V., ‘Policy responses to climate- e496; and Scott, S. V. and Ku, C., Climate
related security risks: The African Union’, Change and the UN Security Council (Edward
SIPRI Background Paper, May 2020. Elgar Publishing: 2018).climate-related security risks and the african union 3
Strengths growing resonance of member
states to the climate security
There is a rapidly evolving agenda. For instance, AU countries
discourse around climate security adopted the Bamako Declaration
within the AU. AU member states on Access to Natural Resources and
and the AUC are increasingly Conflicts between
recognizing the security risks Communities in AU discourse and its translation into
associated with climate change. November 2019, practice seem endogenous—that is, they
Across the 16 frameworks—most showing the
of which have been negotiated appear to stem from inside the continent
AU’s emerging
among member states in the AU policy rhetoric in framing and
Assembly—the AU explicitly or potential in developing effective
implicitly recognizes climate integrated policy responses and
change as one of the emerging implementation mechanisms for
global trends undermining Africa’s climate-related security risks.10
human and state security. 8 The On the commission level,
discourse around climate security interviews with selected experts
across the AU is rapidly developing have indicated a strong sense of
and translating into new initiatives ownership, mutual partnerships
and programmes that are yet to be and collective responsibility in
implemented. Notably, the discourse important parts of the AUC on
and its translation into practice addressing climate-related security
seem endogenous—that is, they risks.11 Indeed, climate security
appear not to be driven by external has found resonance within
donor interests but rather stem from the top leadership of the AUC,
inside the continent. with the AU commissioner for
Frameworks around agriculture peace and security, Ambassador
and food security are especially Smaïl Chergui, publicly calling
prominent in highlighting the on all member states to mitigate
impacts of climate change on the the effects of climate change in
continent. This seems logical given reference to the Silencing the Guns
the continent’s dependence on agenda, which is the AU’s key
agriculture for livelihood and food initiative ‘for ending all wars, civil
security, and recurrent climate- conflicts, gender-based violence,
related impacts such as droughts violent conflicts and preventing
and famine.9 The agriculture sector genocide in the continent by 2020’.12
also remains the most important The AU dedicated its annual theme
area to achieve food security and
poverty reduction—both of which
10 AU, Communique of the 901st PSC Meeting
are key elements for achieving the
on the Theme Strengthening Governance
UN’s Sustainable Development
Systems in the Management of Natural
Goals and the AU’s Agenda 2063. Resources Between and Among Communities
On the member state level, a clear in Africa: Briefing on the ‘Bamako Declaration
climate security champion is still on Access to Natural Resources and Conflicts
between Communities’ (AU: Dec. 2019).
missing. However, conversations 11 AU officials nos 1 and 3, Conversation with
with AUC officials suggest a authors, 3 Mar. 2020.
12 Ambassador Chergui via Twitter, 20 Dec.
2019; AU, ‘Silencing the guns by 2020’; and
8 Aminga (note 5). African Centre for the Constructive Resolution
9 Busby, J. and von Uexkull, N., ‘Climate of Disputes (ACCORD), Silencing the Guns,
shocks and humanitarian crises’, Foreign Owning the Future: Realising a Conflict-free
Affairs, 29 Nov. 2018. Africa (ACCORD: 2015).4 sipri policy brief
for 2020 to silencing the guns to in addressing the root causes of
accelerate achieving the vision instability.14
underscored in the disarmament With the renewed coordination,
instrument beyond 2020. AU AU departments now have the
officials have stressed the need for potential to benefit from wider
the AU to leverage and effectively institutional knowledge and identify
exploit the 2020 annual theme avenues for synergetic responses
to its full potential by discussing to climate-related security risks.15
structural causes of conflict such as However, it remains to be seen if
climate-related risks.13 this potential will translate into
policy action. Some observers close
Collaboration and coordination to the AU fear that lack of dedication
is improving. Like in most and commitment of senior leader
institutions, climate issues have ship makes implementation slow.16
been dealt with in silos and with
limited coordination within the Weaknesses
AU. Since the AU’s inception in
2002, its climate-related security There is a lack of tangible
work (largely on food security) has policy operationalization. The
been handled by the Department progress on strengthening the
of Rural Economy and Agriculture AU’s institutional understanding
(DREA), which administers of climate-related security risks
various programmes on climate is commendable. However, there
change in agriculture. Various AU remains a significant amount
departments with mandates in the to be done to concretize timely
humanitarian, development and and targeted responses and
security nexus are already exploring develop actionable commitments.
opportunities for synergetic Implementing the recommendations
and cohesive cross-sectoral in the Bamako Declaration, for
collaboration. instance, has the potential to elevate
Recently, concrete steps the AU’s understanding, political
have been taken to increase engagement and programmatic
collaboration and coordination interventions for addressing
among different departments on conflicts associated with climate
climate-related security risks. For change, natural resources and
instance, the Conflict Prevention stability. Yet, implementing well-
and Early Warning Division and intended frameworks remains
DREA have given new life to the a challenge. For example, the
ambitious Master Roadmap of
Interdepartmental Taskforce on
Conflict Prevention (IDTFCP), 14 Wachira, G. M., Strengthening the Peace
inviting representatives from and Governance Nexus within the African
various AUC departments and Union: Enhancing Synergy between the African
Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African
specialized organs to establish
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA),
and institutionalize a climate NUPI Report no. 7 (Norwegian Institute of
cluster. The IDTFCP was International Affairs: Oslo, 2017), p. 3.
15 AU officials nos 1 and 2, Comments on
established in 2014 to synergize
authors’ manuscript, 30 Oct. 2019. See also
AU interdepartmental efforts Aminga (note 5).
16 UN Development Programme (UNDP)
13 AU official no. 1, Interview with authors, official, Conversation with authors, 23 Apr.
23 Apr. 2020. 2020.climate-related security risks and the african union 5
Practical Steps to Silence the of AU reforms. Yet, the institution
Guns in Africa by Year 2020 still is still dependent on external
faces substantive operational and donors—in the form of bilateral aid
institutional obstacles.17 Similarly, through states and also through UN
the 2014 Malabo Declaration agencies. 20 The AU can function
on Accelerated Agricultural without the necessary member
Growth and Transformation for states contributions; however,
Shared Prosperity and Improved this limits its ability to achieve
Livelihoods for accelerating more independence from external
agricultural growth and transform actors and achieve more internal
ation and supporting livelihoods accountability. 21
contains clear implementation, Even in cases where commitments
monitoring and evaluation were made for strong member state
strategies, but successf ul implemen contributions, such as in the Malabo
tation is inhibited by limited Declaration, frameworks failed to
member state commitments.18 attain the targets. The 2017 progress
Multifaceted challenges—such report on the Malabo Declaration
as extreme poverty, the rise reveals that most countries had
of violent extremism in some not met the 10 per cent investment
regions, weak state capacity target for
and structural weaknesses of agricultural Rapid formulation and implementation of
the AU—remain core inhibitors growth that
policy to consider Africa’s diverse social
to policy operationalization.19 countries had
Inevitably, rapid formulation and committed to. 22 economic and political realities
implementation of policy responses Out of the 47
will have to consider Africa’s diverse countries that submitted their
social economic and political progress, only Mauritius was on
realities. track with government budget lines
for enhanced resilience to climate-
Member states have limited related risks through disaster
accountability and financial preparedness, early warning
unpreparedness. Despite a response systems and social safety
strong sense of ownership and an nets.
internally evolving climate security Yet there are also positive
discourse, the AU is not financially signs towards more financial
prepared and independent enough commitments. The AU Peace
to prevent and respond to existential
challenges associated with extreme 20 AU, ‘What is financing of the Union’;
climatic events. Efforts to overcome and AU and Board of External Auditors,
the AU’s funding gap from its own Report of the Board of External Auditors on
the Consolidated Financial Statements of the
member states are ongoing as part African Union for the Year Ended 31 December
2018 (AU: May 2019).
21 AU expert no. 1, Seminar with authors
17 AU, African Union Master Roadmap of present, 25 Oct. 2018.
Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 22 AU, The 2017 Progress Report to the
Year 2020 (AU: 2016). Assembly: Highlights on Intra-African Trade for
18 New Partnership for Africa’s Agriculture Commodities and Services: Risks
Development (NEPAD), Malabo Declaration and Opportunities, Inaugural Biennial Report
on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and of the Commission on the Implementation of the
Transformation for Shared Prosperity and June 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated
Improved Livelihoods (NEPAD: 2016). Agricultural Growth and Transformation for
19 Institute for Security Studies official no. 2, Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods
Seminar with authors present, 9 Oct. 2019. (DREA: 30–31 Jan. 2018).6 sipri policy brief
Fund—one of the five pillars of Evidence-based, shared and
the African Peace and Security jointly accepted information
Architecture through which the is a prerequisite for effective
AU plans to fund large parts of its decision making and project
operational activities on peace and implementation. 25 Developing
security—is expected to ‘soon be coordinated analytical capacity
operational by requiring mandatory is likely to facilitate coordinated
member states’ contributions and responses and is necessary within
introducing a sanctions regime’. 23 the AU and with its external
Some experts see potential that relations. 26
parts of the Peace Fund’s activities Enhanced internal coordination
could include tackling issues such as within the newly formed climate
climate-related security risks. 24 cluster between the Peace and
Security Department (PSD)
WAYS FORWARD and the DREA is a prerequisite
to harmonizing programmatic
Given these strengths and
interventions in efforts to better
weaknesses in the AU’s response to
understand and address climate-
climate-related security risks, how
related security risks. This
can the organization capitalize on
improved institutional coherence
and translate the current discursive
will reduce shortcomings associated
momentum into effectively
with replicating interventions
implemented opportunities? How
and synergize the use of financial
can it reorient its already limited
resources. For instance, the DREA,
financial, information and human
as a key implementation actor of
resources to address overlapping
the AU climate work, will thereby
mandates and effectively respond
benefit substantially from the
to climate security issues? Based on
PSD, and also through the Peace
analysis and background mapping,
and Security Council’s normative
this Policy Brief suggests three
agenda setting ability.
possible ways forward.
Developing coordinated analytical
Institutionalize coordinated capacity will require coordination
responses with regional actors. 27 To reach
such actors, the 2008 memorandum
The ongoing institutional of understanding between the
reforms within the AU provide AU and RECs provides a natural
an opportunity to enhance platform for furthering the climate
institutional integration of data security discussion, especially
collection and analysis relating between the Continental Early
to climate-related security risks. Warning System (CEWS) and the
They also provide an opportunity REC early warning centres such
to strengthen coordination among
different actors. 25 Mitchell, S. M. and Zawahri, N. A., ‘The
effectiveness of treaty design in addressing
water disputes’, Journal of Peace Research,
23 International Crisis Group, The Price of vol. 52, no. 2 (2015), pp. 187–200.
Peace: Securing UN Financing for AU Peace 26 AU, ‘Overview of institutional reforms’;
Operation, Africa report no. 286 (International AU expert no. 2, Interview with authors via
Crisis Group: 31 Jan. 2020); and AU, ‘Peace Skype, 10 Jan. 2019; and AU expert no. 3,
Fund’. Interview with authors via Skype, 24 May 2019.
24 UNDP official, Interview with authors, 27 AU (note 26); AU expert no. 2 (note 26);
23 Apr. 2020. and AU expert no. 3 (note 26).climate-related security risks and the african union 7
as ECOWARN (the Economic provides opportunities to identify
Community of West African States root causes by developing joint
Early Warning and Response early warning indicators, and to
Network) and CEWARN (the address human insecurity in a more
Intergovernmental Authority coherent and integrated manner in
on Development’s Conflict the long term. This should catalyse
Early Warning and Response achievement of the AU’s ambitious
Mechanism). 28 The AU is presently Agenda 2063 (Africa’s 50-year
working towards an integrated early development blueprint aiming at
warning structure that will shift repositioning Africa as a dominant
and reinforce the mandate of the player in the global arena by 2063).
CEWS from solely a conflict centric Aside from collaboration with
early warning system to a more regional entities, the AU can also
integrated early warning response benefit further from cooperation
mechanism. 29 and knowledge exchange with the
These efforts to coordinate with UN through existing mechanisms
RECs and their existing regional such as the UN–AU Joint Task Force
early warning centres deserve on Peace and Security and from
credit and call for consolidation and deepening existing consultative
strengthening—structurally within meetings on conflict prevention and
the AU institutional framework and management. 33 There are positive
also financially. 30 The AU Peace signs of deepened
Fund (window 1: mediation and consultations: in AU working towards an integrated early
preventive diplomacy; window 2: February 2020 the
institutional capacity; and window UN–AU joint task
warning structure that will shift and
3: peace support operations) could force highlighted reinforce the mandate of the CEWS
also provide valuable entry points to climate security
find a sustainable funding stream to as a challenge in the continent and
support climate security work. 31 called for the creation of a UN–AU
Moreover, this kind of cooperation climate cluster (in addition to an
will be an opportunity to climate internal AU climate cluster under
proof the AU’s peace and security the IDTFCP). The UN–AU climate
architecture (i.e. make it ‘sensitive cluster is to be created within
to climate-related security and the UN–AU Joint Framework for
development risks’32). It also Enhanced Partnership in Peace and
Security and will further enhance
28 AU, ‘Memorandum of understanding on coordination between the two
cooperation in the area of peace and security organizations. 34
between the African Union, the regional
economic communities and the coordinating
mechanisms of the regional standby brigades Security and Development Risks in Africa,
of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa’, 2008. NUPI Report no. 4 (Norwegian Institute of
29 AU official no. 1, Interview with authors, International Affairs: 2020).
23 Apr. 2020. 33 AU, ‘Joint communiqué: United Nations–
30 AU, ‘Press statement’, PSC/PR/ African Union Joint Task Force on Peace
BR.(DCCCLXXIV), 5 Sep. 2019; and AU, and Security holds eighteenth consultative
‘Communique of the 901st PSC meeting on AU’s meeting in Addis-Ababa on 11 February 2020’,
conflict prevention and early warning efforts Feb. 2020; and UN Office to the African Union,
and the challenges encountered, as well as on ‘12th annual UN–AU–RECS/RMS consultative
the horizon scanning briefing on the state of meeting kicks off in Addis Ababa’, 11 Mar. 2019.
peace and security in Africa’, 13 Mar. 2020. 34 UN and AU, United Nations–African Union
31 AU (note 23). Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in
32 De Coning, C. and Krampe, F. Multilateral Peace and Security (UN and AU: New York,
Cooperation in the Area of Climate-related 19 Apr. 2017).8 sipri policy brief
The UN–AU cluster should Develop strong climate security
further leverage the work leadership within the African
of the UN Climate Security Union
Mechanism, which is a centrally
placed joint mechanism of the Strategic leadership will be
UN Department of Political and important. The anticipated
Peacebuilding Affairs, the UN appointment of an AU special envoy
Development Programme and the for climate change and security
UN Environment Programme. will thus be pivotal—although not
Enhanced knowledge sharing sufficient—to build political willing
will provide entry points for ness and institutionalize a strategic
successful international cooperation coordinated response to climate-
and help generate synergies in related security risks. On several
operationalizing institutional occasions the AU has reiterated the
responses to climate-related need for such a special envoy, for
security risks on the field/local instance in various AU peace and
level. Another channel would be security open sessions and in recent
the existing consultations between AU summits. 37
the AU and the UN Peacebuilding It will be important to draw
Commission. Some observers see upon vital lessons learned by
potential that regular exchanges past and current special envoys
of views on the impact of climate on constraining factors to their
change on peacebuilding, and on political leadership, such as time-
lessons learned, including in the limited assignments and quick
context of Agenda 2063 and the rotations, as well as member state
Silencing the Guns initiative, would influence and financial dependence.
provide opportunities for deeper Nevertheless, there seem to be some
engagement on the AU and UN concrete operational tasks for the
levels. 35 envoy that would advance responses
International collaboration for to climate-related security risks by
these processes will be crucial, but the AU.
the AU should have ownership and The envoy should:
set the agenda. To be successful and 1. Provide leadership
sustainable the AU’s response and
The envoy should provide the
coordination will
A requisite for strong climate change and require institutional necessary political leadership
required to steer the climate cluster
security strategy, and strategic leadership consolidation and
and consolidate a well-placed
to effectively implement strategy political willingness
institutional home for climate-
within the AU
related security risks.
and its member states. So, there
is a requisite for a strong climate
change and security strategy, and Essays, 7 Feb. 2019; and AU expert no. 3
(note 26).
strategic leadership is also required 37 AU, ‘The 774th meeting of the AU Peace
to effectively implement such a and Security Council, an open session on the
strategy. 36 theme: “The link between climate change and
conflicts in Africa and addressing the security
implications”’, 29 May 2018; and AU, ‘The 828th
35 International Peace Institute official, meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council,
Conversation with authors, 30 Apr. 2020. an open session on the theme: “Climate change
36 Krampe, F. and Aminga, V., ‘The need funding in line with the Africa Adaptation
for an African Union special envoy for climate Initiative (AAI) to contribute towards peace
change and security’, SIPRI Commentary/ and security”’, 27 Feb. 2019.climate-related security risks and the african union 9
2. Play an outreach role related security risks jointly with
the envoy, RECs and the AU. Only
The envoy should have an important
then will the envoy be in a position
outreach role that will strengthen
to raise climate security issues
African ownership on shaping the
at the highest
continent’s climate security agenda
political level,
and strengthen Africa’s voice in African mediators are more successful in
thereby mitigating
international forums such as the UN finding negotiated solutions to conflicts
some member
General Assembly, the UN Security
state doubts and because of their inherent legitimacy
Council and the Conferences of
reservations.
the Parties of the UN Framework
This will inevitably require a new
Convention on Climate Change.
narrative around climate change
This would also ensure conflict- and
and security within the AU.
climate-sensitive donor engagement
to strengthen African societies. Change the narrative
3. Have a diplomatic role
With the recognition that climate
The envoy should have a diplomatic change is transforming and
role to mediate and support redefining the African security and
confidence-building measures. As development landscape comes the
recent research suggests, African need for a narrative around climate
mediators are more successful in security that promotes a joint
finding negotiated solutions to vision and regional, cooperative
conflicts on the continent because approaches to addressing
of their inherent legitimacy. 38 This climate-related security risks.
latent advantage of the envoy has Previous SIPRI research suggests
the potential to accelerate the AU’s the need to focus on shared
understanding and response to problems and therefore shared
climate-related security risks. This solutions—multilateralism rather
can be done through early special than nationalism. 39 A vision for
assignments in climate security cooperation in addressing climate-
hotspots that could be identified related security risks may promote
through early warning mechanisms. confidence among countries,
Coordinating the assignments the lack of which has inhibited
with AU RECs will establish cooperation in the past.
synergetic and integrated regional Part of this vision has to be
responses that combine climate anchored in enhanced language
adaptation with peace and security, sensitivity around the framing
development and governance. of climate security issues. In the
For the suggested diplomatic past—elsewhere and within the
endeavours to be successful, AU—climate change has often been
appointing an envoy will certainly labelled as a ‘threat multiplier’.40
not be sufficient. African member However, the framing matters
states must be open and willing because terms such as ‘threat’
to take ownership and lead the encourage zero-sum thinking and
continent’s response to climate-
39 Krampe, F. et al., ‘Water security and
governance in the Horn of Africa’, SIPRI Policy
38 Duursma, A., ‘African solutions to African Paper no. 54, Mar. 2020.
challenges: The role of legitimacy in mediating 40 AUC, African Peace and Security
civil wars in Africa’, International Organization Architecture: APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 (AUC:
(2020). 5 Dec. 2015), p. 20.10 sipri policy brief
nationalistic solutions.41 Reframing
the issues as climate-related
security risks places human security
and development at the centre
of the debate. This does not have
merely semantic
implications because
Reframing the issues as climate-related
avoiding the more
security risks places human security and interventionist
development at centre of debate associations to the
threat discourse
has direct effects on policy and the
potential for more multilateral,
integrated responses to climate-
related security risks.
The challenge at hand is immense
when looking at climate-related
security risks within the AU. Yet,
the problems of today are most likely
small compared with the problems
of the future. Coordination, political
leadership and new narratives
are required to overcome current
issues and provide a foundation of
trust. Drawing on these will drive
solutions for dealing with climate-
related security risks and offer steps
towards cooperation and securing
human livelihood for present and
future generations.
41 Mobjörk, M. et al., Climate-related
Security Risks: Towards an Integrated Approach
(SIPRI and Stockholm University: Stockholm,
Oct. 2016); Born, C. et al., ‘Advancing United
Nations responses to climate-related security
risks’, SIPRI Policy Brief, Sep. 2019; and De
Coning and Krampe (note 32).climate-related security risks and the african union 11
ABBREVIATIONS
ACCORD African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AU African Union
AUC African Union Commission
CEWARN Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS Continental Early Warning System
DREA AU Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture
ECOWARN Economic Community of West African States Early
Warning and Response Network
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IDTFCP Interdepartmental Taskforce on Conflict Prevention
IGO Intergovernmental organization
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
PSD Peace and Security Department
REC Regional economic community
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID United States Agency for International DevelopmentSIPRI is an independent RELATED SIPRI PUBLICATIONS
international institute
dedicated to research into Policy framework responses to climate-related security risks
conflict, armaments, arms in the African Union
control and disarmament.
Vane Aminga
Established in 1966, SIPRI
SIPRI Background Paper
provides data, analysis and
May 2020
recommendations, based on
open sources, to policymakers, Water security and governance in the Horn of Africa
researchers, media and the Dr Florian Krampe, Luc van de Goor, Anniek Barnhoorn
interested public. Elizabeth Smith and Dan Smith
SIPRI Policy Paper
GOVERNING BOARD March 2020
Ambassador Jan Eliasson,
Climate-related security risks and peacebuilding in Somalia
Chair (Sweden)
Karolina Eklöw and Dr Florian Krampe
Dr Vladimir Baranovsky
SIPRI Policy Paper
(Russia)
October 2019
Espen Barth Eide (Norway)
Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) Climate advancing United Nations responses to climate-related
Dr Radha Kumar (India) security risks
Ambassador Ramtane Camilla Born, Karolina Eklöw and Dr Malin Mobjörk
Lamamra (Algeria) SIPRI Policy Brief
Dr Patricia Lewis (Ireland/ September 2019
United Kingdom)
Dr Jessica Tuchman Mathews
(United States)
SIPRI publications are available to download at www.sipri.org/publications
DIRECTOR
Dan Smith (United Kingdom)
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Dr Florian Krampe (Germany/Sweden) is a Senior Researcher in SIPRI’s Climate
Change and Risk Programme, specializing in peace and conflict research,
environmental and climate security, and international security.
Vane Aminga (Kenya) is a Research Assistant in the Climate Change and Risk
Signalistgatan 9 Programme at SIPRI.
SE-169 72 Solna, Sweden
Telephone: +46 8 655 97 00
Email: sipri@sipri.org
Internet: www.sipri.org © SIPRI 2020You can also read
