CHINA BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT (BLUF) ASSESSMENT N.5 SEPTEMBER 2021
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Ms. Buratti Francesca
CHINA BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT (BLUF) ASSESSMENT
N.5 SEPTEMBER 2021
Executive Summary
This China BLUF Assessment provides an overview of NATO and China diplomatic exchanges of the
month, such as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s speech in occasion of the NATO Arms Control
Conference, where he urged Beijing to join international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapon
and expressed concern on how China's nuclear capability lacks transparency. Is also given an overview
of NATO Secretary General virtual meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang.
In the military domain, the dedicated section provides comments of China’s announcement to produce
a new J-20 fighter jet and other major engines. Moreover, it is analyzed in details a new Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’report containing an assessment of the qualitative scale of
change in the Chinese warfare domain, whose remarks are useful in facilitating SACT’s effort to anticipate
and prepare for the ambiguous, complex and rapidly changing future security environment, with regard
to China.
Turning on technology, the highlights for this month include the leaders of the Quad announcing their
willingness to agree to work toward creating a safe supply chain for semiconductor, with a clear
reference to counter China’s position in this domain. Moreover, is given a review of the increasing
technological dependence on China related to Beijing’s state investments in submarine cables. An
assessment of NATO’s need to understand the Chinese conceptions of intelligentization and the PLA’s
efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare, concludes this section.
The last part of the BLUF, focused on the thematic regional area of concern for NATO, retraces Beijing’s
activities within multilateral platforms for September, confirming China’s attempt to engage with
neighboring countries to respond to the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Lat but not least, a final and
fundamental part of this paper is dedicated at providing an assessment of the recently announced new
trilateral security Alliance, the AUKUS, among Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, and
at showing how this agreement might affect China’s role in the Indo-Pacific and the Transatlantic
relations.
Thematic Assessment
Diplomacy
1. NATO and China diplomatic exchanges on disarmament and arms control reveal frictions
and room for cooperation at the same time - During the month of September the NATO-China public
interaction has been consistent and worth reflecting on. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg,
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 1 of 14in occasion of the NATO conference on Arms Control, urged China to join international efforts to limit
the spread of nuclear weapon and expressed concern on how China's nuclear capability lacks
transparency. China’s reaction revealed a consistent approach aimed at supporting Beijing’s position
of no-interest in getting involved in arms control negotiations as well as a rhetoric attitude focused
on blaming NATO’s nuclear policy. During an official press conference, the Chinese official
spokesperson condemned NATO’s “China nuclear threat theory” and its nuclear sharing policy which,
in its opinion, violates the stipulations of the NPT and exacerbates the risks of nuclear proliferation
and conflicts. 1 Moreover, by accusing NATO of being evasive about its own issue while trying to
mislead the public and hyping up the so-called "China nuclear threat", Beijing not only rejected the
Alliance’s claims, but also turned over the attention on the Alliance’s nuclear stockpile and its alleged
Cold War mentality. 2
As shown, at present, the two parties differ on arms control and disarmament. On the one hand,
NATO’s concern over China’s growing nuclear stockpile, not least the recent build up of a large
number of missile silos, would like to push Beijing to acknowledge its responsibility as global power
by joining arms control talks. On the other hand, China firmly refuses to do so, declaring that the
United States and Russia have many more arms and years of weapons development.
Overall, it should be noted that both parties do not see each other as adversaries and keep on
maintaining official relations aimed at exchanging views on current international security challenges.
This month, the NATO Secretary General virtually met with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Notably, the Secretary General welcomed the expanding dialogue between NATO and China and
noted the potential for further engagement on common challenges, such as climate change. He also
raised NATO’s concerns over China’s coercive policies, expanding nuclear arsenal and lack of
transparency on its military modernization. In conclusion, The Secretary General and the Chinese
Foreign Minister discussed developments in Afghanistan. Mr. Stoltenberg particularly stressed the
importance of a coordinated international approach, including with countries from the region, to
hold the Taliban accountable for their commitments on countering terrorism and upholding human
rights, not least the rights of women.3
However, if we look at the transcript of the meeting, published on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the PRC’s website we see no reference of NATO’s recalling China to uphold its international
commitments and act responsibly in the international system. The Chinese report instead focuses on
confirming that the virtual meeting was positive and that the two parties are willing to continue
communication, leverage the established dialogue mechanisms to improve the quality of dialogue,
and facilitate practical cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism, anti-piracy, cyberspace, and
international peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the transcript highlights the State Councilor and
Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s discourse on the Indo-Pacific, expressing concern over NATO’s activities
in the region: “the Asia-Pacific region is home to China. In recent years, some NATO members have
sent ships and planes to the vicinity of China. But the Asia-Pacific region does not need to establish
1 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on September 2, 2021
2 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin's Regular Press Conference on September 2, 2021
3
NATO Secretary General meets virtually with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 2 of 14new military blocs, and should no longer cause confrontation between major powers, let alone
forming small cliques aimed at instigating a new Cold War. NATO should adhere to its original
geographical positioning and play a constructive role in securing peaceful and stable regional
development.”4
2. A French report reveals details of China’s war of influence around the world - On
September 20, the Institute of Strategic Studies of the French Military Schools (IRSEM) issued a
"Report on China's Influence", stating that China "employed cyber navy", or millions of people were
involved in spreading fake news and manipulating public opinion. In this regard, the spokesperson of
the Chinese Embassy in France said that he was shocked by the so-called "report" issued by the
institute-this is not an academic "report" at all, but a naked anti-China smear campaign. 5
The America’s fastest-growing independent news media, the Epoch Times, has dedicated two articles
at analyzing the insights of the report: the Chinese regime has built a sprawling infrastructure with
global reach consisting of a broad network of state and non-state actors to execute its plans. Such
infrastructure is based on the CCP three warfares” doctrine and on the work of the United Front. The
former (Psychological warfare, Public opinion warfare, Legal warfare) serves as key strategies guiding
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its quest to win a war against the free world without firing a
single shot. The latter, described by the CCP’s first leader Mao Zedong as a “magic weapon,” is a
policy that, according to the report, involves the regime “eliminating its internal and external
enemies, controlling groups that may challenge its authority, building a coalition around the Party to
serve its interests, and projecting its influence abroad.” According to IRSEM, the articles continue,
Beijing’s influence operations abroad have two main objectives: “to seduce and subjugate foreign
audiences by creating a positive narrative of China,” and “above all, to infiltrate and coerce.” 6
In conclusion, according to the report, the “counterproductive behavior” Beijing has adopted in
recent years “poses an unpopularity problem for China on such proportions that it could ultimately
indirectly weaken the Party, including vis-à-vis its own population.” China’s relations with the West,
markedly deteriorated around 2017, would be a consequence of this self-defeating behavior:
“despite Beijing’s sweeping efforts to impose its own authoritarian model onto the free world, it is
isolating itself on the world stage after taking an aggressive turn on the diplomatic front in recent
years. This behavior has sparked rising blowback even from countries traditionally on friendly terms
with the Chinese regime”7
Military domain
3. China announces the production of new J-20 fighter jet and other major engines – This
month, top designers for China's advanced warplanes announced the production status for the J-20
stealth fighter jet, domestically developed engines for the Y-20 large transport aircraft and next-
4 Wang Yi Meets with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Request via Video Link
5 French study warns of the massive scale of Chinese influence around the world
6 The Epoch Times, 3 Warfares’ Doctrine Underpins CCP’s Sprawling Campaign to Infiltrate the West: Report
7
The Epoch Times, 3 Warfares’ Doctrine Underpins CCP’s Sprawling Campaign to Infiltrate the West: Report
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 3 of 14generation aircraft carrier-based fighter jet at the ongoing Airshow China in Zhuhai, South China's
Guangdong Province, the Global Times reports. In addition, the Chinese Tabloid reports good
advancements in the production of the next-generation aircraft carrier-based fighter jet, the FC-31,
China's second stealth fighter jet. The FC-31 has been a long-rumored candidate to become the
country's next-generation carrier-based fighter since its flight performance debut at the Airshow
China 2014.8
By assessing these newest Chinese aircraft capabilities, it should be taken in consideration that the
effectiveness of the new J-20 jet will depend from pilot training and real aircraft deployment. No
doubt that Chinese aircraft designers have been trying for years to produce domestically made jet
engines with continuing problems -- they are still reverse-engineering Russian engines or buying
them from Russian factories. The jet engines for the heavy-lift Y-20 transport aircraft should be
watched closely. Regarding China's next-generation aircraft carrier-based fighter jet, the FC31, there
is no/no fixed date when it will be available for flight testing -- and even long after that there will
need to be extensive PLAN pilot training for carrier operations.
4. A new CSIS report stresses the need to focus on the broader transatlantic need to compete
with China and develop a collective approach to persuade it to cooperate and limit the risk of some
future Conflict - This month CSIS released a report containing an assessment of the qualitative scale
of change in China, whose remarks are useful for facilitating SACT’s effort to anticipate and prepare
for the ambiguous, complex and rapidly changing future security environment, with regard to China.
In the interest of SACT, it is worth noting that in a dedicated section the report provides data and
graphs of Beijing’s qualitative change in areas like space, stealth, precision strike, major weapons
design, missile warfare and defense, artificial intelligence, C4I/battle management, IS&R
(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), and nuclear forces that have steadily reshaped the
forces of both Russia and China since 1991 – and that will further revolutionize deterrence and
defense over the coming decades.9
According to the author, these qualitative changes have created modern Chinese military forces that
no longer rely on mass, aging weapons and military organization or on aging tactics, but that they
have a steadily growing capability to project power on a global basis. Chinese forces have changed
radically since 1990 and have done so to the point where China is becoming a peer competitor to the
United States in Asia and could become equal or superior to the United States on a global basis at
some point between 2030 and 2045. Moreover, the expert concludes, the U.S. and Europe need to
look beyond the military dimension and recognize that China’s focus on integrating both military and
economic development has already made China a direct competitor to both the U.S. and Europe in
STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics), most aspects of manufacturing
capability, and many aspects in terms of global influence.
Despite its natural limitations, this study is a must read among NATO’s civilian and military authorities
who must consider the trend in China’s changing and find a common approach to dealing with them,
8 Top designers announce J-20 production capacity, Y-20 domestic engines, new carrier-based fighter at Airshow China
9
CSIS, Strengthening European Deterrence and Defense: NATO, Not European Defense Autonomy, Is the Answer, 20 September 2021
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 4 of 14based on dialogue and mutual analysis and planning. At present, the practical problem within NATO
is to figure out how the U.S. and Europe could work together to find the right balance in meeting the
challenge from both China and Russia, discuss the relative levels of effort the U.S. and Europe should
assign to each and both superpowers, and focus on the additional threats posed by out-of-area
challenges like terrorism and extremism. In the expert’s words: “this must, to a large extent, be the
subject of regular diplomacy. The economic and civil dimensions of competition with Russia and China
are already as serious as the military dimensions, and what might be called “white area” competition
or “warfare” must be addressed through civil means.”
Technology domain
5. Leaders from the U.S., Japan, India and Australia will agree to work toward creating a safe
supply chain for semiconductors – This month, the leaders of the Quad announced their willingness
to agree to work toward creating a safe supply chain for semiconductor at their summit in
Washington10.
The declaration is also a complementary effort of a dialogue initiated within the 4-states Alliance few
months ago, when the parts agreed to lunch a discussion on semiconductor supply chains, and
through bilateral engagement with the Republic of Korea to facilitate mutual and complementary
investment in semiconductors.11
Overall, this step represents not only an in important effort to broaden the scope of the Quad to
counter China in the Indo-Pacific but also a key point for NATO. The supply chain is a serious issue for
the Atlantic Alliance, which is following closely the American pivot to Asia.
In a 100-Day Reviews under the Executive Order 14017, the White House in June 2021 released a
document enlightening the US primary objective to secure US supply chains as well as limiting
progress in countries like China. A great deal of importance is also given at making efforts to
collaborate and coordinate with key supplier allies and partners on effective multilateral control, to
protect U.S. national security interests by limiting advanced semiconductor capabilities in countries
of concern while enabling continued leadership of the U.S. semiconductor sector. Moreover, the
document refers to the Quadrilateral Security Platform as the ideal stage where Allies and Partners
can collaborate on supply chain concerns. In conclusion, recommendations are given on expanding
multilateral diplomatic engagement on supply chain vulnerabilities as well as on convening a global
forum on supply chain resilience that will gather key government officials and private sector
stakeholders from across key U.S. allies and partners to collectively assess vulnerabilities and develop
collective approaches to supply chain resilience. 12
However, it should be noted that although the US document might represents a guide for NATO in
this sense, the Atlantic Alliance has already initiated an autonomous initiative to deal with the supply
10 Quad leaders to call for securing chip supply chain
11 BUILDING RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAINS, REVITALIZING AMERICAN MANUFACTURING, AND FOSTERING BROAD-BASED GROWTH, 100-Day Reviews under
Executive Order 14017 June 2021 A Report by The White House
12
Cfr. 11
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 5 of 14chain issue and technological related ones. In February 2021 Japan was approved to be an Enhanced
Opportunities Partner (STO-EOP) of the NATO Science and Technology Organization. The STO-EOP
framework is key to NATO’s S&T collaboration, which offers more tailored access to NATO structures
and processes. Furthermore, NATO science and technology committee papers are calling for
collaboration with Japan in maritime security and technology: “One area of future collaboration with
Japan could be maritime security and maritime related technologies. China has engaged in aggressive
behaviour in the South and East China Seas, with Beijing utilising ever more sophisticated means to
destabilise the region (including the use of undersea autonomous drones to probe other countries’
sovereign waters) 13. In addition, Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, with a NATO open
food-for-though paper urged Allies to take a more global approach, Defending the Rules-based
International Order and Cooperating with Like-Minded Partners: “We need to better leverage our
partnerships with like-minded partners across the globe to address shared security challenges, in
particular those stemming from the rise of China. I propose holding a NATO-Asia Pacific Summit in
2022 to discuss shared global security challenges and explore how to further develop our cooperation.
I also believe we should seek to launch a security dialogue with democracies in Asia, Africa and Latin
America. Looking to 2030, NATO should aim to become a forum where Allies and like-minded
democracies convene to consult on shared challenges to their security. “14
6. A new analysis provides insights of surveillance technology and increasing technological
dependence on China related to Beijing’s state investments in submarine cables. The Jamestown
Foundation has released a study providing details of China’s stare investment in submarine cables.
The paper explains that many Chinese investments in the global submarine cable network are directly
controlled by the Chinese government. In the current year, the three state-owned telecoms have
substantially increased their investments in new cable projects. The same three state-owned
telecoms—China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom—have all been the subject of United
States government national security concerns. Moreover, reveals the expert, the risk concerns about
state-sponsored espionage and cyber operations stem from the Chinese government’s control of
these submarine cable owners. it is not unusual that 36 percent of the submarine cables that China
Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom have collectively invested in have no landing points in
China. But the Chinese government’s explicit focus on digital infrastructure capacity-building around
the world raises additional geopolitical questions about these state-owned firms’ decisions to invest
in specific cables—as well as what benefits the Chinese government hopes to accrue from them. This
is something NATO should be interested in keeping an eye on: as the global society has become
greatly more dependent on the internet during the COVID-19 pandemic, and consequently more
dependent on submarine cables, the Chinese government investments in physical internet
infrastructure around the world, raise geopolitical urgent questions on security, privacy, and
economic dependence tied to those expenditures.15
13 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE (STC) ENHANCING NATO S&T COOPERATION WITH ASIAN PARTNERS,Preliminary Draft General Report
14 NATO NOT Classified Food for Thought Paper: NATO 2030 - a Transatlantic agenda for the Future
15
Beijing’s Growing Influence on the Global Undersea Cable Network, the Jamestown Foundation, Sept.2021
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 6 of 147. NATO military should work to better understand Chinese conceptions of intelligentization
and the PLA’s efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare – A US accredited defense journal,
Defense One, has published an insightful article aimed at warning the U.S. military to be ready itself
for a warfighting environment in which the PLA realizes its vision of "intelligenization”. Nevertheless,
the same recommendations could be used from SACT to facilitate its ultimate scope to inform
decisions and actions that are required to prepare the Alliance for tomorrow’s security challenges.
Indeed, the Future Alliance Operations will have to take in consideration the Chinese evolution of
warfare, given Beijing’s role as a major player in the military domain. The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) aspires at reaching the “intelligentization”, a Chinese vision for the transformation of warfare
through artificial intelligence and automation. As the article recalls, PLA theorists argue that
intelligentization will center upon a “cognitive space” that privileges complex thinking and effective
decision-making. On battlefields where advanced AI technology enables better decisions, they write,
the side that can better integrate human creativity and robotic calculating capacity will hold the
crucial edge. PLA strategists also believe that ever-more-advanced autonomous systems will
gradually replace human frontline combatants. Above all, intelligentization will aim to achieve
advantages in psychological warfare. The PLA plans to employ all available tools to the overarching
objective of reducing an enemy’s will to resist.
NATO should work to better understand Chinese conceptions of intelligentization and the PLA’s
efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare. Taking advantage of some of the possible
weaknesses of the PLA’s approach should be a priority in the long-term and would also help the
Alliance to shore up some of the weaknesses in its own vision and efforts. Several concrete initiatives
might include:
- NATO forces could enhance its own focus more on how attack the vulnerabilities of adversary
battle networks and command and control (C2) systems. Intelligentization clearly seeks to build
a highly centralized, and consequently potentially vulnerable, decision-making process for the
PLA. Closely studying how to take advantage of these systems and approaches not only would
give to NATO military forces a critical edge in future warfare, it would also help the Alliance’s
military commands better understand the nature of their own envisioned future battle network
and C2 vulnerabilities and more rapidly identify and attempt to mitigate them.
- NATO should dedicate more time to discuss about the PLA’s intelligentization efforts at
Committees Level. 16
Regional assessment
Eurasia
8. China has been active within multilateral platforms in the attempt to engage with
neighboring countries to respond to the evolving situation in Afghanistan – This month China has
16
How Chinese Strategists Think AI Will Power a Military Leap Ahead, Defense One, Sept.2021
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 7 of 14publicly reported to have participated at several multilateral meetings aimed at discussing and
providing cooperative support to the Afghan issue.
First, the Pakistani ISI chief hosted intelligence heads of China, Russia, and other Central Asian nations
to discuss the Afghan situation. The discussion hosted by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
saw the participation of the heads of intelligence of China, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. It should also be noted that few weeks ago the Taliban announced its
new interim government, headed by Mohammad Hasan Akhund, with Abdul Ghani Baradar as his
deputy. The Taliban invited six countries to the inaugural ceremony of the new government -- Russia,
China, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Qatar. 17
Second, on September 8, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the first Foreign
Ministers' Meeting on the Afghan Issue among the neighboring countries of Afghanistan via video
link in Beijing. The meeting was chaired by Pakistani Foreign Minister and attended by Foreign
Ministers of Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Deputy Foreign Minister of Turkmenistan. The Chinese
official spokesperson has made public that during the meeting all parties agreed that Afghanistan's
neighbors should play their unique role and provide a good external environment for Afghanistan's
stability and reconstruction, primarily focusing on coordination and cooperation by providing anti-
pandemic supplies and technical assistance, by keeping ports open on the basis of ensuring security
to facilitate Afghanistan's interaction with the outside world, by strengthening the management of
refugees and migrants, by and calling on the international community to share the responsibility and
jointly handle the issue and by stepping up intelligence sharing and cooperation in border control
and other counter-terrorism security cooperation. 18 He has also declared that the Foreign Ministers'
Meeting is the first trial by Afghanistan's neighboring countries to work closely in response to the
evolving situation in the country and that it signifies the establishment of a coordination and
cooperation mechanism of its neighboring countries. 19 Moreover, the spokesperson has recalled
refugee issue as a top priority to be addressed in the country. In this regard he has urged US and
NATO countries to bear the primary responsibility for resolving the refugee and migrant issue in
Afghanistan. 20
Third, China has attended the meeting on Afghanistan of the heads of state of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). In the
Chinese official words, as close neighbors of Afghanistan, member states of the SCO and CSTO
actively support the peace and reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Beijing, as member of the SCO,
is ready to have close communication and coordination with relevant countries.21
17 Pak ISI chief hosts intelligence heads of China, Russia and other Central Asian nations to discuss Afghan situation, India Today
18 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on September 9, 2021
19 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on September 10, 2021
20 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on September 23, 2021
21
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian's Regular Press Conference on September 16, 2021
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 8 of 14Indo-Pacific
9. Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom announced a new trilateral security
alliance, the so called AUKUS: The new Alliance, is based on a joint effort aimed at supporting the
Australian military to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in an apparent attempt to counter China.
The leaders of the three countries presented the agreement, renamed AUKUS, on Wednesday 15
September. So far, the US has shared nuclear propulsion technology with the UK through a 1958
agreement. Now, the leaders announced, the new trialogue will establish new channels for sharing
information. Together with joint efforts to develop advanced technologies, including in areas such as
cyber security, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and, indeed, subsea capabilities.22
Along with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and his British counterpart Boris Johnson, US
President Joe Biden said the three nations are taking a "historic step" to deepen their cooperation.
"We all recognize the imperative to ensure long-term peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific," Biden
said from the White House. "We need to be able to address both the current strategic environment
in the region and how it might evolve because the future of each of our nations, and indeed the
world, depends on a free and open Indo-Pacific that will last and thrive in the decades ahead,” he
added. 23
The Australian Morrison recalled that the partnership just announced, "will offer a safer region" and
will ultimately benefit everyone. "I want to be clear: Australia is not seeking to acquire nuclear
weapons or establish a civilian nuclear capability," he added, pointing out: "We will continue to
comply with all our nuclear non-proliferation obligations." 24The country has been a signatory to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since February 27, 1970. As part of the agreement signed this
month, Canberra declared its willingness to build eight nuclear-powered submarines.
The reaction of the international community to the new agreement has been immediate and a great
deal diversified. Not surprisingly, strong criticism has been expressed from France. By joining the
AUKUS, Australia has abandoned a 66-billion-dollar agreement to build nuclear submarines with
Paris. The French Navy expressed "great disappointment and regret" at the Australian government's
choice to sign the pact with the US and the UK. "The American choice, which leads to the removal of
a European ally and partner like France from a long-standing partnership with Australia, at a time
when we are facing unprecedented challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, both on our values and
respect for multilateralism based on the rule of law, marks a lack of coherence that France can only
observe and deplore ", said, in a joint statement, the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian,
and the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly.25
Equally criticism, but based on different reasons, came from China. Beijing has described the AUKUS
as "extremely irresponsible" and "narrow minded". Moreover, during an official press conference,
22 Biden Announces Defense Deal With Australia in a Bid to Counter China, the New York Times
23 US builds bulwark against China with UK-Australia security pact, Financial Times
24 Remarks by President Biden, Prime Minister Morrison of Australia, and Prime Minister Johnson of the United Kingdom Announcing the Creation of
AUKUS, The White House
25
Australia Soured a Valuable Naval Partner in France, the Diplomat
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 9 of 14Chinese Foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian stressed that the newly announced alliance risks
"severely damaging regional peace... and intensifying the arms race".26
Some degree of alarmism has also been reported from some Southeast Asian countries such as
Malaysia and Indonesia, who expressed skepticism over nuclear submarines operating in regional
waters. The Malaysian Prime Minister expressed concern that such cooperation will trigger
competition between countries in the Indo-Pacific region in weaponizing their armory with nuclear
weapons. Indonesia stressed that one direct impact of the escalation derived from the new Alliance
that can be predicted is that “there will be many large military forces in the SCS."27
Later, negative reaction also arrived from Russia, saying to be "concerned" about the trilateral
security alliance AUKUS, which links Australia, the UK and the United States. According to Moscow,
the pact threatens global efforts for nuclear non-proliferation because it will allow Australia to
become the second country after the UK to have access to US nuclear technology to produce nuclear-
powered submarines.28
Conversely, the Philippines have expressed support for the new security alliance, arguing that this
could preserve the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Manila's position is in stark contrast to that
of other countries in the region, such as Indonesia and Malaysia. On September 21, Philippine Foreign
Minister Teodoro Locsin issued a statement saying that improving the ability of a close foreign ally to
project power should restore and maintain the balance rather than destabilize it. "Proximity
generates short response times, thus enhancing the military capability of a close friend and ally of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to respond to a threat to the region or challenge
the status quo," he added. 29 The Philippines position is based on the assumption that without a real
presence of nuclear weapons, AUKUS will not threaten the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-
Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) with which the adhering countries have undertaken to ban the presence of
nuclear weapons from their territories30.
Summarizing the reaction of the international community, the main concern of the international
community seems to press on the issue of non-proliferation that the new Pact might undermine,
rather than on the “arm race” deriving from containing China. At present, it is uncertain whether PRC
China is unhappy about a US-UK-Aust security treaty or about Australia getting nuclear submarine
technology. When Australia and France signed a conventional submarine contract five years ago,
Beijing did not express the same level of criticism as it did for AUKUS. From its part, Japan was
unhappy not to get the submarine contract. Therefore, it is worth noting that there is little need for
Australia to have nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles on these to-be-built nuclear submarines – as
they will certainly carry long-range torpedoes and likely medium-range cruise missiles.
26 Aukus: China Denounces US-UK-Australia Pact As Irresponsible, the Indipendent
27 Philippines Throws Support Behind AUKUS Pact, Radio Free Asia
28 Russia Says AUKUS Threatens Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Statecraft
29 Duterte 'concerned' over AUKUS nuclear submarine deal – Palace, the Manila Times
30 Also known as the Bangkok Treaty, the document was signed on December 15, 1995 by Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam to keep nuclear weapons out of Southeast Asia.
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 10 of 14Beyond the speculations and the reasonable reactions coming from third countries, it is crucial to
assess the impact that AUKUS might have on China and the strategic reasons that drove the three
counterparts to undersign it. First, it cannot be underestimated that the pact will focus on military
capability, separating it from the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance which also includes New
Zealand and Canada.31 Nevertheless, while Australia's submarines are the big-ticket item, AUKUS will
also involve the sharing of cyber capabilities and other undersea technologies. However, focus on
military capability does not mean military commitment. As well analyzed from the Chatman House :
“AUKUS does not over-extend Britain. There is no military commitment involved in the agreement”.32
Rather, a strategic-defense engagement is at the cornerstone of the Pact. By deciding to break off
the $66 billion contract signed with France in 2016 to purchase a new fleet of diesel electric
submarines, Australia gave a clear signal of the heightened level of concern about China’s growing
naval capabilities. In other words, in order to guarantee the naval capability that it needs long-term,
Canberra has evaluated the stealthy nuclear-powered submarines developed by Britain with US
support as the best choice. Technology would be the obvious motive behind the Australian
government decision to join AUKUS. As well explained from Foreign Affairs: “U.S.-designed nuclear
submarines are superior in performance to their French counterparts. They are significantly larger
and carry more weapons. And just as important, U.S. nuclear submarines have a sensor suite of
advanced hull-mounted and towed arrays that dramatically improve their capabilities. Access to these
sensors—and to continuous software upgrades for them over time by U.S. labs and industry—is part
of what Australia is acquiring through the deal. France simply cannot provide this capability. No doubt
this is part of what motivated Australia to form the deal with the Americans in the first place.”33
Overall, the AUKUS reveals much about the new geopolitical context. On the one hand, China’s
coercion and hard power in the Indo-Pacific will now have to deal with a structured political-military
reaction. Like it or not, Beijing is forced to face a new defense alliance in the Indo-Pacific, which has
been welcomed by regional partners such as Japan and the Philippines. On the other hand, the
military capabilities provided by the new Pact open new scenarios in the undersea domain: in case
of a crisis in the region, China’s ever-larger force of attack submarines will not find easy to succeed
in the attempt to find and strike US-UK-AU nuclear-powered submarines. U.S. (and future AUKUS)
nuclear submarines are capable of greater speed, endurance, and range than their conventional
counterparts—important characteristics when operating in the vast Indo-Pacific theater. Nuclear-
powered submarines can also be designed to remain stealthy at high speeds and to operate at great
ocean depths. This means that nuclear-powered submarines have a better chance at surviving
Chinese attempts to find them. As a result, nuclear-powered submarines are more likely to be able
to sustain their missions during a crisis or a war. These include surveillance as well as protecting or
attacking ships. Such undersea tasks will be especially vital in the future, as the surface of the ocean
and the airspace above it grow increasingly contested due to technological trends in weaponry and
the prodigious growth of China’s capabilities.34
31 The Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance also has “Third Party” agreements with other countries like Japan and South Korea – in addition to which, the
United States has a number bilateral alliances and agreements in the Indo-Pacific region.
32 AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context, Chatman House
33 Don’t Sink the Nuclear Submarine Deal, Foreign Affairs
34
Cfr. 33
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 11 of 14To conclude, while it is important not to overestimate the benefits of the agreement, it is fair to
recognize its potential strategic advantage that might provide to the west, not least as Allies’
warranty of the United States’ political commitment in the region. Not to forget that the AUKUS took
shape while the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, United States, Japan, India and
Australia, committed themselves to pursuing the goal of creating an Indo-Pacific region free, open
and not limited by coercion. The leaders of the four countries presented a united front against
concerns from China during a face-to-face summit organized at the White House on Friday 24
September. Although China was not mentioned in the four leaders' public remarks or in the lengthy
joint statement released at the end of the meeting, the talks often mentioned the need for rules-
based behavior in a region where Beijing is undermining regional stability with assertive and
provocative military moves. 35 The meeting was followed closely by Beijing, that has ever since
criticized the group, describing it as "doomed to fail"; China has also expressed resentment toward
the QUAD as a platform outdated with a Cold War zero-sum mentality and driven by ideological
bias.36
Outlook
10. The diplomatic section of this BLUF Report, highlighted major events that have seen NATO
and China discussing the issue of arms control and disarmament. At present, China firmly rejects to
join any dialogue on this issue with the US and Russia, since its minimum nuclear doctrine would not
allow to obtain any advantage in taking part in this dialogue.
11. China’s September meeting with NATO Sec.Gen, left open room for finding a common
ground on other issues, such as climate change and pandemic aids. However, NATO’s consistent
request addressed to Beijing to join arms control negotiation and provide warranties of transparency
has been not satisfied so far. Mr. Stoltenberg recently welcomed the agreement between the United
States and Russia to extend for another five years the New START treaty limiting their strategic
nuclear weapons. But he also recalled that more kinds of arms should be added to non-proliferation
talks, including new technologies like Artificial Intelligence, a domain where Beijing is a major
counterpart.37
12. In the military domain, this month has been reported the Chinese production of the new
J-20 jet fighter, confirming a trend that sees Beijing investing a great deal in its air and sea capabilities.
Nevertheless, the main challenge for China will be to effectively train pilots and deploy the aircraft.
Currently the PLAN is increasingly doing operational training for its pilots on the two active aircraft
carriers -- with a third one being under construction.
13. Turning on technology, the core part of the section analyzed a brilliant report from CSIS,
containing an assessment of the qualitative scale of change in China’s warfare capabilities, identified
as a valid resource for SACT to better understand Beijing’s rapid adaptation to the current and future
security environment. The main outcomes of the report provide food-for thoughts for NATO’s
35 Quad leaders press for free Indo-Pacific, with wary eye on China, Reuters
36 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on September 27, 2021
37
NATO chief urges China to join nuclear arms control talks, AP News
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 12 of 14comprehension of China as a new authoritarian superpower way more influential than Russia. A
proper strategy for the Alliance will need to equally assess the growing challenge from Moscow and
the growing threat posed by Russian and Chinese military operation. In practice this would mean
planning collectively, making a common effort to address both Russia and China as a key part of NATO
annual planning, intelligence, and net assessment efforts, and providing constant realistic analysis
and dialogue that can help share information on an “Atlantic” basis. In line with the remarks of the
experts, the European nations will need to focus on net assessments of their present and future
capabilities to deter and defend against Russia, on what member countries can do to improve their
forces, and on modernization at a time when there is an ongoing revolution in military affairs that
will last for at least the next few decades. The key for succeeding in future military operations will be
the creation of a well-balanced, integrated, and interoperable mix of national forces, able to address
the military strengths and weaknesses of each member state in different ways. In other words, the
Alliance will need to develop a new approach to force planning based on real net assessment, plans,
and budgets as well as on a collective approach to persuade Beijing to cooperate and limit the risk of
some future conflict.38
14. Another crucial part of this section was dedicated at assessing a strategic paper that gives
insight of China’s intelligenization ambition and at evaluating how the US and ultimately the Alliance
should adapt to future warfare scenario with AI. As recalled, NATO should be ready itself for a future
warfighting environment, where the PLA’s realization of its intelligenization ambitions will increase
vulnerabilities to the western way of war. According to the author of the American defense
newspaper, if realized, Chinese military strategists’ ambitions could portend an environment that has
become less familiar in recent decades for the U.S. military—one in which disorientation,
misinformation, and complex deception are commonplace during conflict with a peer adversary.
Preparing for this increasing possibility, while maintaining resolve, and effectiveness will be essential
to prevailing in a cognitive confrontation, not only for the US military but also for the whole Atlantic
Alliance.
15. In addition, this monthly BLUF provided insights of the latest development in the Afghan
theatre. China is getting more and more engaged in multilateral platforms with neighboring countries
with the ambition to ensure that the Afghan situation will receive adequate multilateral support and
will avoid running into a spillover of terrorism and instability. In this regard, China met with the
intelligence heads of China, Russia and other Central Asian nations and further attended the first
Foreign Ministers' Meeting on the Afghan Issue, with Pakistan, Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Beijing firmly position remains to recall US responsibility to assist the region in the
aftermath of the withdrawal and to maintain a dialogue with the Taliban to receive security
warranties in exchange.
16. The report concludes with a strategic assessment of the newly shaped defense
partnership among the U.S., Australia, and the U.K, the so called AUKUS. Whether the agreement
for many is seen as a platform that might undermine transatlantic solidarity, given the French
humiliation and resentment coming from the Australian decision to terminate the contract with
Paris for the acquisition of nuclear submarines in favor of those produced by US and the UK, seen
38
CSIS, Strengthening European Deterrence and Defense: NATO, Not European Defense Autonomy, Is the Answer, 20 September 2021
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 13 of 14from another perspective , the AUKUS might play a critical role in strengthening the West’s ability
to compete with China, and Australian nuclear submarines might give NATO a far better and more
lasting capability to deter China in the Pacific waters near Beijing. However, whether the new
Alliance will result effective and strategically benefiting it remain to be seen. As recalled from
authoritative experts, firstly AUKUS should not be an Anglo-only club; “Its current mission appears
to be defense-industrial cooperation, but it could expand to operations. A useful initial step would
be to expand the club to include France, Japan, and perhaps India. Those nations have serious
militaries and are tech leaders. Other NATO and Asian allies might also eventually join. Steps
would need to be taken to safeguard certain technologies. But that should not preclude an
expansion, which could become the basis for broad naval cooperation in Asia.”39 Moreover, the
AUKUS could be turned into an opportunity to create a new partnership that furthers both US
and French interests if both sides genuinely consider one another’s strategic priorities. This
should be facilitated by allaying recurring French concerns about the continuation of US support
for operations in the Sahel and the NATO mission in Iraq; by deepening the US-French partnership
in the Indo-Pacific, by speaking more forcefully about supporting European defense initiatives
and recognizing the growing strategic role of the European Union in the NATO’s next Strategic
Concept. In conclusion, deepening consultations on arms control and the most efficient political-
military approach to facing the Russian challenge, as well as recognizing that French concerns
about European strategic stability underpin French positions, notably within NATO, might be win-
win factors for the successful future of AUKUS . 40
39 Experts react: The AUKUS deal has shaken the transatlantic alliance. What should the US and its allies do now?, Atlantic Council
40
Cfr. 39
NOT CLASSIFIED Page 14 of 14You can also read
