A descriptive analysis of the 2007 public sector strike in South Africa
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A descriptive analysis of the 2007
public sector strike in South Africa
*
by Adewale Banjo and
**
Sanjay Balkaran
Abstract
With the restoration of open democracy in South Africa in 1994, there was
unusual optimism and hope that prosperity, as the dividends of democracy, would
trickle down to the working population. But post-repressive societies have not
always attained this Eldorado. One of the many ways in which this contradiction
has manifested itself is the continuing frosty relationship between the state and
the labour movement. The troubled labour relations have in fact often led to
violent industrial action. By means of a descriptive approach and content analysis
of media (print & electronic) as well as documentary sources, the study, after a
brief literature review on strike action in Southern/South Africa, traces the root of
the 2007 public service union strike in South Africa, the strategies adopted by the
parties to the dispute, the way the dispute was resolved and the cost of the strike.
The article concludes by highlighting the intended and unintended outcomes for
both the government and the unions.
1 Background and introduction
In the early years of the 20th century it was mainly the white workers in the labour
movement who built up the political parties and trade unions in South Africa. In time,
the progressive labour groups had to change their attitudes to non-white workers and
argued that only solidarity between white and non-white workers could overthrow the
capitalist system in South Africa. The International Socialist League (ISL), in particular,
believed that the conflict in South Africa was not a racial conflict between black and
white, but an economic or class conflict between the rich capitalists and the poor
workers. The ISL argued that the struggle for democratic rights had to be based on
industrial unions and proposed that the industrial trade unions were a sufficient basis
for the struggle for democracy (Walt 2008:2).
One direct product of this kind of thinking and ideological framework was the massive
expansion and steady growth enjoyed by multiracial public sector unions in South
Africa just before 1994. The public sector unions in South Africa also grew in numerical
strength and prominence in the context of the transformation ushered in by the post-
1994 public sector reforms. Arguably, these post-1994 public sector reforms was the
basis for the massive 1999 strike, when about 400 000 public servants downed tools
over wages in the new South Africa’s first big strike. The twelve public service unions
*
Dr A Banjo is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science & Public Administration,
University of Zululand
**
Mr S Balkaran is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science & Public Administration,
University of Zululand
120 South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009Forum Section [PSUs], which had been deadlocked in wage negotiations with the government, had demanded a 10% increase while the government responded with a counter-offer of only 6.3% for the majority of public servants and 6.5% for teachers. In 2000, Vusi Nhlapo, the President of NEHAWU, threatened that collective bargaining in the public service would collapse if the government went ahead with its unilateral plans to implement its six percent [6%] offer (The Sowetan, 2000). The government's “recalcitrant attitude” after all seven rounds of negotiations had produced nothing new, except to strengthen civil servants’ resolve to go on a massive national strike (The Sowetan, 2000). Again in 2004 hundreds of thousands of public servants took part in a similar strike, which was regarded at the time as the biggest public servant wage strike in the history of the country. More than 700 000 public servants stayed away from work. In 2004 the government struck a (three-year) multiterm wage agreement with a 4% increase - which meant that the unions could not negotiate on salary increases for three years (Mbanjwa 2007). Thus, as the public service unions and government headed for another collision in 2007, the disputes and acrimonious negotiations resembled those of previous years. In 2007 the biggest wave of strikes since the end of apartheid caused a crisis in South African politics, and shook a government that was hesitant to increase pay for public sector workers (Ceruti 2007). The strike was also described as the longest and most intense since the end of apartheid. Although the strike took some people by surprise, for others it represented the culmination of a gradual build-up of tension caused by unresolved issues. In some observers’ opinion the 2007 strike was so acrimonious that the parties almost succeeded in wiping each other out (Mischke 2008:1). The aim of this study is essentially to identify post-1994 cases of PSU strikes in South Africa, and thereby unravel the background to the 2007 PSU versus government dispute. The article describes the cause[s], the actors and strategies adopted by the disputants, and further explores the immediate and long-term costs and consequences. It concludes with succinct explanations on how the dispute was resolved. 2 Literature overview Across countries and cultures, workers join unions in order to overcome their weakness as individuals in the employment relationship. A group of workers organised into a trade union meets the employer on a more equal footing than the individual, and confronts the employer with collective power. When union and employer engage in collective bargaining their relationship involves the threat or deployment of power and the outcomes of bargaining reflect the balance of power. Workers' power is fragile, however, and is can easily be undermined by high unemployment (Kelly 1998:17). For example, the labour laws of most SADC member states show that while the right to strike is recognised, its exercise remains subject to many restrictions. Even where the right is provided for in the Constitution, statutory limitations include broadly defined essential services, prohibition of strikes over rights disputes and inhibitory procedural requirements. This has been attributed by Madhuku (1997) to a restrictive regime and the perception that more liberal legislation might prove to be economically disruptive. Anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that democratisation on the subcontinent and in South Africa (since 1994) has weakened the corporatist hold of the state and has strengthened and expanded civil society. From the foregoing, it has become obvious South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009 121
Forum Section that the working class in new democracies have come to the conclusion that they can no longer afford to sit around the table and hope that their voices will be heard, without action-backed pressure. Thus, workers’ action/industrial action or strike/labour disputes in post-conflict societies have come in for academic scrutiny in Southern and South Africa since the early 1990s. A recent collection of essays, including studies on countries in southern Africa, has attempted to plug this gap. These include a contribution by Mogalakwe (1996:23-27), which provides examples of labour disputes and industrial action in Botswana from January 1991 to December 1994. Existing dispute resolution procedures are discussed, and the author takes a brief look at how the new Industrial Court could make a difference in Botswana. Khabo (1996:28-49) highlights the main features of the Labour Code Order 1992, and the functions of the Labour Court, which was established on 13 October 1994 in Lesotho. The study looks at the nature of labour disputes, mechanisms used to resolve them (conciliation, arbitration, industrial action, the Labour Court), and ILO conventions that could act as guidelines. The study also assesses these mechanisms, and looks at alternatives. The Namibian experience, with the introduction of the new Labour Act 6 of 1992 after independence to redress the pre-independence labour situation, is reviewed by Daniels (1996:51-57). The study lists individual disputes between 1992 and 1994, and then looks at collective disputes and strikes, the District Labour Court and the Labour Court, methods and practices employed in handling disputes, effectiveness of procedures and their shortcomings. The Tanzanian labour dispute resolution system was the main thrust of Rutinwa`s work (1996:90-106), in which he reviews legislation introduced in Tanzania after independence to eradicate the major forms of industrial action such as strikes, lockouts, picketing, sit-ins, go-slows, etc, and looks at the type of disputes encountered, the availability and efficiency of existing mechanisms for settling disputes, and adjudication under specific acts. The study proceeds with an assessment of procedures, and looks at the proposed new system. Banda (1996:107-113) argues that Zambia has been plagued by industrial action on an extended scale since independence. Labour legislation was resented by trade unions, and the political change to multiparty politics brought about the introduction of the Industrial and Labour Relations Act in 1993. The study lists core features of this Act, gives a general overview of industrial disputes, how they are expressed and how effective and efficient settlement arrangement are. With specific reference to South Africa, although not many studies have been conducted on public workers’ strikes after 1994, an overview of selected studies on the subject prior to 1994 will serve a useful purpose. Drawing on the seminal work by Swan (1984:239-258), it has been discovered that strikes as an instrument of negotiation have a long history in South Africa. Examples of other studies include the Lloyd (1991:3-7) study, which describes trade unionism in South Africa, specifically during the decade 1980-1989 and gives special attention to the strike instrument and its increasing use as a means of resolving disputes in the labour market. Other authors, such as Bendix and Graham (1988:23-38), Davis and Fine (1985:25-48) and Bendix (1984:8-39) have explored the right to strike, and the state of politics/state-labour nexus in South Africa in the 1980s. Other seminal works include that of Boshoff (1986:16-24), which investigates some aspects of the cost of strikes in the 70s and 80s, concluding that social or public costs are not always judged in the proper perspective. There is also the Longreach Report (1988:1-23), which reviews South Africa’s situation in the 1980s, the strike actions, internal unrest, reform and the impact on 122 South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009
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foreign economic involvement in South Africa.
The essence of this study is therefore to fill a major gap in the study of strike and
collective bargaining in the new South Africa with specific reference to the 2007 Public
Service Strike. It is important to note that the PSU strike in South Africa formed part of
the Africa-wide employee-employer conflict in 2007. [See table 1.]
Table 1
2007 - Strikes in African countries in 2007
COUNTRY POPULATION YEAR STRIKES (NATURE)
biggest strike in history – four weeks’
SOUTH AFRICA 48 million 2007
public sector strike
Strikes in Ndola council (six weeks)
ZAMBIA 12 million 2007
and Kanshani mine
MOCAMBIQUE 20 million 2007 sugar plantation workers' strike
public sector strikes, one million on
streets of Kinshasa against election
CONGO (DEMOCRATIC
60-70 million 2006/2007 result, continued fighting in the east
REPUBLIC OF CONGO)
(600,000 internal refugees in Kivu
alone) and massacres in the west
CAMEROON 16 million 2007 health workers' strike
2002-2005: Seven general strikes
and mass protests
NIGERIA 140-153 million 2002-2007 2007: general strike in June – “the
entire country came to a halt”, public
sector strike in Ekiti state
health workers' and bus drivers'
GHANA 24 million 2007
strikes
LIBERIA 3.2 million 2007 strike at University of Liberia
18 days’ general strike and mass
GUINEA 10 million 2007
movement in Jan-Feb
Dock workers' strike against
GAMBIA 2007
redundancies
ZIMBABWE 13 million 2007 6,000 bank workers plan strike
Source: CWI-CIT Summer School. (2007). Africa. Retrieved August 4, 2008, from Socialistworld:
www.socialistworld.net.
3 The actors and the crux of the 2007 PSU Dispute
Most commentators erroneously described the June 2007 public sector industrial action
in South Africa as “a COSATU strike”. But, as one of the COSATU negotiators noted:
“It’s the unions outside COSATU that seem the most militant” (Bell 2008). Unions
affiliated to both these federations FEDUSA and NACTU, as well as several
independent trade unions, were involved in the 2007 public sector dispute. The public
sector unions are categorically opposed to the notion that wages are a source of higher
inflation. For COSATU, at the very least, minimum wages should be set at the inflation
rate and should preferably be set higher than inflation to help eliminate poverty.
The public sector unions claimed that the strike was technically about wages in
response to inflation and the basket of basic issues that include the price of food,
petrol, education, transport, electricity, rates and other services, all of which had
increased in the past year; but other observers though that the strike had major political
undertones. This was because the Congress of South African Trade Unions
South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009 123Forum Section
(COSATU), although allied to the ANC government, was implacably opposed to
President Mbeki's economic policy. The Congress argued that Mbeki`s policies provide
tax benefits to the rich while neglecting pro-poor social services (Sidley 2007:1240). But
labour insisted that there was no political agenda. The PSU stated that the “fight with
government was for the restoration and expansion of the services that we deliver. It is a
fight against the concept of a broken-down, poorly-paid and under-resourced public
service” (Mbanjwa 2007).
Interestingly, the government also responded in similar vein. Minister Fraser-Moleketi
argued that the wage negotiation was not simply about percentages and an annual
increase, but about a complete package and cautioned against putting short-term
solutions, such as higher salaries, above longer term security and broader conditions of
service. Within this context the government was reported to have:
indicated commitment to resolving the public sector wage stand-off in a non-
confrontational way and indicated that there was no need for brinkmanship by any
side.
indicated commitment to collective bargaining and resolving the matter in a way that
excluded industrial action.
opted for the principle that links salary increases to inflation in order to protect the
buying power of public servants.
considered aligning the public service with the Basic Conditions of Employment Act,
which would mean workers would receive time-and-a-half pay on Sundays and
double-time on public holidays. In addition, medical subsidies for members of the
government service medical aid scheme (GEMS) were to be improved (Quintal
2007).
However, the public service unions refused to accept wage increases linked to inflation.
They claimed that this had resulted in no real wage increases over the last 10 years
and also condemned the employer’s insistence on spreading salary negotiations over a
multi-term period. The unions rejected the state’s position that salaries should be kept
within a 16-notch system linked to performance while the state lacked the capacity
among its officials to implement any performance management system (Hosken &
Mbanjwa 2007).
In the response by the Department of Public Service and Administration [DPSA] to
the above, it estimated that the unions' original stance would add an additional R200
billion to the wage bill in the first year of implementation, more than double the 2007
wage bill. The DPSA stated that COSATU's demands - which also called on the
government to fill all staff vacancies and improve a housing subsidy that had not been
increased since 1988 - would cost taxpayers R198 billion. But the unions called that
figure a gross distortion (The Mercury 2007).
At this point the government merely indicated that it would stick to the monetary
targets set out in its macro-economic policy and that it would set the pace in terms of
trying to keep wage demands below the rate of inflation. But workers argued that there
are specific mechanisms that could be utilised to lever further money. One mechanism,
the unions suggested, would be to have the government lower their contribution to the
state-run pension fund. This would make available sufficient money for wages and
infrastructural investment in the public service. Such a move would also be in line with
the African National Congress (ANC) manifesto for a more thorough and accelerated
transformation. For labour, the platform of accelerated transformation means increased
funding for those areas of the public service that improve the quality of life for the poor.
124 South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009Forum Section To counter the union’s position, the government again argued that its annual budget has only been growing at the rate of two percent, that its resources are not infinite and that increases in the wage bill could only come about by increasing value added tax (VAT). But the unions responded by stating that additional revenue could be gained by increasing taxes on profits and the wealthy, rather than attempting to gain additional revenue from VAT, which disproportionably affects those with low incomes. 4 Strategies adopted by the disputants In addition to the debate, argument and counterarguments that characterised the disputes, other strategies were employed by each party to force the other to its knees while the crisis lasted. The following represents a combination of such strategies, as employed by both the government and the Public Sector Union: 4.1 Suspension and disruption of services In a plea for unity and cohesive solidarity the union’s negotiators entreated strikers to mobilise for the strike through pickets and lunch-hour demonstrations in all public service institutions (The Mercury 9 May 2007). Across the country, teachers, health workers and even some police officials “marched for more money”. Border posts, motor licensing offices, port authorities, deeds offices and other important administrative services were not available (Mbanjwa 2007). The payment of social grants was also disrupted. The Departments of Labour did not open for compensation payments, injuries on duty and UIF applications. Health services at most government hospitals were paralyzed as workers stayed away despite a “return to work or be fired” ultimatum issued by the government (Savides, Ndenze, & SAPA 2007). Furthermore, a number of immigration officials employed by the Department of Home Affairs also embarked on strike action and their action impacted on operations at the international airports when arriving flights had to be diverted or delayed, causing massive inconvenience to foreign and domestic passengers (Quintal, Ngqiyaza, & SAPA 2007). Contrary to Minister Fraser-Moleketi`s report that “the disruptions were caused mostly by the absence of support staff such as cleaning, catering and clerical services”, the union leaders claimed that police, nurses, cleaners, doctors and teachers also participated in the strike through work-to-rule action (Cape Argus 2007). In response to the unions’ request, in most provincial capitals, members picketed at the entrance to their workplaces. Protesting workers across the country regularly blocked access routes, causing traffic mayhem and queues several kilometres in length. At most of the public hospitals, medical and paramedical staff demonstrated outside picket lines to “discourage scab labour” (SAPA 2007). In retrospect, though, the unions claimed that they had completely shut down all schools and hospitals, but in some parts of the country the effects of the strike were minimal. 4.3 Hardening of positions and propaganda Minister Fraser-Moleketi and COSATU Secretary-General Zwelinzima Vavi dug in their heels as they announced that they were not moving from their 6.5% wage offer and 12% wage increase demands respectively. Vavi, in a show of force, declared that “COSATU will not allow a defeat of the public sector strike. The implications of such a defeat to workers as a whole will be simply devastating” (SAPA 2007). The Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) estimated that the participation of 70 000 workers in the marches had had a “minimal impediment” on most service delivery. The South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009 125
Forum Section unions countered this and claimed that reports showed a significant or general public service shut-down, “despite obvious government propaganda to the contrary” (SAPA 2007). 4.4 Litigation For the first time in South Africa's post-1994 history, unions fought for the participation of nurses and police officers in a public service strike. The police and nurses form part of essential services and are by law not allowed to strike. By downing tools they would, according to government, put the public's health and safety at risk. In the ensuing legal battle, the Labour Court ruled that not all employees of the SA Police Service (SAPS) render an essential service, and therefore they are not all prohibited from striking. After looking at the SA Police Service Act 68 of 1995 and the Public Service Act 103 of 1994, the Labour Court fastened on this distinction between members and employees. The SA Police Service Act defines members but not employees; the Labour Relations Act defines employees and not members. Eventually, the South African Police Services (SAPS) succeeded in securing an interdict preventing staff from striking, on the grounds that they are essential services workers. 4.5 Application of force, threats and appeals Despite the DPSA’s attempts to downplay the magnitude of the public sector strike, when the unions threatened a total shutdown of the public service, the country's security opted for a show of force to ensure law and order. The police routinely used rubber bullets and tear gas on strikers and protesters. In a gloves-off approach, the government deployed security forces around the country at schools and hospitals. The defence forces as well as the private security companies were called in to maintain law and order during the volatile wage impasse (Mbanjwa & Webb 2007). There was intimidation from both sides. Several government officials received anonymous death threats (Adams & Ngqiyaza 2007). At the peak of an intense media-orchestrated war of words, the chair of the Parliamentary Public Service Committee and a former COSATU leader, John Gomomo, opted for the middle ground. Gomomo, made a special appeal to all negotiating parties to act responsibly, asking that they should not distract the nation “from the broad national agenda that we have adopted as a country and enshrined in the Constitution” (Mbanjwa & Quintal 2007). 5 Breaking the log jam: how the dispute was resolved Because of the volatile environment in which negotiations were taking place, the parties had to find common ground. Accordingly, a working document was drafted to form the basis of the new discussions and collectively move from a deadlock situation to one in which to negotiate on the future nature of the public service. In order to prove government’s readiness to terminate the dispute and further pressurise the unions, the Minister signed her confirmation of the final offer as employer even before the final rounds of negotiation. This placed the unions in a constitutional predicament as they (unions) had 21days in which to respond to government’s final offer. If the period had lapsed without 51 percent of the unions signing, the PSCBC would have been compelled to “reopen” negotiations and the negotiations would have had to start from scratch (Mbanjwa 2007). However, as a show of brinkmanship and a face-saving ploy, both parties conceded that agreement had been reached on the greater part of the government’s proposal. The objectives of the government proposal were to: 126 South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009
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[i] Provide a basis for the general salary adjustments for employees for the
forthcoming years, introduce revised salary structures for specific professional
occupations, catering for career-pathing, pay progression, grade progression,
seniority, increased competencies and performance, with a view to attracting and
retaining professionals and specialists;
[ii] Replace the existing Scarce Skills Framework for the public service with the
introduction of the revised salary structures;
[iii] Review non-pensionable allowances; deal with certain leave matters; provide for
the adjustment of the medical aid subsidy;
[iv] Provide for the alignment of the public service with the requirements of the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act 1997; and
[v] Provide for processes to review certain existing terms and conditions of
employment.
Other details included:
[a] A 7,5 percent wage increase for the year 2007 with effect from July 1;
[b] Annual salary adjustments to be determined through the bargaining process after
the 2008 adjustment based on the projected CPI-X plus one percent;
[c] A reduction in the number of notches per salary level to 12 instead of 15;
[d] A fixed percentage increment between notches of 1,5 percent;
[d] All employees (3 559) on level 1 with five or more years' service to be moved to
level 3 in July; all employees (29 438) on salary level 2 with 20 or more years'
service to be moved to level 3 in July;
[e] An increase in danger and night shift allowance by 25 percent with the separation
allowance increased to R25.17 a day; an increase in housing allowance to R500
per month from July 1;
[f] The filling and advertisement of all new and old vacant funded posts within
12 months; and an increase in medical aid allowance from R1 090 to R2 020
(Mbanjwa 2007).
6 A description of the cost and consequences
The primary reason why the 27-day PSU strike of 2007 lasted for so long was the
intransigence of both labour and government. Other possible reasons include union
solidarity and public sympathy. However, there is no doubt that the strike involved
enormous costs and had far-reaching consequences. The unions incurred substantial
costs including the cost of defending employees who were dismissed (Business Report
2007). Other costs were as follows:
(1) The government was forced to find R5,4 billion extra to move from its initial offer of
a 5,3 percent to a 7,5 percent wage increase.
(2) The already stretched services experienced massive backlogs, to the detriment of
poor communities (Business Report 2007).
(3) The cost of the strike was 500 000 worker days for each day of the strike
(Business Report 2008). This added up to a loss of 12 million worker days at a
cost of about R5.6 billion.
(4) The indirect costs were likely to have been even more damaging. These included
heightened inflationary expectations, with the likely consequences of interest rate
South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009 127Forum Section
increases; a possible loss of investor confidence in South Africa; and damaged
relationships between striking workers and their employers. One way to measure
the impact on the economy is in terms of lost income to the strikers. The 700 000
striking employees represented about 5 percent of the total work force of
12.5 million employed in both the formal and informal sectors. This meant a
0.1 percent loss of production each week. While in some industries workers were
able to make up for lost income by working overtime, most civil servants were
unable to do so (Business Report 2007).
(5) Several hundreds of patients died during the strike because of the lack of
ambulances or because hospitals were providing only limited services. Patients
with HIV/Aids and tuberculosis were also denied their regular treatment because of
clinic closures. The Chris Hani Baragwanath Hospital, one of the largest hospitals
in the southern hemisphere, was forced to fly premature and sick babies in
incubators by helicopters to private facilities at enormous cost to the government
(Sidley 2007:1241).
7 From 2007 PSU Strikes to 2009 OSD Strikes
The repeated postponements of Occupation-Specific Dispensation (OSD) payments in
the public sector in the aftermath of the 2007 agreements compelled unions of
professional employees to embark on “wildcat” strikes in 2009. The OSD Strikes, as
they came to be known, include the doctors' strike, the Correctional Services strike, the
teachers'/educators' strike and the soldiers' strike.
The first of this wave of strikes was the doctors' strike. Although it is against the law
for doctors to strike as they are classified as an essential service, about 10 653 doctors
in public hospitals embarked on nationwide “wildcat” strikes, from May to June 2009,
after the government allegedly “reneged” on the implementation of the 2007
Occupation-Specific Dispensation (OSD) which should have taken effect from July
2008.
The second OSD strike in 2009 was the Correctional Services strike. In June 2009,
88 prison warders embarked on an “illegal go-slow” at the Johannesburg Prison. The
warders, who were members of the Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Public
Service Association, had embarked on a go-slow because of the government's
unwillingness to pay occupation-specific dispensation (OSD) benefits and because of
other prison security matters.
The third was the teachers'/educators' strike. On 9 June 2009 the Labour Court
declared the strike by the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) illegal
and interdicted members from embarking on protests and work stoppages. Before this,
however, SADTU members had disrupted classes and had been on strike for over a
week in a bid to communicate their grievances to the government over OSD and
related issues.
The fourth OSD-related strike in 2009 took the form of a rebellion by members of the
South African armed forces. The rebellion took place on 15 August 2009, coincidentally
on the 15th anniversary of the founding of the South African National Defence Union
(SANDU). The protest turned violent; there were clashes with police on the streets
during demonstrations, cars were smashed, and police fired tear gas and rubber bullets
to prevent the demonstrators entering the Union Buildings, the seat of government. Up
to 3000 military personnel embarked on this violent protest, over pay and conditions,
demanding a 30% increase from the government despite a court order prohibiting their
128 South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009Forum Section march on the Union Buildings. The South African Security Forces Union (SASFU) vowed to fight to have soldiers’ benefits brought in line with those of other members of the security cluster to achieve parity in the remuneration of the security cluster. Parity was seen as an urgent need as low salaries were causing soldiers to have their homes repossessed and these repossessions were breaking up families. The union alleged that the root cause was unwillingness on the part of defence management to better its members’ conditions of service, which had been exacerbated by the worsening sociopolitical conditions and the economic downturn. 8 Conclusion From the foregoing we have highlighted the fact that the June 2007 public sector strike in South Africa involved some 700 000 workers, who held out for 27 days. This strike demonstrated unity among the workers and the 17 unions in the sector. However, by adopting a tough stance on basic wages and concentrating on boosting conditions of service instead of merely granting salary increases, the government achieved at least three intended and unintended outcomes: First, it set a benchmark for wage settlements in all sectors. By curbing the increase, the state moved towards limiting the inflationary impact of the 2007 wage increases. Second, the negotiation process started by laying the groundwork for differential pay, for different levels of achievement. Third, the overtly political, intra-party/intra-alliance nature of the strike was clearly exposed. Workers within the movement were made to realise that the strike involved more than a battle for better pay and working conditions. The public held the unions accountable and this will probably make future widespread, multi-sector strikes less likely. List of references Adams, S. 2007. Grim cost of the strike. Available from Iol.co.za [11 June 2007]: http://www.Iol.co.za (accessed on 1 August 2008). Adams, S & Ngqiyaza, B. 2007. Non-striking workers get death threats. Available from Iol.co.za (accessed on 8 August 2008). Banda, DA .1996. Resolutions of labour disputes in Southern Africa: the case of Zambia, in Labour dispute resolution in Southern Africa:107-113. Bell, T. 2008. Key lessons from public sector strike. Available from http://www.amandlapublishers.co.za/content/view/115/1/lang,en/ (accessed on 4 August 2008). Bendix, S. 1984. Industrial relations review 1983 and prognosis 1984. Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa 4(1):8-39. Bendix, W & Graham, A. 1988. The right to strike in South Africa. Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa viii(2):23. Boshoff, TR. 1986. Aspects of the costs of strikes in the Republic of South Africa: a review. Industrial Relations Journal of South Africa 6(1):16-24. Business Report, 15 June 2007. Strike costs SA R3.4 bn - and it's only the start. Business Report, 2 July 2007. The good and the bad of the public sector strike. Available from South African Journal of Labour Relations: Vol 33 No 2 2009 129
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