2020 Country Brief: Iran - imgix

P RIMER Published September 17, 2020 • 11 minute read

2020 Country Brief: Iran

          The Nat ional Securit y Program

   Takeaways
   A nuclear-armed Iran is an unacceptable threat to America and our allies. But because of
   Donald Trump, we are closer to—not farther from—this nightmare scenario.

   Donald Trump chose a bellicose, chaotic, go-it-alone strategy toward Iran. He blew up
   the Iran Deal, the international agreement that froze Iran’s nuclear weapons program,
   because it was negotiated by Barack Obama. When he blew it up, our European allies
   were shocked—and for the         rst time ever, they sided with Iran to preserve the deal over
   the Trump Administration. And that’s what just happened again at the United Nations
   in August of this year. Now it will be more di       cult to stop Iran’s malign activity in the
   future.

   President Obama brought international pressure to bear to force Iran into a di          cult
   choice: they could have an economy or nuclear weapons, but not both. Iran chose an

economy, and in doing so, accepted restrictions on its nuclear program and submitted
   to international inspections. In return, the United States, our European allies, Russia,
   and China began to resume economic activity with Iran. After freezing Iran’s nuclear
   program, the United States could have begun dealing with Iran’s other malign activity.

   Unfortunately, against the advice of his senior national security advisors and allies,
   President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Iran Deal. Then he threatened our
   negotiating partners with sanctions for attempting to salvage the deal. And when that
   didn’t work, in January, he ordered a unilateral strike to kill one of Iran’s senior military
   leaders, Qasem Soleimani, risking outright war. Despite all this, he signaled he was open
   to negotiations with Iran but has not indicated what a successful agreement would
   include.

   Trump’s chaotic, bellicose strategy has yielded no positive results. Future policymakers
   will need to rebuild the coalition to deal with Iran and develop a long-term strategy to
   get Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions, end its support for terrorists, and become a
   responsible global player.

The Iran deal was not perfect, but it was
successful in freezing Iran’s nuclear program
and provided the foundation to address the
country’s other malign activities.
In 2015, when President Obama negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),
often referred to as the Iran Deal, Iran was on the brink of obtaining a nuclear weapon. The
country’s estimated “breakout time” to produce       ssile material for a nuclear weapon was two
to three months. 1 After the adoption of the JCPOA and its requirement that Iran roll back its
weapons program, the breakout time increased to one year. 2 International inspections
required under the deal repeatedly found that Iran was complying with its obligations. 3 Yet
President Trump announced in May 2018 that the United States would withdraw from the
agreement. 4

President Trump called the agreement a bad deal, focusing on what the United States gave
and ignoring what it got. 5 He measured the deal from perfect rather than the status quo ante.
While the United States and other world powers lifted economic sanctions, in exchange Iran
agreed to freeze its nuclear program, comply with a robust inspection regime, and
permanently commit to not build a nuclear weapon. 6

The deal was a foundation, not an end state. A tough and smart approach would build upon—
not destroy—the deal. Further e orts could have addressed the following:

   Sunset provisions:While some restrictions in the deal expire or “sunset” at di erent
   points and would need to be addressed in the future, others last more than a decade, and
   some last forever. 7 The agreement commits that Iran will not seek, develop, or acquire
   nuclear weapons, 8 reinforcing its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
   (NPT), which prohibits the country from manufacturing or acquiring a nuclear weapon.
   Iran also agreed to allow United Nations (UN) inspectors to inde nitely monitor and verify
   that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This ensures the United States and
   its allies can catch any Iranian attempts to cheat.

   Support for terrorism:Iran has long been a supporter of terrorist groups, including Hamas,
   Hezbollah, and other groups throughout the Middle East, 9 which have killed hundreds of
   Americans. 10 The threat of Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism is indeed not addressed in the
   Iran deal. But walking away from the deal without US negotiating partners and without any
   indication Iran is in breach of the agreement is a serious blow to US credibility and reduces
   America’s ability to build future coalitions to deal with Iran’s terrorist threat.

   Ballistic missile program:While the deal freezes Iran’s nuclear weapons program, it does
   not address the development and testing of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of
   delivering nuclear weapons. However, the United States already had the ability to sanction
   individuals and companies supporting Iran’s ballistic missile program outside of the
   JCPOA. 11 Importantly, America’s European allies had expressed a willingness to work with
   the United States to address concerns about Iran’s missile program. However, since
   President Trump withdrew from the Iran deal over the objections of those same allies,
   rebuilding this coalition is unlikely.

The JCPOA was meant to deal with the most pressing problem: Iran was just months away
from developing a nuclear weapon. With the United States pulling out of the deal, the
safeguards the agreement put in place could collapse. And without the coalition that the
United States built to negotiate JCPOA in the    rst place, it will now be nearly impossible to
build a coalition that can bring su   cient pressure to force Iran back to the negotiating table
on these remaining issues.

Even if a better deal was possible, it would
require Iran and America’s allies to be willing to
negotiate; withdrawing from the deal just made
it that much harder to do so.

After announcing the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA, President Trump violated the
agreement by ordering the Department of Treasury to re-impose sanctions on Iran related to
its nuclear program. These sanctions were largely put back into place in November 2018, 12 and
since that time the Administration has announced new sanctions on the country as part of its
“maximum pressure” campaign, refusing to provide any exemptions during the COVID-19
crisis. 13 The overwhelming majority of these sanctions are “secondary sanctions” to prevent
non-US companies and individuals from doing business with Iran. As this signi cantly
impacts European entities, European leaders created a mechanism known as INSTEX to work
around US nuclear sanctions and maintain certain types of trade with Iran. 14 They have also
committed to remaining in the JCPOA. 15 In e ect, the Trump Administration is seeking to
punish US allies economically for staying in a pact they agreed to with his predecessor.

Thus far, it’s America’s European allies that have faced the biggest brunt of these re-imposed
sanctions. The Trump Administration provided exemptions from Iranian sanctions for Iran’s
biggest petroleum customers, like China and India, to continue to do business with the
country (although those were wound down last year). 16 The United States spent many years
building up enough international support to impose strong sanctions that would force Iran to
the negotiating table. Major European leaders, including former United Kingdom Prime
Minister Theresa May, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Angela
Merkel, rightly argued the deal worked and that Iran is complying, which is why they lobbied
President Trump for months to stay in the agreement. 17 To reject their counsel and then ask
for their help in re-isolating Iran against their own beliefs is unlikely to get them to return to
the negotiating table. Even as new US sanctions have signi cantly hurt Iran’s economy, there
is little evidence that Iran is willing to return to the table after the United States violated the
last agreement. 18

The deal’s participants—including Iran—have signaled they will try to continue the deal,
leaving the United States alone in walking away. International inspectors veri ed in June 2020
that Iran is continuing to comply with its obligations under the JCPOA. 19 However, Iran has
taken some small steps in violation of the deal’s limitations at certain points. 20

President Trump has been entirely unsuccessful in getting the JCPOA negotiating partners to
agree on his bellicose, chaotic approach to Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, the pathway to
addressing the issues outside the JCPOA’s scope is likely impossible. In 2018, US Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo laid out 12 conditions that the United States wants to see Iran ful ll as
part of any new agreement. 21 However, these demands by the Trump Administration were not
agreed to during the initial JCPOA negotiations. By walking away from the Iran Deal alone,
President Trump has lost the credibility and leverage to shape any of Iran’s behavior. He has
also damaged the United States’ standing with its allies, whose cooperation would be
necessary for any new agreement.

Any way you break it down, the Trump
Administration’s actions and decisions put our
country and our allies at greater risk.
The impact of President Trump’s decision could continue to play out in many di erent ways.
But no matter how you slice it, it has and will continue to put the United States more at risk.

First, the Administration’s decision to walk away from the JCPOA and re-impose sanctions
have forced the United States to place sanctions on companies and individuals in countries
that are key allies in protecting American security and helping solve crises around the
globe. 22 These are the very same countries that the United States partners with to address
collective threats such as terrorism and cyberattacks. The Administration’s decision puts US
cooperation with these key allies at risk.

Second, the decision to strike and kill Major General Qasem Soleimani at an airport in Iraq
risked an all-out war and was reckless and irresponsible. Soleimani had blood on his hands
and was plotting more violence. But wise presidents seek to reduce Iran’s dangers without
risking the lives of American service members in yet another war in the Middle East. General
Stan McChrystal, the former head of US Special Forces, recently wrote that he had the chance
to take Soleimani out in 2007 but did not because the repercussions were likely to be too
severe. 23 In response to the Trump Administration’s reckless actions, Congress re-asserted
its constitutional role over matters of war and peace and passed a bipartisan resolution to
limit the president’s power to launch military action against Iran without congressional
approval. Unfortunately, the President vetoed the resolution and it was not overridden. 24

The killing of Soleimani will have long-term rami cations on the relationship between the US
and Iran. In direct response, Iran issued an arrest warrant for President Trump. While Iran
asked INTERPOL for assistance, the international police organization denied Iran’s request to
get involved, citing the political nature of the request. 25 Separately, Iran retaliated with
airstrikes on US military bases in Iraq that injured over 100 American service members. 26 Iran
is a sophisticated cyber actor and could launch cyberattacks on American interests and
businesses around the world, shutting down critical infrastructure and/or causing billions of
dollars in damage.

Third, while Iran says it will abide by the JCPOA for now, only time will tell how its internal
political factions respond to US withdrawal. Moderates, like current President Hassan
Rouhani, had to overcome enormous pushback from hardline elements inside the Iranian
government to even get to the negotiating table. The United States’ decision to rip up the deal
may have damaged these moderates’ credibility while bolstering the hardliners’ claim that the
United States is not a trustworthy negotiating partner. If Iran also pulls out of the deal

completely, it would be free from the JCPOA’s restraints and may restart its nuclear program
without international inspections. Already, Iran says it is developing the infrastructure needed
to restart its nuclear program if the JCPOA completely breaks down. 27 Saudi Arabia, which has
been subject to congressional action for its increasingly dangerous and destabilizing behavior
under Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, 28 has also said it would build a nuclear weapon if
Iran resumes its nuclear program. 29 This would heighten the risk of a devastating arms race
in the Middle East.

Attacking Iran to destroy its nuclear program would likely be counterproductive. An attack on
Iran’s nuclear facilities could convince hardliners in Iran that they were right not to trust the
United States, and that Iran needs nuclear weapons to protect itself. 30 Moreover, Iran has
spread elements of its nuclear program throughout the country, in many cases deep
underground. 31 Military strikes may fail to take out all of these facilities and only cause Iran to
double down on its nuclear program.

Finally, President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA has impacted America’s
credibility on the global stage and jeopardizes the standing of its diplomatic negotiations in
the future. After years of multilateral work to negotiate the JCPOA with our partners, other
countries may nd it di     cult to trust America’s word; this has already left America more
isolated and with reduced global in uence.

In withdrawing from the JCPOA, President
Trump lost both leverage and the support of US
negotiating partners.
A sticking point during the original JCPOA negotiations was a US demand for an inde nite
moratorium on selling Iran conventional weapons. Russia and China, two members of the
deal, ercely pushed back on this proposal and the two sides settled on a       ve-year
embargo. 32   At the time of writing, the Trump Administration is escalating tensions with
America’s allies over a   ght to renew the embargo set to expire in October 2020. 33 The
Administration has said if the UN Security Council does not extend the arms embargo, the US
will force a “snapback” of sanctions against Iran by all the Security Council members under
the provisions of the 2015 Iran deal, which would put the entire Iran Deal in jeopardy by re-
imposing all multilateral sanctions if UN members choose to abide by them. 34 America’s
European allies, who strongly support the Iran Deal, have argued that the Trump
Administration is trying to have it both ways: withdrawal from the deal but the right to invoke
its provisions if the Administration doesn’t get its way.

When the Trump Administration withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, they relinquished any
leverage they had to reform aspects of the deal. To avoid Iran completely withdrawing from
the deal, the United States must re-enter the JCPOA, work with its international partners to
  nd a solution to the arms embargo that limits Iran’s ability to arm its allies in the region, and
stop the in ammatory and reckless actions the Administration takes on a frequent basis.

Conclusion
President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the JCPOA was irresponsible
and based on unrealistic and fallacious assumptions that a better deal with Iran and the other
negotiating partners is possible. The idea to target and assassinate one of Iran’s most
important generals was even more reckless. The Trump Administration has destroyed
America’s credibility and leverage, damaging the progress made under JCPOA and making
further headway impossible. Simply put, the Administration has no strategic plan for Iran.
Congress must continue to call for the United States to return to the JCPOA while trying to
limit the president’s ability to start a devastating war without congressional oversight.

T O P IC S

FO REIG N RELAT IO NS 143

  ENDNOTES

  1.    United States, White House. “The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear
        Weapon.” obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal. Accessed 18 May
        2018.

  2.    Gladstone, Rick and Sahil Chinoy. “What Changes and What Remains in the Iran Nuclear Deal.”
        The New York Times, 8 May 2018,
        www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/07/world/middleeast/iran-deal-before-after.html.
        Accessed 7 Jan. 2019.

  3.    International Atomic Energy Agency. Veri cation and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in
        light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). GOV/2018/33, 30 Aug. 2018,
        www.iaea.org/sites/default/ les/18/09/gov2018-33.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov. 2018.

  4.    “Read the Full Transcript of Trump’s Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times, 8
        May 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/us/politics/trump-speech-iran-deal.html.
        Accessed 12 July 2018.

  5.    White House. “Statement by the President on the Iran Nuclear Deal.” 12 Jan. 2018,
        www.whitehouse.gov/brie ngs-statements/statement-president-iran-nuclear-deal/.
        Accessed 11 June 2018.

  6.    United States, Department of State. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” 14 July 2015,
        www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2018.

  7.    Lewis, Je rey. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: A New Standard for Safeguards
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        comprehensive-plan-action-new-standard-safeguards-agreements/. Accessed 11 June 2018.

  8.    US Department of State. “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” 14 July 2015,
        www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2018.

  9.    [1] US Department of State. “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017.” Sept. 2018,
        www.state.gov/documents/organization/283100.pdf. Accessed 9 Jan 2019.

  10. See for example: United States, White House. “Remarks by President Trump Commemorating
        the 35th Anniversary of the Attack on Beirut Barracks.” 24 Oct. 2018,
        www.whitehouse.gov/brie ngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-commemorating-
        35th-anniversary-attack-beirut-barracks/. Accessed 9 Jan. 2019.

  11.   “Treasury Sanctions Iranian Entities.” Press Release, US Department of the Treasury, 4 Jan. 2018,
        home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0246. Accessed 11 June 2018.

12. Gladstone, Rick. “Iran Sanctions Explained: U.S. Goals, and the View From Tehran.” The New
      York Times, 5 Nov. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-
      explained.html. Accessed 20 Nov. 2018.

13.   Fassihi, Farnaz. “Iran Says U.S. Sanctions Are Taking Lives. U.S. O   cials Disagree.” The New
      York Times, 1 Apr. 2020, www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/world/middleeast/iran-virus-
      sanctions.html. Accessed 29 Aug. 2020.

14. Lipin, Michael. “More European Nations Join E ort to Bypass US Sanctions on Iran.” Voice of
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15.   The Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. “Joint statement on the
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      in the framework of the e orts to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).” 31
      Jan. 2019, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country- les/iran/events/article/joint-statement-on-
      the-creation-of-instex-the-special-purpose-vehicle-aimed-at. Accessed 1 February 2019.

16. Cole, Devan and Kylie Atwood. “Trump administration announces all countries importing
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17.   Associated Press. “Tillerson nds skeptics as he presses EU allies on Iran deal.” CBS News, 23
      Jan. 2018, www.cbsnews.com/news/rex-tillerson-donald-trump-iran-nuclear-deal-
      skepticism-in-europe-france/. Accessed 12 July 2018.

18.   “Six charts that show how hard US sanctions have hit Iran.” BBC News, 9 Dec. 2019,
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19. Kerr, Paul K. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations.”
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20. Kheel, Rebecca. “Five things to know about Iran’s breaches of the nuclear deal.” The Hill, 6 July
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21. US Department of State. “After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy.” Secretary of State Michael
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22. Iran Watch. “Why Companies around the World are Reversing Course on Iran Business.” 11 Aug.
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      are-reversing-course-iran-business. Accessed 29 Aug. 2020.

23. McChrystal, Stanley. “Iran’s Deadly Puppet Master.” Foreign Policy, Winter 2019,
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24. Crowley, Michael. “Trump Vetoes Measure Demanding Congressional Approval for Iran
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25. AlTaher, Nada, Sam Kiley, and Tara John. “Iran Issues arrest warrant for Trump over drone
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26. Rubin, Alissa J., Farnaz Fassihi, Eric Schmitt, and Vivian Yee. “Iran Fires of U.S. Forces at 2
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27. Harris, Gardiner. “Europeans Should Have Known Trump Would Abandon Iran Deal, Bolton
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28. Foran, Clare, et al. “Senate rebukes Trump, condemns Saudi crown prince for Khashoggi
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29. Gaouette, Nicole. “Saudi Arabia set to pursue nuclear weapons if Iran restarts program.” CNN,
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30. Rouhi, Mahsa. “Explosion at Natanz: Why sabotaging Iran’s nuclear program could back re.”
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31.   Associated Press. “Iran con rms damaged nuclear site was centrifuge facility.” The Washington
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32. Crichton, Kyle and David E. Sanger. “Who Got What They Wanted in the Iran Nuclear Deal.”
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33. Lynch, Colum and Robbie Gramer. “Trump Administration Unveils Security Council Resolution
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34. Lee, Matthew. “Pompeo: US to call UN vote on Iran arms embargo extension.” The Washington
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