Israel: Demography and Density 2007-2020 - Evgenia Bystrov Arnon Soffer - Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy University of Haifa - Military Gospel
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Israel: Demography and Density 2007-2020 Evgenia Bystrov Arnon Soffer Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy University of Haifa
Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy
University of Haifa
Israel: Demography
and Density 2007-2020
Evgenia Bystrov
Arnon Soffer
May 2008Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa This Chair is concerned with issues of national security that contain a spatial expression, such as natural resources and their distribution, population spread, physical infrastructure, and environmental elements. The Chair publishes position papers, offers consultation to senior decision makers, initiates research projects, holds study days and conferences, publishes books and scholarly works, and assists research students in the fields listed above. It likewise engages in the proliferation of these matters at high schools and academic institutions. The Late Reuven Chaikin (1918-2004) Reuven Chaikin was born in Tel Aviv, and became a senior partner in the Somekh-Chaikin accounting firm. He evinced deep interest in geography and geopolitics, and offered great assistance in these areas at the University of Haifa. May his memory be for a blessing. Prof. Arnon Soffer Holder of the Reuven Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy Translated by: Murray Rosovsky Cartography Editor: Noga Yoselevich Printed by: a.a.a. print ltd. http://geo.haifa.ac.il/~ch-strategy © All rights reserved to the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy, University of Haifa. ISBN 965-7437-06-3 Printed in Israel in May 2008
Preface to the 2007 Edition Since the publication of the last edition of Israel, Demography 2006-2020 in Light of the Process of Disengagement (Soffer and Bystrov 2006) the document Tel Aviv State – A Threat to Israel (Soffer and Bystrov 2005) has appeared. Its essence is the doomsday process of concentration of the entire Jewish population of Israel into the Dan bloc. Meanwhile, five printings have appeared in Hebrew and English of the demographic account, and demand is only increasing. In public declarations at least, Israeli leaders (prime ministers, ministers, directors- general, mayors) and many others have applauded our conclusions and concur with the need to halt the condensing into 'Tel Aviv state' lest Jewish Israel be swallowed up. The present updated study reviews recent developments in demography, and mainly warns that Israel is turning into the most densely populated state in the Western world; this will intensify the violence, the feeling of strangulation, the flight of young people from Israel, and its descent to the level of a third-world country. Evgenia Bystrov wrote about this in her study Israel between the Developed and the Developing World, likewise published by the Chaikin Chair in Geostrategy (Bystrov 2007). This time too we return to what seems to us solutions that may still be workable in a democratic regime so as to change the disastrous direction in which Israel is heading. But we believe ever less that with the present form of government that has developed in Israel ways can be found to apply what is proposed. This is a grim and sad conclusion, and we counsel the responsible reader to weigh matters up with due consideration. Israel today reminds us of the story of the Titanic: the vessel sailed into a huge large iceberg but in its ballrooms the party went one, with refusal of the dancers to listen to the warnings. We have decided to try to change the Titanic's course. We have no passport except the Israeli, but we have discovered that foreign passports are to be found in abundance in the pockets of some of the dancers, particularly those issued by Western countries (the European
Union and the USA). Do their possessors plan to leap into the lifeboats reserved exclusively for the nobility? We are not content with writing and a warning; we race from government department to government department, and make it quite clear that the data in the document entail a threat, and something may still be done. We also turn to you, Israeli citizens who care: read these things in a responsible fashion, and help us steer the ship of all of us to a safe haven! Arnon Soffer and Evgenia Bystrov, October 2007
Preface to the 2004 Edition Disengagement: To protect Israel as an island of Western-ness in a mad region The booklet Israel – Demography 2003-2020: Dangers and Opportunities, published by the Chaikin Chair in Geogstrategy, sold out after two printings in Hebrew and English. The English version was distributed among the board of the Jewish Agency, the board of the world Keren Hayesod [Foundation Fund], the Anti-Defamation League, and leaders of the Jewish communities in France and in various cities in the USA: Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, New York, and Los Angeles, and in southern California. Demand for the booklet is never ending – which goes to show that the issue of demography and its implications for the future of Israel are the focus of public interest in this country and among world Jewry. This may stem from the understanding of many – Jews and non-Jews – that Israel must remain an isolated island of Western-ness in this tempestuous and crazy part of the world. The present book is intended mostly for two population groups that continue to deny the demographic danger, and on that account also deny the necessity of disengagement – the only course that will allow the state of Israel to continue to preserve its Jewish, Zionist, and democratic nature. These two groups – the extremist right and the extremist left – are augmented by a large group of Israel-haters who are bitterly opposed to disengagement, among them Palestinians, the Arab states, Muslim Europe, the anti-Semitic institution of the United Nations, and the judges of The Hague who present themselves as seekers after justice. Disengagement has set out on the road, and there is no going back. Some cosmetic changes may perhaps be made in it at the request of the Israeli Supreme Court. This institution consists of judges who are not geographers or versed in security matters, and they would be better off refusing to discuss matters they do not understand or are not judgeable. In the same
breath we say to people of the security system that in their plotting the lie of the disengagement line it would be most useful if they considered not only the day after, but also the processes that will unfold in the area in twenty years and more. This small book attempts to present different aspects of the day after the disengagement, naturally with emphasis on the demographic changes it will bring about, all of which are positive. Arnon Soffer and Evgenia Bystrov, September 2004
Preface to the 2003 Edition This small book was first published in 2001, and tens of thousands of copies were distributed to the wider public, senior economists, senior people in Israel's security systems, and to politicians, prime ministers past and present, ministers, Members of Knesset, and directors-general in the government. The latter persons also held a penetrating discussion with the author. The book appeared in English translation, of which several thousand copies were distributed among the Jewish community and decision makers in the USA; the author met personalities in the American administration and also US ambassadors in Israel on this subject. The responses surpassed all expectations. There was almost national consensus in Israel regarding the data and regarding the recommendation on unilateral separation from the Palestinians. Furthermore, after unnecessary postponements, which also cost much blood, the government of Israel adopted the document. Meanwhile several civil movements arose to struggle against the construction of the separation fence, and if that job is not done resolutely and quickly, it is not impossible that a political movement will sprout from these movements also (the author is not active in any organization or movement). Since the interest shown by the public in the subject shows no sign of abating, and the problems under discussion in the document have only grown worse – all against the background setting of paralysis in the legislative and executive branches, we decided to publish a new and updated edition, intended for the Zionist and concerned community among the citizens of Israel. Arnon Soffer, March 2003
Preface to the 2001 Edition In 1988 I published a document entitled Geography and Demography: Is This the End of the Zionist Dream? (published by Gestelit, Haifa). In it I analysed the significance of the visual geographic development in Palestine, and I warned of the danger of the disappearance of the Jewish Zionist state. In retrospect it emerges that the document I published contained two errors: I did not foresee the immigration of the Jews of the Soviet Union, and I did envisage a decline in the natural increase of the Arabs of Israel. The danger that I warned against then is as real as ever, and has even become more acute. Thirteen years after the appearance of the document, and despite the immigration to Israel of about a million Jews, not only has the demographic threat not diminished or disappeared, it has begun to materialize before our eyes, more rapidly than expected, and already today it assails many domains of our lives. And still the Israeli government displays total inertia in the presence of these dangers. Recent governments of Israel, and the Knesset as a whole, have not found time to take decisions on the national level, but are instead occupied with media gimmickry on a level of activity suitable for a Jewish community in a small town in Poland or Morocco. Considering this helplessness, and to avert the evil decree, a broad-based civil movement, conscious of the facts and the dangers, may perhaps be able to put pressure on the government to initiate and take hard national decisions in the framework of national unity. This monograph describes the present situation and offers a forecast for the coming twenty years. It clarifies that continued Jewish-Zionist existence is not a given, and that without preventive actions it is liable to end. These contents were formulated for the purpose presentation before various respected forums: a conference of the budget division of the Ministry of Finance, the Herzliya Conference, which dealt with national resilience and security, the Forum for National Responsibility (under the auspices of the Rabin Centre), the National Security Council, the board of the Jewish Agency, the Zionist Council, and other circles of decision makers on the various national levels. Arnon Soffer, March 2001
Table of Contents Preface to the 2007 Edition 3 Preface to the 2004 Edition 5 Preface to the 2003 Edition 7 Preface to the 2001 Edition 8 Introduction 11 Difficulties in implanting the issue of demography in the decision- making body as a whole, and among extremist groups on the Israeli right and left 15 Part One: The Demographic Dimension in Israel and Palestine 18 General 19 Processes around the borders of Israel 23 Demographic changes: Basic data 26 Demographic trends in the Jewish population 28 Demographic trends in the haredi population 30 The Arabs of Israel – Demographic strength translated into political and strategic strength 35 Danger of the loss of Jerusalem as the Jewish capital of Israel and loss of terrain, including Galilee, the Triangle, and the northern Negev 42 The Arabs of Judaea and Samaria and of the Gaza: What have they to do with Israel and its future? 47 Part Two: What Is Demography Doing to Society in Israel? 49 Immigration to Israel and emigration from Israel 51 Demography and the dissipation of democracy in Israel 56 Demography and the deterioration of the education system 59 Collapse of the national planning and the national infrastructures 61 The case of the water regime 64 The case of the transport regime 66 Part Three: What Can Still Be Done to Save Israel? 68 Sources 75 Appendix: The Bedouins in the northern Negev: Geographic aspects 2007 80
10
List of Figures, Tables, and Maps
Figures
Figure 1: World population growth 1750-2150 11
Figure 2: Dangers to Israel owing to rapid demographic changes
expected in the next two decades (2007-2025) 17
Figure 3: Relative poverty incidence (persons) according to group,
in 1997 and 2005 32
Figure 4: Age pyramid of the core haredi population vs. all the
Jews in Israel in 2001 33
Figure 5: Age pyramid of Arabs vs. Jews in Israel in 2007 34
Figure 6: Jewish migration to the centre of Israel 1998-2005 44
Tables
Table 1: Changes in population size in the Middle East since 1800 12
Table 2: Population composition in Palestine (in millions and
in percent) in 2007 and forecast for 2020 20
Table 3: Employment rate and average wage for a paid job according
to population groups aged 65 and younger in 2005 32
Table 4: Immigration and emigration in Israel, 1990-2006 52
Table 5: Number of leavers from Israel according to age group, 1995-2003 53
Table 6: Number of leavers from Israel among immigrants of the
1990s from the former Soviet Union 53
Table 7: Population close to the borders of Israel 2003-2020 and
forecast of demands for water 65
Table 8: Desalination plants in Israel (operational) 66
Maps
Map 1: Distribution of the Palestinian people in Palestine 22
Map 2: Urbanization around the borders of Israel 24
Map 3: Crime along the borders of Israel 25
Map 4: 'Tel Aviv state' encircled by the Palestinian people in Palestine 4111
Introduction
The world population today numbers some six and a half billion people.
About 15% of them live in countries belonging to the developed Western
world. Their population hardly grows, and in some of them, for example
in Europe, it is actually decreasing. The remaining five billions live in
developing countries, whose natural increase rate is for the most part high,
and will continue to be high for many years to come. The developing world
is expected to double in population in about forty years (see Figure 1). These
data are the key to the future of the entire world, as they are anticipated to
cause changes in the nature of the globe, migration movements, famine and
disease, movement of goods, and wars, and they will perhaps affect climate
change one way or another.
The Middle East, especially Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and western Land of Israel
(hereinafter Palestine), is characterized by high natural increase. In fact,
natural increase in these populations, which stands at 2.4-3.3%, was among
the highest in the world in 2007. This means a doubling of the populations
10
8
2007
Population in billions
6 Developing countries
4
2
Developed countries
0
1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000 2050 2100 2150
Figure 1: World population growth 1750-215012
Table 1: Changes in population size in the Middle East since 1800
(in millions of people)
Forecast Forecast
Country 1800 1900 1950 1981 2007
for 2025 for 2050
Egypt 3.5 10.0 20.0 44.0 73.4 95.9 117.9
Turkey 9.5 14.0 21.0 47.0 74.0 87.8 88.7
Iran 6.0 10.0 14.0 37.0 71.2 88.2 100.2
Iraq 1.0 2.2 5.2 14.0 29.6 43.2 61.9
Syria 1.5 2.2 3.2 9.1 19.9 27.5 34.9
Lebanon 0.2 0.5 1.5 2.6 3.9 4.6 5.0
Palestinians 0.1 0.2 0.7 1.2 3.5 6.2 8.8
Jordan 0.2 0.3 0.5 2.0 5.7 7.7 9.8
Israel 0.2 0.5 1.5 4.0 7.3 9.3 11.2
Saudi Arabia 5.0 6.0 9.0 10.5 27.6 35.7 49.7
Oil principalities 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 10.8 12.2 16.1
Yemen 2.5 3.0 4.2 7.3 22.4 36.6 58.0
Oman 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.7 3.1 3.9
Sudan 2.0 5.0 9.1 19.0 38.6 54.3 73.0
Total Middle East population 32.1 54.5 91.0 199.9 390.0 512.3 639.1
North Africa 6.0 10.0 22.2 48.6 82.2 102.3 118.2
Overall Arab population of Middle 22.0 46.2 87.2 181.0 319.7 429.3 557.2
East and North Africa*
Sources: Data of World Bank 1950, 1981; PRB, Washington for 2007 and future forecasts.
Data for 1800 and 1900 are conjectured. Palestinians were counted without Jerusalem.
* Excluding Iranians, Turks, and Jews.
of the peoples of the region in twenty to thirty years (see Table 1). In
Egypt natural increase fluctuates around 1.9-2%, that is, a doubling of the
population in thirty to forty years. It is hardly credible that in so short a
time these states will be able to double their infrastructures also: double
the hospitals, schools, water supply and drainage, sewage, agricultural
land, public transport, and all other needs of human beings in a modern
society. And if indeed these states cannot meet the task of doubling the13 infrastructures a fall in living standards and a feeling of despair among their inhabitants may be expected. A discontented population is dangerous, and it is most reasonable to assume that its members will resort to acts of extreme protest, from terror to an extremist Muslim holy war. The events of September 2001 in New York, the early attempt in 1993 to destroy the World Trade Center (Twin Towers), the appalling Muslim terror attacks in 2001- 2007 against embassies of the USA, Britain, France, Australia, Israel, Russia, and others, and against Israeli facilities all over the world, the shocking terror in Spain, Russia, Uzbekistan, Iraq, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, and the extremist Muslim undergrounds that have sprung up worldwide, especially in Iraq, are striking testimony to our fighting the third world war: between extremist Islam, partly representing the developing world, and the West, representing development. In the West many question marks are surfacing about the resilience of the West in this war; in a country such as France, which is inundated with a North African population, the proportion of Muslims has steadily risen. Today six to ten million Muslims already live in France (according to official and unofficial statistics), and Muslim natural increase is high; the rest of the French population is diminishing (0.4% natural increase in 2007). The world's rich countries are aware of this possibility, and presently are doing everything to help in the struggle to lower the high birthrate and to boost development, but are also taking steps in the event of their being unable to save so many poor people throughout the world. That is, they are preparing for a new war that will drag on for many years. The European Union is enclosing itself behind fences and walls to stop the waves of invaders from the third world. The invitation to Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria to join the European Union was done not out of liberal considerations but out of the need to bring working hands to Western Europe. In small, densely populated Israel, all these demographic processes are taking place very fast. Within a decade enormous changes have taken place, so the effects are more evident than in Europe, and they have left their mark
14 drastically on all areas of life. Not surprisingly, today the term 'demographic threat' has become widespread and common in population research in Israel to describe the situation, and the construction of the separation fence, which has won wide support among the Jewish public, is a national project and part of the implementation of demographic policy in Israel. This study sets out to analyse the dangers that Israel may have to meet in the coming fifteen years owing to the demographic developments within and around it. Figure 2 gives a general outline of these dangers. Clearly, in such a forecast, as in every forecast, there is an element of chance and the possibility of error. Whoever in 1930 made forecasts about the future of the Jewish people in the following two decades could not have foreseen what was about to take place. It would have been hard to predict that three years after the end of the Holocaust a Jewish state would arise. Those who in 1970 conducted forecasts about Israel for the next two decades could not have envisaged the collapse of the Soviet Union and the immigration of about a million Jews to Israel. Examples of errors in forecasting are not lacking. Yet for all their limitations, forecasts are essential for society generally and for decision makers particularly, as they make it possible to prepare for the future in fields where changes cannot be made from one day to the next. Examples are building schools, training teachers, training the army and police, providing water sources, building transport systems and establishing power stations – for all these, the accepted time for forecasting is fifteen to twenty years (the UN prepares forecasts for even longer periods, as shown in Figure 1 and Table 1). In an array of social, economic, security, geographic, and ecological domains, what happens in Israel cannot be separated from what happens in the Gaza Strip, in Judaea and Samaria and on the borders of the other neighbouring countries. Therefore, we treat Israel's demography and in parallel Palestine's demography; we also discuss processes taking place close to the borders of Israel.
15 Difficulties in implanting the issue of demography in the decision-making body as a whole, and among extremist groups on the Israeli right and left Today the primary threats to the survival both of our organizations and of our societies come not from sudden events but from slow, gradual processes of which we are generally unaware: the arms race, environmental decay, social and educational erosion... If we focus on events, the best we can ever do when we undertake forecasts is to predict a development before it strides so that we can prepare ourselves or react optimally (Senge 1990). Projecting the content of this statement onto Israeli society yields a picture remote from the normative situation described: what is a burning issue for us is nowhere to be found on the world agenda, so it is not discussed by Israeli governments. This holds for the entire matter at stake: from Jewish– Palestinian relations to all aspects of the increasing crowding in Israel, whose dangers are no less; so much the more for the demographic problem. The demographic clock is ticking against the Jews of Israel at great speed, yet surprisingly, in Israeli society no serious discussion of this issue has been held for many years. There may be various reasons for this: difficulty in digesting abstract statistical data; balking at the supposedly racial aspect of the problem; deep belief that all will turn out for the best (with the help of the Almighty); unwillingness to face up to the idea of partition of Palestine; a feeling that what is happening is a slow process that carries no threat; or the opposite – a tendency to fend off the subject precisely because of the threat inherent in it, which demands hard decisions. In 2005-2007 the Israeli right showed a clear and dangerous tendency to deny the reality and to ignore the relevant figures. One report even states that the Palestinians number one and half million fewer than the accepted number (Zimmerman, Seid and Wise 2006; Zimmerman, Seid, Wise et al. 2005). On the left too some refuse to read the map of the Middle East or to acknowledge Israel's parlous state. Such are Zvi Barel (Haaretz 30 May 2007) and Akiva Eldar in many of his pieces in Haaretz. Dismissal of this subject is bad; better that we shout out now so as to forestall the commission of inquiry that will inevitably come afterwards.
16 The various editions of this monograph have contributing to the appearance of the demographic issue on the world agenda. Most of the population take in the figures and their gloomy meaning. In 2007 two groups were left that doggedly refused to read the data and infer what had to be inferred from them. One is the segment of the left that continue to cling to the two-nation-state notion, whose significance, we believe, is the destruction of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state in the Middle East. Hence this segment's objection in word and deed to the separation fence – Israel's fence for life. The second group, relatively large, is that of settlers in parts of Judea and Samaria on the extreme right, and their supporters inside the Green Line – who belong to the Likud party, the National Union (Moledet in its various transformations), and the ultra-orthodox (hereinafter haredi; plural haredim) parties, including Habad, which in the past stayed neutral on the question of Greater Israel. We have still not forgotten the destruction brought upon Israel by the obstinate ones, or the fools, in the person of Bar-Kozeva – Bar-Kokhba – and others. If this large group continues in its refusal to recognize the figures – as attested by the pretexts directed to us in writing or verbally – its members will be responsible communally and individually for the coming disaster. Proposals for a demographic solution on the lines of 'We'll transfer the Arabs of the Land of Israel to Irbid' (Benny Elon) or 'We'll move the Arabs of the Land of Israel to Bir Gafgafa in Sinai' (Efraim Eytam) are intolerable in terms of their applicability in 2007 and testify to a lack of comprehension of the global system. The truth is that most of the world (including Europe) is waiting to see the end of Israel, and only an American veto saves it every few weeks. A claim such as 'The Palestinians are leaving Israel' (Aryeh Eldad, Yediot Aharonot, 11 Nov. 2003 and the report of Zimmerman et al. 2006) is a further unforgivable delusion. Claims such as 'All the demographic data are wrong, because Israeli army censuses, like the Palestinian census in 1997 or 2007, are unreliable, and according to the correct demographic data millions of Arabs should be subtracted' (Zimmerman et al. 2006) attest to profound emotional distress. The data in Figure 2 highlight the urgent demographic challenges for which Israel needs a truly gifted leadership worthy of the name.
17
Political implications Geopolitical implications Implications for
Changes in the structure Trickle of Arabs from neighbouring quality of life
of society in Israel – rapid countries into Israel
Intensification of crowding:
growth of the weak and
Worsening of relations of Jews and Israel is the most densely
anti-Zionist population and
Israeli Arabs (who call themselves populated state of the
persistent weakening of the
‘Palestinians living in Israel’) developed world, mainly
middle class
around the Tel Aviv core.
Density is connected to
Terrains such as the Galilee mountains, poverty, environmental
Change in the structure of the
the Triangle, the northern Negev poverty and a fall in
Knesset to the point of danger
and Jerusalem drop out of Israeli quality of life
to the Zionist state and
sovereignty, and the Jews of Israel
degradation of the Knesset in
cluster in ‘Tel Aviv state’, which very
its different functions Deterioration of the national
quickly is liable to turn into ‘Masada’
physical infrastructure
Accelerated urbanization around and
Steady undermining of within the borders of Israel requires Shortage of water and land
democracy in Israel until its the Israeli army to engage in a new and Collapse of transport and
elimination more complex kind of warfare murder on the highways
Poverty and the rise of radical Islam Disappearance of the green
Anarchy as a result of a in the neighbouring countries and in parks
non-functioning Knesset, Palestine cause a rise in level of terror
absence of law enforcement, and extremism against the Jews of Israel Decline of educational,
cultural, social, and
and paralysis of decision- economic systems
making systems (since we
The states of the region, including the Environmental decline
first published this model in
Palestinian Authority, show no signs and pollution of the
2000, anarchy has become
of entering the global village, but the environment: air, water,
normative; the danger to
opposite. This has fateful implications sewage, waste
Israel’s existence, among
for the socio-economic future of the
other things because of this,
region and its attitude to Israel and the
is more real than ever) Collapse of national
West generally
planning
Pressure increases Already in the present Signs of the third world Flight of the strong;
on Israel’s borders in extensive parts of in all walks of life in chronic weakening of
all matters, including Israel have no law Israel, where pockets of national vigour
massive arms enforcement, and Westernization gradually
smuggling Israel’s sovereignty is dwindle and cluster
weakening around the Dan bloc
Israel under actual existential threat, and more rapid than most of the public reckons
Figure 2: Dangers to Israel owing to rapid demographic changes expected
in the next two decades (2007-2025)Part One The Demographic Dimension in Israel and Palestine
19 General The state of Israel can continue to exist only if it has a clear Jewish- Zionist majority, living in territory whose dimensions and borders permit actualization of the state's sovereignty and defence, and if it enjoys a quality of life that befits a Western society. Attainment of these two essential conditions for the existence of a Jewish-Zionist Israel is not self-evident; demographic processes in western Palestine threaten the capacity to realize them. In all the chapters of this study a clear distinction is made between Israel that lies within the borders on the eve of the 1967 Six Day War, more or less, and the Palestine – the land within the boundaries of the British Mandate on the eve of the declaration of the partition of Palestine in November 1947. In recent years the demographic factor has become increasingly dominant in determining the relations of Jews and Arabs throughout Palestine. In 2007 the Jews in the territory of Israel constituted 76% of its population. Because of the rapid natural increase of the Palestinian population it is expected that the proportion of the Jewish population in Israel, despite continuing immigration, will have fallen to 70.8% by 2020 (see Table 2). The Palestinian population living in western Palestine, particularly in the Gaza Strip, is mostly poor, and its standard of living is liable to decline still more because its high natural increase is liable to swallow up aid intended to raise living standards, if it gets there. The gap in per capita income between a Jew and a Palestinian stood at 1:17 before the outbreak of the second Intifada (today it is 1:30), as against a gap of 1:4 between a US citizen and a Mexican, or 1:3 between a German and his Polish neighbour on the eve of the unification. Wide differences can also be found between Israel and its Arab neighbours, fluctuating between 1:15 and 1:4 or 1:5. That is, western Palestine shows the greatest economic gap in the world between two population groups. The meaning of this is a continuation and an increase in attempts to infiltrate into Israel by impoverished members of the Palestinian population so close to its borders, and also from other
20
Table 2: Population composition in Palestine (in millions and in percent) in
2007 and forecast for 2020 (on a minimalist assumption of the Palestinian
population in the administered territories)
Year 1.01.07 2020
Population group In thousands In percent In thousands In percent
Citizens in Israel
Jews 5,415 76.0 6,300 70.8
Other citizens (mostly from the 310 4.3 400 4.5
former Soviet Union)
Druze 120 1.7 160 1.8
Arabs, of these: 1,425 18.0 2,000 22.9
Christians 125 170
Muslims, of these: 1,300 1,830
Bedouins in the south 160 350
in East Jerusalem 264 380
Total citizens of Israel 7,115 100 8,860 100
Arabs living illegally in Israel* 220 300
Of these: in Jerusalem 100
Among the Bedouins 39
In the settlements of the 50
Triangle and Galilee
Foreign workers 179 500
Total population living in Israel 7,514 9,660
Arabs residing in the 3,500 5,680
Palestinian Authority**
Of these: in the Gaza Strip 1,400 2,340
In Judaea and Samaria 2,100 3,340
Total population living in 11,014 Jews amount 15,340 Jews
Palestine*** to 49.1% amount to
of total 41% of total
population population
Source: According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (hereinafter CBS), Statistical Yearbook of
Israel; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics data for Palestinian statistics 1 January 2007,
with subtraction of 500,000 residents of Judea and Samaria who were counted twice.
* Assuming that the fence will put an end to mass infiltration to Israel. Some of those residing
illegally in Israel will be granted citizenship, so the number will remain as it is.
** Assuming that the fence is completed, and Greater Israel is longer be an issue, it will be correct
no longer to count the Arabs of the territories as part of the state of Israel. They will be part
of the some entity that will form in the future. According to Palestinian CBS data, in 2007 the
Palestinian population in the territories was 2.5 million in Judea and Samaria and 1.5 million
in Gaza, totalling four million.
*** It is possible to speak of the total residents dwelling in western Palestine in the ecological and
environmental context, which is never off the agenda in all borders that are not decided in the
future also.21 neighbouring countries. The unique demographic data of the Palestinian population show that it will not be possible to narrow these gaps in the near future, with dire implications for the borders or the fences that separate Israel from its neighbours. This also explains more than anything why the fence/wall is a matter of life and death for Israel, and not just a political extravagance. The high natural increase within Israel, mainly among the Muslim population, including the Bedouins, but also the haredi Jews, ensures that here too tensions and quarrels may be expected against an economic background, which will spread to the social, religious, and national planes. Population density in Israel, which already in 2007 was the highest in the Western world – and without the Negev it is higher still, is liable to cause ecological decline in all Palestine, and its first casualties will be residents of the coastal plain (mostly Jews). In 2005 density in Israel was 341 people per square kilometre, in Belgium it was 346 per square kilometre, in Holland it was 403 per square kilometre, but in Israel without the Negev it was 845 people per square kilometre! This population, which is mainly Western in its culture and economy, is liable to react to the drop in quality of life by emigration to promising parts abroad, or to lose its national resilience if it remains. (This matter is discussed in greater detail in chapter 2.) The demographic dimension also has implications for the national feeling. Already today Israel has a large Arab population, possessing a developed national consciousness, which sees itself an integral part of the Palestinian people whose centre is in the West Bank. The two parts of the Palestinian people are highly likely to muster forces strong enough to bring them closer, and when the day comes the Palestinians of Israel will act with their brothers east of the Jordan river for the founding a great Palestinian state from the Mediterranean to the Arabian desert. At present there are eight million Palestinians in this terrain, and in 2020 their population will number some thirteen million. Against this background ever tauter national tensions may be anticipated within Israel itself, and worsening difficulties between Israel and Palestinians throughout Palestine and Jordan. The
22
Partition plan border, 29 Nov. 1947
Green Line border
Border of the distribution of the
Palestinian people
Arabs of Israel
Bedouins of Israel
Akko
Other Palestinians
Infiltrations in 2007
Haifa
Tiberias
Nazareth
Netanya
Shechem
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Jerusalem
Hebron
Dead Sea
Gaza
Beersheba
km
Map 1: Distribution of the Palestinian people in Palestine23 events of September-October 2000, the publication of the 'Future Vision of the Arabs of Israel' (2006) and the 'Haifa Declaration' (15 May 2007) indicate a new possible direction in relations between Jews and Arabs inside Israel, which does not bode well for either population. In thirteen years a Jewish population of 6.3 million on the coast will be hard pressed to contend with the minority located inside Israel, which will number some two million Palestinians; about 5.5 million more Palestinians will be living in the other parts of Palestine, and a further 4.5 million will live across the Jordan river in the kingdom of Jordan. The total will be 11.5-12 million (see Map 1). Processes around the borders of Israel Decision makers, concerned with daily burning problems, do not take time out to survey the processes around our borders, which despite being gradual must be managed right now. Millions of Arabs are inexorably moving closer to the borders of Israel (see Map 2). This feature seems strange, for Israel's boundaries with its neighbours are war frontiers; still, they constitute a kind of magnet for millions, mostly poor and disaffected. This fact may have implications worthy of consideration. In 2007 about four million Arabs lived very close to the borders of Israel. Across the line for a distance of about 50 kilometres live a further ten million or so. In less than twenty years this population will double, and reach seven or eight million on the border and twenty million at a distance of up to 50 kilometres from it. This increase will cause a rise in the demand for water (for domestic and agricultural use). Until recently the supply has been the Israeli water potential. Another result of the enlargement of the population around the borders is the increase in activities of the criminal world around Israel and its neighbours (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and even Saudi Arabia and Iraq). Israel serves as a bridge among these states, principally between the Levantine states and Egypt (see Map 3, and extensively Appendix 1 on the Bedouins in the south as a bridge). At issue here is the transfer of much war materiel, and drugs, human trafficking and sexual exploitation, theft of agricultural produce and
24
Border
Latakia
Built urban area 1967
Built urban area 1967-2006
Urban area to be built in the near
future
Area of dry crops and reservoirs
outside the built area Tripoli
Highway
LEBANON
Beirut
Sidon
Tyre Damascus
Mediterranean Sea SYRIA
Haifa
West Bank
Irbid
Tel Aviv Zarka
Amman
Gaza Jerusalem
Port Said
El-Arish Hebron
Suez Canal
JORDAN
ISRAEL
Suez
Eilat
SINAI Taba Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA
EGYPT
0 50 100
km
Map 2: Urbanization around the borders of Israel25
Smuggling routes
Terror activity
LEBANON
Beirut
Mediterranean Sea Sidon
Damascus
Tyre
f Is the
l
rae
s o ng
SYRIA
ore alo
Haifa
Sh ime
Cr
West Bank
Tel Aviv
Amman
Jerusalem
Port Said Gaza
El-Arish
Suez Canal
JORDAN
ISRAEL
Prostitutes
Drugs
Arms
Drugs
Refugees
Arms
Other
Cars
Electronic instruments
Eilat
SINAI
EGYPT SAUDI ARABIA
0 50 100
km
Map 3: Crime along the borders of Israel26 infiltration of hostile populations (Sudanese, Egyptians, Jordanians, Iraqis and Palestinians from the east) into so-attractive Israel. The borders are wide open; the absence of law and order in the settlements springing up close to the borders and the 'no-man's-land' are well exploited by criminal elements in Israel. Further implications will be a rise in urbanization within and around Israel, and environmental decline in the area. This situation requires closure of the boundary, along the lines of the northern boundary of Israel, and a fence between Israel and the areas of the Palestinian Authority. In parallel, technological solutions for the defence of the borders have to be sought; these will be more effective that operating patrols. The demographic processes around Israel have implications for all walks of life: political, geopolitical, cultural, and daily life. As illustrated in Figure 2, these effects combined lead to an actual existential threat. The demography and the reality of the Middle Eastern countries are pulling Israel's neighbours near and far towards a dangerous place, and Israel must do everything it can not to hurtle down with them. Israel must remain an island of enlightenment in this turbulent part of the world. The situation calls for greater separation between this country and its neighbours, in the form of physical barriers (fences), the most efficient means of defence and technological control, and a supporting juridical system. Till when? Till natural increase in the Middle East decelerates, the demographic momentum slows, the people of the region begin to take an interest in globalization and its benefits, and abandon their hopes of salvation through radical Islam and the destruction of Israel. Assuming that these things will indeed come about, we mean a period of twenty to thirty years at least! 'Tel Aviv state', the pivot of political, economic, cultural, demographic power, and the cosmopolitan air that prevails over it today, do not signal readiness for this. This matter must be placed on the world agenda, because our lives depend on it. Demographic changes: Basic data Since 2001 the Jews of Israel have been a minority in the population of western Palestine as a whole (that year showed a clear majority of the
27 0‑15-year-old cohort of Arab children in western Palestine). Inside Israel's borders the rates of Jews will continue to fall, despite the increment to the population through immigration of Jews (Table 2). This forecast is based on the following assessments: Annual rate of natural increase in the Palestinian-Muslim sector is estimated at 3.0%, as follows: 3.1% among the Arabs of Israel and Judea and Samaria (population doubles in 20-23 years), 4.5-5% among the Bedouins in the south, and 3.5-4% in the Gaza Strip (population doubles in 12-15 years). This is the highest natural increase rate in the world (for comparison, in Egypt it is about 2%, in Turkey 1.3%, and in Iran 1.2%: 2006 data). Annual natural increase of the Jewish population in Israel was 1.5% in 2007; with the addition owing to immigration of Jews the population growth rate at the start of the 2000s was about 2%, but it no longer is. In 2007 the number of emigrants exceeded the number of immigrants. The significance of these figures is that the overall population of western Palestine, a small, dry land, numbered some eleven million in 2007, and in thirteen years it is expected to increase by a further 4.5 million residents, to reach 15-15.5 million in 2020. The great majority of these additional millions will be poverty-stricken and disaffected (Palestinians and haredi Jews) (Table 2). Any aid given to the poor population will be swallowed up by the natural increase, without being able to improve their living standards or the general living standard in the country. Corruption by the authorities on the Palestinian side is also liable to widen the already yawning social gaps, and population density will bring about ecological decline. The Western- Jewish population along the Israeli coastline has advanced technologies and high levels of income and living standards, but as time passes the area will steadily shrink and the population will grow smaller and become out of place on the scene. The inevitable result of all these factors is perpetual friction between two societies on various levels of (periodic) violence, and more extreme polarization between them. Note that we have not taken into account here the actualization of the demand
28 for the return of the Palestinian refugees to areas of western Palestine, negative migration of Jews, and other possible factors that might lead to a crisis in the relations of the two peoples and population movements. Demographic trends in the Jewish population Annual natural increase in the Jewish population in Israel is, as noted, 1.5%. This rate is low compared with the Arab natural increase in Israel, but almost double that of the countries of the West. In the haredi population in Israel, as in the Jewish settler population all across Judea and Samaria, natural increase is not less than among the Arabs, but recall that at the moment these groups are no more than 20% of all the Jews in the country. The birthrate of the other Jews in Israel, most of whom are secular, is limited. Natural increase of 1.5% reflects the entire Jewish population in Israel. On the face of it, factors are present in the world today that drive Jewish immigration to Israel, in the first place the swelling wave of anti-Semitism and persecution of Jews worldwide. However, the aging of the Jewish communities across the globe, the dimensions of assimilation in the large concentrations of Jews in the world, as in the USA and Canada, as well as in London, Paris, Buenos Aires, and Moscow, are moderating factors. Presumably too, these Jews would not wish to go to a place that seems to them like a violent third-world country – a condition Israel is moving towards. Even the immigration from France, which seems more realistic than that of any other place, is tardy despite the visits of thousands of French Jews to Israel. As for the Jews of Russia, new ones are not coming, and many among those who did come are going back. In 2007 the rate of Jews in Israel (within the Green line, including east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights) was 76.0% of all citizens of the state, excluding illegal foreign workers. If we add to the Jews of Israel and population of non-Jews from the FSU, who immigrated by virtue of the Law of Return, with or without their Jewish family members, the proportion rises to about 80%. If we exclude from the calculation east Jerusalem, the proportion of Jews rises to 84% of the citizens of the state. However, if we
29 do not refer to the citizens of the state, but to the total population living in Israel in 2006, which includes legal and illegal residents – Arabs residing in Israel illegally and foreign workers, legal and illegal, who are expected to stay for many years – as happens in other countries of the Western world – the rate of Jews in the total population of Israel falls to 72%. This proportion is a cause of concern because it presents Israel as a bi-national or a multi- national state. As for the future, the outlook for 2020 indicates that the rate of Jews among all the citizens of the state will drop to 70.8%, and among the entire population of Israel (i.e., including those without identity cards) their rate will plummet to 65%. In fact, we are talking about a bi-national state with a small Jewish majority. As for all western Palestine, to this calculation must be added the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria. According to the data, the number of Palestinians in 2006 was 3.5 million (we have cancelled out half a million on account of a double counting of the Arab residents of Jerusalem and other errors in the calculations of natural increase), the rate of the Jews throughout Palestine was 49% in 2007, and towards 2020 it is expected to decrease to about 41%. According to a report published by a group of right-wing people in 2005, and again in 2006, which ignores data of the Palestinian census and is based on various strange manipulations, the Jewish proportion throughout Palestine in 2007 was 56%, and in 2020, based on their data, it will reach 50% (Zimmerman et al. 2005, 2006). In consequence of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip we no longer count the Arabs of Gaza among areas under Israeli control; in that case the Jewish population in the other parts of Palestine in 2007 was about 60%, but by 2020 it will fall to some 50%. From this forecast the day is evidently not far off when Israel will be obliged to concede the territories of Judea and Samaria – which are populated mostly by Palestinians – and by then to have sealed the separation from that land and its people by completing the security fence. This will very likely remove from Israel several existential dangers: the danger of suicide bombers, the demographic danger, namely the inundation of Israel by
30 thousands of Palestinians trying to find a livelihood here or to realize the claim of 'return'; the danger of the thefts, as well as that of the deadly and developing connection between the Arabs of Israel and the Arabs of the territories. Certainly, the fence will greatly obstruct economic or other integration between Israel and the Palestinians, but we must realize that the socio-cultural, religious, and economic gaps between Israel and its neighbours are so great that in any case Israel has no chance of becoming integrated with them equitably and amicably in economic or other systems in the foreseeable future. Even assuming that a considerable stretch of the fence will have been established, the security systems must well prepared for the demographic pressures not to come to an end. Various attempts to get through the fence are to be anticipated, mainly at the crossing points, and to enter Israel and harm it: by tunnelling, by sea, by hang-gliders and hot-air balloons, by curved trajectory firing, by poisoning wells, and by other means that human imagination can devise. In other words, the fence does not ensure a total seal, and many dangers exist from within also. Israel will therefore need to continue contending with the Islamic 'death culture' and with terror threats, continue to pursue Palestinian terror within, and in areas across the fences. This has implications for the time of the coming withdrawal from areas of Judea and Samaria, which will not be soon, for the practical chances of establishing a Palestinian state on the territories of Judea and Samaria, and for the removal of the settlements on the other side of the fence whose steadily growing numbers is liable to make the evacuation an impossible mission. Demographic trends in the haredi population The size of the growth of the different groups in the population in Israel has to be addressed because demography affects all branches of the country's economy. Changes in the socio-demographic balance in Israel are reflected in the increase or decrease of the size of the workforce, tax revenues and transfer payments to the needy sector, and even for the very economic
31 growth, standard of living, and quality of life of the entire society in Israel. The effect begins with the nature of the population in age composition, education, and employment rates in the economy. Compared with the countries of the West, Israel has a high rate of dependent population owing to the high rate of children and young people who have not yet reached working age, especially in the haredi sector and the Arab sector, chiefly among the Muslims (see Figures 4 and 5). The state directly supports the dependent population through social insurance and support in the form of money transfers to households by means of the National Insurance Institute and investments in welfare: education, health, housing, communal services, religious needs, and more. In 2007 there were in Israel 7,115,000 residents, of whom about 8% were haredi (about 430,000 people). The forecast is that in 2020 the proportion of haredim will amount to more than 12% of the population, namely about a three quarters of a million people, out of all the Jews in Israel, and most of them will be children. This forecast is based on the following data: In the early 1980s the average number of children of a non-haredi woman was 2.6, and of a haredi woman it was 6.5. Since then a trend to a rise in fertility among the haredi Jews and to a decline among the non-haredi Jews has been clearly evident: in 2001 the number for a non-haredi woman was 2.3 children and for a haredi woman it was 7.7; and in 2007 it was apparently 6-7. Thus, the haredi population has doubled in the last fifteen years. In the mid-1990s there were 280,000 haredim in Israel, of whom 150,000 were children. For 2020, a haredi population of three quarters of a million may be expected, of whom 570,000 will be children. Haredi children are at present 8% of the children in Israel, and in 2020 their proportion will reach 22% of all the children in the country. In the 1980s, 41% of haredi men aged 25-54 studied in yeshivas. In 1996 their proportion reached 60%. This demographic development sentences the haredim to grumble disgruntled poverty (see Figure 3). The high increase rate of the haredi population means a community that doubles in size every sixteen to eighteen years and rapidly outruns its resources: the haredi educational system, which does not supply yeshiva graduates with skills for the labour market; a low participation rate
32
in the workforce of men of working age; low current income to families
will increase the dimensions of poverty and will hasten the demographic
explosion (Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro 2004). Since the haredi sector
expands faster than other Jewish sectors, and since a considerable part of the
young age group is a dependent population and another fraction consists
of a population of very limited employability (see Table 3), this population
is becoming a burden on the shoulders of the supporting population. Every
year of the last decade 10% of the national product has been allocated to the
70
1997 2005 64,1
60
54,2
50
40 39,3
35,9
30
20
12,3 13,9
10
0
Population except for Haredi Jews Arabs
haredim and Arabs
Figure 3: Relative poverty incidence (persons) according to group, in 1997
and 2005 (Excluding the Arabs of Jerusalem) (Source: According to Flug
2007; CBS data)
Table 3: Employment rate and average wage for a paid job according to
population groups aged 65 and younger in 2005
Employment rate (percent) Average wage (NIS)
Population group
Men Women Men Women
Arabs 55.6 15.9 5,347 4,101
Haredi Jews* 23.4 44.2 5,476 3,791
Rest of population in Israel 65.8 60.9 9,228 5,494
Total population 60.9 52.2 8,565 5,417
Source: According to Flug 2007; CBS data
* It is difficult to single out haredim in the workforce survey and in the wages survey.
The identifications here are based on one family member attending a post-secondary
yeshiva as the final learning institution.33
Haredi core All Jews
65+
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
34-35
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
30 20 10 0 0 10 20 30
Percent Age Percent
Figure 4: Age pyramid of the core haredi population vs. all the Jews in
Israel in 2001 (Source: According to Gurovich and Cohen-Kastro 2004)
needy public (Bank of Israel 2007), and every year the absolute sum of these
transfers rises due to the increase in the product (growth). So far, the state
has financed this singular lifestyle of the haredi population. But till when
can Israel afford to be a welfare state and sustain dependent populations of
such dimensions?
The proportion of employed people in Israel is even now very low among
these proportions in the developed countries, and the proportion of
unemployed is among the highest (OECD 2007). The unemployed population
does not contribute to the product in the state, or to economic growth, and
even constitutes a financial burden on the shoulders of the wage-earning
element – and the sums in question are colossal. As the haredi sector
grows larger, and its sons and daughters receive no schooling and training
suited to meeting the challenges of the modern economy, and as they are
denied social mobility and opportunities to integrate into the quality labour
market, so the economic gulfs widen between that population and the rest
of the Jews, and ever larger sums of money are needed for transfers so as to
narrow these gaps and maintain populations that do not pay their own way
at a decent living standard (in education, health, security, etc.).34
Men Jews Women
90+
85-89
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
34-35
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Percent Age Percent
Men Muslims Women
90+
85-89
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
34-35
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Percent Age Percent
Figure 5: Age pyramid of Arabs vs. Jews in Israel in 2007 (Source: CBS
2007)
Because of the differences in natural increase between the haredim and the
other Jews, changes may be expected in the political map also. At present
the parties representing haredi interests wield not inconsiderable weight
in decisions on the government policies (Sheffer 2007). The issue of welfare
policy arises in every debate on the state budget, and so far in most cases the
haredi parties have been in the ruling coalition and have largely succeeded
in preserving a situation of wide government support for encouragement of
childbirth, infrastructures of religious education, and funding a haredi way35 of life. This influence can only expand toward 2020, as Israeli democracy protects the principle of representation. The Arabs of Israel – Demographic strength translated into political and strategic strength In 2007 the Arabs of Israel (including the Arabs of Jerusalem) numbered about 1.4 million, being 20% of the total population of Israel. The natural increase of this population is among the highest in the world: 3.1% annually (in the Muslim population. This is due to very high birthrates, as in Kenya and other countries in Africa, and very low mortality by virtue of good health services and the fact that this population consists mostly of children and youth (in Judea and Samaria the increase is similar to that of the Arabs of Israel). The natural increase of the Bedouin who live in the south of Israel is even higher, reaching 4.5-5.5% annually, due to polygamy; most of the wives are imported. (Natural increase in the Gaza Strip was estimated at 3.5-4% in 2006; there the population is likely to grow in the next thirteen years till 2020 from 1.4 million to 2.3 million.) According to the forecast, in 2020 the Arab population in Israel will have reached about 2.0 million. Even without adding Druze, Christian Arabs, and the Arabs of Jerusalem to this population, in 2006 figures here is a rural and urban Muslim population of 876,000 people, which in 2020 will have reached 1.8 million (Table 2). This rapid enlargement has three implications on three distinct levels: the family, the municipal and the national. On the family level the significance of the high natural increase is a large number of children and a small number of breadwinners, as the status of the woman is inferior and she is outside the civil workforce circle. The size of the Arab household is about five persons, as against about three persons in the Jewish household (including haredim) (CBS 2007). This means continuation of poverty as a feature of the Arabs of Israel (mainly Muslims), no chance at all of children getting proper schooling, hence none of the occupational skills required in the modern economy, working in traditional trades, and women not working outside the home. All these are factors of low income
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