TURKEY-GERMANY-EU RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL - IPC POLICY BRIEF
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IPC POLICY BRIEF March 2022 TURKEY-GERMANY-EU RELATIONS IN AN ERA OF GEOPOLITICAL TURMOIL Nilgün Arısan-Eralp, Senem Aydın-Düzgit, Atila Eralp, E. Fuat Keyman, Çiğdem Nas
T U R K E Y - G E R M A N Y - E U R E L AT I O N S I N A N E R A O F G E O P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L About Istanbul Policy Center Istanbul Policy Center (IPC) is a global policy research institution that specializes in key social and political issues ranging from democratization to climate change, transatlantic relations to conflict resolution and me- diation. IPC organizes and conducts its research under six main clusters: • The Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative • Climate Change • Democratization and Institutional Reform • SHURA Energy Transition Center • Urbanization and Local Governance • Conflict Resolution and Mediation Since 2001, IPC has provided decision makers, opinion leaders, and other major stakeholders with objective analyses and innovative policy recommendations. 2|
MARCH 2022 | IPC POLICY BRIEF Introduction need for change to meet the challenges of the mul- tiple crises facing both Germany and the EU. The The advent of the Social Democratic Party (SPD)- coalition agreement strongly emphasizes the sig- Green Party-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coali- nificance of such an approach in order to prepare tion government in Germany formed in December Germany and the EU for the post-COVID-19 world, 2021 has, among other issue areas, ushered in dis- which faces major socio-economic challenges in cussions on the implications for European foreign addition to severe health issues. The main dimen- policy as well the EU’s relations with countries in sions of this comprehensive change-oriented pro- its immediate neighborhood, including Turkey. gram as underlined in the coalition agreement With the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war in Feb- include the green transformation, digital transfor- ruary 2022, the new government has found itself mation, rule of law and democracy, multilateralism, in a rapidly changing geopolitical context, where and a new economic strategy with the social-eco- it has substantially increased its defense commit- logical market economy at its core. ments in the face of Russian aggression, making a U-turn in its foreign and security policy, and played For the SPD, social justice, climate, democracy, and a key role in bringing Europe closer than ever on human rights emerge as the government’s primary forging a unified foreign policy with a stronger targets in line with the social democratic ideology. defense component. While it is too early to say As for the Greens, the raison d’etre of the party how the Russia-Ukraine war will play out and the stems from environmental and climate-related precise implications that it will have for European concerns. In addition, a principled approach to- security and defense policy, the European security ward foreign policy, which is reflected in the party’s architecture, and Germany’s and the EU’s relations more critical approach toward authoritarian coun- with Turkey, certain trends in the policies of the tries like China and Russia, is also discerned. The new coalition government require further scrutiny third partner of the government, the Liberal Party, regarding the potential and risks that they entail is more focused on economic and financial matters concerning the future of Germany’s and the EU’s as well as empowering the digital agenda and op- relationship with Turkey. In what follows, we first posing the joint debt burden in the EU, since they outline the domestic and foreign policy agenda of believe that the EU’s common debt will mostly be the new German government and the constituent born by the German people, and this may under- parties of the coalition, with a specific emphasis mine financial stability and budgetary discipline. on the changing regional and global context. Then, The coalition agreement signifies the consensus we turn to discussing the potential impact of this reached by the three parties on the future of Ger- political change in Germany on Turkey-EU-Germa- many. After Merkel’s 16-year rule, the revitalization ny relations, the potential that the Customs Union and recalibration of the political scene in Germany and the green transformation hold in constituting a has come to the fore. Similar to the EU, the two rules-based relationship, and future scenarios. most important priorities of the new government are the climate crisis and adaptation to the digitali- The New German Government and zation of the economy. the Shifting Focus on Processes of The most important political message coming from Change: Dare Progress, Dare Change, the new coalition government in Germany is its fo- cus on processes of change in Germany as well as Dare Democracy in the EU. How the dimensions of change interact The new German government is composed of and link with each other and how democracy and three political parties that differ in major dimen- multilateral orientations will be redefined in a more sions from the more pragmatic policy orientation inclusionary manner are important tenets of this of the former government led by Chancellor An- change-oriented process. The green and digital gela Merkel. Diverging from the long period of Mer- transformations are pivotal in shaping more inclu- kel leadership, which focused more on “muddling sive democratic and multilateral orientations. We through,” the new government has promoted the have also witnessed such policy reorientations |3
T U R K E Y - G E R M A N Y - E U R E L AT I O N S I N A N E R A O F G E O P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L during the presidency of Joe Biden in the United global context in order to face the illiberal authori- States. The implementation of these changes, tarian challenges not only by Russia and China but however, is even more difficult in a coalition gov- also globally—even within the United States. The ernment. The emphasis on a new economic orien- Biden presidency also returned to the Paris Climate tation is particularly important in order to tackle regime and underlined the necessity of the green socio-economic difficulties. We will see in future transformation in the United States and globally. how the social and ecological dimensions will be The green transformation became the backbone defined in relation to the market economy as well of the new multilateral orientation of the United as whether social and ecological policies or neolib- States as well as the EU. eral policies oriented toward the market economy The change in Germany and the election of a new will have the upper hand. While the new coalition coalition government composed of social demo- government faces important challenges, it also of- crats, greens, and liberals is important in this con- fers a comprehensive change-oriented program to text of changing transatlantic relations with a new meet challenges both in Germany and the EU. emphasis on democracy/multilateral orientation. The green transformation is also the cornerstone of The New German Government and the the program of the new coalition government. The Changing Global Context election of the new coalition government coincides not only with important challenges in the transat- The international system has witnessed multiple lantic alliance but also with important debates on crises since 2008, starting with the global finan- the future of Europe. Related to this, the Confer- cial crisis in that year. This major crisis was fol- ence on the Future of Europe, under the leadership lowed by the refugee crisis in 2015, which led to of the French presidency, is currently in its final severe problems of solidarity inside the EU. Then, phase. It remains to be seen whether the new Ger- there was the prolonged Brexit saga, which raised man government will own this process along with debates about disintegration amid the process of France and whether the Conference will respond to European integration. These crises created a con- citizens’ existential problems. ducive environment for the rise of illiberal political tendencies and unilateral international orientations Initially, the Russia-Ukraine war placed the new globally. In this turbulent climate, we observed the German government in a difficult position in terms rise of alternative authoritarian/unilateral tenden- of balancing its relations with the United States and cies challenging the West’s democracy/multilateral Russia. While President Biden expected Germany orientation not only in Russia and China but also to follow the U.S. lead in adapting a strict stance within the EU, such as in Poland and Hungary, and against Russia, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz ini- even in the United States, with the presidency of tially refrained from committing to such a policy Donald Trump. These tendencies were reinforced and adopted a wait-and-see approach to the crisis. with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and led to The underlying reasons were related to Germany’s severe socio-economic concerns in addition to un- dependence on the supply of natural gas from Rus- precedented global health problems. sia and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as well as his- torical notions of Germany’s “Ostpolitik,” which at- After the initial phase of the pandemic, which re- tached importance to its relations with the Soviet inforced illiberal/unilateral tendencies, new orien- Union and refrained from undermining its foreign tations in the United States and Europe arose to policy priorities. This policy changed in a matter of meet the challenges of the turbulent context. The days as the war between Russia and Ukraine broke election of Joe Biden as president of the United out, and the transatlantic alliance managed to dis- States signaled an important change from Trump’s play a unified front with coordinated responses, in- authoritarian/unilateral tendencies toward more cluding sanctions. Within just four short days, the democratic/multilateral orientations. Biden em- war precipitated a U-turn in German foreign policy, phasized the significance of transatlantic relations with Germany now pledging to increase its defense and the need for multilateralism in the turbulent spending to more than 2 percent of its economic 4|
MARCH 2022 | IPC POLICY BRIEF output and agreeing to send weapons to Ukraine.1 and security problems particularly in the Eastern The war also brought Europe to the forefront as a Mediterranean. Merkel’s main objective was to geopolitical actor and demonstrated that the de- contain the crisis in Turkey-Germany-EU relations mocracy-security nexus cannot effectively be built through interest-driven functional cooperation, without first establishing democratic consolida- mainly on refugee issues and bilateral economic tion. It remains to be seen whether this reinvigor- relations. During her time in office, however, Tur- ated solidarity both within Europe and the trans- key’s accession process resulted in stalemate. Al- atlantic alliance will be long-lasting, which will not though relations focused on a “positive agenda,” only depend on the outcome of the war in Ukraine this was largely rhetorical. There was little action but also Europe’s relations with China, where Mer- on the critical issues shaping the positive agenda kel’s leadership had largely pursued a pragmatic such as the modernization of the Customs Union or approach and did not defer to U.S. policy. The visa liberalization. Merkel’s policy of functional co- immense Chinese market, with its ever-growing operation was also adopted by Turkey’s leadership economic power and Germany’s economic and fi- and served both to maintain the relationship and to nancial interests in its relations with China may still avoid the much-needed focus on democracy, rule result in a middle-of-the-road policy choice for the of law, and human rights issues in Turkey. government. How the new change-oriented coalition govern- ment of Germany will reshape the prevalent in- Turkey-Germany-EU Relations in terest-driven functional cooperation of the Merkel the Changing Context: Functional period remains a critical question. The coalition Transactionalism and Rules-Based agreement is quite clear in its negative stance on Turkey’s membership and the revitalization of the Transactionalism accession process. Although the coalition partners As the comprehensive change-oriented program all agree that Turkey is strategically very important of the new German government becomes evident, for Germany, the coalition has agreed that no ne- the critical question is whether this orientation will gotiation chapters will be opened or closed unless affect its relations with Turkey and, if so, how and there is an improvement in the state of democ- when. Turkey remains a major partner for Germany racy in Turkey. Although they support continuing in terms of the depth and breadth of economic re- the EU-Turkey dialogue, there is no specific policy lations, security and political dialogue, migration objective in the coalition agreement regarding the cooperation, and the large number of Turkish-ori- modernization of the Customs Union or visa liber- gin German citizens and residents. Although lower alization. in priority, similar to the cases of Russia and China, The Social Democrats have seemingly adapted relations with Turkey also present a challenge for Merkel’s “muddling through” policy in the sense the new German government. that, although they are not openly against Tur- Germany has always been a pivotal actor in shap- key’s candidacy status, they are willing to ignore it. ing Turkey’s relations with the EU, both in mov- Their party program has adopted an open-ended ing these relations forward and keeping relations approach and a very small space for Turkey. The stagnant. After Turkey was declared a candidate Greens, on the other hand, which have the most for membership and became part of the EU’s pre- detailed manifesto regarding Turkey, empha- accession strategy, Germany played a critical role size universal values like democracy, rule of law, in moving relations forward in the “Helsinki turn” and human rights with an emphasis on women’s in 1999. However, we have also seen how Germa- rights. They make special reference to youth ex- ny has created stagnation in Turkey-EU relations change and the importance of strengthening civil during the long leadership of Chancellor Helmut society. They are not against continuing accession Kohl. Chancellor Merkel’s tenure in office was also negotiations provided that Turkey returns to the marked by a long stalemate in Turkey-EU relations. reform process in order to fulfill its membership Merkel tried hard to de-escalate tensions in foreign conditions. The Liberals, although categorically |5
T U R K E Y - G E R M A N Y - E U R E L AT I O N S I N A N E R A O F G E O P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L not against Turkey’s membership, seem to be less that this is most likely to be achieved in two related keen on accepting Turkey as a candidate state and policy areas: trade and the green transformation. would like to suspend or break off the accession negotiations given the extent of democratic back- Customs Union Modernization and the sliding in the country. They propose an alternative framework based on security and economic coop- Green Agenda eration, although they also are unable to define the The Customs Union between Turkey and the EU details of such cooperation. has been instrumental for integrating Turkish in- It is also not clear how the coalition partners ap- dustries into European supply chains. Germany has proach functional cooperation or a rules-based become a major destination for Turkish exports in relationship. Although some segments of Turkish sectors such as automobiles, machinery, ready- society have raised expectations that the three- to-wear, iron, metal, electronics, chemicals, steel, way coalition in Germany will focus more on rules- and mining products. Germany ranked as Turkey’s based policies, given the three-way split, the divi- third largest import partner following China and sion between values and interests is more likely to Russia, with USD 21.733 billion in imports in 2020. continue, with some rhetorical adjustments. For The bilateral trade volume between the two coun- instance, the issue of customs modernization is tries reached USD 41.08 billion in 2021, increasing not linked to political conditions in the coalition 20.94% from the previous year. While Turkey ex- agreement as was the case in the former coali- ported USD 19.32 billion worth of goods to Ger- tion between Merkel and social democrats. Some many, its imports from Germany amounted to USD inside Germany argue that the new government 21.76 billion in 2021.2 The economic ministers of the should continue the interest-driven functional co- two countries announced their intention of reach- operation of the Merkel years but compartmental- ing USD 50 billion in bilateral trade volume during ize relations into different areas such as migration, the second Joint Economic and Trade Commission economy, and foreign/security policy and tie these meeting (JETCO) on October 13, 2021.3 specific relations to concrete conditions. This does The large scale of foreign direct investments (FDI) not seem likely as such an issue-specific, transac- from Germany also constitutes another dimen- tional approach would not only be devoid of val- sion of the economic relationship. Between 2005 ues but also would have the potential to fall short and 2021, USD 10.4 billion worth of FDI flows to of the main objective of the coalition government: Turkey originated from Germany, while Turkish in- progress. Unless it puts together a medium-term, vestors also invested USD 3.1 billion in Germany. well-articulated, comprehensive, and coherent While more than 7,600 German companies oper- strategy targeted toward more engagement with ate in Turkey, about 80,000 Turkish-German busi- multi-level actors like civil society to try to prevent nesses have been established in Germany, with an further shrinking of democratic spaces in Turkey, annual turnover of USD 52 billion and employing the coalition’s Turkey policy will not prove different nearly 500,000 persons inside Germany.4 While from the previous government. Furthermore, it will FDI originating from Germany constitutes about not even be easy to carry out functional relations if 14% of total FDI flows in Turkey, major new green- Turkey continues with similar rule of law problems field investments decreased in the recent period and human rights issues. In this context, it should due to concerns about democratic governance, le- be noted that the Greens hold the offices of the gal predictability, and the rule of law as exemplified foreign, environment, and economic ministries and by the German carmaker Volkswagen’s decision to are very keen on upholding human rights and rule pull out its investments from Turkey.5 Hence, the of law issues in relation to Turkey. upgrading of bilateral relations not only concerns Hence, the real challenge, as it has been for a while, the trade aspect but also maintaining FDI flows, lies in taking a critical stance toward Turkey’s dem- which play a very important role in the production ocratic record while promoting a rules-based re- potential of the Turkish economy and exports to lationship in which both sides benefit. We argue Europe. FDI flows into new green plants and tech- 6|
MARCH 2022 | IPC POLICY BRIEF nology carries the utmost importance for Turkey’s ernized by including liberalization of agriculture, adaptation to the European Green Deal. Further- services, and public procurement and adopting ef- more, green transformation can be a crucial for- fective dispute resolution and trade policy consul- eign policy tool in securing stability in the Eastern tation mechanisms. In line with the EU’s evolving Mediterranean. Germany’s ability to contribute to trade policy, norms and standards will also play a the transformation of regional energy resources in major role in the upgraded relationship. a way that would fit into the EU’s emerging green The modernization process has yet to be initiated economy would bring “new economic perspec- despite a common understanding reached by the tives and incentives for political cooperation both parties in 2015.8 The first obstacle was related to on regional and international levels.”6 questions about human rights, democracy, and In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU is the rule of law in Turkey. The coalition government redefining its trade strategy toward “open strate- formed in Germany in 2018 agreed not to start Cus- gic autonomy,” which prioritizes diversification of toms Union modernization talks due to concerns supply chains; achieving resilience, sustainability, about the rule of law and independence of the judi- and accessibility; interconnectedness of transport, ciary as well as limitations of freedom of expression mobility, and internet connectivity; and the incor- and freedom of the media in Turkey. While these poration of environmental, climate-related, social criticisms are still valid, the tension over the East- and human rights principles.7 Hence, the upgrad- ern Mediterranean further complicated relations. ing of the EU’s relationship with Turkey assumes The Customs Union modernization goal reemerged greater importance in view of the adaptation to the within the framework of the Positive Agenda pro- green and digital agenda. Turkey should likewise posed by the European Council in 2020 to ease prioritize maintaining and improving its standing in tension and engage with Turkey.9 However, ne- European supply chains by way of adapting to the gotiations could not be started due to problems changing standards, norms, and codes of conduct regarding the extension of the Customs Union to in production, distribution, services, logistics, and all member states and trade irritants in the current related sectors. functioning of the Customs Union. The EU gave pri- These changing methods and norms are deter- ority to resolving problems in the Customs Union mined by the green and digital transitions: hence, before starting formal negotiations with Turkey. embodying elements of the circular economy In the meantime, precious time has been lost, and model, which rests on the renewable energy transi- Turkey-EU relations continue to lose ground. In our tion, energy efficiency, sustainable production and opinion, Germany and the new German govern- consumption, reusing and recycling, and waste ment should take the initiative to accelerate this management. Moreover, the increasing merger of process. The Turkish government could be per- the manufacturing and services sectors requires suaded to engage in certain reforms based on a a deeper trade and investment relationship that clear and positive signal from the EU side that ne- takes into account the changing nature of eco- gotiations may be opened in the near future. The nomic processes including the regulation of issues German government may take an active role in this such as e-commerce, artificial intelligence, and respect in order to create a common perspective data transfer. in the EU with a view to the revitalization of Tur- key-EU relations by initiating formal negotiations Germany, being Turkey’s major trading partner in for the modernization of the Customs Union, which the EU, assumes a central role in this transition pe- would effectively upgrade trade and economic riod. Within the context of the EU, the moderniza- relations and establish a rules-based economy in tion of the Turkey-EU Customs Union may be the Turkey to a significant extent. In this way, the Cus- most important mechanism that could be employed toms Union modernization process could trigger a to upgrade the trade and economic relationship. If new period of Europeanization in Turkey in terms formal negotiations are opened between Turkey of adapting norms and principles of rules-based and the EU, the Customs Union should be mod- governance. |7
T U R K E Y - G E R M A N Y - E U R E L AT I O N S I N A N E R A O F G E O P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L Future Scenarios to expect changes in the Turkey-Germany-EU rela- tionship. In the medium term, we may expect more With such considerations, let us focus on short-, focus on a rules-based relationship, which seems medium- and longer-term prospects in the Turkey- to be the main orientation of the new German gov- Germany-EU relationship: ernment as underlined in the coalition agreement. This change could be reflected in the activation of In the short term, it is difficult to expect any major the much-needed upgrading of Customs Union ne- change in relations. The change-oriented program gotiations. of the new German government will not change relations with Turkey. We will observe a “wait- In addition to issues related to the trade and green and-see” policy until the Turkish general elections, agendas, there could be more dialogue on visa lib- which are expected to be held in 2023. As empha- eralization, if Turkey fulfills the necessary criteria. It sized in this policy brief, it is even difficult to main- is also possible to facilitate renewed cooperation tain interest-driven functional relations because on refugee issues, with more focus on humanitarian of concerns over human rights and the rule of law problems related to refugees and clearer burden in Turkey. The two sides may even face friction on sharing. With more cooperation and rules-based these issues in the short term if Turkey continues relations, it could be possible to revitalize the such policies, e.g., over the ongoing trial of Turkish stagnant membership negotiations in the medium philanthropist Osman Kavala. As official relations and long term, if Turkey carries out the necessary face important hurdles, there is more room for co- political and economic reforms and moves in the operation in the informal arena of civil society rela- direction of democracy/multilateral orientation. If tions. The coalition agreement emphasizes people- Turkey gains the support of the German govern- to-people contact between Germany and Turkey. ment after its elections and adapts economic and In this context, there could more dialogue between political reforms, then Germany may have the po- German and Turkish civil society groups and local tential to change the stalemate in the EU-Turkey actors. relationship. As mentioned, the role of Germany was critical in the “Helsinki turn” in the Turkey-EU In the short term, it is also not politically feasible to relationship. At that point, the Social Democrat- expect any movement forward in terms of a rules- Green coalition signaled the green light to change based relationship in the context of the moderniza- the stagnating EU-Turkey relationship if Turkey tion of the Customs Union and/or accession nego- met the necessary Copenhagen criteria. At pre- tiations. However, with a view to political change in sent, however, there is a different global context. Turkey, there is no overtly negative policy orienta- The EU also faces major internal debates, and there tion within the German government toward the is- is a more negative stance on enlargement across sue of Customs Union modernization in the longer the Union. Turkey also has exhibited a long period term. The same attitude is to be expected also in of authoritarian policies and tendencies. There- terms of accession negotiations. While the new fore, there are important hurdles facing the revi- coalition has agreed to adapt a negative stance on talization of accession negotiations. Nonetheless, the membership issue at present and the Liberals the accession framework is still the most effective want to formulate a new framework for the EU-Tur- framework to anchor Turkey within the European key relationship, it is rather difficult to expect an and transatlantic framework and to move Turkey important change in this regard in the short term. forward in its democracy at home and multilateral The Greens and the Social Democrats do not want orientation globally. to give up the membership framework at least until the elections in 2023. It also needs to be mentioned that in the medium to long run, one of the important objectives of the In the medium and long term, in the case that po- new coalition government is to change Germany’s litical constellations change in Turkey and bring stance toward its population of German citizens forth a new approach to democracy, rule of law, of Turkish descent. In addition to prioritizing the and human rights issues, then it may be possible fight against racism and Islamophobia, the coali- 8|
MARCH 2022 | IPC POLICY BRIEF tion envisages emphasizing the importance of to accommodate the expectations of these two the diversity of German society and allowing dual countries due to the geopolitical challenges posed citizenship. These policies have the potential to by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This exercise may further integrate the population of German Turks lead to a reform of the integration process by way and may serve as an impediment to the Turkish of applying new methods of differentiated integra- government(s)’ ability to manipulate this popula- tion, such as a core league of fully integrated coun- tion during election periods in Turkey. tries with a second tier of less-integrated countries sharing common policies in wider Europe. If pos- In recent years, Turkey has lost its democratic and sible, such a form of advanced differentiated inte- multilateral anchor and drifted toward authoritar- gration may also include Turkey, based on its clear ian/unilateral tendencies. This orientation has had European perspective and accompanying demo- important costs economically, socially, and politi- cratic reforms. cally, as there is also a strong connection between the lack of democracy in Turkey and its weakening Civil society may play a critical role in achieving effectiveness as a foreign policy actor. Hence, at a breakthrough in the stalemate in Turkey-EU re- present, this orientation is facing a major crisis, and lations and enable progress in the direction of Ankara’s foreign policy is reaching its limits. greater coordination and integration. Turkish civil society actors would need to follow the debates While it would be wrong to ditch Merkel’s so-called in Germany and Europe closely and reflect on the “constructive dialogue” with Turkey on the part of possibility of Germany as the new anchor in Tur- Germany and the EU, it is necessary to transform key’s EU orientation and transatlantic relations, this policy from “appeasement” to “engagement” whereas both Germany and the EU would have to and from personal to institutional as soon as pos- foster engagement with multi-level actors like local sible. Merkel’s policy managed to keep relations governments, opposition parties, and civil society with Turkey on track. However, weakening norma- institutions. tive conditionality (e.g., sidelining universal values like democracy, rule of law, and conditionality) for the sake of sustaining the country’s role as a buffer state to keep refugees outside the territories of EU member states has contributed to democratic backsliding in the country. There is an increasing domestic demand for change toward a more democratic Turkey, which may help to transform its international orientation toward multilateralism. There is a possibility that this de- mand may meet with a changing European for- eign policy in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine, with significant implications for decisions on EU enlargement, neighborhood policy, and differenti- ated integration, which may also constitute a push factor in putting Turkey-Germany-EU relations on the path of a virtuous cycle of reform and rap- prochement. Although the possibility of attaining membership in the near future looks dim, Ukraine’s application to join the EU, followed by Georgia’s and Moldova’s application, may trigger an accel- erated rethinking of the EU’s enlargement policy. The EU may be compelled to welcome these ap- plications in rhetoric and devise innovative ways |9
T U R K E Y - G E R M A N Y - E U R E L AT I O N S I N A N E R A O F G E O P O L I T I C A L T U R M O I L Endnotes eastern-mediterranean-as-a-focus-for-the- eus-energy-transition. 1| Maria Sheahan and Sarah Marsh, “Germany 7| European Commission, “Communication to to increase defence spending in reponse to the European Parliament, the Council, the ‘Putin’s war’ - Scholz,” Reuters, Februrary 27, European Economic and Social Committee 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/ and the Committee of the Regions: Trade aerospace-defense/germany-hike-defense- Policy Review: An Open, Sustainable and spending-scholz-says-further-policy- Assertive Trade Policy”, February 18, shift-2022-02-27// 2021, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ 2| Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_644. Turkey, “Commercial and Ecnomic Relations 8| European Commission, “EU and Turkey between Turkiye and the Federal Republic of announce modernisation of the Customs Germany,” accessed March 10, 2022, https:// Union,” May 12, 2015, https://trade.ec.europa. www.mfa.gov.tr/commercial-and-economic- eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1307. relations-between-turkey-and-the-federal- republic-of-germany.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20 9| European Council, “Special European bilateral%20trade%20volume%20 Council, 1–2 October 2020,” https://www. between,billion%20US%20Dollars%20in%20 consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european- 2021).&text=069%20German%20tourists%20 council/2020/10/01-02/. visited%20T%C3%BCrkiye. 3| Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey, “Türkiye-Almanya Ortak Ekonomi ve Ticaret Komisyonu İkinci Dönem Toplantısı yapıldı (Turkey-Germany Joint Economy and Trade Commission Second Term Meeting was held),” October 13, 2021, https://ticaret.gov.tr/haberler/turkiye- almanya-ortak-ekonomi-ve-ticaret- komisyonu-ikinci-donem-toplantisi-yapild. 4| Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, “Commercial and Economic Relations.” 5| Sevgi Ceren Gökkoyun, “Turkey: ‘Volkswagen decision politically motivated,” Anadolu Agency, January 3, 2021, https://www. aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-volkswagen- decision-politically-motivated/2097203. The German carmaker applied for liquidation last December after opening a local firm in Turkey in 2019. 6| Moritz Rau, Günter Seufert, and Kirsten Westphal, “Deep-Rooted Enmities and New Opportunities for Cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus,” SWP Comment 2022/C 08, February 10, 2022, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publikation/the- 10|
MARCH 2022 | IPC POLICY BRIEF Nilgün Arısan-Eralp is the Director of the Europe- an Union Studies Centre at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Senem Aydın-Düzgit is a Senior Scholar and the Research and Academic Affairs Coordinator at Istanbul Policy Center and a Professor of Interna- tional Relations at Sabancı University. Atila Eralp is a 2021/22 Mercator-IPC Senior Fellow, Senior Fellow at the Center for European Studies, and Emeritus Professor in the Depart- ment of International Relations at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara. E. Fuat Keyman is the Director of Istanbul Policy Center and the Vice President of Institutional Affairs and Social Impact and a Professor of Inter- national Relations at Sabancı University. Çiğdem Nas is the Secretary General of the Eco- nomic Development Foundation (IKV) and Associ- ate Professor at the Yildiz Technical University. Turkey-Germany-EU Relations in an Era of Geopolitical Turmoil 11 p.; 30 cm. - (Istanbul Policy Center-Sabancı University-Stiftung Mercator Initiative) Cover Design and Page Layout: MYRA Istanbul Policy Center Bankalar Caddesi Minerva Han No: 2 Kat: 4 34420 Karaköy-Istanbul T +90 212 292 49 39 ipc@sabanciuniv.edu - ipc.sabanciuniv.edu | 11
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