Towards a hunhu/ubuntu dialogical moral theory
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Towards a hunhu/ubuntu dialogical moral theory
Fainos Mangena, PhD
Centre for Leadership Ethics in Africa, University of Fort Hare, South Africa
fainosmangena@gmail.com
Key words/phrases
Normative theories; dialogical moral theory; hunhu/ubuntu; elders; the common moral position;
experience; moral wisdom
ABSTRACT
In Western thought, moral acts have always been evaluated, condemned and/or justified by
three normative theories, namely virtue theories, Kantian deontology and teleology, particularly
utilitarianism. Because of the popularity of Western philosophy, these normative theories have
wholesomely been applied across cultures as standards for human action despite the fact that
some of these cultures have different moral requirements. The theories have put the individual
at the centre of morality with reason occupying a central place. In this article, while I admit that
these normative theories have to some extent received worldwide acclaim, I argue that they
cannot be wholesomely applied across cultures without facing problems of cultural validation.
Relying on my Zimbabwean moral experience, I argue against this universal application of
normative theories across African cultures and I argue for a hunhu/ubuntu dialogical moral
theory as the most appropriate or relevant theory to be used in Southern Africa in general, and
in Zimbabwe in particular.
INTRODUCTION
In the history of Western philosophy, normative theories have had a special place because of
how they have evaluated, condemned and/or justified individual moral acts. The general
appeal of Western philosophy across the globe has led to the universal application of these
normative theories even in non-Western cultures. This is notwithstanding the fact that different
1
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012cultures have different moral requirements. Against this background, this article argues that it
is problematic to apply these normative theories in non-Western cultures such as those in sub-
Saharan Africa, since these usually face problems of cultural acceptance and validation
because of their emphasis on notions of reason and individualism.
The article starts by surveying these normative strands of moral thinking. As an entry
point to the debate, we begin by introducing virtue theories which are popularised by two
Greek philosophers, namely Plato and Aristotle, who both consider reason and the individual
to be the defining characteristics of morality. While Plato ties the ideas of reason and the
individual to justice, Aristotle ties the same ideas to happiness. Like Plato and Aristotle, Kant
also places an imperative on reason and the individual although his major focal point is duty
and not justice or happiness. Thus, Kant argues that the goodwill, which he says is
unqualifiable, is a function of duty and that only the moral law can enable an individual to do
duty for duty’s sake.
Kant concludes by setting principles which must be followed if duty is to be done for its
own sake. These principles are the principle of Universal Law, the principle of Respect for
Persons and the principle of the Kingdom of Ends.1 Having surveyed the three normative
theories of morality above, the article concludes by arguing that only a dialogical moral theory
premised on the idea of hunhu/ubuntu can sit well with sub-Saharan African cultural and/or
moral requirements and continues to explain how this theory can be built.
ON THE THREE NORMATIVE STRANDS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY
The normative strand of ethics presents virtue theories, Kantian deontology and utilitarianism
as the main theories in which human behaviour can be evaluated and judged in the West and
beyond. Virtue theories as propounded by Plato and Aristotle place an imperative on reason as
the key defining feature of morality. Plato, for example, argues that the Highest Good is the
1
Kant and Deontology. 2007. Available at http://py111.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/kant-and-deontology/ Accessed 7 July
2012.
2
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012knowledge of the Form of the Good which, for him, exists for the individual, the society and the
state, if each of these exhibits the highest virtue called justice.2 Plato argues that when this is
known, an individual is able to distinguish what is good from what is bad or what is right from
what is wrong. Since only the intellect can attain the knowledge of the Forms, Plato believes
that only this level of consciousness is real.3 Thus, for Plato, reason must rule so as to control
the spiritual and desiring or appetitive part of the human soul, which are always pursuing
unreality.4 Plato postulates that justice is a virtue of the individual soul and injustice is its vice.
Thus, virtue, for Plato, is the health of the individual soul while vice is its disease.5
Plato maintains that the individual soul is at the centre of morality as it is the individual’s
rational actions which bring about justice (or lack thereof). Plato compares the individual soul
to the state which, for him, is made up of three groups of people namely, the “Philosopher
Kings and Queens, the Auxiliaries and the Artisans”.6 The Philosopher Kings and Queens, for
Plato, are the rulers and just like reason, in the individual, they are responsible for monitoring
the other two groups, that is, the Auxiliaries and the Artisans to ensure that justice is
achieved.7
For Aristotle, like Plato, justice is the quintessential moral virtue and is the natural
outcome of the virtuous person who desires to live the good life. Justice, for Aristotle, is the
end and means of happiness and the most virtuous person makes moral decisions through the
intellect and reason.8 Aristotle considers happiness to be a virtuous activity which only a
rational soul can attain.9 Conversely, the vicious and irrational person cannot be happy since
2
Edel, A., Flower, E. & O’Connor, F. 1989. Morality, philosophy and practice: historical and contemporary readings and
studies. New York: Random House. p. 35.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Wardman, AE. & Creed, JL. (trans). 1963. The philosophy of Aristotle. New York: Penguin Books. pp. 412-416.
9
Ibid.
3
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012he has no courage or self control over his bodily appetites.10 It is important to observe that
although Plato puts a lot of emphasis on the place of justice in his search for the Highest Good
and Aristotle puts a lot of emphasis on happiness as the Highest Good, they both agree that
morality is a function of the individual soul guided by reason. This means that only individual
moral acts are subject to evaluation and judgment and not the collective conscience of the
community.
With regard to Kantian deontology, it is important to note that reason remains a key
aspect of moral evaluation and judgment. Kant does not ground morality in God’s will, or in the
seemingly arbitrary moral codes of particular cultures.11 Kant believes that morality is grounded
in reason itself, and that the demands of morality can be discovered through rational
reflection.12 Thus, Kant’s is a deontological and absolutist moral theory. 13
Deontological moral theories, for Kant, permit or forbid different actions by arguing that
each of them is right or wrong with respect to moral duties.14 Deontological theories state that
actions are right or wrong in themselves, quite apart from their consequences.15 Kant explains
this theory using what he calls the “Categorical Imperative” which, according to him, is made
up of three maxims or principles namely; the principle of the Universal Law, the principle of
Respect for Persons and the principle of the Kingdom of Ends.
On the Universal Law principle, Kant puts it thus: “We ensure that our moral laws do not
compromise the principles of autonomy or people as ends by only willing those moral acts that
can be universalized”. 16 This means that we can wish anyone in the same situation to behave
10
Op-cit. Edel. (1989). p. 35.
11
Op-cit. Kant and Deontology. 2007. Available at http://py111.wordpress.com/2007/10/26/kant-and-deontology/Accessed
Accessed 7 July 2012.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
4
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012the same way. Kant thinks that this universal imperative of duty can be formulated in the
following way: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal
law of nature.”17 Kant believes that this would lead every rational being to agree to (and
thereby legislate) the same moral laws.18
On the principles of Respect for Persons and Kingdom of Ends, Kant argues that, as
rational beings, human beings are required to treat each other as ends, not merely as a means
to their own ends.19 This, for Kant, is a sure way of respecting other persons as no end is to be
understood as worth more than a person and we stand in relations of mutual respect.20 On the
principle of the Kingdom of Ends, Kant argues that every person is an end unto himself since
he is a law giver.21 Thus, each person is a maker and subject of moral laws.22
With regard to utilitarianism, two versions are often given, namely Jeremy Bentham’s
Classical or Hedonistic utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill’s Ideal utilitarianism. Both versions
are called utilitarianism because they both maintain that the only reason for an act to be right is
its utility, that is, its usefulness for producing results which are good in themselves.23
Bentham’s Classical or Hedonistic utilitarianism considers a moral act to be a function of utility,
that is, the morality of an individual action depends on how much utility the action can produce,
where utility is measured in amounts of pleasure and pain.24
Thus, Bentham’s Classical or Hedonistic utilitarianism places a premium on the quantity
of the pleasurable experience and this is why it is sometimes called Quantitative utilitarianism.
Hedonistic utilitarians agree that virtue, love, knowledge and beauty are good, but they deny
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Raphael, DD. 1994. Moral philosophy. Oxford University Press. p. 35.
24
Timmons, M. 1990. Conduct and character: readings in moral theory. California: Wardsworth. p. 165.
5
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012that their goodness is independent of the goodness of pleasure. They believe that virtue, love,
knowledge and beauty are good because they are enjoyable (pleasant) or because they are a
means to pleasure.25 After defending the claim that the principle of utility is the basic principle
of right conduct, Bentham proceeds to set forth his famous hedonic calculus – a list of seven
considerations to be used in calculating the utility of actions.26
For Bentham, the quantitative score for any pleasure or pain experience can be
obtained by summing up the seven aspects of a pleasurable or painful experience, namely; its
intensity, duration, certainty, nearness, faithfulness, purity and extent.27 Adding up the amounts
of pleasure and pain for each possible act and then comparing the scores would enable us to
decide which act to perform.28 For instance, with regard to the example of deciding between
giving the dying man’s money to CAPS United Football Club (the club the dying man has
supported for many years) or giving the money to Jairos Jiri Association for the Blind, we
would add up the likely pleasures to accrue to both CAPS United and Jairos Jiri Association for
the Blind, for all the seven qualities. If we find that giving the money to Jairos Jiri Association
for the Blind will cause at least 6 million hedons (units of pleasure) and that giving the money
to CAPS United will cause less than 4 million hedons, it would be prudent to give the money to
Jairos Jiri Association for the Blind.
However, in his ideal utilitarianism, which places a premium on quality, Mill takes a
swipe at Bentham’s formulation of utilitarianism. He thinks that the emphasis on the pursuit of
pleasure reduced utilitarianism to “a doctrine worthy of Swine.”29 Mill also thinks that in
ordinary circumstances, one may not have time to calculate the utility of actions as some
actions may require quick thinking.30 Mill distinguishes between what he calls higher pleasures
25
Op-cit. Raphael. 1994. p. 35.
26
Op-cit. Timmons. 1990. p. 165.
27
Pojman, LP. 2002. Ethics: discovering right and wrong. Canada: Wardsworth. p.109.
28
Ibid.
29
Op-cit. Timmons. 1990. p.172.
30
Ibid.
6
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012and lower pleasures in order to set forth his qualitative scheme of utilitarianism and it is to the
higher pleasures that Mill’s utilitarianism speaks.31 Because utilitarianism considers the pursuit
of higher, distinctively human pleasures (such as knowledge, creativity, intellection and
enjoying great literature) as important, it is, Mill asserts, a doctrine worthy of human beings.32
For Mill, a being of higher faculties requires more to be happy, and is capable of more
acute suffering than one of lower faculties. Thus, for Mill, “it is better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than to be a pig satisfied.” For Mill, one should act so as to produce the greatest possible
balance of good over bad for everyone affected by our actions.33 By “good” Mill understood it
to mean happiness or pleasure.34
ON THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING NORMATIVE THEORIES ACROSS CULTURES
It is important to note that at the centre of every culture there are norms, customs and
traditions that define these cultures, which norms, customs and traditions vary from society to
society. This, by implication, means that every culture has its own moral requirements and that
there cannot be a universal theory that can be used to explicate these moral requirements. As
Andrew Oldenquist puts it, all morality is tribal morality and that there will always be as many
systems of social morality as there are loyalties.35
One of the biggest challenges posed by all three normative theories above, is their
emphasis on the centrality of the individual when deciding whether a moral act is right or
wrong. This emphasis on individualism does not sit well with most African cultures, as these
locate the morality of actions within a particular group of persons. For instance, it is worrisome
to note that many centuries, after the death of both Plato and Aristotle, virtue theories are still
31
Campbell, CG. 2010. Mill’s liberal project and a defense of colonialism from a post-colonial perspective. South African
Journal of Philosophy, 29(2), p.67.
32
Op-cit. Timmons. 1990. p. 172.
33
Shaw, WH. 1996. Social and personal ethics. Belmont: Wardsworth. p. 51.
34
Ibid.
35
Oldenquist, A. 1982. Loyalties. The Journal of Philosophy, 79(4), p.179.
7
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012being used as standards of measurement for moral actions – even in non-Greek cultures – and
yet these theories have problems of cultural validation.
The point is that the concepts of justice and happiness may cut across all cultures but
the idea of placing an individual person at the centre of justice and happiness can be
problematic, especially within communitarian cultures such as those that the author is familiar
with. In these communitarian cultures mentioned above, justice does not reside in the
individual – it resides in the community of which the individual is part. In sub-Saharan Africa,
the ideas of reason, spirit and desire which, in Platonic terms, define justice in the individual,
project the individual as being part of a community. Thus, reason, spirit and desire exist as
assets of the community and not as elements that make up an individual.
With regard to utilitarianism, it is critical to observe that in most African cultures,
pleasure is not pleasure if it is not shared or experienced by a group or a community. Even the
idea of respect for persons which Kant valorises cannot make sense in African cultures where
the dignity of the community is more important than the dignity of a mere individual. Also note
that the idea of individual rationality is emphasised more in all the three normative theories,
making it impossible for the same theories to make inroads in non-Western cultures such as
Africa, where morality is a function of experience and communal rationality. In most sub-
Saharan African cultures, especially the Shona culture, the idea of communal rationality brings
to the fore the importance of dialogical morality, which form the core of moral theorising in
Shona society. Below, the idea of this dialogical moral theory is outlined and expounded.
ON HUNHU/UBUNTU AS A DIALOGICAL MORAL THEORY
It is important to define the word dialogue before defining the phrase dialogical moral theory. In
the modern day, dialogue between ideologies refers to something precise and definite, namely
two-way communication between persons. One-way lecturing or speaking will obviously not be
included in this meaning.36 However, there are many different kinds of two-way
36
Swidler, L. 2011. What is dialogue? Available at http://institute.jesdialogue.org/fileadm.
8
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012communication, for example fighting, wrangling and debating, and yet none of these mean
dialogue.37 Thus, dialogue cannot be reduced to meaning mere fighting, mere wrangling or
mere debating, since dialogue involves the meeting of minds. On the other extreme we may
find communication between persons who hold precisely the same views on a particular
subject. This will also not be included when we use the term dialogue.
If we consider these two opposite kinds of two-way communication, which are not
meant by the word dialogue, we can learn quite precisely what we do in fact mean when we
use the term dialogue.38 Dialogue is two-way communication, where the persons involved in
the dialogue do not have to hold the same views on a particular subject, but must have
different points of view on issues of mutual concern. In an article entitled: Dialogue as the
nucleus of morality: reflections on the moral quandary inherent in religion in Nigeria published
in 2011, Osikhena defines dialogue as the “effective communication between human persons
aimed at a shared understanding of reality”. 39 In Shona society, however, the dialogical
process does not only involve human beings, it also has a spiritual dimension.
While dialogue remains a two way communication, it involves communication between
vanhu (human beings) and spiritual beings such as midzimu (ancestral spirits) and
musikavanhu (creator God). The last sections of this essay will deal with the link between
vanhu, midzimu and musikavanhu. While Osikhena does not expand on what he calls reality,
the author contends that he is probably referring to moral realities or realities of a moral nature,
because he uses the phrase dialogical morality repeatedly in the mentioned article.
For Osikhena, a dialogical moral theory does not consider the individual to be an
isolated being. As long as he or she is born in a community of living people and is in interaction
with people upholding varying moral intuitions, the individual cannot universalise his or her
moral thoughts.40 As a dialogical self, the individual’s identity is dependent on relations with
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.
39
Osikhena, LI. 2011. Dialogue as the nucleus of morality: reflections on the moral quandary inherent in religion in Nigeria.
Chiedza Lighting Africa: Journal of Arrupe College Jesuit School of Philosophy and Humanities, 14(1), p.15.
40
Ibid, p. 17.
9
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012others.41 This means that communal norms have a bearing on the person’s identity and these
are arrived at through mutual dialogue.42 For Osikhena, a morally sensitive individual cannot
be reduced to a moral solipsist within a community.43 In other words, a morally sensitive
individual must respect the moral opinions of others.
In this article, it is argued that hunhu/ubuntu recognises the power intrinsic to the
capacity for dialogue and it places the community at the centre of all moral deliberations which
are premised on the idea of communal or group rationality. Communal or group rationality
means that kind of rationality where the opinions of the group take centre stage compared to
the opinions of the individual, as is characteristic of the normative moral theories such as virtue
theories, utilitarian theories and Kantian theories. Thus, from a hunhu/ubuntu perspective, it is
important to observe that the opinions of the group are at the core of dialogical morality. This is
illustrated by the Shona expression rume rumwe harikombi churu (one man cannot surround
an anthill), which means that it takes the effort of a group to do something meaningful.
In moral terms; it is collective morality that counts and not individual morality. When we
comment on the character and conduct of an individual, we do not isolate the individual from
the group in which he or she belongs. We say: Mwana wokwa Mangena anetsika (This child
from Mangena’s family is well behaved or well groomed). What this means is that the
behaviour exhibited by the child becomes a reflection of the behaviour of all the members of
Mangena’s family. It even goes beyond the family to reflect on the behaviour of the whole
community. This thinking is premised on the idea of group or community responsibility as is
illustrated by the expression: “It takes a village to raise a child.”
Having said that, it is important to briefly explain the notion of hunhu/ubuntu as an
indigenous African philosophy before showing how the dialogical character of this philosophy
captures African notions of morality. As intimated above, at the centre of hunhu/ubuntu is the
value attached to the community. In other words, individuals only become important when they
41
Taylor, C. 1992. The politics of recognition. In: Amy Gautmann (Ed.). Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press. p. 32.
42
Op-cit. Osikhena. 2011. p. 17.
43
Ibid.
10
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012contribute positively to the sustenance of their community. John S Mbiti captures it very well
when he says: “I am because we are, since we are therefore I am.”44 By this, Mbiti means that
an individual’s importance is seen with regard to the way he or she participates in a group.
This emphasis on the group is different from the emphasis on individual rights as propounded
by normative theories mentioned above. Desmond Tutu also explains it in a different way when
he says: “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” which, when translated to English, means “a person is
a person through other persons.” This means that whatever a person does must be for the
betterment of the community to which he or she belongs rather than seeing himself as an
isolated being.
Hunhu/Ubuntu is not only a dialogical African moral theory; it is also a way of life. This
means that hunhu/ubuntu does not only evaluate and justify moral acts in African settings but it
is also a world view for the Africans. According to this philosophy, individual moral acts are
only important if they conform to the expectations of the community. Thus, notions of right and
wrong or virtue and vice are notions that are negotiated through dialogue. Therefore, individual
opinions, varied and diverse as they may be, have to be put together in order to come up with
what can be called a “common moral position” which is meant to safeguard the interests of the
community as a whole. This can be called the “common moral position” because it is a moral
position agreed to by the majority of elders who are the custodians of moral, epistemological
and ontological wisdom.
Thus, a dialogical moral theory can be formulated by taking into consideration this point.
The common moral position is not a position established by one person as is the case with
Plato’s justice theory, Aristotle’s happiness theory, Kant’s duty theory and Mill’s ideal
utilitarianism. The idea of a common moral position is meant to allow group moral acts to be
subjected to group moral criticism. By this it is not argued that there should not be room for
relativity, but if individuals know they are answerable to the community in as far as their actions
are concerned, they will choose the good in order to avoid group criticism or being ostracised
by the community.
44
Mbiti, JS. 1969. African religions and philosophy. London: Heinemann. pp. 204-215.
11
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012ON HOW THE “COMMON MORAL POSITION” IS CONCEPTUALISED IN SHONA
SOCIETY
As intimated above, the common moral position is obviously a function of the society’s cultural
conscience, which is idealised by the philosophy of hunhu/ubuntu. A person can adhere to the
common moral position if his or her actions are in conformity with the community’s agreed
moral standards. In the case of sub-Saharan African cultures, the process of reaching a
common moral position is dialogical. Elders, who are considered to be fountains of wisdom
(including moral wisdom), set the moral standards or parameters through dialogue. Thus,
wisdom in Shona society becomes a function of age and experience.45 Among the Shona
when they say: vakuru vedu vanoti (our elders say), they do so as a way of acknowledging that
wisdom and intelligence belong to the elders.46
But how is the common moral position to be attained in Shona society? In Shona
society, the common moral position cannot be isolated from the idea of tsika which refers to
moral traits that are passed from one generation to the other. The second question to ask is
how do the Shona people acquire tsika? We say: Vakuru vanodzidzisa vana tsika padare
(Elders pass on moral wisdom to the youths at night gatherings).
This proceeds as follows: children listen to their elders as they educate them about how
to behave and how to live well with others (kugara nevanwe zvakanaka). Elders do this
sometimes through story telling (ngano) or through proverbs (tsumo).The moral wisdom which
these elders pass on to the youths is not written down but it is passed on from generation to
generation. Thus, when people want to know whether they have acted morally or immorally,
they will always make reference to this moral wisdom. For example, mutsika dzedu tinoti kuita
ruvoko kwakaipa (in our culture we say stealing is wrong) and the source of this claim is elderly
wisdom. Our elders also tell us that stealing disturbs the spirit world which is the source of our
45
Mangena, F. 2010. Shona epistemology and Plato’s divided line. Journal of Pan African Studies, 3(9). pp. 64-77
46
Ibid.
12
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012moral conscience. Thus, taking this point further, a dialogical moral theory can only be
established if we try to understand the tripartite character of hunhu/ubuntu morality which is
outlined and explained below.
Shona moral wisdom is tripartite in that it involves three different kinds of beings,
namely vanhu (human beings or those living their dated lives), midzimu (ancestral spirits or the
living timeless and Musikavanhu (the creator God). Musikavanhu, who is also referred to as
Mwari, Nyadenga or Wedenga by the Shona people, works together with the ancestral spirits
who are thought to direct events in the life of the Shona person. Ancestral spirits are
represented by the following categories: Firstly, there are those responsible for guarding
national territories such as the spirit of Nehanda, Kaguvi and Chaminuka. Secondly, there are
those that protect the interests of the whole tribe known as tribal or clan spirits; and thirdly,
there are those that are responsible for protecting members of the immediate family called
family spirits. These spirits are appeased in order to perform their duties and they, in turn,
protect the family members or clan against diseases, misfortune and deaths.
But how do these three kinds of beings, that is, those living their dated lives, the living
timeless and Musikavanhu generate and safeguard moral wisdom? As noted above, elders of
the community generate moral wisdom which then becomes a template to be used by
generations to come. To ensure that there are no moral deviations, the spirit world enforces
the moral principles which are the building blocks of Shona moral wisdom through sanctions
such as death, misfortunes and illnesses to those who break the moral codes. In Shona they
say: Ukaita zvinhu zvakaipa midzimu inotsamwa ukarohwa neshamhu inorwadza (if you
behave immorally, you risk upsetting the ancestors who can punish you severely). Note that
the Shona word zvakaipa has the same rendering as the word bad behaviour and the Shona
word shamhu means punishment.
13
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012The tripartite character of hunhu/ubuntu morality in diagrammatic form
Musikavanhu/Wedenga/Nyadenga/God
as the conceptualiser of the common
moral position
Midzimu/ancestral spirits/the living
timeless as enforcers and guardians of
the common moral position
Vanhu/human beings/those living their
dated lives as generators of the
common moral position
Vakuru/elders use their Vadiki/youths learn about
experience to transmit moral moral wisdom through
wisdom to vadiki/youths listening to their elders. This
through ngano (folktales) and wisdom becomes the
tsumo (proverbs) at a dare common moral position
PROVERBS AND EXPERIENCE AS SOURCES OF THE COMMON MORAL POSITION
But what is it that grounds Shona moral wisdom, apart from the fact that it is spiritual and
communitarian? While reason grounds virtue theories as well as Kantian deontology and
teleology; the same cannot be said of Shona moral wisdom. What grounds Shona moral
wisdom is experience and this notion of experience is more revealing in proverbs such as,
among others, chakachenjedza ndechakatanga (once beaten, twice shy or first experiences
make one wiser). By way of interpretation, this Shona proverb points to the fact that a person
knows that an action is good or bad based on what he or she has experienced before. Thus, a
14
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012person learns that theft is bad if he or she was once incarcerated for theft or that marriage is
good or bad if he or she was once married.
The other proverb which foregrounds the issue of experience in Shona society is:
Takabvonoko kumhunga hakuna ipwa (we know that there are no sweet reeds in a rapoko field
because we passed through the rapoko field). In moral terms elders often use the example of
marriage when educating the youth about the dangers of early marriages. With regard to the
challenges of early marriages an elder would educate his children or grand children by saying:
Vazukuru or Vanangu tangaimakura mugozowana nokuti wanano inoda kushinga (my
grandchildren/children grow up first before getting married because marriage is for the strong
and mature people). This point is well captured by another Shona proverb which says:
muziviwenzira yeparuware ndiye mufambi wayo (the only person who knows the path that
passes through a flat rock stretch is the one who has used that path before).
There are also Shona proverbs that celebrate hunhu/ubuntu as a collective philosophy
and these include: Zano ndoga wakapisa jira (the person who did not listen to advice burnt his
blanket). This proverb shows that life is a collective experience at least from the perspective of
hunhu/ubuntu. Thus, one has to take advice from others in order to avoid plunging into
problems. As intimated in earlier sections of this essay: Munhu munhu muvanhu or umuntu
ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through other persons). In Shona society they also
say: Rume rimwe harikombi churu (one man cannot surround an anthill) meaning that most of
life’s challenges require group participation.
Mazano marairanwa (wisdom is a shared experience) is the other proverb which means
that one has to listen to what other people think about his or her opinions on something. Thus,
elders would say humbimbindoga hunosiya munhu musango (individualism leads people
astray). So, Shona proverbs celebrate group participation in all spheres of life including in the
sphere of morality. Based on the above, it is clear that the common moral position, which is the
moral template for hunhu/ubuntu, is a function of experience.
15
Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012CONCLUSION
In this article we considered the relevance of normative moral theories in non-Western
cultures. The claim was made that these theories face problems of cultural validation in other
cultures because they put the individual at the centre of morality and yet African cultures are
by nature communitarian as they celebrate group participation and responsibility when it
comes to matters relating to right and wrong. Having made these important observations, it
was then concluded that normative moral theories cannot be applied in communitarian cultures
without problems. Using Zimbabwe as illustration, this article argued for a dialogical moral
theory which is premised on the idea of hunhu/ubuntu as the most appropriate or relevant
moral theory applicable in communitarian cultures such as the Shona/Ndebele cultures in
Zimbabwe. It was contended that only the common moral position, which is a product of elderly
moral wisdom, can be used as a template for judging an act either as good or bad and that this
common moral position is a function of experience.
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Phronimon Volume 13(2) 2012BIBLIOGRAPHY
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