Moral education from Levinas: Another educational model
←
→
Page content transcription
If your browser does not render page correctly, please read the page content below
Moral education from Levinas:
Another educational model
La educación moral a partir de Levinas: otro modelo educativo
Pedro ORTEGA RUIZ, PhD. Professor. Universidad de Murcia (portega@um.es).
Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ, PhD. Associate Professor. Universidad de Murcia (eromero@um.es).
Abstract: space of encounter; teachers’ testimony;
This work takes Levinasian ethics and attention to students in their context; the
anthropology as sources to inspire a new need to examine the sense of responsibilty
pedagogical discourse and educational prax- further; and the pedagogy of donation. Mor-
is in the field of moral education. In this al education, based on Levinasian ethics,
paradigm, the human being is a historical, can serve to increase alerity and humanise
situational being that is open to the other the school and society.
from its vulnerability. Accordingly, moral
education becomes a compassionate, wel- Keywords: ethics, anthropology, moral edu-
coming response to the other in its situation cation, welcoming, educational climate.
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
of special need. The authors highlight the
close link between education and a particu-
lar conception of the human being and how Resumen:
it relates to others. To ask about education Los autores parten de la ética y la antro-
revista española de pedagogía
is to ask about the human. Levinasian eth- pología levinasiana como fuentes inspirado-
ics do not back setting specific guidelines ras de un nuevo discurso pedagógico y praxis
for educational action; they only justify the educativa en el ámbito de la educación mo-
creation of an educational climate (ethos) ral. Desde este paradigma el ser humano es
in classrooms that favours openness to the concebido como un ser histórico, situacional
other through action in the following are- y abierto al otro desde su vulnerabilidad. De
as of intervention: pupils’ experience as a este modo, la educación moral se traduce en
Revision accepted: 2021-12-23.
This is the English version of an article originally printed in Spanish in issue 282 of the revista española de
pedagogía. For this reason, the abbreviation EV has been added to the page numbers. Please, cite this article as
follows: Ortega Ruiz, P., & Romero Sánchez, E. (2022). La educación moral a partir de Levinas: otro modelo educativo |
Moral education from Levinas: Another educational model. Revista Española de Pedagogía, 80 (282), 233-249. https://
doi.org/10.22550/REP80-2-2022-01
https://revistadepedagogia.org/ ISSN: 0034-9461 (Impreso), 2174-0909 (Online)
233 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
una respuesta de acogida compasiva al otro la experiencia del alumno como espacio de en-
en su situación de especial necesidad. Los cuentro; el testimonio del maestro; la aten-
autores subrayan la estrecha vinculación de ción al educando en su contexto; la necesidad
la educación a una determinada concepción de profundizar en el sentido de la responsabi-
del ser humano y su relación con los demás. lidad; y la apuesta por la pedagogía del don.
Preguntar por la educación es preguntar por La educación moral, fundamentada en la éti-
el hombre. La ética levinasiana no ampara la ca levinasiana, puede servir para desarrollar
programación de pautas concretas de actua- la aleridad y para humanizar a la escuela y a
ción educativa; solo justifica la creación de la sociedad.
un clima educativo (ethos) en las aulas que
favorezca la apertura al otro a través de una Descriptores: ética, antropología, educación
acción en los siguientes focos de intervención: moral, acogida, clima educativo.
1. Introduction form the structure of moral education at
Discourse and praxis in moral educa- present on the basis of differing discourses
tion currently revolve around two princi- and different educational practices.
pal focuses: ontological ethics inspired by
Platonic idealism, and material ethics rep- Emmanuel Levinas has had a notable
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
resented by Schopenhauer, the first gen- influence in the field of ethics and moral ed-
eration of philosophers from the Frank- ucation. Although Levinas did not explic-
furt School (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2004), itly address the question of education as a
and Levinas. These two focuses differ “topic” to study, his philosophical think-
revista española de pedagogía
in their conception of man and his rela- ing comprises a fertile source for “another
tionship with the world and with others. mode” of educating from “another way”
Idealist ethics emphasise the individual of understanding the relational structure
dimension of the person; material ethics of the human being.
accentuate its relational dimension. While
idealist ethics emphasise the person’s The prevailing view of education as a
transcendence, material ethics emphasise project of producing rational autonomous
its immanence; if idealist ethics insist that subjects has been challenged by post-
“there is something” immutable in human modern and poststructuralist critiques of
beings that transcends the body and is in- substantial subjectivity. In a similar vein,
dependent of it, material ethics reaffirm Levinas, understands that subjectivity
it corporeality and contingency. This dia- is derivative of an existentially prior re-
lectic forms part of our vision of the hu- sponsibility to and for the other… This
man being and its relationship with the reframing of ethical responsibility as the
world and with others. These two currents precondition for subjectivity might offer a
234 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
new way of conceiving moral agency in ed- link to students’ processes of psychologi-
ucation. (Chinnery, 2003, pp. 5-7) cal development, to the detriment of the
philosophical basis (Sánchez Rojo, 2019).
For Levinas, the human being is only An antipathy towards philosophy can
understood from the other and for the easily be perceived in many pedagogical
other. It is not an autonomous and inde- discourses, as though ethical and anthro-
pendent being with its reason for being in pological reflection were “alien” tasks
itself. Instead, its way of existing is a con- for education. And there is no education-
stant appeal to the other on whom it de- al action that is not linked to a partic-
pends to be called to a human existence. ular conception of the human be-
Nobody is human by himself or herself. It ing: “To educate is to create a person,
is the ethical relationship with the other, and asking about education is to ask
dependence on the other, that makes us about the human being” (Delgado,
human. This way of understanding hu- 2010, p. 479). Some authors have ex-
man beings and their relationship with pressed their concern about the pos-
the world and with the other is the start- itivist drift in pedagogical discourse
ing point for a new pedagogical dis- and educational praxis: “The contem-
course and a new educational prax- porary problem of the epistemological
is, which are expressed through wel- colonisation of pedagogy by cognitive-be-
coming the other in its particular havioural psychology is symptomatic of
situation. Hence, education, in line a process that has replaced pre-compre-
with Levinasian philosophy, is faith- hensions and facilitated the replacement
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
ful to the historical condition of the hu- of the usual concepts” (Pagès, 2016, p.
man being and to the “circumstance” 272). The epistemological question is
that envelops the life of each student. not the most urgent challenge that ed-
ucationalists must address; it is not the
revista española de pedagogía
While “moral education” can be inspired control of the inputs that affect an edu-
by many authors, we intend to base ours cational process, but rather whether in
on the philosophy of Levinas. education we are helping to form human
beings who are responsible for the other
and for the world.
2. Anthropology and ethics in Levinas
There are no ethics without anthro- For Levinas, the openness of the hu-
pology, nor is there anthropology or man being to the other “does not come as a
education without ethics. A particular supplement to a previous existential base;
conception of the human being (anthro- it is in ethics, understood as responsibility,
pology) underlies each ethical model, that the very knot of the subjective is tied”
even if at times there is an intention to (Levinas, 2015, p. 79). Levinas’s original
ignore the essential dependence of edu- idea of subjectivity shatters many of the
cation on the anthropological and ethical metaphysical foundations of the Being on
foundations that support it, stressing its which Western philosophy has been based
235 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
since the Enlightenment. For Levinas, it is a choice or an inspiration in way of the
fundamental to examine the ethical condi- oneness of what is assigned. The subject
tions at the heart of subjective interpellation is for the other, its being disappears for
as infinite responsibility based on key con- the other, its being dies in signification”
cepts such as substitution, hostage, and hos- (2011, p. 106).
pitality (Lee, 2019). For many philosophers
of education (Lee, 2019; Matanky, 2018; Levinas turns away from the Platonic
Todd, 2016; Zhao, 2014; Mèlich, 2010), this idea of the universal man, situating it in
interpretation of subjectivity is especially time and space. “The One of which Pla-
relevant in the field of education and par- to speaks in the first hypothesis of Par-
ticularly in moral education. menides is a stranger to definition and to
the limit, to the place and time, to iden-
Levinas sets out to deconstruct West- tity with itself and the difference with
ern philosophy centred on the Self. He regards to itself, to similarity and dis-
explains this through the metaphor of similarity, a stranger to being and to the
Abraham and Ulysses. While the former knowledge of the fact that, furthermore,
left his land on a journey without return, all of these attributes are categories”
Ulysses lives with the obsession of return- (Levinas, 1998, pp. 51-52). For Levinas,
ing to Ithaca, a land he has never really the human being is not a concept or an
left. Being human means being open to idea from which we make ourselves; but
the other and living with others: we are rather a historical, corporeal being. “Un-
human through others. That which is der the species of corporeality the ties are
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
human in man involves being constant- joined … for the other, reluctantly, from
ly focussed on the “outside,” the oth- itself; the laborious nature of work in the
er person, the inappropiable stranger. patience of ageing, in the duty to give the
For Levinas “the way of being that is other the bread from one’s own mouth
revista española de pedagogía
characteristic of man, more than be- and the cloak from one’s own shoulders”
ing with the other (mit sein) is being (Levinas, 2011, p. 110); the ethical re-
for the other, which is not explained lationship is only established between
from itself and in itself, but from the historical human beings, not imaginary
other in an asymmetrical relationship ones: “Only when all are clothed and
that dispenses with or ignores all reci- well-fed will the true ethical problem be
procity between the I and the you” (Or- visible” (Levinas, 2008, p. 42).
tega, 2016, p. 251). The radical structure
of man is openness to the other; being Idealist ethics have underestimated
in a constant exit from himself that ap- the corporeal dimension of the human be-
peals to the other, the “stranger.” Levi- ing. Its openness to the other, from corpo-
nas expresses this in these terms: “The reality, has always been viewed with sus-
for itself of the identity is no longer for picion, if not scorned; and by overlooking
itself. The identity of the same in the corporeality, idealistic ethics are incapa-
“I” comes from outside despite itself, as ble of answering for the other. “We take it
236 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
for granted, as truth, that in the events of passively imposes itself on me and makes
peoples, an ultimate purpose dominates, me liable for it without it being possible
not the reason of a particular subject, but for me to decide to accept or reject this
the divine and absolute reason” (Hegel, responsibility. Levinas expresses this in
2005, p. 98). The vulnerability of the hu- these terms: “Not being able to evade re-
man being, its exposure to suffering, does sponsibility, not having as a hiding place
not find a historical response in Hegel, an inner being in which one returns to
only in divine reason, and this response oneself, moving forwards without consid-
is outside of history. For material ethics, eration of oneself” (Levinas, 1998, p. 64).
in contrast, corporeality is not a stranger, This openness to the other, being respon-
but rather its identifying mark: “That sible for the other, affects the very compo-
human beings are corporeal does not sition of the subject as a human being. It
mean that everything is reduced to the is not my freedom of choice, but obedience
body, but that everything we think, do or to the invocation of the other from its po-
feel ‘passes’ through the body” (Mèlich, sition of need that confers the status of
2010, p. 100). The body is not the prison moral subject on me. “It is not, in effect,
of the soul, nor a covering that hides the a matter of receiving an order, first per-
true reality of the human being; it is not ceiving it and then obeying it, in an act of
simply the physical or material part of a will. The obligation to obedience precedes
person, something that can be separated hearing the order in this proximity of the
from the other spiritual part. The body, face” (Levinas, 2014, pp. 40-41).
for Levinas, is extreme passiveness, ex-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
posure to illness, to suffering and death; In Levinasian anthropology, the human
it is exposure to compassion and to help being is a being fractured by the presence
and care of the other. The body is the of the other, which we cannot let go of
whole person insofar as it feels itself root- without risking our own identities. The
revista española de pedagogía
ed in the world, living with others. We are characteristic mode of existence and of
body, and through it we can sympathise being human is the un-condition of be-
with the other, respond to its suffering ing a “stranger,” being strange to one-
and take responsibility for it. Without self. “This tear in the very structure of
corporeality there is no ethics, because the being of man … is what makes man
without it, there cannot be com-passion. a stranger to himself because he depends
Levinas accepts corporeality as the only on others” (Ortega, 2016, p. 251), to the
possible way for the human being to live point that one cannot think without the
in time and space. And outside of this presence of the other, without a relation-
“circumstance” the human being dis- ship of radical dependence on the oth-
appears, is diluted in its context and its er. “The face of the other means for me
history. an unchallengeable responsibility that
precedes any free consent, any pact, any
For Levinas, subjectivity is the expe- contract” (Levinas, 2011, p. 150). But the
rience of the other as wholly other, that individual is not only open to the singu-
237 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
lar and concrete other, but to all human lute certainty and truth, Levinas
beings, to others. This is what Levinas makes circumstance, the contin-
(2014, p. 82) means with the expression gent, and the ephemeral into the nat-
of the “third”: “The third is also a neigh- ural habitat of the life of human beings. It
bour, a face, an unattainable otherness. is not the permanent and definitive that
Here is, based on the third, the proxim- characterises human beings, but rather
ity of a human plurality”. Levinas cate- the precarious and provisional, becoming
gorically asserts openness to “others”: “ and change. The subject in Levinas is not
…all men are responsible for one anoth- the transcendental being from Kantian
er, ‘and I more than the others’.” For me, ethics, but rather the historical being
this formula and this asymmetry are of who is moved by and sympathises with
the greatest importance: “all mean are the other in need of help; it is the negative
responsible for one another and I more experience of the suffering of the other
than any” (Levinas, 1993, p. 133), citing as totally other, that makes the subject
the words of Dostoievski “each of us is a moral subject when he answers for it.
guilty before everyone for everyone, and This experience of exteriority breaks the
I more than the others” (Toumayan, limited sphere of ontology to inscribe it-
2004, p. 55). self in the field of ethics, in other words,
of responsibility towards the other.
In the anthropology of Levinas, open- “Speaking about ethics from anthropol-
ness to the other goes beyond the confines ogy, and not from ontology, means start-
of idealist anthropology and ethics, which ing from finitude and, therefore, from
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
ignored the structural ties that link us to time and space, from history, from con-
humans and make us interdependent to tingency, from memory, from relational-
exist as humans. Humankind is not a mass ity, and from otherness” (Mèlich, 2002,
of isolated, self-sufficient individuals who p. 129). This movement from ontol-
revista española de pedagogía
are independent of one another, but rath- ogy to ethics in the “I-you” relationship
er it comprises structurally associated and positions the you in history, in space and
interdependent beings whose existence time, in a relationship of responsibility
as humans is linked to the unavoidable re- towards the specific other in need, not to-
lationship with the other. This conception wards an imaginary being without biog-
of the human being opens the door for us raphy or context. Levinas breaks with
to another way of being in the world: it the Western philosophical tradition,
makes a new pedagogical discourse and which is strongly marked by ontology,
educational praxis possible. by reduction of the Other to the Same.
“This primacy of the Same was Socrates’
For Levinasian anthropology, the hu- teaching. To receive nothing of the Oth-
man being is a historical being subjected to er but what was in me, as though from
contingency and uncertainty as unavoid- all eternity I was in possession of what
able conditions of its existence. comes to me from the outside” (Levinas,
Far from building a world of abso- 1987, p. 65).
238 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
3. Ethics are a response to the demand, of responding before being able
demand of the other to decide, before exercising my freedom.
Where is your brother? This is the “Why does the other concern me? What’s
question that persistently confronts Hecuba to me? Am I my brother’s keep-
us. The experience of the other’s need er? These questions only make sense if
breaks all of the barriers we might build it has already been assumed that the I
to avoid answering this question. It is only care for itself, is only care for it-
the mysterious voice from our interior self. In effect, in such a hypothesis, the
that we cannot silence before the de- absolute outside of Me, the other who
mand of the “stranger, the orphan and concerns me, is incomprehensible. That
the widow,” of the vulnerable other in its said, in the ‘prehistory’ of the I, posi-
human condition. It is not the argumen- tioned for itself, a responsibility speaks.
tative force of discourse that obliges us The self in its full depth is a hostage
to respond to the demand of the other, in a much older way that is I, before
but instead the authority of its vulner- the principles” (Levinas, 2011, p. 187).
able face. “Spontaneous agitation when
faced with the suffering of others does For Levinas, the human being is de-
not originate from self-legislating rea- pendence and subjection of the I to the
son, but rather from physical distress Other. From Levinasian ethics, freedom
and the feeling of solidarity with tor- breaks into an ethical situation that is
tured and humiliated bodies. … This unforeseen by nature. In contrast with
spontaneous agitation manifests itself moral codes that impose a particular be-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
in urgency and impatience when faced haviour, Levinasian ethics allow for the
with injustice. Both resist a deferral of possibility of transgression that “opens
action for reasons of rationalisation or the door to being in another way, to be-
substantiation” (Zamora, 2004, pp. 265- ing another, to being different, not just
revista española de pedagogía
266). We should not interpret the Levi- with the world and with others, but also
nasian expression of the “stranger, the and, above all, with ourselves as we are,
orphan and the widow” in a sociological to a great extent, the result of this world.
sense – those abandoned by society – In short, for an ethics of compassion,
but rather in the anthropological sense: there is only ethics if there is transgres-
the human being is structurally frag- sion” (Mèlich, 2010, p. 173). For Levi-
ile, vulnerable, in need of compassion. We nas, “the notion of freedom as autonomy
are all suffering beings, subjected to suffer- is tied to an egocentered, self-enclos-
ing, pain, and death. This is the baggage ing subject and is the very part and par-
that is always with us. cel of the humanist subject. In critiquing
the Western tendency to locate the ori-
Levinasian ethics are responsibility gin of human subjectivity essentially in
before the other that is assigned to me ego and consciousness, Levinas pro-pos-
and obliges me to put myself in its place es freedom as heteronomy” (Zhao, 2014,
without any possibility of rejecting its p. 514).
239 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
Levinas’s insistence on the responsibil- When someone refers to an existing or-
ity of the I does not in any way lead to the der, whether it is legal or moral in na-
development of an egological immanence ture. However, we must start from the
to which Levinasian thinking is wholly op- supposition that any order is contingent
posed. Levinas (1993, pp. 130-131) ex- from its very origins. … But if every one
presses it thus: “ … what is affirmed of the orders has its frontiers, this sug-
in the relationship with the Face is the gests that judgements do indeed have ar-
asymmetry: in the starting point, what guments in favour of them, but not suf-
another is with respect to me matters lit- ficient arguments. These would occur if,
tle to me, it is the other’s business; for as Leibniz thought, we found ourselves
me, the other is above all one for whom I in the best of worlds. (Waldenfels, 2015,
am responsible.” Egology is the legacy re- p. 209)
ceived from Western philosophy in which
“not just theoretical thinking, but all There are situations in which it is
spontaneous movement of the conscience not possible to turn to established moral
again appears to be directed at such a re- codes, and a response becomes urgent.
turn to itself” (Levinas, 1998, p. 50). These are the dark areas or new frontiers
of morality. “One of these ‘dark areas’ or
Ethics is the response to the demand new frontiers of morality is the situation
formulated by the injured man by the of migrants adrift in the Mediterranean
side of the road from Jerusalem to Jer- Sea who seek help in a host country but
icho. Its attention is not focussed on the are turned away by laws passed in the
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
idea of obeying the law (morals), but on countries they hope to reach” (Ortega &
the need to help the other, to take care Romero, 2019, p. 193). Material ethics
of it (ethics). From this ethical focus, makes the situation of the other its own
the human being becomes somebody and responds with help and welcome,
revista española de pedagogía
who moves us, who interpellates us. Re- above or against the established moral
sponsibility in the response is framed in codes. This responsible answer derives
a circumstance, in a specific time and from the experience of need of the other,
space, not in an ideal world without of concern for the fate of the other who
context; the demand of the other that appears before me without prior warn-
calls on us to act by not obeying the law ing. The clearest example of the distinc-
or the norm does not go unanswered. tion between ethics and morals is the
Sometimes, the response to the other is ur- passage from the Gospel according to
gent and does not fit the mould of the estab- Luke (10, pp. 30-35). Ethical behaviour
lished moral codes. This is what Walden- is represented by the Samaritan, moral
fels calls the “dark stain” of morals. behaviour by the priest and the Levite.
We encounter new frontiers when we The ethical response in Levinas is
subject to our consideration the criteria not born from a reflection on the dignity
that underlie the judgement of actions. of the human being and the consequent
240 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
obligation to act in accordance with this whether we have acted in accordance with
principle. Instead, it is an unwavering re- the needs of the other, if we have been suf-
sponse to a specific situation of the other ficiently responsible. In the ethical rela-
who demands our help and care. For the tionship we are always accompanied by
Lithuanian thinker, ethics are not born the restlessness of conscience about the
from a reflection on the dignity of the per- unfulfilled duty. The human being does
son. They are not born from reason, nor not have a fixed homeland nor a firm eth-
from universal and abstract principles, ical ground to tread. It lives provisional-
but rather from the absolute command ly, in uncertainty. This is the precarious
of the “nakedness” of the vulnerable face baggage with which it must confront the
of the other. It is the face of the “orphan task of living with others. Therefore, in
and of the widow” that “orders” me to re- the ethical relationship with the other
spond to its command. Nobody can respond there cannot be a calm conscience when
for me. It is the other that interpellates faced with the fear of not having been suf-
me and accuses me while I cannot ignore ficiently responsible towards it. If there
the question of its fate. It is the feeling were, this would involve placing limits on
of compassion towards the other, the in- the ethical signification of the other. And
ability to be unconcerned about the other the other, in the signification of its face, is
that precedes any attempt at motivation inexhaustible, it evokes the Infinite: “The
or rational justification. “The face of the face of the other in proximity, more than
other concerns me without the respon- representation, is the unrepresentable
sibility-for-with-other that he orders trace, the mode of the Infinite” (Levinas,
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
allowing me to return to the thematic 2011, p. 185).
presence of a being, which would be the
cause or source of this order. It is not, in For Levinas, “that which is hu-
effect, a case of receiving an order per- man is the return … to the bad con-
revista española de pedagogía
ceiving it first and then obeying it in a science, to its possibility of fearing
decision, in an act of will. The obligation injustice rather than death, of prefer-
to obedience precedes hearing the order ring the injustice suffered to the injus-
in this proximity of the face” (Levinas, tice committed” (2014, p. 38). In Lev-
2014, pp. 40-41). inasian ethics there is no place for compla-
cence with the duty done; we are always
Ethics comprise the response to all that exposed to “shame” thanks to the fear
escapes from the realm of morals; they that we have not responded adequately
enter the “dark areas” of morality, which to the demand of the other in need. From
morals cannot reach, thus transcending Levinasian ethics, “one can never have a
codes of moral behaviour. In this pas- clear conscience. We will never be able to
sage to the dark areas of morality, nothing pass through the gates of heaven, and so
is prescribed or established in advance; it it is not possible to know for sure if we
is necessary to respond from uncertainty have acted well, if we have acted correct-
and unease. Therefore, we will never know ly” (Mèlich, 2010, p. 153).
241 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
4. Another educational model In other words, favouring the creation
Levinasian ethics lead to “an- of an educational ethos or environment
other way of educating,” making that makes it possible “to foster spac-
its own the situation of the other in es for coexistence among the students
need of help and care, “the orphan, themselves, as well as between them
the stranger and the widow,” in Lev- and the teachers, with the aim of cre-
inas’s words. If Levinasian ethics cannot ating positive environments that provide
dispense with their relationship with the for plans for welcoming, rituals of mutu-
other in the “nakedness” of its face, ed- al respect, etc.” (Pallarés, 2020, p. 23).
ucational action also cannot free itself
from the bonds that link it to the other Levinasian ethics are resistant to
as a historical subject. Abstract defence an education that results in planning
of human rights is not, therefore, the concrete guidelines for action. The ed-
starting point in education. Instead it ucator is only permitted to create an
is the concrete situations that surround educational climate in the classroom
the life of each student. It is the experi- that encourages students to put them-
ence of life that marks the framework of selves in the place of the other and wel-
action of education. come it, broadening ethical horizons to
include the “third,” expanding ethical
Ethics, in Levinas, are always an unfore- interest in caring for nature and the
seen and singular response given to the most vulnerable. Developing these at-
other in a specific situation, here and now. titudes does not involve setting guide-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
Any ethical response is always situated, lines for action that can be extrapolated
provisional, singular, and unrepeatable; to other subjects and other contexts, since
it does not form part of our behavioural the ethical response, as the experience of
habits. It is always improvised, in con- each subject, is always original and unre-
revista española de pedagogía
trast with moral behaviour which al- peatable. And experience is a necessary
ways refers to norms or codes of “good part of each educational process.
conduct,” such as: respecting the rules
of the road, paying taxes, rules for liv- This way of understanding ethics
ing together, and so on, behaviour that is calls for “another form of education,”
indispensable for living in a society. The which results in an ethical response to
essential characteristic of the ethical the student in its specific situation. To
response means that it is not appropri- educate is to welcome, to accompany the
ate to refer to a competence that is ac- other in its process of personal construc-
quired or learnt for an ethical response. tion; it is to answer for the other (Ortega,
And so we can only speak of the creation 2010). But each student, in its singular-
of an educational climate that favours ity, sets the pace of this process depend-
the development of feelings of open- ing on its personal characteristics and on
ness to the other, sensitivity towards the contribution of its social and family
the demands of the other (Todd, 2016). setting. Individualising educational pro-
242 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
cesses is an inescapable requirement of them to ourselves. Our life is, inextrica-
education. bly, experience” (Pérez-Guerrero, 2016,
p. 229). Students, in their lived realities,
Cognitive pedagogy has centred on the were just a pretext for transmitting what
learning of knowledge and competences, was previously prescribed. Without ex-
forgetting other essential dimensions of perience, education becomes an activity
the training of the student. The ideal- without meaningful content (Ortega &
ist philosophy that reduces education to Romero, 2021). The subject of education
the development of the “higher” facul- is somebody, and this is inseparable from
ties of the human being is behind this the experience of that person’s life. The
educational model. Feelings are ignored, thread of the life of each student becomes
subordinated to an idealist conception of the basic content of any educational pro-
the human being. Educators’ interests cess. It is not the students’ intelligence or
did not include corporeality as a form skills that must be formulated as a prior-
of existence and human life but instead ity, but also the ethical values that make
they only deposited the knowledge that up the basic architecture of the building
had to be transmitted. Sharon Todd in of the human being and the foundation
her book Learning from the Other (2003) of life in society. Without accepting the
argues that what is important is not so experience of the student as educational
much knowing the other as learning from content, there is discourse alone, and no
it. She focuses on empathy, love, guilt, education. In such a situation, the stu-
and listening in order to underline the dent remains overlooked in the action of
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
complex nature of learning about dif- the teacher. The experience of the stu-
ference and the ethical possibilities of dent is the only space in which teacher
education. To do so she establishes an and student can meet in a dialogue that is
interesting dialogue, not without ten- fruitful for both.
revista española de pedagogía
sion, between the thinking of Emma-
nuel Levinas and that of Sigmund Freud, 4.2. The testimony of the teacher
Melanie Klein, Judith Butler, and Cor- The pedagogy of testimony (Standish,
nelius Castoriadis among others. 2020) aims to transmit an experience of
proximity and reception towards the oth-
This educational model based on Lev- er. It does not set out to show, nor to tell any-
inasian ethics is linked to the creation of one what they must do, only to show an
an educational ethos or classroom environ- experience, to testify to a way of being a
ment, associated with the following focal neighbour (proximate) to the other. Teach-
points for intervention: ers are witnesses to what “is happen-
ing.” They should not hide their respon-
4.1. Experience, meeting space sibility towards the problems that affect
“Our life is not just a series of situa- the community of which they form part.
tions that follow on from one another, Teachers cannot limit themselves to be-
but rather we live our lives recounting ing good professionals, if they want their
243 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
students to be able to critique what is orphan and the widow” of which Levinas
happening in their surroundings. They speaks. This means that educational ac-
must also be witnesses. The story of the tion cannot be confined to knowledge of
experience of healthcare workers during virtue and reflection on human rights
the Covid-19 pandemic could be one very as basic strategies. In moral education,
effective way of conveying the experience from Levinasian ethics, the life experi-
of solidarity with people in need better ence of the other, in its circumstance,
than any discourse on human fraternity; is the starting point, and its reception
or the story of the experience of immi- the end point. Education, if it is such,
grants on their journey to an unknown cannot make the specific situation of
land could help students put themselves each individual into an abstraction in
in the other’s shoes. The story of an ex- order to take refuge in “neutral land.”
perience of suffering and receiving has But “circumstance” is very different in
the force of testimony, it is what inter- each individual. All people, to some ex-
pellates us, what obliges us to think tent, make their situation or context
about “what is happening.” And “it is their own, and it will mould or shape a
not the experience of ideal models drawn particular way of being and living. “In
from legend and literature that becomes education there are no educational pro-
an ethical experience; it is the close ex- cesses or educational languages that are
periences, subject to contradictions, that the same and work for everyone. There
reflect the life of individuals who are is no ‘objective’ world that is the same
also real” (Ortega & Romero, 2021, p. for everyone. This is a world that is nec-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
101, own translation). The authority of essarily interpreted in the way peculiar
educational action lies in its credibility, to each culture. To educate it is essential
in the testimony of someone who dis- that educators emerge from themselves
plays ethical values from the experience and take responsibility for the other in
revista española de pedagogía
of his or her life. Values are learnt or ap- all of its reality, in which the student
propriated by mimesis or imitation, not lives, because ‘until they make a space
through discourse or reasoning. for the other, even at the cost of their
own survival, the ethical significance of
4.3. Attention to the other in its circum- the other will not be real’” (González R.-
stance or context Arnáiz, 2002, p. 89).
Educating demands acceptance of all
of the human, all of what envelops the 4.4. Elaborating on the meaning of re-
life of the other. We do not educate im- sponsibility
aginary beings, but rather individuals The discovery of my responsibility
who live in a context that shapes them in before the other and the others. It is
their essence. We are circumstance. But not my future as an individual that is in
the human being that we know by expe- play; the fate of the other and of the oth-
rience is the corporeal being, vulnerable, ers with me is also in my fate. “My life is
in need of compassion, the “stranger, the implicated in other lives. My life is not
244 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
completely mine. We come into the world connection and service” (Martín et
needing hospitality and this vulnerable al., 2019, p. 58). The school should
condition cannot be avoided, it cannot be make space for the culture of dona-
overcome” (Butler, 2006, p. 44). Bringing tion. Coexistence in society is very
experiences of suffering caused by hun- difficult or impossible without rela-
ger and wars into the classroom makes tionships of freely-given trust, coop-
it possible for the world of pain to come eration, and care and attention for the
close to the lives of students, making other. A society built only on the struc-
them sensitive to another frequently for- tures of justice would be uninhabitable, in-
gotten reality; bringing the experience human. Interhuman relations based on sol-
of suffering of immigrants and prison- idarity and giving-freely, on the culture
ers into the classroom can help students of donation as a form of living, are neces-
see them with other eyes, fostering the sary. “There is no society without dona-
help and welcoming that make us regard tion, and there is no education without
them as others that belong to us. This understanding the donation by educa-
is a means of breaking down the walls – tors and the capacity to give of students”
sometimes insurmountable – that school (Martín et al., 2019, p. 14). But for there
has built, isolating itself from the reality to be a donation, there must not be any
of life. Beyond my interests and needs payment or recognition of the gift re-
there is a “third” that also reclaims ceived (Derrida, 1995). “The gift always
what belongs to it. It is the sense of be- resides in gratuity and even in the lack
longing to a community that is linked of reason” (Mèlich, 2021, p. 125). Educa-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
to the awareness of my responsibil- tors should take the experience of dona-
ity towards others and of the others. tion as common behaviour in society and
This is how to face up to a society of iso- in places of educational into the class-
lated individuals in an atomised society. room; they should help students name
revista española de pedagogía
The other forms part of me as question the behaviour of solidarity and fraterni-
and answer. ty that make society more human. It is
ethical experiences in “normal” people
4.5. A pedagogy of donation that bring values within our reach, and
Turning classrooms into spaces for en- help us to appreciate and imitate them.
counter and disinterested help, in contrast
with teaching centred on training individ-
uals to compete, acritically and detached 5. Final considerations
or indifferent to the good of the commu- The educational theorists who have
nity. “Human education has more to do considered the work of Levinas emphasise
with contributing to different chains of his importance for rethinking education-
altruism than with the solitary conquest al theory and praxis (Lee, 2019; Matanky,
of autonomy. … Pedagogy should direct it- 2018; Biesta, 2010; Ortega, 2016). All of
self towards processes of mutual help and them underline the originality of his think-
contribution to the community through ing and the need to elaborate another
245 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
educational discourse and praxis centred I do? Its reference point is the rule, the
on the singularity of each subject, in its duty that must be fulfilled. For Levinas,
circumstance, and converting educational the question is another very different
action into an action of receiving and car- one: who is my neighbour? The referent
ing for the other (Ortega, 2016). They also is not the rule, but the other in its con-
underline the role of educators as credible crete situation. A different ethics neces-
sources of what they transmit, and their sarily leads to an educational praxis that
responsibility for creating an education- is also different. In this work, we might
al climate that favours ethical behaviour. be expected to offer concrete strategies
“Like Seneca, educators believe in what or guidelines for educational action that
they teach, they express it in their behav- are already set in advance, as cogni-
iour, and if they use rhetorical techne it is tive pedagogy does in moral education.
so that the uttered truth forms the being Levinasian ethics do not contain a de-
of the listener” (Santos, 2013, p. 482). tailed programme, fixed in time, because
the ethical response is always given to the
Levinasian ethics do not turn to argu- unforeseen demand of the other. And the
ments based on reason to prescribe partic- response is always linked to a unique, sin-
ular types of behaviour. It is not re- gular situation. It is not, therefore, possi-
flection based on discussion that ble to plan actions that prepare the indi-
leads us to receive the other. Instead, vidual for an ethical response. It is only
it is the ethical authority of the oth- possible to create an educational climate
er that pulls us out of our indiffer- that favours openness to the other, sen-
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
ence towards the other, from the con- sitivity to the other in its situation. This
fines of our “I”. Compared with the mor- is what makes the ethics of Levinas great
al world of Kantian ethics, which are and of value. The educational model pro-
predetermined, Levinasian ethics devel- posed, starting from Levinas, takes the
revista española de pedagogía
op in uncertainty, in provisionality like limitation and contingency of the human
the human being itself. Nothing is defin- being from its structural need as its start-
itively conquered; we are obliged to in- ing point, and compassionate reception as
vent ethical responses, because the ones its end point.
already given only respond to the need of
the other in a concrete, singular, and un- Moral education, founded on Levinasian
repeatable situation. Therefore, ethical ethics, can serve to humanise the school and
competence is not possible. There will society. Being attentive to the other, listen-
always be an unbridgeable gap between ing to it and welcoming it, accompanying it
the need of the other and the ethical re- in the adventure of the construction of its
sponse given. life project is an essential task of schools.
Ethics in Kant and in Levinas differs This entails … helping, from one’s own
substantially in their starting point. For uncertainty and testimony, the other to
Kant the ethical question is: what should follow its own path without any certainty
246 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
González Rodríguez Arnáiz, G. (2002). La intercul-
of reaching the destination it seeks. It in-
turalidad como categoría moral [Interculturali-
volves letting go of some ‘certainties’ that ty as a moral category]. In G. González Rodrí-
have accompanied us for too long and have guez Arnáiz (Coord.), El discurso intercultural.
made education an in-significant task, dis- Prolegómenos a una filosofía intercultural (pp.
77-106). Biblioteca Nueva.
tanced from the life of each student (Orte-
Hegel, G. W. (2005). Lecciones sobre la filosofía de
ga & Romero, 2019, p. 166). la historia universal [Lessons on the philosophy
of world history]. Tecnos.
It is necessary to create “another way” Lee, S. (2019). Ethics is an optics: Ethical practi-
of educating that accepts the human reality cality and the exposure of teaching. Journal of
Philosophy of Education, 53 (1), 145-164. ht-
of the student. Education, like ethics, does tps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12314
not contemplate idealised beings, lost in the Levinas, E. (1993). Entre nosotros [Amongst us].
skies of “beautiful ideas,” but specific indi- Pre-Textos.
viduals shaped by their circumstances. “If Levinas, E. (1998). La huella del otro [The other’s
footprint]. Taurus.
being human is an ethical category and not Levinas, E. (2000). Totality and infinity: An essay
just a biological one, learning to be so is the on exteriority. Duquesne University Press.
principal task all humans have throughout Levinas, E. (2008). Nombres propios [Proper
our lives” (Pérez-Guerrero, 2016, p. 238). nouns]. Fundación Enmanuel Mounier.
Levinas, E. (2011). De otro modo que ser o más allá de
la esencia [Other than being or beyond essence].
Ediciones Sígueme.
References Levinas, E. (2014). Alteridad y trascendencia [Alter-
Biesta, G. (2010). Education after the death of the
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
ity and transcendence]. Arena Libros.
subject: Levinas and the Pedagogy of Interrup- Levinas, E. (2015). Ética e infinito [Ethics and infin-
tion. In Leonardo Zeus (Ed.), Handbook of ity]. Edit. Machado.
Cultural Politics and Education. Contexts in Martín, X., Gijón, M., & Puig Rovira, J. M.ª (2019).
Education. Volume 4 (pp. 289-300). Sense Pu- Pedagogía del don. Relación y servicio en edu-
revista española de pedagogía
blishers. cación [Pedagogy of the gift. Relationship and
Butler, J. (2006). Vida precariat [Precarious life]. service in education]. Estudios sobre Educación,
Paidós. 37, 51-68. https://doi.org/10.15581/004.37.51-68
Chinnery, A. (2003). Aesthetics of surrender: Matanky, E. (2018). The temptation of pedagogy:
Levinas and the disruption of agency in Levinas´s educational thought from his philo-
sophical and confesional writings. Journal of
moral education. Studies in Philosophy
Philosophy of Education, 52 (3), 412-427. ht-
and Education, 22 (1), 5-17. https://doi.or-
tps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12302
g/10.1023/A:1021129309618
Mèlich, J. C. (2002). Filosofía de la finitud [Philoso-
Delgado, I. (2010). Perspectiva antropológica de la
phy of finitude]. Herder.
educación. Visión desde la filosofía dialógica y Mèlich, J. C. (2010). Ética de la compasión [Ethics
personalista [Anthropological perspective of of compassion]. Herder.
education. Vision from the dialogic and person- Mèlich, J. C. (2021). La fragilidad del mundo: Ensa-
alist philosophy]. revista española de peda- yo sobre un tiempo precario [The fragility of the
gogía, 68 (247), 479-495. world: Essay on a precarious time.]. Tusquets.
Derrida, J. (1995). Dar (el) tiempo [Give (the) time]. Ortega, P. (2010). Educar es responder a la pregun-
Paidós. ta del otro. Edetania, 37, 13-31.
247 EVPedro ORTEGA RUIZ and Eduardo ROMERO SÁNCHEZ
Ortega, P. (2016). La ética de la compasión en Todd, S. (2016). Education Incarnate. Educational
la pedagogía de la alteridad [The ethics of Practice and Theory, 48 (4), 405-417. http://dx.
compassion in the pedagogy of alterity]. re- doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2015.1041444
vista española de pedagogía, 74 (264), Toumayan, A. (2004). “I More than the Others”: Dos-
243-264. toevsky and Levinas. Yale French Studies, 104,
Ortega, P., & Romero, E. (2019). A la intemperie. 55–66. https://doi.org/10.2307/3182504
Conversaciones desde la pedagogía de la alte- Waldenfels, B. (2015). La ética responsiva entre
ridad [Out in the open. Conversations from the la respuesta y la responsabilidad [Responsive
pedagogy of otherness]. Octaedro. ethics between responsiveness and responsibi-
Ortega, P., & Romero, E. (2021). El valor de la ex- lity]. Apeiron, 3, 205-214.
periencia del alumno como contenido educativo Zamora, J. A. (2004). T. W. Adorno. Pensar contra la
[The value of the student’s experience as edu- barbarie. Trotta.
cational content]. Teoría de la Educación. Re- Zhao, G. (2012). Levinas and the mission of edu-
vista Interuniversitaria, 33 (1), 89-110. https:// cation. Educational Theory, 62 (6), 659-675.
doi.org/10.14201/teri.23615 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/edth.12003
Pagès, A. (2016). Actualidad de la Hermenéutica Zhao, G. (2014). Freedom reconsidered: het-
como Filosofía de la Educación [Actuality of eronomy, open subjectivity, and the ‘gift of
Hermeneutics as Philosophy of Education]. teaching’. Studies in Philosophy and Educa-
revista española de pedagogía, 74 (264), tion, 33 (5), 510-524. https://doi.org/10.1007/
265-281. s11217-013-9401-4
Pallarés, M. (2020). Educación humanizada. Una
aproximación a partir del legado de Heinrich
Rombach [Humanized education. An approach Authors’ biographies
based on the legacy of Heinrich Rombach]. Es- Pedro Ortega Ruiz holds a doctor-
tudios Sobre Educación, 38, 9-27. https://doi. ate in Pedagogy. He has studied pedagogy
org/10.15581/004.38.9-27
at the Università Pontificia Salesiana in
Pérez-Guerrero, J. (2016). Ser humano como tarea.
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
Ideas para una antropología de educación de Rome, the Universidad de Valencia and
inspiración clásica [The human being as a task. the Universidad de Murcia. He is a re-
Ideas for a Classically-inspired anthropology of tired Professor of the Theory and His-
education]. revista española de pedagogía, tory of Education at the Universidad de
74 (264), 227-241.
revista española de pedagogía
Murcia. He is co-author of books like:
Sánchez-Rojo, A. (2019). Pedagogía de la atención
para el siglo xxi: más allá de una perspectiva
La enseñanza de actitudes y valores
psicológica [Pedagogy of attention for the twen- [Teaching attitudes and values] (1986);
ty-first century: beyond a psychological pers- La educación moral del ciudadano de
pective]. revista española de pedagogía, 77 hoy [The moral education of the cit-
(274), 421-436. izen of today] (2001) o A la intemperie. Conv-
Santos, M. (2013). Educación y construcción del Self
ersaciones desde la pedagogía de la alteridad
en la Filosofía Helenística según Michel Fou-
cault [Education and Construction of Self in Hel- [In the open: conversations from the pedago-
lenistic philosophy by Michel Foucault]. revis- gy of otherness] (2019). He holds the Educa-
ta española de pedagogía, 71 (256), 479-492. tion and Values Distinguished Chair at the
Standish, P. (2020). Lines of testimony. Journal of Cetys-Universidad (Mexico) and is director
Philosophy of Education, 54 (2), 319-339. ht-
of REDIPE (the Ibero-American Pedagogy
tps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12413
Todd, S. (2003). Learning from the other: Levinas, Network).
psychoanalysis, and ethical possibilities in edu-
cation. State University of New York Press. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3882-0544
248 EVMoral education from Levinas: Another educational model
Eduardo Romero Sánchez is Profes- social and educational exclusion. He holds
sor in the Department of Theory and His- the Education and Values Distinguished
tory of Education at the Universidad de Chair at the Cetys-Universidad (Mexico).
Murcia. He is a member of the Education He is currently taking part in the Conste-
in Values Research Group and coordinator llations of authoritarianism: memory and
of the Research Area of the Social Exclu- presence of a threat to democracy from a
sion Observatory at the Universidad de philosophical and interdisciplinary pers-
Murcia. His principal academic contribu- pective research project with the Institute
tions focus on the following lines: the phi- of Philosophy of the CSIC (Spain’s natio-
losophical and anthropological dimension nal research council).
of education; Levinasian ethics and the
pedagogy of otherness; and processes of https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5090-0961
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022, 233-249
revista española de pedagogía
249 EV
revista española de pedagogía
año 80, n.º 282, mayo-agosto 2022
Spanish Journal of Pedagogy
year 80, n. 282, May-August 2022
Table of contents
Sumario
Studies Notes
Estudios Notas
Pedro Ortega Ruiz, & Eduardo Romero Sánchez Encarnación Sánchez Lissen
Moral education from Levinas: Another educational model Reasons for an educational pact in Spain within the
La educación moral a partir de Levinas: otro modelo framework of decentralised government administration
educativo 233 Razones para un pacto educativo en España en el marco de una
administración descentralizada 311
Joaquín García Carrasco, & Macarena Donoso González
At the dawn of humanisation: Culture casts a polyhedral Santiago López Navia
shadow, the female gender and teaching practice Rhetoric in teaching and e-learning in university education
Al alba de la humanización: Cultura proyecta sombra de Retórica docente y enseñanza online en la educación
poliedro, género de mujer y práctica de magisterio 251 universitaria 331
Ana Isabel Ponce Gea, & Noelia Sánchez-Pérez Antonio Fernández-Cano, & Alfonso Fernández-
Conceptions underlying the construction of knowledge: Guerrero
A model from history teaching Spanish educational production in the Social Sciences
Concepciones subyacentes a la construcción del conocimiento: Citation Index (2010-2020). III
un modelo desde la didáctica de la historia 269 Producción educativa española en el Social Sciences Citation
Index (2010-2020). III 347
Maximiliano de las Fuentes-Lara, Wendolyn Elizabeth
Aguilar-Salinas, Araceli Celina Justo-López, & César Diego González-Rodríguez, Agustín Rodríguez-
Gonzalo Iñiguez-Monroy Esteban, & Héctor González-Mayorga
Measuring students’ algebra, trigonometry, and Differences in teachers’ training in digital competence
geometry skills on a differential calculus for and its application in the classroom: A comparative
engineering course study by educational levels between Spain and France
Medición de las habilidades algebraicas, trigonométricas Diferencias en la formación del profesorado en competencia
y geométricas de los estudiantes en el curso de cálculo digital y su aplicación en el aula. Estudio comparado por
diferencial en ingeniería 289 niveles educativos entre España y Francia 371You can also read
