Hostile Vehicle Mitigation - Schemes for the Streetscape - HVM Schemes for the Streetscape - CPNI
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PUBLISH DATE: CLASSIFICATION: HVM Schemes for the Streetscape March 2021 Official Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Schemes for the Streetscape
PUBLISH DATE: CLASSIFICATION:
HVM Schemes for the Streetscape March 2021 Official
This document has been developed in collaboration with the Home Office.
Physical Security
Contents
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................3
VEHICLE BORNE THREATS .......................................................................4
STREETSCAPE OPTIONS ...........................................................................8
STANDARDS .............................................................................................9
STREETSCAPE OPTIONS, THE SCHEMES ..................................................11
Option 1 – Total Traffic Exclusion........................................................................... 12
Option 2 - Controlled Traffic Inclusion ................................................................... 13
Option 3 - Footway Protection ............................................................................... 14
Option 4 – Traffic Calming ...................................................................................... 15
Option 5 - Semi-Permanent Protection.................................................................. 16
Option 6 - Temporary Protection ........................................................................... 17
Option 7 - Do Nothing ............................................................................................ 18
ANNEX A - ESSENTIAL READING ..............................................................19
Disclaimer Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
The information contained in this document is accurate as at the date it was created. It is intended as general This information is supplied in confidence to the named reader and may not be disclosed further without prior approval from C PNI. This
guidance only and you should not rely on it. This information should be adapted for use in the specific circumsta nces information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information
required and you should seek specialist independent professional advice where appropriate before taking any action legislation.
based on it. To the fullest extent permitted by law, CPNI accept no liability whatsoever for any loss or damage
incurred or arising as a result of any error or omission in the guidance or arising from any person acting, relying upon
or otherwise using the guidance. Full terms and conditions governing the use of this guidance are available on our
website at www.cpni.gov.uk.
©Crown copyright 2
PUBLISH DATE: CLASSIFICATION:
HVM Schemes for the Streetscape March 2021 Official
Introduction
Terrorism in the UK is and has been at a high level of threat for several years. A common method of attack
used by terrorists is to use a vehicle to cause injury, death and an overall sense of fear. Since 2015, there
have been many dozens of attacks in Europe, including those on Westminster and London Bridges in 2017.
This guidance document centres on Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) schemes that may be deployed in
streets in cities and towns. It illustrates and describes a number of HVM schemes which local authority,
highway planners, urban realm developers, CTSAs and other security professionals should consider when
looking to protect streets other Publicly Accessible Locations (PAL) from vehicle borne threats,
predominantly Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW) attack but also Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIED).
The scheme options described in this guidance are as below:
• Total traffic exclusion
• Controlled vehicle inclusion
• Footway protection
• Traffic calming
• Semi-permanent protection
• Temporary protection
• Do nothing
A well-considered HVM scheme envisioned at the earliest possible stages of a new development or a re-
development project should complement the aesthetic, business and functional needs of the area. The
project should incorporate security planning from the outset and consider how a blend of layered measures
can mitigate the threats of concern, including anti-social behaviour, crime and terrorism. Further design
and security guides are listed in:
• Annex A
• CPNI website.
• National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) website
Over and above its intended purpose, visible and effective operational and physical security can provide
several additional benefits, for example:
• Public reassurance
• Provides peace of mind to people and businesses
• Helps provide a sense of space
• Helps reduce anti-social behaviour
• Improves road safety
• Environmental: reduces noise and pollution
• Lower cost if planned early into urban developments
Understanding how vehicle borne attacks manifest themselves will help you devise HVM schemes,
measures and procedures that help reduce the residual security risk to a level acceptable to the risk
owners. For specific advice on countering Vehicle As a Weapon Attack (VAW) we recommend that
organisations engage with their local Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisor (CTSA) or an Suitably
qualified and experienced security HVM consultant.
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Vehicle borne threats
Terrorists use vehicles in three main ways to enable an attack:
Vehicle As a Weapon (VAW)
A Vehicle As a Weapon attack is the driving of a vehicle:
• at an individual or into crowds of people to cause harm; or
possibly;
• deliberately driving a vehicle into infrastructure to damage or
disrupt its operation. This may indirectly lead to harm to
people or disruption to the operation of a site/event, or more
widely, critical services or supplies.
In the UK, terrorists favour VAW because of its simplicity. They are also encouraged to do so by terrorist
propaganda material produced at both at home and overseas.
The attacks frequently begin on public roads with little or no warning and are often followed by a wider
firearms or bladed weapon attack. The attackers are less likely to drive in a manner that risks ending the
attack prematurely: rendering the vehicle unusable or seriously injuring themselves. Consequently, the
terrorist may tend to avoid obstacles, including relatively insubstantial ones.
The end of a VAW attack may look similar to a road traffic incident: the vehicle losing control and crashing
into barriers, buildings, street furniture or other vehicles. Individuals may approach the vehicle to help the
occupants, inadvertently becoming targets for a follow-on bladed weapon or firearms attacks.
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED)
As the name suggests, VBIEDs contain an explosive device this is the
primary means of causing harm. The explosive device may be visible
or concealed.
An improvised explosive device is either visible or concealed within a
vehicle and transported to target.
The effects from a VBIED detonation include the blast, fireball,
shrapnel and hazardous debris and ground shock.
The blast stand-off (the distance between the device and the asset) is the most important factor in
determining the extent of damage that can be caused. Maximising the blast stand-off distance will reduce
the damage sustained to the asset.
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Layered Attack – Vehicle transporting attackers and / or weapons
A layered attack is a combination of attack types.
The vehicle may:
• facilitate the delivery of armed attackers, either covertly or overtly; or
• be combined with a VBIED or VAW attack;
• or be parked in an area in preparation for one of the above.
Vehicle Accessibility
Vehicles (such as cars, vans and lorries) are widely available and terrorists have previously gained access to
them through a number of means:
• Owned – a vehicle is under the attacker’s possession
• Borrowed – a vehicle is lent by an unwitting or complicit associate
• Leased – a vehicle is hired from a company, using real or fake documentation
• Stolen – a stationary, unattended (locked or keys in ignition) vehicle is taken
• Hijacked – an occupied vehicle, parked inside or outside a protected area, is seized.
Rules of the Road
During a terrorist attack, the driver is unlikely to comply with the rules of the road. They will:
• Traverse over green spaces such as fields, recreational ground, parks
• Park illegally
• Ignore traffic signals
• Drive at speed
• Drive on the wrong side of the road
• Mount footways
• Enter pedestrianised zones.
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Exploiting Security Measures
Terrorists and criminals try and exploit weaknesses in operational and/or physical security
measures, typically using the following:
Parked
A vehicle may be parked close to an asset or inside the perimeter of a site
or event space. The vehicle may be parked legitimately, illegally or without
the land-owner or event organiser’s consent. It may be deliberately parked
repeatedly to create familiarity.
The vehicle may be abandoned or remain occupied for a short or
considerable amount of time prior to the time of attack.
Unsecured parked vehicles within or outside a protected area may be
utilised by the attackers.
Encroachment
A hostile vehicle may be able to exploit gaps in:
• An urban/rural landscape or perimeter protection
• Drive slowly through or over what is perceived to be a perimeter or series
of obstructions
• Closely tailgate a legitimate vehicle through a single layer Vehicle Access
Control Point (VACP)
Penetrative
A vehicle may be used at low or high speed to weaken and/or breach
through security measures.
A penetrative attack could result in an IED detonating in or close to an asset
or a hostile vehicle entering a crowded place. Lower speed attacks
may involve the vehicle being aggressively and repetitively rammed against
security measures or other obstructions to gain access.
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Deception
Trojan Vehicle: The vehicle may be modified to replicate a legitimate vehicle.
The vehicle may look familiar: make and model, registration number, livery.
The occupant(s) of a vehicle may use pretence to gain site access. The
occupants may lie, or use forge/stolen documentation to gain access, use
disguises to appear genuine or try to distract/confuse the security officer(s)
to gain access.
Unknowing mule: a legitimate driver unknowingly delivers a hidden IED,
firearms, weapons and/or attackers into a protected area.
Duress/Coercion
A security officer at a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP), a legitimate
driver or other person could be forced to facilitate hostile access into a site.
They or others known to them may be threatened with violence. They may
be placed under undue influence through mental pressure e.g. bribery or
blackmail.
Insider
A person with legitimate access willingly facilitates an attack by operating
the security measures locally or remotely, managing or issuing access rights
or tampering with the security measures.
Tamper/Sabotage
With the intent of leaving no evidence, this attack facilitates hostile vehicle
access at a later time. This may involve altering, weakening, or disabling a
barrier and/or associated security systems.
An aggressive physical attack to sabotage or destroy the barriers at or just
before may facilitate a fast-moving attack.
This may be a physical or cyber-attack that occurs gradually over time or
immediately before an attack.
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Streetscape Options
The HVM schemes illustrated on this page, provide options for the streetscape, to counter Vehicle As a
Weapon attack. There are no right or wrong HVM schemes as the needs of the local community, be they
private residents or businesses need to be factored in when considering the security options.
The images on this page show relative risks between the schemes where rated vehicle security barriers
have been installed. Each scheme has its merits in regard to meeting the community needs and the
robustness of the security they provide. These points are discussed further in a later chapter.
The relative residual risk illustrated in red, amber and green (green being the lowest) are broad judgements
on the security effect of each scheme when you factor in the additional operational environment risks.
The two schemes where the residual risks are not judgments are:
- Total Traffic Exclusion, where vehicles are not allowed access at any time, and;
- Do Nothing, where no effective measures are installed.
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Standards
A vehicle travelling at speed will carry a large amount of kinetic energy.
Speed is the dominant factor in the Kinetic Energy formula and hence
anything that can be done to physically slow a threat vehicle will help save
lives.
Obstructions that force a driver to swerve to avoid them can reduce the
vehicle speed. Installing robust physical measures to create a chicane is the
most effective means of forcing the vehicle to reduce speed.
To stop a fast-moving hostile vehicle in a very
short distance, the only guaranteed way to
achieve that is to install vehicle security barriers
(VSB).
Conventional street furniture, highway barriers
and security barriers are not, by default, suitable
for use against terrorist threats as they may not
provide adequate protection over and above a
possible deterrence.
CPNI recommend that a barrier deployed for the purposes of countering terrorism to protect assets
against vehicle-borne threats should be a ‘Rated Vehicle Security Barrier’ that has undergone formal
vehicle impact testing:
The testing should:
✓ be conducted to a recognised vehicle impact test standard
✓ be performed at an independent test house
✓ achieve a performance rating in accordance with the chosen standard
Due diligence in the selection and procurement of vehicle security barriers is
strongly recommended.
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Vehicle security barriers come in many shapes, sizes and forms, so
it’s important to explore the options available.
Over the last 20 years street furniture and barrier manufacturers have developed a large range of barriers
capable of stopping threat vehicles, including:
Street furniture such as:
• Bus stops
• Bicycle racks
• Planters
• Benches and seating
• Information signs
• Bins
• Lighting and sign columns
Temporary and permanent vehicle security barriers such as:
• Bollards
• Blockers
• Gates
• Rising arm and swing arm barriers
• Wire rope systems
• Fences
Architectural features such as
• Bunds and ditches
• Walls and upstands
• Large statement features such as signs, statues, or art installations.
Details of these products can be found at:
• CPNI HVM – Impact Rated List
• CPNI HVM – Delay Rated List
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Streetscape Options, The Schemes
Design and operational residual risks
This section covers the various risk-based HVM schemes which should be considered when looking at
protecting street spaces. The schemes include:
• Total traffic exclusion (No vehicle allowed)
• Controlled vehicle inclusion (Some vehicles allowed)
• Footway protection (Pedestrian on the pavement)
• Traffic calming (Shared space)
• Semi-permanent protection (Permanent barriers occasionally closed)
• Temporary protection (Short term deployment of portable barriers)
• Do nothing (no protection)
For each scheme an example street is illustrated with the footway and
carriageway coloured red, amber, green to illustrate the relative
residual operational and physical security risks when considering;
- The Vehicle As a Weapon Threat, and;
- The 7 exploits terrorists may use to breach a perimeter.
It is essential that local authorities seek specialist advice from:
- Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSA)
- RSES HVM specialists
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Option 1 – Total Traffic Exclusion
Total Traffic Exclusion (permanent road closure) can be created using permanent passive vehicle security
barriers (barriers that do not move) at all routes leading into the protected area. It is pedestrian permeable
and prevents passenger cars, vans and lorries from entering.
Of the 7 schemes presented this one carries the lowest risk to Vehicle As a Weapon Attack and also
maximises blast stand-off distance.
It is an ambitious scheme requiring alternative negotiated traffic management plans, particularly for;
- deliveries,
- transport partners,
- community and business,
- service and works and
- emergency services.
Such plans might involve moving parking spaces, bus stops and taxi ranks, creating delivery drop off points,
park and ride schemes or consolidating delivery arrangements.
By excluding traffic permanently, other benefits beyond just the security enhancements may present
themselves, including:
• Increased use of space.
• Pedestrian safety is maximised.
• Noise and air pollution are reduced, particularly for those wishing to create low traffic
neighbourhoods, urban greening or outdoor hospitality.
• Improved sense of space and wellbeing.
• Reduced crime rate and anti-social behaviour.
• No operational overlay required to manage vehicle access and security
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Option 2 - Controlled Traffic Inclusion
Controlled traffic inclusion, where vehicles are permitted into the space in a controlled manner helps
balance the needs of the community and businesses with the security requirements.
Traffic is granted access via active barriers at one or more
Vehicle Access Control Points (VACP) and typically through:
• Scheduled access at times of low risk (i.e. fewer crowds),
where the barriers are opened for a period of time
during the day or week.
• Vehicle entry by exception, where the barriers are only
opened for or by authorised vehicle / occupants.
This option relies heavily on effective control of access planning and arrangements to maintain security,
such as;
• Authorised access lists or electronic access rights.
• Verifying and screening of vehicle and occupants.
• Assurance regarding vehicle search regime.
• Training and diligence of the barrier operators.
• The physical security of the vehicle security barrier.
• Service & planned preventative maintenance.
Designed correctly, many of the benefits of Option 1 can be
realised, however, the capital costs are higher as are the
long-term management and resource requirements.
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Option 3 - Footway Protection
Footway protection involves installing passive vehicle security barriers down the entire length of the
footways. It provides a high level of protection to people on the footway whilst allowing the carriageway
to remain open.
In comparison to options 1 and 2, it does not maximise VBIED blast stand-off distance, but does permanently
enforce it.
Pedestrians in the carriageway will remain vulnerable to road traffic collisions and therefore VAW attack.
The scheme doesn’t provide the same level of environmental benefits as Options 1 and 2 but will provide a
sense of safety and security for those on the protected side of the barriers.
The scheme has a very high capital costs and often conflicts with existing underground items such as tree
roots, utilities and structures.
Typical operational costs are minimal beyond cosmetic repairs to the measures.
Vehicle access beyond the barrier line, say into a hotel or business is possible through active security barriers
or by closing off the footway at those entry points.
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Option 4 – Traffic Calming
This scheme takes some of the benefits of option 2 and 3 and creating a mixed-use / partly shared space.
It lends itself to more sympathetic architectural and landscape design and the deployment of dual use
measures such as street furniture with integrated vehicle security barriers. It can also assist in delivering
low traffic neighbourhoods and urban greening.
The main principle of this scheme is to enforce traffic calming through the deployment of robust vehicle
security barriers. In essence, preventing high vehicle speeds.
CPNI recommends vehicle speeds no higher than 20mph.
Traffic calming measures such as chicanes require the vehicle to move horizontally to negotiate through the
measures. In doing so vehicle speed can be reduced.
Note: Vertical deflections such as speed bump only slow vehicles driven by consensual drivers.
The measures deployed down the length of the street will not necessarily have to have a high vehicle impact
rating as the vehicle speeds will be lowered. This offers the opportunity to use a wider suite of smaller
measures that may not require large or deep foundations, thus minimising the risk of clashes with sub-service
structures or services.
This solution relies on horizontal deflections to impose low vehicle speeds, in doing so the chicanes might be
tight, requiring an alternative legitimate vehicle access plan. For example, larger goods, service or public
transport vehicles may need to use alternative routes or smaller vehicles used to service this area. A Swept
Path Analysis together with a Vehicle Dynamics Assessment will help establish the design of the chicanes.
Typical operational costs are minimal beyond cosmetic repairs to the measures or service and maintenance
of the dual use street furniture (e.g. benches, planters, information signs)
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Option 5 - Semi-Permanent Protection
Semi-permanent protection involves installing permanent vehicle security barriers that are then only
deployed or closed when there is a planned event, for example, socketed foundations where bollards can be
inserted by hand or swing gates that can be closed.
For regular events that are planned to take place over several years, this scheme provides a cost-effective
alternative to repeatedly deploying temporary barriers. Additionally, they are likely to provide a higher
level of protection against vehicle impact because of their connections to the ground.
The protection is available at any time for events whilst leaving the streetscape open at all other times for
business-as-usual.
This scheme allows for temporary traffic
exclusion and traffic inclusion during the event
period, though risk increases when the barriers
are being operated. The illustration above and to
the right shows amber coloured vehicles to
remind readers that unless the vehicle, occupants
and cargo area are adequately searched and
screened then risk remains.
Consideration should be given to how the active
VSBs are to be operated, by who and whether they are adequately trained and security vetted.
Semi-permanent manually operated barriers require very little maintenance and will be more reliable than
powered barrier systems. They are not suitable for high traffic volumes as they often have to be moved by
hand.
This solution can have similar capital costs to Option 1 (permanent traffic exclusion), though operational
costs are significantly lower than option 2 (controlled traffic inclusion).
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Option 6 - Temporary Protection
The temporary deployment of vehicle security barriers is often done for pre-planned events or an increase
in threat level.
Temporary vehicle security barriers are generally heavy free-standing systems that rely on their mass or
multi-linked units to resist vehicle impact. Some are potentially vulnerable to being slowly pushed or rammed
out of the way by a vehicle. The also move when impacted by a high-speed vehicle and this should be
factored in when deploying them.
Lighter modular Vehicle Security Barriers are also available. These allow greater vehicle penetration and
should also be manned when deployed to avoid them being moved.
All temporary barrier should be inspected regularly to ensure they have not been tampered with.
The amber area in the image illustrates how far a temporary array of VSBs may move if impacted by a
threat equivalent to its vehicle impact test.
A wide range of temporary vehicle security barriers can be purchased or leased from suppliers. If the
deployment is for a long period of time, then it may be more cost effective to purchase the units.
Traffic management plans will need to be produced for each deployment.
Each deployment will need to be planned and road closures put in place during the installation and
recovery stage.
Consideration should be given to how the active VSBs are to be operated, by who and whether they are
adequately trained and security vetted.
Equally, a good procurement strategy will be needed and planning for each deployment, the storage and the
maintenance of the barriers.
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Option 7 - Do Nothing
In this option, no vehicle security barriers are installed, and hence carries the highest residual risk.
Protection in the street will be reliant on the possible visual deterrent effect and the robustness of non-
impact rated street furniture, trees or other obstructions.
The risk is high throughout the street.
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Annex A - Essential Reading
This document supplements other guidance on the design, safety and security of public spaces.
National Design Guide.
National Design Code.
National Planning Policy Framework
Building Better, Building Beautiful Commission: government response to
the ‘Living with Beauty’ report
Department for Transport, Manual for Streets.
Inclusive mobility and Tactile Paving Guide
Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI)
British Business Improvement District (BIDs)
Association of Town and City Managers
New London Architect
Landscape Institute
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation
A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation.
National Counter Terrorism Security Office website.
Designing Out Crime, A designers’ guide.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design.
Designing Out Crime website.
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